Latest / Eye Spy: The Intelligence History Podcast / Spying in South Asia
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to EyeSpy, the Intelligence History Podcast.
- 0:08I'm your host, Krystel von Kumberg.
- 0:12Every few weeks, I'm going to be interviewing historians, practitioners and scholars in
- 0:16the field of intelligence to explore some aspect of the past and what it can tell us
- 0:21about the present and future of intelligence studies.
- 0:28Today we'll be discussing Paul McGarra's new book, Expying in South Asia, Britain,
- 0:32the United States and India's Secret Cold War, which is coming out today.
- 0:37This book is the first of its kind, examining the importance of the global south after World
- 0:41War II and interventions made by Western intelligence services in post-colonial India, as well as
- 0:47how the foreign hand has affected India's socio-political discourse and cultural production.
- 0:51Dr. Paul McGarr is a lecturer in intelligence studies at King's College, London.
- 0:55He has published widely on British and American intelligence interventions concerning post-colonial
- 1:00South Asia.
- 1:01His work focuses on non-Western intelligence cultures, disinformation, intelligence liaison
- 1:06and covert action.
- 1:08Welcome.
- 1:09It's an honor to have you here today.
- 1:14Thank you for joining us on iSpy, the Intelligence History Podcast.
- 1:20So I wanted to begin by considering how we view the Cold War, generally speaking, today.
- 1:29And generally we see it as a conflict of ideologies, a struggle between socialist East and capitalist
- 1:34West.
- 1:36And in this context, the global South has been somewhat sidelined in mainstream Cold
- 1:41War history.
- 1:43So really, my question is, how does your book rectify this gap in the literature?
- 1:48And would you say it forces us to conceptualize this period in a new light?
- 1:52Thanks, Christel.
- 1:53And thanks for inviting me on the podcast.
- 1:55I'm really grateful for the invitation.
- 1:56Yeah, it's a great question, great first question, actually.
- 1:59And I think really gets to the heart of what my book was aiming to do, which was to think
- 2:03about new ways of approaching the Cold War, particularly as an ideological conflict.
- 2:08Lots of literature, certainly up until the last 10 years or so, has been approaching
- 2:10the conflict in a very sort of binary East-West way.
- 2:14So it very frames it sort of map perspective, really, from the perspective of the Cold War
- 2:17between Washington and Moscow.
- 2:19And what I tried to do is to shift that lens slightly and have a look at the Cold War from
- 2:24a North-South perspective.
- 2:25And I think if you do that, it does fundamentally change the way you approach the Cold War and
- 2:30about how participants in it acted and why they acted.
- 2:32So it tells us something about actions, but also motivations as well, and also about outcomes.
- 2:38And actually, interestingly, I think you've hit on the question that does get really to
- 2:43the roots of my book.
- 2:44So on the first page of the introduction, there are two quotations.
- 2:47One is from Jawaharlal Nehru, who was India's first premier, first prime minister, from
- 2:531947 until 1964 when he died in office.
- 2:56And the second quotation is just from a normal Indian citizen, just a citizen from Bombay,
- 3:02whose name was Anand Nawaz.
- 3:04And he wrote a letter to William O. Douglas, who was then serving on the United States
- 3:09Supreme Court.
- 3:10And Douglas, whenever the court was out of session, which it often was and often is still
- 3:14today, lots of long holidays on the Supreme Court, great job.
- 3:16Douglas used to travel really widely and he had a particular fascination with Asia.
- 3:21So he spent a lot of time in Southeast Asia, but also a lot of time in South Asia.
- 3:26And he really came to love India and Pakistan and traveled there widely during the 1950s
- 3:32and 1960s.
- 3:33He wrote three bestselling books based on his travels through India and Pakistan, which
- 3:36are fascinating reading.
- 3:38And in Douglas's private papers, which are contained in the Library of Congress, the
- 3:42manuscripts division in Washington, D.C., there are lots of letters from just ordinary
- 3:47Indian citizens and Pakistani citizens who came across Douglas on his public speaking
- 3:51tours or read articles that he wrote for Indian and Pakistani newspapers while he was in South
- 3:55Asia.
- 3:56And they corresponded with him.
- 3:58And one of those letters was from this guy called Anand Nawaz.
- 4:00And it's about the Cold War.
- 4:02And it's a really interesting letter just from an average Indian.
- 4:05And he says, look, I'm just a citizen of Bombay, Mumbai now.
- 4:09And I was just really intrigued by your take on the Cold War and ideological sort of perspective
- 4:13on it.
- 4:14And he was just emphasizing to Douglas that actually the Cold War for him just wasn't
- 4:17about ideology.
- 4:18And the Cold War and Western intervention, he wasn't really concerned about the ideological
- 4:23context of it.
- 4:24His interaction with the United States and the Soviet Union was very much more transactional.
- 4:29It was about what can those social systems do for me in terms of jobs, in terms of educational
- 4:33opportunities, in terms of how my family's welfare might develop.
- 4:37It was a much more sort of grassroots approach to the Cold War.
- 4:42And it struck me that it really gets to the heart of what American and Soviet policymakers
- 4:46often miss, because most South Asians weren't really ideologically wedded to a Cold War.
- 4:50They weren't wedded to a social system, whether it be capitalism or socialism.
- 4:54It was much more about how those social systems might deliver for South Asians, given their
- 5:00particular sort of challenges that they faced.
- 5:02And interestingly, Nir is saying much the same thing.
- 5:04So we have sort of history from below coming from letters that Indian citizens were writing
- 5:08back to American policymakers, which are quite interesting, I think.
- 5:11But also history from above, elite Indian history from people like Nirri, who were basically
- 5:16saying at the same time, Nirri's quote comes from 1954, I think.
- 5:21The letter from Anand Niswas is 1952.
- 5:23So it's the beginning of the Cold War period, in an Indian context, at least.
- 5:27And Nirri's saying much the same thing.
- 5:29He's saying, I don't really understand why the West and the East are fighting the Cold
- 5:33War in the way they are.
- 5:34They seem to be intervening in Asia.
- 5:36And here we're just off the back of the Korean War finishing in 1953.
- 5:39Nir is saying they're intervening in Asia, but they're not really involving Asians.
- 5:43This seems to be a Cold War where Moscow is fighting Washington with its allies, but no
- 5:49one's really involving Asia.
- 5:50No one's talking to India.
- 5:51No one's talking to people in Southeast Asia.
- 5:54Beijing has been isolated by the United States in diplomatic terms.
- 5:58So Nir is just emphasizing, it seems very odd to him this Cold War is being fought largely
- 6:03in Asia in the early 1950s, but without any Western or Eastern, and by Eastern I mean
- 6:08Russian, involvement of Asian powers or Asian statesmen.
- 6:12So it really struck me as interesting that they had a very different, both elite levels
- 6:15of Indians and Indians coming up with history from below, very different approaches to the
- 6:19Cold War.
- 6:20I think that sort of a huge dissonance really with what's happening in the West and in Moscow
- 6:26in that period.
- 6:27So yeah, it gets to the heart of the thing, really interesting question.
- 6:29It gets to the heart of the book, I think.
- 6:31Yeah, absolutely, that's really fascinating.
- 6:34And it leads me to ask you more about your research process and methods that you tend
- 6:42to use when envisioning your perspective research objectives.
- 6:46And also, how does your latest book expand on your first book on the Cold War in South
- 6:52Asia, Britain, the United States and the Indian subcontinent?
- 6:57One of the things I built on in the first book I read about the Cold War, which was
- 7:00a wider sort of take on the Cold War, really looking at its social economic dimensions
- 7:05as well as its political dimensions, was the extent to which it had to be a social history.
