Latest / Philosophy / 026 - XXVI Events Matter and Mind
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter twenty six of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell. This LibriVox
- 0:04Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain events, matter, and mind.
- 0:10Speaker 1: Everything in the world is composed of events. That, at
- 0:14Speaker 1: least is the thesis I wish to maintain. An event,
- 0:18Speaker 1: as I understand, it is something having a small finite
- 0:22Speaker 1: duration and a small finite extension in space, or rather,
- 0:26Speaker 1: in view of the theory of relativity, it is something
- 0:29Speaker 1: occupying a small finite amount of space time if it
- 0:34Speaker 1: has parts. These parts, I say, are again events, never
- 0:39Speaker 1: something occupying a mere point of instant, whether in space,
- 0:43Speaker 1: in time, or in space time. The fact that an
- 0:46Speaker 1: event occupies a finite amount of space time does not
- 0:49Speaker 1: prove that it has parts. Events are not impenetrable, as
- 0:54Speaker 1: matter is supposed to be. On the contrary, every event
- 0:57Speaker 1: in space time is overlapped by other events. There is
- 1:02Speaker 1: no reason to suppose that any of the events with
- 1:04Speaker 1: which we are familiar are infinitely complex. On the contrary,
- 1:09Speaker 1: everything known about the world is compatible with the view
- 1:12Speaker 1: that every complex event has a finite number of parts.
- 1:17Speaker 1: We do not know that this is the case, but
- 1:20Speaker 1: it is a hypothesis which cannot be refuted and is
- 1:23Speaker 1: simpler than any other possible hypothesis. I shall therefore adopt
- 1:28Speaker 1: it as a working hypothesis. In what follows, when I
- 1:32Speaker 1: speak of an event, I do not mean anything out
- 1:35Speaker 1: of the way. Seeing a flash of lightning is an event.
- 1:39Speaker 1: So is hearing a tire burst, or smelling a rotten egg,
- 1:42Speaker 1: or feeling the coldness of a frog. These are events
- 1:46Speaker 1: that are data in the sense of Chapter twenty five.
- 1:49Speaker 1: But on the principles explained in that chapter, we infer
- 1:53Speaker 1: that there are events which are not data and happen
- 1:56Speaker 1: at a distance from our own body. Some of these
- 1:59Speaker 1: are data to other people, others are data to no one.
- 2:03Speaker 1: In the case of the flash of lightning, there is
- 2:06Speaker 1: an electromagnetic disturbance consisting of events traveling outward from the
- 2:11Speaker 1: place where the flash takes place. And then when this
- 2:14Speaker 1: disturbance reaches the eye of a person or animal that
- 2:18Speaker 1: can see, there is a percept which is causally continuous
- 2:22Speaker 1: with the events between the place of the lightning and
- 2:24Speaker 1: the body of the precipient. Percepts afford the logical premises
- 2:29Speaker 1: for all inferences to events that are not precepts. Wherever
- 2:34Speaker 1: such inferences are logically justifiable, particular colors and sounds and
- 2:39Speaker 1: so on are events. Their causal antecedents in the inanimate
- 2:44Speaker 1: world are also events. If we assume, as I propose
- 2:49Speaker 1: to do, that every event has only a finite number
- 2:52Speaker 1: of parts, then every event is composed of a finite
- 2:56Speaker 1: number of events that have no parts. Such event I
- 3:00Speaker 1: shall call minimal events. It will simplify our discussion to
- 3:04Speaker 1: assume them, but by a little circumlocution this assumption could
- 3:08Speaker 1: be eliminated. The reader must not, therefore regard it as
- 3:12Speaker 1: an essential part of what follows. A minimal event occupies
- 3:17Speaker 1: a finite region in space time. Let us take time
- 3:20Speaker 1: alone for purposes of illustration. The event in question may
- 3:25Speaker 1: overlap in time with each of two others, although the
- 3:29Speaker 1: first of these others wholly precedes the second. For example,
- 3:33Speaker 1: you may hear a long note on the violin while
- 3:35Speaker 1: you hear two short ones on the piano. It is
- 3:38Speaker 1: not necessary to suppose that these are really minimal events.
- 3:42Speaker 1: I merely want to illustrate what is meant. I assume
- 3:46Speaker 1: that every event is contemporaneous with events that are not
- 3:50Speaker 1: contemporaneous with each other. This is what is meant by
- 3:54Speaker 1: saying that every event lasts for a finite time, as
- 3:58Speaker 1: the reader can easily convince himself if he remembers that
- 4:01Speaker 1: time is wholly relational. If we look away from the
- 4:05Speaker 1: world of physics for a moment and confine ourselves to
- 4:08Speaker 1: the world of one man's experience, we can easily define
- 4:11Speaker 1: an instant in his life. It will be a group
- 4:15Speaker 1: of events, all belonging to his experience and having the
- 4:19Speaker 1: following two properties. One any two of the events overlap. Two.
- 4:26Speaker 1: No event outside the group overlaps with every member of
- 4:29Speaker 1: the group. By a slightly more complicated but essentially similar method,
- 4:35Speaker 1: we can define a point instant in space time as
- 4:38Speaker 1: a group of events having two properties analogous to those
- 4:42Speaker 1: used just now in defining an instant in one biography
- 4:47Speaker 1: footnote see the analysis of matter by the present author,
- 4:52Speaker 1: Chapter twenty eight end footnote. Thus, the points or point
- 4:57Speaker 1: instance that the mathematician needs are not simple, but are
- 5:01Speaker 1: structures composed of events made up for the convenience of
- 5:05Speaker 1: the mathematician. There will be many points of which a
- 5:08Speaker 1: given minimal event is a member. All these together make
- 5:13Speaker 1: up the region of space time occupied by that event.
