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Mega Edition: Bryan Kohberger And the Full Court Push For Dismissal (8/25/26) · Beyond The Horizon

0:05
Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the program. This episode,
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Speaker 1: we're gonna dive right back into those core documents and
0:13
Speaker 1: we're going to take a look at the newest document
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Speaker 1: to hit the docket, which is the reply to the
0:19
Speaker 1: State's objection to defendant's motion to dismiss the grand jury
0:24
Speaker 1: on grounds of error in the grand jury instructions. So
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Speaker 1: let's just get right to it. Case number c R
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Speaker 1: twenty nine DASH twenty two DASH twenty eight oh five
0:36
Speaker 1: Reply to State's objection to Defendant's motion to dismiss grand
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Speaker 1: jury on grounds of error in grand Jury Instructions. The
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Speaker 1: State of Idaho, Plaintiff versus Brian C. Coburger. The defendant
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Speaker 1: comes now Brian C. Coburger buy and, through their attorney
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Speaker 1: Jay Weston Logsdon, Chief Deputy Litigation, and hereby submits the
0:58
Speaker 1: following reply to the State's objection to his previously filed
1:02
Speaker 1: motion to dismiss the indictment for error in the instruction
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Speaker 1: as to the standard of proof or to remand for
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Speaker 1: a preliminary hearing one. There is no Idaho Supreme Court
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Speaker 1: authority binding on this Court as to the standard of
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Speaker 1: proof for a grand jury. The State begins by arguing
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Speaker 1: that Edmondson contains a holding binding upon this Court that
1:28
Speaker 1: the standard of proof for a grand jury is probable cause.
1:32
Speaker 1: State's brief at two. The State insists this was a
1:35
Speaker 1: holding because the Supreme Court relied upon it to come
1:39
Speaker 1: to two conclusions the use of a grand jury as
1:42
Speaker 1: opposed to a preliminary hearing did not violate equal protection,
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Speaker 1: and that a court may set aside an indictment lacking
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Speaker 1: probable cause. The issue then, is did it matter to
1:55
Speaker 1: the court that the standard it proclaimed for a grand
1:58
Speaker 1: jury was probable cast. Starting with the equal protection claim,
2:02
Speaker 1: the answer is clearly no. The court's holding as to
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Speaker 1: mister Edmondson's equal protection challenge was it was a cloak
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Speaker 1: for a request to place a limit on prosecutorial discretion. Edmondson, one,
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Speaker 1: thirteen Idaho at two thirty four. The State insists that
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Speaker 1: the next lines claiming that a grand jury has the
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Speaker 1: same purpose as a preliminary hearing or what cinched it
2:28
Speaker 1: for prosecutorial discretion. However, the issue of the standard of
2:34
Speaker 1: proof was not before the court. Mister Edmondson wanted the
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Speaker 1: ability to call witnesses and challenge his case in a
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Speaker 1: preliminary hearing. He took no issue with the standard. The
2:45
Speaker 1: court determined he could be denied those rights because of
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Speaker 1: prosecutor's reasons for choosing a grand jury instead were valid
2:54
Speaker 1: at two thirty five. That was the holding, not that
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Speaker 1: somehow the lower standard of probable cause save the day
3:01
Speaker 1: four grand juries as opposed to the balanced approach of
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Speaker 1: a preliminary hearing. Next, the states claim that there is
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Speaker 1: no holding dealing with sufficient evidence required is not quite accurate.
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Speaker 1: The actual issue was whether admission of hearsay required the
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Speaker 1: indictment to be thrown out Edmondson, one thirteen, Idaho at
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Speaker 1: two thirty six. The defendant did not even challenge whether
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Speaker 1: there was sufficient evidence after the hearsay was excised from
3:33
Speaker 1: the proceedings. Thus, the state claims that this is a
3:36
Speaker 1: holding are simply erroneous. The state goes on to say
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Speaker 1: that the unexamined issue of the standard of proof for
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Speaker 1: a grand jury is set in black letter law because
3:47
Speaker 1: courts have been using probable cause States Brief at four
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Speaker 1: and five. An issue of first impression is not somehow
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Speaker 1: set in stone by cases that relied on unchallenged court rules.
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Speaker 1: The Idaho Supreme Court has never considered the constitutionality of
4:04
Speaker 1: Idaho Code six and a half. Thus this court is
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Speaker 1: free to do so. Two Section nineteen eleven oh seven
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Speaker 1: sets the standard of proof for grand juries at beyond
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Speaker 1: a reasonable doubt. The state's next argument is that, despite
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Speaker 1: its plan language, Idaho Code nineteen dash eleven oh seven
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Speaker 1: actually has to be transposed into probable cause because the
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Speaker 1: Idaho Supreme Court adopted a rule on the same issue, which,
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Speaker 1: according to the state, forces this court to abandon the
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Speaker 1: usual rules of statutory interpretation States Brief at five and six.
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Speaker 1: The Idaho Supreme Court remarked once indicta that it did
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Speaker 1: not think the statute set the standard at beyond a
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Speaker 1: reasonable doubt. In gasper Verse seventh Judicial District, seventy four
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Speaker 1: Idaho three eighty eight three ninety five nineteen fifty three,
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Speaker 1: States Brief is at six. The phrase in their judgment
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Speaker 1: means no one should question what a grand jerry does,
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Speaker 1: States Brief at six and seven. The word warrant in
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Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two meant to authorize, to give authority or
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Speaker 1: power to do or forbear anything by which the person
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Speaker 1: authorized is secured or saved harmless from any loss or damage.
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Speaker 1: By the act. States Brief at seven, quoting Goodrich Chauncey
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Speaker 1: A an American Dictionary of the English Language G. N. C. Merriam, Springfield, Mass.
