Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1968 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
Transcript
- 0:001968 Whereas the partnership agreement represents the legal
- 0:04understanding among us, the ground rules represent the
- 0:08personal understanding and in some ways is the more important
- 0:12document. I consider it essential that any
- 0:14changes be clearly set forth and explained prior to their effect
- 0:18on partnership activity or performance.
- 0:21Hence the October letter Cordially.
- 0:24Warren E Buffett West Bay 110 Buffett Partnership Ltd 610
- 0:30Kiwit Plaza, Omaha, NE 68131 Telephone 0424110 October 9th,
- 0:391967 to my partners. Over the past 11 years, I have
- 0:44consistently set forth as the BPL investment goal and average
- 0:48advantage an hour performance of 10 percentage points per annum
- 0:51in comparison with the Dow Jones Industrial Average under the
- 0:56environment that existed during that period.
- 0:58I have considered such an objective difficult but
- 1:01obtainable. The following conditions now
- 1:03make a change in yardsticks appropriate one.
- 1:06The market environment has changed progressively over the
- 1:09past decade, resulting in a sharp diminution in the number
- 1:13of obvious quantitatively based investment bargains available. 2
- 1:17Mushrooming interest in investment performance, which
- 1:20has its ironical aspects since I was among a lonely few preaching
- 1:24the importance of this some years ago, has created a hyper
- 1:27reactive pattern market behavior against which my analytical
- 1:31techniques have limited value. 3 The enlargement of our capital
- 1:36base to about $65 million when applied against a diminishing
- 1:40trickle off good investment ideas has continued to present
- 1:43the problems mentioned in the January 1967 letter.
- 1:47And four, my own personal interests dictate a less
- 1:51compulsive approach to superior investment results than when I
- 1:55was younger and leaner. Let's look at each of these
- 1:57factors in more detail. The evaluation of securities and
- 2:01businesses for investment purposes has always involved a
- 2:04mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors.
- 2:07At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to
- 2:11qualitative factors would say by the right company with the right
- 2:14prospects, inherent industry conditions, management,
- 2:18etcetera, and the price will take care of itself.
- 2:21On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would
- 2:24say, buy at the right price and the company and stock will take
- 2:28care of itself. As is so often the pleasant
- 2:30result in the securities world, money can be made with either
- 2:34approach, and of course any analyst combines the two to some
- 2:38extent. His classification in either
- 2:41school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to
- 2:43the various factors and not to his consideration of one group
- 2:48of factors to the exclusion of the other group.
- 2:51Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily
- 2:54in the quantitative school, and as I write this now one has come
- 2:58back from recess, I may be the only one left in the class.
- 3:01The really sensational ideas I have had over the years have
- 3:05been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have
- 3:08had a high probability insight. This is what causes the cash
- 3:12register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent
- 3:15occurrence, as insights usually are, and of course no insight is
- 3:20required on the quantitative side.
- 3:22The figure should hit you over the head with a baseball bat.
- 3:25So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are
- 3:28right on qualitative decisions. But, at least in my opinion, the
- 3:33more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative
- 3:36decisions. Such statistical bargains have
- 3:39tended to disappear over the years.
- 3:41This may be due to the constant combing and re combing of
- 3:45investments that has occurred during the past 20 years without
- 3:48an economic convulsion, such as that of the 30s to create a
- 3:52negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new
- 3:55bargain securities. It may 111 be due to the new
- 4:00growing social acceptance and therefore usage.
- 4:03Or maybe it's vice versa. I'll let the behaviorists figure
- 4:06it out of takeover bids, which have a natural tendency to focus
- 4:10on bargain issues. It may be due to the exploding
- 4:13ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified
- 4:17scrutiny of issues far beyond what existed some years ago.
- 4:21Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual
- 4:24disappearance of the bargain issue as determined
- 4:27quantitatively and thereby of our bread and butter.
- 4:30There still may be a few. From time to time.
- 4:32There will also be the occasional security where I am
- 4:35really competent to make an important qualitative judgement.
- 4:39This will offer our best chance for large profits.
- 4:42Such instances will, however, be rare.
- 4:45Much of our good performance during the past three years has
- 4:48been due to a single idea of this sort.
- 4:51The next point of difficulty is the intensified interest in
- 4:54investment performance. For years I have preached the
- 4:57importance of measurement consistently.
- 5:00I have told partners that unless our performance was better than
- 5:03average, the money should go elsewhere.
- 5:06In recent years, this idea has gained momentum throughout the
- 5:09investment or, more importantly, the investing community.
