Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / Regime Change, Cyberwar & the Nuclear Program | Part 4/5 | Epic Fury Series
Transcript
- 0:16The Cold War ended in 1991. The Soviet Union dissolved the
- 0:22strategic framework that had justified 26 years of American
- 0:25support for the Shah, 2 decades of covert backing for Savik, and
- 0:29a decade of contradictory covert warfare with the Islamic
- 0:32Republic. That entire framework was gone
- 0:35overnight. For a brief and fragile moment,
- 0:38there was a genuine question about whether the relationship
- 0:40between Washington and Tehran might be reset, whether the
- 0:44accumulated grievances and betrayals of four decades might,
- 0:47in the new environment, be set aside in favor of something less
- 0:51corrosive. That moment passed quickly.
- 0:54The 1990s open with the United States and Iran on opposite
- 0:58sides of almost every significant question in the
- 1:00Middle East, and they would remain there for the 35 years
- 1:03that followed until the question of Iran's nuclear program
- 1:06finally produced the conflict that this podcast covers.
- 1:09This is episode 4 of the CIA and Iran bonus series Regime Change,
- 1:15Cyber War, and the Nuclear File. To understand the CIA's role in
- 1:19the events that led to Operation Epic Fury, you have to trace 3
- 1:22interlocking threads through the post Cold War decades.
- 1:26The first is the covert action program, the regime change
- 1:29efforts, the support for opposition groups, and the
- 1:32intelligence operations that ran throughout the 1990s and 2000's.
- 1:36The second is the Cyber War, specifically the development and
- 1:39deployment of Stuxnet, the most consequential covert operation
- 1:43the CIA and its Israeli partners ever conducted against Iran.
- 1:47And the third is the nuclear file, the intelligence
- 1:50collection, the diplomatic engagement, and ultimately the
- 1:53collapse of diplomacy that preceded the decision to use
- 1:56military force. These 3 threads run alongside
- 1:59each other, intersect repeatedly, and ultimately
- 2:02converge in the opening strikes of February 2026.
- 2:06The Gulf War of 1991, which saw an American LED coalition Dr.
- 2:10Saddam Hussein's forces out of Kuwait, left Iran in an
- 2:14uncomfortable strategic position.
- 2:16The country was relieved that it's wartime enemy had been
- 2:19humiliated and weakened, but alarmed by the overwhelming
- 2:22demonstration of American military power now permanently
- 2:25stationed on its western doorstep.
- 2:27The George HW Bush administration made no serious
- 2:30overtures to Tehran in the war's aftermath, and the Islamic
- 2:34Republic Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had succeeded
- 2:37Khomeini in June 1989, showed no inclination to offer any.
- 2:41The brief window that might have existed for a post Cold War
- 2:44reset was not opened by either side.
- 2:47Iran had actually played a quietly constructive role during
- 2:50the Gulf War itself, remaining neutral and refusing to allow
- 2:53Saddam Hussein to use Iranian territory or airspace.
- 2:57Several Iraqi aircraft that fled into Iran during the conflict
- 3:00were retained by the Iranians rather than returned, a small
- 3:04but pointed signal that Tehran was not going to help its former
- 3:07enemy escape the consequences of his invasion of Kuwait.
- 3:10None of those gestures translated into any diplomatic
- 3:13engagement. The pattern of missed
- 3:15opportunities that had characterized the US Iran
- 3:18relationship since 1979 continued without interruption.
- 3:22The Clinton administration, which took office in January
- 3:251993, articulated a policy it called dual containment,
- 3:29simultaneously restraining both Iraq and Iran through sanctions,
- 3:33diplomatic isolation, and COVID pressure.
- 3:36For Iran, dual containment meant comprehensive economic
- 3:40sanctions, active American opposition to Iranian
- 3:42participation in regional diplomacy, and ACIA covert
- 3:46action program that was expanded through a series of presidential
- 3:49findings signed in the mid 1990s.
- 3:52Those findings reportedly authorized operations designed
- 3:55to destabilize the regime, disrupt Iranian weapons
- 3:58procurement networks, and develop intelligence assets
- 4:01inside the country that could provide warning of potential
- 4:04Iranian aggression against American interests or allies.