- 7:11So traditionally my background is diplomatic history and international history, so I've
- 7:14tended to approach it from an elite level.
- 7:17So the first book largely was written by consulting national archives, presidential libraries,
- 7:26looking at papers of elite individuals in the American and British governments, but
- 7:31also in South Asian governments as well, but really an elite history.
- 7:34As I was writing the book, I found that sort of increasingly frustrating and unsatisfactory.
- 7:38It's almost as though forgotten voices of South Asian history, but also histories in
- 7:42the United States, United Kingdom that were engaging with the Cold War and American and
- 7:47British intervention in South Asia, India and Pakistan, being sort of written out of
- 7:51those histories.
- 7:52So a lot of the histories I consulted when I was writing the book initially to provide
- 7:56a sort of a historiographical framework were very much that sort of history, that elite
- 8:00top down history.
- 8:01And I think it sort of didn't really reflect what was going on necessarily within the Indian
- 8:05subcontinent during that period.
- 8:07So towards the end of that book, I tried to make it more of a social history.
- 8:12But by the time I came to write the second book, Spying in South Asia, which is looking
- 8:15at intelligence, it struck me that intelligence in South Asia was less impactful in terms
- 8:22of intelligence activity and by that I mean propaganda or covert action or different sort
- 8:28of missions undertaken by the intelligence agencies of Britain in the United States and
- 8:32to some extent the Soviet Union, the KGB and the GRU.
- 8:36What was really impactful was the extent to which they were changing the culture, political
- 8:43and social culture of the subcontinent.
- 8:45So the actual operations weren't really having much of an impact, but the symbolism behind
- 8:49those operations and also the symbolism associated particularly with the Central Intelligence
- 8:54Agency and the KGB were changing the political landscape of those countries.
- 8:58So people becoming more paranoid about intelligence services, more fearful about repression, almost
- 9:04going back to a colonial area where British colonialism was sort of predicated on a very
- 9:09powerful secret state that was controlling Indians.
- 9:12So that sort of narrative was really gaining traction, I think, in the 1950s and 1960s.
- 9:17And it was much more significant and much more important than actually what was happening
- 9:20on the ground.
- 9:21So not much really in terms of intelligence activity.
- 9:24I mean the CIA and the KGB were involved in trying to coerce and bribe Indian politicians.
- 9:30They were involved in covert black propaganda within India.
- 9:33But that didn't seem to be making much of an impact or having much of an impact.
- 9:38It was wider societal perceptions of intelligence and what it might be doing and its omnipotence,
- 9:42which I think was wildly exaggerated in South Asian imagination, but was having that sort
- 9:47of impact.
- 9:48So it was much more about thinking about it as a social phenomenon rather than just a
- 9:52strictly narrow intelligence phenomenon.
- 9:54But that in turn sort of threw up some really interesting methodological challenges, I think,
- 10:00that I couldn't just go back to presidential libraries and national archives and look at
- 10:04what policymakers were writing and what they were putting their memorandums and reports.
- 10:08I had to really approach it from below.
- 10:10So going back to the beginning and thinking about that letter from an Indian national
- 10:14in Bombay to William Douglas, it was that sort of material that I think was really interesting
- 10:19in opening up new insights really.
- 10:21So what were the average Indians thinking about the Cold War and about the CIA and the
- 10:25KGB and intelligence and where do I find the information?
- 10:28So a lot of it was going to cultural archives.
- 10:30A lot of it was going to social history archives.
- 10:33A lot of it was thinking about oral history from Indians from below as well and trying
- 10:37to write their story, almost a forgotten voice into the book.
- 10:42And the other sort of element to social history was more of a cultural history.
- 10:46Certainly in intelligence studies, I think, one of the great sort of breakthroughs that's
- 10:49been really interesting and valuable, I think, over the last 10 years is to embrace a cultural
- 10:54turn in intelligence studies.
- 10:55So to think about the way intelligence is represented in film, in literature, in popular
- 11:00culture.
- 11:01And I think that was really important in a South Asian sort of context as well.
- 11:05So thinking about how cultural production impacted the way intelligence was mediated
- 11:11in South Asia was really important.
- 11:12And looking at different sources, thinking about literary criticism, thinking about sort
- 11:17of, you know, the Harry Ransom archive, for example, pretty useful in University of Texas
- 11:21in Austin and those sort of cultural repositories of papers produced by people who are writing
- 11:27the sort of history, making those sort of films, that was really important.
- 11:30So yeah, it got me thinking, I think, the second book, try to approach it methodologically
- 11:35from a much wider and more expansive perspective.
- 11:39And what you said about operational insignificance, actually, is really important and leads me
- 11:45to the next question, how perception might be even more important.
- 11:49And I think this is one of the reasons why historians sometimes consider the intelligence
- 11:54realm irrelevant or redundant.
- 11:57What do you consider the impact of these secret operations or the foreign hand, so to speak,
- 12:04on the sociopolitical and cultural landscape of the Indian subcontinent?
- 12:08Yeah, really profound, I think.
- 12:10And I think it's important to put that sort of in a long historical perspective, in that
- 12:16intelligence operations in India really have always been on a relatively small scale.
- 12:19So even when we go back and think about British colonialism, there is a narrative and lots
- 12:23of historians have written about this, a narrative of this omnipotence of the colonial police
- 12:28state or intelligence state in India.
- 12:31And to a certain extent, Indian intelligence was very important to the British colonial
- 12:36state in attempts to control India.
- 12:38But it was never a huge undertaking.
- 12:39There were very few intelligence officers employed within colonial India by the British.
- 12:44Its reach was always very small.
- 12:46Its importance was probably deliberately overstated by the British as a means of control.
- 12:51This notion that everyone was under surveillance, everyone was being watched, the British colonial
- 12:56state had this omnipotence is really, I think, an exaggeration.
- 13:00And so the popular idea of how intelligence is developing is really important.
- 13:04And you can go back to really similar works like Roger Jodh Kipling's Kim, which is published
- 13:08in 1901, beginning of the 20th century, and how that really impacts this notion of a really
- 13:14powerful, effective intelligence operation, strict security operation that the British
- 13:19are running in Kim's case against Imperial Russia, for example, it really gaining traction
- 13:25in the Indian imagination and both the American imagination and the British imagination and
- 13:29creating this sort of aura around intelligence in a South Asian perspective.
- 13:33I mean, interestingly, Alan Dulles, the sort of one of the most famous, I guess, CIA directors
- 13:39in the 1950s during the so-called golden age of CIA operations was a great fan of Kipling.
- 13:45You know, famously, he read Kipling repeatedly during his lifetime and actually a copy of
- 13:51Kipling, his own personal copy, was lying on his bedside when he died and was found
- 13:55when he passed away.
- 13:57This was something that we resonated with American English officials involved in espionage
- 14:02and Dulles's family was intimately involved in India, he travelled to India in his youth
- 14:09and had lots of interesting connections with the Indian subcontinent and a lot of that
- 14:12was informed by this notion of British literature and spy literature and that genre of spy literature,
- 14:18which is really interesting, I think.
- 14:20And again, bringing it forward, I think, when John Le Carrier starts writing in the early
- 14:261960s and all of that work has a really strong Indian connection and really a theme to it.
- 14:31And again, I think that resonates with policymakers.
- 14:34When interestingly, going back slightly to Kim, when I was doing some research in the
- 14:38British archives, I found a list of recommended books that were given to British diplomats
- 14:43and this was around the mid 1960s before they travelled to India.
- 14:47So the Foreign Office was saying, read this list of books before you go out to the Indian
- 14:50subcontinent and I'll help you prepare.