- 5:13In the last year or two, it has started to look a bit like a
- 5:16tidal wave. I think we are witnessing the
- 5:18distortion of a sound idea. I have always cautioned partners
- 5:22that I considered three years a minimum in determining whether
- 5:25we were performing. Naturally, as the investment
- 5:28public has taken the bit in its teeth, the time span of
- 5:32expectations has been consistently reduced to the
- 5:35point where investment performance by large aggregates
- 5:38of money is being measured yearly, quarterly, monthly and
- 5:42perhaps sometimes even more frequently, leading to what is
- 5:45known as instant research. The payoff for superior short
- 5:49term performance has become enormous, not only in
- 5:53compensation for results actually achieved, but in the
- 5:56attraction of new money for the next round.
- 5:59Thus a self generating type of activity has set in which leads
- 6:02to larger and larger amounts of money participating on a shorter
- 6:06and shorter time span. A disturbing corollary is that
- 6:10the vehicle for participation, the particular companies or
- 6:13stocks, becomes progressively less important, at times
- 6:17virtually incidental, as the activity accelerates.
- 6:21In my opinion, what is resulting is speculation on an increasing
- 6:24scale. This is hardly a new phenomenon.
- 6:27However, a dimension has been added by the growing ranks of
- 6:30professional, in many cases formerly quite docile, investors
- 6:34who feel they must get aboard. The game is dignified, of
- 6:38course, by appropriate ceremonies, personages and
- 6:41lexicon. To date, it has been highly
- 6:43profitable. It may also be that this is
- 6:46going to be the standard nature of the market in the future.
- 6:49Nevertheless, it is an activity at which I am sure I would not
- 6:53do particularly well. As I said on page five of my
- 6:56last annual letter. Furthermore, we will not follow
- 6:59the frequently prevalent approach of investing in
- 7:02securities wherein attempt to anticipate market action
- 7:05overrides business valuations. Such so-called fashion investing
- 7:09has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in
- 7:13recent years and currently, as I write this in January.
- 7:18It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can
- 7:21neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy
- 7:25my intellect or perhaps my prejudices and most definitely
- 7:29does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money
- 7:32based upon such an approach. Hence, I will most certainly not
- 7:36do so with your money. Any form of hyperactivity with
- 7:39large amounts of money in securities markets can create
- 7:43problems for all participants. I make no attempt to guess the
- 7:46action of the stock market and haven't the foggiest notion as
- 7:50to whether the Dow will be AT600900 or 1200 a year from
- 7:55now. Even if there are serious
- 7:56consequences resulting from present and future speculative
- 8:00activity, experience suggests estimates of timing are
- 8:04meaningless. However, I do believe certain
- 8:06conditions that now exist are likely to make activity in
- 8:10markets more difficult for us. For the intermediate future, the
- 8:13above may simply be old foggy ISM.
- 8:16After all, I am 37. When the game is no longer being
- 8:20played your way, it is only human to say the new approach is
- 8:24all wrong, bound to lead to trouble, etcetera.
- 8:27I have been scornful of such behavior by others in the past.
- 8:31I have also seen the penalties incurred by those who evaluate
- 8:34conditions as 112. They were not as they are.
- 8:39Essentially, I am out of step with present conditions on one
- 8:42point. However, I am clear I will not
- 8:45abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand,
- 8:48although I find it difficult to apply, even though it may mean
- 8:52forgoing large and apparently easy profits to embrace an
- 8:55approach which I don't fully understand, have not practiced
- 8:59successfully, and which possibly could lead to substantial
- 9:03permanent loss of capital. The Third Point of difficulty
- 9:06involves our much greater base of capital.
- 9:09For years my investment ideas were anywhere from 110% to 1000%
- 9:15of our capital. It was difficult for me to
- 9:17conceive that a different condition could ever exist.
- 9:21I promised to tell partners when it did and in my January 1967
- 9:25letter had to make good on that promise.
- 9:28Largely because of the two conditions previously mentioned,
- 9:32our greater capital is now something of a drag on
- 9:35performance. I believe it is the least
- 9:37significant factor of the four mentioned and that if we were
- 9:41operating with 110th of our present capital, our performance
- 9:44would be little better. However, increased funds are
- 9:47presently A moderately negative factor.
- 9:50The final and most important consideration concerns personal
- 9:54motivation. When I started the partnership,
- 9:56I set the motor that regulated the treadmill at 10 points
- 9:59better than the Dow. I was younger, poorer and
- 10:02probably more competitive. Even without the three
- 10:05previously discussed external factors making for poorer
- 10:09performance, I would still feel that changed personal conditions
- 10:12make it advisable to reduce the speed of the treadmill.
- 10:15I have observed many cases of habit patterns in all activities
- 10:20of life, particularly business, continuing and becoming
- 10:24accentuated as years pass, long after they ceased making sense.
- 10:28Bertrand Russell has related the story of two Lithuanian girls
- 10:32who lived at his manner subsequent to World War One.