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Speaker 1: Eighteen sixty two, page twelve forty nine. The California Supreme
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Speaker 1: Court's decision in Comisky versus Supreme Court, eight thirty nine,
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Speaker 1: page dot two d. Ten fifty nine, ten sixty six, California,
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Speaker 1: nineteen ninety two is persuasive. Authority States Brief at eight.
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Speaker 1: The debate at the Idaho Constitutional Convention strains a knowledgeable
6:01
Speaker 1: group clearly aware of the laws in effect in the territory,
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Speaker 1: States Brief at eight to nine. Organizing the state's arguments,
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Speaker 1: we have two relating to the plain meaning of the statute,
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Speaker 1: too relating to judicial interpretations, an argument about the separation
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Speaker 1: of powers, presumably, and an argument from history a The
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Speaker 1: plan language of the statute does not help the state's case,
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Speaker 1: especially if we are speaking in eighteen sixty two. The
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Speaker 1: state's argument as to the plane language of the statute
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Speaker 1: is confusing at best. While warrant today might give the
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Speaker 1: States some wiggle room to advance a reasonable foundation argument,
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Speaker 1: its own quote from eighteen sixty two permits no such
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Speaker 1: reading of the statute a reasonable foundation argument. Its own
6:51
Speaker 1: quote from eighteen sixty two permits no such reading of
6:55
Speaker 1: the statute. Why then, does the state claim that to authorize,
6:59
Speaker 1: to give a authority or a power to do somehow
7:02
Speaker 1: shows that a grand jury was permitted to act at
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Speaker 1: a lower standard of proof. The state's argument as to
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Speaker 1: what in their judgment means is even more confusing. The
7:13
Speaker 1: cases cited seem to merely indicate the grand jury's ability
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Speaker 1: to nullify. Certainly, in Idaho and other states that have
7:22
Speaker 1: adopted the Field codes, the ability to challenge their judgment
7:26
Speaker 1: was adopted by statute. Even if it were not so.
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Speaker 1: The state has already noted that Edmondson permits such challenges.
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Speaker 1: B history does not help the state's case. The state
7:39
Speaker 1: offers that which the defense has already acknowledged. William Claggett
7:43
Speaker 1: claimed grand jury's decide things on the basis of probable cause,
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Speaker 1: and the defense already explained why he was mistaken. In
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Speaker 1: the words of our Supreme Court, our founders took a
7:55
Speaker 1: belt in Suspender's approach to anticipating and assusing can Congressional
8:00
Speaker 1: concerns about admitting Idaho to the Union State versus Heath
8:05
Speaker 1: one sixty eight Idaho six seventy eight six point eighty four,
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Speaker 1: twenty twenty one. At issue in that particular debate was
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Speaker 1: whether to permit preliminary hearings because, perhaps ironically, some of
8:18
Speaker 1: the framers did not care for them. But the constitution,
8:22
Speaker 1: it must be recalled, was not adopted by the convention,
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Speaker 1: but by the voters that ratified it. State versus Clark,
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Speaker 1: one sixty five Idaho three ninety three, three ninety seven,
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Speaker 1: twenty nineteen. Just because the delegate from Shoshone was unaware
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Speaker 1: of the Field code and its import hardly means the
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Speaker 1: voters were not. The fact that literally every grand jury
8:47
Speaker 1: case the Supreme Court considered until Edmondson involved, the court
8:52
Speaker 1: noting that the prosecutors, for some reason that they could
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Speaker 1: not fathom, were using a beyond reasonable doubt standard, tend
9:00
Speaker 1: to show that the people of this state believed in
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Speaker 1: that standard. Neither Kamiski nor Gasper are convincing authorities. The
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Speaker 1: state claims that Idaho Supreme Court in Gasper rejects the
9:13
Speaker 1: plane language of the statute. Perhaps, but it gave no
9:17
Speaker 1: grounds as to why it did so, and as to
9:20
Speaker 1: why indicta it is of no help to the state's
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Speaker 1: argument gasper versus District Court seventy four Idaho three eighty eight,
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Speaker 1: three ninety and ninety two nineteen fifty three. Kamiski is
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Speaker 1: a more complicated matter, similar to the state's Hodgepodge argument. Here,
9:38
Speaker 1: the California Supreme Court makes various claims to try to
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Speaker 1: overcome the plan language of the statute A thirty nine p.
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Speaker 1: Dot two d at ten sixty four. It begins with
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Speaker 1: the plane language, but uses the definition of warrant from
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Speaker 1: nineteen eighty. Its cites to Calpedal Code section nine ninety five,
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Speaker 1: which at the time and still today specifically states an
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Speaker 1: indictment can be dismissed if it lacks probable cause. Idaho
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Speaker 1: has no such statutory language. In point of fact, the
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Speaker 1: language was adopted in nineteen forty nine C. Status nineteen
10:17
Speaker 1: forty nine C. Thirteen eleven, page twenty two ninety eight,
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Speaker 1: Section one. Thus, it is no surprise that the Court
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Speaker 1: goes on to cite a number of cases all post
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Speaker 1: nineteen forty nine. The Court then calls the holding in
10:34
Speaker 1: tender went to the quality of evidence instead of the standard,
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Speaker 1: which makes little sense, particularly in view of history of
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Speaker 1: the field codes and their champion in the state of California, who,
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Speaker 1: as previously noted in the defense's brief, wrote Tender Comiski
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Speaker 1: a thirty nine page dot two d at ten sixty six,
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Speaker 1: citing People versus Tender nineteen California five thirty nine, eighteen
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Speaker 1: sixty two. It would be a rather large mistake for
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Speaker 1: the State of Idaho to consider Kamiski a persuasive authority
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Speaker 1: as to its own statutes, unmodified since territorial times, and
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Speaker 1: now able to be viewed in terms of their origin.