- 14:53And there were lots of obvious political texts on there and texts about Indian economics
- 14:57and Indian social systems.
- 14:58But right at the top of that list was Kim, was a novel, a fictional novel about intelligence.
- 15:04And it was like, wow, in 1965 or 66, British diplomats are still being told, read Kim from
- 15:101981 about spying in India and that will help you understand modern India.
- 15:14I think many Indians would throw their hands up in horror and say, how ridiculous, how
- 15:17archaic that is.
- 15:19But it just speaks to the extent to which popular fiction permeates through to diplomacy
- 15:24and even intelligence practice, I think.
- 15:25And a similar sort of thing with Le Carrier in the 1960s when I spoke to one Indian intelligence
- 15:30officer actually, who served in the Indian External Intelligence Agency, the Research
- 15:36and Analysis Wing, and rose to a really senior position in the Research and Analysis Wing
- 15:41during his career.
- 15:42And when he was first joining the agency, this is in the mid 1970s, he reached out to
- 15:47colleagues, he'd come from the Indian Police Service, which is a traditional route into
- 15:50the Research and Analysis Wing, didn't really know much about intelligence, was sort of
- 15:54floundering around a bit and said to a colleague, what do I read?
- 15:57How do I find out what Indian intelligence actually does?
- 16:00I really feel a bit out of my depth here.
- 16:03It wasn't really any facts that were commonly available on Indian intelligence.
- 16:06And we can maybe get back to this later, but this lack of scholarly work on intelligence,
- 16:10both in the West and particularly in India, is problematic, I think, and allows popular
- 16:15culture to fill a void that more sort of academic texts on that subject sort of creates, creates
- 16:21a sort of void there.
- 16:22This guy, I said, well, how do I know about what we do?
- 16:25And his colleague said, well, we tinker tailor soldiers spy by John le Carrier, and that
- 16:30will tell you what intelligence agencies actually get up to.
- 16:32And again, many of I think modern intelligence officers would say, well, how ridiculous,
- 16:36you know, that's but this notion that actually fiction can help you can be of value in contemporary
- 16:43intelligence terms.
- 16:44So the cultural and the sort of literary side of things is really, really important in setting
- 16:49a context around there and about how how people in South Asia particularly mediate intelligence.
- 16:55Partly that's because there isn't really more hasn't until very recently been any sort of
- 17:00academic work or biographies for former intelligence officers that they can draw on, which would
- 17:05give them a more realistic picture.
- 17:06And in the absence of that, they turn to novels to film to fiction to fill that sort of void,
- 17:12I think.
- 17:13Another question I have for you is how your book engages with the role of politicians,
- 17:19journalists and human rights activists and how they fought against or collaborated with
- 17:26the British and American intelligence services.
- 17:30So I'm wondering what the key impacts of these interactions were and whether they're still
- 17:36visible perhaps today, whether they're just short term or are they long term impacts?
- 17:41Yeah, really good question.
- 17:43Thank you.
- 17:44Just like another one that I thought quite deeply about really the extent to which outside
- 17:49of political intelligence circles, lots of really important actors were involved in sort
- 17:53of secret covert Cold War that was established in during that period, both on the sort of
- 17:57Western side and on the Soviet side as well.
- 18:00And I think there were significant sort of elements in which journalists, particularly
- 18:06just picking on journalists, were really important players in that.
- 18:09I think the West particularly saw journalists as a sort of important medium in the South
- 18:14Asian context.
- 18:15So I found that actually exploring the papers of journalists and again, one example would
- 18:21be the Harrison Salisbury papers, which are stored in the Butler archive at Columbia University,
- 18:25which are an absolute goldmine of information on American foreign policy during the 1950s
- 18:31and 1960s.
- 18:32So Tony Lucas, who was the sort of the New York Times correspondent in New Delhi during
- 18:39the 1960s, really seminal period for intelligence in India, gives some fascinating insights
- 18:44on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, and the limitations of
- 18:49those insights as well.
- 18:50So Lucas is a great observer, one of those observers, I guess, from below slightly outside
- 18:54of the establishment, not wedded to the US government, that he's telling us something
- 18:57really interesting about what's going on in intelligence.
- 19:00And also about the relative influence of those individuals and intelligence agencies.
- 19:06And Lucas has some great stories about his time in India.
- 19:10One of them involves him actually writing an article, one of the first articles in the
- 19:13New York Times published, which actually declares that they have calls to CIA or operating in
- 19:19India.
- 19:20There is a CIA station in the American embassy in New Delhi.
- 19:23When everyone knows this, it's an obvious fact, but Lucas publishes it for the first
- 19:26time.
- 19:27And it's not a story, a really innocent story, actually.
- 19:30It's a story about ducks in the US embassy.
- 19:33So the US embassy in New Delhi is a really modernist building.
- 19:36It's called Roosevelt House.
- 19:37It's sort of built after the Second World War, and it has a huge pond in front of it.
- 19:43And this pond becomes occupied by a whole swathe of ducks, and they flourish, and there's
- 19:48more and more ducks in the pond, and it becomes a big problem for the US embassy.
- 19:52They struggle to control it.
- 19:54And so the local CIA officer basically, during that period, suggests that maybe the duck
- 20:01should be culled.
- 20:04And Lucas says, oh, that's really interesting.
- 20:07A big controversy breaks out at the embassy.
- 20:09Some officers say this is inhumane.
- 20:11You can't cull ducks.
- 20:12It's terrible.
- 20:13The CIA is saying, no, we need to deal this proactively.
- 20:16We need to get rid of these ducks.
- 20:17So Lucas just publishes a really humorous story saying, you know, this is what happened,
- 20:21and this is how the CIA got involved.
- 20:23And he's called in by the ambassador, and then he's, what's going on?
- 20:27What's happening?
- 20:28The ambassador calls him in, so he's like, I don't often get to meet the US ambassador.
- 20:31And he sits him down, and the local station chief, CIA station chief, is sitting next
- 20:34to him, and he says, you are in serious trouble.
- 20:37You have just publicly announced that the CIA are operating in India with this story
- 20:42about ducks, and we're going to PNG you.
- 20:44We're going to send you home from India if you ever write about the CIA again.
- 20:48And Lucas is just amazed.
- 20:51This is ridiculous.
- 20:52This is not a state secret.
- 20:55Everyone in India knows the CIA operating in India.
- 20:58But there's this sort of sense that, yeah, that the journalists are regarded as this
- 21:02sort of malevolent force, and they need to be doing the work of the US government.
- 21:06And even if they speak the truth to this sort of thing, it's going to be really problematic.
- 21:10So yeah, journalists, I think, are an interesting source of information during that period.
- 21:17I think generally, Western and Eastern intelligence services tried to co-opt both journalists
- 21:23and producers of popular culture to their own ends in South Asia.
- 21:27And it was relatively unsuccessful.
- 21:29So quite a lot of effort was put in trying to get journalists on Indian newspapers, for
- 21:34example, to print stories that were favorable, quite a lot of money exchanged hands.
- 21:38I'm not sure how big an impact that actually had.
- 21:41I think the more interesting side of that story, again, thinking about impact, is not
- 21:47the extent to which the CIA, the KGB, the GRU were spending quite a lot of time and
- 21:52effort and money in trying to get producers of popular culture and journalists and politicians
- 21:59in India to do their bidding for them.
- 22:01I think the interesting thing is about a story about agency, but in reverse.
- 22:04I think the agency actually rested not with the CIA and not with the KGB and the GRU,
- 22:10but with those individuals that were taking money off of those institutions, but then
- 22:14not acting as passive voices that were willing to receive funding, whether they be a political
- 22:19party or a newspaper from intelligence services, but were then continuing to act in an independent
- 22:25manner.
