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031 - Chapter 15 Part 2 - The Hungnam Redeployment · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

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Speaker 1: Chapter fifteen, Part two of US Marine Operations in Korea
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Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
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Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
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Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. The Hungnam redeployment contributions
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Speaker 1: of marine aviation. The close coordination of aviation with the
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Speaker 1: ground forces in the Chosen Campaign was due in large
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Speaker 1: measure to the assignment of additional pilots to the first
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Speaker 1: Marine Division as forward air controllers. They had been plucked
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Speaker 1: from First Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons barely in time to
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Speaker 1: join their battalions before embarkation at Incheon. Increasing the number
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Speaker 1: of facts to two per battalion did much to bring
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Speaker 1: air support down to the company level when needed. Air
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Speaker 1: units frequently had to rely upon charts with place names,
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Speaker 1: grid coordinates, and scales different from those in the hands
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Speaker 1: of the ground troops. Hear the marine system of the
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Speaker 1: man on the ground talking the pilot onto the target
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Speaker 1: by reference to visual landmarks paid off. Cloudy stormy weather
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Speaker 1: was common. Three night fighter pilots were lost because of icing,
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Speaker 1: disorientation and insufficient radio aids to navigation. Two VMF two
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Speaker 1: twelve land based pilots saved themselves from destruction only by
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Speaker 1: landing on the Bedong Straight with their last drops of gas.
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Speaker 1: With the approach of winter, in cold weather, aircraft on
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Speaker 1: the landing strips had to be run up every two
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Speaker 1: hours at night to keep the oil warm enough for
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Speaker 1: early morning takeoffs. Ordnance efficiency dropped planes skidded on icy runways.
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Speaker 1: Once after a six inch snow, Eighty men and ten
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Speaker 1: trucks worked all night to clear and sand a one
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Speaker 1: hundred fifty foot strip down the runway at Yanpo as
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Speaker 1: early as mid November. It once took hours of scraping
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Speaker 1: and chipping on the Bedong Straight to clear three inches
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Speaker 1: of glazed dyce and snow off the decks. Catapults arresting
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Speaker 1: wires and barriers. Planes which stood the night on the
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Speaker 1: flight deck had to be taken below to the hangar
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Speaker 1: deck to thaw out. On another occasion, VMF two fourteen
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Speaker 1: had to cancel all flight operations because sixty eight kno winds,
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Speaker 1: heavy seas and freezing temperatures covered the Sicilyes flight deck
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Speaker 1: and aircraft with a persistent coat of ice. One pilot
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Speaker 1: of VMF three twenty three had to return shortly after
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Speaker 1: takeoff because water vapor frozen his oil breather tube in flight,
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Speaker 1: with the back pressure throwing oil all over his windshield
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Speaker 1: and billowing black vapor and smoke out of his cowl.
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Speaker 1: He landed only to have the front of his corsair
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Speaker 1: burst into flames when the escaped oil dripped on the
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Speaker 1: hot exhaust stacks. Quick work by the deck crews extinguished
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Speaker 1: the fire. A hazard as great as being shot down
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Speaker 1: was a crash, landing or bailout at sea, where the
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Speaker 1: water was cold enough to kill a man in twenty minutes.
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Speaker 1: Revival clothing and equipment was so bulky that pilots could
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Speaker 1: barely get into their cockpits. Maintenance and servicing problems ashore,
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Speaker 1: complicated by dirt, dust, and scarcity of parts, kept mechanics
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Speaker 1: working to the point of exhaustion. Insufficient trucks forced the
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Speaker 1: ground crews to refuel and armed planes by hand, often
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Speaker 1: from rusting fuel drums. Two destructive crashes, one fatal, were
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Speaker 1: attributed to accumulated water and gasoline aboard ship. Until mid November,
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Speaker 1: VMF two fourteen was able to keep ninety one percent
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Speaker 1: of its planes operative when suddenly deployed a short a Wansan,
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Speaker 1: its aircraft availability dropped to eighty two percent and at
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Speaker 1: Yon Post sixty seven percent. Once back at sea again
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Speaker 1: in December, it jumped up to ninety percent. Basic difference
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Speaker 1: in close air support doctrine between the Navy and Marines
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Speaker 1: and Air Force were resolved by close and friendly liaison
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Speaker 1: between the first Marine Aircraft Wing and the Fifth Air
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Speaker 1: Force commands by a Marine aviator attached to the Joint
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Speaker 1: Eighth Army Fifth Air Force Operations Center at Seoul, and
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Speaker 1: by indoctrination of non marine units of the ten Corps
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Speaker 1: and the Marine Navy style of close air support. Difficulties
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Speaker 1: in inner service communications slowed fitth Air Force operations orders
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Speaker 1: to carryer squadrons. Both Navy and Marine messages were routed
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Speaker 1: via FIEF and comnav Fee in Tokyo and arrived hours
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Speaker 1: late ashore. Even mag twelve during the first two weeks
