Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / IPO Booms and Market Tops?
Transcript
- 0:00You know, back in 1999 when an IPO popped like 65% on its
- 0:04opening day, the financial media just celebrated it as this
- 0:07massive win for everyday investors.
- 0:09Oh yeah, it was the headline everywhere.
- 0:11Right. But today we know it was
- 0:13actually the ultimate insider trap.
- 0:15So welcome to the deep dive. Glad to be here.
- 0:17Yeah, And before we unpack how today's private equity firms
- 0:21and, you know, venture capitalists are essentially
- 0:22running the exact same playbook, we do have a quick community
- 0:26update. Right, the housekeeping stuff.
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- 0:50All analysis is based on publicly available sources and
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- 1:19All right, let's look at the mission for today's deep dive,
- 1:21because we have a pretty heavy stack of sources.
- 1:24We really do, yeah. We're pulling from this
- 1:26comprehensive century long report on IPO cycles and market
- 1:30tops. We're also looking at a real
- 1:32time weekly market indicators dashboard.
- 1:35Which is fascinating right now. It is.
- 1:37And to ground all of this in the current macro environment, we
- 1:39are parsing a transcript of the weekly wrap from financial
- 1:42analyst Steve Iseman, and this was recorded on May 21st, 2026.
- 1:47Right. And really, our objective here
- 1:49is to synthesize these three distinct pillars for you.
- 1:52Yeah, exactly. Because I mean we have these
- 1:54structural metrics that are just flashing extreme overvaluation
- 1:58on one side and then a rapidly deteriorating retail consider on
- 2:02the other. Which is such a crazy
- 2:04disconnect. It is.
- 2:05And we're going to use the historical mechanics of IPO
- 2:08markets to sort of connect those dots.
- 2:10By the end of this discussion, we want you to really understand
- 2:13the underlying temperature of this market.
- 2:15Right. And more importantly, the
- 2:17specific micro signals that tell you when a speculative bubble is
- 2:22quietly being, you know, unloaded under the public.
- 2:25Exactly, unloaded is the perfect word.
- 2:27So taking the current temperature right now, it
- 2:30reveals a pretty terrifying contradiction between Wall
- 2:33Street and Main Street. I mean, let's just look at the
- 2:35Weekly Market Indicators dashboard.
- 2:37Yeah, let's start there. The Buffett Indicator, and for
- 2:40those following at home, you know, this tracks total U.S.
- 2:43equity value relative to GDP. It has an alert threshold of
- 2:47210%. Which is already high.
- 2:49Right. But today it's sitting between
- 2:51221 and 227%. It's totally trick.
- 2:55Yeah, that's mass. And we are also looking at the
- 2:58Schiller KP index, so the cyclically adjusted to earnings
- 3:02and it's floating around 40.9 to 41.7.
- 3:05Wow. I mean, anything over 40 puts us
- 3:08in the rarefied air of the late 90s dot com extremes.
- 3:10Yeah, it does. And when metrics like KE cross
- 3:14that 40 threshold, it essentially signals that the
- 3:16market is pricing in absolute, unblemished perfection for the
- 3:21next decade. Perfection.
- 3:23Right. And the implied long term
- 3:25valuation risk there is just enormous, because any slight
- 3:28deviation from perfect growth fundamentally breaks the math of
- 3:32those multiples. Well, OK, I am going to push
- 3:34back on that historical comparison though.
- 3:35Oh, go for it. Let's play devil's advocate for
- 3:37a second using Steve Eisman's own data.
- 3:40If we look under the hood at actual corporate performance, I
- 3:43mean these companies are kind of delivering on that perfection.
- 3:46You're talking about the recent earnings, Yeah.
- 3:48Eisman notes the Q1S and P500 earnings growth was expected to
- 3:51be around 14.4%. The actual print came in at an
- 3:55incredible 28.3. Percent massive beat, yeah.
- 3:58And we have to talk about the AI structural shift.
- 4:02Look at NVIDIA. They grew their revenue by 85%,
- 4:06their EPS shot up 95%, and they're doing it with 75% gross
- 4:11margins. Those numbers are staggering.