- 22:26So the money was changing hands, but the influence wasn't being reciprocated.
- 22:30Those individuals were still more than happy to follow their own particular agenda, which
- 22:34might not be the agenda they were being nominally paid for.
- 22:38So I think it's a story of agency, but a story of local agency and Indian agency and the
- 22:44power of that agency to resist an asymmetrical power from the CIA and the KGB, other intelligence
- 22:50agencies.
- 22:51So that was something that came really strongly out of the book.
- 22:54I was very surprised about the extent to which, despite their huge power and their huge reach
- 23:00and the numbers of individual CIA and KGB officers that were employed in India at various
- 23:05times during the Cold War, which was really significant, they weren't really able to change
- 23:09the political weather in India.
- 23:11So they weren't really able to shift Indian policy.
- 23:14They weren't really able to influence Indian public opinion in a meaningful way.
- 23:19But Indian agency, I think, was quite strong in resisting that and actually co-opting it
- 23:24to its own purposes.
- 23:26So it was a story, I guess, of the limits of intelligence power as deployed by the CIA
- 23:32and the KGB when local forces were quite adept at resisting it.
- 23:36And it took on, it came to take on a really bizarre, I'll tell you one other really bizarre
- 23:40story which sort of emphasises this, is the extent to which local Indians were really
- 23:45attuned to the extent to which they could exploit this Cold War going on between the
- 23:50CIA, particularly in the KGB within India.
- 23:53So on one occasion, I think this was in the late 1960s, early 1970s, the Socialist Party
- 23:58in India were quite prominent at that point.
- 24:01Both sides were trying to co-op them or trying to win their favour.
- 24:04And a socialist, a leading member of the Socialist Party of India actually approached the British
- 24:09High Commission in India and knocked on the door and got to see one of the political councillors
- 24:14and said, I would like you to tell me the name of a CIA officer in the American Embassy.
- 24:20And the British sort of dipped back and said, well, I can't do that.
- 24:23Why?
- 24:24I can't even confirm the CIA is operating in the American Embassy.
- 24:27And anyway, why would you want the name of a CIA officer?
- 24:30And the Socialist Party of India just said really candidly, well, we're running out of
- 24:33money and we just need money from someone.
- 24:35And we heard the CIA giving money out to everyone.
- 24:37So we just thought we'd ask.
- 24:39And it's just that really bold sort of approach that we know these guys are handing out money
- 24:43freely.
- 24:45We think we'd like some.
- 24:46We're not going to give anything in return.
- 24:47But if we go there, so this sort of extent to which that is going on, I think is quite
- 24:53endemic during that period.
- 24:55And I think that sort of indicates a bigger problem in that the sort of impact of covert
- 25:00intelligence activity is not in changing Indian politics or swaying in a particular direction.
- 25:06It's almost debasing that politics.
- 25:07It's almost the sort of influx of Western money and Western coercion is sort of debasing
- 25:13that that sort of way Indian politics is conducted.
- 25:16And I think that filters through to Indian public.
- 25:18So they have a perception that intelligence services on both sides are really undermining
- 25:25or trying to undermine Indian democracy.
- 25:27And I think that's the more problematic sort of social and political sort of consequence
- 25:31of intelligence activity from that perspective.
- 25:33The extent to which this traction or this feeling grows that both sides in the cold
- 25:40are attempting for their own purposes to undermine Indian democracy and they're having some
- 25:44success in doing so.
- 25:46So to what extent is this foreign presence truly pervasive?
- 25:50It seems like actually it isn't as much as, you know, Kipling's novel Kim, for instance,
- 25:56tells us.
- 25:58So when writing this history, how do you grapple with fiction and reality and do these ever
- 26:05blend together or intersect somehow?
- 26:08And if so, what are the consequences?
- 26:10Yeah, again, a really great question, one I really grapple with when writing the book.
- 26:15So I think in terms of scale, I think it is important.
- 26:18So when we think of works like Kim and even spy fiction like The Carrier, there is a sense
- 26:22of omnipotence, which I think is exaggerated.
- 26:25I mean, I think just when we think about countries like India and China in terms of scale, huge
- 26:30countries, India is a subcontinent.
- 26:32It would be impossible for any intelligence service to control what goes on in India.
- 26:37It's just such a vast country.
- 26:39And the diversity of India, both in terms of its geography, but also in terms of religious
- 26:43diversity, social diversity, regional diversity, the number of official dialects in India.
- 26:49It's just really difficult to conceive that any intelligence service would have to reach
- 26:52the range of sophistication to be able to control what happens in that sort of environment.
- 26:56And the same for China or elements of Africa and South America.
- 26:59Equally, it's very difficult in terms of scale and the particular problem in terms of social
- 27:04diversity, to be able to think you could control any sort of society.
- 27:08And I think although the KGB and the CIA did at various points, the CIA station was one
- 27:14of the largest CIA stations anywhere in the world.
- 27:16And similarly, the KGB certainly by the late 1960s was operating on a huge scale in India.
- 27:23And various Soviet intelligence officers have said that, again, it was one of the largest
- 27:27KGB stations, if not the largest KGB station, anywhere outside of the Eastern Bloc by the
- 27:33late 1960s, early 1970s.
- 27:36So a huge amount of effort, both material effort, both money, but also just in terms
- 27:40of intelligence officers on the ground, was being invested in India by the CIA and by
- 27:45the KGB because it was regarded as a huge Cold War prize, one of the most important
- 27:49members of the non-aligned movement, a really influential voice in the global South.
- 27:53But I don't necessarily think that effort actually translates into influence or political
- 27:58power within the Indian system.
- 28:01So Britain, for example, on a lower scale, British SIS, Secret Intelligence Service, another
- 28:08propaganda arms, the Information Research Department, which is a covert propaganda arm of the British,
- 28:13which was closely linked to MI6, was operating in India quite extensively during the Cold
- 28:17War.
- 28:18But the tale I got from reading the records was their frustration about their lack of,
- 28:24despite the fact they were being lavishly funded in global intelligence terms, there's
- 28:27still their inability to have adequate coverage.
- 28:30So the British had propaganda operations in major cities, New Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai,
- 28:37but they still felt they were never able really to penetrate India just because of the scale
- 28:42of the task before them.
- 28:44So I think a lot of that notion of omnipotence is overstated in terms of what intelligence
- 28:50services recently expected to be able to achieve in India, which was relatively small given
- 28:54the size and the diversity of the country.
- 28:56But certainly in popular terms, I think there is a crossover.
- 28:59I do draw quite a lot, I try to draw quite a lot on literature and fiction, and particularly
- 29:04on the work of John Le Carrier, which I think is fascinating.
- 29:07He had very close connections to India.
- 29:11And you know, for example, one of the central characters, Bill Hayden in Tinker Tailor Soldier
- 29:16Spiders, out to be the traitor, is based on Image 5, based on Kim Philby, essentially.
- 29:21You know, Kim Philby famously grew up in India.
- 29:24He was born in India.
- 29:25He grew up in Ambala in Punjab.
- 29:28His first language when he was growing up was Punjabi, it wasn't English.
- 29:32So there's this long tradition in Western intelligence of literary links back to India.
- 29:38And I found it was really interesting to, when we're thinking about trying to be creative
- 29:42in terms of methodology, when you talk about intelligence, because any intelligence historian
- 29:47or diplomatic historian that's trying to engage with intelligence matters always comes up
- 29:51against those sort of those walls of secrecy that are frustrating, the records aren't in
- 29:56the archives, you can't get hold of official information.