- 5:17Speaker 1: Space time order as well as space time points. Results
- 5:21Speaker 1: from the relations between events. A piece of matter, like
- 5:25Speaker 1: a space time point, is to be constructed out of events,
- 5:29Speaker 1: but the construction is considerably more complicated, and in the
- 5:33Speaker 1: end is only an approximation to what the physicists supposes
- 5:37Speaker 1: to be really taking place. There are at the moment
- 5:41Speaker 1: two somewhat different views of matter, one appropriate to the
- 5:44Speaker 1: study of atomic structure, the other to the general theory
- 5:48Speaker 1: of relativity, as affording an explanation of gravitation. The view
- 5:53Speaker 1: appropriate to atomic structure has itself two forms, one derived
- 5:58Speaker 1: from Heisenberg, the other from Debrolier and Schroedinger. These two forms,
- 6:04Speaker 1: it is true, are mathematically equivalent, but in words, they
- 6:08Speaker 1: are very different. Heisenberg regards a piece of matter as
- 6:12Speaker 1: a center from which radiations travel outward. The radiations are
- 6:17Speaker 1: supposed really to occur, but the matter at their center
- 6:21Speaker 1: is reduced to a mere mathematical fiction. The radiations are,
- 6:25Speaker 1: for example, such as constitute light. They are all avowedly
- 6:30Speaker 1: systems of events, not changes in the conditions or relations
- 6:34Speaker 1: of substances. In the Debroleer Schrodinger system, matter consists of
- 6:39Speaker 1: wave motions. It is not necessary to the theory to
- 6:43Speaker 1: postulate anything about these wave motions except their mathematical characteristics.
- 6:48Speaker 1: But obviously, since they are to explain matters, they cannot
- 6:52Speaker 1: serve their purpose if they consist of motions of matter
- 6:56Speaker 1: in this system. Also, therefore, we are led to construct
- 7:00Speaker 1: matter out of systems of events which just happen and
- 7:03Speaker 1: do not happen to matter or to anything else. Gravitation,
- 7:09Speaker 1: as explained by the general theory of relativity, is reduced
- 7:12Speaker 1: to crinkles in space time space time being as we
- 7:16Speaker 1: have already seen a system constructed out of events, the
- 7:20Speaker 1: crinkles in it are also derived from events. There is
- 7:24Speaker 1: no reason to suppose that there is a thing at
- 7:27Speaker 1: the place where the crinkle is most crinkly. Thus, in
- 7:30Speaker 1: this part of physics, also matter has ceased to be
- 7:34Speaker 1: a thing and has become merely a mathematical characteristic of
- 7:37Speaker 1: the relations between complicated logical structures composed of events. It
- 7:43Speaker 1: was traditionally a property of substance to be permanent, and
- 7:47Speaker 1: to a considerable extent, matter has retained this property in
- 7:51Speaker 1: spite of its loss of substantiality, but its permanence now
- 7:55Speaker 1: is only approximate, not absolute. It is thought that an
- 7:59Speaker 1: ee electron in a proton can meet and annihilate each
- 8:03Speaker 1: other in the stars. This is supposed to be happening
- 8:06Speaker 1: on a large scale. Footnote see the Analysis of Matter
- 8:10Speaker 1: by the present author, Chapter twenty eight, end footnote. And
- 8:15Speaker 1: even while an electron or proton lasts, it has a
- 8:19Speaker 1: different kind of persistence from that formerly attributed to matter.
- 8:23Speaker 1: A wave in the sea persists for a longer or
- 8:26Speaker 1: shorter time. The waves that I see dashing themselves to
- 8:29Speaker 1: pieces on the Cornish coast may have come all the
- 8:32Speaker 1: way from Brazil, But that does not mean that a
- 8:34Speaker 1: thing has traveled across the Atlantic. It means only that
- 8:38Speaker 1: a certain process of change has traveled. And just as
- 8:42Speaker 1: a wave in the sea comes to grief at last
- 8:45Speaker 1: on the rocks, so an electron or proton may come
- 8:48Speaker 1: to grief when it meets some unusual state of affairs. Thus,
- 8:53Speaker 1: matter has very definitely come down in the world as
- 8:56Speaker 1: a result of recent physics. It used to be the
- 8:59Speaker 1: cause of our sensations. Doctor Johnson disproved Berkeley's denial of
- 9:04Speaker 1: matter by kicking a stone. If he had known that
- 9:08Speaker 1: his foot never touched the stone, and that both were
- 9:11Speaker 1: only complicated systems of wave motions, he might have been
- 9:14Speaker 1: less satisfied with his refutation. We cannot say that matter
- 9:19Speaker 1: is the cause of our sensations. We can say that
- 9:23Speaker 1: the events which cause our sensations usually belonged to the
- 9:26Speaker 1: sort of group that physicists regard as material. But that
- 9:30Speaker 1: is a very different thing. Impenetrability used to be a
- 9:34Speaker 1: noble property of matter, a kind of declaration of independence.
