Latest / Revisionist History / Bombs-Away LeMay
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- 0:15Speaker 1: Pushkin.
- 0:20Speaker 2: Curtis Emerson LeMay, who for the better part of twenty
- 0:23Speaker 2: five years dominated the greatest fighting force the world had
- 0:25Speaker 2: ever known, had three nicknames, Old Iron Pants, the Demon,
- 0:32Speaker 2: and bombs Away LeMay. He was not that category of
- 0:38Speaker 2: leader who led by force of wit, charm and charisma.
- 0:42Speaker 2: Nor was he some great thinker, the kind of leader
- 0:45Speaker 2: whose appeal lies with carefully thought out manifestos and elaborate ideologies.
- 0:50Speaker 2: Le Maay never took his cigar out of his mouth
- 0:52Speaker 2: long enough to say anything. He belonged to a different category,
- 0:57Speaker 2: the one that gets overlooked.
- 0:59Speaker 1: Curtis LeMay. In my view, he was the greatest air
- 1:01Speaker 1: commander in history.
- 1:03Speaker 2: I'm talking to the military historian Conrad Crane. No historian
- 1:07Speaker 2: writes about the Second World War out considering the legacy
- 1:10Speaker 2: of LeMay.
- 1:11Speaker 1: Everything he touched he transformed. He was a dynamic leader.
- 1:15Speaker 1: He shared the difficulties of his airman. He was the
- 1:18Speaker 1: best navigator of the Air Force I had it, was
- 1:20Speaker 1: a great pilot, He could do mechanics stuff. He was
- 1:23Speaker 1: the Air Force's ultimate problem solver. But he was one
- 1:26Speaker 1: of those guys that you would if you gave him
- 1:28Speaker 1: a problem to fix, you didn't ask a whole lot
- 1:30Speaker 1: of questions.
- 1:30Speaker 2: Harry was going to do it bombs away. LeMay was
- 1:33Speaker 2: known as someone you get the job done. My name
- 1:39Speaker 2: is Malcolm Gladwell. You're listening to Revisionist History, my podcast
- 1:43Speaker 2: about things Overlooked and Misunderstood. This is part three of
- 1:48Speaker 2: my four part series about Curtis le May and the
- 1:51Speaker 2: events of March nineteen forty five. This episode is about
- 2:00Speaker 2: the role of people like Curtis le May in times
- 2:02Speaker 2: of crisis. In the normal course of events, we are
- 2:06Speaker 2: led by people of ideas and people of arristhma. But
- 2:10Speaker 2: when things start to go badly, those people get pushed
- 2:14Speaker 2: aside and the problem solver takes center stage. Only the
- 2:19Speaker 2: problem solver doesn't play by the same moral rules. Let
- 2:30Speaker 2: me give you an example of what it means to
- 2:32Speaker 2: approach the world the way someone like Curtis LeMay did.
- 2:35Speaker 2: It's not one of the signature stories in the LeMay legend.
- 2:39Speaker 2: It happened long before he was famous, years before the
- 2:42Speaker 2: Second World War. He would mention it sometimes in passing
- 2:45Speaker 2: in some of the interviews he gave in retirement, but
- 2:48Speaker 2: it's one of those stories that made me stop and say, oh,
- 2:53Speaker 2: I think I understand him now. In nineteen thirty seven,
- 2:59Speaker 2: with the threat of war in Europe growing, the Army's
- 3:02Speaker 2: Air Corps wanted a chance to practice their bombing technique,
- 3:06Speaker 2: real world practice, only with dummy bombs fifty pounders filled
- 3:11Speaker 2: with water.
- 3:12Speaker 3: I'mt me tell you the story of that. I mentioned
- 3:15Speaker 3: that the Air Force has been battling to make a
- 3:17Speaker 3: contribution to the fans of the country ever since I've
- 3:21Speaker 3: done around, nobody paid much attention to it.
- 3:26Speaker 2: This is an interview LeMay gave to the Air Force
- 3:28Speaker 2: Academy in nineteen seventy one, a few years after leaving
- 3:31Speaker 2: his post as Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
- 3:34Speaker 2: When he was taking the post retirement victory lap, a
- 3:36Speaker 2: famous generals take.
- 3:38Speaker 3: We wanted an exercise, or we could drop bomb on
- 3:41Speaker 3: a battleship.
- 3:42Speaker 2: Find a battleship for the practice run. To work, the
- 3:47Speaker 2: Air Corps needed the Navy to play along. Hide a
- 3:49Speaker 2: battleship out on the seas, give out its coordinates at
- 3:53Speaker 2: the last minute, and dare the bombers to find it.
- 3:56Speaker 2: This was before sophisticated radar and navigation aids. To find
- 4:00Speaker 2: a battleship, you had to see it with your eyes,
- 4:02Speaker 2: then hit its narrow decks with a bomb from thousands
- 4:05Speaker 2: of feet up, all the while flying at hundreds of
- 4:08Speaker 2: miles an hour. The Navy was not enthusiastic.
- 4:14Speaker 3: Finally, they agreed that they would have an exercise and
- 4:18Speaker 3: it would be in August off the West coast. Now
- 4:23Speaker 3: in August off the west coast, there's nothing but fog
- 4:26Speaker 3: for a thousand miles out there, and they deliberately picked
- 4:31Speaker 3: it for this time. I'm sure.
- 4:35Speaker 2: How could you spot a battleship in one thousand miles
- 4:39Speaker 2: of fog. To make matters worse, the Navy bent the rules.
- 4:43Speaker 2: The agreement was to have the wargame run for twenty
- 4:45Speaker 2: four hours from noon the first day until noon the next,
- 4:49Speaker 2: but the Navy didn't give out the coordinates of its ship,
- 4:51Speaker 2: the uss Utah, until late the first afternoon, and the
- 4:56Speaker 2: cordinates they gave were wrong, off by sixty miles one
- 5:00Speaker 2: thousand miles of fog. Late directions, fake directions a needle
- 5:05Speaker 2: in a haystack would have been easier at ten minutes before.