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Speaker 1: at Wanson received its Fifth Air Force mission orders six
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Speaker 1: to thirty six hours late. A direct radio teletype between
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Speaker 1: First MALL and Fifth Air Force Headquarters alleviated the situation,
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Speaker 1: and when the CG First MALL received full control of
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Speaker 1: the air over the ten Corps area on one December
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Speaker 1: these problems were eased. Actual control of air support for
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Speaker 1: the scattered ground units demonstrated close cooperation between the Navy
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Speaker 1: and Marine Corps. This was evident for from the time
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Speaker 1: the Navy's Tactical Air Control Squadron one on the USS
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Speaker 1: Mam McKinley passed control to the Air Defense Section of
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Speaker 1: m TAX two at ham hung to the time that
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Speaker 1: control returned to the ship in the Hungnam evacuation. When
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Speaker 1: the Marines had control, the ship stood by as an
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Speaker 1: emergency tack and acted as a radar reporting station for
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Speaker 1: m TAX two. When control was passed back afloat, the
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Speaker 1: Air Defense Section of m TAX two stood by as
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Speaker 1: a standby tack aboard an LST until the last man
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Speaker 1: was pulled off the beach. Furthermore, three officers from MIXIS
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Speaker 1: I went aboard Mam McKinley to help out as air
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Speaker 1: defense controllers. They were experienced. All through the Wan San
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Speaker 1: Chosen campaign. The MIXIS had directed the defensive fighter patrols
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Speaker 1: circling Wansan and Yanpo to check all unidentified aircraft before
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Speaker 1: the latter got close enough to do any damage. MIXIS
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Speaker 1: one also steered lost planes to base in bad weather
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Speaker 1: occasionally only vectored them to the GCA radar controlled landing
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Speaker 1: pattern and even assisted m TAX two in directing air
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Speaker 1: support planes to facts. Tactical air support in the ten
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Speaker 1: Corps zone was directed to the ground units by the
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Speaker 1: Air Support section of m TAX two. From twenty six
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Speaker 1: October to eleven December three thousand, seven hundred three sorties
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Speaker 1: in one thousand fifty three missions were controlled by the
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Speaker 1: TACPs of Marine Army and Rock units. Close air support
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Speaker 1: missions accounted for five hundred ninety nine of the total,
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Speaker 1: four hundred sixty eight for the First Marine Division, eight
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Speaker 1: for the Third Infantry Division, fifty six for the seventh
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Speaker 1: Infantry Division, and sixty seven for the Rocks. The remaining
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Speaker 1: four hundred fifty four missions were search and attack. When
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Speaker 1: fact communications failed from valley to valley, aircraft became radio
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Speaker 1: relays and controllers. This was highlighted by the airborne TADC
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Speaker 1: orbiting over the road from Hagaroo. Approximately half of the
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Speaker 1: marine air missions were in support of non marine ground units.
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Speaker 1: The Rock and the U. S Army units were not
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Speaker 1: as well supplied with experienced facts as the First Marine Division.
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Speaker 1: In these areas. Four Air Force mosquitoes. Eighty six Texan
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Speaker 1: training planes were assigned to ten Corps to assist in
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Speaker 1: the control of air support. When shore based marine air
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Speaker 1: support was about to cease with the closing of Yanpo Airfield,
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Speaker 1: VMF two fourteen and VMF two twelve quickly moved their
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Speaker 1: operations aboard carrier, and during the final phases of the
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Speaker 1: hung Nam evacuation, almost half of the marine tactical air
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Speaker 1: strength was operating from carrier bases. VMF two fourteen flew
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Speaker 1: back aboard Sicily on seven December without missing a mission,
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Speaker 1: and VMF two twelve, which had moved to Atami on
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Speaker 1: four December to draw and test a new complement of
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Speaker 1: carrier corsairs, was aboard the U S S Baton eight
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Speaker 1: days later. When the month ended. Still another squadron, VMF
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Speaker 1: three twelve, was polishing up its carrier landing technique for
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Speaker 1: seaborn duty. The outcome of the Hagaru withdraw owed much
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Speaker 1: to air drop supplies and to casualty evacuations by General
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Speaker 1: Tunner's Combat Cargo Command CCC. Assisting combat cargo and marine
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Speaker 1: support were the Wings R four D twin engine transports
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Speaker 1: and TBM World War II type torpedo bombers, both of
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Speaker 1: which were flown largely by the field desk pilots of
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Speaker 1: the wing and group staffs. Most of the Marine's share
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Speaker 1: of the heavy airlifting, however, was done by the four
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Speaker 1: engine R five D transports of Colonel Dean C. Roberts
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Speaker 1: VMR one fifty two. Early in October, this squadron had
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Speaker 1: been temporarily shifted from the trans Pacific airlift of the
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Speaker 1: Navy's Fleet Logistics Air Wing to support the Marines in
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Speaker 1: the wants On campaign in Korea. Its operations were controlled
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Speaker 1: by the Combat Cargo Command, which committed an average of
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Speaker 1: five Marine R five d's a day into the ccclift.