- 4:13Right, so if the biggest companies on the planet are
- 4:15literally doubling their earnings, why shouldn't we just
- 4:19ignore historical metric like a CAPPY of 40?
- 4:22Like maybe the 210% Buffett indicator threshold is just
- 4:26obsolete in an AI driven economy.
- 4:28Well, you just use the most dangerous 4 words in finance.
- 4:31Oh boy, this time is different. Exactly this time is different.
- 4:34Look, the explosive growth. A company like NVIDIA is
- 4:37undeniable, right? But corporate earnings don't
- 4:40just exist in a vacuum. Valuations are ultimately
- 4:43anchored by the cost of capital. You can have a company doubling
- 4:46its earnings, but if the macro environment shifts, specifically
- 4:50interest rates and consumer liquidity, well, those earnings
- 4:54are suddenly worth less to an investor.
- 4:56As you were saying. Yeah, and Eisman points out that
- 4:58the 10 year Treasury yield recently hit 4.6%.
- 5:02He actually calls a 4.5% yield the Rubicon.
- 5:05Meaning once you cross it, the gravitational pull in equities
- 5:08just becomes too strong. Exactly when the risk free rate
- 5:12is offering nearly 5% the present value of future cash
- 5:16flows, which you know is how these high flying tech stocks
- 5:19are valued, it gets mechanically crushed.
- 5:21Because investors demand a higher risk premium.
- 5:24Right. And while the enterprise side is
- 5:26out there buying AI chips hand over fist, the bedrock of the
- 5:31economy, the retail consumer, is showing severe exhaustion.
- 5:35Oh man. Yeah, Eisman's data on the
- 5:37retail side is grim. It's pretty bleak.
- 5:40Cargit managed a 5.6% bump in same store sales but then
- 5:44management immediately threw cold water on it.
- 5:46They warned of a severe tightening ahead.
- 5:48Yeah, they were not optimistic. Not at all.
- 5:50And Walmart entirely missed their earnings guidance for the
- 5:53next quarter. They're projecting 72 to 74
- 5:55cents against the $0.75 expectation, which is a big.
- 5:58Tell. Yeah.
- 5:59And then you look at housing and home improvement.
- 6:02Home Depot and Lowe's both basically flatlined with an
- 6:04anemic .6%. Same store sales growth.
- 6:07And the underlying mechanics of that weakness are what really
- 6:10matter here. Both Target and Walmart
- 6:12explicitly cited the fading stimulus of tax refunds and the
- 6:17really aggressive bite of higher oil prices.
- 6:20Yeah, just the everyday costs. Exactly.
- 6:22This is a massive liquidity drain.
- 6:24Consumers are spending a larger percentage of their disposable
- 6:27income just to commute and keep the lights on.
- 6:29Which leaves he's a lot less for discretionary spending.
- 6:32Precisely. And Eisman actually ties those
- 6:35rising oil prices directly to geopolitical catalysts.
- 6:40He specifically mentions former President Trump threatening to
- 6:43start bombing again as a, you know, a rhetorical driver that
- 6:46spiked oil markets. And just as a quick reminder for
- 6:49you listening, we are strictly parsing Eisman's market view
- 6:52here just to understand the mechanics of oil prices.
- 6:55We aren't taking any political sides or endorsing the politics
- 6:57behind it at. All, No, absolutely not.
- 6:59We are just looking at the input cost, right.
- 7:01So if you synthesize that whole setup, you have a market
- 7:04commanding dot com era multiples colliding with a risk free rate
- 7:09that has crossed the 4.5% Rubicon and a consumer base that
- 7:13is completely tapped out. So the margin of safety is
- 7:15effectively 0. It's 0.
- 7:17Which, well, that brings us to a really dark logical pivot,
- 7:20right? If the macro setup is this
- 7:22fragile, why are we seeing so many companies rushing to go
- 7:26public? I mean, that is where this
- 7:29century long IPO report pulls back the curtain on human
- 7:32behavior. Because when public market
- 7:35valuations hit these irrational highs, the insiders, so the
- 7:39founders, the private equity firms, the VCs, they see a
- 7:42massive arbitrage opportunity. Yeah, It's formally known in the
- 7:45literature as the market timing hypothesis.