- 29:59It's difficult to do so.
- 30:00So you have to try and be creative.
- 30:02And I found Le Carrier's work really fascinating because often they pointed to facts about
- 30:07intelligence in various areas of the world that weren't publicly known at the time, but
- 30:12sort of gave a hint of what was happening.
- 30:14So John Le Carrier famously worked for MI5, he then spent a little bit of time in MI6
- 30:20before he exited the secret world and became a bestselling author.
- 30:23Le Carrier's writing Tinker Tailor Soldier Spice in the mid 1970s, and he hints at defections
- 30:31that were taking place in Cold War India.
- 30:33He hints at a very close intelligence liaison relationship between the British and Indian
- 30:37intelligence services, hints at all these things that were very accurate depictions
- 30:42of what was going on in Cold War India.
- 30:44At the time in the 1970s, no intelligence records were open or available.
- 30:48So if you go back and read Le Carrier in reverse, you can see a lot of what he's sort of saying
- 30:53is fictional, but it's rooted in what was actually happening in a South Asian context.
- 30:59And I think it's illuminating when you think of it in that sort of way, really.
- 31:04And again, sort of going back to the Indian intelligence officer I spoke about in the
- 31:07mid 1970s, some colleagues were often saying, read Le Carrier, read it with caution, obviously,
- 31:13but actually there is a grain of truth in what he's saying.
- 31:15And this is someone who's operated with the secret world, he has contacts in the subcontinent,
- 31:20some of what he's saying actually makes sense.
- 31:23So I think that's significant.
- 31:25And just thinking about Le Carrier, his work is really popular in India, it still is, it's
- 31:29hugely popular.
- 31:30And I think part of that is the fact that it's really difficult.
- 31:34I mean, we think of it, I think now about the West and about Britain, the United States,
- 31:38I'm always frustrated that there isn't enough written on intelligence and we want to know
- 31:42more, always want to find out more about the secret world and what goes on in it and what
- 31:45more people do.
- 31:46And lately, I guess, more and more is coming out from MNMARs, from CIA officers, and I'm
- 31:53really great academic work on intelligence and sort of filling that void from a Western
- 31:57perspective.
- 31:58But I think in other areas of the world, and India is a prime example, there's still a
- 32:02massive gulf in public appetite to know more about their intelligence services and particularly
- 32:08Indian intelligence services and what they can actually find in terms of academic publishing
- 32:12or official histories.
- 32:13There is no official history of an Indian intelligence service.
- 32:16All Indian intelligence services, they're record to embargo.
- 32:19So the research and analysis wing in his external intelligence service, which was formed in
- 32:241968, none of its records have ever been released, a bit like Britain's MI6.
- 32:28So you can't find out any official history of those organisations until relatively recently,
- 32:33most of the fictional work about those organisations hasn't really been available.
- 32:37So works like the carry, I think, gained traction in areas of the world like South Asia because
- 32:41people want to know about intelligence, they know it happens, they're interested in it.
- 32:45But there aren't there isn't sort of the official sources that they can draw on.
- 32:50And I mean, the carries fascinating.
- 32:51I mean, it was his sort of breakthrough book, The Spy Who Came from the Cold in the 1960s.
- 32:57That was a huge hit in India, massively massive bestseller.
- 33:02And even when the film was released, I think in 1965, again, massively important in India,
- 33:07although interestingly, again, in the Cold War context, the Indian censor cut a huge
- 33:11swathe of that film out because they felt it depicted the Soviet Union in a way that
- 33:15wasn't conducive to Indian foreign policy.
- 33:17So lots of that I don't know if you've seen The Spy Who Came from the Cold with Richard
- 33:21Burton from 1965, but it's quite a bleak black and white film.
- 33:26And it depicts sort of the Eastern Bloc in very sort of stark terms, very unflattering
- 33:30terms.
- 33:32And the Indian censor thought that isn't really very good in our context of our relationship
- 33:35with Moscow.
- 33:36We don't really want that being, you know, might upset the Soviets.
- 33:39So they basically cut the film significantly and all the sort of the elements that showed
- 33:44a really repressive totalitarian bleak existence in the Eastern Bloc were just cut out from
- 33:50the film.
- 33:51So much of the horror of the film's producers.
- 33:55But yeah, it's just interesting the way that sort of that cultural world, I think, is really
- 34:00is filled to some extent by literature and by film.
- 34:05And it's amazing how much truth you can get away with writing about in fiction versus
- 34:09if there ever would be an official history on India, if the archives ever do open up,
- 34:17would you be happy to write that official history?
- 34:21It's funny you should say that.
- 34:23As an aside, so there is, I think, interestingly, there is a lacuna, I think, just generally
- 34:29in academic circles about intelligence services outside of the so-called Anglian sphere, so
- 34:34outside of Europe and the United States, and I'm including Russia in Europe.
- 34:40So there's lots of literature about the KGB, about CIA, about SIS, hundreds of academic
- 34:45books, thousands of academic books, and representations in film and on television.
- 34:51But really, when it comes to intelligence services, the developing world, the Global
- 34:54South, very little has been written or even in terms of cultural production.
- 34:58But recently, there have been some really good, I think, an important step to sort of
- 35:02try and bridge that gap and close that sort of dissonance.
- 35:08So Georgetown University Press, for example, published some great works recently on intelligence
- 35:12services outside of the Anglian sphere.
- 35:14So one has been recently published on Pakistan's ISI intelligence service.
- 35:21And I've just, I'm hopefully just about to write one on the research and analysis wing,
- 35:26India's external intelligence service, which was founded in 1968.
- 35:30And that interestingly does, I think we've alluded to, represent a real challenge because
- 35:35much as in the UK with SIS, no official records have been released.
- 35:40So it's very much a detective story in trying to piece together the history of a secret
- 35:44organization from a very sort of fractured sort of record that's available in the public
- 35:49domain.
- 35:50But I think it is now possible to do so, probably only been possible in the last five to 10
- 35:56years, when much more information has come out about Indian intelligence.
- 35:59And I think those sort of books will make a big difference in sort of satiating, I think,
- 36:06a huge demand, I think, in India's subcontinent to hear more about their intelligence services,
- 36:12but also just in sort of wider global sort of history of intelligence.
- 36:16I mean, I teach an intelligence course at King's College London, and I work for the
- 36:20King's Centre for the Study of Intelligence, KCSLI.
- 36:23And we teach hundreds of undergraduates every year.
- 36:26And one of the things that struck me, having taught them over the last few years, is how
- 36:30interested they still are in the Central Intelligence Agency and MI6 and MI5 and German intelligence
- 36:37and French intelligence, but also how desperate they are to hear more about global intelligence.
- 36:41So I think students of intelligence now are really interested in what's happening in South
- 36:46America, what's happening in South Africa, what's happening in the Middle East.
- 36:50Tell us more about the MSS in China.
- 36:53Tell us more about the research analysis we're going to do.
- 36:55That's what we're really interested in.
- 36:56We don't know about that.
- 36:57So there's a huge desire on the part of students, and I've found, of intelligence to know more
- 37:02about those sort of intelligence services, really.
- 37:06But hopefully that will be, that is being addressed now, I think, for the first time.
- 37:09And hopefully that sort of process will develop and expand over time.
- 37:13Absolutely.
- 37:14It's very important work.
- 37:16I'm glad you're on it.
- 37:19So while rummaging through the source material available to you, I was wondering how difficult
- 37:28it was to unpack some similarities or differences between the British and the American trade
- 37:35craft.
- 37:37Who was more successful at winning over hearts and minds and why?