- 9:39Speaker 1: Now it is a merely tautological result of the way
- 9:42Speaker 1: in which matter is defined. The events which are the
- 9:45Speaker 1: real stuff of the world are not impenetrable, since they
- 9:49Speaker 1: can overlap in space time. In a word, matter has
- 9:53Speaker 1: become no more than a convenient shorthand for stating certain
- 9:57Speaker 1: causal laws concerning events. But if matter has fared badly,
- 10:02Speaker 1: mind has fared little better. The adjective mental is one
- 10:06Speaker 1: which is not capable of any exact significance. There is,
- 10:11Speaker 1: it is true, an important group of events, mainly percepts,
- 10:15Speaker 1: all of which may be called mental. But it would
- 10:18Speaker 1: be arbitrary to say that there are no mental events
- 10:21Speaker 1: except percepts. And yet it is difficult to find any
- 10:25Speaker 1: principle by which we can decide what other events should
- 10:28Speaker 1: be included. Perhaps the most essential characteristics of mind are
- 10:33Speaker 1: introspection and memory. But memory in some of its forms is,
- 10:38Speaker 1: as we have seen, a consequence of the law of
- 10:41Speaker 1: conditioned reflexes, which is at least as much physiological as psychological,
- 10:46Speaker 1: and characterizes living tissue rather than mind. Knowledge, as we
- 10:50Speaker 1: have found, is not easy to distinguish from sensitivity, which
- 10:54Speaker 1: is a property possessed by scientific instruments. Introspection is a
- 10:59Speaker 1: form of knowledge, but turns out on examination to be
- 11:03Speaker 1: little more than a cautious interpretation of ordinary knowledge. Where
- 11:08Speaker 1: the philosopher's child at the zoo says there is a
- 11:11Speaker 1: hippopotamus over there, the philosopher should reply, there is a
- 11:15Speaker 1: colored pattern of a certain shape, which may perhaps be
- 11:18Speaker 1: connected with a system of external causes of the sort
- 11:21Speaker 1: called a hippopotamus. I do not live up to this
- 11:25Speaker 1: precept myself. In saying that there is a colored pattern.
- 11:30Speaker 1: The philosopher is practicing introspection in the only sense that
- 11:33Speaker 1: I can attach to that term, i e. His knowledge
- 11:37Speaker 1: reaction is to an event situated in his own brain
- 11:41Speaker 1: from the standpoint of physical space, and is consciously avoiding
- 11:45Speaker 1: physiological and other inference as far as possible events to
- 11:49Speaker 1: which a knowledge reaction of this sort occurs are mental,
- 11:54Speaker 1: so are presumably other events resembling them in certain respects.
- 11:58Speaker 1: But I do not see any way of defining this
- 12:01Speaker 1: wider group except by saying that mental events are events
- 12:05Speaker 1: in a living brain, or better in a region. Combining
- 12:08Speaker 1: sensitivity and the law of learned reactions to a marked extent,
- 12:13Speaker 1: this definition has at least the merit of showing that
- 12:16Speaker 1: mentality is an affair of causal laws, not of the
- 12:19Speaker 1: quality of single events, and also that mentality is a
- 12:23Speaker 1: matter of degree. Perhaps it is not unnecessary to repeat
- 12:28Speaker 1: at this point that events in the brain are not
- 12:30Speaker 1: to be regarded as consisting of motions of bits of matter.
- 12:35Speaker 1: Matter and motion, as we have seen, are logical constructions
- 12:39Speaker 1: using events as their material, and events are therefore something
- 12:43Speaker 1: quite different from matter in motion. I take it that
- 12:46Speaker 1: when we have a percept, just what we perceive if
- 12:50Speaker 1: we avoid avoidable sources of error, is an event occupying
- 12:54Speaker 1: part of the region which, for physics is occupied by
- 12:58Speaker 1: the brain. In fact, perception gives us the most concrete
- 13:02Speaker 1: knowledge we possess as to the stuff of the physical world.
- 13:06Speaker 1: But what we perceive is part of the stuff of
- 13:08Speaker 1: our brains, not part of the stuff of tables and chairs, sun, moon,
- 13:13Speaker 1: and stars. Suppose we are looking at a leaf and
- 13:17Speaker 1: we see a green patch. This patch is not out
- 13:21Speaker 1: there where the leaf is, but is an event occupying
- 13:24Speaker 1: a certain volume in our brains during the time that
- 13:27Speaker 1: we see the leaf. Seeing the leaf consists of the
- 13:30Speaker 1: existence in the region occupied by our brain of a
- 13:34Speaker 1: green patch causally connected with the leaf, or rather with
- 13:38Speaker 1: a series of events emanating from the place in physical
- 13:41Speaker 1: space where physics places the leaf. The percept is one
- 13:45Speaker 1: of this series of events, differing from the others in
- 13:49Speaker 1: its effects, owing to the peculiarities of the region in
- 13:52Speaker 1: which it occurs. Or perhaps it would be more correct
- 13:55Speaker 1: to say that the different effects are the peculiarities of
- 13:59Speaker 1: the region. Thus, mind and mental are merely approximate concepts,
- 14:04Speaker 1: giving a convenient shorthand for certain approximate laws. In a
- 14:09Speaker 1: completed science, the word mind and the word matter would
- 14:12Speaker 1: both disappear and would be replaced by causal laws concerning events.