- 4:07The most significant and most controversial element of the
- 4:10CIA's Iran program in the 1990s was its relationship with Emoji
- 4:14Hidden E Calc known as the MEK. The MEK's history is one of the
- 4:19more morally complicated chapters in the story of Iranian
- 4:22opposition politics. Founded in the 1960s as a
- 4:26leftist Islamist organization, it had been a significant force
- 4:30in the revolutionary period before its relationship with
- 4:32Khomeini broke down. Catastrophically driven out of
- 4:36Iran, it established itself in Iraq under Saddam Hussein's
- 4:39direct patronage, fighting alongside Iraqi forces against
- 4:43Iran during the Iran Iraq War, an act that permanently
- 4:46discredited the organization with a large portion of the
- 4:48Iranian population. Through the 1980s and 1990s, it
- 4:53carried out bombings and assassinations inside Iran that
- 4:56killed hundreds of people, including civilians. the United
- 4:59States designated the MEK as a foreign Terrorist Organization
- 5:03in 1997. That designation did not prevent
- 5:07elements of the American National security apparatus from
- 5:10finding the organization useful. By the late 1990s and early
- 5:142000's, the MEK had developed substantial intelligence
- 5:17networks inside Iran, networks producing information about the
- 5:21nuclear program that was not available through other means.
- 5:24The precise nature of the relationship between American
- 5:27intelligence and the MEK during this period remains partly
- 5:31classified. What is documented is that in
- 5:33August 2002, the MEK held a press conference in Washington
- 5:37at which it revealed the existence of two previously
- 5:40unknown Iranian nuclear facilities, the uranium
- 5:43enrichment plant at Natans and a heavy water production facility
- 5:46at Iraq. That revelation was a pivotal
- 5:49moment. The intelligence behind it had
- 5:52been available to American and Israeli services before the MEK
- 5:56went public. The timing, made public in
- 5:59August 2002, precisely as the Bush administration was building
- 6:03its political case for confrontation with the axis of
- 6:05evil, was not accidental. The exposure of Natanz in Iraq
- 6:10confronted the International Atomic Energy Agency with
- 6:13evidence it could not ignore, placed Iran's clandestine
- 6:16nuclear activities on the international agenda in an
- 6:18irreversible way, and set in motion the chain of events they
- 6:22investigations, European diplomatic efforts, Security
- 6:26Council referrals, multilateral sanctions, and ultimately the
- 6:29negotiations. And their collapse that ended
- 6:32with the bombs of February 2026 is also worth noting.
- 6:36What the Mek's role in this disclosure tells us about the
- 6:39methods the CIA's Iran program had settled into.
- 6:42By the early 2000's, the agency was using a designated foreign
- 6:46Terrorist Organization as an intelligence asset and a vehicle
- 6:50for public disclosure. That arrangement, outsourcing
- 6:53sensitive intelligence revelations to a proxy that
- 6:56could provide deniability, was entirely consistent with the
- 6:59broader pattern of covert action that had characterized American
- 7:02policy toward Iran since 1953. The Natan's revelation of 2002
- 7:07is, in a real sense, the beginning of the final chapter
- 7:11of the CIA's history with Iran. The broader context of the early
- 7:142000s reshaped the CIA's Iran program in ways that were not
- 7:18always productive. The September 11th attacks in
- 7:212001 consumed the attention and resources of the American
- 7:25intelligence community in ways that had both direct and
- 7:28indirect consequences for the Iran file.
- 7:30Iran, which had quietly cooperated with the United
- 7:33States in the initial phase of the Afghan campaign, sharing
- 7:36intelligence about the Taliban and facilitating the political
- 7:39arrangements that produced the Karzai government, found that
- 7:42cooperation rewarded in January 2002 when President Bush
- 7:46included Iran in his Axis of Evil designation alongside Iraq
- 7:49and North Korea. Iranian officials who had been
- 7:52involved in the behind the scenes cooperation with the
- 7:54United States on Afghanistan described the Axis of Evil
- 7:58speech as a deeply demoralizing and strategically damaging
- 8:01moment. It told them that even
- 8:03substantive cooperation on issues of genuine shared
- 8:06interest produced no diplomatic dividend.
