Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [1988] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Chairman's Letter 1988 Berkshire Hathaway Inc to the shareholders
- 0:04of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated.
- 0:07Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million or 20%.
- 0:14Over the last 24 years, that is since present management took
- 0:18over our per share book value has grown from 19.46 dollars to
- 0:232974.52 dollars or at a rate of 23% compounded annually.
- 0:30We've emphasized in past reports that what counts however is
- 0:34intrinsic business value, the figure necessarily in estimate
- 0:38indicating what all of our constituent businesses are
- 0:42worth. By our calculations, Berkshires
- 0:44intrinsic business value significantly exceeds its book
- 0:48value over the 24 years. Business value has grown
- 0:52somewhat faster than book value. In 1988, however, book value
- 0:57grew the faster by a bit. Berkshire's past rates of gain
- 1:01in both book value and business value were achieved under
- 1:04circumstances far different from those that now exist.
- 1:08Anyone ignoring these differences makes the same
- 1:11mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the
- 1:14future prospects of a 42 year old center fielder on the basis
- 1:18of his lifetime batting average. Important negatives affecting
- 1:21our prospects today are one A less attractive stock market
- 1:25than generally existed over the past 24 years 2 Higher corporate
- 1:30tax rates on most forms of investment income. 3A.
- 1:34Far more richly priced market for the acquisition of
- 1:37businesses and four industry conditions, four capital cities,
- 1:41ABC Incorporated, GEICO Corporation and The Washington
- 1:45Post Company Berkshires 3 permanent investments
- 1:49constituting about 1/2 of our net worth that range from
- 1:53slightly to materially less favorable than those existing
- 1:565210 years ago. All of these companies have
- 1:59superb management and strong properties, but at current
- 2:03prices, they're upside potential looks considerably less exciting
- 2:07to us today than it did some years ago.
- 2:10The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital
- 2:14base. You've heard that from us
- 2:16before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each
- 2:21year. And also just as with age, it's
- 2:23better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to
- 2:27have it solved. For years ago I told you that we
- 2:29needed profits of 3.9 dollars billion to achieve a 15% annual
- 2:34return over the decade. Then ahead today for the next
- 2:38decade, a 15% return demands profits of $10.3 billion.
- 2:44That seems like a very big number to me and 2C Munger,
- 2:48Berkshire's vice Chairman and my partner.
- 2:50Should that number indeed proved too big, Charlie will find
- 2:54himself in future reports retrospectively identified as
- 2:59the senior partner. As a partial offset to the drag
- 3:02that our growing capital base exerts upon returns.
- 3:06We have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24
- 3:09years ago. Then, all our capital was tied
- 3:12up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic
- 3:16characteristics. Today, part of our capital is
- 3:19invested in some really exceptional businesses.
- 3:22Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted 7,
- 3:26Buffalo News, Fetchheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart,
- 3:30Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, Seize and World Book.
- 3:34In 1988, the Saints came marching in.
- 3:37You can see just how extraordinary their returns on
- 3:40capital were by examining the historical cost financial
- 3:43statements on Page 45, which combine the figures of the
- 3:48Sainted 7 with those of several smaller units with no benefit
- 3:52from financial leverage. This group earned about 67% on
- 3:56average equity capital In most cases.
- 3:59The remarkable performance of these units arises partially
- 4:02from an exceptional business franchise in all cases, and
- 4:06exceptional management is a vital factor.
- 4:09The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers
- 4:13alone. In my judgement, these
- 4:15businesses in aggregate will continue to produce superb
- 4:19returns. Well need these.
- 4:20Without this help, Berkshire would not have a chance of
- 4:23achieving our 15% goal. You can be sure that our
- 4:27operating managers will deliver. The question mark in our future
- 4:31is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds
- 4:34that they generate. In that respect, we took a step
- 4:38in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80%
- 4:42interest in Borsheims, a jewelry business in Omaha.
- 4:46This purchase described later in this letter, delivers exactly
- 4:51what we look for and outstanding business run by people we like,
- 4:55admire and trust. It's a great way to start the
- 4:58year. Accounting changes.
- 5:00We have made a significant accounting change that was
- 5:03mandated for 1988 and likely we'll have another to make in
- 5:071990 when we move figures around from year to year without any
- 5:11change in economic reality. One of our always thrilling
- 5:15discussions of accounting is necessary.
- 5:18First, they'll offer my customary disclaimer.
- 5:21Despite the shortcomings of generally accepted accounting
- 5:24principles GAP, I would hate to have the job of devising a
- 5:27better set of rules. The limitations of the existing
- 5:30set, however, need not be inhibiting.
- 5:34CE OS are free to treat GAP statements as a beginning rather
- 5:38than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors.
- 5:42And indeed they should. After all, any manager of a
- 5:46subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he
- 5:49reported bare bones gap numbers that omitted key information
- 5:53needed by his boss, the parent corporation CEO.
- 5:57Why then should the CEO himself withhold information vitally
- 6:01useful to his bosses, the shareholder owners of the
- 6:04corporation? What needs to be reported is
- 6:07data, whether GAP, non GAAP or extra GAAP, that helps
- 6:11financially Literate readers answer three key questions.
- 6:14One, approximately how much is this company worth?
- 6:182 what is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations?
- 6:22And three, how good a job are its managers doing given the
- 6:25hand they have been dealt? In most cases, answers to one or
- 6:29more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and
- 6:32impossible to glean from the minimum gap presentation.
- 6:36The business world is simply too complex for a single set of
- 6:39rules to effectively describe economic reality for all
- 6:43enterprises, particularly those operating in a wide variety of
- 6:47businesses such as Berkshire. Further complicating the problem
- 6:51is the fact that many management's view gap not as a
- 6:55standard to be met but as in obstacle to overcome.
- 6:58Too often their accountants willingly assist them.
- 7:02How much says the client is 2 + 2?
- 7:05Replies the cooperative accountant?
- 7:06What number did you have in mind?
- 7:09Even honest and well-intentioned management sometimes stretch gap
- 7:13a bit in order to present figures they think well more
- 7:16appropriately describe their performance.
- 7:18Both the smoothing of earnings and the big bath quarter are
- 7:22white lie techniques employed by otherwise upright management's.
- 7:26Then there are managers who actively use GAP to deceive and
- 7:30defraud. They know that many investors
- 7:33and creditors accept GAP results is gospel.
- 7:36So these charlatans interpret the rules imaginatively and
- 7:40record business transactions in ways that technically comply
- 7:44with GAP but actually display an economic allusion to the world.
- 7:48As long as investors, including supposedly sophisticated
- 7:52institutions, place fancy valuations on reported earnings
- 7:56that March steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers
- 8:00and promoters will exploit GAP to produce such numbers, no
- 8:04matter what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I
- 8:07have observed many accounting based frauds of staggering size.
- 8:12Few of the perpetrators have been punished.
- 8:14Many have not even been censured.
- 8:17It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen then small
- 8:20sums with a gun. Under one major change mandated
- 8:23by GAAP for 1988, we have been required to fully consolidate
- 8:28all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings
- 8:31statement. In the past mutual savings and
- 8:35loan and Scott Fetzer Financial, a credit company that primarily
- 8:39finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products
- 8:43were consolidated on A1 line basis.
- 8:45That meant we one showed our equity in their combined net
- 8:48worths as a single entry asset on Berkshire's consolidated
- 8:52balance sheet and two included our equity in their combined
- 8:56annual earnings is a single line income entry in our consolidated
- 9:00statement of earnings. Now the rules require that we
- 9:04consolidate each asset and liability of these companies in
- 9:07our balance sheet and each item of their income and expense in
- 9:12our earnings statement. This change underscores the need
- 9:15for companies also to report segmented data.
- 9:18The greater the number of economically diverse business
- 9:21operations lumped together in conventional financial
- 9:25statements, the less useful those presentations are and the
- 9:29less able investors are to answer the three questions posed
- 9:32earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever
- 9:35prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside
- 9:39requirements. On the other hand, Charlie and I
- 9:42constantly study our segment data.
- 9:44Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our gap
- 9:48statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary
- 9:52information that we think will help you measure both business
- 9:55value and managerial performance.
- 9:57Berkshire's ability to discharge its obligations to creditors.