- 14:17Speaker 1: The only events known to us otherwise in their mathematical
- 14:21Speaker 1: and causal properties being percepts, which are events situated in
- 14:25Speaker 1: the same region as a brain and having effects of
- 14:28Speaker 1: a peculiar sort called knowledge. Reactions. It will be seen
- 14:33Speaker 1: that the view which I am advocating is neither materialism
- 14:36Speaker 1: nor mentalism, but what we call neutral monism. It is
- 14:41Speaker 1: monism in the sense that it regards the world as
- 14:44Speaker 1: composed of only one kind of stuff, namely events, but
- 14:48Speaker 1: it is pluralism in the sense that it admits the
- 14:51Speaker 1: existence of a great multiplicity of events, each minimal event
- 14:56Speaker 1: being a logically self subsistent entity. There is, however, another
- 15:01Speaker 1: question not quite the same as this, namely the question
- 15:06Speaker 1: as to the relations of psychology and physics. If we
- 15:09Speaker 1: knew more, would psychology be absorbed in physics, or conversely,
- 15:14Speaker 1: would physics be absorbed in psychology. A man may be
- 15:18Speaker 1: a materialist and yet hold that psychology is an independent science.
- 15:23Speaker 1: This is the view taken by doctor Broad in his
- 15:25Speaker 1: important book The Mind and Its Place in Nature. He
- 15:30Speaker 1: holds that a mind is a material structure, but that
- 15:33Speaker 1: it has properties which could not even theoretically, be inferred
- 15:37Speaker 1: from those of its material constituents. He points out that
- 15:41Speaker 1: structures very often have properties which, in the present state
- 15:45Speaker 1: of our knowledge, cannot be inferred from the properties and
- 15:48Speaker 1: relations of their parts. Water has many properties which we
- 15:53Speaker 1: cannot infer from those of hydrogen and oxygen, even if
- 15:56Speaker 1: we suppose ourselves to know the structure of the molecule
- 15:59Speaker 1: of water water more completely than we do as yet,
- 16:03Speaker 1: properties of a whole which cannot even theoretically be inferred
- 16:07Speaker 1: from the properties and relations of its parts are called
- 16:10Speaker 1: by doctor broad emergent properties. Thus he holds that a
- 16:15Speaker 1: mind or brain has properties which are emergent, and to
- 16:19Speaker 1: this extent, psychology will be independent of physics and chemistry.
- 16:24Speaker 1: The emergent properties of minds will only be discoverable by
- 16:28Speaker 1: observation of minds, not by inference from the laws of
- 16:31Speaker 1: physics and chemistry. This possibility is an important one, and
- 16:36Speaker 1: it will be worthwhile to consider it. Our decision to
- 16:40Speaker 1: regard a unit of matter as itself not ultimate but
- 16:43Speaker 1: an assemblage of events somewhat alters the form of our
- 16:47Speaker 1: question as to emergent properties. We have to ask, is
- 16:52Speaker 1: matter emergent from events? Is mind emergent from events? If
- 16:58Speaker 1: the former is mind emergent form matter or deducible from
- 17:02Speaker 1: the properties of matter, or neither. If the latter is
- 17:06Speaker 1: matter emergent from mind, or deducible from the properties of mind,
- 17:11Speaker 1: or neither. Of course, if neither mind nor matter is
- 17:15Speaker 1: emergent from events. These latter questions do not arise. Let
- 17:20Speaker 1: us coin a word chronogeography for the science which begins
- 17:24Speaker 1: with events having space time relations and does not assume
- 17:28Speaker 1: at the outset that certain strings of them can be
- 17:30Speaker 1: treated as persistent material units or as minds. Then we
- 17:35Speaker 1: have to ask ourselves first, can the science of matter
- 17:39Speaker 1: as appears in physics and chemistry be wholly reduced to chronogeography?
- 17:44Speaker 1: If no matter is emergent from events? If yes, it
- 17:48Speaker 1: is not emergent. Is matter emergent from events? In the
- 17:54Speaker 1: present state of science, it is difficult to give a
- 17:56Speaker 1: decided answer to this question. Of matter in modern physics
- 18:02Speaker 1: has become absorbed into the notion of energy. Eddington, in
- 18:06Speaker 1: his Mathematical Theory of Relativity, shows that in virtue of
- 18:10Speaker 1: the laws assumed concerning events, there must be something having
- 18:14Speaker 1: the observed properties of matter and energy as regards conservation.
- 18:19Speaker 1: This he calls the material energy tensor, and suggests that
- 18:23Speaker 1: it is the reality which we sometimes call matter and
- 18:26Speaker 1: sometimes energy. To this extent, matter has been shown to
- 18:30Speaker 1: be not emergent, but the existence of electrons and protons
- 18:35Speaker 1: to the extent that they do exist has not yet
- 18:38Speaker 1: been deduced from the general theory of relativity, though attempts
- 18:42Speaker 1: are being made and may at any moment succeed. If
- 18:46Speaker 1: and when these attempts succeed, physics will cease to be
- 18:49Speaker 1: in any degree independent of chronogeography. But for the present
- 18:53Speaker 1: it remains in part independent. As for chemistry. Although we
- 18:58Speaker 1: cannot practically reduce all to physics, we can see how
- 19:02Speaker 1: theoretically this could be done, and I think it is
- 19:05Speaker 1: safe to assume that it is not an ultimately independent science.
- 19:10Speaker 1: The question we have been asking is could we predict
- 19:14Speaker 1: theoretically from the laws of events that there must be
- 19:17Speaker 1: material units obeying the laws which they do in fact obey,
- 19:22Speaker 1: or is this a new logically independent fact in theory.
