Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1965 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
Transcript
- 0:00That advance withdrawals will be far more than covered by advance
- 0:03payments. For example, on June 30th, 1965
- 0:07we had $98,851.00 of advance withdrawals and $652,931.00 of
- 0:15advance payments. Why then the willingness to pay
- 0:186% for the net of advance payments over advance
- 0:21withdrawals when we can borrow from commercial banks at
- 0:25substantially lower rates? The answer is that we expect on
- 0:28a long term basis to earn better than 6%.
- 0:31The general partners allocation is 0 unless we do, although it
- 0:35is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure
- 0:39in any short period. Moreover, I can adopt A
- 0:42different attitude regarding the investment of money that can be
- 0:46expected to soon be a part of our equity capital than I can on
- 0:50short term borrowed money. The advance payments have the
- 0:52added advantage to us of spreading the investment of new
- 0:56money over the year rather than having it hit us all at once in
- 0:59January. On the other hand, 6% is more
- 1:03than can be obtained in short term dollar secure investments
- 1:06by our partners. So I consider it mutually
- 1:08profitable. Miscellaneous.
- 1:10The bold expansion program to 909 square feet described in the
- 1:15annual letter was carried off without a hitch.
- 1:18The Pepsi's never even got warm. John Harding joined us in April
- 1:22and is continuing the record whereby all the actions in the
- 1:25personnel field have been winning.
- 1:27Once, as in past years, we will have a letter out about November
- 1:311st to partners and those who have indicated in interest to me
- 1:35by that time in becoming partners with the commitment
- 1:38letter for 1966, estimate of the 1965 tax situation, etcetera.
- 1:44Cordially, Warren E Buffett, 82 Buffett Partnership Ltd, 810
- 1:50Kiewit Plaza, Omaha 31, Nebraska, November 1st, 1965 to
- 1:56my partners for 1966. Enclosed are 1/2 copies or the
- 2:01commitment letter for 1966, one to be kept by you and one return
- 2:05to us. You may amend the commitment
- 2:08letter right up to midnight December 31st.
- 2:11So get it back to us early and if it needs to be changed just
- 2:15let us know by letter or phone. Commitment letters become final
- 2:19on December 31st. Every year I get a number or
- 2:22calls in the first week in January expressing a desire to
- 2:26add to the January 1st capital. This can't be done to a copy of
- 2:31our ever popular The Ground Rules.
- 2:33It is essential that we see eye to eye on the matters covered
- 2:37therein. If you have different views,
- 2:39fine, yours may be better, but you shouldn't be in the
- 2:42partnership. Please particularly note ground
- 2:45rule 7. This has been added this year,
- 2:47reflecting A moderate shift in my attitude over a period of
- 2:51time. It represents A decidedly
- 2:53unconventional but logical in my opinion when applied to our
- 2:57operation approach and is therefore specifically called to
- 3:00your attention. Any withdrawals will be paid
- 3:03January 5th. You may withdraw any amount you
- 3:06desire from $100 up to your entire equity.
- 3:10Similarly, additions can be for any amount and should reach us
- 3:13by January 10th. In the event you are disposing
- 3:17of anything, this will give you a chance to have the transaction
- 3:20in 1966 if that appears to be advantageous for tax reasons.
- 3:25If additions reach us in November, they take on the
- 3:28status of advance payments and draw 6% interest until year end.
- 3:33This is not true of additions reaching us in December.
- 3:36The partnership owns a controlling interest in
- 3:38Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated, a publicly traded security.
- 3:42As mentioned in my mid year letter, asset values and earning
- 3:46power are the dominant factors affecting the valuation of a
- 3:50controlling interest in a business.
- 3:53Market price, which governs valuation of minority interest
- 3:57positions, is of little or no importance in valuing A
- 4:00controlling interest. We will value our position in
- 4:03Berkshire Hathaway at Urand at a price halfway between net
- 4:07current asset value and book value.
- 4:10Because of the nature of our receivables and inventory, this
- 4:14in effect amounts to valuation of our current assets at 100
- 4:18cents on that dollar in our fixed assets at $0.50 on the
- 4:21dollar. Such a value, in my opinion, is
- 4:23fair to both adding and withdrawing partners.
- 4:27It may be either of lower than market value at the time.
- 4:30As I write this, we are orbiting in quite satisfactory fashion.
- 4:34Our margin over the Dow is well above average and even those
- 4:38Neanderthal partners who utilize such crude yardsticks as net
- 4:42profit would fine performance satisfactory.
- 4:45This is all, of course, subject to substantial change by your
- 4:49end. If anything needs clarification,
- 4:51call or write John Harding who is in charge of deconfusing
- 4:55partners. The tax situation is about as
- 4:58reported in the August letter, but if you would like John to
- 5:01make the calculation for you, he will be glad to do it cordially.
- 5:05Warren E Buffett 83 PS We are continuing our no prize policy
- 5:11for the last ones to get their commitment letters back to us.
- 5:14It will make things easier for us if you get it back pronto.