- 5:10Speaker 2: At the very last moment, le May found the ship
- 5:13Speaker 2: and dropped his bombs. Now, of course he found the ship,
- 5:19Speaker 2: there was nothing Li May could not do if he
- 5:21Speaker 2: put his mind to it. That's not the point of
- 5:23Speaker 2: the story. The point is what happened before he dropped
- 5:27Speaker 2: his bombs. The Navy was certain they couldn't be found,
- 5:31Speaker 2: so they took no precautions. The sailors were all over
- 5:34Speaker 2: the decks going about their business. They were supposed to
- 5:37Speaker 2: take cover in a bombing exercise. They didn't. So what
- 5:41Speaker 2: did LeMay do? He bombed the Utah anyway, raining fifty
- 5:45Speaker 2: pound water bombs down on the sailors.
- 5:48Speaker 3: And the Navy was so sure that they weren't going
- 5:51Speaker 3: to be found. I don't know if that bog die
- 5:54Speaker 3: like it, but the men were all over the decks,
- 5:56Speaker 3: everybody diving for the gang plank patches and way hard
- 6:03Speaker 3: rumors that there are a few people part a little bit.
- 6:09Speaker 2: Imagine how other types of leaders might have handled the
- 6:12Speaker 2: decision to bomb after seeing sailors out in the deck.
- 6:15Speaker 2: The thinker would have understood the moral dimensions of willingly
- 6:19Speaker 2: harming one of your own in the course of a
- 6:21Speaker 2: routine training exercise. The charismatic leader would have wondered, what
- 6:25Speaker 2: will my own men think of me if they see
- 6:28Speaker 2: that I am capable of such a casual act of brutality.
- 6:32Speaker 2: But the problem solver. The problem was to find the
- 6:35Speaker 2: Utah and bomb it, and so he bombs it.
- 6:40Speaker 3: I'd rather have somebody who is real stupid. I did
- 6:45Speaker 3: something and even it was wrong, alre he did something,
- 6:51Speaker 3: and I have somebody who would vacilate and do nothing.
- 6:57Speaker 2: You cannot do nothing in the world view of the
- 7:00Speaker 2: problem solver, even if what you end up doing is horrifying.
- 7:05Speaker 2: In his memoirs, LeMay says they were rumors for years
- 7:08Speaker 2: that some sale got killed in the bombing exercise of
- 7:10Speaker 2: nineteen thirty seven, and then he says, quote, I remember
- 7:15Speaker 2: watching the first bomb, which smashed into the deck. It
- 7:19Speaker 2: sent splintered pieces of wood flying in every direction. I
- 7:22Speaker 2: hadn't realized that wood could frag like that. It was
- 7:27Speaker 2: a learning opportunity. Who knew wood reacted that way? He
- 7:31Speaker 2: files that fact away and goes on to the next problem.
- 7:38Speaker 2: In the first years of the Second World War, the
- 7:41Speaker 2: American fight against the Japanese was defined by a single fact.
- 7:45Speaker 2: Japan was beyond the reach of the US Air Force.
- 7:49Speaker 2: The American workhorse bomber was the B seventeen. It had
- 7:52Speaker 2: a range of roughly two thousand miles. That's a thousand
- 7:56Speaker 2: miles out and one thousand miles back. Now, look at
- 7:59Speaker 2: a map of the world from say, January of nineteen
- 8:02Speaker 2: forty four, and try and find an air base controlled
- 8:05Speaker 2: by the Allies that is within one thousand miles of
- 8:08Speaker 2: tow You can't. And if you can't reach Japan, how
- 8:14Speaker 2: on earth are you going to defeat them? The solution
- 8:17Speaker 2: comes in two parts.
- 8:21Speaker 4: This is where it began, here in the exact geographic
- 8:26Speaker 4: center of the United States, Grand Island, Nebraska.
- 8:32Speaker 2: That voice sounds familiar, doesn't it. It's fron of Reagan.
- 8:36Speaker 2: Long before he became president, Reagan narrated newsreels during the
- 8:40Speaker 2: Second World War.
- 8:41Speaker 4: The men were brought here from every corner of the
- 8:43Speaker 4: country and a few corners outside the country.
- 8:48Speaker 3: They were a.
- 8:49Speaker 4: Hand picked American mixture of draftees and west pointers, of butchers,
- 8:53Speaker 4: teachers and bankers, of your sons, husbands, and fathers.
- 9:00Speaker 2: In the newsreel, we see soldiers arriving in barracks, handsome
- 9:05Speaker 2: crisp uniforms, all gazing up at a magnificent and gleaming airplane.
- 9:11Speaker 4: She was a B twenty nine, the superport designed to
- 9:16Speaker 4: carry more destruction and carry it higher, faster, farther than
- 9:21Speaker 4: any bomber ever built before. And to complete this mission,
- 9:26Speaker 4: That's exactly what she was going to have to do.
- 9:31Speaker 2: She The B twenty nine was one of the great
- 9:34Speaker 2: achievements of the American war effort, an enormous bomber dedicated
- 9:38Speaker 2: entirely to the fight against the Japanese. In the Wars
- 9:41Speaker 2: specific theater, the B twenty nine's range fifty six hundred
- 9:46Speaker 2: miles much better than its predecessor. So then came the
- 9:50Speaker 2: second step. In the summer of nineteen forty four, in
- 9:54Speaker 2: some of the most brutal fighting of the war, the
- 9:56Speaker 2: Marines captured three tiny specks in the middle of the
- 9:59Speaker 2: Western Pacific, the Mariana Islands, Guam, Saipan, and Tinian. Why
- 10:06Speaker 2: were they captured because the Marianna is with thirteen hundred
- 10:10Speaker 2: and forty two miles from Tokyo, straight shot across the ocean,
- 10:16Speaker 2: put the B twenty nine together with the Marianas, and
- 10:19Speaker 2: overnight the odds of beating Japan shifted.