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Speaker 1: In such missions, these transports supported all UN units from
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Speaker 1: Pyongyang to Yanpo in points North. Marine transports not committed
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Speaker 1: by the CCC for general YUN support in Korea were
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Speaker 1: available for wing use. From one November until Christmas. Vm
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Speaker 1: R one fifty two safely carried five million pounds of
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Speaker 1: supplies to the front and evacuated more than four thousand casualties.
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Speaker 1: The Chosen Reservoir campaign opened two new chapters in marine
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Speaker 1: aviation history. The first was the use of the airborne
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Speaker 1: TADC to control the air support of the division column
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Speaker 1: between Hagaroo and Chinhung Nie. The second was the appearance
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Speaker 1: of VMF three eleven, the first marine jet squadron to
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Speaker 1: fly in combat. Beginning on ten December, the newly arrived
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Speaker 1: squadron flew interdiction missions for four days from Yanpo, then
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Speaker 1: it moved to Pusan to operate for the remainder of
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Speaker 1: the month, with Fifth Air Force jets streaking up the
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Speaker 1: Long Peninsula to cover the w withdrawal of the Eighth Army.
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Speaker 1: Appreciation for the assistance given by marine aviation to marine
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Speaker 1: ground forces was expressed in a letter of twenty December
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Speaker 1: from General Smith to General Harris, the commanding general of
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Speaker 1: the first Marine Air Wing. The division commander said, without
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Speaker 1: your support, our task would have been infinitely more difficult
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Speaker 1: and more costly. During the long reaches of the night
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Speaker 1: and in the snowstorms, many a marine prayed for the
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Speaker 1: coming of day or clearing weather when he knew he
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Speaker 1: would again hear the welcome roar of your planes as
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Speaker 1: they dealt out destruction to the enemy. Even the presence
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Speaker 1: of a Knight Heckler was reassuring. Never in its history
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Speaker 1: has marine aviation given more convincing proof of its indispensable
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Speaker 1: value to the ground marines, A bond of understanding has
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Speaker 1: been established that will never be broken. The story of
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Speaker 1: air support in the Chosen Reservoir campaign would not be
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Speaker 1: complete without a summary of the results of VMO six.
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Speaker 1: Marines took a proprietary interest in Major Gouvernes CHOK Squadron,
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Speaker 1: which had put into effect the helicopter techniques worked out
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Speaker 1: at Quantico by the Experimental Squadron HMX one. Some of
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Speaker 1: these techniques were having their first test in combat. For
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Speaker 1: the development of rotary wing aircraft in nineteen fifty was
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Speaker 1: at a pioneer stage comparable to that of fixed wing
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Speaker 1: aircraft in the first year of World War One. On
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Speaker 1: twenty eight October VMO six had a strength of twenty
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Speaker 1: five officers, ninety five enlisted men, ten light fixed wing aircraft,
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Speaker 1: eighty two S two L five g's and nine H
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Speaker 1: three S one helicopters. From that date until fifteen December,
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Speaker 1: the squadron made one thousand, five hundred forty four flights
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Speaker 1: for a total of one thousand, six hundred twenty four
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Speaker 1: point eight hours. The principal missions were as follows, reconnaissance
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Speaker 1: OYS three hundred ninety three helicopters sixty four, Transportation, OY
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Speaker 1: one hundred thirty helicopters four hundred, twenty one, evacuation O
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Speaker 1: wy's twenty nine helicopters one hundred ninety one, Liaison, O
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Speaker 1: WYS thirty five helicopters ninety, artillery spot O wy's thirty
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Speaker 1: nine helicopters zero, utility, oy's twenty six helicopters sixty rescue
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Speaker 1: O wy's zero helicopters eleven. But statistics can give no
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Speaker 1: idea of the most significant achievement of VMO six in
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Speaker 1: the Reservoir campaign, for during the most critical period, the
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Speaker 1: only physical contact between units separated by enemy action was
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Speaker 1: provided by the O Whys and helicopters. The importance of
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Speaker 1: this contribution can hardly be overestimated losses sustained by the enemy.
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Speaker 1: Marine losses in Northeast Korea, as reported by the Secretary
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Speaker 1: of the Navy, included a total of four thousand, four
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Speaker 1: hundred eighteen battle casualties from twenty six October to fifteen
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Speaker 1: December nineteen fifty six hundred four KA, one hundred fourteen DOW,
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Speaker 1: one hundred ninety two MIA and three thousand, five hundred
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Speaker 1: eight WIA. The seven thousand, three hundred thirteen non battle
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Speaker 1: casualties consisted largely of minor frostbite and indigestion cases who
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Speaker 1: were soon restored to active duty. Eight marine pilots were
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Speaker 1: ka or died of wounds, four were mia, and three
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Speaker 1: were wounded. General Smith estimated that a third of the
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Speaker 1: non battle casualties were returned to duty during the operation.