- 5:18If you want to make changes later before January LST, just
- 5:22give us a call and we'll amend it for you. 84 Buffett
- 5:26Partnership Ltd 810 Kiwit Plaza Omaha 31, Nebraska January 20th
- 5:331966 Our performance in 1965 our War on Poverty was successful in
- 5:381965 especially we were $12,304,060 less poor at the end
- 5:45of the year. Last year, under a section in
- 5:48the annual letter entitled Our Goal.
- 5:50Please particularly note it was not our promise.
- 5:54I stated we were trying to achieve an average advantage
- 5:56relative to the Dow of 10 percentage points per annum for
- 6:00BPL before allocation to the general partner.
- 6:03Again, with large amplitudes in that margin, from perhaps 10
- 6:07percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25
- 6:10percentage points better when everything clicks.
- 6:13My fallibility as a forecaster was quickly demonstrated when
- 6:17the first year fell outside my parameters.
- 6:19We achieved our widest margin over the Dow in the history of
- 6:23BPL with an overall gain of 47.2%, compared to an overall
- 6:29gain, including dividends which would have been received through
- 6:32ownership of the Dow, of 14.2% for the Dow.
- 6:36Naturally, no rider likes to be publicly humiliated by such a
- 6:40mistake. It is unlikely to be repeated.
- 6:43The following summarizes the year by year performance of the
- 6:46Dow, the performance of the partnership before allocation,
- 6:491/4 of the excess over 6% to the general partner, and the results
- 6:54for limited partners. Year Overall results from
- 6:57Partnership results to Limited Partners Dow 1 Results Three
- 7:021957 - 8.4 percent 10.4 percent 9.3% 195838.5 percent 40.9
- 7:12percent 32.2% Nineteen 5920 percent 25.9 percent 20.9
- 7:18percent 1960 - 6.2 percent 22.8 percent 18.6% Nineteen 6122.4
- 7:28percent 45.9 percent 35.9% 1962 - 7.6 percent 13.9 percent 11.9%
- 7:39Nineteen 6320.6 percent 38.7% Thirty .5% Nineteen 6418.7
- 7:48percent 27.8 percent 22.3% Nineteen 6514.2 percent 47.2
- 7:56percent 36.9% 1. Based on yearly changes in the
- 8:01value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received
- 8:04through ownership of the Dow during that year.
- 8:07The table includes all complete years of partnership activity. 2
- 8:11for 1957 to 61 consists of combined results of all
- 8:15predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire
- 8:19year after all expenses but before distributions to partners
- 8:23or allocations to the general partner. 3 For 1957 to 61
- 8:29computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership
- 8:32results allowing for allocation to the general partner based
- 8:36upon the present partnership agreement but before monthly
- 8:39withdrawals by limited partners on a cumulative or compounded
- 8:43basis. The results are 85 year.
- 8:47Overall results from partnership results.
- 8:49Limited Partners Dow Results 1957 - 8.4 percent 10.4 percent
- 8:569.3 percent 19575826.9 percent 55.6% Forty 4.5 percent
- 9:0519575952.3 percent 95.9 percent 74.7% 19576042.9 percent 140.6
- 9:17percent 107.2 percent 1950760174 .9 percent 251 percent 181.6
- 9:27percent 19576261.6 percent 299.8 percent 215.1% 1950760395 .1
- 9:40percent 454.5 percent 311.2 percent 1957 Sixty 4131.3
- 9:49percent 608.7 percent 402.9 percent 1957 Sixty 5164.1
- 9:58percent 943.2 percent 588.5% Annual compounded 11.4 percent
- 10:0729.8 percent 23.9% rate. After last year, the question
- 10:12naturally arises, what do we do for an encore?
- 10:16A disadvantage of this business is that it does not possess
- 10:19momentum to any significant degree.
- 10:21If General Motors accounts for 54% of domestic new car
- 10:26registrations in 1965, it is a pretty safe bet that they're
- 10:30going to come fairly close to that figure in 1966 due to owner
- 10:34loyalties, dealer capabilities, productive capacity, consumer
- 10:38image, etcetera. Not so for BPL.
- 10:41We start from scratch each year with everything valued at market
- 10:45when the gun goes off. Partners in 1966, new or old,
- 10:50benefit to only a very limited extent from the efforts of 1964
- 10:55and 1965. The success of past methods and
- 10:58ideas does not transfer forward to future ones.
- 11:01I continue to hope on a longer range basis for the sort of
- 11:05achievement outlined in the our Goal section of last year's
- 11:09letter. Copies still available.
- 11:10However, those who believe 1965 results can be achieved with any
- 11:15frequency are probably attending weekly meetings of the Halley's
- 11:19Comet Observers Club. We are going to have lost years
- 11:22and are going to have years inferior to the DAO, no doubt
- 11:25about it. But I continue to believe we can
- 11:28achieve average performance superior to the DAO in the
- 11:31future. If my expectation regarding this
- 11:33should change, you will hear immediately.