- 10:23Speaker 1: June of nineteen forty four is a arguably the most
- 10:27Speaker 1: important month of the war. You have D Day and
- 10:30Speaker 1: where we go ashore in northwest Europe, you have the
- 10:33Speaker 1: invasion of the Marianas and the Pacific, the final breaking
- 10:38Speaker 1: of the internal defense line of the Japanese, the fall
- 10:42Speaker 1: of the Tojo government because of that. So all that
- 10:46Speaker 1: stuff happens in that same month.
- 10:48Speaker 2: Throughout the summer and fall of nineteen forty four, the
- 10:51Speaker 2: Navy built massive bases on each of the captured islands
- 10:54Speaker 2: of the Mariannas. The biggest base contained the largest airport
- 10:58Speaker 2: in the world that was on tinian six runways, the
- 11:03Speaker 2: equivalent of three Boulder dams with a concrete and when
- 11:07Speaker 2: they were finished, the military again flying in brand new
- 11:10Speaker 2: B twenty nine bombers, hundreds of them.
- 11:14Speaker 4: Their final base was no longer a mystery. Four thousand
- 11:18Speaker 4: miles farther west, with only one refueling stop on the way,
- 11:23Speaker 4: lay the island of Saipan. Less than four months before,
- 11:28Speaker 4: it had still been in the hands of the Japanese.
- 11:32Speaker 2: To head up the newly created B twenty nine strike
- 11:34Speaker 2: force known as the twenty first Bomber Command, the military
- 11:38Speaker 2: brass brought in a high priest of the bomber mafia,
- 11:41Speaker 2: a brilliant young general named Hayward Hansel. Hayward Hansel came
- 11:49Speaker 2: from an aristocratic Southern military family. His great grandfather was
- 11:53Speaker 2: a general in the Confederate Army, his grandfather a Confederate officer.
- 11:59Speaker 2: Hansel's father had been an army surgeon who came to
- 12:01Speaker 2: dinner in a white linen suit and a panama hat.
- 12:05Speaker 2: Hansel himself was a skilled dancer, a poet, and an
- 12:08Speaker 2: aficionado of Gilbert and Sullivan operettas. His favorite book was
- 12:12Speaker 2: Don Quixote. He felt a connection with the knight tilting
- 12:15Speaker 2: at windmills. He put flying first, Polo second, and family
- 12:20Speaker 2: a distant third. Once the story goes early in his marriage,
- 12:24Speaker 2: he heard a baby cry and turned to his wife,
- 12:27Speaker 2: what's that sound. That's your son, she said. He liked
- 12:32Speaker 2: to carry a swagger stick, like the English army officers did.
- 12:37Speaker 2: As a child, he was nicknamed Possum because of the
- 12:40Speaker 2: narrowness of his face. The name stuck. On his final
- 12:46Speaker 2: mission as a pilot, a bombing run over Belgium, Hensel
- 12:49Speaker 2: entertained his exhausted crew with a rendition of the popular
- 12:53Speaker 2: music hall song The Man on the Flying Trapeze. This
- 12:57Speaker 2: is the most famous version. Eddie canters, Oh.
- 13:03Speaker 5: He floats through the air with the greatest evise, this
- 13:08Speaker 5: daring young man, and I'm the flying trabbe.
- 13:11Speaker 4: His actions are.
- 13:12Speaker 2: Graceful, old girls, He does please, and my love was
- 13:15Speaker 2: soolen away. Of all the bombing fundamentalists to come out
- 13:21Speaker 2: of the Air Corps tactical school, Heyward Hansel was the
- 13:25Speaker 2: truest believer the idealist airpower, intelligently and surgically deployed could
- 13:31Speaker 2: bring any enemy to its knees well.
- 13:36Speaker 5: The first operation against Japam was called San Antonio one.
- 13:41Speaker 5: It was coordinated with the Joint Cheese of Staff strategy,
- 13:44Speaker 5: which made the timing extremely important. As a matter of fact,
- 13:48Speaker 5: we were going. We were in some danger of standin
- 13:50Speaker 5: of falling on this operation.
- 13:52Speaker 2: When Possum Hansel takes over in the Mariannas in nineteen
- 13:55Speaker 2: forty four, he says to himself, what is the critical
- 13:59Speaker 2: vulnerability of the Japanese war economy? What can my newbe
- 14:04Speaker 2: twenty nine's attack. The answer to him is obvious. The
- 14:08Speaker 2: Japanese air craft manufacturing plants, which are almost entirely concentrated
- 14:13Speaker 2: in a few factories in and around Tokyo, in particular
- 14:17Speaker 2: the Nakajima Aircraft Company known as Subru. Today Nakajima made
- 14:22Speaker 2: at least a third of all Japanese combat aircraft engines.
- 14:26Speaker 2: Hansel said, let's hit Nakajima, and we'll cripple the Japanese
- 14:31Speaker 2: fighting force. The newsreel Ronald Reagan narrated, is all about
- 14:37Speaker 2: that first attack by Hansel on Nakajima.
- 14:40Speaker 4: Six hours later, through the clouds, they saw it, Fujiyama.
- 14:47Speaker 4: Here comes some modern symbols, phosphorus, bombs and flag.
- 14:56Speaker 2: The B twenty nine s traveled fifteen hundred miles from
- 14:59Speaker 2: the Marianas, skimming over the ocean at several thousand feet.
