Latest / Defensive Line Shorts / The Defensive Line Shorts — Episode 3: WannaCry
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_00: Welcome to The Defensive Line Shorts, our series of 10-minute episodes.
- 0:05SPEAKER_00: One security control, or one breach from history, and the lessons that still hold.
- 0:10SPEAKER_00: Today, it's a breach that's nearly a decade old,
- 0:13SPEAKER_00: but still shapes how the UK thinks about cyber risk.
- 0:16SPEAKER_00: WannaCry.
- 0:17SPEAKER_00: My name's Carter, and I'm an intelligence analyst.
- 0:20SPEAKER_00: I focus on the attackers, who they are, what they did, and why.
- 0:25SPEAKER_00: And alongside me is Lizzie.
- 0:27SPEAKER_01: Thanks, Carter.
- 0:28SPEAKER_01: My name's Lizzie, and I'm a Blue Teamer.
- 0:30SPEAKER_01: I focus on the defense,
- 0:32SPEAKER_01: the lessons that carry across organizations and the trade-offs that come with them.
- 0:36SPEAKER_00: Quick note first.
- 0:37SPEAKER_00: This briefing is drafted and read by AI, but reviewed and edited by humans.
- 0:42SPEAKER_00: WannaCry starts with an exploit called EternalBlue.
- 0:46SPEAKER_00: It targeted version 1 of SMB, the Windows protocol behind things like mapped network drives.
- 0:51SPEAKER_00: EternalBlue was developed by the U.S. National Security Agency.
- 0:55SPEAKER_00: At some point,
- 0:56SPEAKER_00: it was stolen,
- 0:56SPEAKER_00: and in April 2017, a group calling itself the Shadow Brokers leaked it publicly.
- 1:02SPEAKER_00: Who the Shadow Brokers were has never been formally confirmed.
- 1:05SPEAKER_00: Microsoft had already released a patch a month earlier, in March.
- 1:09SPEAKER_00: Then, on the 12th of May 2017, WannaCry was released.
- 1:13SPEAKER_00: It combined EternalBlue with ransomware, and, crucially, it was a worm.
- 1:18SPEAKER_00: It spread itself from machine to machine over SMB, with no email and no user clicking anything.
- 1:24SPEAKER_00: Reporting at the time put infections at over 200,000 machines
- 1:27SPEAKER_00: in around 150 countries within days.
- 1:39SPEAKER_00: That researcher was Marcus Hutchins, and he set himself
- 2:00SPEAKER_00: One more detail that surprised people.
- 2:02SPEAKER_00: The headlines blamed old Windows XP machines,
- 2:05SPEAKER_00: but analysis afterwards found most infected computers were running Windows 7.
- 2:09SPEAKER_00: Supported, just not patched.
- 2:12SPEAKER_00: It demanded a ransom in Bitcoin,
- 2:13SPEAKER_00: but there was no reliable way to match payments to victims,
- 2:17SPEAKER_00: so in practice it behaved more like destructive malware.
- 2:20SPEAKER_00: In December 2017,
- 2:22SPEAKER_00: the UK and US governments publicly attributed WannaCry to North Korea,
- 2:26SPEAKER_00: and in 2018, the US charged a North Korean programmer.
- 2:30SPEAKER_00: The group behind it is usually tracked as Lazarus,
- 2:32SPEAKER_00: which is also linked to large thefts from banks and cryptocurrency firms.
- 2:36SPEAKER_00: And EternalBlue didn't stop with WannaCry.
- 2:39SPEAKER_00: Six weeks later, NotPetya used it too, disguised as ransomware but built to destroy.
- 2:45SPEAKER_00: That one was attributed to Russia's military intelligence and caused billions
- 2:48SPEAKER_00: in damage worldwide.
- 2:50SPEAKER_00: Once a powerful exploit is public, many different attackers will pick it up.
- 2:54SPEAKER_00: The NHS was hit hard.
- 2:57SPEAKER_00: The National Audit Office found at least 81 of the 236 hospital trusts in England were affected.
- 3:03SPEAKER_00: An estimated 19,000 appointments were cancelled,
- 3:07SPEAKER_00: and in five areas, patients had to be diverted to other emergency departments.
- 3:11SPEAKER_00: No NHS organization paid the ransom.
- 3:14SPEAKER_00: The NHS had been warned.
- 3:16SPEAKER_00: Critical alerts to patch went out in March and April.
- 3:19SPEAKER_00: But patching in a hospital isn't simple.
- 3:22SPEAKER_00: Medical devices need vendor support,
- 3:24SPEAKER_00: systems run around the clock,
- 3:26SPEAKER_00: and there's rarely a spare MRI scanner to test a patch on.
- 3:29SPEAKER_00: Lizzie, where do you start?
- 3:31SPEAKER_01: With patching, but not in the way people expect.
- 3:35SPEAKER_01: The lesson from WannaCry isn't patch faster, as if nobody had thought of it.
- 3:40SPEAKER_01: It's that patching needs to be business as usual, rehearsed and practiced.