- 10:01The third question we listed should be obvious.
- 10:05Whatever statements you examine in these supplementary
- 10:09presentations, we will not necessarily follow gap
- 10:12procedures or even corporate structure.
- 10:14Rather, we will attempt to lump major business activities in
- 10:18ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail.
- 10:22Our goal is to give you important information in a form
- 10:26that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed.
- 10:29On pages 41 to 47, we show separate combined balance sheets
- 10:34and earnings statements. For one are subsidiaries engaged
- 10:38in finance type operations which are mutual savings and Scott
- 10:42Fetzer Financial. 2 are insurance operations with their
- 10:46major investment positions itemized. 3 are manufacturing,
- 10:50publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside
- 10:54certain non operating assets and purchase price accounting
- 10:57adjustments and four in all other category that includes the
- 11:01non operating assets, primarily marketable securities held by
- 11:05the companies in three as well as various assets and debts of
- 11:09the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.
- 11:12If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these 4
- 11:15segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAP
- 11:19statements. However, we want to emphasize
- 11:22that are new presentation does not fall within the purview of
- 11:26our auditors who in no way bless it.
- 11:28In fact, they may be horrified. I don't want to ask.
- 11:32I referred earlier to a major change in GAP that is expected
- 11:36in 1990. This change relates to the
- 11:39calculation of deferred taxes and is both complicated and
- 11:43controversial, so much so that it's imposition originally
- 11:46scheduled for 1989 was postponed for a year.
- 11:51When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various ways.
- 11:55Most important, we will be required to change the way we
- 11:59calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized
- 12:03appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.
- 12:06Right now, our liability is layered for the unrealized
- 12:11appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years. 1.2
- 12:16dollars billion. We have booked a 28% tax
- 12:19liability for the unrealized appreciation built up since $600
- 12:24million. The tax liability has been
- 12:27booked at 34%. The difference reflects the
- 12:30increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987.
- 12:35It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will
- 12:39require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990,
- 12:44taking the charge against our earnings.
- 12:47Assuming no change in tax rates by 1990, this step will reduce
- 12:51our earnings in that year and thereby our reported net worth
- 12:55by $71,000,000. The proposed rule will also
- 12:59affect other items on our balance sheet, but these changes
- 13:02will have only a minor impact on earnings and net worth.
- 13:06We have no strong views about the desirability of this change
- 13:10in calculation of deferred taxes.
- 13:13We should point out, however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax
- 13:18liability precisely depicts economic reality at Berkshire,
- 13:22since we have no plans to sell the stocks in which we have the
- 13:25great bulk of our gains. To those of you who are
- 13:28uninterested in accounting, I apologize for this dissertation.
- 13:32I realize that many of you do not pour over our figures, but
- 13:36instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that 1C and I
- 13:41have the bulk of our money in Berkshire.
- 13:43Two, we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in
- 13:47direct proportion to ours, and three, the record has so far
- 13:51been satisfactory. There is nothing necessarily
- 13:54wrong with this kind of faith approach to investing.
- 13:57Other shareholders, however, prefer an analysis approach, and
- 14:02we want to supply the information they need in our own
- 14:05investing. We search for situations in
- 14:07which both approaches give us the same answer.
- 14:10Sources of Reported Earnings In addition to supplying you with
- 14:14our new for sector accounting material, we will continue to
- 14:18list the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings
- 14:21just as we have in the past. In the following table.
- 14:25Amortization of goodwill and other major purchase price
- 14:28accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific
- 14:32businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and
- 14:36shown separately. This procedure lets you view the
- 14:39earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported
- 14:42had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports
- 14:45why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to
- 14:49investors and managers than the standard gap presentation which
- 14:53makes purchase price adjustments on a business by business basis.
- 14:57The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course,
- 15:01identical to the gap total in our audited financial
- 15:04statements. Further information about these
- 15:07businesses is given in the business segment section on
- 15:10pages 32 to 34 and in the management's discussion section
- 15:15on pages 36 to 40. In these sections, you also will
- 15:19find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. 4
- 15:23Information on West Coast businesses I urge you to read
- 15:26Charlie Munger's letter, which starts on page 52.
- 15:30It contains the best description I have seen of the events that
- 15:34produced the present savings and loan crisis.
- 15:37Also take special note of Dave Hillstrom's performance at
- 15:40Precision Steel Warehouse, Owesco subsidiary.
- 15:44Precision operates in an extremely competitive industry,
- 15:48yet Dave consistently achieves good returns on invested
- 15:51capital. Though data is lacking to prove
- 15:54the point, I think it is likely that his performance both in
- 15:571988 and years past would rank him number one among his peers.
- 16:02The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are superb,
- 16:06whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of
- 16:09they're competitors. For that, we thank our operating
- 16:12managers. You and I are fortunate to be
- 16:15associated with them at Berkshire.
- 16:17Associations like these last a long time.
- 16:19We do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they
- 16:23have attained A specified age, whether the traditional 65 or
- 16:28the 95 reached by Mrs. B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988.
- 16:33Superb managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply
- 16:37because a cake gets crowded with candles.
- 16:40Moreover, our experience with newly minted MBAs has not been
- 16:44that great. They're academic, records always
- 16:47look terrific, and the candidates always know just what
- 16:50to say, but too often they are short on personal commitment to
- 16:54the company and general business savvy.
- 16:57It's difficult to teach a new dog old tricks.
- 17:00Hey Race, an update on our major non insurance operations O at
- 17:03Nebraska Furniture Mart misses B Rose Blumkin and her cart roll
- 17:08on and on. She's been the boss for 51
- 17:10years, having started the business at 44 with $500.
- 17:15Think what she would have done with $1000 with Missus B, Old
- 17:20age will always be 10 years away.
- 17:23The Mart, long the largest home furnishing store in the country,
- 17:27continues to grow. In the fall, the store opened a
- 17:30detached 20,000 square foot clearance center, which expands
- 17:34our ability to offer bargains in all price ranges.
- 17:38Recently, Dillard's, one of the most successful department store
- 17:41operations in the country, entered the Omaha market.
- 17:45In many of its stores, Dillard's runs a full furniture
- 17:48department, undoubtedly doing well on this line.
- 17:52Shortly before opening in Omaha, however, William Dillard,
- 17:56chairman of the company, announced that his new store
- 17:59would not sell furniture, said he, referring to NFM.
- 18:02We don't want to compete with them.
- 18:04We think they are about the best there is.
- 18:07At the Buffalo News we extol the value of advertising and our
- 18:11policies at NFM prove that we practice what we preach.
- 18:14Over the past three years NFM has been the largest ROP
- 18:18advertiser in the Omaha world. Herald ROP advertising is the
- 18:23kind printed in the paper as contrasted to the pre printed
- 18:26insert kind and no other major market to my knowledge is a home
- 18:31furnishings operation. The leading customer of the
- 18:34newspaper. At times we also run large ads
- 18:38and papers as far away as Des Moines, Sioux City and Kansas
- 18:42City, always with good results. It truly does pay to advertise
- 18:47as long as you have something worthwhile to offer.
- 18:50Misses BS son Louis and his boys Ron and Irv complete the winning
- 18:55Blumkin team. It's a joy to work with this
- 18:58family. All its members have character
- 19:00that matches their extraordinary abilities.
- 19:03Well, last year I stated unequivocally that pre tax
- 19:06margins at the Buffalo News would fall in 1988.
- 19:10That forecast would have prove correct that almost any other
- 19:13newspaper our size or larger. But Stan Lipsey, bless him, has
- 19:18managed to make me look foolish. Though we increased our prices a
- 19:22bit less than the industry average last year, and though
- 19:25our new Sprint costs and wage rates rose in line with industry
- 19:29norms, Stan actually improved margins a tad.
- 19:33No one in the newspaper business has a better managerial record.
- 19:37He has achieved it. Furthermore, while running a
- 19:39paper that gives readers an extraordinary amount of news, we
- 19:43believe that our Newshole percentage, the portion of the
- 19:47paper devoted to news, is bigger than that of any other dominant
- 19:51paper of our size or larger. The percentage was 49.5% in 1988
- 19:57versus 49.8% in 1987. We are committed to keeping it
- 20:02around 50%, whatever the level or trend of profit margins.