- 19:27Speaker 1: We might be able to prove that it is not independent,
- 19:30Speaker 1: but it would be very difficult to prove that it is.
- 19:33Speaker 1: The present position is, broadly speaking, that the continuous properties
- 19:38Speaker 1: of the physical world can be deduced from chronogeography, but
- 19:42Speaker 1: not the discontinuous facts viz. Electrons and protons and planks quantum. Thus,
- 19:48Speaker 1: for the present, materiality is practically, though perhaps not theoretically,
- 19:53Speaker 1: an emergent characteristic of certain groups of events. Is mind
- 19:58Speaker 1: emergent from events? This question, as yet can hardly be
- 20:03Speaker 1: even discussed intelligently, because psychology is not a sufficiently advanced science.
- 20:09Speaker 1: There are nevertheless some points to be noted. Chronogeography is
- 20:14Speaker 1: concerned only with the abstract mathematical properties of events, and cannot, conceivably,
- 20:20Speaker 1: unless it is radically transformed, prove that there are visual
- 20:24Speaker 1: events or auditory events, or events of any of the
- 20:28Speaker 1: kinds that we know by perception. In this sense, psychology
- 20:32Speaker 1: is certainly emergent from chronogeography, and also from physics, and
- 20:36Speaker 1: it is hard to see how it can ever cease
- 20:39Speaker 1: to be so. The reason for this is that our
- 20:42Speaker 1: knowledge of data contains features of a qualitative sort which
- 20:45Speaker 1: cannot be deduced from the merely mathematical features of the
- 20:49Speaker 1: space time events inferred from data, And yet these abstract
- 20:53Speaker 1: mathematical features are all that we can legitimately infer. The
- 20:57Speaker 1: above argument decides also that mind must be emergent for
- 21:01Speaker 1: matter if it is a material structure. No amount of
- 21:05Speaker 1: physics can ever tell us all that we do in
- 21:07Speaker 1: fact know about our own percepts. We have still to
- 21:11Speaker 1: ask whether we are to regard a mind as a
- 21:13Speaker 1: structure of material units or not. If we do so
- 21:17Speaker 1: regard it, we are, so far as mind is concerned,
- 21:21Speaker 1: emergent materialists. In view of what we have just decided,
- 21:25Speaker 1: this is the view favored by doctor Broad. If we
- 21:28Speaker 1: do not so regard it, we are in no sense materialists.
- 21:32Speaker 1: In favor of the materialist view, there is the fact that,
- 21:36Speaker 1: so far as our experience goes, minds only emerge in
- 21:40Speaker 1: connection with certain physical structures, namely living bodies, and that
- 21:44Speaker 1: mental development increases with a certain kind of complexity of
- 21:48Speaker 1: physical structure. We cannot set against this the argument that
- 21:53Speaker 1: minds have peculiar characteristics, for this is quite consistent with
- 21:57Speaker 1: emergent materialism. If we are to refute it, it must
- 22:02Speaker 1: be by finding out what sort of group of events
- 22:05Speaker 1: constitutes a mind. It is time to address ourselves to
- 22:09Speaker 1: this question, what is a mind? It is obvious to
- 22:13Speaker 1: begin with that a mind must be a group of
- 22:16Speaker 1: mental events, since we have rejected the view that it
- 22:19Speaker 1: is a single simple entity, such as the ego was
- 22:23Speaker 1: formerly supposed to be. Our first step, therefore, is to
- 22:26Speaker 1: be clear as to what we mean by a mental event.
- 22:30Speaker 1: We set a few pages ago that mental events are
- 22:34Speaker 1: events in a region combining sensitivity in the law of
- 22:37Speaker 1: learned reactions to a marked extent. For practical purposes, this means,
- 22:43Speaker 1: subject to a proviso to be explained shortly, that a
- 22:46Speaker 1: mental event is any event in a living brain. We
- 22:50Speaker 1: explain that this does not mean that a mental event
- 22:53Speaker 1: consists of matter in motion, which is what an old
- 22:56Speaker 1: fashioned physicist would regard as the sort of event that
- 22:59Speaker 1: happens in a brain. Matter in motion, we have seen,
- 23:03Speaker 1: is not an event in our sense, but a shorthand
- 23:06Speaker 1: description of a very complicated causal process among events of
- 23:10Speaker 1: a different sort. But we must say a few words
- 23:14Speaker 1: in justification of our definition. Let us consider some alternative definitions.
- 23:20Speaker 1: A mental event, we might say, is one which is experienced.
- 23:25Speaker 1: When is an event experienced we might say when it
- 23:29Speaker 1: has mnemic effects, i e. Effects governed by the law
- 23:32Speaker 1: of association. But we saw that this law applies to
- 23:36Speaker 1: pure bodily events, such as the contraction of the pupil,
- 23:40Speaker 1: with which nothing mental seems to be connected. Thus, if
- 23:44Speaker 1: our definition is to serve we shall have to define
- 23:47Speaker 1: experience differently. We shall have to say that the mnemic
- 23:51Speaker 1: events must include something that can be called knowledge. This
- 23:55Speaker 1: would suggest the definition a mental event is anything that
- 23:59Speaker 1: is remembered, but this is too narrow. We only remember
- 24:03Speaker 1: a small proportion of our mental events. We might have
- 24:07Speaker 1: regarded consciousness as the essence of mental events, but this
- 24:10Speaker 1: view was examined and found inadequate in Chapter twenty. Moreover,
- 24:15Speaker 1: we do not want our definition to exclude the unconscious.