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Speaker 1: Enemy losses for the same period were estimated at a
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Speaker 1: total of thirty seven thousand, five hundred fifteen thousand killed
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Speaker 1: and seven thousand, five hundred wounded by marine ground fires,
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Speaker 1: plus ten thousand killed and five thousand wounded by marine
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Speaker 1: air Not much reliance can be placed in such figures
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Speaker 1: as a rule, but fortunately we have enemy testimony as
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Speaker 1: to heavy losses sustained by the Chinese communists. This evidence
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Speaker 1: goes far toward explaining why they did not interfere with
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Speaker 1: the Hungnam redeployment. Contrary to expectations, Chinese military critiques have
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Speaker 1: been candid in admitting failures and unsparing in self criticism.
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Speaker 1: Among captured documents are summaries of the operations of the
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Speaker 1: three ccf armies encountered by the Marines in the chosen
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Speaker 1: reservoir area. These major units, representing at least eleven and
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Speaker 1: probably twelve divisions, were as follows. Twentieth CCF Army, fifty eighth,
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Speaker 1: fifty ninth, and sixtieth divisions with the eighty ninth division
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Speaker 1: of the thirtieth Army attached, twenty six CCF Army, seventy six,
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Speaker 1: seventy seventh, and seventy eighth divisions with probably the ninety
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Speaker 1: fourth division of the thirty second Army attached, seventh CCF Army,
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Speaker 1: seventy ninth, eightieth, and eighty first divisions, with the seventieth
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Speaker 1: division of the twenty fourth Army attached. All three armies
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Speaker 1: were major units of the ninth Army group of the
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Speaker 1: third CCF Field Army. In mid October, the leading elements
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Speaker 1: of the fourth CCF Field Army had crossed the Yalu
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Speaker 1: to oppose the U S eighth Army, the operations of
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Speaker 1: ten Corps in Northeast Korea being considered a threat to
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Speaker 1: the left flank. The forty second Army was detached with
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Speaker 1: a mission of providing flank protection pending relief by units
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Speaker 1: of the third CCF Field Army. Three divisions, the one
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Speaker 1: hundred twenty fourth, one hundred twenty fifth and one hundred
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Speaker 1: twenty sixth were represented, while the last hovered on the
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Speaker 1: left flank of the fourth Field Army. The one hundred
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Speaker 1: twenty fourth was hard hit near Sudan during the first
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Speaker 1: week of November by RCT seven of the first Marine Division.
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Speaker 1: In order to cover the withdrawal of the remnants, the
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Speaker 1: one hundred twenty fifth Division moved south of Hagaroo from
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Speaker 1: the Fuson Reservoir area. Both CF divisions then fell back
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Speaker 1: to Udam Knee, where they were relieved by units of
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Speaker 1: the twentieth Army Third Field Army. This ended the operations
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Speaker 1: of the Fourth Field Army in Northeast Korea. Shortly after
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Speaker 1: the appearance of the twentieth Army and the Udam Knee area,
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Speaker 1: the twenty seventh Army moved into positions north of the
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Speaker 1: Chosen Reservoir. Thus, the enemy had available eight divisions for
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Speaker 1: the attacks of twenty seven to twenty eight November on
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Speaker 1: the Marines and the Udamnee area, and the three seventh
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Speaker 1: Infantry Division battalions east of the Chosen Reservoir. If it
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Speaker 1: may be assumed that these CCF divisions averaged seventy five
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Speaker 1: hundred men each, or three fourths of full strength. The
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Speaker 1: enemy had a total of sixty thousand men in assault
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Speaker 1: or reserve. The Chinese, as we know, failed to accomplish
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Speaker 1: their basic mission, which prisoners agreed was the destruction of
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Speaker 1: the first marine division. In every instance, the efforts of
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Speaker 1: the first night were the most formidable, with enemy effectiveness
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Speaker 1: declining sharply after a second or third attack. The explanation
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Speaker 1: seems to be that the twelve divisions were sent into
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Speaker 1: Northeast Korea with supplies which would have been sufficient only
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Speaker 1: if the first attempts had succeeded. The following comment by
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Speaker 1: the twenty sixth Army supports this conclusion. A shortage of
17:23
Speaker 1: transportation and escort personnel make it impossible to accomplish the
17:27
Speaker 1: mission of supplying the troops. As a result, our soldiers
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Speaker 1: frequently starve. From now on, the organization of our rear
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Speaker 1: service units should be improved. The troops were hungry, They
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Speaker 1: ate cold food, and some had only a few potatoes
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Speaker 1: in two days. They were unable to maintain the physical
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Speaker 1: strength for combat. The wounded personnel could not be evacuated.
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Speaker 1: The firepower of our entire army was basically inadequate. When
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Speaker 1: we used our guns, there were no shells, and sometimes
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Speaker 1: the shells duds. The enemy's tactical rigidity and tendency to
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Speaker 1: repeat costly errors are charged by the twentieth Army to
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Speaker 1: inferior communications. Our signal communication was not up to standard.