- 7:48OK. These insiders have perfect
- 7:50asymmetric information. Meaning they know more than we
- 7:52do. Exactly.
- 7:54They know the exact intrinsic value of their company.
- 7:56They know its flaws. They know it's decelerating
- 7:59growth metrics long before the public does.
- 8:01Oh wow, So when they see retail investors eagerly paying 40
- 8:05times earnings, they recognize a rapidly closing window.
- 8:09They know it's not going to last.
- 8:10Right, they list their shares when the public's fear of
- 8:13missing out is just blinding them to the fundamentals.
- 8:16Because the cost of capital is effectively 0 when the public is
- 8:19just, you know, throwing money at them.
- 8:21Exactly. And the report proves this isn't
- 8:24some new phenomenon invented by Silicon Valley, either.
- 8:27No, it goes way back. Right, let's go back to 1929.
- 8:31The popular history just focuses on the October crash, but it was
- 8:35preceded by an absolute frenzy in what were called investment
- 8:39trusts. Oh yeah, those were wild.
- 8:41Yeah, they were essentially unregulated, highly leveraged
- 8:44mutual funds. By August 1929, they made-up 60%
- 8:48of all new market issuances. That's just staggering.
- 8:52And the mechanics of those trusts were designed purely to
- 8:55extract fees from retail speculators.
- 8:57Absolutely. But to tell like the real signal
- 9:00was what the insiders were doing at the time, yes.
- 9:03This was the most fascinating data point in the entire report
- 9:06from. Off the seat prices, Yeah, if.
- 9:08You want to know what the smart money was thinking in 1929?
- 9:10Look at the price of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange.
- 9:14A seat give you the right to trade on the floor and collect
- 9:16volume fees, right? In the months prior to the
- 9:19October crash, while the Dow Jones was still printing record
- 9:22highs, the price to buy a seat dropped by 20%.
- 9:27It's such an incredible leading indicator.
- 9:30It is the insiders on the floor were quietly pricing in a
- 9:33catastrophic collapse in trading volume and asset values even
- 9:38while they were out there selling those investment trusts
- 9:40to the public. It's ruthless and we saw the
- 9:43exact same distribution phase in the 1999 and 2000.com bubble,
- 9:48just dressed up in different technologies.
- 9:50Right pets.com instead of investment trusts.
- 9:53Exactly that famous IPO pop averaged 65% on the first day of
- 9:58trading. Which people thought was a good
- 10:00thing. Right.
- 10:01But from a corporate finance perspective, if a company stock
- 10:03pops 65% on day one, the underwriters fundamentally
- 10:07mispriced the offering. Yeah, they left billions of
- 10:10dollars of capital on the table that could have gone straight to
- 10:12the company's balance sheet. But look, the underwriters
- 10:15aren't stupid. Yeah, that underpricing wasn't
- 10:17an accident. It was a deliberate marketing
- 10:19expense. That's such a good way to put
- 10:21it. By artificially keeping the
- 10:23initial offering price low, they guarantee a massive first day
- 10:27headline, right? That 65% pop acts as a siren
- 10:31song, just luring in retail momentum traders Who assume the
- 10:35stock will just keep going up forever.
- 10:37And meanwhile, the quality of what was actually being sold was
- 10:40deteriorating rapidly, fast. The data shows that in the
- 10:431980s, only about 20% of companies going public were
- 10:46unprofitable. Yeah, but by the peak of 1999
- 10:49and 2000, nearly 80% of them were bleeding cash it.
- 10:52Completely inverted. It did, and you know we live
- 10:55through the modern rhyme of this in 2020 and 2021 with this SPAC
- 10:58boom. Special purpose acquisition
- 11:00companies. Yeah, these were literally blank
- 11:02check companies raising billions based on pre revenue PowerPoint
- 11:06presentations about like space, mining and electric vehicles.
- 11:09That's pure euphoria, yeah. Twenty 21613 Spacs raised $145
- 11:14billion, and when the Federal Reserve finally ended the zero
- 11:18interest rate party, the D SPAC index lost 70% of its value.
- 11:22The insiders got their management fees and the retail
- 11:25investors basically held the bag.
- 11:26Which the report frames through the lens of auction theory,
- 11:30specifically a concept called the Winner's Curse.