- 24:20Speaker 1: It is clear that the primary mental events, those about
- 24:23Speaker 1: which there can be no question, are percepts. But percepts
- 24:27Speaker 1: have certain peculiar causal properties, notably that they give rise
- 24:31Speaker 1: to knowledge reactions, and that they are capable of having
- 24:35Speaker 1: mnemic effects, which are cognitions. These causal properties, however, belong
- 24:40Speaker 1: to some events which are not apparently percepts. It seems
- 24:44Speaker 1: that any event in the brain may have these properties.
- 24:48Speaker 1: And perhaps we were too hasty in saying that the
- 24:50Speaker 1: contraction of the pupil on hearing a loud noise involves
- 24:53Speaker 1: nothing mental. There may be other mental events connected with
- 24:58Speaker 1: the human body besides those belonging to the central personality.
- 25:02Speaker 1: I shall come back to this possibility presently. Meanwhile, I
- 25:06Speaker 1: shall adhere to the above definition of a mental event, which,
- 25:10Speaker 1: as we saw, makes mentality a matter of degree. We
- 25:14Speaker 1: can now return to the question what is a mind.
- 25:18Speaker 1: There may be mental events not forming part of the
- 25:21Speaker 1: sort of group that we should call a mind, but
- 25:23Speaker 1: there certainly our groups having that kind of unity that
- 25:26Speaker 1: make us call them one mind. There are two marked
- 25:30Speaker 1: characteristics of a mind. First, it is connected with a
- 25:34Speaker 1: certain body. Secondly, it has the unity of one experience.
- 25:40Speaker 1: The two prima facie diverge in cases of dual or
- 25:43Speaker 1: multiple personality, but I think this is more apparent than real.
- 25:48Speaker 1: These two characteristics are one physical, the other psychological. Let
- 25:53Speaker 1: us consider each in turn. Is a possible definition of
- 25:56Speaker 1: what we mean by one mind in the film physical way.
- 26:01Speaker 1: We begin by observing that every mental event known to
- 26:04Speaker 1: us is also part of the history of a living body,
- 26:07Speaker 1: and we define a mind as the group of mental
- 26:10Speaker 1: events which form part of the history of a certain
- 26:13Speaker 1: living body. The definition of a living body is chemical,
- 26:17Speaker 1: and the reduction of chemistry to physics is clear in theory,
- 26:21Speaker 1: though in practice the mathematics is too difficult. It is
- 26:24Speaker 1: so far a merely empirical fact that mnemic causation is
- 26:28Speaker 1: almost exclusively associated with matter having a certain chemical structure.
- 26:33Speaker 1: But the same may be said of magnetism. As yet,
- 26:36Speaker 1: we cannot deduce the magnetic properties of iron from what
- 26:39Speaker 1: we know of the structure of the atom of iron,
- 26:42Speaker 1: but no one doubts that they could be deduced by
- 26:45Speaker 1: a person with sufficient knowledge and sufficient mathematical skill. In
- 26:49Speaker 1: like manner, it may be assumed that mnemic causation is
- 26:53Speaker 1: theoretically deducible from the structure of living matter. If we
- 26:57Speaker 1: knew enough, we might be able to infer that some
- 27:00Speaker 1: other possible structure would exhibit mnemic phenomena, perhaps in an
- 27:04Speaker 1: even more marked degree. If so, we might be able
- 27:08Speaker 1: to construct robots who would be more intelligent than we are.
- 27:12Speaker 1: In the psychological way of defining a mind, it consists
- 27:16Speaker 1: of all the mental events connected with a given mental
- 27:19Speaker 1: event by experience, i e. By mnemic causation. But this
- 27:24Speaker 1: definition needs a little elaboration before it can be regarded
- 27:27Speaker 1: as precise. We do not want the contraction of the
- 27:31Speaker 1: pupil to count as a mental event. Therefore, a mental
- 27:35Speaker 1: event will have to be one which has mnemic effects,
- 27:38Speaker 1: not merely mnemic causes. In that case, however, there cannot
- 27:42Speaker 1: be a last mental event in a man's life unless
- 27:45Speaker 1: we assume that it may have mnemic effects on his
- 27:47Speaker 1: body after death. Perhaps we may avoid this inconvenience by
- 27:52Speaker 1: discovering the kind of event that usually has mnemic effects,
- 27:56Speaker 1: though they may be prevented from occurring by special circumstances.
- 28:00Speaker 1: Or we might maintain that death is gradual even when
- 28:03Speaker 1: it is called instantaneous. In that case, the last events
- 28:08Speaker 1: in a man's life grow progressively less mental as life Ebbs.
- 28:13Speaker 1: Neglecting this point, which is not very important, we shall
- 28:16Speaker 1: define the experience to which a given mental event belongs
- 28:19Speaker 1: as all those mental events which can be reached from
- 28:22Speaker 1: the given event by a mnemic causal chain, which may
- 28:26Speaker 1: go backwards or forwards, or alternatively, first one and then
- 28:29Speaker 1: the other. This may be conceived on the analogy of
- 28:33Speaker 1: an engine shunting at a juncture, or where there are
- 28:36Speaker 1: many points any line that can be reached by. However,
- 28:39Speaker 1: many shuntings will count as part of the same experience.