- 15:03Speaker 2: As they approached Japan, they climbed twenty five or thirty
- 15:07Speaker 2: thousand feet out of harm's way. They turned at Mount Fuji,
- 15:11Speaker 2: then came in from the west over Tokyo. Here, speaking
- 15:16Speaker 2: over aerial shots of the city, Reagan lays it on thick.
- 15:21Speaker 4: Within a radius of fifteen miles of the Imperial Palace
- 15:24Speaker 4: lived seven million Japanese, a people we used to think
- 15:28Speaker 4: of as small, dainty, polite, concerning themselves only with floral
- 15:32Speaker 4: arrangements and rock gardens and the cultivation of silkworms. But
- 15:37Speaker 4: it isn't silkworms, and it isn't Imperial Palace. As these
- 15:40Speaker 4: men are looking for in the suburbs of Tokyo is
- 15:44Speaker 4: the huge Nakajima aircraft plant. Well, bud, what are you
- 15:50Speaker 4: waiting for?
- 15:53Speaker 2: Like I said? He dated on a little thick That
- 15:58Speaker 2: first mission, San Antonio I was hugely symbolic proof that
- 16:03Speaker 2: Japan could finally be reached. But was it a success
- 16:07Speaker 2: as a military operation? After the war. Speaking to cadets
- 16:12Speaker 2: at the Air Force Academy, Hansel tried to put a
- 16:15Speaker 2: good face on things.
- 16:16Speaker 5: The operation wasn't because had light by un permission help it.
- 16:21Speaker 5: It did show that it could be done, and this
- 16:24Speaker 5: was a very very Dunfeld issue.
- 16:28Speaker 3: At the time.
- 16:29Speaker 2: The operation wasn't as good as we would have liked,
- 16:33Speaker 2: was to say the least, an understatement. None of the
- 16:36Speaker 2: bombs dropped by Hansel's B twenty nine s actually hit
- 16:39Speaker 2: the Nakajima plant, so Hansel tried again three days later,
- 16:43Speaker 2: same thing. Hansel sent mission after mission. On one of
- 16:48Speaker 2: his last attempts, he went back with seventy two B
- 16:51Speaker 2: twenty nines. They missed the plant and hit a hospital. Heyward,
- 16:57Speaker 2: Hansel couldn't solve the problem because the problem was much
- 17:01Speaker 2: bigger than anyone at the time understood. Long after the war,
- 17:19Speaker 2: one of Heywood Hansel's B twenty nine pilots, Lieutenant Ed Hyatt,
- 17:24Speaker 2: was interviewed for a documentary by the BBC.
- 17:27Speaker 6: After flying six hours, we climbed up to bombing altitude.
- 17:31Speaker 6: We climbed up to thirty seven thousand feet and just
- 17:34Speaker 6: as we broke out of the storm, there's Mount Fuji
- 17:36Speaker 6: sitting right in front of us, and it's a gorgeous site.
- 17:39Speaker 1: It really is.
- 17:41Speaker 2: Hyatt tried to describe what went wrong on those first
- 17:44Speaker 2: B twenty nine precision attacks on Tokyo. His bombardier, a
- 17:48Speaker 2: man named Glenn, starts to make his calculations on their
- 17:51Speaker 2: bomb site, lining up the Nakajima factory, but the telescope
- 17:56Speaker 2: on the bomb site wouldn't line up.
- 17:58Speaker 6: They turned around and he said, he said, I can't
- 18:00Speaker 6: get this damn telescope on the target. And so we
- 18:06Speaker 6: called a radar operator check our ground speed and see
- 18:09Speaker 6: what our ground speed is. He came back and he says,
- 18:11Speaker 6: we got one hundred and twenty five tailwind. He said,
- 18:14Speaker 6: we're going about four hundred and eighty miles an hour.
- 18:16Speaker 6: It's impossible, it can't be. There's no wins like that.
- 18:22Speaker 2: No Air Force pilots had ever experienced what was now
- 18:25Speaker 2: happening to the B twenty nine bombers over Japan. They
- 18:28Speaker 2: expected winds a fraction of these speeds.
- 18:32Speaker 6: We're going four hundred and eighty miles an hour when
- 18:34Speaker 6: we should be going three hundred and forty miles an hour.
- 18:38Speaker 6: I said, well, Glenn dropped the damn bombs. He dropped
- 18:42Speaker 6: the bombs, and we were already twelve miles past the
- 18:44Speaker 6: target because of that wind.
- 18:48Speaker 2: They were bewildered, and back at base they couldn't explain
- 18:51Speaker 2: what happened to their superiors from.
- 18:54Speaker 6: The debriefed as they gave us a third degree, they said, no,
- 18:59Speaker 6: there is no such thing. There can't be a win
- 19:02Speaker 6: like that. You're a lion. You didn't make it over
- 19:05Speaker 6: the target. You're just making this up.
- 19:07Speaker 2: But one crew after another arrived back at the Marianas
- 19:10Speaker 2: and told the exact same story.
- 19:12Speaker 7: To tell you how powerful these winds were. A reconnaissance
- 19:16Speaker 7: plane went up on time to take some pictures after
- 19:19Speaker 7: a mission to see how effective they'd been, and the
- 19:22Speaker 7: navigator called the pilot and told him they were going
- 19:25Speaker 7: three miles an hour backwards. That was something you couldn't
- 19:29Speaker 7: afford to do, because if you went from east to west,
- 19:32Speaker 7: you were going to be a sitting duck for Japanese
- 19:34Speaker 7: fighters or their flag.
- 19:37Speaker 2: To solve that puzzle, Hensel turned to his team of meteorologists.
- 19:42Speaker 2: They'd all been trained at the University of Chicago. Back then,
- 19:45Speaker 2: in the days before a sophisticated radar, meteorologists were crucial
- 19:49Speaker 2: to the success of bombing campaigns. If you were doing
- 19:52Speaker 2: a daylight bombing run over a city, you had to
- 19:54Speaker 2: see the target in order to line up the bomb site,
- 19:57Speaker 2: and if the skies were too cloudy, that was impossible.