- 11:36Investment companies. We regularly compare our results
- 11:39with the two largest open end investment companies, mutual
- 11:42funds that follow a policy of being typically 95 percent, 100%
- 11:48invested in common stocks and the two largest diversified
- 11:52closed end investment companies. These four companies,
- 11:55Massachusetts Investors Trust Investors Stock Fund,
- 11:59Tricontinental Corporation and Lehman Corporation, manage over
- 12:02$5 billion, are owned by about 600,000 shareholders and are
- 12:07probably typical of most of the $35 billion investment company
- 12:11industry. My opinion is that their results
- 12:14roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other
- 12:18investment advisory organizations, which handle in
- 12:21aggregate vastly greater sums. The purpose of this tabulation
- 12:25is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of
- 12:29investment achievement. The advisory talent managing
- 12:32just the four companies shown commands annual fees of about
- 12:36$10 million, and this represents a very small fraction of the
- 12:40professional investment management industry.
- 12:43The public batting average of this highly paid and widely
- 12:46respected talent indicates performance a shade below that
- 12:50of the Dow. An unmanaged index.
- 12:53Yearly results Year Massachusetts Inv Investors
- 12:57Lehman 2. Tricont Dow Limited 86 Trust One
- 13:01Stock 1-2 Partners 1957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4
- 13:12percent 9.3% 195842.7 percent 47.5% Forty .8 percent 33.2
- 13:22percent 38.5 percent 32.2 percent 19599 percent 10.3
- 13:29percent 8.1 percent 8.4 percent 20 percent 20.9% 1960 - 1.0% -
- 13:380.6% Two .5 percent 2.8% - 6.2 percent 18.6% Nineteen 6125.6
- 13:48percent 24.9 percent 23.6 percent 22.5 percent 22.4
- 13:55percent 35.9% 1962 - 9.8% - 13.4% - 14.4% - 10.0% - 7.6
- 14:07percent 11.9% Nineteen 6320 percent 16.5 percent 23.7
- 14:14percent 18.3 percent 20.6% Thirty .5% 196415.9 percent 14.3
- 14:23percent 13.6 percent 12.6 percent 18.7 percent 22.3%
- 14:31Nineteen 6510.2 percent 9.8% Nineteen percent 10.7 percent
- 14:3714.2 percent 36.9% One Computed from changes in asset value plus
- 14:44any distributions to holders of record during Year 2 from 1965.
- 14:48Moody's Bank and Finance Manual for 1957 to 64 estimated for
- 14:541965 compounded year. Massachusetts Inv Investors
- 14:59Lehman 2 Tricont Dow Limited Trust One Stock 1-2 Partners
- 15:041957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% - 2.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3 percent
- 15:1619575826.4 percent 29.2 percent 24.7% Thirty percent 26.9% Forty
- 15:264.5% 1950750937 .8 percent 42.5 percent 34.8% Forty .9% Fifty
- 15:372.3 percent 74.7 percent 19576036.4 percent 41.6% Thirty
- 15:468.2 percent 44.8 percent 42.9 percent 107.2% 1950760171 .3
- 15:56percent 76.9% Seventy .8 percent 77.4 percent 74.9 percent 181.6
- 16:05percent 19576254.5 percent 53.2 percent 46.2 percent 59.7
- 16:14percent 61.6 percent 215.1% 19576385.4 percent 78.5% Eighty
- 16:25.8 percent 88.9 percent 94.9 percent 311.2 percent 1957 Sixty
- 16:334114.9 percent 104 percent 105.4 percent 112.7 percent 131.3
- 16:42percent 402.9% 1957 Sixty 5136.8 percent 124 percent 145.3
- 16:53percent 138.4 percent 164.1 percent 588.5% Annual 10.1
- 17:02percent 9.4 percent 10.5 percent 10.1 percent 11.4 percent 23.9%
- 17:10compounded rate. A number of the largest
- 17:13investment advisory operations managing in some cases well into
- 17:17the billions of dollars also manage investment companies
- 17:21partly as a convenience for smaller clients and partly as a
- 17:24public showcase the results of these funds roughly parallel
- 17:28those of the four funds on which we report I strongly believe.
- 17:32In measurement the investment. Managers mentioned above utilize
- 17:36measurement constantly in their activities.
- 17:38They constantly study changes in market shares, profit margins,
- 17:42return on capital, etcetera. Their entire decision making
- 17:46process is geared to measurement of management's industries,
- 17:51comparative yields, etcetera. I am sure they keep score on
- 17:54their new business efforts as well as the profitability of
- 17:57their advisory operation. What then can be more
- 18:00fundamental than the measurement in turn of investment ideas and
- 18:04decisions? I certainly do not believe the
- 18:07standards I utilize and wish my partners to utilize in measuring
- 18:11my performance are the applicable ones for all money
- 18:14managers. But I certainly do believe
- 18:17anyone engaged in the management of money should have a standard
- 18:20of measurement and that both he and the party whose money is
- 18:24managed should have a clear understanding why it is the
- 18:27appropriate standard, what time period should be utilized,
- 18:30etcetera. Frank Block put it very well in
- 18:33the November December 1965 issue of the Financial Analyst
- 18:37Journal. Speaking of measurement of
- 18:40investment performance, he said, However, the fact is that
- 18:44literature suffers a yawning hiatus in this subject.