- 10:35Regularly each evening after the house was dark, they would sneak
- 10:40out and steal vegetables from the neighbors for hoarding in
- 10:42their rooms. This despite the fact that food
- 10:46was bountiful at the Russell table.
- 10:48Lord Russell explained to the girls that while such behavior
- 10:51may have made a great deal of sense in Lithuania during the
- 10:54war, it was somewhat out of place in the English
- 10:57countryside. He received dissenting nods and
- 11:00continued stealing. He finally contented himself
- 11:03with the observation that their behavior, strange as it might
- 11:06seem to the neighbors, was really not so different from
- 11:09that of the elder Rockefeller. Elementary Self analysis tells
- 11:12me that I will not be capable of less than all out effort to
- 11:16achieve a publicly proclaimed goal.
- 11:18To people who have entrusted their capital to me, all out
- 11:21effort makes progressively less sense.
- 11:23I would like to have an economic goal which allows for
- 11:26considerable non economic activity.
- 11:28This may mean activity outside the field of investments or it
- 11:32simply may mean pursuing lines within the investment field that
- 11:36do not promise the greatest economic reward.
- 11:39An example of the latter might be the continued investment in a
- 11:43satisfactory but far from spectacular control business,
- 11:47where I like the people and the nature of the business.
- 11:50Even though alternative investments offered an
- 11:52expectable higher rate of return, more money would be made
- 11:56buying businesses at attractive prices, then reselling them.
- 11:59However, it may be more enjoyable, particularly when the
- 12:03personal value of incremental capital is less, to continue to
- 12:06own them and hopefully improve their performance, usually in a
- 12:10minor way through some decisions involving financial strategy.
- 12:14Thus, I am likely to limit myself to things which are
- 12:17reasonably easy, safe, profitable and pleasant.
- 12:21This will not make our operation more conservative than in the
- 12:24past, since I believe, undoubtedly with some bias, that
- 12:28we have always operated with considerable conservatism.
- 12:32The long term downside risk will not be less, the upside
- 12:36potential will merely be less. Specifically, our longer term
- 12:40goal will be to achieve the lesser of 9% per annum or A5
- 12:43percentage point advantage over the Dow.
- 12:46Thus, if the Dow averages -2% over the next five years, I
- 12:50would hope to average 3%, but if the Dow averages 12%, I will
- 12:55hope to achieve an average of only 9%.
- 12:58These may be limited objectives, but I consider it no more likely
- 13:01that we will achieve even these more modest results under
- 13:05present conditions then I formerly did that we would
- 13:07achieve our previous goal of A10 percentage point average annual
- 13:11edge over the Dow. Furthermore, I hope limited
- 13:14objectives will make for more limited effort.
- 13:17I'm quite sure the converse is 113.
- 13:20True. I will incorporate this new goal
- 13:23into the ground rules to be mailed you about November 1st
- 13:26along with the 1968 commitment letter.
- 13:29I wanted to get this letter off to you prior to that mailing so
- 13:32you would have ample time to consider your personal situation
- 13:36and, if necessary, get in touch with me to clear up some of the
- 13:39enclosed before making a decision on 1968.
- 13:43As always, I intend to continue to leave virtually all of my
- 13:47capital, excluding data document stock along with that of my
- 13:50family in BPL. What I consider satisfactory and
- 13:54achievable may well be different from what you consider, so
- 13:58partners with attractive alternative investment
- 14:00opportunities may logically decide that their funds can be
- 14:03better employed elsewhere. And you can be sure I will be
- 14:06wholly in sympathy with such a decision.
- 14:09I have always found behavior most distasteful which publicly
- 14:12announces one set of goals and motivations when actually an
- 14:16entirely different set of factors prevails.
- 14:19Therefore, I have always tried to be L00 percent candid with
- 14:23you about my goals and personal feelings.
- 14:25So you aren't making important decisions pursuant to phony
- 14:29proclamations. I've run into a few of these in
- 14:31our investment experience. Obviously, all the conditions
- 14:35enumerated in this letter haven't appeared overnight.
- 14:38I have been thinking about some of the points involved for a
- 14:41long period of time. You can understand, I am sure,
- 14:44that I wanted to pick a time when past goals had been
- 14:47achieved to set forth a reduction in future goals.
- 14:50I would not want to reduce the speed of the treadmill unless I
- 14:53had fulfilled my objectives to this point.
- 14:56Please let me know if I can be of any help in deciphering any
- 14:59portion of this letter cordially.