- 20:07Charlie and I have loved the newspaper business since we
- 20:10we're youngsters and we have had great fun with the news in the
- 20:1312 years since we purchased it. We were fortunate to find Murray
- 20:17Light a top flight editor, on the scene when we arrived and he
- 20:21has made us proud of the paper ever since.
- 20:23O CS Candies sold a record £25.1 million in 1988.
- 20:29Prospects did not look good at the end of October, but
- 20:32excellent Christmas volume, considerably better than the
- 20:35record set in 1987. Turn the tide.
- 20:39As we've told you before, CS business continues to become
- 20:42more Christmas concentrated. In 1988, the company earned a
- 20:47record 90% of its full year profits in December, $29 million
- 20:52out of $32.5 million before tax. It's enough to make you believe
- 20:57in Santa Claus. December's deluge of business
- 21:01produces a modest seasonal bulge in Berkshire's corporate
- 21:04earnings. Another small bulge occurs in
- 21:07the first quarter when most World Book annuals are sold.
- 21:11Charlie and I put Chuck Huggins in charge of CS about 5 minutes
- 21:15after we bought the company. Upon reviewing his record, you
- 21:19may wonder what took us so long. Oh, at Fetchheimer, the
- 21:22Hellmans, Bob George, Gary Rodger and Fred are the
- 21:27Cincinnati counterparts of the Blumpkins.
- 21:29Neither furniture retailing nor uniform manufacturing has
- 21:33inherently attractive economics in these businesses.
- 21:37Only exceptional managements can deliver high returns on invested
- 21:41capital. And that's exactly what the five
- 21:44Hellman's do. As Mets announcer Ralph Kiner
- 21:47once said when comparing pitcher Steve Trout to his father Dizzy
- 21:51Trout, the famous Detroit Tigers pitcher.
- 21:54Theirs a lot of heredity in that family.
- 21:57Fetchheimer made a fairly good sized acquisition in 1988.
- 22:01Charlie and I have such confidence in the business savvy
- 22:04of the Hellman family that we okayed the deal without even
- 22:08looking at it. There are very few managements
- 22:11anywhere, including those running the top tier companies
- 22:14of the Fortune 500, in which we would exhibit similar
- 22:18confidence. Because of both this acquisition
- 22:21and some internal growth, sales at Fetchheimer should be up
- 22:24significantly in 1989. Oh, all of the operations
- 22:28managed by Ralph Shea, World Book Kirby and the Scott Fetzer
- 22:32Manufacturing Group performed splendidly in 1988.
- 22:37Returns on the capital entrusted to Ralph continue to be
- 22:40exceptional. Within the Scott Fetzer
- 22:42Manufacturing group, particularly fine progress was
- 22:46recorded at its largest unit, Campbell Housefelt.
- 22:49This company, the country's leading producer of small and
- 22:53medium sized air compressors, has more than doubled earnings
- 22:56since 1986. Unit sales at both Kirby and
- 23:00World Book were up significantly in 1988, with export business
- 23:05particularly strong. World Book became available in
- 23:08the Soviet Union in September when that country's largest
- 23:11American bookstore opened in Moscow.
- 23:13Ours is the only general encyclopedia offered at the
- 23:16store. Ralph's personal productivity is
- 23:19amazing. In addition to running 19
- 23:22businesses in superb fashion, he is active at the Cleveland
- 23:26Clinic, Ohio University, Case Western Reserve and a venture
- 23:30capital operation that has spawned 16 Ohio based companies
- 23:34and resurrected many others. Both Ohio and Berkshire are
- 23:38fortunate to have Ralph on their side.
- 23:40Borchheim's. It was in 1983 that Berkshire
- 23:43purchased an 80% interest in the Nebraska Furniture Mart.
- 23:48Your chairman blundered then by neglecting to ask Missus BA
- 23:51question any schoolboy would have thought of.
- 23:54Are there any more at home like you?
- 23:56Last month I corrected the error.
- 23:58We are now 80% partners with another branch of the family.
- 24:02After Missus became over from Russia in 1917, her parents and
- 24:07five siblings followed her. Two other siblings had preceded
- 24:11her. Among the sisters was Rebecca
- 24:13Friedman, who with her husband Louis, escaped in 1922 to the
- 24:18West through Latvia in a journey as perilous as Misses BS earlier
- 24:23odyssey to the east through Manchuria.
- 24:26When the family members reunited in Omaha, they had no tangible
- 24:30assets. However, they came equipped with
- 24:32an extraordinary combination of brains, integrity and enthusiasm
- 24:37for work, and that's all they needed.
- 24:40They have since proved themselves invincible.
- 24:43In 1948, Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheims, a small Omaha jewelry
- 24:48store. He was joined in the business by
- 24:50his son Ike in 1950, and as the years went by, Ike's son Allen
- 24:56and his sons in law, Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.
- 25:01You won't be surprised to learn that this family brings to the
- 25:04jewelry business precisely the same approach that the Blumpkins
- 25:08bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone 4.
- 25:11Both enterprises is misses BS Creed Sell cheap and tell the
- 25:16truth. Other fundamentals at both
- 25:18businesses are one single store operations featuring huge
- 25:22inventories that provide customers with an enormous
- 25:25selection across all price ranges, 2 daily attention to
- 25:29detail by top management, 3 rapid turnover for shrewd
- 25:33buying, and five incredibly low expenses.
- 25:36The combination of the last three factors let's both stores
- 25:40offer everyday prices that no one in the country comes close
- 25:44to matching most people, no matter how sophisticated they
- 25:48are. Another matters.
- 25:49Feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry, they
- 25:52can judge neither quality nor price.
- 25:55For them, only one rule makes sense.
- 25:57If you don't know jewelry, know the jeweler.
- 26:00I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman
- 26:03and his family will never be disappointed.
- 26:06The weigh in which we purchased our interest in their business
- 26:09is the ultimate testimonial. Borsheim's had no audited
- 26:13financial statements. Nevertheless, we didn't take
- 26:16inventory, verify receivables or audit the operation in any way.
- 26:21Ike simply told us what was so, and on that basis we drew up a
- 26:25one page contract and wrote a large check.
- 26:28Business at Borsheim's has mushroomed in recent years as
- 26:31the reputation of the Friedman family has spread.
- 26:34Customers now come to the store from all over the country.
- 26:38Among them have been some friends of mine from both coasts
- 26:41who thank me later for getting them there.
- 26:43Borsheim's new links to Berkshire will change nothing.
- 26:46In that way this business is run.
- 26:48All members of the Friedman family will continue to operate
- 26:52just as they have before. Charlie and I will stay on the
- 26:55sidelines where we belong. And when we say all members, the
- 26:59words have real meaning. Mr. and Missus Friedman, at 88
- 27:03and 87, respectively, are in the store daily.
- 27:07The wives of Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy
- 27:11times, and a fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.
- 27:16It is great fun to be in business with people you have
- 27:18long admired. The Friedmans, like the
- 27:21Blumpkins, have achieved success because they have deserved
- 27:24success. Both families focus on what's
- 27:27right for the customer, and that inevitably works out well for
- 27:31them. Also, we couldn't have better
- 27:33partners. The combined ratio represents
- 27:36total insurance cost losses incurred plus expenses compared
- 27:40to revenue from premiums. A ratio below 100 indicates an
- 27:45underwriting profit and one above 100 indicates a loss.
- 27:49When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on
- 27:53to policyholders funds the FLOTUS taken into account, a
- 27:57combined ratio in the 107 to 111 range typically produces an
- 28:02overall break even result exclusive of earnings on the
- 28:06funds provided by shareholders. For the reasons laid out in
- 28:09previous reports, we expect the industries incurred losses to
- 28:13grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation
- 28:18runs considerably lower. If premium growth, meanwhile,
- 28:22materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount,
- 28:26though the industry's tendency to under reserve when business
- 28:30turns bad may obscure their size for a time.
- 28:33As the table shows, the industry's underwriting loss
- 28:37grew in 1988. This trend is almost certain to
- 28:41continue and probably will accelerate for at least two more
- 28:45years. The property casualty insurance
- 28:47industry is not only subnormally profitable, it is subnormally
- 28:51popular. As Sam Goldwyn philosophized, in
- 28:55life, one must learn to take thee bitter with the sour.