- 8:09It strengthened the argument of hardliners inside the Iranian
- 8:12system who had been saying all along that any cooperation with
- 8:15America was naive and dangerous. And it made the reformist
- 8:19government of President Khatami, which had been cautiously
- 8:21exploring the possibility of a broader diplomatic opening with
- 8:25the West, look politically foolish for having tried.
- 8:28The Bush administration debated through 2002 and 2003 whether
- 8:33Iran should follow Iraq as the next target of American military
- 8:36action. Those debates were ultimately
- 8:39resolved by the reality that the Iraqi insurgency was consuming
- 8:42military and political capacity at a rate that made a second
- 8:45major regional war unrealistic in the near term.
- 8:49But the covert action program against Iran was significantly
- 8:52expanded. Special Operations forces
- 8:55conducted reconnaissance missions inside Iranian
- 8:58territory, identifying potential military targets.
- 9:01The agency worked to develop and expand networks of human
- 9:05intelligence sources inside the country.
- 9:07The most consequential covert operation of this entire period,
- 9:11arguably the most significant single covert action in the CI
- 9:14as history since Operation Ajax in 1953, was the development and
- 9:19deployment of a cyber weapon against Iran's nuclear
- 9:21infrastructure. The program was given the code
- 9:24name Olympic Games. The weapon it produced became
- 9:27known to the world as Stuxnet. The origins of Olympic Games lie
- 9:31in the Bush administration, which authorized the program in
- 9:34approximately 2006 in close cooperation with Israel's Unit
- 9:388200, the signals intelligence and cyber operations branch of
- 9:42Israeli military intelligence. The target was the uranium
- 9:46enrichment facility at Natanz, where Iran had installed
- 9:49thousands of R1 centrifuges, the spinning machines used to
- 9:52increase the concentration of fissile uranium 235.
- 9:56The objective was to damage those centrifuges in a way that
- 9:59would set back the nuclear program significantly, without
- 10:03triggering the kind of open military confrontation that
- 10:06conventional strike would produce.
- 10:08The weapon that American and Israeli engineers developed over
- 10:11the following years was technically extraordinary.
- 10:14Stuxnet was not a blunt instrument of disruption.
- 10:18It was a precision weapon designed to operate invisibly
- 10:21inside the industrial control systems governing the
- 10:23centrifuges, to identify the specific equipment configuration
- 10:27at Natans, and to cause the centrifuges to spin at speeds
- 10:30and in patterns that would physically destroy them, while
- 10:33simultaneously falsifying the readings shown to human
- 10:36operators monitoring the system. The centrifuges would tear
- 10:39themselves apart while the instruments reported that
- 10:41everything was normal. Iranian engineers would watch
- 10:44their machines fail without being able to understand why.
- 10:48The software was introduced into the Air Gap Natanz facility,
- 10:52almost certainly through infected USB drives carried in
- 10:55by individuals with access, whether wittingly or
- 10:58unwittingly, is not publicly established.
- 11:01Once inside the network, it behaved precisely as designed.
- 11:05Iranian centrifuges began failing at an elevated rate.
- 11:09Engineers struggled to diagnose machines that appear by every
- 11:13available instrument reading to be functioning correctly.
- 11:16The program ran for several years before it was detected,
- 11:19and by the time it was an estimated 1000 centrifuges have
- 11:23been damaged or destroyed. Obama inherited the Olympic
- 11:26Games program in January 2009 and made the decision to
- 11:30accelerate it. He was shown evidence that the
- 11:33attacks were causing significant and measurable damage to the
- 11:36Iranian nuclear program and made the judgement that continuing
- 11:39and expanding the operation was preferable to the available
- 11:42alternatives, either accepting Iranian nuclear progress
- 11:45unchecked or launching a military strike with
- 11:48unpredictable regional consequences.
- 11:50The cyberattack was, in the administration's framing, the
- 11:54responsible middle path. That framing was not wrong as a
- 11:57description of the immediate tactical choice.