- 20:01Speaker 2: So going or not going on a mission hinged on
- 20:04Speaker 2: the weather forecast. But the tools available to meteorologists of
- 20:08Speaker 2: that era were crude. The easiest thing to forget about
- 20:13Speaker 2: the Second World War is that it was another technological era.
- 20:17Speaker 2: It's half twentieth century and half nineteenth century. The chief
- 20:21Speaker 2: tool of the meteorologists of that time were balloons weather
- 20:25Speaker 2: balloons that would float up into the atmosphere, carrying little
- 20:29Speaker 2: instrument kits that could record the wind, the temperature, and
- 20:33Speaker 2: the humidity and transmit that information back to Earth. I
- 20:38Speaker 2: asked John Lewis about those days he's a scientist at
- 20:41Speaker 2: the Desert Research Institute in Nevada. He knew a number
- 20:44Speaker 2: of the meteorologists who worked with the Air Force during
- 20:47Speaker 2: the war. Are these balloons they can forgive me? It's
- 20:50Speaker 2: a very naive question. Are they connected by a rope
- 20:53Speaker 2: or are they just free floating?
- 20:54Speaker 4: Oh?
- 20:55Speaker 1: No, they're released.
- 20:56Speaker 8: They eventually, as the pressure gets lower, as the balloon
- 21:00Speaker 8: goes higher in the atmosphere, they expand, expand, expand. Kaboom,
- 21:04Speaker 8: they explode and they fall to the ground with the
- 21:07Speaker 8: instrument attached. And at that time they had a message
- 21:10Speaker 8: on all the instrument packages, could you please return this
- 21:13Speaker 8: to the University of Chicago in.
- 21:16Speaker 2: The Pacific field of war. That technique wasn't going to work.
- 21:20Speaker 2: So there they were, the meteorologists in the middle of
- 21:23Speaker 2: the Pacific with one of the most important jobs in
- 21:26Speaker 2: the whole outfit, figuring out when to send the bombers,
- 21:30Speaker 2: and they're baffled. What's with these winds? On a theoretical level,
- 21:40Speaker 2: Do they have a suspicion that there may be very
- 21:44Speaker 2: very high winds at high altitudes at the Air Force?
- 21:46Speaker 2: Or is it that they don't reach that conclusion until
- 21:48Speaker 2: the pilots come back with their.
- 21:50Speaker 8: They did not reach their conclusions until the pilots came back.
- 21:55Speaker 2: What slowly became clear is that the pilots had stumbled
- 21:58Speaker 2: on a previously unknown phenomenon in the upper atmosphere, what
- 22:03Speaker 2: came to be known as the jet stream, a river
- 22:07Speaker 2: of fast flowing air that circles the globe starting at
- 22:10Speaker 2: around twenty thousand feet. Some scientists had theorized about the
- 22:14Speaker 2: jet stream, but until the B twenty nine was built,
- 22:17Speaker 2: almost no one had ever flown at altitudes high enough
- 22:20Speaker 2: to experience those winds firsthand.
- 22:24Speaker 8: This vast stream of air, very narrow, moves from north
- 22:31Speaker 8: to south in both hemispheres. Basically, it is dividing the
- 22:37Speaker 8: very cold air of the polar regions from the more
- 22:41Speaker 8: warm mid latitude and equatorial air.
- 22:46Speaker 2: Yeah, when you say very narrow, how narrow.
- 22:50Speaker 8: I would say typically two hundred kilometers across something on
- 22:55Speaker 8: that order. So that's the narrowness of it.
- 23:00Speaker 2: And did it entirely encircle the Earth?
- 23:02Speaker 8: It does?
- 23:05Speaker 2: So what is the problem facing the pilots gathered on
- 23:08Speaker 2: the man that in the winter of nineteen forty four
- 23:12Speaker 2: and the early spring of nineteen forty five, this narrow
- 23:16Speaker 2: hurricane force band of air known as a jet stream,
- 23:18Speaker 2: happens to be directly over Japan, and that makes it
- 23:23Speaker 2: impossible for Hansel to do any of the precision bombing
- 23:27Speaker 2: that he had planned to do. If they fly across it,
- 23:30Speaker 2: the plane will get blown sideways. If they fly into it,
- 23:33Speaker 2: they'll be fighting to stay aloft and be easy targets
- 23:36Speaker 2: for the Japanese. And if they fly with it, they'll
- 23:39Speaker 2: be racing too fast to take proper aim. In the
- 23:42Speaker 2: service of a conviction that bombing could bring Japan to
- 23:46Speaker 2: its knees, Thousands of Marines had been killed in the
- 23:49Speaker 2: fight to capture the Marianas. The construction of the three
- 23:53Speaker 2: island air bases had been one of the most intensive
- 23:57Speaker 2: engineering feats of the war. The B twenty nine was
- 24:00Speaker 2: a three billion dollar project that's forty three billion in
- 24:04Speaker 2: today's money. All of that investment in the air war
- 24:08Speaker 2: against the Japanese by December of nineteen forty four had
- 24:12Speaker 2: come up empty. Hansel and all the other brass and
- 24:16Speaker 2: the Marianas were bewildered. When a true believer discovers that
- 24:23Speaker 2: his God cannot save him, what's left nothing Heyward Hansel
- 24:29Speaker 2: was finished in January of nineteen forty five, Hansel was
- 24:34Speaker 2: relieved of his post as head of the twenty first
- 24:37Speaker 2: bomber command. In his place was put the man you
- 24:41Speaker 2: bring in when all else has failed, Curtis le May.