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Speaker 1: For example, it took more than two days to receive
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Speaker 1: instructions from higher level units. Rapid changes of the enemy's
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Speaker 1: situation and the slow motion of our signal communications caused
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Speaker 1: us to lose our opportunities in combat and made the
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Speaker 1: instructions of the high level units ineffective. We succeeded in
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Speaker 1: the separation and encirclement of the enemy, but we failed
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Speaker 1: to annihilate the enemy one by one. The units failed
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Speaker 1: to carry out the orders of the higher echelon. For example,
18:43
Speaker 1: the failure to annihilate the enemy at Udam Knee made
18:46
Speaker 1: it impossible to annihilate the enemy at Hagaroo. The higher
18:51
Speaker 1: level unit's refusal of the lower level unit's suggestion of
18:55
Speaker 1: rapidly starting the combat and exterminating the enemy one by
18:58
Speaker 1: one gave the enemy a chance to break out from
19:01
Speaker 1: the encirclement. One of the most striking instances of the
19:05
Speaker 1: tactical and flexibility which stultified Chinese efforts was found at Hagaru.
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Speaker 1: With only a depleted Marine infantry battalion and service troops
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Speaker 1: available to defend a perimeter four miles in circumference, the
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Speaker 1: enemy needed mere daylight observation to ascertain and avoid the
19:21
Speaker 1: most strongly defended positions. Yet these were just the positions
19:26
Speaker 1: chosen for the attack, not only on the first night,
19:29
Speaker 1: but also the second occasion forty eight hours later. The
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Speaker 1: CCF tactics were mechanical, commented the twenty seventh Army. We
19:38
Speaker 1: underestimated the enemy, so we distributed the strength, and consequently
19:42
Speaker 1: the higher echelons were overdispersed while the lower echelon units
19:46
Speaker 1: were overconcentrated. During one movement, the distance between the three
19:51
Speaker 1: leading divisions was very long, while the formations of the battalions,
19:55
Speaker 1: companies and units of lower levels were too close and
19:58
Speaker 1: the troops were unable to deploy. Furthermore, reconnaissance was not
20:03
Speaker 1: conducted strictly. We walked into the enemy firenet and suffered
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Speaker 1: heavy casualties. Summing up the reasons why the Marines at
20:11
Speaker 1: you tom Me were not exterminated promptly the twenty seventh
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Speaker 1: Army concludes that it was because our troops encountered unfavorable
20:19
Speaker 1: conditions during the missions and the troops suffered too many casualties.
20:24
Speaker 1: This would seem to be another way of saying that
20:26
Speaker 1: the Chinese failed to destroy the first Marine Division because
20:29
Speaker 1: they themselves were nearly destroyed in the attempt. At any rate,
20:33
Speaker 1: evidence from the enemy documents points overwhelmingly to crippling losses,
20:38
Speaker 1: both for marine firepower and non battle casualties chargeable to
20:42
Speaker 1: lack of equipment and supplies. The twentieth Army had one
20:46
Speaker 1: hundred deaths from tetanus caused by improper care of wounds.
20:50
Speaker 1: Hundreds of other soldiers were incapacitated by typhus or ailments
20:54
Speaker 1: of mal nutrition and indigestion. More than ninety percent of
20:58
Speaker 1: the twenty sixth Armyes suffered from frostbite. The twenty seventh
21:03
Speaker 1: Army complained of ten thousand non combat casualties alone out
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Speaker 1: of a strength of four divisions. The troops did not
21:10
Speaker 1: have enough food, they did not have enough houses to
21:12
Speaker 1: live in. They could not stand the bitter cold, which
21:16
Speaker 1: was the reason for the excessive non combat reduction in personnel.
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Speaker 1: More than ten thousand persons. The weapons were not used effectively.
21:25
Speaker 1: When the fighters bivouacked and snow covered ground during combat,
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Speaker 1: their feet, socks, and hands were frozen together in one
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Speaker 1: ice ball. They could not unscrew the caps on the
21:34
Speaker 1: hand grenades, the fuses would not ignite, the hands were
21:38
Speaker 1: not supple. The mortar tube shrank on account of the cold.
21:42
Speaker 1: Seventy percent of the shells failed to detonate. Skin from
21:46
Speaker 1: the hands was stuck on the shells and the mortar tubes.
21:49
Speaker 1: Testimony asked to the effects of marine firepower is also
21:52
Speaker 1: given by the twenty sixth Army. The coordination between the
21:56
Speaker 1: enemy infantry, tanks, artillery and airplanes is risingly close. Besides
22:02
Speaker 1: using heavy weapons for the depth, the enemy carries with
22:06
Speaker 1: him automatic light firearms, which coordinated with rockets, launchers and
22:11
Speaker 1: recoilless guns, are disposed at the front line. The characteristic
22:15
Speaker 1: of their employment is to stay quietly under cover and
22:18
Speaker 1: open fires suddenly when we come to between seventy and
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Speaker 1: one hundred meters from them, making it difficult for our
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Speaker 1: troops to deploy and thus inflicting casualties upon us. The
22:28
Speaker 1: twentieth and twenty seventh Armies appeared to have been bled
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Speaker 1: white by the losses of the first week. Early in December,
22:35
Speaker 1: the units of the twenty sixth Army appeared on the
22:38
Speaker 1: east side of the MSR between Hagarou and Coto Ree,
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Speaker 1: and this unit furnished most of the opposition From six
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Speaker 1: to eleven December. Seven divisions in all were identified by
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Speaker 1: the first Marine Division, and since the taking of prisoners
22:52
Speaker 1: was not a matter of top priority with men fighting
22:54
Speaker 1: for existence, it is likely that other CCF units were encountered.