- 28:59One of the ironies of business is that many relatively
- 29:02unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices
- 29:06habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers, even
- 29:11while other hugely profitable industries are spared complaints
- 29:15no matter how high their prices. Take the breakfast cereal
- 29:18industry, whose return on invested capital is more than
- 29:22double that of the auto insurance industry, which is why
- 29:25companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times
- 29:28book value and most large insurers sell close to book.
- 29:32The cereal companies regularly impose price increases, few of
- 29:36them related to a significant jump in their costs.
- 29:39Yet not a peep is heard from consumers.
- 29:42But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not
- 29:46even match cost increases, customers are outraged.
- 29:49If you want to be loved, it's clearly better to sell
- 29:52high-priced corn flakes than low priced auto insurance.
- 29:56The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can
- 29:59have serious consequences. Proposition One O 3A California
- 30:04initiative passed last fall threatens to push auto insurance
- 30:08prices down sharply even though costs have been soaring.
- 30:12The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the
- 30:15initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not
- 30:19been suspended. Even if the initiative is
- 30:22overturned, insurers are likely to find it tough to operate
- 30:26profitably in California. Thank heavens the citizenry
- 30:29isn't mad at bonbons. If Proposition 103 applied to
- 30:33candy as well as insurance, Seize would be forced to sell
- 30:37its product for 5.76 dollars per pound rather than the 7.60
- 30:42dollars we charge, and would be losing money by the bucket full.
- 30:46The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative
- 30:50are minor since we saw a few opportunities for profit in the
- 30:54rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote.
- 30:58However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect
- 31:01GEICO are 44% owned investee which gets about 10% of its
- 31:07premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO
- 31:11is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in
- 31:15other states through either initiatives or legislation.
- 31:18If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost,
- 31:22it eventually must be sold by government.
- 31:24Stockholders can subsidized policy holders for a short
- 31:28period, but only taxpayers can subsidized them over the long
- 31:32term. At most property casualty
- 31:34companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster
- 31:37for shareholders because of the commodity characteristics of the
- 31:42industry. Most insurers earn mediocre
- 31:44returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill
- 31:48to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto
- 31:52insurance business. But GEICO, because it is a low
- 31:55cost producer able to earn high returns on equity, has a huge
- 31:59amount of economic goodwill at risk.
- 32:02In turn, so do we. At Berkshire.
- 32:04In 1988, our premium volume continued to fall and in 1989 we
- 32:09will experience a large decrease for a special reason.
- 32:13The contract through which we receive 7% of the business, a
- 32:17Fireman's fund, expires on August 31st.
- 32:21At that time, we will return to Fireman's Fund the unearned
- 32:24premiums we hold that relate to the contract.
- 32:27This transfer of funds will show up in our premiums written
- 32:31account as a negative $85 million or so and will make our
- 32:35third quarter figures look rather peculiar.
- 32:37However, the termination of this contract will not have a
- 32:41significant effect on profits. Berkshire's underwriting results
- 32:45continued to be excellent in 1988.
- 32:48Our combined ratio on a statutory basis and excluding
- 32:52structured settlements and financial reinsurance was 104.
- 32:56Reserve development was favorable for the second year in
- 32:59a row after a string of years in which it was very
- 33:02unsatisfactory. Details on both underwriting and
- 33:05reserve development appear on pages 36 to 38.
- 33:09Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run
- 33:13very low since business with a reasonable potential for profit
- 33:17will almost certainly be scarce. So be it.
- 33:20At Berkshire we simply will not write policies at rates that
- 33:24carry the expectation of economic loss.
- 33:27We encounter enough troubles when we expect to gain despite
- 33:31or perhaps because of low volume.
- 33:33Our profit picture during the next few years is apartment to
- 33:37be considerably brighter than the industries.
- 33:40We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float
- 33:42compared to premium volume and that augers well for profits.
- 33:47In 1989 and 1990. We expect our float premiums
- 33:51ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property
- 33:55casualty company. Mike Goldberg with special help
- 33:58from Aji, Jane Dinos, Ayordanu and the national indemnity
- 34:02managerial team has positioned us well in that respect.
- 34:06At some point, we don't know when we will be deluged with
- 34:10insurance business. The cause will probably be some
- 34:13major physical or financial catastrophe.
- 34:16But we could also experience an explosion in business as we did
- 34:20in 1985 because large and increasing underwriting losses
- 34:25that other companies coincide with their recognition that they
- 34:28are far under reserved. In the meantime, we will retain
- 34:32our talented professionals, protect our capital and try not
- 34:36to make major mistakes. Marketable Securities In
- 34:39selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we
- 34:43can choose among five major categories 1.
- 34:46Long term common stock investments, 2 medium term fixed
- 34:49income securities, 3 long term fixed income securities for
- 34:54short term cash equivalents and five short term arbitrage
- 34:57commitments. We have no particular bias when
- 35:00it comes to choosing from these categories.
- 35:03We just continuously search among them for the highest after
- 35:06tax returns as measured by mathematical expectation,
- 35:10limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives.
- 35:13We think we understand our criteria have nothing to do with
- 35:17maximizing immediately reportable earnings.
- 35:20Our goal rather is to maximize eventual net worth.
- 35:24O. Below we list our common stock
- 35:25holdings having a value over $100 million, not including
- 35:30arbitrage commitments, which will be discussed later.
- 35:33Nominally A preferred stock, this security is financially
- 35:37equivalent to a common stock. Our permanent holdings, Capital
- 35:41Cities, ABC Incorporated, GEICO Corporation and The Washington
- 35:45Post Company remain unchanged. Also unchanged is our
- 35:50unqualified admiration of their management's Tom Murphy and Dan
- 35:54Burke at Cap City's, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and
- 35:58Kate Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post.
- 36:02Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent and
- 36:05integrity these managers bring to their businesses.
- 36:08Their performance, which we have observed at close range,
- 36:12contrast vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have
- 36:15fortunately observed from a safe distance.
- 36:18Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs.
- 36:22Their positions, nevertheless, are usually secure.
- 36:26The supreme irony of business management is that it is far
- 36:29easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an
- 36:33inadequate subordinate. If a secretary, say, is hired
- 36:37for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a
- 36:41minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a
- 36:44minute, she will lose her job in no time.
- 36:47There is a logical standard for this.
- 36:49Job performance is easily measured, and if you can't make
- 36:53the grade, you're out. Similarly, if new salespeople
- 36:56fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough, they
- 37:00will be let go. Excuses will not be accepted as
- 37:03a substitute for orders. However, Aceo, who doesn't
- 37:07perform, is frequently carried indefinitely.
- 37:10One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom
- 37:14exist. When they do, they are often
- 37:16fuzzy, or they may be waved or explained away.
- 37:20Even when the performance shortfalls are major and
- 37:23repeated at too many companies, the boss shoots the arrow of
- 37:27managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye
- 37:31around the spot where it lands. Another important but seldom
- 37:35recognized distinction between the boss and the foot soldier is
- 37:39that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is
- 37:43itself getting measured. The sales manager who retains a
- 37:46bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water
- 37:50himself. It is in his immediate
- 37:52self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes,
- 37:56otherwise he himself may be weeded out.
- 37:58An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same
- 38:03imperative. But the CE OS boss is a board of
- 38:05directors that seldom measures itself and is infrequently held
- 38:09to account for substandard corporate performance.
- 38:13If the board makes a mistake in hiring and perpetuates that
- 38:16mistake, So what? Even if the company is taken
- 38:20over because of the mistake, the deal will probably bestow
- 38:23substantial benefits on the outgoing board members.
- 38:27The bigger they are, the softer they fall.
- 38:29Finally, relations between the board and the CEO are expected
- 38:34to be congenial. At board meetings, criticism of
- 38:37the CE OS performance is often viewed as the social equivalent
- 38:41of belching. No such inhibitions restrain the
- 38:44office manager from critically evaluating the substandard
- 38:48typist. These points should not be
- 38:50interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CE OS or boards
- 38:54of directors. Most are able and hard working,
- 38:57and a number are truly outstanding.
- 38:59But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us
- 39:03thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three
- 39:06permanent holdings. They love their businesses.
- 39:09They think like owners and they exude integrity and ability.