- 24:47Speaker 2: Even decades later, possum Hansel would bristle when asked about
- 24:50Speaker 2: the circumstances of his departure and the person who replaced
- 24:54Speaker 2: him in the Pacific. He had taught le May at
- 24:57Speaker 2: the Air Court Tactical School and was his commanding officer
- 25:00Speaker 2: in Europe. Here's Hansel again at the Air Force Academy
- 25:04Speaker 2: in nineteen sixty seven. He's just been asked a name
- 25:07Speaker 2: who he felt were the finest officers of his generation.
- 25:11Speaker 9: Among the people who I knew in my littleitary career,
- 25:16Speaker 9: I would say the three hank standing ones, John Marshall,
- 25:22Speaker 9: Joel Andrews and John Fradhn And they were outstanding for
- 25:27Speaker 9: pretty much the same reason they were man okay, character,
- 25:31Speaker 9: They were obviously intelligent man, but no a spersonal integrity
- 25:35Speaker 9: and character.
- 25:37Speaker 8: General O May was one of your group commanders.
- 25:39Speaker 3: I not if you didn't put him in this.
- 25:41Speaker 2: Last group, well exactly. Le May was not a patrician
- 25:47Speaker 2: with a swagger stick. He did not read Savantes and
- 25:50Speaker 2: sing musical theater to his crew at the end of
- 25:53Speaker 2: long missions. He had no time for demonstrations of personal
- 25:57Speaker 2: integrity and character. He had a problem to solve when
- 26:10Speaker 2: he takes over the twenty first bombing command. When he
- 26:13Speaker 2: first arrives in the Marianas, he does not have his
- 26:17Speaker 2: eventual strategy worked out. His mind is still open.
- 26:21Speaker 1: Yes, Zach, Yeah, that is correct.
- 26:23Speaker 2: I'm talking again with the military historian Conrad Crane about
- 26:27Speaker 2: Curtis the May after he takes over command from General
- 26:30Speaker 2: Heyward Hansell in January of nineteen forty five. I'm really
- 26:34Speaker 2: curious to sort of reconstruct his thought process, how he
- 26:38Speaker 2: all the reasons why he arrives at the strategy finally
- 26:41Speaker 2: arrives at So he begins by does he begin by
- 26:45Speaker 2: doing exactly what Hansel had done?
- 26:47Speaker 1: Well? He he walks in, and he looks around and
- 26:49Speaker 1: sees the primitive nature of the facilities that said this
- 26:52Speaker 1: won't do.
- 26:53Speaker 2: Le May is not happy with the military's infrastructure on
- 26:56Speaker 2: the Mariannas. It was all built by the Navy's construction Battalion,
- 27:00Speaker 2: the Seabees. Le May has lost none of his disdain
- 27:03Speaker 2: for the Navy, the people who cheated in the bombing
- 27:06Speaker 2: exercise years before.
- 27:09Speaker 1: He gets invited to have dinner with Admiral Nimtz, who
- 27:14Speaker 1: also is headquartered in Marianna's And he goes over to
- 27:16Speaker 1: Nimbus's place and he's in this ornate almost a palace,
- 27:19Speaker 1: and he gets fed on the very formal naval style
- 27:23Speaker 1: dinner with the tablecloths and being served and everything. So
- 27:27Speaker 1: he invites the Admiral Nimmos to visit him for dinner
- 27:30Speaker 1: in the next couple of days, and Admiral Nimmtz shows
- 27:32Speaker 1: up for his dinner and they're sitting in a quancert
- 27:35Speaker 1: hut on a couple of crates, eating sea rations. And
- 27:40Speaker 1: at the end of the end of the meal, Nimmits
- 27:42Speaker 1: looks at LeMay and says, I get your point. And
- 27:46Speaker 1: then he started sending more construction materials to La May
- 27:49Speaker 1: to help finish up the rest of the facilities.
- 27:52Speaker 2: By the early spring of nineteen forty five, LeMay was ready.
- 27:57Speaker 2: He starts out by trying his own version of the
- 27:59Speaker 2: strategy taken by his predecessor. He decides to take out
- 28:03Speaker 2: the Nakajima aircraft planned in Tokyo.
- 28:07Speaker 1: His perception is is that he's still expected to do
- 28:10Speaker 1: high altitude precision bombing, So he's going to do everything
- 28:13Speaker 1: he can to make sure that I how Toude precision
- 28:15Speaker 1: bombing is going to be more effective.
- 28:18Speaker 2: Le May sends two missions against Nakajima in January, one
- 28:22Speaker 2: in February another in early March. Hundreds of B twenty
- 28:26Speaker 2: nine's making the long trek to Japan, and in the
- 28:29Speaker 2: end the plant is still standing. He's run up against
- 28:33Speaker 2: the same obstacle as Hensel did. How can I force
- 28:37Speaker 2: a Japanese surrender from the air if I can't hit anything.
- 28:42Speaker 1: But when he realizes he's fixed all those problems, there's
- 28:44Speaker 1: nothing else he can tweak, you know, he says, Okay,
- 28:47Speaker 1: I'm gott to try something different.
- 28:51Speaker 2: Le May's first realization is that the jet stream is
- 28:55Speaker 2: a powerful force. It can't be wished away, and it's
- 28:58Speaker 2: making everything else impossible. The first principle of precision bombing
- 29:04Speaker 2: doctrine is that the bomber should come in high, well
- 29:07Speaker 2: above the range of enemy fire and anti aircraft guns.
- 29:11Speaker 2: Le May throws it out the window. He decides to
- 29:14Speaker 2: be twenty nine's will have to fly at lower altitudes
- 29:18Speaker 2: under the jet.
- 29:19Speaker 1: Stream and once he realizes he's going to have to
- 29:21Speaker 1: go to lower altitude. Then that leads to a whole
- 29:25Speaker 1: set of other conclusions from that.
- 29:28Speaker 2: Next logical step. Precision bombing was supposed to be daylight bombing.