- 18:47If investment management organizations sought always the
- 18:50best performance, there would be nothing unique in careful
- 18:54measurement of investment results.
- 18:56It does not matter that the customer has failed to ask for a
- 18:59formal presentation of the results.
- 19:01Pride alone should be sufficient to demand that each or us
- 19:05determine objectively the quality of his recommendations.
- 19:09This can hardly be done without precise knowledge 87 of the
- 19:13outcome. Once this knowledge is in hand,
- 19:16it should be possible to extend the analysis to some point at
- 19:19which patterns of weakness and strength begin to assert
- 19:22themselves. We criticize a corporate
- 19:25management for failure to use the best of tools to keep it
- 19:28aware of the progress of a complicated industrial
- 19:31organization. We can hardly be excused for
- 19:35failure to provide ourselves with equal tools to show the
- 19:38efficiency of our own efforts to handle other people's money.
- 19:42Thus, it is our dreary duty to report that systems of
- 19:45performance measurement are not automatically included in the
- 19:49data processing programs of most investment management
- 19:52organizations. The sad fact is that some seem
- 19:55to prefer not to know how well or poorly they are doing.
- 19:58Frankly, I have several selfish reasons for insisting that we
- 20:02apply a yardstick and that we both utilize the same yardstick.
- 20:06Naturally, I get a kick out of beating Par in the lyrical words
- 20:10of Casey Stengel. Show me a good loser and I'll
- 20:13show you a loser. More importantly, I ensure that
- 20:16I will not get blamed for the wrong reason.
- 20:19Having losing years, but only for the right reason, doing
- 20:21poorer than the Dow, knowing partners will grade me on the
- 20:25right basis helps me do a better job.
- 20:27Finally, setting up the relevant yardsticks ahead of time ensures
- 20:30that we will all get out of this business if the results become
- 20:34mediocre or worse. It means that past successes
- 20:37cannot cloud judgement of current results.
- 20:40It should reduce the chance of ingenious rationalizations of
- 20:43inept performance. Bad lighting has been bothering
- 20:47me at the bridge table lately. While this masochistic approach
- 20:50too measurement may not sound like much of an advantage, I can
- 20:54assure you from my observations of business entities that such
- 20:58evaluation would have accomplished a great deal in
- 21:00many investment and industrial organizations.
- 21:04So if you are evaluating others or yourself in the investment
- 21:08field, think out some standards, apply them, interpret them.
- 21:12If you do not feel our standard, a minimum of a three-year test
- 21:15versus the Dow is an applicable 1, you should not be in the
- 21:19partnership. If you do feel it is applicable,
- 21:21you should be able to take the minus years with equanimity in
- 21:25the visceral regions as well as the cerebral regions as long as
- 21:29we are surpassing the results of the Dow.
- 21:32The Sorrows of Compounding Usually at this point in my
- 21:35letter, I have paused to modestly attempt to set straight
- 21:38the historical errors of the last four or 500 years.
- 21:42While it might seem difficult to accomplish this in only a few
- 21:45paragraphs a year, I feel I have done my share to reshape world
- 21:49opinion on Columbus, Isabella Francis I, Peter Minuit, and the
- 21:54Manhattan Indians. A byproduct of this endeavor has
- 21:57been to demonstrate the overwhelming power of compound
- 22:01interest. To ensure reader attention, I
- 22:03have entitled these essays The Joys of Compounding.
- 22:07The Sharp eyed may notice a slight change this year, a
- 22:10decent rate. Better, we have an indecent rate
- 22:12of compound. Plus, the addition of
- 22:15substantial new money has brought our beginning capital
- 22:18this year to $43,645,000. Several times in the past I have
- 22:24raised the question whether increasing amounts of capital
- 22:28would harm our investment performance.
- 22:30Each time I have answered negatively and promised you that
- 22:33if my opinion changed, I would promptly report it.
- 22:36I do not feel that increased capital has hurt our operation
- 22:39to date. As a matter of fact, I believe
- 22:42that we have done somewhat better during the past few years
- 22:45with the capital we have had in the partnership than we would
- 22:48have done if we had been working with a substantially smaller
- 22:51amount. This was due to the partly
- 22:53fortuitous development of several investments that were
- 22:56just the right size for us, big enough to be significant and
- 23:00small enough to handle. I now feel that we are much
- 23:03closer to the point where increase size may prove
- 23:06disadvantageous. I don't want to ascribe too much
- 23:09precision to that statement since there are many variables
- 23:12involved. What may be the optimum size
- 23:15under some market and business circumstances can be
- 23:18substantially more or less than optimum under other
- 23:21circumstances. There have been a few times in
- 23:24the past when, on a very short term basis, I have felt it would
- 23:27have been advantageous to be smaller, but substantially more
- 23:31times when the converse was true. 88 Nevertheless, as
- 23:35circumstances presently appear, I feel substantially greater
- 23:39size is more likely to harm future results than to help
- 23:42them. This might not be true for my
- 23:44own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your
- 23:48results. Therefore, unless it appears
- 23:51that circumstances have changed under some conditions, added
- 23:54capital would improve results, or unless new partners can bring
- 23:58some asset to the partnership other than simply capital, I
- 24:02intend to admit no additional partners to BPL.
