Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / The infostealer malware that doesn't need your password: Anthropic's Claude session theft
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Sunday, the thirtieth of August.
- 0:06The infostealer malware that doesn't need your password: Anthropic's Claude session theft.
- 0:13Anthropic told users this week that ordinary infostealer malware has started stealing something more useful
- 0:21than passwords: live Claude login sessions.
- 0:24This is the kind of malware that's been quietly harvesting browser passwords for years.
- 0:30Criminals used commodity tools.
- 0:32Vidar, LummaC2, StealC, RedLine and Acreed on Windows, and Atomic Stealer on Mac.
- 0:41They lifted active session cookies from infected machines.
- 0:45Then they reused them to log into other people's Claude accounts, running up usage on someone else's bill.
- 0:51No password. No one-time code.
- 0:54Anthropic is revoking the stolen sessions.
- 0:58It's stripping saved payment methods and refunding unauthorised charges.
- 1:03And it was careful to say the malware has nothing to do with Claude itself.
- 1:08It's generic credential-stealing software that happened to find a session token worth taking.
- 1:13That's a fair distinction.
- 1:15But it doesn't make the lesson go away.
- 1:17The same trick works against any browser-based SaaS tool a UK team logs into.
- 1:23And most of the defences organisations have built sit at the wrong layer to stop it.
- 1:28Next. The keycard, not the lock.
- 1:32Password strength and multi-factor authentication protect the front door.
- 1:36That's the moment someone proves who they are.
- 1:39A stolen session cookie skips the door entirely.
- 1:42Think of a stolen hotel keycard.
- 1:45Whoever holds it walks straight into the room.
- 1:48The hotel already checked identity when the card was issued, and it has no way of knowing the card changed ha
- 1:54nds.
- 2:00There's an easier target sitting in every browser's cookie store: proof of a login that already happened.
- 2:06Once that proof is copied, it works from anywhere, on any machine, until it expires or someone notices.
- 2:13And finally. The Secure by Design lesson.
- 2:17So the fix isn't "use a stronger password".
- 2:20The password was never involved.
- 2:23The fix is to shorten how long that proof of login stays valid and useful outside its original context.
- 2:30The N C S C's own guidance on agentic AI, published this month, makes exactly this point for a related probl
- 2:38em. Avoid long-lived credentials.
- 2:41Use temporary ones where possible.
- 2:43Revoke access as soon as a task is done.
- 2:46The same principle applies to ordinary human sessions, not just AI agents.
- 2:51If your organisation relies on browser-based tools, and by 2026 that's effectively all of them, treat sessio
- 2:59n lifetime as a control worth setting deliberately.
- 3:02Use shorter timeouts. Ask people to re-authenticate for sensitive actions, like changing payment details.
- 3:09And bind sessions to a device or I P range, so a copied cookie stops working the moment it moves.
- 3:16None of that shows up on a compliance checklist about password policy.
- 3:20Which is precisely why it gets skipped.
- 3:23That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:28Thanks for listening.