Latest / Ego and Other Things / Is It Possible to Know Something Without Being Able to Explain It? (Part One)
Transcript
- William: Okay, the question is Is it possible To know something, but not to be able to explain why. And I assume this question It's a little deeper than that. It's not just in terms of articulation, right? Because somebody can know the truth about something, but just not really have the language to explain it, or just the capacity, I guess, to explain it. So I assume that the question is a little bit deeper than that, and what it's asking is something like: can you know that something is true without having a good reason for it, right? Without being able to really justify it. which is I think a much more interesting question. Now I I think the traditional way of defining knowledge philosophically is comes out of Plato and it's considered justified true belief. And there's a man named Gettier who I believe in the nineteenth century no no in the tw twentieth century came up with a series of problems that were supposed to say or were supposed to prove that not all cases of knowledge could be classified under justified true belief. And he came up with a few thought experiences or or thought scenarios and claimed that justified true belief was not a sufficient definition a sufficient universal definition for knowledge. and and many of the Gettier's problems are they're obscure and they're almost they're situations in which you wouldn't really find yourself in. and there's not much of a principle behind what seems to be problematic about them. it was sort of a case of invoking a couple examples that seemed to to violate the universal validity of justified true belief. but sort of functionally speaking, if you will, the notion of justified true belief covers something like ninety-nine percent of of knowledge cases. And the idea of justified true belief as that for something to count as knowledge, In the first place you must have valid or true reasons for holding it. You must have valid reasons for for holding it. the idea or the statement or the n yeah, the the idea or the statement must be true, must correspond with reality in some way, or correspond with what is the case in some way, and you must believe it. You must believe that that this idea has some You must believe that this idea is true. And justified. Right? So obviously if you if you couldn't if you couldn't if you didn't believe that it was true, then that would preclude you knowing about it. if you believed it and you had good reasons for it, but it didn't correspond with reality, then it would be false and couldn't be counted as as true knowledge. And If you believed in it and it was true, but you didn't have a valid justification for it, or a good justification for it, then it wouldn't really count as knowledge, it would have counted as sort of like you had perhaps stumbled upon it, right? Stumbled upon the truth. And so that's a classic way of defining it. And I think it's I think in large part it it works for our purposes. Though the thing that I think this question really targets is that that question of justification, right? Do you need a good justification to have knowledge? And justification can kind of be split into to two Kinds of, I guess, categories or directions, maybe. Because there are when it comes to philosophical knowledge, there is what I can prove to another person, or explain to another person, or attempt to justify to another person, and there is what I experience or the stand the standards of proof the standards of justification to myself are different than the standards of justification to another person chiefly because that person is not sort of there right so if you get abducted by aliens you know you can say without a doubt because you were there experiencing it and you've you have no reason to suspect that your experience wasn't real that you were abducted by aliens but if you went out And said to somebody, hey, I've been abducted by aliens. you know, they came last night and took me in their mothership, and they asked you, Well, how can you prove it? unless you had any sort of concrete evidence to show them, then you wouldn't be able to, right? you would be unable to prove, to justify your claim to another person. And And that way you would sort of fail to meet this criteria. but you would still have knowledge because you could justify it to yourself. So the standard of justification is a little wonky because or the the part the the injustified true belief, the justification part is kind of the the loosest part in the formulation because what counts as justification? Right. and And who gets to set the standard of of what is justified, right? Who gets to set set the epistemological standard of justification? Now, the the question becomes: you know, if you had an experience like the alien abduction that you did directly experience, and by all by all standards of evidence available just to you individually, you truly were abducted, do you have knowledge of the abduction? Even though you can't. prove it or justify it according to the standards of reason to somebody else. And I would argue that the clear answer is is yes, you have a individual, an epistemologically isolated kind of knowledge, but you have a knowledge nonetheless. And so your belief in in aliens would be substantiated by knowledge, even if nobody else you you could not prove it to anybody else by any other other reason. It failed, you might say, the test of of evidence, but not necessarily the test of of justification. So I think that justification has to include the bar the the low you might say the lower bar of a of of personal experience rather than the the higher bar of sort of evidence or proof to another person. But we will Leave off here for the moment and pick it up next time.