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Speaker 1: See The Idaho Supreme Court cannot overrule statutes by adopting
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Speaker 1: rules on the same subject. The state's final argument is
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Speaker 1: that Idaho Code Section nineteen Dash eleven oh seven and
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Speaker 1: Idaho Code Criminal Rules six and a half A share
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Speaker 1: the same title and address the same issue sufficiency of
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Speaker 1: evidence to warrant indictment. The rule explicitly sets the standard
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Speaker 1: of proof at probable cause see Idaho Code six and
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Speaker 1: a half. The statute can and therefore must be read
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Speaker 1: to do the same see State versus Garner, one sixty
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Speaker 1: one Idaho seven oh eight seven eleven three ninety p.
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Speaker 1: Dot three D four thirty four, four thirty seven, twenty seventeen.
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Speaker 1: Statutes and rules that can be read together without conflicts
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Speaker 1: must be read in that way, states Brief at five
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Speaker 1: and six. This is an accurate quote, However, it is
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Speaker 1: misleading without the context of the paragraph preceding the analysis.
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Speaker 1: When a statute and a rule can be reasonably interpreted
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Speaker 1: so that there is no conflict between them, they should
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Speaker 1: be so interpreted, rather than interpreted in a way that
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Speaker 1: results in conflict. State versus two Gin Incorporated, one forty
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Speaker 1: eight Idaho, seven oh six, seven oh nine, twenty ten.
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Speaker 1: When there is a conflict between a statute and a
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Speaker 1: criminal rule, this court must determine whether the conflict is
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Speaker 1: one of procedure or one of substance. If the conflict
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Speaker 1: is procedural, the criminal rule will prevail. State versus. Johnson,
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Speaker 1: one forty five Idaho, nine seventy nine, seventy four, one
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Speaker 1: eighty eight, p Dot three d nine twelve nine sixteen,
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Speaker 1: two thousand and eight. On the other hand, when the
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Speaker 1: conflict is substantiative, the statute will prevail. Two Gin one
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Speaker 1: forty eight Idaho seven oh nine, two twenty eight, p.
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Speaker 1: Dot three d at three ninety See also State versus Beam,
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Speaker 1: one twenty one Idaho, eight sixty two, eight twenty eight
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Speaker 1: p Dot two D eight ninety one, nineteen ninety two.
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Speaker 1: State versus Garner, one sixty one Idaho, seven oh eight
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Speaker 1: seven eleven, twenty seventeen. The Court and Garner goes to
13:35
Speaker 1: some pains to show the lack of conflict in the
13:38
Speaker 1: statute and rule at issue in the case. A statute
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Speaker 1: and rule nothing at all like what it is at
13:46
Speaker 1: issue before this court. This court then must consider whether
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Speaker 1: this is a substantive or procedural issue. Section three Idaho Code,
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Speaker 1: nineteen Dash eleven oh seven in Rule six and a
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Speaker 1: half a conflict and the rule does not control because
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Speaker 1: it is a substantiative right. The state next argues that
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Speaker 1: the standard of proof is a procedural matter rather than
14:13
Speaker 1: a substantiative one. To get there, the state relies on
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Speaker 1: a concurrence by a former federal jurist a United States
14:21
Speaker 1: Supreme Court case involving choice of law in AEDPA decision
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Speaker 1: by the United States Supreme Court that burdens of proof
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Speaker 1: differ from standards that only Idaho can decide whether the
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Speaker 1: standard for a grand jury is procedural or substantiative. It
14:40
Speaker 1: should be noted that if the state is correct as
14:43
Speaker 1: to the last point, the first three are irrelevant, starting
14:47
Speaker 1: then with the second to the last point, it is
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Speaker 1: true that the burden of proof differs from the standard
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Speaker 1: of proof Standard of proof eighteen fifty seven the degree
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Speaker 1: or level of proof demanded in a specif case, such
15:01
Speaker 1: as beyond a reasonable doubt or by preponderance of the evidence.
15:06
Speaker 1: A rule about the quality of the evidence that a
15:09
Speaker 1: party must bring forward to prevail. Black's Law Dictionary, eleventh edition,
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Speaker 1: twenty nineteen. Burden of proof eighteen c one a party's
15:20
Speaker 1: duty to prove a disputed assertion or charge a proposition
15:25
Speaker 1: regarding which of two contending litigants loses when there is
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Speaker 1: no evidence on a question, or when the answer is
15:32
Speaker 1: simply too difficult to find. The burden of proof includes
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Speaker 1: both the burden of persuasion and the burden of production,
15:41
Speaker 1: also termed evidentiary burden, evidential burden, or an onus pro
15:46
Speaker 1: bandy see shifting the burden of proof standard of proof,
15:50
Speaker 1: loosely burden of persuasion. In the past, the term burden
15:54
Speaker 1: of proof has been used in two different senses. One
15:59
Speaker 1: the burden of going far forward with the evidence. The
16:01
Speaker 1: party having this burden must introduce some evidence if he
16:05
Speaker 1: wishes to get a certain issue into the case. If
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Speaker 1: he introduces enough evidence to require consideration of this issue,
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Speaker 1: this burden has been met. Two burden of proof in
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Speaker 1: the sense of carrying the risk of non persuasion. The
16:20
Speaker 1: one who has this burden stands to lose if the
16:23
Speaker 1: evidence fails to convince the jury or the judge in
16:26
Speaker 1: a non jury trial. The present trend is to use
16:30
Speaker 1: the term burden of proof only with this second meaning.