- 29:33Speaker 2: You needed to see the target before you could line
- 29:36Speaker 2: up the bomb site. But if le Maay's bombers came
- 29:39Speaker 2: in low during the day, they would be sitting ducks
- 29:42Speaker 2: for the Japanese air defenses. So he decides they have
- 29:46Speaker 2: to come under cover of night.
- 29:48Speaker 1: Once you realize you can't go to a high altitude anymore,
- 29:50Speaker 1: it drives kind of the rest of his decision process.
- 29:54Speaker 2: Jetstream means low, low means night, and the decision to
- 29:58Speaker 2: switch to night raids means you can't do precision bombing anymore,
- 30:02Speaker 2: because there's no way with the technology of the time
- 30:05Speaker 2: that a bombing crew would be able to focus on
- 30:07Speaker 2: any precise target if they couldn't see it. So just
- 30:12Speaker 2: like that, Curtis le May doesn't about face. The man
- 30:17Speaker 2: who came of age in the high church of precision
- 30:19Speaker 2: bombing decides, at the most crucial juncture of his career
- 30:24Speaker 2: to abandon his faith to bomb indiscriminately to become an
- 30:30Speaker 2: area bomber and what weapon would he use for that task.
- 30:35Speaker 2: He knew as well as anyone the reports from the
- 30:37Speaker 2: Army testing grounds back in America, where perfect replicas of
- 30:41Speaker 2: Japanese towns had been incinerated by Harvard's new wonder weapon.
- 30:49Speaker 2: The whole plan is so radical that when le May
- 30:52Speaker 2: sends a copy of it to Washington for the approval
- 30:55Speaker 2: of his boss, General hap Arnold, he makes sure it
- 30:58Speaker 2: arrives on a day when Arnold isn't in his office, so.
- 31:01Speaker 1: He can get that initial raid off before Arnold really
- 31:04Speaker 1: has a chance to look at it very much, because
- 31:06Speaker 1: he realizes he's taken a risky es are very valuable.
- 31:10Speaker 1: It's very risky. You're talking about going in at night,
- 31:13Speaker 1: low altitude. He leaves most of the ammunition and gunners behind.
- 31:18Speaker 2: Crucial fact, the only thing LeMay lets his pilots have
- 31:22Speaker 2: to defend themselves is a tail gunner. All other guns
- 31:26Speaker 2: are removed. He wants to save as much weight as
- 31:30Speaker 2: possible for bombs. In the Air Force archives, it is
- 31:37Speaker 2: possible to find interviews from long ago with pilots who
- 31:40Speaker 2: remember the day when LeMay told them what was going
- 31:43Speaker 2: to happen that night.
- 31:45Speaker 10: And they were just a gasp in the audience because
- 31:47Speaker 10: you never thought about doing anything high altitude flying.
- 31:51Speaker 2: This is a B twenty nine navigator named David Braden.
- 31:55Speaker 10: And you went out and the bottom of your aircraft
- 32:00Speaker 10: have been painted black. So you do this is going
- 32:03Speaker 10: to be a different thing. Most of the guys thought
- 32:06Speaker 10: it was a susi admission.
- 32:08Speaker 2: And Braden's commander, Curtis le May, know this was going
- 32:11Speaker 2: to work. Of course he didn't, but remember his words,
- 32:16Speaker 2: the credo of the man who gets things done. I'd
- 32:19Speaker 2: rather have someone who was real stupid but did something
- 32:22Speaker 2: than have someone who'd vacillate and do nothing. Curtis le
- 32:27Speaker 2: May was going to do something. He was going to
- 32:30Speaker 2: aery A Bob Tokyo under cover of night with napalm.
- 32:35Speaker 3: I woke up one day and I'd been up there
- 32:37Speaker 3: for about two months. I hadn't done anything much, yet
- 32:41Speaker 3: I'd better do something.
- 32:45Speaker 2: I wonder if this is why le May fascinated so
- 32:47Speaker 2: many people in his day, because of his ability to
- 32:50Speaker 2: make that sudden turn, to turn his back on who
- 32:53Speaker 2: he was in the service of solving the problem. Curtis
- 32:58Speaker 2: le May was a member of the Bombing Mafia, a
- 33:01Speaker 2: graduate of the Air Corps Tactical School, a proponent of
- 33:04Speaker 2: precision bombing progress unhindered by custom. Later in his career
- 33:10Speaker 2: he would champion something called the B seventy bomber, an
- 33:13Speaker 2: airplane so absurdly complicated, so ridiculously advanced, so preposterously expensive,
- 33:20Speaker 2: and so deliciously and fantastically tricked out that the Air
- 33:24Speaker 2: Force only built two prototypes, one of which crashed. The
- 33:29Speaker 2: other has spent its entire life in the museum. Le
- 33:33Speaker 2: May was in his heart always the little boy who
- 33:37Speaker 2: ran after airplanes in the sky, and yet when he
- 33:41Speaker 2: needed to, he could take all that, his entire identity,
- 33:45Speaker 2: the modern, progressive, skilled war maker, and throw it out
- 33:49Speaker 2: the window.
- 33:52Speaker 1: May.
- 33:52Speaker 10: Where did the idea for the low level fire attacks originate?
- 33:57Speaker 6: Oh?
- 33:59Speaker 4: Were?
- 33:59Speaker 3: You had ideas flying back and forth a lot. It
- 34:03Speaker 3: was my basic decision made it. Nobody said anything about
- 34:07Speaker 3: night saintury vomit where he had to have some results
- 34:10Speaker 3: and I had to produce him. If I didn't produce them,
- 34:13Speaker 3: or made the long guess, get another.
- 34:14Speaker 1: Commander in there.
- 34:16Speaker 3: That's what happened to hansle You've got no results, I'd
- 34:21Speaker 3: have them. That's the reason for it.