- 15:02Warren E Buffett Webb at 114 Buffett Partnership Ltd, 610
- 15:08Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, NE 68131 Telephone 0424110 January 24th,
- 15:181968 Our performance in 1967. By most standards we had a good
- 15:24year in 1967. Our overall performance was plus
- 15:2735.9% compared to plus 19% for the Dow, thus surpassing our
- 15:33previous objective of performance 10 points superior
- 15:37to the Dow. Our overall gain was
- 15:39$19,384,250, which even under accelerating inflation will buy
- 15:46a lot of Pepsi. And due to the sale of some long
- 15:49standing large positions in marketable securities, we had
- 15:53realized taxable income off $27,376,667, which has nothing
- 16:00to do with 1967 performance, but should give all of you a feeling
- 16:05of vigorous participation in the Great Society on April 15th.
- 16:10The minor thrills described above are tempered by any close
- 16:14observation of what really took place in the stock market during
- 16:171967. Probably a greater percentage of
- 16:20participants in the securities markets did substantially better
- 16:24than the Dow last year than in virtually any year in history.
- 16:28In 1967. For many, it rained gold and it
- 16:32paid to be out playing the bass tuba.
- 16:34I don't have a final tabulation at this time, but my guess is
- 16:37that at least 95% off investment companies following a common
- 16:42stock program achieved better results than the Dow, in many
- 16:45cases by very substantial amounts.
- 16:48It was a year when profits achieved were in inverse
- 16:51proportion to age and I am in the geriatric ward.
- 16:54Philosophically, the following summarizes the year by year
- 16:58performance of the Dow, the partnership before allocation
- 17:011/4 of the excess over 6% to the general partner and the results
- 17:06for limited partners. Year Overall Results Partnership
- 17:10Results Limited Partners from Dow 1-2 Results Three 1957 - 8.4
- 17:16percent 10.4 percent 9.3% Nineteen 5838.5% Forty .9
- 17:24percent 32.2% Nineteen 5920 percent 25.9 percent 20.9% 1960
- 17:32- 6.2 percent 22.8 percent 18.6% Nineteen 6122.4 percent 45.9%
- 17:42Thirty 5.9 percent 1962 - 7.6 percent 13.9 percent 11.9%
- 17:51Nineteen 6320.6 percent 38.7% Thirty .5% 196418.7 percent 27.8
- 18:02percent 22.3% Nineteen 6514.2 percent 47.2 percent 36.9
- 18:10percent 1966 - 15.6 percent 20.4 percent 16.8% Nineteen 6719
- 18:19percent 35.9 percent 28.4% 1. Based on yearly changes in the
- 18:25value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received
- 18:28through ownership of the Dow during that year.
- 18:31The table includes all complete years of partnership activity. 2
- 18:35for 1957 to 61 consists of combined results of all
- 18:40predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire
- 18:44year after all expenses but before distributions to partners
- 18:48or allocations to the general partner. 3 For 1957 to 61
- 18:53computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership
- 18:56results allowing for allocation to the general partner based
- 19:00upon the present partnership agreement but before monthly 115
- 19:05withdrawals by limited partners on a cumulative or compounded
- 19:09basis. The results are year overall
- 19:12results from partnership results.
- 19:14Limited Partners Dow Results 1957 - 8.4 percent 10.4 percent
- 19:219.3 percent 19575826.9 percent 55.6% Forty 4.5% 19575952.3
- 19:33percent 95.9% Seventy 4.7 percent 19576042.9 percent 140.6
- 19:42percent 107.2 percent 1950760174 .9 percent 251 percent 181.6%
- 19:5319576261.6 percent 299.8 percent 215.1 percent 1950760395 .1
- 20:04percent 454.5 percent 311.2 percent 1957 Sixty 4131.3
- 20:14percent 608.7 percent 402.9%. 1957 Sixty 5164.1 percent 943.2
- 20:25percent 588.5 percent 1957 Sixty 6122.9 percent 1156 percent
- 20:36704.2 percent 1957 Sixty 7165.3 percent 1606.9 percent 932.6%
- 20:48annual compounded 9.3 percent 29.4 percent 23.6% rate
- 20:55investment companies. On the following page is the
- 20:58usual tabulation showing the results of what were the two
- 21:01largest mutual funds. They have stood at the top in
- 21:04size since BPL was formed this year.