- 24:05The only way to make this effective is to apply it across
- 24:08the board, and I have notified Susie that if we have any more
- 24:11children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for
- 24:15them. Because I anticipate that
- 24:16withdrawals for taxes, among other reasons, may well approach
- 24:20additions by present partners, and also because I visualize the
- 24:24curve of expectable performance sloping only very mildly as
- 24:28capital increases, I presently see no reason why we should
- 24:32restrict capital additions by existing partners.
- 24:35The medically oriented probably will interpret this entire
- 24:38section as conclusive evidence that an effective antithyroid
- 24:42pill has been developed. Trends in our business Last
- 24:46year, I discussed our various categories of investments.
- 24:49Knowing the penalties for cruel and unusual punishments, I will
- 24:53skip a rehash of the characteristics of each
- 24:56category, but merely refer you to last year's letter.
- 24:59However, a few words should be said to bring you up to date on
- 25:02the various segments of the business and perhaps to give you
- 25:06a better insight into their strengths and weaknesses.
- 25:09The workout business has become very spasmodic.
- 25:12We were able to employ an average of only about $6 million
- 25:16during the year in the workout section and this involved only a
- 25:20very limited number of situations.
- 25:23Although we earned about $1,410,000 or about 23% on
- 25:28average capital employed. This is calculated on and all
- 25:31equity basis. Borrowed money is appropriate in
- 25:34most workout situations and we utilize it which improves our
- 25:39rate of return above this percentage.
- 25:41Over half of this was earned from one situation.
- 25:44I think it unlikely that a really interesting rate of
- 25:47return can be earned consistently on large sums of
- 25:50money in this business under present conditions.
- 25:53Nevertheless, we will continue to try to remain alert for the
- 25:57occasional important opportunity and probably continue to utilize
- 26:01a few of the smaller opportunities where we like the
- 26:03probabilities. The general's private owner
- 26:06basis category was very good to us in 1965.
- 26:10Opportunities in this area have become more scarce with a rising
- 26:14Dow, but when they come along, they are often quite
- 26:17significant. I mentioned at the start of last
- 26:20year that we were the largest stockholder of three companies
- 26:23in this category. Our largest year end 1964
- 26:27investment in this category was disposed of a 1965 pursuant to a
- 26:32tender offer resulting in a realized gain for BPL of
- 26:36$3,188,000. At year end 1964, we had
- 26:41unrealized appreciation in this investment of $451,000.
- 26:47Therefore, the economic gain attributable to 1965 for this
- 26:52transaction was only $2,737,000, even though the entire tax
- 26:58effect fell in that year. I mentioned these figures to
- 27:01illustrate how our realized gain for tax purposes in any year
- 27:05bears no necessary relationship to our economic gain.
- 27:09The fundamental concept underlying the General's private
- 27:12owner category is demonstrated by the above case.
- 27:15Hey Private owner was quite willing and in our opinion,
- 27:19quite wise to pay a price for control of the business, which
- 27:22isolated stock buyers were not willing to pay for very small
- 27:26fractions of the business. This has been a quite common
- 27:29condition in the securities markets over many years and
- 27:33although purchases in this category workout satisfactorily
- 27:36in terms of just general stock market behavior, there is the
- 27:40occasional dramatic profit due to corporate actions such as the
- 27:43one above. 89 The control section of our business received
- 27:48a transfer member from our private owner category.
- 27:51Shares in Berkshire Hathaway had been acquired since November
- 27:541962 on much the same line of reasoning as prevailed in the
- 27:59security mentioned above. In the case of Berkshire,
- 28:02however, we ended up purchasing enough stock to assume a
- 28:06controlling position ourselves, rather than the more usual case
- 28:09of either selling our stock in the market or to another single
- 28:13buyer. Our purchases of Berkshire
- 28:15started at a price of 7.60 dollars per share in 1962.
- 28:20This price partially reflected large losses incurred by the
- 28:24prior management and closing some of the mills made obsolete
- 28:27by changing conditions within the textile business which the
- 28:31old management had been quite slow to recognize.
- 28:34In the post war period the company had slid downhill a
- 28:37considerable distance, having hit a peak in 1948 when about 29
- 28:42dollars 12 million was earned before tax and about 11,000
- 28:46workers were employed. This reflected output from 11
- 28:49mills. At the time we acquired control
- 28:51in spring of 1965, Berkshire was down to two mills and about 2300
- 28:57employees. It was a very pleasant surprise
- 29:00to find that the remaining units had excellent management
- 29:03personnel and we have not had to bring a single man from the
- 29:06outside into the operation. In relation to our beginning
- 29:10acquisition cost of 7.60 dollars per share.