- 11:34OK, let's contextualize that for the listener.
- 11:36Yeah, the winner's curse essentially means that if you
- 11:39win an option where the true value of the item is highly
- 11:42uncertain, you almost certainly overpaid, right?
- 11:44Why? Because you had the most
- 11:46optimistic and therefore the most statistically flawed
- 11:50valuation in the entire room. You're the one who got it wrong
- 11:53the most, basically. Exactly.
- 11:55Trying to get an allocation of a hot IPO as a retail investor is
- 11:59like, well, it it's like trying to get a table at an incredibly
- 12:03exclusive Michelin star restaurant on a Friday night.
- 12:07OK, I like this analogy. If you call them up and they
- 12:10happily give you a prime 7:00 PM reservation with 0 hassle, you
- 12:13shouldn't feel lucky. You should be suspicious.
- 12:16Highly suspicious the food quality is probably tanked.
- 12:19If the institutional smart money actually wanted that IPO
- 12:21allocation, you know they would have taken it all.
- 12:23Oh, absolutely. The fact that the syndicate desk
- 12:25is letting you, the retail investor, buy it right just
- 12:28means the informed money passed on it.
- 12:31And that structural reality is exactly why an IPO boom is such
- 12:35a reliable indicator of a market top right.
- 12:38If it is easy for the uninformed crowd to buy, it's because the
- 12:41informed crowd is enthusiastically distributed.
- 12:43Unloading. Right.
- 12:45But and we have to address the glaring anomaly in this data
- 12:49set. Oh, I know where you're going
- 12:50with this. If extreme public issuance
- 12:52signals the top, how do we model the 2008 Great financial crisis?
- 12:56Yes, this is where I really wanted to test the limits of
- 12:59this indicator because the market peaked in 2007 and
- 13:03completely unraveled in 2008. But if you look at the data,
- 13:07there was no massive equity IPO boom leading up to it.
- 13:10There wasn't. So does that break the market
- 13:13chiming hypothesis entirely? It doesn't break the hypothesis.
- 13:16It just demands that we look at a different asset class. 2008
- 13:20was a credit and housing bubble, right?
- 13:22It was not a public equity bubble.
- 13:23That's true. The extreme unhinged issuance
- 13:26wasn't happening on the New York Stock Exchange.
- 13:28It was happening in the fixed income markets.
- 13:30Through securitized debt. Exactly.
- 13:32Mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations.
- 13:36In fact, the equity markets were experiencing the exact opposite
- 13:39of an IPO boom then, right Public companies were actually
- 13:42shrinking in number because private equity firms were taking
- 13:45them private through massive leveraged buyouts.
- 13:48Yeah. So the hot issuance was in the
- 13:50bond market. And this brings us right back to
- 13:53the present moment to a highly relevant segment from Steve
- 13:56Eisman's Mailbag. Oh, this part was so good.
- 13:58It really was. An analyst from Fish Ratings
- 14:00wrote to him about the current state of private credit and
- 14:03private equity and the parallels to the pre 2008 hidden leverage
- 14:08are deeply concerning. Yeah, Eisman laid out this
- 14:10brilliant deduction regarding private software companies.
- 14:14He pointed out that public software giants are currently
- 14:16taking an absolute beating because the market is trying to
- 14:19price in AI disruption. Right.
- 14:21Like Salesforce is down 35% year to date, ServiceNow is down 50%
- 14:26over the past year. Eisman's logic here is just
- 14:29undeniable. If the massive, highly
- 14:33profitable, transparent public software companies have lost
- 14:36half their value, then the mediocre, opaque software
- 14:41companies that private equity bought up with heavy debt three
- 14:44years ago must be down at least 50% too.
- 14:47Oh, absolutely. But because those companies are
- 14:49private, they don't have to mark their assets to market every
- 14:52day. They can just hide the bleeding.
- 14:53They can hide it, but they can't hide it forever, No.
- 14:56And this introduces what the credit markets call the
- 14:58refinancing wall, right? Those private equity backed
- 15:01companies were purchased using debt that matures between 2027
- 15:05and 2031. And here is the mechanical
- 15:07problem. Yeah, they bought those
- 15:08companies when debt was essentially free.