- 39:13Oh, in 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan
- 39:17Mortgage, PFD, Freddie Mac and Coca-Cola.
- 39:20We expect to hold these securities for a long time.
- 39:24In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with
- 39:27outstanding management's, our favorite holding period is
- 39:31forever. We are just the opposite of
- 39:34those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform
- 39:37well, but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that
- 39:40disappoint. Peter Lynch aptly likens such
- 39:43behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds.
- 39:47Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum allowed by law and
- 39:51are extensively described by Charlie and his letter in our
- 39:55consolidated balance sheet. These shares are carried at cost
- 39:59rather than market since they are owned by mutual Savings and
- 40:02loan. A noninsurance subsidiary.
- 40:05We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few
- 40:08companies that we try to understand well.
- 40:11There are only a handful of businesses about which we have
- 40:14strong long term convictions. Therefore, when we find such a
- 40:17business, we want to participate in a meaningful way.
- 40:21We agree with Mae W Too much of a good thing can be wonderful,
- 40:26but we reduced our holdings of medium term tax exempt bonds by
- 40:29about $100 million last year. All of the bonds sold were
- 40:33acquired after August 7th, 1986. When such bonds are held by
- 40:39property casualty insurance companies, 15% of the tax exempt
- 40:43interest earned is subject to tax.
- 40:45The $800 million position we still hold consists almost
- 40:49entirely of bonds grandfathered under the Tax Reform Act of
- 40:531986, which means they are entirely tax exempt.
- 40:57Our sales produced a small profit in our remaining bonds
- 41:01which haven't average maturity of about six years are worth
- 41:05modestly more than carrying value.
- 41:08Last year we described our holdings of short term and
- 41:11intermediate term bonds of Texaco which was then in
- 41:14bankruptcy. During 1988 we sold practically
- 41:17all of these bonds at a pre tax profit of about $22 million.
- 41:22This sale explains close to $100 million of the reduction in
- 41:26fixed income securities on our balance sheet.
- 41:30We also told you last year about our holdings of another security
- 41:33whose predominant characteristics are those of an
- 41:36intermediate fixed income issue are $700 million position in
- 41:41Salomon Inc 9% convertible preferred.
- 41:45This preferred has a sinking fund that will retire it in
- 41:48equal annual installments from 1995 to 1999.
- 41:53Berkshire carries this holding at cost for reasons discussed by
- 41:57Charlie on page 69. The estimated market value of
- 42:02our holding has improved from moderately under cost at the end
- 42:05of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end.
- 42:09The close association we have had with John Gutfreund, CEO of
- 42:13Salomon, during the past year has reinforced our admiration
- 42:17for him. But we continue to have no great
- 42:20insights about the near intermediate or long term
- 42:23economics of the investment banking business.
- 42:26This is not an industry in which it is easy to forecast future
- 42:30levels of profitability. We continue to believe that our
- 42:33conversion privilege could well have important value over the
- 42:37life of our preferred. However, the overwhelming
- 42:40portion of the preferred's value resides in its fixed income
- 42:44characteristics, not its equity characteristics.
- 42:47But we have not lost our aversion to long term bonds.
- 42:50We will become enthused about such securities only when we
- 42:54become enthused about prospects for long term stability in the
- 42:58purchasing power of money. And that kind of stability isn't
- 43:01in the cards. Both society and elected
- 43:04officials simply have too many higher ranking priorities that
- 43:08conflict with purchasing power stability.
- 43:11The only long term bonds we hold are those of Washington Public
- 43:15Power Supply Systems, WPPSSA. Few of our WPPSS bonds have
- 43:21short maturities and many others because of their high coupons
- 43:25are likely to be refunded and paid off in a few years.
- 43:29Overall, our WPPSS holdings are carried on our balance sheet at
- 43:33$247 million and have a market value of about $352 million.
- 43:40We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983
- 43:45Annual Report and are pleased to tell you that this commitment
- 43:49has worked out about as expected.
- 43:51At the time of purchase, most of our bonds were yielding around
- 43:5517% after taxes and carried no ratings which have been
- 43:59suspended recently. The bonds were rated a A by
- 44:03Standard and Poor's. They now sell at levels only
- 44:06slightly below those enjoyed by top grade credits.
- 44:09In the 1983 report, we compared the economics of our WPPSS
- 44:15purchased to those involved in buying a business.
- 44:17As it turned out, this purchase actually worked out better than
- 44:21did the general run of business acquisitions made in 1983,
- 44:25assuming both are measured on the basis of unleveraged after
- 44:29tax returns achieved through 1988.
- 44:32Our WPPSS experience, though pleasant, does nothing to alter
- 44:37our negative opinion about long term bonds.
- 44:40It only makes us hope that we run into some other large
- 44:43stigmatized issue whose troubles have caused it to be
- 44:47significantly misappraised by the market arbitrage.
- 44:51In past reports we have told you that our insurance subsidiaries
- 44:55sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to holding short
- 44:59term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to make
- 45:03major long term commitments, but we often have more cash than
- 45:07good ideas. At such times arbitrage
- 45:09sometimes promises much greater returns than treasury bills and
- 45:13equally important, cools any temptation we may have to relax
- 45:18our standards for long term investments.
- 45:20Charlie, sign off after we've talked about an arbitrage
- 45:24commitment is usually OK, at least it will keep you out of
- 45:28bars. During 1988 we made unusually
- 45:31large profits from arbitrage measured both by absolute
- 45:35dollars and rate of return. Our pre tax gain was about $78
- 45:39million. On average, invested funds of
- 45:41about $147 million. This level of activity makes
- 45:46some detailed discussion of arbitrage and our approach to it
- 45:50appropriate. Once the word applied only to
- 45:53the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign
- 45:57exchange in two different markets, the goal was to exploit
- 46:01tiny price differentials that might exist between, say, Royal
- 46:05Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in London,
- 46:09and dollars in New York. Some people might call this
- 46:12scalping. It won't surprise you that
- 46:14practitioners opted for the French term arbitrage.
- 46:17Since World War One, the definition of arbitrage, or risk
- 46:21arbitrage as it is now sometimes called, has expanded to include
- 46:26the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event such
- 46:29as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization,
- 46:33reorganization, liquidation, self tender, etcetera.
- 46:37In most cases, the arbitrager expects to profit regardless of
- 46:41the behavior of the stock market.
- 46:43The major risk he usually faces instead is that the announced
- 46:47event won't happen. Some offbeat opportunities
- 46:50occasionally arise in the arbitrage field.
- 46:53I participated in one of these when I was 24 and working in New
- 46:57York for Graham Newman Corporation.
- 46:58Rockwood and Company, a Brooklyn based chocolate products company
- 47:02of Limited profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation
- 47:06in 1941 when Coco was selling for five per pound.
- 47:10In 1954, a temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to sort
- 47:15of over 60 and cent. Consequently, Rockwood wished to
- 47:19unload its valuable inventory quickly before the price
- 47:23dropped. But if the cocoa had simply been
- 47:26sold off, the company would have owed close to a 50% tax on the
- 47:30proceeds. The 1954 tax code came to the
- 47:33rescue. It contained an arcane provision
- 47:36that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO profits if
- 47:40inventory was distributed to shareholders.
- 47:42As part of a plan reducing the scope of a corporation's
- 47:46business, Rockwood decided to terminate one of its businesses
- 47:50the sale of cocoa butter and said 13,000,000 lbs of its cocoa
- 47:54bean inventory was attributable to that activity.
- 47:58Accordingly, the company offered to repurchase its stock in
- 48:01exchange for the cocoa beans it no longer needed, paying 80 lbs
- 48:06of beans for each share. For several weeks, I busily
- 48:09bought shares, sold beans, and made periodic stops at Schroeder
- 48:13Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse
- 48:16receipts. The profits were good and my
- 48:19only expense was subway tokens. The architect of Rockwoods
- 48:22restructuring was an unknown but brilliant Chicagoan Jay
- 48:26Pritzker, then 32. If you're familiar with Jay's
- 48:30subsequent record, you won't be surprised to hear the action
- 48:33worked out rather well for Rockwood's continuing
- 48:36shareholders. Also, from shortly before the
- 48:39tender until shortly after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from
- 48:4315 to 100, even though the company was experiencing large
- 48:47operating losses. Sometimes there is more to stock
- 48:50valuation than price earnings ratios.