- 29:14The average cost however was 14.86 dollars per share
- 29:18reflecting very heavy purchases in early 1965.
- 29:23The company on December 31st 1965 had net working capital
- 29:27alone before placing any value on the plants and equipment of
- 29:31about $19.00 per share. Berkshire is a delight to own.
- 29:35There is no question that the state of the textile industry is
- 29:39the dominant factor in determining the earning power of
- 29:42the business, but we are most fortunate to have Ken Chase
- 29:45running the business in a first class manner and we also have
- 29:49several of the best sales people in the business heading up this
- 29:52end of their respective divisions.
- 29:54While a Berkshire is hardly going to be as profitable as a
- 29:57Xerox, Fairchild camera or National Video in a hypertense
- 30:01market, it is a very comfort able sort of thing to own, as my
- 30:05West Coast philosopher says it is.
- 30:08While they have a diet consisting of oatmeal as well as
- 30:10cream puffs. Because of our controlling
- 30:13interest, our investment in Berkshire is valued for our
- 30:16audit as a business, not as a marketable security.
- 30:20If Berkshire advances $5 per share in the market, it does BPL
- 30:24no good. Our holdings are not going to be
- 30:27sold. Similarly, if it goes down $5
- 30:30per share, it is not meaningful to us.
- 30:32The value of our holding is determined directly by the value
- 30:36of the business. I received no divine inspiration
- 30:39in that valuation of our holdings.
- 30:42Maybe the owners of the three wonder stocks mentioned above do
- 30:45receive such a message in respect to their holdings.
- 30:49I feel I would need something at least that reliable to sleep
- 30:52well at present prices. I attempt to apply a
- 30:55conservative valuation based upon my knowledge of assets,
- 30:59earning, power, industry conditions, competitive
- 31:02position, etcetera. We would not be a seller of our
- 31:05holdings at such a figure, but neither would we be a seller of
- 31:08the other items in our portfolio at year end valuations,
- 31:11otherwise we would already have sold them.
- 31:14Our final category is generals, relatively undervalued.
- 31:18This category has been growing in relative importance as
- 31:22opportunities in the other categories become less frequent.
- 31:25Frankly, operating in this field is somewhat more ethereal than
- 31:29operating in the other 3 categories, and I'm just not an
- 31:32ethereal sort. Therefore, I feel
- 31:35accomplishments here are less solid and perhaps less
- 31:38meaningful for future projections than in the other
- 31:41categories. Nevertheless, our results in
- 31:441965 were quite good in the relatively undervalued group,
- 31:48partly due to implementation of the technique referred to in
- 31:51last year's letter, which serves to reduce risk and potentially
- 31:55augment gains. It should reduce risk in any
- 31:58year, and it definitely augmented the gains in 1965.
- 32:03It is necessary to point out that results in this category
- 32:06were greatly affected for the better by only two investments.
- 32:10Candor also demands I point out that during 1965 we had our
- 32:14worst single investment experience in the history of BPL
- 32:18on one idea in this group, 90 Overall, we had more than our
- 32:22share of good breaks in 1965. We did not have a great quantity
- 32:27of ideas, but the quality, with the one important exception
- 32:30mentioned above, was very good and circumstances developed
- 32:34which accelerated the timetable in several.
- 32:37I do not have a great flood of good ideas as I go into 1966,
- 32:42although again, I believe I have at least several potentially
- 32:45good ideas of substantial size. Much depends on weather.
- 32:48Market conditions are favorable for obtaining a larger position.
- 32:52All in all, however, you should recognize that more came out of
- 32:56the pipeline in 1965 than went in diversification last year.
- 33:01In commenting on the inability of the overwhelming majority of
- 33:05investment managers to achieve performance superior to that of
- 33:09pure chance, I ascribed it primarily to the product of one
- 33:13group decisions. My perhaps jaundiced view is
- 33:16that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment
- 33:19management to come from a group of any size with all parties
- 33:23really participating in decisions to a desire to conform
- 33:26to the policies and to and extent the portfolios of other
- 33:30large, well regarded organizations.
- 33:33Three, an institutional framework whereby average is
- 33:36safe and the personal rewards for independent action are in no
- 33:40way commensurate with the general risk attached to such
- 33:44action for an adherence to certain diversification
- 33:47practices which are irrational. And finally and importantly, 5,
- 33:51inertia this year in the material which went out in
- 33:54November, I specifically called your attention to a new ground
- 33:57rule reading. 7, we diversify substantially less than most
- 34:02investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our
- 34:06net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an
- 34:09extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning our
- 34:13correct with a very low probability that anything could
- 34:16drastically change the underlying value of the
- 34:19investment. We are obviously following a
- 34:22policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that
- 34:26of practically all public investment operations.