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Speaker 1: Rolin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law, seventy eight,
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Speaker 1: third edition, nineteen eighty two. The expression burden of proof
16:43
Speaker 1: is tricky because it has been used by courts and
16:46
Speaker 1: writers to mean various things. Strictly speaking, burden of proof
16:51
Speaker 1: denotes the duty of establishing, by a fair preponderance of
16:55
Speaker 1: the evidence, the truth of the operative facts upon which
16:59
Speaker 1: the issue at hand is made to turn. By substantiative law.
17:04
Speaker 1: Burden of proof is sometimes used in a secondary sense
17:07
Speaker 1: to mean the burden of going forward with the evidence.
17:11
Speaker 1: In this sense, it is sometimes said that a party
17:14
Speaker 1: has the burden of countering with evidence a prima facie
17:18
Speaker 1: case made against that party William D. Hawkland Uniform Commercial
17:22
Speaker 1: Code Series Section two A five sixteen zero eight, nineteen
17:28
Speaker 1: eighty four. As noted by Black's Law Dictionary, simply going
17:33
Speaker 1: by the word burden or standard is unhelpful, but to
17:36
Speaker 1: the state's more interesting argument. Defense counsel was able to
17:40
Speaker 1: find the same argument in the case g. M Farms
17:44
Speaker 1: versus Funk Incorporated one nineteen, Idaho five fourteen, five thirty
17:49
Speaker 1: through thirty two, nineteen ninety one. Bistline, j. Concurring in part.
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Speaker 1: Justice Bistline in that matter argues essentially what the State
17:59
Speaker 1: argues here. The standard of evidence is procedural and is
18:03
Speaker 1: not bound by the holdings of the United States Supreme Court,
18:07
Speaker 1: Idaho at five point thirty two. The trouble for the state,
18:10
Speaker 1: of course, is that Justice Bisline was arguing alone. Additionally,
18:15
Speaker 1: as the State noted, there is no doubt that the
18:17
Speaker 1: burden of proof is substantiative. State versus Bassett, eighty six,
18:22
Speaker 1: Idaho two seventy seven, nineteen sixty three. However, even Bassett
18:28
Speaker 1: seems to imply that the presumption of innocence includes the
18:32
Speaker 1: evidentiary standard. From the perspective of the defense. This understanding
18:38
Speaker 1: implicit in Basset is correct. For example, in State versus
18:42
Speaker 1: Jones one twenty five, Idaho, four seventy seven, four eighty
18:46
Speaker 1: five and eighty six nineteen ninety four, overruled on the
18:50
Speaker 1: grounds by State versus Montgomery one sixty three, Idaho forty
18:55
Speaker 1: twenty seventeen, the court considered the difference between the substantative
19:00
Speaker 1: law versus evidentiary principle, as the court found the burden
19:04
Speaker 1: of proof was a requirement that differed between these two.
19:09
Speaker 1: Although the Court used the term burden, it also quotes
19:12
Speaker 1: with approval the Ninth Circuits understanding of what must be proved,
19:17
Speaker 1: and since in either case the burden is clearly on
19:19
Speaker 1: the state, the court undoubtedly was considering the standard of proof,
19:24
Speaker 1: quoting United States versus Peralta nine forty one F dot
19:28
Speaker 1: two d one zero zero three one zero zero six,
19:32
Speaker 1: Ninth Circuit, nineteen ninety one, quoting United States versus Gills
19:36
Speaker 1: six oh four F dot two D five forty six
19:39
Speaker 1: five forty nine seven Circuit nineteen seventy nine. Another example
19:44
Speaker 1: is State versus Shackelford one fifty Idaho three fifty five
19:48
Speaker 1: three seventy five, twenty ten, abrogated on other grounds by
19:54
Speaker 1: State versus Garcia, one sixty six Idaho six sixty one,
19:58
Speaker 1: twenty nineteen, which dealt with ex post facto law. In
20:03
Speaker 1: that fact, the Court gave a more robust definition of
20:06
Speaker 1: substantiative opposed to procedural. However, if the change is merely
20:11
Speaker 1: a procedural and does not increase the punishment nor change
20:14
Speaker 1: the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary
20:18
Speaker 1: to establish guilt, there is no ex post facto violation.
20:23
Speaker 1: Weaver versus Graham, four fifty US twenty four, twenty nine
20:27
Speaker 1: to twelve, nineteen eighty one, quoting Hopped versus Utah one
20:32
Speaker 1: ten US five seventy four, five ninety four Supreme Court
20:36
Speaker 1: two two two ten, twenty eight law addition to sixty
20:41
Speaker 1: two to sixty nine, eighteen eighty four. The constitutional provision
20:46
Speaker 1: was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and
20:51
Speaker 1: oppressive legislation, and not to limit the legislative control of
20:56
Speaker 1: remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matter
21:00
Speaker 1: of substance. Bizell versus Ohio two sixty nine US one
21:04
Speaker 1: sixty seven, one seventy one forty six Supreme Court sixty
21:09
Speaker 1: eight sixty nine seventy Law Addition two sixteen two eighteen
21:13
Speaker 1: nineteen twenty five. The Supreme Court, in Collins versus young Blood,
21:18
Speaker 1: stated that procedural can be thought to refer to changes
21:22
Speaker 1: in the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated,
21:27
Speaker 1: as opposed to changes in the substantiative laws of crimes.
21:32
Speaker 1: Four ninety seven US thirty seven forty five one ten.
21:36
Speaker 1: Supreme Court twenty seven, fifteen twenty seven, twenty one eleven
21:41
Speaker 1: Law Audition Dot two d thirty forty nineteen ninety. The
21:46
Speaker 1: Court concluded that a change as to instructions to treat
21:50
Speaker 1: direct and circumstantial evidence the same way was merely procedural.