- 12:00It was incomplete as a strategic analysis.
- 12:04What Stuxnet also did was demonstrate to Iran and to every
- 12:07other state with the resources and motivation to develop
- 12:10offensive cyber capabilities that infrastructure could be
- 12:13physically destroyed through cyber attack.
- 12:16It established A precedent that state sponsored cyber weapons
- 12:19could cross the line from espionage and disruption into
- 12:22physical destruction. That fundamentally changed the
- 12:25International Security environment.
- 12:27Once that threshold had been crossed that could not be
- 12:31uncrossed, every state that subsequently invested in
- 12:34offensive cyber capabilities was in some measure responding to
- 12:38the world that Stuxnet had created.
- 12:41Iran drew from the experience a lesson that was entirely
- 12:44predictable and needed the capability to respond in kind.
- 12:48In the years following Stuxnet's public discovery in 2010, when a
- 12:52software error caused it to escape from Natans and propagate
- 12:55across the global Internet, where cybersecurity researchers
- 12:59eventually reverse engineered it and published their findings,
- 13:02Iran invested heavily in building its own offensive cyber
- 13:05program. Iranian Cyber Operations against
- 13:08Saudi Aramco in 2012, which destroyed the hard drives of
- 13:11approximately 35,000 computers in a single attack against
- 13:15American financial institutions in the same period and against a
- 13:19range of other targets in subsequent years, were the
- 13:21direct consequence of the Stuxnet precedent.
- 13:23The weapon designed to set back Iran's nuclear program by
- 13:26several years also handed Iran a strategic lesson in asymmetric
- 13:31cyber power that it applied aggressively and effectively.
- 13:34Running parallel to the cyber war through the late 2000s and
- 13:38into the early 20 tens was a series of assassinations
- 13:41targeting Iranian nuclear scientists.
- 13:44Between 2010 and 2012, five Iranian scientists with
- 13:48connections to the nuclear program were killed in attacks
- 13:51that bore the hallmarks of professional intelligence
- 13:53operations, magnetic bombs attached to moving vehicles by
- 13:56motorcyclist, precision shootings in public spaces, and
- 14:00at least one bombing. The attacks were widely
- 14:02attributed to a joint CIA Mosad program, though neither
- 14:06government formally acknowledged responsibility.
- 14:09The scientists killed were not peripheral figures.
- 14:12Masood Ali Mohammadi, a nuclear physicist, was killed by a
- 14:16remote control bomb in January 2010.
- 14:19Majid Sharyari was killed in a car bomb attack in November
- 14:232010. Darius Rizenjad, an expert in
- 14:26high voltage switches used in certain nuclear applications,
- 14:30was shot dead in July 2011. Mustafa Almada Roshan, a
- 14:34director at the Natanz facility, itself was killed by a magnetic
- 14:38bomb in January 2012. 1/5 Scientist Faeridun Abbasi Davani
- 14:44survived an assassination attempt and was subsequently
- 14:47appointed by Ahmadinejad to lead Iran's Atomic Energy
- 14:50Organization, an appointment that was itself appointed
- 14:53response to the campaign against him.
- 14:55These were targeted killings of civilians on foreign soil by
- 14:58intelligence services operating outside any acknowledged legal
- 15:02framework in a country with which the United States was not
- 15:05formally at war. The legal and ethical questions
- 15:08they raised received limited serious public examination.
- 15:11At the time, the Obama administration was
- 15:13simultaneously running drone assassination programs in
- 15:16Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia under legal theories that had
- 15:20substantially expanded. The executives claimed authority
- 15:22for targeted killing and the Iranian scientist assassinations
- 15:26existed within that broader permissive environment.
- 15:29They also raised a strategic question that received even less
- 15:32public attention, whether killing individual scientists
- 15:35durably slowed the nuclear program or whether it's simply
- 15:38hardened Iranian political will and accelerated recruitment into
- 15:41the program as a patriotic cause.
- 15:44The available evidence suggests the second effect was at least
- 15:47as significant as the first. Iran's response included
- 15:50attempted retaliatory attacks against Israeli and American
- 15:54targets in multiple countries. India.