- 34:29Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have
- 34:3150 different investment opportunities, all of which have
- 34:35a mathematical expectation. This term reflects the range of
- 34:39all possible relative performances, including negative
- 34:42ones, adjusted for the probability of each no yawning
- 34:46please of achieving performance surpassing the Dow buy say 15
- 34:51percentage points per annum. If the 50 individual
- 34:54expectations were not inter correlated, what happens to 1 is
- 34:57associated with what happens to the other.
- 34:59I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with
- 35:04a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would
- 35:08be very close to such a 15 percentage point advantage.
- 35:12It doesn't work that way. We have to work extremely hard
- 35:15to find just a very few attractive investment
- 35:17situations. Such a situation by definition
- 35:21is 1, where my expectation, defined as above, of performance
- 35:24is at least 10 percentage points per and I'm superior to the Dow.
- 35:28Among the few we do find the expectations vary substantially.
- 35:33The question always is how much do I put in #1 ranked by
- 35:37expectation of relative performance and how much do I
- 35:40put in #8. This depends to a great degree
- 35:43on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical
- 35:46expectation of #1 versus #8. It also depends upon the
- 35:51probability that number one could turn in a really poor
- 35:54relative performance. 2 securities could have equal
- 35:57mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of
- 36:02performing 15 percentage points or more worse than that Dow, and
- 36:06the second might have only .01 chance of such performance.
- 36:10The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the
- 36:14desirability of heavy concentration in it.
- 36:17The above may make the whole operation sound very precise.
- 36:21It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is
- 36:24that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and
- 36:27reason to such facts to reach expectations.
- 36:31Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may
- 36:34be, that is what the business is all about.
- 36:37The results of many years 91 of decision making and securities
- 36:42will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such
- 36:45calculations, whether you consciously realize you're
- 36:48making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates
- 36:52at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his
- 36:55thought process is following. There is one thing of which I
- 36:58can assure you, if good performance of the fund is even
- 37:02a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing 100 stocks, whether
- 37:06the manager is handling $1000 or $1 billion, is not being
- 37:11operated logically. The addition of the 100 stock
- 37:15simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio
- 37:18performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative
- 37:21effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.
- 37:26Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably
- 37:29studying their investment merit, and I don't care how prestigious
- 37:33their labels, is following what I call the NOAA School of
- 37:36Investing 2 of everything, such investors should be piloting
- 37:40ARCS. While NOAA may have been acting
- 37:43in accord with certain time tested biological principles,
- 37:46the investors have left the track regarding mathematical
- 37:49principles. I only made it through plane
- 37:52geometry, but with one exception.
- 37:54I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our
- 37:57partnership. Of course, the fact that someone
- 38:00else is behaving illogically and owning 100 securities doesn't
- 38:03prove our case. While they may be wrong and over
- 38:06diversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a
- 38:10proper diversification policy. In terms of our objectives, the
- 38:14optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices
- 38:18available and the degree of variance in performance which is
- 38:21tolerable. The greater the number of
- 38:23selections, the less will be the average year to year variation
- 38:27in actual versus expected results.
- 38:29Also the lower will be the expected results assuming
- 38:33different choices have different expectations of performance.
- 38:36I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year
- 38:40to year results. Remember, when I talk of
- 38:41results, I am talking of performance relative to the Dow
- 38:45in order to achieve better overall long term performance.
- 38:49Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite
- 38:52heavily in what I believe to be the best investment
- 38:55opportunities, recognizing very well that this may cause an
- 38:58occasional very sour year, 1, somewhat more sour probably than
- 39:03if I had diversified more. While this means our results
- 39:06will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long term
- 39:10margin of superiority should be greater.
- 39:12You have already seen some examples of this.
- 39:15Our margin versus the Dow has ranged from 2.4 percentage
- 39:19points in 1958 to 33.0 points in 1965.
- 39:24If you check this against the deviations of the funds listed
- 39:27on page three, you will find our variations have a much wider
- 39:30amplitude. I could have operated in such a
- 39:33manner as to reduce our amplitude, but I would also have
- 39:36reduced our overall performance somewhat, although it still
- 39:39would have substantially exceeded that of the investment
- 39:42companies. Looking back and continuing to
- 39:45think this problem through, I feel that if anything I should
- 39:49have concentrated slightly more than I have in the past, hence
- 39:52the new ground rule and this long winded explanation.
- 39:56Again, let me state that this is somewhat unconventional
- 39:59reasoning. This doesn't make it right or
- 40:01wrong. It does.
- 40:03Mean you have to do your own thinking on it and you may well
- 40:06have a different opinion if you do.
- 40:08The partnership is not the place for you.