- 48:53In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved
- 48:57takeovers friendly and unfriendly.
- 48:59With acquisition fever rampant, with antitrust challenges almost
- 49:03non existent, and with bids often ratcheting upward,
- 49:08arbitragers have prospered mightily.
- 49:10They have not needed special talents to do well.
- 49:13The trick a lot Peter Sellers in the movie has simply been being
- 49:17there in Wall Street. The old proverb has been
- 49:20reworded. Give a man a fish and you feed
- 49:23him for a day. Teach him how to arbitrage, and
- 49:26you feed him forever. If, however, he studied at the
- 49:30Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state institution
- 49:34that supplies his meals. To evaluate arbitrage
- 49:37situations, you must answer for questions one how likely is it
- 49:41that the promised event will indeed occur?
- 49:44To how long will your money be tied up free?
- 49:46What chances there that something still better will
- 49:49transpire? A competing takeover bid, for
- 49:52example? And for what will happen if the
- 49:55event does not take place because of antitrust action,
- 49:58financing glitches, etcetera? Arcada Corporation, one of our
- 50:02more serendipitous arbitrage experiences, illustrates the
- 50:06twists and turns of the business.
- 50:08On September 28th, 1981, the directors of Arcada agreed in
- 50:12principle to sell the company to Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and
- 50:17Company KKR, then and now a major leverage buyout firm.
- 50:21Arcada was in the printing and forest products businesses and
- 50:25had one other thing going for it.
- 50:27In 1978 the US government had taken title two 10,700 acres of
- 50:33Arcada timber, primarily old growth Redwood to expand Redwood
- 50:38National Park. The government had paid 97.9
- 50:42dollars million in several installments for this acreage, a
- 50:46sum Arcada was contesting as grossly inadequate.
- 50:49The parties also disputed the interest rate that should apply
- 50:53to the period between the taking of the property and final
- 50:56payment for it. The enabling legislation
- 50:59stipulated 6% simple interest. Arcada argued for a much higher
- 51:04and compounded rate. Buying a company with a highly
- 51:07speculative, large sized claim and litigation creates a
- 51:11negotiating problem whether the claim is on behalf of or against
- 51:15the company. To solve this problem, KKR
- 51:18offered $37 per Arcada share plus 2/3 of any additional
- 51:24amounts paid by the government for the Redwood Lands.
- 51:27Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask
- 51:31ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction
- 51:33since, among other things, its offer was contingent upon its
- 51:37obtaining satisfactory financing.
- 51:40A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller.
- 51:43It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between
- 51:47proposal and marriage. However, we were not
- 51:50particularly worried about this possibility because KKR's past
- 51:54record for closing had been good.
- 51:56We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR
- 52:00deal did fall through. And here we also felt reasonably
- 52:03comfortable. Arcada's management and
- 52:05directors had been shopping the company for some time and were
- 52:09clearly determined to sell. If KKR went away, Arcada would
- 52:13likely find another buyer, though of course the price might
- 52:16be lower. Finally, we had to ask ourselves
- 52:19what the Redwood claim might be worth.
- 52:21Your chairman? Who can't tell an Elm from it?
- 52:24Oak had no trouble with that one.
- 52:26He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a
- 52:30whole lot. We started buying Arcata stock
- 52:33then around 33.50 dollars on September 30th and in eight
- 52:38weeks purchased about 400,000 shares or 5% of the company.
- 52:43The initial announcement said that the $37 would be paid in
- 52:47January 1982. Therefore, if everything had
- 52:50gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of
- 52:54return of about 40%, not counting the Redwood claim which
- 52:58would have been frosting. All did not go perfectly.
- 53:01In December, it was announced that the closing would be
- 53:04delayed a bit. Nevertheless, A definitive
- 53:07agreement was signed on January 4th.
- 53:09Encouraged, we raised our stake, buying at around $38 per share
- 53:14and increasing our holdings to 655,000 shares or over 7% of the
- 53:20company. Our willingness to pay up even
- 53:24though the closing had been postponed reflected our leaning
- 53:27toward a whole lot rather than 0 for the Redwoods.
- 53:31Then on February 25th, the lenders said they were taking a
- 53:34second look at financing terms in view of the severely
- 53:38depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcadia's outlook.
- 53:42The stockholders meeting was postponed again to April.
- 53:45On Arcata spokesman said he did not think the fate of the
- 53:49acquisition itself was imperiled.
- 53:52When arbitragers hear such reassurances, their minds flash
- 53:56to the old saying he lied like a finance minister on the eve of
- 54:00devaluation. On March 12th, KKR said it's
- 54:03earlier deal wouldn't work, first cutting its offer to 33.50
- 54:08dollars, then two days later raising it to $35.
- 54:13On March 15th, however, the directors turned this bid down
- 54:17and accepted another group's offer of 37.50 dollars plus 1/2
- 54:22of any Redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal
- 54:26and the 37.50 dollars was paid. On June 4th, we received $24.6
- 54:33million versus our cost of $22.9 million.
- 54:37Our average holding period was close to six months.
- 54:40Considering the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15%
- 54:45annual rate of return, excluding any value for the Redwood claim
- 54:49was more than satisfactory. But the best was yet to come.
- 54:53The trial judge appointed 2 commissions, 1 to look at the
- 54:56Timbers value. The other two consider the
- 54:59interest rate questions. In January 1987, the 1st
- 55:03commissions said the Redwoods were worth $275.7 million, and
- 55:08the second Commission recommended a compounded blended
- 55:12rate of return working out to about 14%.
- 55:15In August 1987, the judge upheld these conclusions, which meant a
- 55:20net amount of about $600 million would be due Arcada.
- 55:24The government then appealed in 1988, though before this appeal
- 55:29was heard, the claim was settled for $519 million.
- 55:33Consequently, we received an additional 29.48 dollars per
- 55:37share, or about $19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or
- 55:44so in 1989. Berkshires arbitrage activities
- 55:47differ from those of many arbitragers. 1st, we participate
- 55:52in only a few and usually very large transactions each year.
- 55:57Most practitioners buy into a great many deals, perhaps 50 or
- 56:01more per year. With that many irons in the
- 56:03fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring both the
- 56:07progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks.
- 56:11This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives.
- 56:15What's the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape
- 56:19all day? Because we diversify so little,
- 56:21one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will
- 56:25affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will
- 56:29the typical arbitrage operation. So far, Berkshire has not had a
- 56:33really bad experience, but we will.
- 56:37And when it happens, well report the gory details to you.
- 56:40The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is
- 56:43that we participate only in transactions that have been
- 56:46publicly announced. We do not trade on rumors or try
- 56:49to guess takeover candidates. We just read the newspapers,
- 56:53think about a few of the big propositions and go by our own
- 56:57sense of probabilities at your end.
- 56:59Our only major arbitrage position was 334-2000 shares of
- 57:05RGR and Nabisco with a cost of $281.8 million and a market
- 57:11value of $304.5 million. In January, we increased our
- 57:16holdings to roughly 4 million shares and in February we
- 57:20eliminated our position. About 3 million shares were
- 57:24accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR which acquired
- 57:28RGR and the return shares were promptly sold in the market.
- 57:32Our pre tax profit was a better than expected $64 million.
- 57:37Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding
- 57:41contest, Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group
- 57:45that made a tax oriented offer to quote Yogi Berra.
- 57:49It was Deja vu all over again. During most of the time when we
- 57:53normally would have been purchasers of RJR, our
- 57:56activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon's
- 58:00participation in a bidding group.
- 58:02Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of
- 58:05Salomon, are walled off from information about its merger and
- 58:09acquisition work. We have asked that it be that
- 58:12way. The information would do us no
- 58:14good and could in fact occasionally inhibit Berkshire's
- 58:19arbitrage operations. However, the unusually large
- 58:22commitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RGR deal required
- 58:27that all directors be fully informed and involved.
- 58:30Therefore, Berkshire's purchases of RJR were made at only two
- 58:35times, first, in the few days immediately following
- 58:39management's announcement of buyout plans, before Salomon
- 58:42became involved, and considerably later after that.
- 58:46RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR.
- 58:49Because we could not buy at other times, our directorships
- 58:53cost Berkshire significant money.