23:00
Speaker 1: ZCF Ninth Army Group, according to a prisoner questioned on
23:03
Speaker 1: seven December, included a total of twelve divisions. This pow
23:08
Speaker 1: gave the following statement. Missions of the four armies in
23:12
Speaker 1: the ninth Group are to annihilate the first Division, which
23:16
Speaker 1: is considered to be the best division in the US.
23:19
Speaker 1: After annihilating the First Marine Division, they are to move
23:22
Speaker 1: south and take hamhung As to the reason why the
23:25
Speaker 1: Chinese took no advantage of the Hungnam redeployment, there seems
23:29
Speaker 1: to be little doubt that the Ninth Army Group was
23:32
Speaker 1: too riddled by battle and non battle casualties to make
23:35
Speaker 1: the effort. This is not a matter of opinion. Following
23:39
Speaker 1: the Hungnam redeployment. As the U s eighth Army braced
23:42
Speaker 1: itself to meet a new CCF offensive. UN and FICMG
23:46
Speaker 1: two officers were naturally concerned as to whether the remaining
23:50
Speaker 1: Ninth Army Group troops in Northeast Korea would be available
23:53
Speaker 1: to strengthen the CCF fourth Field Army. It was estimated
23:57
Speaker 1: that only two weeks would be required to move these
24:00
Speaker 1: troops to West Korea, where they had the capability of
24:03
Speaker 1: reinforcing the CCF attack against the eighth Army. Efforts to
24:07
Speaker 1: locate the Ninth Army Group were unavailing for nearly three months.
24:12
Speaker 1: Then a prisoner from the seventy seventh Division of the
24:14
Speaker 1: twenty sixth Army was captured by US eighth Army troops
24:17
Speaker 1: on eighteen March nineteen fifty one. During the following week,
24:22
Speaker 1: POW interrogations established that three divisions of the twenty sixth
24:26
Speaker 1: Army were in contact with eighth Army units northeast of Seoul.
24:30
Speaker 1: The only conclusion to be drawn comments the Marine Corps
24:33
Speaker 1: Board study based on information collected by FIRSMARDV and ten
24:37
Speaker 1: Corps and that by UN and FEC, is that all
24:41
Speaker 1: corps of Ninth Army Group had been rendered militarily ineffective
24:45
Speaker 1: in the Chosen Reservoir operation and required a considerable period
24:48
Speaker 1: of time for replacement, re equipment, and reorganization. Thus, it
24:54
Speaker 1: appears that the Marines not only saved themselves in the
24:56
Speaker 1: Chosen Reservoir fights, they also saved US eighth Army from
25:00
Speaker 1: being assailed by reinforcements from Northeast Korea in the CCF
25:04
Speaker 1: offensive which exploded on the last night of nineteen fifty.
25:09
Speaker 1: Results of the Reservoir campaign, there could be no doubt,
25:14
Speaker 1: after taking into account the CCF mission, that the Ninth
25:18
Speaker 1: Army Group, third Field Army had sustained a reverse in
25:21
Speaker 1: Northeast Korea, which amounted to a disaster. On the other hand,
25:26
Speaker 1: it might have been asked whether a retrograde movement such
25:29
Speaker 1: as the Marine breakout, even though aggressively and successfully executed,
25:33
Speaker 1: could be termed a victory. This question involves issues too
25:37
Speaker 1: complex for a clear cut positive answer, but it would
25:41
Speaker 1: be hard to improve upon the analysis of results in
25:43
Speaker 1: the Marine Corps Board study. Although the operations of this
25:47
Speaker 1: phase constituted a withdraw, despite the fact that cg FIRSMARDIV
25:51
Speaker 1: characterized them as an attack in a new direction. The
25:55
Speaker 1: withdrawal was executed in the face of overwhelming odds and
25:58
Speaker 1: conducted in such a manner that, contrary to the usual witraw,
26:03
Speaker 1: some very important tactical results were achieved. These may be
26:07
Speaker 1: summarized as follows. One extricated first mar div from a
26:12
Speaker 1: trap sprung by overwhelming enemy ground forces by skillful employment
26:16
Speaker 1: of integrated ground and air action, which enabled the division
26:20
Speaker 1: to come through with all operable equipment, with wounded properly evacuated,
26:24
Speaker 1: and with tactical integrity. Two outfought and outlasted at least
26:29
Speaker 1: seven CCF Divisions under conditions of terrain and weather chosen
26:33
Speaker 1: by the enemy and reputedly to his liking. Although frostbite
26:38
Speaker 1: took a heavy toll on the division, it hit CCF
26:41
Speaker 1: units far harder, perhaps decisively. Three, and the process of
26:46
Speaker 1: accomplishing two above rendered militarily non effective a large part
26:50
Speaker 1: of ninth CCF Army Group. Those units not contacted by
26:55
Speaker 1: First Maar div were fixed in the chosen reservoir area
26:58
Speaker 1: for possible employment again against the division, and consequently suffered
27:02
Speaker 1: from the ravages of sub zero cold and heavy air attacks. Four.