- 37:41Yes, again, really, really good question.
- 37:44Thanks, Crystal.
- 37:45In Indian terms, there wasn't, when I'm thinking about the operation of the Central Intelligence
- 37:50Agency and that's MI5 and MI6, MI5 really was responsible for, under the Atlee Directive,
- 37:59which was passed in 1947, which basically, in British intelligence terms, ensured that
- 38:04MI5, the British security service, had dominance, had preeminence within intelligence in the
- 38:10British Commonwealth and the former Commonwealth.
- 38:12So India, because it fell under the Commonwealth, the MI6 was largely precluded from operating
- 38:19in India, really from 1947 through until the mid 1960s, around 1964, I think, SAS was allowed,
- 38:27formally allowed back into India by the British government.
- 38:31And that made a big difference because MI5 is effectively a security service.
- 38:35It's much more about domestic security.
- 38:37And India was quite happy to openly cooperate with MI5, the British security service, because
- 38:43it valued its expertise in controlling internal subversion.
- 38:48So India in Cold War terms was much less concerned about espionage and spying on sort of foreign
- 38:54adversaries.
- 38:55It was really concerned about how do we control the Indian state.
- 38:58So it's really concerned about India's just been through partition, it's been divided
- 39:01between India and Pakistan, Bangladesh becomes a nation state in 1971, huge country, very
- 39:08politically diverse, linguistically diverse, socially diverse.
- 39:11How do we keep it as a unitary whole?
- 39:13There are all these pressures trying to pull India apart and fracture the nation state.
- 39:17So they were much more concerned about how they would control potentially subversive
- 39:20forces.
- 39:21And communism was one of the leading subversive forces, very powerful communist party of India
- 39:25for most of the Cold War period.
- 39:27How do we control that?
- 39:28And so they wanted to really draw on MI5's expertise of dealing with domestic subversion
- 39:32rather than espionage, spying and covert action.
- 39:35So MI5 really dominated the external scene from a British perspective until the mid 1960s
- 39:40when SIS then really took over in India.
- 39:43So partly during the early Cold War period, the difference was because the Central Intelligence
- 39:48Agency was responsible really for India from an American perspective.
- 39:52And I think that's an external intelligence agency, much more covert action and espionage.
- 39:57So they established a primary intelligence liaison relationship with Indian intelligence
- 40:01during that period.
- 40:02The fact that MI5 were doing it for the British.
- 40:05So they were, their sort of approach was very different.
- 40:07One was about internal control of subversion.
- 40:10The other was much more about covert action and external intelligence activities.
- 40:15That meant the methods were very different.
- 40:17India in the Cold War period, it didn't really want to invite the CIA or MI6 into India.
- 40:23The Indian government was suspicious of foreign intelligence agencies and suspicious about
- 40:28if we work in partnership with them, if we have a liaison relationship with CIA and SIS,
- 40:33that's great.
- 40:34And if they work with us, for example, in spying on China, which was a strategic threat
- 40:38to India, that's all fantastic.
- 40:41But what would they be doing in India that they aren't telling us about?
- 40:44So then, you know, the Indian government isn't naive.
- 40:46It's thinking, well, OK, if we work with the CIA and SIS against China, that's all well
- 40:51and good.
- 40:52That's great.
- 40:53But then they're then trying to subvert Indian politics.
- 40:55Maybe they're then trying to subvert what's going on in India.
- 40:58Maybe they'll launch covert propaganda that we aren't told about.
- 41:01One of the reasons why the Indian government was so keen to work with MI5 and not with
- 41:05MI6 during the Cold War.
- 41:07In fact, MI6 did try to reestablish itself in India in 1947, but they got quite quickly,
- 41:12they got into trouble.
- 41:13And a couple of SIS officers were, well, they got up to something they really, we don't
- 41:19know precisely what, but I think they were involved in bribing Indian politicians that
- 41:22alienated the Indian government and they were PNG, they were persona non grataed out of
- 41:26India in 1947 and they didn't get to return until 1964.
- 41:30So SIS blotted its copybook quite early on in India and sort of confirmed these suspicions
- 41:35of the Indian government that we'd rather work with a domestic intelligence service.
- 41:40The reverse happened in America, but not because India wanted it to, rather a sort of accident
- 41:45of circumstance, really.
- 41:48His intelligence supremo in 1947 was a guy called Sanjay V. Pillay and he wanted to work
- 41:54with the FBI.
- 41:55He wanted to establish a liaison relationship, not with CIA, not with Langley, but with J.
- 42:00Edgar Hoover's FBI.
- 42:01And he was a real fan of Hoover.
- 42:03I mean, Hoover, not particularly nice individual as we now know, and had lots of problems in
- 42:09his personal life and also in his sort of professional career.
- 42:12But Sanjay V. had this idealized image of Hoover, I think from the 1920s and 1930s,
- 42:18when he sort of thought about Hoover and his G-men and what the FBI were achieving in America
- 42:22in terms of controlling organized crime and that sort of thing.
- 42:26And Sanjay V. went to Washington in 1949 with the sole purpose of really establishing a
- 42:31liaison relationship with the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover, which was similar, very similar to
- 42:36what he'd achieved with MI5 in Britain.
- 42:39And so he really went, he didn't really want to work with the Central Intelligence Agency.
- 42:44But Hoover, for various reasons, one of which was because he was an unreconstructed racist,
- 42:49really sort of snubbed Sanjay V. He wouldn't meet with him.
- 42:52He sort of palmed him off to his subordinates, didn't give him any time, was quite dismissive
- 42:58in any sort of approaches that Sanjay V. made to him.
- 43:01And Sanjay V. was horrified.
- 43:02He felt that he was being treated in a different way because of his color, because of his background
- 43:07as an Indian.
- 43:08He was really affronted and offended by the way J. Edgar Hoover treated him.
- 43:13And he basically came back to the American Embassy in New Delhi and said, I will never,
- 43:17ever work with the FBI as long as J. Edgar Hoover is in charge of their organization.
- 43:21What I will do is I'll work with the CIA.
- 43:23And interestingly, the CIA lunched and wine and dined and sort of generally sort of formed
- 43:28over Sanjay V. in quite a big way.
- 43:30And that just completely changed the dynamic of that relationship.
- 43:33I mean, we could have had a Cold War relationship where the FBI was in primacy in India from
- 43:371947 through to the present, potentially.
- 43:41But that sort of personal interaction of circumstance completely changes the dynamic.
- 43:45And it meant that the CIA became involved in India.
- 43:48And I think that worked to the detriment of both the United States and India in many senses
- 43:53because they then got involved or was sort of implicated in covert action in India that
- 44:00backfired.
- 44:01So to a certain extent, it's to do with the organizations that were involved.
- 44:05Once we get to the period after the 1960s when SIS are operating in India and alongside
- 44:11the CIA, there is very little difference in tradecraft, I think.
- 44:14They're both doing very similar things.
- 44:17Most of the work in India is around covert propaganda.
- 44:20So the Information Research Department is really one of the biggest, I think, covert operations
- 44:26staged in India by the British in the Cold War period.
- 44:29The British are involved in lots of black propaganda, great propaganda within India
- 44:33and largely anti-communist.
- 44:36The Americans are as well.
- 44:37The Americans are much more involved in trying to subvert Indian political parties and bribe
- 44:42Indian politicians, as are the KGB and the GIU.
- 44:45But I think that largely comes down to financial resources.
- 44:48SIS just didn't have a lot of money.
- 44:50In crude terms, they didn't have the same amount of largesse to dispense in Cold War
- 44:54India.
- 44:55And so they felt a disadvantage.