- 21:07However, Dreyfus Fund overtook them that follow a policy of
- 21:11being typically 95 to 100% invested in common stocks and
- 21:17the two largest diversified closed and investment companies
- 21:21year Massachusetts Inv Investors Lehman 2 Tricont Dow Limited
- 21:26Trust One Stock 1-2 Partners 1957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% -
- 21:362.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3 percent 195842.7 percent 47.5% Forty .8
- 21:46percent 33.2 percent 38.5 percent 32.2 percent 19599
- 21:53percent 10.3 percent 8.1 percent 8.4 percent 20% 20.9 percent
- 22:001960 - 1.0% - 0.6% Two .5 percent 2.8% - 6.2 percent 18.6%
- 22:11Nineteen 6125.6 percent 24.9 percent 23.6 percent 22.5
- 22:19percent 22.4 percent 35.9% 1962 - 9.8% - 13.4% - 14.4% - 10.0% -
- 22:327.6 percent 11.9% Nineteen 6320 percent 16.5 percent 23.7
- 22:40percent 18.3 percent 20.6% Thirty .5% 196415.9 percent 14.3
- 22:49percent 13.6 percent 12.6 percent 18.7 percent 22.3%
- 22:56Nineteen 6510.2 percent 9.8% Nineteen percent 10.7 percent
- 23:0314.2 percent 36.9% 1966 - 7.7% - 10.0% - 2.6% - 6.9% - 15.6
- 23:16percent 16.8%. Nineteen 6720 percent 22.8
- 23:21percent 28 percent 25.4% Nineteen percent 28.4%
- 23:27Cumulative 162.3 percent 147.6% Two 106.2 percent 181.5 percent
- 23:36165.3 percent 932.6% Results Annual 9.2 percent 8.6 percent
- 23:4510.7 percent 9.9 percent 9.3 percent 23.6% Compounded rate 1
- 23:53Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to
- 23:57holders of record during year 2 from 1967.
- 24:00Moody's Bank and Finance Manual for 1957 to 1966 estimated for
- 24:061967. Last year I said 116.
- 24:11A few mutual funds and some private investment operations
- 24:14have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and in some
- 24:18cases substantially superior to Buffett Partnership Limited.
- 24:22Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours
- 24:26and not within my capabilities. In 1967, this condition
- 24:30intensified. Many investment organizations
- 24:33performed substantially better than BPL, with gains ranging to
- 24:37over 100%. Because of these spectacular
- 24:40results, money, talent and energy are converging in a
- 24:45maximum effort for the achievement of large and quick
- 24:48stock market profits. It looks to me like greatly
- 24:51intensified speculation with concomitant risks, but many of
- 24:55the advocates insist otherwise. My mentor Ben Graham used to say
- 25:00speculation is neither illegal, immoral, nor fattening
- 25:03financially. During the past year, it was
- 25:06possible to become fiscally flabby through a steady diet of
- 25:09speculative bonbons. We continue to eat oatmeal, but
- 25:13if indigestion should set in generally, it is unrealistic to
- 25:16expect that we want half some discomfort.
- 25:19Analysis of 1967 Results The overall figures given earlier
- 25:24conceal vast differences in profitability by portfolio
- 25:27category. During 1967, we had our worst
- 25:31performance in history in the workout section In the 1965
- 25:35letter. This category was defined as
- 25:38securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate
- 25:41activity, sellouts, mergers, reorganizations, spin offs,
- 25:46etcetera. In this category, we are not
- 25:48talking about rumors or inside information pertaining to such
- 25:52developments, but to publicly announced activities of this
- 25:55sort. We wait until we can read it in
- 25:57the paper. The risk does not pertain
- 26:00primarily to general market behavior, although that is
- 26:03sometimes tied in to a degree, but instead to something
- 26:07upsetting the apple cart so that the expected corporate
- 26:10development does not materialize.
- 26:12The streets were filled with upset apple carts.
- 26:15Our apple carts during 1967. Thus, on an average investment
- 26:20of $17,246,879, our overall gain was $153,273.
- 26:31For those of you whose slide rule does not go to such
- 26:33insulting depths, this represents a return of .89 of
- 26:381%. While I don't have complete
- 26:40figures, I doubt that we have been below 10% in any past year.
- 26:45As in other categories, we tend to concentrate our investments
- 26:48in the workout category in just a few situations per year.
- 26:52This technique gives more variation in yearly results than
- 26:56would be the case if we used an across the board approach.
- 26:59I believe our approach will result in as great or greater
- 27:03profitability on a long term basis, but you can't prove it by
- 27:061967. Our investment in controlled
- 27:09companies was a similar drag on relative performance in 1967,
- 27:14but this is to be expected in strong markets.
- 27:17On an average investment of $20,192,776, we had an overall
- 27:24gain of $2,894,571. I am pleased with this sort of
- 27:31performance, even though this category will continue to
- 27:34underperform if the market continue strong.
- 27:37During 1968, through our two controlled companies,
- 27:40Diversified Retailing and Berkshire Hathaway, we acquired
- 27:442 new enterprises in 1967, Associated Cotton Shops and
- 27:49National Indemnity, along with National Fire and Marine, an
- 27:52affiliated company. These acquisitions couldn't be
- 27:55more gratifying. Everything was as advertised or
- 27:59better. The principal selling
- 28:00executives, Ben Rosner and Jack Ringwald, have continued to do a
- 28:05superb job, the only kind they know, and in every respect have
- 28:09far more than lived up to their end of the bargain.