27:07
Speaker 1: As a direct result of three above, enabled ten Corps
27:11
Speaker 1: to evacuate Hungnam without enemy interference and consequently as a
27:16
Speaker 1: combat effective unit with all personnel and serviceable equipment. Pressure
27:21
Speaker 1: on ten Coreps by nine ccf Army Group during the
27:24
Speaker 1: seaward evacuation of the Corps, a most difficult operation, would
27:28
Speaker 1: undoubtedly have altered the result. Improvisations and tactics were now
27:34
Speaker 1: and then made necessary by unusual conditions of terrain, weather
27:38
Speaker 1: or enemy action. But on the whole, the Marines saved
27:41
Speaker 1: themselves in the Reservoir Campaign by the application of sound
27:45
Speaker 1: military tactics. In the doing, they demonstrated repeatedly that the
27:49
Speaker 1: rear makes as good affront as any other for the
27:52
Speaker 1: militarily skilled and stout hearted, and that a unit is
27:56
Speaker 1: not beaten merely because it is surrounded by a more
27:59
Speaker 1: numerous enemy. Inevitably, the Marine campaign has been compared to
28:03
Speaker 1: that classic of all military breakouts, the March of the
28:07
Speaker 1: Immortal ten thousand, which is the subject of Xenophons and Ambassis.
28:12
Speaker 1: Stranded in the hostile Persian Empire in the year four
28:15
Speaker 1: hundred one BC, these Greek mercenaries cut their way to
28:18
Speaker 1: safety through Asiatic hordes. The following description of the tactics
28:23
Speaker 1: used by Xenophon and his lieutenant Cherisaphis to overcome roadblocks
28:27
Speaker 1: in mountain country will have a familiar ring to marine
28:30
Speaker 1: veterans of the reservoir. The enemy, by keeping up a
28:34
Speaker 1: continuous battle and occupying in advance every narrow place, obstructed
28:39
Speaker 1: passage after passage. Accordingly, whenever the van was obstructed, Xenophon
28:45
Speaker 1: from behind made a dash up the hills and broke
28:48
Speaker 1: the barricade and freed the vanguard by endeavoring to get
28:52
Speaker 1: above the obstructing enemy. Whenever the rear was the point attacked, Cherisaphus,
28:58
Speaker 1: in the same way made a deep and by endeavoring
29:01
Speaker 1: to mount higher than the barricaders, freed the passage for
29:05
Speaker 1: the rear rank. And in this way turn and turn about.
29:08
Speaker 1: They rescued each other and paid unflinching attention to their
29:12
Speaker 1: mutual needs. Spears and arrows have been superseded by bazukahs
29:16
Speaker 1: and machine guns, but the basic infantry tactics of the
29:20
Speaker 1: reservoir breakout were essentially those which served Xenophon and the
29:24
Speaker 1: ten thousand more than thirty three centuries ago. Organization, combat training,
29:29
Speaker 1: spirit and discipline enabled the marines liked the helenas before them,
29:34
Speaker 1: to overcome numerical odds and fight their way over Asiatic
29:37
Speaker 1: mountain roads. To see the overall strategic effect of the
29:41
Speaker 1: Reservoir campaign as summarized by the Marine Corps Board Study,
29:46
Speaker 1: whereas follows. One played a prominent part in enabling ten Corps,
29:51
Speaker 1: a considerable segment of the total UN forces in Korea,
29:55
Speaker 1: to be withdrawn from hung Nam as a combat effective
29:58
Speaker 1: force available for employed with the Eighth Army in South
30:01
Speaker 1: Korea at a time when that army was retreating and
30:04
Speaker 1: was in critical need of a reinforcement. Two were largely
30:09
Speaker 1: responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF forces on Eighth Army
30:13
Speaker 1: front by twelve divisions during a period when such reinforcement
30:17
Speaker 1: might have meant to Eighth Army the difference between maintaining
30:20
Speaker 1: a footholding Korea or forced evacuation therefrom by being instrumental
30:25
Speaker 1: in rendering ninth CCF Army Group a force of three
30:29
Speaker 1: corps of four divisions each militarily non effective for a
30:33
Speaker 1: minimum period of three months. That the breakout of the
30:36
Speaker 1: first Marine Division had affected American political and military policy
30:40
Speaker 1: at the highest levels was the assertion of the editorial
30:43
Speaker 1: in time. When referring to what it termed the Great
30:47
Speaker 1: Debate in December nineteen fifty as to whether American forces
30:51
Speaker 1: should be withdrawn from Korea, the news magazine commented, when
30:56
Speaker 1: the Marines fought their way down to Hungnam through the
30:59
Speaker 1: unconquered Chinese hordes and embarked for Pussan with their equipment,
31:04
Speaker 1: their wounded, and their prisoners, the war in Asia took
31:07
Speaker 1: on a different look. The news stories, pictures, and newsreels
31:12
Speaker 1: of the hung Nam action contributed more to forming US
31:15
Speaker 1: policy than all the words in the Great Debate. The
31:18
Speaker 1: nation and the revitalized Eighth Army now knows that U
31:22
Speaker 1: S fighting men will stay in Korea until a better
31:25
Speaker 1: place and a better opportunity is found to punish Communist aggression.