- 44:57I think one of the interesting things that I came across is, again, this is cultural,
- 45:01which is I think is really, really cultural and social more than anything, which I think
- 45:05is really important, is the British really felt they were superior in intelligence terms
- 45:11to the Americans in terms of their tradecraft, even though the tradecraft was very similar
- 45:16in terms of its practicalities.
- 45:19There's lots of memos and minutes and reports in British archives about tensions between
- 45:26British and American intelligence in Cold War India in the 1960s and 1970s.
- 45:31And it's predicated on this notion in British archives that we've got all the brains and
- 45:36you've got all the money sort of approached.
- 45:38You're going back to Lord Halifax and sort of John Maynard Keynes in 1940s Washington
- 45:43that we have to tell the Americans how to manage the post-Cold War period because we've
- 45:47got all the experience and the diplomatic expertise.
- 45:50All they've got is money.
- 45:51They're quite brash and youthful.
- 45:52Interesting.
- 45:53That sort of attitude, although it's just crazy, it doesn't make any sense, is still
- 45:58very much prevalent in British intelligence circles into the 1970s.
- 46:03We may not have the money, we may not have the reach, we may not have the number of intelligence
- 46:06officers on the ground in India, but we're just much better at this sort of thing.
- 46:10And there's no evidence to support that at all.
- 46:13But culturally, it's embedded in the British intelligence establishment that of course
- 46:17we're better at this sort of thing.
- 46:19We're SIS, we know what we're doing, the Americans don't.
- 46:22So yeah, that's one source of tension I think is interesting.
- 46:25There's a really great quote actually from a covert British propaganda officer in the
- 46:29information research department.
- 46:31And they're asking him to say, well, how do you measure impact of your covert propaganda
- 46:36operations in India?
- 46:37How can you tell us that this is working as opposed to say what the Americans are doing
- 46:40and what the Soviets are doing?
- 46:42And this officer just writes a report and he says, well, we may have the British, he
- 46:47says, I'll put it in this way, I'll use this metaphor.
- 46:50He said, the British have got an eyedropper.
- 46:52So we're putting eye drops into an infected Indian eye and we're being really effective
- 46:57in applying that eyedropper really systematically, really carefully in absolutely the right place.
- 47:03The Americans and Soviets are just walking around with a water hose and they're dispersing
- 47:07this water randomly everywhere across India and they're hitting Indians in the face with
- 47:11it and it's going everywhere.
- 47:13And we think that's much less effective as a sort of approach really.
- 47:16Now, there's no evidence to back up that that is the case at all.
- 47:19I don't think British propaganda was at all effective, particularly in Cold War India,
- 47:23certainly not in shifting Indian policy.
- 47:25But there is this assumption that we may not have the resources or we're certainly better
- 47:29at this sort of thing, we have our expertise.
- 47:31So I found that really surprising that that sort of almost arrogance really of hubris
- 47:38in Cold War intelligence still persisted into the 1970s when I would have thought at
- 47:43that point, events and other issues would have led it to dissipate.
- 47:47But no real difference, I think, fundamentally in tradecraft.
- 47:55And shifting to the Soviets, how did the Soviet perspective on India contrast with that of
- 48:02the West and what influence did the KGB and GRU exert in India?
- 48:07Yeah, so quite a lot.
- 48:09The Soviets are very active.
- 48:10I think up until 1953 and the death of Joseph Stalin, India was regarded by the Soviets
- 48:16really as a sort of neo-imperial or neo-Kalelial project, still of the British and the Americans.
- 48:22So Stalin very suspicious that India actually was even independent.
- 48:25And lots of Soviet diplomats were saying, well, India is not really independent, it's
- 48:28still a sort of proto-colony of the British, even after 1947.
- 48:32I think Stalin dying in 1953 is really seminal, it's a really watershed moment where a new
- 48:38era or new sort of leadership in the Soviet Union comes into being.
- 48:42And by the mid 1950s, when you've got Khristof and Balgharmin in power, then I think the
- 48:48Soviet leadership really recognizes India as being a strategic Cold War prize.
- 48:52So Khristof visits India in 1955 with Balgharmin and they really try to court Nero and Indian
- 48:58leaders and sort of sway India towards the Soviet side in the Cold War.
- 49:03And they see India, I think, particularly as a really valuable strategic prize.
- 49:06It's geographic location, potentially its economic potential.
- 49:10We now see India as a rising economic superpower.
- 49:12Already in the 50s, both Britain, the United States and the Soviets are anticipating that.
- 49:17It takes a lot longer than they think for India to develop into an economic superpower.
- 49:20But already they're thinking, well, if India gets its act together, its population size,
- 49:24its natural resources, its strategic location, its entrepreneurial spirit, all are going
- 49:29to lead to India become a major player in global geopolitical terms.
- 49:33So I think it is regarded as a Cold War prize.
- 49:35And really from the 50s onwards, the intelligence footprint that the Soviets have in India grows
- 49:42exponentially and significantly.
- 49:44So by the time we get to the late 60s, early 1970s, there is a huge GRU and AGB presence
- 49:51on the ground in India.
- 49:52And they are significantly interested in affecting what happens in India.
- 49:57I don't think the Soviets ever perceived that they are going to turn into communists.
- 50:01So again, in binary Cold War terms, it's not a question Moscow is saying, well, we can
- 50:05make sure that India becomes a communist state.
- 50:08That's never on the agenda.
- 50:09I think they're much more pragmatic.
- 50:11What they're trying to do is say, well, perhaps we can get the Indian state to work in our
- 50:15interest within the non-aligned movement, within the United Nations, within a broader
- 50:19international context.
- 50:20So India will remain a democratic state.
- 50:23In many ways, the Soviets see that to their advantage.
- 50:25They don't want India to be seen as a sort of patsy of the Soviet Union.
- 50:28They want them to be seen as an independent nation state, but one which will lean towards
- 50:33the Soviet Union on key issues as and when they develop on the international stage.
- 50:38Here I'm thinking, for example, about India support for the Soviet Union when in the Prague
- 50:42Spring in 1968, when Soviet tanks move into Prague to crush the Czechoslovakian uprising,
- 50:48India remains relatively silent on the international stage.
- 50:50And the Soviets regard that as a big win for the Soviet Union.
- 50:53And similarly in Afghanistan in 1979, when Moscow's forces move into Afghanistan to occupy
- 51:01the country, the Indian government are relatively subdued in their condemnation of Soviet aggression
- 51:07at that point.
- 51:08And again, Moscow regards that as a big win for itself in terms of global propaganda,
- 51:13in terms of muting the sort of international outcry and condemnation of Soviet aggression
- 51:18in 1979.
- 51:19So it's those sort of incidents where I think Moscow thinks, well, if we can keep India
- 51:23on side, that can be really valuable to us in Cold War terms.
- 51:27And the intelligence footprint is really important in terms of that.
- 51:30I mean, the British report have some really interesting figures actually in the British
- 51:34archives about the number of Soviet intelligence officers operating in India during the Cold
- 51:38War period.
- 51:39And the numbers just mushroom really for the 1960s and 1970s.
- 51:43And the British repeatedly, British intelligence officers in India repeatedly send back really
- 51:48plaintiff messages from New Delhi saying, well, we are just being swamped by the KGB
- 51:53and GLU in India.
- 51:54Our work is being, you know, encounter intelligence terms, they're all over us.
- 51:58This is really difficult.
- 51:59They have much more money and influence than we do.
- 52:02They're being much more effective.
- 52:03We really are fighting a losing battle in India.
- 52:06We need more resources.