21:55
Speaker 1: It did so because the change did not affect the
21:58
Speaker 1: substantiative criminal law, but merely recognize that direct and circumstantial
22:04
Speaker 1: evidence possesses the same probative value, and thus the reasonable
22:08
Speaker 1: doubt standard is applicable to both. One can also come
22:13
Speaker 1: at this issue from the other direction. In Winship three
22:17
Speaker 1: ninety seven US three fifty eight, nineteen seventy, conclusively established
22:22
Speaker 1: that the standard of proof for criminal and juvenile cases
22:26
Speaker 1: is beyond a reasonable doubt because it was required for
22:29
Speaker 1: due process. However, who was the court overruling in that case?
22:35
Speaker 1: It was the standard of proof set by the legislature
22:38
Speaker 1: of New York. It may be that due process concerns
22:42
Speaker 1: lead courts to overrule statutory standards of proof, but in
22:47
Speaker 1: case after case, it was the legislature, not the courts,
22:51
Speaker 1: that set those standards. In Idaho, for example, the legislature
22:55
Speaker 1: has set the standard of proof for various hearings. See
22:58
Speaker 1: Ballard versus Kerr, one sixty, Idaho, six seventy four seven ten,
23:03
Speaker 1: twenty sixteen. Holding Legislature sets the standard of proof in
23:08
Speaker 1: medical malpractice actions. Acres versus DL White Construction Incorporated. One
23:14
Speaker 1: fifty six, Idaho thirty seven fifty two ten, twenty thirteen,
23:19
Speaker 1: Finding legislatures standard of proof for punitive damages. Roads versus
23:24
Speaker 1: State Department of Health and Welfare one oh seven, Idaho
23:28
Speaker 1: eleven twenty, nineteen eighty five, Bisline J concurring, Noting legislature
23:34
Speaker 1: sets standard of proof in parental right termination cases. State
23:38
Speaker 1: versus Osborne one O two, Idaho four oh five four
23:42
Speaker 1: twenty eight, nineteen eighty one, Bisline Jay, separately concurring in
23:46
Speaker 1: reversal for sentencing arguing legislature set standard of proof for
23:51
Speaker 1: aggravators and death cases. State versus mcgow one, twenty nine,
23:56
Speaker 1: Idaho three seventy one, three seventy four Appeals nineteen ninety six,
24:02
Speaker 1: finding legislature set standard of proof for forfeiture interest of
24:06
Speaker 1: doh one, twenty twenty two w L one six nine
24:10
Speaker 1: five five one sixty four at three. Council cannot find
24:15
Speaker 1: an Idaho or anywhere else a time when a court
24:18
Speaker 1: has held that the legislature set the standard of proof
24:21
Speaker 1: too high and set it lower, as the court held
24:24
Speaker 1: and ballard. Where the legislature has intended that a heightened
24:28
Speaker 1: standard of proof or a specific method of proof apply,
24:32
Speaker 1: it has expressly provided for such a requirement. For example,
24:37
Speaker 1: the legislature has required that a claim in seeking punitive
24:41
Speaker 1: damages prove by clear and convincing evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious,
24:47
Speaker 1: or outrageous conduct by the party against whom the claim
24:50
Speaker 1: for punitive damages is asserted Idaho Code Section six sixteen
24:55
Speaker 1: oh four. Likewise, the legislature expressly provided that the standard
25:01
Speaker 1: of care and breach of that standard be proven by
25:05
Speaker 1: direct expert testimony in medical malpractice action Idaho Code Section
25:10
Speaker 1: six ten twelve. Idaho Code Section six sixteen oh three
25:15
Speaker 1: provides that the cap on awards of non economic damages
25:19
Speaker 1: shall not apply to causes of action arising out of
25:22
Speaker 1: reckless misconduct, but is silent on the method of proof
25:25
Speaker 1: required to show recklessness. Likewise, Section six ten twelve is
25:31
Speaker 1: silent on the issue of recklessness. Where the legislature has
25:35
Speaker 1: not expressly provided that direct expert testimony is required to
25:40
Speaker 1: prove recklessness in medical malpractice actions, we decline to apply
25:44
Speaker 1: such a requirement one sixty Idaho at seven ten. It
25:49
Speaker 1: would be exceedingly anomalous for the judiciary to suddenly proclaim
25:54
Speaker 1: that the citizens of Idaho may not demand additional protections
25:58
Speaker 1: against the risk of false arrest. See Winship three ninety
26:01
Speaker 1: seven US at three sixty three. The reasonable doubt standard
26:05
Speaker 1: is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
26:09
Speaker 1: resting on factual error. It should be beyond a reasonable
26:13
Speaker 1: doubt that the Idaho Supreme Court did not somehow supplant
26:17
Speaker 1: the law with a rule. In the nineteen eighties, Part four,
26:21
Speaker 1: mister Coberger asserts a theory the law allows and seeks
26:25
Speaker 1: a remedy this court can grant the state's final argument
26:29
Speaker 1: is that erroneous instructions to a grand jury do not
26:32
Speaker 1: permit either dismissal or to treat the indictment as a presentment.
26:37
Speaker 1: State's Brief at eleven thirteen. Once again a tortuous path
26:41
Speaker 1: to this conclusion must be tread. First, the state claims
26:45
Speaker 1: only statutory basis for dismissal can effect a grand jury,
26:50
Speaker 1: relying on a case from nineteen twenty seven Idaho at eleven,
26:54
Speaker 1: quoting State versus Auguay forty four, Idaho forty three, nineteen
26:58
Speaker 1: twenty seven. While the defense is typically interested in the past,
27:03
Speaker 1: the state already noted that in Edmondson, the court went
27:07
Speaker 1: beyond what the statute permits. The defense already explained why
27:11
Speaker 1: courts like Idaho have gone beyond the statutes to find
27:14
Speaker 1: due process concerns attached to grand juries. Defense is brief
27:18
Speaker 1: at eighteen. The state, likely realizing that this argument has
27:22
Speaker 1: little likelihood of success, then shifts to arguing that prejudice
27:26
Speaker 1: must be shown First. Mister Koberger disagrees, yes, the case's
27:31
Speaker 1: counsel cited are for trial juries. However, there is simply
27:36
Speaker 1: no credible argument to be made that the state may
27:39
Speaker 1: mislead a grand jury as to the standard of proof
27:42
Speaker 1: and rely on the indictment it procures. Additionally, it makes
27:46
Speaker 1: little sense that a defendant deprived of his right to
27:49
Speaker 1: counsel for a preliminary hearing will doom his eventual conviction.