- 15:56Georgia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and others.
- 16:01Several were disrupted. Several succeeded in causing
- 16:05casualties. The cycle of covert violence
- 16:08constituted A genuine shadow war, operating at low but real
- 16:12intensity beneath the threshold of acknowledged conflict.
- 16:15There is a dimension of the 1990s that shaped the CIA's Iran
- 16:19program in ways that are rarely discussed, and it concerns what
- 16:22happened inside Iran itself during those years.
- 16:25The election of Mohammed Khatami as president of Iran in 1997 was
- 16:29a genuine political surprise. Khatami was a reformist cleric
- 16:33who ran on a platform of civil society, the rule of law, and
- 16:37what he called the dialogue of civilizations.
- 16:40He won with 69% of the vote, reflecting real popular appetite
- 16:44for change after nearly two decades of revolutionary
- 16:47governance. The Clinton administration's
- 16:49response was cautious. Genuine debates occurred inside
- 16:53the administration about whether to extend some form of
- 16:56diplomatic gesture toward the reformist government, a partial
- 16:59easing of sanctions, a public signal of openness.
- 17:02Those debates did not produce decisive action.
- 17:06The absence of any American response to Qatami's genuine
- 17:09overtures, including a remarkable CNN interview in 1998
- 17:13in which he expressed respect for the American people and
- 17:16acknowledged that the 1979 hostage taking had been a
- 17:18mistake, contributed to the political weakening of the
- 17:21reformist camp inside Iran and strengthen the hard line
- 17:24argument that engagement with America was pointless.
- 17:27The pattern here recurs throughout the CIA's Iran
- 17:30Project. Covert action programs designed
- 17:33to pressure the Iranian government consistently
- 17:35undermined the political prospects of the Iranian
- 17:37politicians most interested in reducing that pressure.
- 17:41Sanctions meant to encourage moderation consistently produced
- 17:44rallying effects that benefited hardliners.
- 17:47Intelligence operations meant to demonstrate American resolve
- 17:50consistently provided the Revolutionary Guard with
- 17:53evidence that American intentions toward Iran were
- 17:55fundamentally hostile, making the case for reformists and
- 17:58pragmatists increasingly difficult to sustain.
- 18:01The Islamic Republic's internal dynamics were shaped by many
- 18:04forces, most of them domestic, but the decades long pattern of
- 18:08American covert pressure against Iran consistently produced
- 18:12political outcomes that were the opposite of what American policy
- 18:15claimed to want. If the stated goal was in Iran,
- 18:18more open to diplomatic engagement, the actual effect of
- 18:21the tools deployed was consistently to empower the
- 18:24faction most committed to permanent confrontation.
- 18:27The nuclear diplomacy of the Obama years produced the Joint
- 18:30Comprehensive Plan of Action in July 2015, the genuine
- 18:34diplomatic achievement that constrained Iran's nuclear
- 18:36program substantially in exchange for sanctions relief.
- 18:40Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement in May 2018,
- 18:43reimposing sanctions and adopting a maximum pressure
- 18:46strategy intended to force Iran back to negotiations on more
- 18:50demanding terms. The strategy produced
- 18:53significant economic damage inside Iran.
- 18:56It did not produce a new agreement.
- 18:58What it produced was a progressive Iranian decision to
- 19:01shed the agreement's constraints.
- 19:03Enriching uranium beyond permitted levels, reducing
- 19:06inspector access, accelerating centrifuge installation, and a
- 19:10nuclear program that was substantially more advanced by
- 19:12the time Syria's diplomacy was attempted again than it had been
- 19:16when Trump walked away. By 2023, Iran was enriching
- 19:19uranium to 60% purity, far beyond the 3.67% permitted under
- 19:25the agreement and approaching the 90% threshold that defines
- 19:28weapons Gray material. By 2024, the IA was reporting
- 19:33that Iran had accumulated enough enriched uranium, if further
- 19:36processed, to produce multiple nuclear devices.
- 19:40The intelligence assessments circulating in Washington and
- 19:43Jerusalem were increasingly focused not on whether Iran
- 19:46could build a nuclear weapon, but on how quickly it could do
- 19:48so if the political decision were made.