- 28:12The satisfying nature of our activity in controlled companies
- 28:15is a minor reason for the moderated investment objectives
- 28:19discussed in the October 9th letter.
- 28:21When I am dealing with people I like in businesses, I find
- 28:25stimulating What business isn't and achieving worthwhile overall
- 28:28returns on capital employed, say 1012%.
- 28:32It seems foolish to rush from situation to situation to earn a
- 28:36few more percentage points. It also does not seem sensible
- 28:40to me to trade known pleasant personal relationships with high
- 28:43grade people at a decent rate of 117 return for possible
- 28:49irritation, aggravation or worse at potentially higher returns.
- 28:53Pence. We will continue to keep a
- 28:55portion of our capital, but not over 40% because of the possible
- 28:59liquidity requirements arising from the nature of our
- 29:02partnership agreement. Invested in controlled operating
- 29:06businesses at an expected rate of return below that inherent in
- 29:10an aggressive stock market operation.
- 29:12With a combined total of $37,439,655 in workouts and
- 29:19controls, producing an overall gain of only 3 million,
- 29:23$47,844.00. The more alert members of the
- 29:27class will have already concluded.
- 29:29We had a whale of a year in the Generals relatively undervalued
- 29:33category. On a net average investment of
- 29:36$19,487,996.00, We had an overall gain of $14,096,593 or
- 29:4872%. Last year.
- 29:50I referred to one investment which substantially outperformed
- 29:53the general market in 19641965 and 1966 and because of its
- 30:00size, the largest proportion we have ever had in anything we hit
- 30:04our 40% limit had a very material impact on our overall
- 30:08results and even more so this category.
- 30:11This excellent performance continued throughout 1967 and a
- 30:16large portion of total gain was again accounted for by this
- 30:20single security. Our holdings of this security
- 30:23have been very substantially reduced and we have nothing in
- 30:26this group remotely approaching the size or potential which
- 30:30formerly existed in this investment.
- 30:32The Generals private owner section produced good results
- 30:36last year $1,297,215 on $5,141,710 average investment
- 30:46and we have some mildly interesting possibilities in
- 30:49this area at present. Miscellaneous We begin the new
- 30:52year with net assets of $68,108,088.
- 30:58We had partners with capital of about $1,600,000 withdraw at
- 31:04year end primarily because of the reduced objectives announced
- 31:07in the October 9th letter. This makes good sense for them
- 31:11since most of them have the ability and motivation to
- 31:14surpass our objectives and I am relieved from pushing for
- 31:17results that I probably can't attain under present conditions.
- 31:21Some of those who withdrew and many who didn't ask me what do
- 31:24you really mean after receiving the October 9th letter.
- 31:28This sort of a question is a little bruising to any author,
- 31:31but I assured them I meant exactly what I had said.
- 31:35I was also asked whether this was an initial stage in the
- 31:38phasing out of the partnership. The answer to this is definitely
- 31:42no. As long as partners want to put
- 31:44up their capital alongside of mine and the business is
- 31:47operationally pleasant and it couldn't be better.
- 31:50I intend to continue to do business with those who have
- 31:53backed me since Tennis Shoes. Gladys Kaiser has joined us and
- 31:57is doing the same sort of top notch job that we have long
- 32:00received from Donna, Bill and John.
- 32:02The Office group spouses and children have over $15 million
- 32:06invested in BPL on January 1st, 1968, so we have not had a need
- 32:11for Nodos during business hours. Within a few days you will
- 32:15receive 1A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for
- 32:20your 1967 federal income tax return.
- 32:23This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes. 2
- 32:28An audit from Pete Marwick Mitchell and Company.
- 32:30They have again done an excellent job for 1967 setting
- 32:35forth the operations and financial position of BPL as
- 32:38well as your own capital account. 3A Letter signed by me
- 32:42setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1st,
- 32:461968. This is identical with the
- 32:49figures developed in the audit. Let me know if anything in this
- 32:53letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying.
- 32:56My next letter will be about July 15th, summarizing the first
- 33:00half of this year cordially. 118 Warren E Buffett 119 Buffett
- 33:06Partnership Ltd 610 Kiewit Plaza Omaha, NE 68131 Telephone
- 33:140424110 July 11th, 1968 First Half Performance During the
- 33:22first half of 1968, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
- 33:25declined fractionally from 905 to 898.
- 33:30Ownership of the Dow would also have produced dividends of about
- 33:33$15 during the half, resulting in an overall gain of 0.9% for
- 33:39that average. The Dow once again was an anemic
- 33:42competitor for most investment managers, although it was not
- 33:46surpassed by anything like the margins of 1967.
- 33:50Our own performance was unusually good during the first
- 33:52half with an overall gain of 16%, excluding any change in
- 33:57valuation for controlled companies, which represented
- 34:00slightly over 1/3 of net assets at the beginning of the year.