- 28:44Speaker 1: We cannot be sure that all the mental events connected
- 28:47Speaker 1: with one body are connected by links of mnemic causation
- 28:50Speaker 1: with each other, and therefore we cannot be sure that
- 28:54Speaker 1: our two definitions of one mind give the same result.
- 28:58Speaker 1: In cases of multiple personnel, some at least of the
- 29:02Speaker 1: usual mnemic effects, notably recollection, are absent in the life
- 29:06Speaker 1: of one personality when they have occurred in the life
- 29:09Speaker 1: of the other. But probably both personalities are connected by
- 29:13Speaker 1: mnemic chains with events which occurred before the dissociation took place,
- 29:18Speaker 1: so that there would be only one mind according to
- 29:21Speaker 1: our definition. But there are other possibilities which must be considered.
- 29:26Speaker 1: It may be that each cell in the body has
- 29:29Speaker 1: its own mental life, and that only selections from these
- 29:32Speaker 1: mental lives go to make up the life which we
- 29:35Speaker 1: regard as ours. The unconscious might be mental lives of
- 29:39Speaker 1: subordinate parts of the body, having occasional mnemic effects which
- 29:44Speaker 1: we can notice, but in the main separate from the
- 29:47Speaker 1: life of which we are conscious. If so, the mental
- 29:50Speaker 1: events connected with one body will be more numerous than
- 29:54Speaker 1: the events making up its central mind. These, however, are
- 29:58Speaker 1: only speculative possibilities. I spoke a moment ago of the
- 30:02Speaker 1: life of which we are conscious, and perhaps the reader
- 30:05Speaker 1: has been wondering why I have not made more use
- 30:08Speaker 1: of the notion of consciousness. The reason is that I
- 30:12Speaker 1: regarded as only one kind of mnemic effect, and not
- 30:15Speaker 1: one entitled to a special place to say that I
- 30:19Speaker 1: am conscious. Of an event is to say that I
- 30:21Speaker 1: recollect it at any rate for a short time after
- 30:24Speaker 1: it has happened. To say that I recollect an event
- 30:28Speaker 1: is to say that a certain event is occurring to
- 30:30Speaker 1: me now, which is connected by mnemic causation with the
- 30:33Speaker 1: event recollected, and is of the sort that we call
- 30:36Speaker 1: a cognition of the event. But events which I do
- 30:39Speaker 1: not recollect may have mnemic effects upon me. This is
- 30:43Speaker 1: the case not only where we have Freudian suppression, but
- 30:46Speaker 1: in all habits which were learnt long ago and have
- 30:49Speaker 1: now become automatic, such as writing and speaking. The emphasis
- 30:53Speaker 1: upon consciousness has made a mystery of the unconscious, which
- 30:57Speaker 1: ought to be in no way surprising. It does not
- 31:01Speaker 1: much matter which of our two definitions of a mind
- 31:04Speaker 1: we adopt. Let us provisionally adopt the first definition, so
- 31:08Speaker 1: that a mind is all the mental events which form
- 31:11Speaker 1: part of the history of a certain living body, or
- 31:14Speaker 1: perhaps we should rather say a living brain. We can
- 31:18Speaker 1: now tackle the question which is to decide whether we
- 31:21Speaker 1: are emergent materialists or not, Namely, is a mind a
- 31:25Speaker 1: structure of material units? I think it is clear that
- 31:29Speaker 1: the answer to this question is in the negative, even
- 31:33Speaker 1: if a mind consists of all the events in a brain.
- 31:36Speaker 1: It does not consist of bundles of these events grouped
- 31:39Speaker 1: as physics groups them, i e. It does not lump
- 31:42Speaker 1: together all the events that make up one piece of
- 31:45Speaker 1: matter in the brain, and then all the events that
- 31:48Speaker 1: make up another, and so on. Mnemic causation is what
- 31:51Speaker 1: concerns us most in studying mind. If we assume, as
- 31:55Speaker 1: seems plausible, that mental mnema causation is due to effects
- 31:59Speaker 1: of the brain, This question, however, is still an open one.
- 32:04Speaker 1: If mnema causation is ultimate, mind is emergent. If not,
- 32:09Speaker 1: the question is more difficult. As we saw earlier, there
- 32:13Speaker 1: certainly is knowledge in psychology which cannot ever form part
- 32:17Speaker 1: of physics. But as this point is important, I shall
- 32:21Speaker 1: repeat the argument in different terms. The difference between physics
- 32:25Speaker 1: and psychology is analogous to that between a postman's knowledge
- 32:29Speaker 1: of letters and the knowledge of a recipient of letters.
- 32:33Speaker 1: The postman knows the movements of many letters, the recipient
- 32:37Speaker 1: knows the contents of a few. We may regard the
- 32:40Speaker 1: light and sound waves that go about the world as
- 32:43Speaker 1: letters of which the physicist may know the destination. Some
- 32:47Speaker 1: few of them are addressed to human beings, and when read,
- 32:50Speaker 1: gives psychological knowledge. Of course, the analogy is not perfect,
- 32:55Speaker 1: because the letters with which the physicist deals are continually
- 32:59Speaker 1: changing to in their journeys, as if they were written
- 33:02Speaker 1: in fading ink, which also was not quite dry all
- 33:05Speaker 1: the time, but occasionally got smudged with rain. However, the
- 33:09Speaker 1: analogy may pass if not pressed. It would be possible
- 33:13Speaker 1: without altering the detail of previous discussions, except that of
- 33:17Speaker 1: chapter twenty five, to give a different turn to the
- 33:20Speaker 1: argument and make matter a structure composed of mental units.