- 52:07In the 1960s, 1970s, Whitehall has no interest in providing extra intelligence resources
- 52:12or funding them in South Asia.
- 52:14So the British feel as though they're really losing material terms against the, against
- 52:20the service.
- 52:21Again, another interesting sort of rams at home, I guess, that Stella Remington, MI5's
- 52:25first female director general, is recruited into the secret world, is recruited into MI5
- 52:31in India.
- 52:32So she goes out to India with her husband, who's a British diplomat, I think in 1965.
- 52:37And she just goes out as a special sort of hire, goes out and works sort of odd jobs
- 52:41in the British High Commission in New Delhi, while her husband, who's a relatively senior
- 52:45diplomat, is completing a tour in India.
- 52:49And while she's in India, she's a bit of a loose end and she's a very talented individual
- 52:54who's really wanting to, to occupy her time.
- 52:57She's recruited by the local MI5 officer to work for MI5.
- 53:00And she starts working for the propaganda arm really of MI5 in India during that period
- 53:05and goes on to have an incredibly successful Stella career in the British secret world
- 53:09and MI5.
- 53:10But she's, the GRU attempted to recruit her when she's in India.
- 53:14So they have a very crude pass at Stella Remington and the GRU try to sort of dangle and dangle
- 53:21individuals in front of her, try to persuade her to act as a Soviet agent.
- 53:25And obviously she's having none of it.
- 53:27But she speaks in her memoirs actually of a sense of pervasive Soviet intelligence presence
- 53:33in India.
- 53:34She's in India, I think, for three or four years and it grows exponentially even when
- 53:38she's in India.
- 53:39So she's this sense of being overwhelmed by the scale of the Soviet intelligence footprint
- 53:44in India.
- 53:45I think that's again, partly because the Soviet senior is incredibly important in the Cold War.
- 53:49And it's because of Western incompetence to a certain extent, or Western bundling in terms
- 53:54of its relations with India.
- 53:56That sort of the souring of Western diplomatic relations in India is responsible.
- 54:01It occurs for two things in the British.
- 54:03One in 1965, Harold Wilson, the British prime minister, India goes to war with Pakistan
- 54:08in 1965 over Kashmir.
- 54:10And Wilson blames India for precipitating that conflict.
- 54:15And that Indians are just horrified.
- 54:17They think Wilson's taking sides.
- 54:19He's got it wrong that India isn't the aggressor Pakistan is.
- 54:23And that really sends British relations with India into the deep freeze, probably for a
- 54:28good five years or more.
- 54:29And it creates a window for the Soviets to get on in India's good books.
- 54:33And again, a few years later in 1971, Richard Nixon does much the same thing when Pakistan
- 54:39fractures between East and West Pakistan, the United Nations state of Bangladesh is
- 54:43formed and India's seminal in providing support to Bangladesh to break away from West Pakistan.
- 54:50And the Nixon administration for various reasons gets on Pakistan's side during that conflict.
- 54:55And India is horrified.
- 54:58And then formally signs a treaty of sort of military alliance with the Soviet Union in
- 55:021971.
- 55:03Certain actions, but in London and Washington, push India further away from the West and
- 55:07towards the Soviet Union.
- 55:09And again, that sort of leads or produces a climate that's much more conducive to the
- 55:14operation of Soviet intelligence services in India, the union government are much less
- 55:19willing to alienate Moscow because they need their diplomatic, political and military support
- 55:24really from the mid 1960s onwards.
- 55:25So that creates a much more benign environment for Soviet intelligence operations in India
- 55:29during that period.
- 55:31And they do grow progressively, I think, from that point almost until the end of the field
- 55:34war.
- 55:35So, James, would you like your readers to take away from your book?
- 55:39Yeah, I think a lot of it's about power.
- 55:42So it's a bit bit bit of a cliche really, but thinking about the Cold War in a North
- 55:46South perspective and not in an East West perspective.
- 55:50So very much the book is about shifting that lens and trying to think about it from the
- 55:54global South perspective, but to turn around and think, trying to get every reader to think
- 55:58about this, not as a Cold War between Washington and Moscow or London and Moscow, but really
- 56:03a global Cold War, which was very fractured, involved lots of different actors.
- 56:07And it is quite complicated when you look at it from a South Asian perspective, you
- 56:11know, very different perspective, as we mentioned on ideology on what the Cold War meant for
- 56:15that, that particular region, why it was significant.
- 56:18And in part, I think that gets the hub of the issue around around power and around agency.
- 56:23So one of the key takeaways in the book, I think, is this notion of asymmetrical power
- 56:28and the limitations of power.
- 56:30So I guess if you think about in a Southeast Asian terms around about the same time, you
- 56:34know, Vietnam is the obvious example.
- 56:36The United States is a global superpower, but it can't bend Vietnam to its will in the
- 56:401960s and 1970s.
- 56:41It's unable to do so.
- 56:43And that's because of local agency and the power of local forces.
- 56:46And it's a similar sort of issue going on in South Asia, obviously, in a much less sort
- 56:49of, you know, not in a hot war sense, but in a Cold War sense, United States and Moscow
- 56:54are both trying to bend South Asia to its will ideologically, but also in terms of its
- 56:59politics.
- 57:00They fail.
- 57:01They don't have the resources to do so.
- 57:04And I don't think it would ever have been possible.
- 57:06So this notion that power as deployed by superpowers has severe limitations, particularly in the
- 57:12global south.
- 57:13And it will be useful if many more politicians in Western capitals recognize the limitations
- 57:19of that power and how it's projected.
- 57:21And again, we could think back recently to the one terror and Washington's intervention
- 57:26in Afghanistan and people saying, well, that's probably not going to end well.
- 57:30If you look at the lessons of history and how that works, that there are going to be
- 57:32limitations of the nation building and how you can recraft society through the global
- 57:37south if they're contesting your intervention.
- 57:41Very similar in India, I think, where both the Soviet Union and more so the United States
- 57:45and Great Britain, I think, have to learn really painful lessons about the limitations
- 57:49of power.
- 57:50And the other principal lesson, I think, is the flip side of that.
- 57:53The power of Indians at all levels, not just elite levels, not just Nero, Nero Gandhi,
- 57:58senior Indian politicians, but Indians at a much lower level to really effectively resist
- 58:03Western intervention or Western power in the subcontinent and to become extremely adept
- 58:09at manipulating the West.
- 58:10So at an elite level, I'd say Indian politicians and Indian government are very good at playing
- 58:15Washington off against Moscow, taking economic aid from both Moscow and Washington, taking
- 58:20military aid from both Washington and Moscow, not really doing the bidding that Washington
- 58:25and Moscow want to do at certain times in the United Nations, being really effective
- 58:28at doing that, that balancing act.
- 58:30But at lower levels, Indian cultural producers, Indian journalists, minor Indian politicians
- 58:36being really good at taking political support, financial support, all sorts of supports from
- 58:42both sides in the Cold War and then just not doing what the Americans or the Russians want
- 58:45them to do.
- 58:46So again, this sort of notion that, yeah, we're perfectly happy to do it, but that's
- 58:49not really what we're going to do.
- 58:51So I think local agency and the sort of power of local agency is the other big, big issue
- 58:55I draw from the book really and how South Asia just shows that to be the case.
- 59:01Very important lessons to be learned.
- 59:03I'm greatly looking forward to reading your book.
- 59:06So thank you.
- 59:07Thank you for joining me on I Spy The Intelligence History podcast.
- 59:12It's been an absolute pleasure.
- 59:14Thank you for having me.
- 59:15Thanks for such great questions.
- 59:16It's really got me to think back about how I wrote the book and what's really important.
- 59:20So thank you very much.