- 34:05However, any release of adrenaline is unwarranted.
- 34:08Our marketable security investments are heavily
- 34:11concentrated in a few situations, making relative
- 34:15performance potentially more volatile than in widely
- 34:18diversified investment vehicles. Our long term performance goals
- 34:22are as stated in the revised ground rules and I will be quite
- 34:26happy if we achieve those limited objectives over a period
- 34:29of years. The following table summarizes
- 34:32performance to date on the usual basis.
- 34:34Year Overall Results Partnership Results Limited Partners from
- 34:38Dow 1-2 Results Three 1957 - 8.4 percent 10.4 percent 9.3%
- 34:47Nineteen 5838.5% Forty .9 percent 32.2% Nineteen 5920
- 34:54percent 25.9 percent 20.9 percent 1960 - 6.2 percent 22.8
- 35:02percent 18.6% 196122.4 percent 45.9% Thirty 5.9 percent 1962 -
- 35:137.6 percent 13.9 percent 11.9% Nineteen 6320.6 percent 38.7%
- 35:22Thirty .5% Nineteen 6418.7 percent 27.8 percent 22.3%
- 35:31196514.2 percent 47.2 percent 36.9 percent 1966 - 15.6 percent
- 35:4120.4 percent 16.8% Nineteen 6719 percent 35.9 percent 28.4% First
- 35:51Half 1968 Zero .9% Sixteen percent 13.5% Cumulative Results
- 35:57167.7 percent 1880 percent 1072% Annual Compounded 8.9 percent
- 36:0629.6 percent 23.8% Rate 1 Based on yearly changes in the value
- 36:12of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through
- 36:16ownership of the Dow during that year.
- 36:18The table includes all complete years of partnership activity. 2
- 36:22for 1957 to 61 consists of combined results of all
- 36:26predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire
- 36:30year after all expenses but before distributions to partners
- 36:34or allocations to the general partner. 3 for 1957 to 61
- 36:39computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership
- 36:43results, allowing for allocation to the general partner based
- 36:47upon the present partnership agreement but before monthly
- 36:50withdrawals by limited partners. 120 Although we revise
- 36:54valuations of our controlled companies only at Urand, it
- 36:58presently appears that our share of their 1968 earnings will be
- 37:03something over $3,000,000. Those with primary
- 37:06responsibility for their operations, Ken Chase at
- 37:09Berkshire Hathaway, Lewis Cone at Hotchild Cone, Jack Ringwald
- 37:14at National Indemnity and Ben Rosner at Associated Cotton
- 37:17Shops, continue to meld effort and ability into results.
- 37:22This year, Diversified Retailing Company, owner of Hot Shield
- 37:25Cone and Associated Cotton Shops, issued its first
- 37:29published annual report. This was occasioned by the
- 37:32public sale of debentures to approximately 1000 investors
- 37:36last December. Thus, DRC is in the rather
- 37:39unusual position of being a public company from a creditors
- 37:43viewpoint, but a private one. There are three stockholders.
- 37:46BPL owns 80%. For ownership purposes I am
- 37:51enclosing the DRC report with this letter except where
- 37:54duplicates go to one household and plan to continue to send
- 37:58them along with future mid year letters.
- 38:00As I have mentioned before, we cannot make the same sort of
- 38:03money out of permanent ownership of controlled businesses that
- 38:07can be made from buying and reselling such businesses or
- 38:10from skilled investment in marketable securities.
- 38:14Nevertheless, they offer a pleasant long term form of
- 38:17activity when conducted in conjunction with high grade able
- 38:21people at satisfactory rates of return.
- 38:23Investment Companies. On the following page is the
- 38:26form sheet on the usual investment companies year.
- 38:29Massachusetts Inv Investors Lehman 2 Tricont Dow Limited
- 38:34Trust One Stock 1-2 Partners 1957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% -
- 38:442.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3% 195842.7 percent 47.5% Forty .8 percent
- 38:5433.2 percent 38.5 percent 32.2 percent 19599 percent 10.3
- 39:02percent 8.1 percent 8.4 percent 20 percent 20.9% 1960 - 1.0% -
- 39:120.6% Two .5 percent 2.8% - 6.2 percent 18.6% Nineteen 6125.6
- 39:22percent 24.9 percent 23.6 percent 22.5 percent 22.4
- 39:28percent 35.9% 1962 - 9.8% - 13.4% - 14.4% - 10.0% - 7.6
- 39:41percent 11.9% Nineteen 6320 percent 16.5 percent 23.7
- 39:48percent 18.3 percent 20.6% Thirty .5% 196415.9 percent 14.3
- 39:57percent 13.6 percent 12.6 percent 18.7 percent 22.3%
- 40:05Nineteen 6510.2 percent 9.8% Nineteen percent 10.7 percent
- 40:1114.2 percent 36.9%. 1966 - 7.7% - 10.0% - 2.6% - 6.9% - 15.6
- 40:24percent 16.8% Nineteen 6720 percent 22.8 percent 28 percent
- 40:3125.4% Nineteen percent 28.4% First half 5.1 percent 2.8
- 40:38percent 4.4% Two percent 0.9 percent 13.5% 1968 Cumulative
- 40:46175.7 percent 154.5 percent 218.6 percent 186.7 percent
- 40:55167.7 percent 1072% Results Annual 9.2 percent 8.5 percent
- 41:0410.6% Nine .6 percent 8.9 percent 23.8% Compounded rate 1
- 41:12Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to
- 41:16holders of record during year 2 from 1968.