27:54
Speaker 1: But a defendant given a grand jury told it may
27:57
Speaker 1: indict a ham Sandwich has no reqolt. C. Coleman versus Alabama,
28:02
Speaker 1: three ninety nine US one, nineteen seventy. To deprive the
28:06
Speaker 1: accused of a fundamental right has natural consequences. Second, mister
28:12
Speaker 1: Coberger will demonstrate in a separate motion the prejudice that
28:15
Speaker 1: resulted from the erroneous instruction in the matter. Finally, the
28:20
Speaker 1: state argues that it can always seek another indictment, and
28:23
Speaker 1: there is no way for this court to treat this
28:25
Speaker 1: indictment as a presentment. The law is replete with courts
28:30
Speaker 1: treating legal documents masquerading as one thing as what they
28:34
Speaker 1: actually are. C eg State versus do p Dot three
28:38
Speaker 1: D twenty twenty three, w L four seven five zero
28:42
Speaker 1: seven two seven Court of Appeals, twenty twenty three. The
28:46
Speaker 1: State's argument that the language in IC nineteen sixteen oh
28:50
Speaker 1: three sixteen oh four does not give the courts the
28:53
Speaker 1: power to prevent resubmission of a case to a grand
28:56
Speaker 1: jury is simply inaccurate. The Idaho Supreme Court found that
29:01
Speaker 1: a court can refuse resubmission see Martin versus Lyons, nineteen
29:06
Speaker 1: ninety eight Idaho one O two, one O four five.
29:11
Speaker 1: The opinions of various district courts are not persuasive authority.
29:16
Speaker 1: The state also appends to its decision three district court
29:19
Speaker 1: opinions claiming they are persuasive authority. Certainly, all these respectable
29:24
Speaker 1: jurists may have attempted to tackle these issues, but they
29:28
Speaker 1: did not have the benefit of mister Coberger's briefing and
29:32
Speaker 1: research elucidating where the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for
29:37
Speaker 1: grand juries originated and how it has been treated by
29:41
Speaker 1: prosecutors in courts ever since its adoption. It appears that
29:45
Speaker 1: the State has called from these decisions much of its argument,
29:50
Speaker 1: and there is nothing within them that has not been
29:52
Speaker 1: addressed above. Thus the defense respectfully asks that this court
29:57
Speaker 1: approach this subject with an open mind. This was dated
30:01
Speaker 1: on the twenty second of August of twenty twenty three
30:04
Speaker 1: and signed by Jay Weston Logsden all Right, Folks that's
30:09
Speaker 1: gonna do it for this one. All of the information
30:11
Speaker 1: that goes with this episode can be found in the
30:14
Speaker 1: description box fich. What's up everyone, and welcome back to
30:18
Speaker 1: the program. Brian Cohberger and his ridiculous attempt to get
30:24
Speaker 1: his indictment thrown out has been laughed out of court
30:28
Speaker 1: by the Supreme Court in Idaho. Now there was no
30:31
Speaker 1: doubt in my mind that this would be the end result.
30:34
Speaker 1: But like usual, I always leave some headroom for shit
30:37
Speaker 1: to go south. But usually you have to have some
30:40
Speaker 1: kind of evidence in your favor for that to occur,
30:43
Speaker 1: or there has to be some kind of prosecutorial misconduct,
30:46
Speaker 1: and there hasn't been even a sliver of that that
30:50
Speaker 1: we have seen throughout this whole entire process. So Brian Cohberger,
30:54
Speaker 1: he has to rely on the facts. He has to
30:57
Speaker 1: rely on the evidence. And when it comes to the evidence, well,
31:00
Speaker 1: we all know that Brian Coberger is short on evidence
31:04
Speaker 1: that is favorable to him. And how do we know that, Well,
31:07
Speaker 1: the court keeps smacking down all of his requests, and
31:11
Speaker 1: yesterday's appearance was no different. Today's article is from the
31:15
Speaker 1: Daily Mail and the headline Idaho Supreme Court rules on
31:18
Speaker 1: Brian Coberger's request to dismiss grand jury indictment as he
31:22
Speaker 1: prepares the sand trial for the murder of four university students.
31:27
Speaker 1: This article was authored by Mackenzie Tattanani. The Idaho Supreme
31:33
Speaker 1: Court denied a pre trial appeal by Brian Colberger's public
31:36
Speaker 1: defenders that would have served to delay the quadruple murder case.
31:41
Speaker 1: Just what we need up here. Huh more delays. That's
31:43
Speaker 1: the salve that'll heal all wounds. Huh another delay. The
31:47
Speaker 1: decision was reached Tuesday after Coburger's lawyers urged the court
31:51
Speaker 1: to throw out the grand jury indictment. The twenty nine
31:54
Speaker 1: year old Pennsylvania man stands accused of murdering for University
31:58
Speaker 1: of Idaho students in November of twenty twenty two. Coburger's
32:03
Speaker 1: lawyers have argued that a grand jury sat by prosecutors
32:06
Speaker 1: improperly indicted him on four counts of first degree murder
32:09
Speaker 1: and one count of felony burglary. Yeah, Okay, in what
32:14
Speaker 1: realm did that take place? Are they talking about the
32:17
Speaker 1: alternate reality Brian Coburger? Because in this reality, this timeline,
32:21
Speaker 1: the evidence that's been presented has been strong as hell,
32:25
Speaker 1: and only contrarians and people out there that are looking
32:28
Speaker 1: to drive traffic to their lame ass content are going
32:31
Speaker 1: to say any different. Now, that doesn't mean that he's guilty, right,
32:35
Speaker 1: but you have to call it for what it is.