- 34:26Speaker 2: On the night of March ninth, nineteen forty five, Curtis
- 34:29Speaker 2: le May launched Operation Meetinghouse. He sent three hundred and
- 34:34Speaker 2: thirty four B twenty nine's from the Marianas to Tokyo,
- 34:39Speaker 2: loaded with as much napalm as they could carry. The
- 34:42Speaker 2: target was not the Nakajima aircraft plant. That plan was over.
- 34:48Speaker 2: The new target was a densely populated region of Tokyo
- 34:52Speaker 2: straddling the Sumita River, a few miles east of the
- 34:55Speaker 2: Imperial Palace Zone one. The first few bombers dropped flares,
- 35:03Speaker 2: marking the target area for those that followed. Le Maay
- 35:06Speaker 2: was sending in his bombers at five thousand feet incredibly low.
- 35:11Speaker 2: That was so crazy that the Japanese were completely unprepared.
- 35:17Speaker 2: The bombs fell from the B twenty nine in clusters.
- 35:20Speaker 2: They were small steel pipes twenty inches long, weighing six pounds,
- 35:25Speaker 2: packed with tnt in napalm, little baby bombs, each with
- 35:30Speaker 2: a long silver gauze streamer at one end, so that
- 35:33Speaker 2: if you looked in the sky that night in Tokyo,
- 35:36Speaker 2: there would have been a moment of extraordinary beauty, thousands
- 35:39Speaker 2: of these little silver daggers falling down to earth and
- 35:44Speaker 2: then boom on impact. Thousands of small explosions, burning gloves
- 35:53Speaker 2: of napalm thrown in every direction, All told by morning,
- 35:59Speaker 2: one thousand, six hundred and sixty five tons of napalm
- 36:03Speaker 2: dropped on Tokyo in one night. Circling high above Tokyo
- 36:10Speaker 2: is the master bomber, LeMay's deputy, Tommy Power, choreographing the attack.
- 36:16Speaker 2: Conrad Crane says that Power sat in his cockpit drawing
- 36:19Speaker 2: pictures of everything he saw.
- 36:22Speaker 1: He remarked, you know, the air was soul ful of
- 36:23Speaker 1: and sented areas you could not have walked through them.
- 36:26Speaker 1: By two thirty seven, the largest visual fire areas was
- 36:29Speaker 1: about forty blocks long and fifteen wide. The smoke was
- 36:33Speaker 1: up to twenty five thousand feet. When he draws his
- 36:38Speaker 1: last sketch, which is about an hour after initial his
- 36:42Speaker 1: first one, there's basically a score of separate areas from
- 36:46Speaker 1: fifty to one thousand city blocks burning at the same time,
- 36:49Speaker 1: and his last part last report says that the glow
- 36:51Speaker 1: from the fires was visible one hundred and fifty miles away.
- 36:57Speaker 2: The napom creates a firestorm, a conflagration hundreds of blocks long,
- 37:03Speaker 2: a fire of such intensity and duration that it creates
- 37:06Speaker 2: and sustains its own wind system. Everything burns sixteen square miles.
- 37:12Speaker 2: Buildings burst into flame before the fire even reaches them.
- 37:18Speaker 2: After the war, the US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded the following.
- 37:24Speaker 2: Probably more persons lost their lives by fire at Tokyo
- 37:27Speaker 2: in a six hour period than any time in the
- 37:31Speaker 2: history of man. More than one hundred thousand people died
- 37:38Speaker 2: that night.
- 37:40Speaker 10: Frankly, when those cities were on fire, it looked like
- 37:43Speaker 10: you're looking into the mouth of hell. I mean, you
- 37:45Speaker 10: should not imagine a fire that big.
- 37:49Speaker 2: Over the course of the spring and summer of nineteen
- 37:51Speaker 2: forty five, LeMay went on to firebomb another sixty six
- 37:55Speaker 2: Japanese cities. In the chaos of war. The dead were
- 38:00Speaker 2: never counted. The final toll may be as high as
- 38:03Speaker 2: half a million.
- 38:04Speaker 1: They're about five thousand feet. They are pretty low. They
- 38:07Speaker 1: are low enough that the ah, the smell of burning
- 38:12Speaker 1: flesh permeates the aircraft. They actually have to fumigate the
- 38:15Speaker 1: aircraft when they land back in the Marianas because the
- 38:18Speaker 1: smell of burning flesh remains within the aircraft.
- 38:22Speaker 2: Two cities were spared, Nagasaki and Hiroshima. They were left
- 38:27Speaker 2: for another day and another Air Force command with a
- 38:31Speaker 2: different idea of how to win a war.
- 38:37Speaker 3: Thank you all.
- 38:41Speaker 2: On August fifteenth, nineteen forty five, at twelve noon, the
- 38:46Speaker 2: Emperor of Japan surrendered. The Air Force was asked to
- 38:52Speaker 2: bring Japan to its knees from the air so that
- 38:55Speaker 2: a ground invasion could be avoided. They succeeded. Next week
- 39:03Speaker 2: The reckoning When you burn alive hundreds of thousands of
- 39:07Speaker 2: civilians in the course of a military objective, What happens next?
- 39:19Speaker 2: Revisionist History is produced by Mee La Belle and Lee Mingestou,
- 39:23Speaker 2: with Jacob Smith, Eloise Linton and on An. I'm our
- 39:27Speaker 2: editor is Julia Barton. Original scoring by Luis Garra, mastering
- 39:32Speaker 2: by Flon Williams, fact checking by Beth Johnson. Special thanks
- 39:36Speaker 2: to the Pushkin Crew, Hetephane Carly Migliore, Maya Knigg, Maggie Taylor,
- 39:41Speaker 2: Jason Gambrel and of course Jacob Weisberg. I'm Malcolm Blackwell.