- 58:55Considering Berkshire's good results in 1988, you might
- 58:59expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989.
- 59:03Instead, we expect to be on the sidelines. 1 pleasant reason is
- 59:07that our cash holdings are down because our position in equities
- 59:11that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially
- 59:14up. As regular readers of this
- 59:17report, no, our new commitments are not based on a judgement
- 59:21about short term prospects for the stock market.
- 59:23Rather, they reflect an opinion about long term business
- 59:26prospects for specific companies.
- 59:29We do not have, never have had, and never we'll have an opinion
- 59:33about where the stock market, interest rates or business
- 59:37activity will be a year from now.
- 59:39Even if we had a lot of cash, we probably would do little in
- 59:42arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have
- 59:46developed in the takeover field, as Dorothy says, Toto, I have a
- 59:50feeling we're not in Kansas anymore.
- 59:53We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we
- 59:57know what will change the attitudes of government, lender
- 1:00:00and buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the
- 1:00:03prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the
- 1:00:06greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own
- 1:00:09affairs. We have no desire to arbitrage
- 1:00:12transactions that reflect the unbridled and, in our view,
- 1:00:17often unwarranted optimism of both buyers and lenders in our
- 1:00:22activities. We will heed the wisdom of Herb
- 1:00:25Stein. If something can't go on
- 1:00:27forever, it will end. Efficient market theory.
- 1:00:30The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small
- 1:00:34discussion of efficient market theory EMT also seem relevant.
- 1:00:38This doctrine became highly fashionable, indeed almost holy
- 1:00:42scripture, in academic circles during the 1970s.
- 1:00:46Essentially, it said that analyzing stocks was useless
- 1:00:49because all public information about them was appropriately
- 1:00:53reflected in their prices. In other words, the market
- 1:00:56always knew everything. As a corollary, the professors
- 1:01:00who taught EMT said that someone throwing darts at the stock
- 1:01:04tables could select a stock portfolio having prospects just
- 1:01:08as good as one selected by the brightest, most hard working
- 1:01:11security analyst. Amazingly, EMT was embraced not
- 1:01:16only by academics, but by many investment professionals and
- 1:01:20corporate managers as well. Observing correctly that the
- 1:01:23market was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude,
- 1:01:26incorrectly that it was always efficient.
- 1:01:29The difference between these propositions is night and day.
- 1:01:33In my opinion, the continuous 63 year arbitrage experience of
- 1:01:37Graham Newman Corporation, Buffett Partnership and
- 1:01:40Berkshire illustrates just how foolish EMT is.
- 1:01:44There's plenty of other evidence also.
- 1:01:46While at Graham Newman, I made a study of its earnings from
- 1:01:50arbitrage during the entire 1926 to 1956 lifespan of the company.
- 1:01:56Unleveraged returns averaged 20% per year.
- 1:01:59Starting in 1956, I applied Ben Graham's arbitrage principles,
- 1:02:04first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire.
- 1:02:07Though I've not made an exact calculation, I have done enough
- 1:02:11work to know that the 1956 to 1988 returns averaged well over
- 1:02:1620%. Of course, I operated in an
- 1:02:19environment far more favorable than Ben's.
- 1:02:22He had 1929 to 1932 to contend with.
- 1:02:27All of the conditions are present that are required for a
- 1:02:30fair test of portfolio performance.
- 1:02:32One to three organizations traded hundreds of different
- 1:02:35securities while building the 63 year record. 2 The results are
- 1:02:40not skewed by a few fortunate experiences.
- 1:02:43Three, we did not have to dig for obscure facts or develop
- 1:02:47keen insights about products or managements.
- 1:02:50We simply acted on highly publicized events and for our
- 1:02:54arbitrage positions were a clearly identified universe.
- 1:02:57They have not been selected by hindsight.
- 1:03:00Over the 63 years, the general market delivered just under a
- 1:03:0510% annual return, including dividends.
- 1:03:08That means $1000 would have grown to $405,000 if all income
- 1:03:13had been reinvested. A 20% rate of return, however,
- 1:03:18would have produced $97,000,000. That strikes us as a
- 1:03:23statistically significant differential that might
- 1:03:26conceivably arouse 1's curiosity.
- 1:03:29Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in
- 1:03:32discordant evidence of this type.
- 1:03:34True, they don't talk quite as much about their theory today as
- 1:03:37they used to, but no one, to my knowledge, has ever said he was
- 1:03:42wrong, no matter how many thousands of students he has
- 1:03:45sent forth Misinstructed. EMT, moreover, continues to be
- 1:03:49an integral part of the investment curriculum at major
- 1:03:52business schools. Apparently, a reluctance to
- 1:03:56recant and thereby to demystify the priesthood is not limited to
- 1:04:00theologians. Naturally, the disservice done
- 1:04:03students and gullible investment professionals who have swallowed
- 1:04:07EMT has been an extraordinary service to us and other
- 1:04:11followers of Graham. In any sort of a contest,
- 1:04:14financial, mental or physical, it's an enormous advantage to
- 1:04:19have opponents who have been taught that it's useless to even
- 1:04:22try. From a selfish point of view,
- 1:04:24grammites should probably endowed shares to ensure the
- 1:04:27perpetual teaching of EMT. All this said, a warning is
- 1:04:31appropriate. Arbitrage has looked easy
- 1:04:35recently, but this is not a form of investing that guarantees
- 1:04:38profits of 20% a year, or for that matter, profits of any
- 1:04:43kind. As noted, the market is
- 1:04:45reasonably efficient much of the time.
- 1:04:48For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63 year
- 1:04:52period, many more were foregone because they seemed properly
- 1:04:55priced. An investor cannot obtain
- 1:04:57superior profits from stocks by simply committing to a specific
- 1:05:01investment category or style. He can earn them only by
- 1:05:05carefully evaluating facts and continuously exercising
- 1:05:09discipline. Investing in arbitrage
- 1:05:11situations per SE is no better a strategy than selecting A
- 1:05:16portfolio by throwing darts. New York Stock Exchange Listing
- 1:05:20Berkshire's shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange
- 1:05:24on November 29th, 1988. On pages 50 to 51, we reproduce
- 1:05:29the letter we sent to shareholders concerning the
- 1:05:32listing. Let me clarify one point not
- 1:05:34dealt with in the letter, though.
- 1:05:36Our round lot for trading on the NYSE is 10 shares.
- 1:05:39Any number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold.
- 1:05:43As the letter explains, our primary goal in listing was to
- 1:05:47reduce transaction costs and we believe this goal is being
- 1:05:51achieved. Generally, the spread between
- 1:05:54the bid and asked price on the NYSE has been well below the
- 1:05:58spread that prevailed in that over the counter market.
- 1:06:01Henderson Brothers Incorporated, the specialist in our shares, is
- 1:06:05the oldest continuing specialist firm on the exchange.
- 1:06:09It's progenitor, William Thomas Henderson bought his seat for
- 1:06:13$500 on September 8th, 1861. Recently, seats were selling for
- 1:06:19about $625,000. Among the 54 firms acting as
- 1:06:24specialists, HBI ranks second in number of stocks assigned with
- 1:06:2983. We were pleased when Berkshire
- 1:06:32was allocated to HBI and have been delighted with the firm's
- 1:06:36performance. Jim McGuire, chairman of HBI,
- 1:06:39personally manages the trading in Berkshire and we could not be
- 1:06:43in better. Hence, in two respects, our
- 1:06:46goals probably differ somewhat from those of most listed
- 1:06:49companies. 1st, we do not want to maximize the price at which
- 1:06:53Berkshire shares trade. We wish instead for them to
- 1:06:56trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value,
- 1:07:00which we hope increases at a reasonable or better yet,
- 1:07:04unreasonable rate. Charlie and I are bothered as
- 1:07:07much by significant overvaluation as significant
- 1:07:11undervaluation. Both extremes will inevitably
- 1:07:13produce results for many shareholders that will differ
- 1:07:17sharply from Berkshire's business results.
- 1:07:20If our stock price instead consistently mirrors business
- 1:07:23value, each of our shareholders will receive an investment
- 1:07:27result that roughly parallels the business results of
- 1:07:30Berkshire during his holding period.
- 1:07:32Second, we wish for very little trading activity.