32:38
Speaker 1: And the evidence that's been presented so far is very
32:41
Speaker 1: strong against Brian Colberger and all of it is tied
32:45
Speaker 1: by that DNA. And until somebody can explain how that
32:49
Speaker 1: knife sheath ended up under Madison with Brian Coolberger's DNA
32:53
Speaker 1: on it, I don't want to hear jack shit about
32:55
Speaker 1: Brian Kolberger getting railroaded. You know who got railroaded, Khalif Browner.
33:00
Speaker 1: That's who. They contended that the standard for a grand
33:04
Speaker 1: jury to indict should be guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
33:07
Speaker 1: rather than the lower standard of probable cause, pointing to
33:11
Speaker 1: interpretations of Idaho state law. The ruling did not provide
33:15
Speaker 1: legal reasoning for the court's denial of the motion to appeal.
33:19
Speaker 1: The document was signed by Melanie Kanye Pain, clerk of
33:23
Speaker 1: the Idaho Supreme Court. Although the appeal was dismissed, a
33:27
Speaker 1: separate motion seeking to seal it was granted. That doesn't
33:30
Speaker 1: shock me, considering all of the secrecy we've seen up
33:33
Speaker 1: in Idaho this whole entire time. I don't think anybody
33:36
Speaker 1: should be shocked when documents are being sealed, when things
33:40
Speaker 1: are being filed in a way that we're not going
33:43
Speaker 1: to have access to them, because that's the way the
33:45
Speaker 1: process works once there's a gag order in place, and
33:49
Speaker 1: especially a gag order to the scope and size that
33:52
Speaker 1: we see up here in Idaho. The pre trial appeal
33:56
Speaker 1: was the latest in a series of attempts to delay
33:58
Speaker 1: the murder Trial's legal team previously sought to have the
34:02
Speaker 1: indictment dismissed due to inadmissible evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, among
34:07
Speaker 1: other claims. So again, like I said from the very jump,
34:11
Speaker 1: loopholes and technicalities, those are the tools and the weapons
34:16
Speaker 1: of the guilty. And I hate to say it, but
34:18
Speaker 1: it's the truth. When that's what you're relying on to
34:21
Speaker 1: try and get yourself off a murder conviction that's going
34:24
Speaker 1: to lead to a death penalty, my friend, you're in
34:27
Speaker 1: big trouble because if you had witnesses to back up
34:30
Speaker 1: the shit you're saying, you'd provide them. If there was
34:34
Speaker 1: somebody to corroborate this dude's alibi, like he says, don't
34:38
Speaker 1: you think that person would be trotted out already? They'd
34:40
Speaker 1: be talking about we have a witness for this that.
34:42
Speaker 1: The other thing we haven't heard any of that. All
34:45
Speaker 1: we've heard is Coburger needs a little more time. There's
34:49
Speaker 1: prosecutorial misconduct. Hell, I'm waiting for them to talk about
34:52
Speaker 1: ode knights, just like down in Delphi. At this point,
34:55
Speaker 1: in January, lead defense attorney Ann Taylor asked the court
34:59
Speaker 1: to delay the true until at least twenty twenty five.
35:02
Speaker 1: Taylor argued that she had not been provided enough time
35:06
Speaker 1: to complete discovery or interview a sufficient number of witnesses.
35:10
Speaker 1: Later that month, the defense filed a motion to move
35:13
Speaker 1: the trial out of Leta County, arguing inflammatory pre trial
35:17
Speaker 1: publicity and the small size of the community made finding
35:20
Speaker 1: an impartial jury impossible. Look, if they found a jury
35:24
Speaker 1: for El Chappo, and they found a jury for Glenn Maxwell,
35:27
Speaker 1: and they found a jury for insert dirtbag here, they'll
35:30
Speaker 1: find a jury for Brian Kolberger. A hearing for that
35:34
Speaker 1: request is scheduled for April seventeenth, And here's the order
35:38
Speaker 1: in full. It's very short. A motion for permission to
35:42
Speaker 1: appeal from interlocatory orders and motion to seal. Defendant's motion
35:46
Speaker 1: for permission to appeal from interlocatory orders was filed by
35:51
Speaker 1: Council for Defendant on February eighth, twenty twenty four. An
35:55
Speaker 1: objection to the motion for permission to appeal from an
35:59
Speaker 1: interlocatory order and motion to seal Plaintiff's objection to motion
36:03
Speaker 1: for permission to appeal were filed by Council for Plaintiff
36:07
Speaker 1: on February twentieth, twenty twenty four. Therefore, after due consideration,
36:12
Speaker 1: it is ordered that Defendant's motion to seal, Defendant's motion
36:15
Speaker 1: for permission to appeal from interlocatory orders, and Plaintiff's motion
36:20
Speaker 1: to seal motion for permission to appeal from interlocatory orders
36:24
Speaker 1: are granted. It is further ordered that Defendant's motion for
36:27
Speaker 1: permission to appeal from interlocatory orders is denied, and that's
36:32
Speaker 1: the whole order that was produced by the court. Coburger
36:36
Speaker 1: was charged in connection to the murder of four University
36:39
Speaker 1: of Idaho students who were stabbed to death in their
36:42
Speaker 1: off campus housing accommodation on November thirteenth, twenty twenty two.