- 40:11We are obviously only going to go to 40% in very rare
- 40:14situations. This rarity of course is what
- 40:18makes it necessary that we concentrate so heavily when we
- 40:21see such an opportunity. We probably have had only 5 or 6
- 40:26situations in the nine year history of the partnership where
- 40:28we have exceeded 25%. Any such situations are going to
- 40:33have to promise very significantly superior
- 40:36performance relative to the Dow compared to other opportunities
- 40:39available at the time. They are also going to have to
- 40:42possess such superior qualitative and or quantitative
- 40:45factors that the chance of serious permanent loss is
- 40:48minimal. Anything can happen on a short
- 40:51term quotational basis which partially explains the greater
- 40:54risk of widen year to year variation in results.
- 40:58In selecting the limit to which I will go in anyone investment,
- 41:01I attemt to reduce to a tiny figure the robability that the
- 41:05single investment or group if there is intercorrelation can
- 41:09produce a result 92 for our total portfolio that would be
- 41:13more than 10 percentage points poorer than the Dow.
- 41:16We presently have two situations in the over 25% category 1A
- 41:21controlled company and the other a large company where we will
- 41:24never take an active part. It is worth pointing out that
- 41:27our performance in 1965 was overwhelmingly the product of
- 41:31five investment situations. The 1965 gains in some cases
- 41:36there were also gains applicable to the same holding in prior
- 41:39years from these situations range from about $800,000 to
- 41:44about 3 dollars 12 million. If you should take the overall
- 41:47performance of our five smallest general investments in 1965, the
- 41:52results are lackluster. I chose a very charitable
- 41:55adjective. Interestingly enough, the
- 41:58literature of investment management is virtually devoid
- 42:01of material relative to deductive calculation of optimal
- 42:05diversification. All texts counsel adequate
- 42:08diversification, but the ones who quantify adequate virtually
- 42:12never explain how they arrive at their conclusion.
- 42:15Hence, for our summation on over diversification, we turn to that
- 42:19eminent academician, Billy Rose, who says you've got a harem of
- 42:2470 girls, you don't get to know any of them very well.
- 42:28Miscellaneous. Last year we boldly announced an
- 42:31expansion move encompassing an additional 227 fourteen square
- 42:36feet. Older partners shook their
- 42:38heads. I feel that our gain from
- 42:40operations in 1965 of $12,304,060 indicates that we
- 42:47did not overextend ourselves. Fortunately, we didn't sign a
- 42:51percentage lease. Operationally, things have never
- 42:54been running more smoothly, and I think our present set up
- 42:57unquestionably lets me devote a higher percentage of my time to
- 43:01thinking about the investment process than virtually anyone
- 43:04else in the money management business.
- 43:07This, of course, is the result of really outstanding personnel
- 43:11and cooperative partners. John Harding has taken complete
- 43:15charge of all administrative operations with splendid
- 43:17results. Bill Scott continues to develop
- 43:21detailed information on investments which substantially
- 43:24enhances our net profit figure. Beth Feehan, Donna Walter and
- 43:28Elizabeth Hainan, who joined us in November, have all handled
- 43:32large work load. Secretary's note Amen accurately
- 43:36and efficiently. The above people, their spouses,
- 43:391 apiece, and children, have a combined investment in the
- 43:42partnership of over $600,000. Susie and I have an investment
- 43:47of $6,849,936, which should keep me from slipping away to the
- 43:54movies in the afternoon. This represents virtually our
- 43:58entire net worth with the exception of our continued
- 44:01holding of Midcontinent Tab Card, a local company into which
- 44:05I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders.
- 44:09Additionally, my relatives consisting of three children,
- 44:13mother, two sisters, two brothers in law, father-in-law,
- 44:173 aunts, 2 uncles, 5 cousins and six nieces and nephews have
- 44:22interests in BPL directly or indirectly totaling $2,708,233.
- 44:30So don't get any ideas about voting a change in the
- 44:33partnership name. Pete Marwick Mitchell and
- 44:36Company has done the customary excellent job of expediting the
- 44:39audit and tax information. This requires great effort and
- 44:43ability and they supply both. This year a computer was brought
- 44:47to bear on our problems and naturally I was a little worried
- 44:51someone else would come out as the general partner.
- 44:53However, it all worked quite smoothly.
- 44:56Within the coming two weeks, you will receive 1 a tax letter
- 45:00giving you all BPL information needed for your 1965 federal
- 45:04income tax return. This letter is the only item
- 45:07that counts for tax purposes. 2 An audit from Pete Marwick
- 45:12Mitchell and Company for 1965 setting forth the operations and
- 45:17financial 93 position of BPL as well as your own capital
- 45:21account. 3A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your
- 45:25BPL interest on 1166. This is identical with IT
- 45:30figures developed in the audit. Let me know if anything in this
- 45:33letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying.
- 45:36It is difficult to anticipate all of the questions you may
- 45:39have and if there is anything that is confusing, I want to
- 45:43hear about it. For instance, we received an
- 45:45excellent suggestion last year from a partner regarding the
- 45:48presentation of the reconciliation of Personal
- 45:51Capital accounts. My next letter will be about
- 45:54July 15th, summarizing the first HA 1F of this year cordially,
- 45:59Warren E Buffett 94.