- 15:11Now they have to refinance in a world where the 10 year treasury
- 15:14has crossed that 4.6% Rubicon we talked about earlier.
- 15:17Exactly. Think about the interest
- 15:19coverage ratios if a private equity firm bought a tech
- 15:21company at 15 times EBITDA with 70% debt at a 4% interest rate.
- 15:26The cash flow works fine, right? It works.
- 15:29But when they have to roll that exact same debt at say, 9%, oh
- 15:34wow, the interest expense just wipes out all the free cash
- 15:37flow. The math simply breaks.
- 15:39It's unsustainable completely. When they go to refinance, the
- 15:42private credit lenders are going to look at these software
- 15:44companies, see their valuations have been cut in half, and
- 15:47demand that the PE firms inject fresh equity just to cure the
- 15:52covenants. And if the PE firms refuse to
- 15:55throw good money after bad, I mean they will literally have to
- 15:58hand the keys of the companies over to the private credit
- 16:01lenders. Yeah, so the lack of a massive
- 16:05equity IPO boom right now shouldn't really make anyone
- 16:08comfortable. The bubble just migrated.
- 16:10It's sitting in private credit, much like it was sitting in
- 16:13mortgage bonds in 2007. That's the scary part.
- 16:15So how do you actually survive this setup?
- 16:18Yeah, let's talk strategy. We've established the macro
- 16:21vulnerabilities, you know, the high Keepy ratio, the tapped out
- 16:24consumer, the rising cost of capital and we've established
- 16:27the historical reality of insiders selling at the top.
- 16:31So we need to look at the specific micro signals that
- 16:33allow you to actually navigate this.
- 16:35OK. The first micro signal the
- 16:37report highlights is the Gray market premium, or GMP.
- 16:42A really important one. Yeah, For those unfamiliar, the
- 16:44Gray market essentially functions as unofficial futures
- 16:47market where institutional investors trade the rights to an
- 16:51IPO shares before it officially lists on an exchange.
- 16:55It is a direct, quantifiable measurement of retail FOMO.
- 16:58Yes, if you see a highly anticipated tech IPO commanding
- 17:01a Gray market premium of 50% or even 100% over its intended
- 17:05issue price. It's priced for absolute
- 17:08perfection before a single official trade is even executed.
- 17:11Exactly. Our data indicates that extreme
- 17:13GMP is a classic signal of a local market top right.
- 17:17It reliably predicts that massive short term pop on day
- 17:20one, followed almost most inevitably by a brutal multi
- 17:23year flop as the fundamentals just fail to catch up to the
- 17:27hype. And Speaking of the flop, the
- 17:28single most important mechanic to watch is the lockup
- 17:31expiration. Oh, this is huge.
- 17:33Right, when a company goes public, the insiders, the
- 17:36founders in the VCs, are legally restricted from selling their
- 17:39shares for a set period. Usually it's 90 to 180 days.
- 17:43Right. And this artificially constrains
- 17:45the public float. Yeah, it's kind of like a cartel
- 17:47restricting the supply of oil to keep the price elevated.
- 17:50Exactly. It's a an artificial supply
- 17:52squeeze, but the day that lockup expires, the available supply of
- 17:57tradable shares can triple or quadruple overnight.
- 18:00It's. A flood.
- 18:00It's like a dam bursting on supply and if you watch the tape
- 18:04on lockup expiration day and you see insiders aggressively
- 18:07hitting the bid to dump their shares the literal second
- 18:11they're legally allowed. To It's the ultimate red flag.
- 18:14It's the ultimate bearish divergent.
- 18:16They are loudly telling you through their actions that they
- 18:19do not believe their own company can sustain its public
- 18:21valuation. Right, they are rushing for the
- 18:23exits. Which, you know, brings to mind
- 18:25another fantastic detail from Eisman's mailbag regarding the
- 18:29famous trade immortalized in The Big Short.
- 18:31Oh, I love this part. Yeah.
- 18:33A listener asked Eisman about that incredibly dramatic movie
- 18:36scene where Steve Carell, who plays a fictionalized version of
- 18:39Eisman, is agonizing on a rooftop in Manhattan before
- 18:43finally screaming into his cell phone.