36:46
Speaker 1: I can't believe it's already been two years. It seems
36:49
Speaker 1: like yesterday we were just talking about this case, and
36:52
Speaker 1: I can't even imagine what the family members are going
36:55
Speaker 1: through with all these delays, all of these hurdles and hiccups.
37:00
Speaker 1: It has to just be absolutely brutal. Prosecutors alleged Coburger
37:06
Speaker 1: entered the residence in the early hours of the morning
37:08
Speaker 1: and killed twenty one year old Kaylee Gonsalves, twenty one
37:11
Speaker 1: year old Madison Mogan, twenty year old Xana Kernodle, and
37:15
Speaker 1: twenty year old Ethan Chapin using a knife, a knife
37:18
Speaker 1: that they haven't found, by the way, and when we
37:21
Speaker 1: talk about that knife, I have no doubt in my
37:23
Speaker 1: mind that on the way home when Brian Colberger left
37:27
Speaker 1: the crime scene allegedly that he tossed this knife on
37:31
Speaker 1: that long route home. And it's also my suspicion that
37:35
Speaker 1: he had a burn pit out there where that might
37:37
Speaker 1: be I don't know, but that's the only thing that
37:39
Speaker 1: explains getting rid of all this evidence and having no
37:42
Speaker 1: evidence found out his apartment or anything. Right, you don't
37:45
Speaker 1: just magically make that shit disappear. And the best way
37:49
Speaker 1: to get rid of stuff like clothing or anything that
37:52
Speaker 1: might have DNA on it is to burn it. And
37:54
Speaker 1: if you go and do it in the middle of
37:56
Speaker 1: the desert in a burn pit, nobody's going to be
37:59
Speaker 1: the wiser. At the time, he was pursuing a PhD
38:02
Speaker 1: in criminology at Washington State University, just across the state
38:06
Speaker 1: line from where the murders took place. The victims surviving
38:10
Speaker 1: roommates Dylan Mortenson and Bethany Funk, were home at the
38:13
Speaker 1: time of the murderers, but were unharmed. They were ruled
38:16
Speaker 1: out as suspects early into the investigation, ruled out by
38:20
Speaker 1: the authorities insane people, but not by the crazy people
38:23
Speaker 1: on TikTok. Remember how crazy shit was in the aftermath
38:26
Speaker 1: of this. Everybody was a murderer, they were killed by
38:29
Speaker 1: drug dealers. It was just insane. And even today with
38:34
Speaker 1: Brian Koberger in custody, there's still people out there pitching
38:36
Speaker 1: their bullshit. And I guess if there's a market for it,
38:40
Speaker 1: then people are going to continue to do it. But
38:42
Speaker 1: that doesn't make it any less disgusting. Police sources told
38:47
Speaker 1: Delhimel dot Com that the crime scene was the worst
38:50
Speaker 1: they'd ever encountered, with so much blood that it seeped
38:52
Speaker 1: through the walls of the house. And look, whenever you
38:56
Speaker 1: murder somebody, it's going to be a brutal situation, right,
39:00
Speaker 1: But when you murder four people with a knife and
39:02
Speaker 1: then the bodies aren't found for the amount of time
39:05
Speaker 1: that we saw here, yeah, I would think that there's
39:07
Speaker 1: going to be a lot of blood, right, So I
39:10
Speaker 1: can only imagine what sort of scene awaited the investigators
39:13
Speaker 1: when they first arrived. Coburger was arrested at his family's
39:17
Speaker 1: home in Pennsylvania the following month, concluding a nearly seven
39:21
Speaker 1: week long man hunt. He was brought to Idaho to
39:24
Speaker 1: face the charges and indicted in May of twenty twenty three.
39:28
Speaker 1: The indictment allowed prosecutors to bypass a previously scheduled June
39:32
Speaker 1: hearing where the surviving roommates could have been cross examined.
39:36
Speaker 1: And that's exactly why they used the grand jury process here.
39:39
Speaker 1: Coberger's team was signaling that they wanted to talk to
39:42
Speaker 1: the surviving roommates. So what happened was the prosecution they
39:46
Speaker 1: just did the end around, right. They were like, you
39:48
Speaker 1: know what, why take the chance of anything untowards happening.
39:52
Speaker 1: Let's go directly to the grand jury and we'll get
39:54
Speaker 1: our indictment that way, So they circumvented the whole entire process.
39:58
Speaker 1: Coburger remains during his arraiement, forcing the judge to enter
40:02
Speaker 1: a not guilty plea on his behalf. The twenty nine
40:05
Speaker 1: year old has since waved his right to a speedy trial.
40:08
Speaker 1: A trial date has yet to be set, and I
40:11
Speaker 1: think that's really where it's at. Right trial date, that's
40:14
Speaker 1: the most important thing at this point. All of Coberger's nonsense,
40:17
Speaker 1: it's all gonna fail. I've said it from the beginning,
40:20
Speaker 1: and I'll continue to say it until he shows something
40:22
Speaker 1: of substance as far as evidence proving what he's talking about.
40:27
Speaker 1: Then all of this stuff is bound to fill. But
40:29
Speaker 1: unfortunately for the families of the victims, the process is
40:33
Speaker 1: going to take time. But with this ruling, hopefully the
40:37
Speaker 1: process is pushed forward a little bit and we get
40:40
Speaker 1: moving into the next sector of this, the next portion
40:43
Speaker 1: of this, and that portion obviously is the trial. All right, folks,
40:48
Speaker 1: that's going to do it for this one. All of
40:50
Speaker 1: the information that goes with this episode can be found
40:53
Speaker 1: in the description box