- 41:19Moody's Bank and Finance Manual for 1957 to 1967 Estimated for
- 41:25first half of 1968. Due to a sluggish performance by
- 41:29the Dow in the last few years, the four big funds now have on
- 41:33average about a 1/2 point per annum advantage over the Dow for
- 41:37the full period. The present environment 121.
- 41:40I make no effort to predict the course of general business or
- 41:44the stock market period. However, currently there are
- 41:47practices snowballing in the security markets and business
- 41:51world which while devoid of short term predictive value,
- 41:55bother me as to possible long term consequences.
- 41:58I know that some of you are not particularly interested and
- 42:01shouldn't be in what is taking place on the financial stage.
- 42:05For those who are, I am enclosing a reprint of an
- 42:08unusually clear and simple article which lays bare just
- 42:12what is occurring on a mushrooming scale.
- 42:14Spectacular amounts of money are being made by those
- 42:17participating, whether as originators, top employees,
- 42:21professional advisors, investment bankers, stock
- 42:24speculators, etcetera. In the chain letter type stock
- 42:27promotion vogue, the game is being played by the gullible,
- 42:30the self hypnotized and the cynical.
- 42:33To create the proper illusions, it frequently requires
- 42:37accounting distortions. One particularly progressive
- 42:40entrepreneur told me he believed in bold imaginative accounting
- 42:44tricks of capitalization and camouflage of the true nature of
- 42:48the operating businesses involved.
- 42:50The end product is popular, respectable and immensely
- 42:54profitable. I'll let the philosophers figure
- 42:56in which order those adjectives should be placed.
- 42:59Quite candidly, our own performance has been
- 43:01substantially improved on an indirect basis because of the
- 43:05fall out from such activities. To create an ever widening
- 43:09circle of chain letters requires increasing amounts of corporate
- 43:13raw material, and this has caused many intrinsically cheap
- 43:16and not so cheap stocks to come to life.
- 43:18When we have been the owners of such stocks, we have reaped
- 43:21market rewards much more promptly than might otherwise
- 43:25have been the case. The appetite for such companies,
- 43:28however, tends to substantially diminish the number of
- 43:31fundamentally attractive investments which remain.
- 43:34I believe the odds are good that when the stock market and
- 43:37business history of this period is being written, the phenomenon
- 43:41described in Mr. Mays article will be regarded as of major
- 43:44importance and perhaps characterized as a mania.
- 43:48You should realize, however, that is the emperor has no
- 43:51clothes, approaches at odds or dismissed with a So what or an
- 43:56enjoy, enjoy with the views of most investment banking houses
- 44:00and currently successful investment managers.
- 44:03We live in an investment world populated not by those who must
- 44:06be logically persuaded to believe, but by the hopeful,
- 44:10credulous and greedy grasping for an excuse to believe.
- 44:14Finally, for a magnificent account of the current financial
- 44:17scene, you should hurry out and get a copy of The Money Game by
- 44:21Adam Smith. It is loaded with insights and
- 44:24supreme wit. Note, despite my current
- 44:26support, your local postmaster, Dr. I am not enclosing the book
- 44:30with this letter. It retails for 6.95 dollars
- 44:34taxes. Several unusual factors make the
- 44:37tax figure even more difficult than usual to estimate.
- 44:41This year we will undoubtedly have an above average amount of
- 44:44ordinary income. The picture on short term and
- 44:47long term capital gain is subject to unusually substantial
- 44:51variance. At the beginning of the year, I
- 44:53suggested that you use an 8% ordinary income factor.
- 44:57It won't come in this manner, but this figure embodies an
- 45:01adjustment for long term capital gain applied to your BPL capital
- 45:05account on an interim basis to compute quarterly tax estimates.
- 45:09If a figure different from 8% seems more appropriate for your
- 45:13September 15th quarterly estimate, I will let you know by
- 45:17September 5th. If no change is necessary, you
- 45:20will next hear from me on November 1st with the Commitment
- 45:23Letter 4.