- 33:25Speaker 1: I am not quite sure that this is the wrong view.
- 33:28Speaker 1: It arises not unnaturally from the argument as to data
- 33:32Speaker 1: contained in chapter twenty five. We saw that all data
- 33:36Speaker 1: are mental events in the narrowest and strictest sense, since
- 33:40Speaker 1: they are percepts. Consequently, all verification of causal laws consists
- 33:46Speaker 1: in the occurrence of expected percepts. Consequently, any inference beyond percepts,
- 33:52Speaker 1: actual or possible is incapable of being empirically tested. We
- 33:57Speaker 1: shall therefore be prudent if we regard the non mental
- 34:00Speaker 1: events of physics as mere auxiliary concepts, not assumed to
- 34:05Speaker 1: have any reality, but introduced to simplify the laws of percepts.
- 34:10Speaker 1: Thus matter will be a construction built out of percepts,
- 34:14Speaker 1: and our metaphysic will be essentially that of Berkeley. If
- 34:18Speaker 1: there are no non mental events, causal laws will be
- 34:22Speaker 1: very odd. For example, a hidden dictaphone may record a
- 34:26Speaker 1: conversation although it did not exist at the time, since
- 34:29Speaker 1: no one was perceiving it. But although this seems odd,
- 34:33Speaker 1: it is not logically impossible, and it must be conceded
- 34:37Speaker 1: that it enables us to interpret physics with a smaller
- 34:40Speaker 1: amount of dubious, inductive and analogical inference than is required
- 34:45Speaker 1: if we admit non mental events. In spite of the
- 34:49Speaker 1: logical merits of this view, I cannot bring myself to
- 34:52Speaker 1: accept it, though I am not sure that my reasons
- 34:55Speaker 1: for disliking it are any better than doctor Johnson's. I
- 34:59Speaker 1: find myself constitutionally incapable of believing that the sun would
- 35:04Speaker 1: not exist on a day when he was everywhere hidden
- 35:06Speaker 1: by clouds, or that the meat in a pie springs
- 35:10Speaker 1: into existence at the moment when the pie is opened.
- 35:13Speaker 1: I know the logical answer to such objections, and qua logician,
- 35:17Speaker 1: I think the answer a good one. The logical argument however,
- 35:21Speaker 1: does not even tend to show that there are not
- 35:24Speaker 1: non mental events. It only tends to show that we
- 35:27Speaker 1: have no right to feel sure of their existence. For
- 35:31Speaker 1: my part, I find myself, in fact believing in them,
- 35:34Speaker 1: in spite of all that can be said to persuade
- 35:36Speaker 1: me that I ought to feel doubtful. There is an
- 35:39Speaker 1: argument of a sort against the view that we are considering.
- 35:44Speaker 1: I have been assuming that we admit the existence of
- 35:46Speaker 1: other people and their perceptions, but question only the inference
- 35:51Speaker 1: from perceptions to events of a certain kind. Now there
- 35:54Speaker 1: is no good reason why we should not carry our
- 35:57Speaker 1: logical caution a step further. I cannot verify a theory
- 36:01Speaker 1: by means of another man's perceptions, but only by means
- 36:04Speaker 1: of my own. Therefore, the laws of physics can only
- 36:08Speaker 1: be verified by me in so far as they lead
- 36:10Speaker 1: to predictions of my percepts. If then I refuse to
- 36:15Speaker 1: admit non mental events because they are not verifiable, I
- 36:19Speaker 1: ought to refuse to admit mental events in everyone except
- 36:22Speaker 1: myself on the same ground. Thus I am reduced to
- 36:26Speaker 1: what is called solypsism, i e. The theory that I
- 36:30Speaker 1: alone exist. This is a view which is hard to refute,
- 36:34Speaker 1: but still harder to believe. I once received a letter
- 36:38Speaker 1: from a philosopher who professed to be a slypsist, but
- 36:42Speaker 1: was surprised that there were no others. Yet this philosopher
- 36:46Speaker 1: was by way of believing that no one else existed.
- 36:50Speaker 1: This shows that solypsism is not really believed, even by
- 36:54Speaker 1: those who think they are convinced of its truth. We
- 36:57Speaker 1: may go a step further. The past ust can only
- 37:00Speaker 1: be verified indirectly by means of its effects in the future. Therefore,
- 37:05Speaker 1: the type of logical caution we have been considering should
- 37:09Speaker 1: lead us to abstain from asserting that the past really occurred.
- 37:13Speaker 1: We ought to regard it as consisting of auxiliary concepts
- 37:16Speaker 1: convenient in stating the laws applicable to the future. And
- 37:20Speaker 1: since the future, though verifiable if and when it occurs,
- 37:25Speaker 1: is as yet unverified, we ought to suspend judgment about
- 37:28Speaker 1: the future. Also, if we are not willing to go
- 37:32Speaker 1: so far as this, there seems no reason to draw
- 37:35Speaker 1: the line at the precise point where it was drawn
- 37:37Speaker 1: by Berkeley. On these grounds, I feel no shame in
- 37:41Speaker 1: admitting the existence of non mental events such as the
- 37:44Speaker 1: laws of physics lead us to infer. Nevertheless, it is
- 37:48Speaker 1: important to realize that other views are tenable. End of
- 37:53Speaker 1: Chapter twenty six