31:30
Speaker 1: General Douglas MacArthur as sink Unc, in his eleventh Report
31:34
Speaker 1: of Operations of UN Forces in Korea, submitted the following
31:38
Speaker 1: to the United Nations Organization regarding the Chosen Reservoir operation.
31:43
Speaker 1: In this epic action, the Marine Division and attached elements
31:47
Speaker 1: of the seventh Infantry Division marched and fought over sixty
31:50
Speaker 1: miles in bitter cold along a narrow, tortuous ice covered
31:53
Speaker 1: road against opposition from six to eight Chinese Communist force divisions,
31:58
Speaker 1: which suffered staggering losses. Success was due in no small
32:02
Speaker 1: part to the unprecedented extent and effectiveness of air support.
32:07
Speaker 1: The basic element, however, was the high quality of soldierly
32:10
Speaker 1: courage displayed by the personnel of the ground units, which
32:14
Speaker 1: maintained their integrity in the face of continuous attacks by
32:17
Speaker 1: numerically superior forces, consistently held their positions until their wounded
32:21
Speaker 1: had been evacuated, and doggedly refused to abandon supplies and
32:25
Speaker 1: equipment to the enemy. United Nations air forces, through the
32:30
Speaker 1: bulk of their effort into close support of ground forces,
32:33
Speaker 1: cutting their way through overwhelming numbers of Chinese Communists. The
32:37
Speaker 1: toll of the enemy taken by the United Nations aircraft
32:40
Speaker 1: contributed in large measure to the successful move of our
32:44
Speaker 1: forces from the chosen reservoir to the Hungnau area, despite
32:47
Speaker 1: the tremendous odds against them. Air support provided by the
32:51
Speaker 1: United States Marine Air Force and Naval aircraft in this
32:55
Speaker 1: beleaguered area, described as magnificent by the ground force commanders,
33:00
Speaker 1: represented one of the greatest concentrations of tactical air operations
33:03
Speaker 1: in history. Rear Admiral James H. Doyle attributed the successful
33:08
Speaker 1: evacuation at Hungnam in large measure to the marine breakout.
33:12
Speaker 1: Writing to General Smith several months later, he asserted that
33:16
Speaker 1: he had filled in what has been a neglected page
33:19
Speaker 1: in the story of the Hungnam redeployment. It is simply
33:23
Speaker 1: this that the destruction of enemy forces wrought by the
33:26
Speaker 1: First Marine Division on the march down the hill was
33:29
Speaker 1: a major factor in the successful withdrawal, and that the
33:32
Speaker 1: destruction was so complete the enemy was unable to exert
33:35
Speaker 1: serious pressure at any time on the shrinking perimeter. To
33:39
Speaker 1: my mind, as I told you at Hungnam, the performance
33:42
Speaker 1: of the First Marine Division on that march constitutes one
33:45
Speaker 1: of the most glorious chapters in Marine Corps history. Letters
33:49
Speaker 1: of commendation were received by the First Marine Division from
33:52
Speaker 1: General Kates, CMC, General Shepherd, Admiral Joy, General Collins, Chief
33:58
Speaker 1: of Staff usr MS ME, General Almond, and many other
34:02
Speaker 1: high ranking military leaders. But for depth of feeling, for
34:07
Speaker 1: sincerity and emotion, there was no message which appealed more
34:10
Speaker 1: to the officers and men of the division than the
34:13
Speaker 1: concluding paragraph of this tribute from the commanding General, who
34:16
Speaker 1: had guided their destinies with unswerving courage, and who had
34:19
Speaker 1: come out with them Major General Oliver P. Smith. The
34:23
Speaker 1: performance of officers and men in this operation was magnificent.
34:27
Speaker 1: Rarely have all hands in a division participated so intimately
34:31
Speaker 1: in the combat phases of an operation. Every Marine can
34:35
Speaker 1: be justly proud of his participation in Korea, Tokyo and Washington.
34:40
Speaker 1: There is full appreciation of the remarkable feat of this division.
34:45
Speaker 1: With the knowledge of the determination, professional competence, heroism, devotion
34:50
Speaker 1: to duty, and self sacrifice displayed by officers and men
34:54
Speaker 1: of this division, my feeling is one of humble pride.
34:57
Speaker 1: No division commander has ever been privileged to command a
35:00
Speaker 1: finer body of men. End of Chapter fifteen, Part two.
35:06
Speaker 1: End of US Marine Operations in Korea nineteen fifty to
35:09
Speaker 1: nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen Reservoir Campaign by
35:14
Speaker 1: Lynn Montrosse and Nicholas Canzona, read by Aaron Bennett,