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03 - The Republic - Plato · The Philosophy Insights Collection

• Book one, Part three. You argue, like an informer Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken, or that he who errs an arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake. In respect of the mistake, true, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake. But this is only a way of speaking, For the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies. They none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist, or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies, though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is honoring, and being honoring, always commands that which is for his own interest, and the subject is required to execute his commands. And therefore, as I said at first, and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger. Indeed, Thrasimachus, And do I really appear to you to argue like an informer? Certainly, he replied. And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you in the argument? Nay, he replied. Suppose is not the word. I know it, But you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail. I shall not make the attempt, my dear man, but to avoid any misunderstanding occurring between us in future, let me ask in what sense do you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it is just that the inferior should execute. Is he a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term, in the strictest of all senses? He said? And now cheat and play the informer if you can. I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able never. And do you imagine I said that I am such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasimachus, I might as well shave a lion. Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed. Enough, I said, of these civilities, it will be better that I should ask you a question. Is the physician, taking in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician, a healer of the sick? He replied. And the pilot, that is to say, the true pilot, is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor? A captain of sailors, the circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account. Neither is he to be called a sailor. The name pilot by which he is distinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill and of his authority over the sailors. Very true, he said, Now, I said, every art has an interest, certainly, for which the art has to consider and provide. Yes, that is the aim of art, And the interest of any art is the perfection of it, this and nothing else. What do you mean? I mean, what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self sufficing, or has wants, I should reply, certainly, the body has wants, for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests through which the art of medicine ministers. And this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right? Quite right? He replied, But is the art of medicine or any other art, faulty or deficient in any quality, in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight, or the ear fail of hearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of seeing and hearing. Has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to defect? And does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end Or have the arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another. Having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other. They have only to consider the interest of their subject matter. For every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true, that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right. Yes, clearly, then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body, true, he said. Nor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of horsemanship, but the interests of the horse. Neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs. They care only for that which is the subject of their art. True, he said, But surely, Thrasimachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects. To this he assented, with a good deal of reluctance. Then I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interests of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker. He made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced. Then I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient. For the true physician is also a ruler, having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere money maker. That has been admits, Yes, and the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors, and not a mere sailor that has been admitted. And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest. He gave a reluctant yes. Then I said, Thrasimachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject, or suitable to his art, to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does. When we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw that the definition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasimachus, instead of replying to me, said, tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse. Why do you ask such a question? I said, when you ought rather to be answering. Because she leaves you to snivel and never wipes your nose. She has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep. What makes you say that, I replied, because you fancy that the shepherd or neat herd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good, and not to the good of himself or his master. And you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh no, and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust, as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good, that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant. And injustice the opposite. For the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just. He is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts. Whenever the unjust is the partner of the just, you will find that when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the state, when there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income. And when there is anything to be received, the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take in office. There is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public because he is just. Moreover, he is hated by his friends and acquaintances for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking as before of injustice on a large scale, in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent, and by meaning will be most clearly seen. If we turn to that highest form of injustice, in which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers, or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable. That is to say, tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little, but wholesale, comprehending in one things sacred as well as profane, private and public, for which acts of wrong. If he were detected perpetrating any one of them singing, he would be punished and incur a great disgrace. They who do such wrong, in particular cases, are called robbers of temples and man stealers, and burglars, and swindlers and thieves. But when a man, besides taking away the money of the citizens, has made slaves of them, then instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens, but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For man kind censure injustice fearing that they may be the victims of it, and not because they shrink from committing it. And Thus, as I have shown Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice. And as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest. Thrasimachus, when he had thus spoken, having like a bathman, deluged our eyes with his words, had a mind to go away, But the company would not let him. They insisted that he should remain and defend his position. And I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasimachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are your remarks? And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life so small a matter in your eyes? To determine how life may be passed by each of us to the greatest advantage. And do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry, You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, Thrasimachus. Whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself. We are a large party, and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part, I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice, either by fraud or force. Still, this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice. And there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong. If so, you, in your wisdom, should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice. And how am I to convince you? He said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said, what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls heaven forbid? I said, I would only ask you to be consistent, or if you change, change openly, and let there be no deception. For I must remark Thrasimachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd. You thought that the shepherd, as a shepherd, tends the sheep, not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banqueter, with a view to the pleasures of the table, or again as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet, surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects. He has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already insured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And and that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects. Whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being an authority. Think nay, I am sure of it. Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others. Let me ask you a question. Are not the several arts different by reason of their each having a separate function? And my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think that we may make a little progress? Yes, that is the difference, he replied, And which art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one? Medicine for example, gives us health, navigation, safety at sea, and so on. Yes, he said, And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay. But we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least, if we are to adopt your exact use of language. Certainly not. Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay, you would not say that the art of payment is medicine. I should not. Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing. Certainly not. And we have admitted I said that the good of each art is specially confined to the art. Yes, then if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use. True, he replied, And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay, the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him. He gave a reluctant assent to this. Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them, which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside. But the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well, I suppose not. But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing? Certainly he confers a benefit. Then, now, Thrasamacus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests. But as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects, who are the weaker and not the stronger. To their good they attend, and not to the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasimacus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without remuneration for in the execution of his work and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard him his own interest, but always that of his subjects. And therefore, in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money or honor, or a penalty for refusing. What do you mean, Socrates, said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, But what the penalty is I do not understand or how a penalty can be a payment. You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment, which, to the best men is the great inducement to rule. Of course, you know that ambition and avarice are held to be as indeed, they are a disgrace, very true, and for this reason I said, money and honor have no attraction for them. Good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves and not being ambitious. They do not care about honor. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office instead of waiting to be compelled has been deemed dishonorable. Now, the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help, not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is. At present. Then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects. And every one who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Frasimachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. The latter question need not be further discussed at present. But when Vresimachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life? Glaucon, do you prefer, I, for my part, deem, the life of the just to be the more advantageous? He answered? Did you hear all of the advantages of the unjust which Thrasimachus was rehearsing? Yes, I heard him, he replied, But he has not convinced me. Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him if we can that he is saying what is not true? Most certainly, he replied, If I said, he makes a set speech, and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers, and we rejoin. There must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, And in the end we shall want judges to decide but if we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons. Very good, he said, And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said, that which you propose. End of Book one, Part three,