- 1:07:35If we ran a private business with a few passive partners, we
- 1:07:39would be disappointed if those partners and their replacements
- 1:07:43frequently wanted to leave the partnership.
- 1:07:46Running a public company, we feel the same way.
- 1:07:49Our goal is to attract long term owners who at the time of
- 1:07:53purchase have no timetable or price target for sale, but plan
- 1:07:57instead to stay with us indefinitely.
- 1:07:59We don't understand that CEO who wants lots of stock activity for
- 1:08:03that can be achieved only if many of his owners are
- 1:08:06constantly exiting. At what other organization,
- 1:08:09school, club, church, etcetera, do leaders cheer when members
- 1:08:14leave? However, if there were a broker
- 1:08:16whose livelihood depended upon the membership turnover in such
- 1:08:20organizations, you could be sure that there would be at least one
- 1:08:24proponent of activity. As in, there hasn't been much
- 1:08:28going on in Christianity for a while.
- 1:08:30Maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.
- 1:08:33Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell from
- 1:08:36time to time and we wish for good replacements who will pay
- 1:08:40them a fair price. Therefore, we try through our
- 1:08:43policies, performance and communications to attract new
- 1:08:47shareholders who understand our operations, share our time
- 1:08:50horizons and measure us as we measure ourselves.
- 1:08:54If we can continue to attract this sort of shareholder and
- 1:08:58just as important, can continue to be uninteresting to those
- 1:09:02with short term or unrealistic expectations, Berkshire shares
- 1:09:06should consistently sell at price is reasonably related to
- 1:09:09business value. David L Dodd Dave Dodd, my
- 1:09:13friend and teacher for 38 years, died last year at age 93.
- 1:09:17Most of you don't know of him yet.
- 1:09:19Any long time shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably
- 1:09:22wealthier because of the indirect influence he had upon
- 1:09:26our company. Dave spent a lifetime teaching
- 1:09:28at Columbia University and he co-authored security analysis
- 1:09:32with Ben Graham. From the moment I arrived at
- 1:09:35Columbia, Dave personally encouraged it, educated me.
- 1:09:38One influence was as important as the other.
- 1:09:41Everything he taught me directly or through his book, made since.
- 1:09:46Later through dozens of letters. He continued my education right
- 1:09:50up until his death. I have known many professors of
- 1:09:53finance and investments, but I have never seen any except for
- 1:09:57Ben Graham, who was the match of Dave.
- 1:10:00The proof of his talent is the record of his students.
- 1:10:03No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have
- 1:10:07achieved unusual success. When students left Dave's
- 1:10:10classroom, they were equipped to invest intelligently for a
- 1:10:14lifetime because the principles he taught were simple, sound,
- 1:10:18useful, and enduring. Though these may appear to be
- 1:10:22unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles embodying
- 1:10:26them has been rare. It's particularly impressive
- 1:10:28that Dave could practice as well as preach.
- 1:10:31Just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his academic ideas to a
- 1:10:36very small purse, so too did Dave.
- 1:10:39Indeed, his financial performance far out shown that
- 1:10:42of Keynes, who began as a market timer leaning on business and
- 1:10:46credit cycle theory, and converted, after much thought,
- 1:10:50to value investing. Dave was right from the start in
- 1:10:54Berkshire's investments. Charlie and I have employed the
- 1:10:57principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham.
- 1:10:59Our prosperity is the fruit of their intellectual tree.
- 1:11:03Miscellaneous We hope to buy more businesses that are similar
- 1:11:06to the ones we have and we can use some help.
- 1:11:10If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me
- 1:11:14or preferably right Hey, raise what we're looking for one large
- 1:11:18purchases at least $10 million of after tax earnings 2
- 1:11:22demonstrated consistent earning power.
- 1:11:24Future projections are of little interest to us, nor a turn
- 1:11:28around situations. Free businesses earning good
- 1:11:32returns on equity while employing little or no debt for
- 1:11:36management in place. We can't supply it. 5.
- 1:11:38Simple businesses. If there's lots of technology we
- 1:11:41want understand it. 6. An offering price.
- 1:11:44We don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking
- 1:11:48even preliminarily about a transaction when price is
- 1:11:52unknown. We will not engage in unfriendly
- 1:11:55takeovers. We can promise complete
- 1:11:57confidentiality and a very fast answer, customarily within 5
- 1:12:02minutes as to whether we're interested.
- 1:12:04We prefer to buy for cash, but we'll consider issuing stock
- 1:12:08when we receive as much an intrinsic business value as we
- 1:12:11give. Our favorite form of purchase is
- 1:12:141 fitting the Blumpkin Friedman Hellman mold.
- 1:12:17In cases like these, the company's owner managers wish to
- 1:12:20generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves,
- 1:12:25but often for their families or inactive shareholders.
- 1:12:29However, these managers also wish to remain significant
- 1:12:33owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in
- 1:12:36the past. We think we offer a particularly
- 1:12:39good fit for owners with these objectives and invite potential
- 1:12:43sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we
- 1:12:46have done business in the past. Charlie and I frequently get
- 1:12:50approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting
- 1:12:53our tests. We found that if you advertise
- 1:12:56an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping
- 1:13:00to sell you their Cocker spaniels.
- 1:13:02Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds or auction like
- 1:13:05sales can best be expressed by another Goldwyn ISM.
- 1:13:09Please include me out. Besides being interested in the
- 1:13:12purchase of businesses as described above, we are also
- 1:13:16interested in the negotiated purchase of large but not
- 1:13:20controlling blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in
- 1:13:23Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in
- 1:13:27purchasing convertible preferreds as a lawn term
- 1:13:31investment as we did at Salomon. We received some good news a few
- 1:13:34weeks ago. Standard and Poor's raised our
- 1:13:37credit rating to AAA, which is the highest rating at Bestows.
- 1:13:41Only 15 other US industrial or property casualty companies are
- 1:13:46rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980. Corporate bondholders have taken
- 1:13:51their lumps in the past few years from event risk.
- 1:13:54This term refers to the overnight degradation of credit
- 1:13:58that accompanies A heavily leveraged purchase or
- 1:14:01recapitalization of a business whose financial policies up to
- 1:14:05then have been conservative. In a world of takeovers
- 1:14:09inhabited by few owner managers, most corporations present such a
- 1:14:13risk. Berkshire does not.
- 1:14:16Charlie and I promise bondholders the same respect we
- 1:14:19afford shareholders. About 97.4% of all eligible
- 1:14:24shares participated in Berkshire's 1988 Shareholder
- 1:14:28Designated Contributions Program.
- 1:14:30Contributions made through the program were $5,000,000 and 2319
- 1:14:35charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable
- 1:14:38business results, we plan to increase the per share
- 1:14:42contributions in 1989. We urge new shareholders to read
- 1:14:46the description of our shareholder designated
- 1:14:49contributions program that appears on pages 48 to 49.
- 1:14:53If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly
- 1:14:57urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered
- 1:15:01in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a
- 1:15:04broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on
- 1:15:09September 30th, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.
- 1:15:14Berkshire's Annual Meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday,
- 1:15:18April 24th, 1989 and I hope you will come.
- 1:15:22The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner related
- 1:15:25questions you may have and we will keep answering until all
- 1:15:29except those dealing with portfolio activities or other
- 1:15:33proprietary information have been dealt with.
- 1:15:36After the meeting we will have several buses available too take
- 1:15:39you to visit Missus B at the Nebraska Furniture Mart in Ike
- 1:15:43Friedman at Borsheims. Be prepared for bargains out of
- 1:15:47towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Missus B during
- 1:15:51the Sunday store hours of noon to five.
- 1:15:53This Sunday, hours seem ridiculously short to Missus B,
- 1:15:57who feels they scarcely allow her time to warm up.
- 1:16:01She much prefers the days on which the store remains open
- 1:16:04from 10:00 AM to 9:00 PM. Borsheims, however, is not open
- 1:16:09on Sunday. Ask Misses B the secret of her
- 1:16:11astonishingly low carpet prices. She will confide to you, as she
- 1:16:16does to everyone, how she does it.
- 1:16:19I can sell so cheap 'cause I work for this dummy who doesn't
- 1:16:22know anything about carpet. Warren E Buffett, February 28th,
- 1:16:271989, Chairman of the Board.