- 18:45Sell it all. It's a great cinematic moment,
- 18:48but Hollywood requires catharsis, right?
- 18:51A high finance rarely operates like that, no.
- 18:54Eisman explained that the real exit was almost eerily quiet.
- 18:58In the spring of 2008, his funds started to model out the
- 19:01political risk. They realized that if the
- 19:04government stepped in and orchestrated a massive bailout
- 19:06to guarantee the toxic debt, well, their credit default swaps
- 19:10might not trigger or their counterparties might be
- 19:12shielded. Right, the systemic risk of
- 19:14winning the trade. Exactly.
- 19:16So there was no screaming on a roof.
- 19:18They simply picked up the phone, quietly called the trading desk.
- 19:21The Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank asked for prices to cover
- 19:24their short positions, accepted the bid and quietly walked away
- 19:28with their profits before the crowd even understood the
- 19:30systemic risk. That's it.
- 19:32The smart money does not panic. They look at the structural
- 19:35mechanics of the market, they evaluate the counterparty risk
- 19:39and they take action quietly. So if we distill this century
- 19:44long IPO report down to an ultimate actionable strategy for
- 19:48you, it is simply this. Avoid the pop, wait for the
- 19:52flop. Avoid the pop.
- 19:54Wait for the flop. Let the 90 to 180 day lockup
- 19:57expire so the artificial supply constraint is totally removed.
- 20:01Wait 6 to 12 months so the company is forced to run the
- 20:04gauntlet of a few actual quarterly earnings reports.
- 20:07It isn't time to prove it. Exactly that is how you allow
- 20:10for true price discovery and on a macro level, watch the
- 20:13aggregate volume. When a flood of unprofitable
- 20:16cash burning companies suddenly starts hitting the public
- 20:19markets, it is a structural signal to reduce your leverage,
- 20:22increase your cash position and upgrade the quality of your
- 20:25portfolio holdings. Because understanding the
- 20:28psychology behind the winner's curse, tracking the Gray market
- 20:31premiums and respecting those lockup expirations, that gives
- 20:34you a distinct structural edge over the retail crowd that just,
- 20:37you know, blindly buys the narrative.
- 20:39It really does. So let's do a quick recap of the
- 20:41journey we just took. Let's do it.
- 20:43We started with the dashboard flashing extreme overvaluation
- 20:47through the Buffett Indicator and the Schiller KP.
- 20:50We challenge that with Eisman's reality check wing, phenomenal
- 20:54corporate earnings against a deteriorating consumer and a 10
- 20:58year yield crossing the dangerous 4.5% Rubicon.
- 21:02We look back through a century of history, from 1929 investment
- 21:06trusts to 2021 SPAC's, to see how insiders use public
- 21:10exuberance as exit liquidity. Always the same playbook.
- 21:13Yep, and finally, we looked beneath the surface of today's
- 21:16market to find the hidden leverage trapped behind the
- 21:19private credit refinancing wall. And by breaking down the
- 21:22underlying causality, rather than just reacting to the daily
- 21:25headlines, you can actually read the true temperature of the
- 21:28market. But I want to leave you with one
- 21:29final provocative thought to Mull over, and this was inspired
- 21:33by a single line buried deep in our IPO report.
- 21:36Well, the structural decline. Yes, the data shows a structural
- 21:40multi decade decline in the total number of public companies
- 21:44as private markets continue to expand.
- 21:46We talked about the refinancing wall, but think about the long
- 21:49term implication here. It's massive.
- 21:51If the absolute best, most innovative companies stay
- 21:54private longer and longer, capturing all their hyper growth
- 21:58behind closed doors, and only the exhausted, overvalued, debt
- 22:02laden companies ever make it to an IPO just so the insiders can
- 22:06cash out, will the IPO boom indicator even exist in the next
- 22:10decade? Or will retail investors be
- 22:13permanently locked out of the true wealth creation phase of
- 22:15the market, left fighting over the scraps of the winner's
- 22:18curse? That structural shift is the
- 22:20multi trillion dollar question for the next era of finance.
- 22:24It truly is. Well, thank you so much for
- 22:26joining us on this deep dive. Stay curious, keep your eyes on
- 22:29mechanics, and we will see you next time.