- 19:51That shift in the intelligence question from capability to
- 19:54timeline was the proximate cause of the strategic urgency that
- 19:58produced Operation Epic Fury. The Soleimani assassination
- 20:02belongs in this history as well. On the 3rd of January 2020, a
- 20:06United States drone strike at Baghdad International Airport
- 20:09killed Major General Kasem Soleimani, the commander of the
- 20:13Kuds Force, the elite external operations branch of the
- 20:16Revolutionary Guard. Soleimani was arguably the most
- 20:19powerful and consequential Iranian military figure of his
- 20:23generation, the architect for two decades of Iran's regional
- 20:26proxy strategy. The CI, as targeting
- 20:29intelligence, was central to the strike.
- 20:32The decision to kill him was made by President Trump on the
- 20:34basis of intelligence that Soleimani was actively planning
- 20:37attacks on American personnel in the region, though the precise
- 20:41nature of that intelligence has been contested by former
- 20:44officials. The strikes legality was argued
- 20:46by the administration under the Authorization for the Use of
- 20:49Military Force and Presidential War Powers, assessments that
- 20:53were themselves contested by constitutional scholars and
- 20:56members of Congress. For the Iranian government,
- 20:59Soleimani's killing was not simply the death of a military
- 21:02commander. It was a statement of intent
- 21:05that the entire senior Iranian leadership was now a legitimate
- 21:08target. It accelerated a process of
- 21:11hardening Iranian decision making against any posture of
- 21:14accommodation. It strengthened the argument for
- 21:17nuclear deterrence, the argument that only a credible nuclear
- 21:20capability could protect the Islamic Republic from the kind
- 21:23of decapitation strike that had killed Soleimani.
- 21:26The killing meant to deter Iran may well have accelerated
- 21:29exactly the nuclear calculations it intended to prevent.
- 21:33That acceleration of Iranian nuclear progress, of Iranian
- 21:37hardening against diplomacy, of Iranian investment in ballistic
- 21:40missile capabilities, is part of the direct chain of causation
- 21:44that leads from the drone strike of January 2020 to the opening
- 21:47of Operation Epic Fury in February 2026.
- 21:50Six years separated the killing of Qasem Soleimani from the
- 21:54beginning of the war that his killing helped make more likely.
- 21:58Each instrument was deployed, each bought time.
- 22:01None resolved the underlying question What happens when the
- 22:04covert tools are exhausted and the diplomatic options have
- 22:07closed? Operation Epic Fury is the
- 22:10answer that Washington and Jerusalem settled upon when they
- 22:13concluded that the question could no longer be deferred.
- 22:16Biden's attempt at a return to the agreement made progress but
- 22:19did not conclude before he left office in January 2025.
- 22:24Trump's return brought maximum pressure back with substantially
- 22:27greater intensity. The CIA's operational posture
- 22:31toward Iran was expanded. American and Israeli
- 22:35intelligence cooperation on the nuclear file was deep into a
- 22:38degree not seen since the peak of the Stuxnet program.
- 22:42The targeting database assembled through years of intelligence
- 22:44work mapping the physical infrastructure of the nuclear
- 22:47program, identifying command nodes, tracking Iranian air
- 22:51defense systems, became the foundation for the strike
- 22:54packages that went active on February 28th, 2026.
- 22:58The 73 years of covert action between Operation Ajax and
- 23:02Operation Epic Fury had not prevented the confrontation in a
- 23:06meaningful sense. They had helped to produce it.
- 23:09Next time, Episode 5, the final episode of this series.
- 23:13What the CIA knew in the months before Operation Epic Fury, how
- 23:17the intelligence picture was assembled, and what the full 70
- 23:20year arc of the Agency's history with Iran tells us about the
- 23:23conflict being fought today. This is the CIA and Iran bonus
- 23:27series, part of Epic Fury, the US Iran War Podcast.
- 23:31Subscribe on Spotify, Apple Podcast or YouTube.
- 23:35Share this with someone who wants to understand not just the
- 23:38war, but everything that came before it.