- 3:44SPEAKER_01: I've seen organisations protect critical systems by never changing them.
- 3:48SPEAKER_01: Then something like WannaCry lands and they're patching that server for
- 3:52SPEAKER_01: the first time in a hurry.
- 3:54SPEAKER_01: So I'd agree an emergency change process in advance.
- 3:57SPEAKER_01: Who decides what gets tested and how fast?
- 4:01SPEAKER_01: Then, depending on your threat model,
- 4:03SPEAKER_01: when a wormable,
- 4:04SPEAKER_01: actively exploited floor appears, you pull it right to the front of the queue.
- 4:08SPEAKER_01: And underneath that sits something unglamorous, knowing what you've got.
- 4:13SPEAKER_01: You can't patch a machine you don't know exists.
- 4:15SPEAKER_01: A lot of WannaCry pain came from devices nobody had on a list,
- 4:19SPEAKER_01: like a PC bolted to a piece of lab equipment.
- 4:22SPEAKER_01: An asset inventory that's good enough to answer,
- 4:25SPEAKER_01: where is SMB version 1 still running,
- 4:27SPEAKER_01: in an hour, is worth a great deal on a bad day.
- 4:31SPEAKER_01: Microsoft has recommended switching SMB version 1 off for years,
- 4:35SPEAKER_01: and newer versions of Windows don't install it by default.
- 4:38SPEAKER_01: Beyond that, I'd look at compensating controls for the things you can't patch quickly.
- 4:43SPEAKER_01: The National Audit Office made a striking point.
- 4:45SPEAKER_01: Whether or not organisations had patched,
- 4:48SPEAKER_01: managing their internet-facing firewalls would have protected them.
- 4:51SPEAKER_01: So, SMB should never be reachable from the internet.
- 4:55SPEAKER_01: Inside the network,
- 4:56SPEAKER_01: the host firewall that's built into Windows lets you stop workstations talking SMB
- 5:00SPEAKER_01: to other workstations.
- 5:02SPEAKER_01: That breaks the worm's favourite path.
- 5:04SPEAKER_01: In a large,
- 5:05SPEAKER_01: complex estate,
- 5:06SPEAKER_01: that's hard, and getting it wrong is disruptive, so start with a pilot.
- 5:10SPEAKER_01: For legacy systems that genuinely need old protocols,
- 5:14SPEAKER_01: isolate them and only allow the specific connections they need.
- 5:17SPEAKER_01: And one more, because it caught people out.
- 5:20SPEAKER_01: Some organisations assumed they had no SMB connections to the outside world,
- 5:25SPEAKER_01: then got hit via a link to a partner.
- 5:27SPEAKER_01: If you have network connections to third parties, it's worth knowing what protocols cross them.
- 5:32SPEAKER_01: Segmentation is hard to deliver,
- 5:34SPEAKER_01: but those business-to-business links are a very sensible choke point to start with.
- 5:38SPEAKER_00: And on the healthcare angle, the story has moved on since.
- 5:42SPEAKER_00: In June 2024,
- 5:44SPEAKER_00: Cinevis,
- 5:44SPEAKER_00: which runs pathology labs for NHS trusts and GP practices in southeast London,
- 5:50SPEAKER_00: was hit by Chilin, a Russia-based ransomware group.
- 5:53SPEAKER_00: More than 10,000 appointments were cancelled at the two worst affected trusts.
- 5:58SPEAKER_00: And in June 2025,
- 6:00SPEAKER_00: one of those trusts confirmed that a long wait for a blood test result caused by
- 6:04SPEAKER_00: the attack was one of the factors that contributed to a patient's death.
- 6:08SPEAKER_00: It's a very different attack.
- 6:10SPEAKER_00: It wasn't a worm, and it hit a supplier rather than the trusts themselves.
- 6:15SPEAKER_00: But it makes the same point WannaCry did, more painfully.
- 6:18SPEAKER_00: Healthcare is completely dependent on IT, often through suppliers it doesn't control.
- 6:24SPEAKER_00: And we should be fair to the NHS.
- 6:26SPEAKER_00: It's enormous,
- 6:28SPEAKER_00: underfunded in IT terms,
- 6:29SPEAKER_00: and runs equipment that simply can't be taken offline casually.
- 6:33SPEAKER_00: These are hard problems, not silly mistakes.
- 6:36SPEAKER_01: Which is why I'd end on resilience rather than prevention.
- 6:40SPEAKER_01: WannaCry also showed how communication breaks.
- 6:43SPEAKER_01: Some trusts shut down email as a precaution,
- 6:46SPEAKER_01: so the warnings and updates couldn't reach the people who needed them.
- 6:49SPEAKER_01: The review afterwards noted there was no rehearsed national plan for
- 6:53SPEAKER_01: a cyber incident at that scale.
- 6:55SPEAKER_01: So I'd agree.
- 6:56SPEAKER_01: In advance, how you'll talk to staff when email and teams are down.
- 7:00SPEAKER_01: A phone tree and a printed contact list sound old-fashioned, but they work.
- 7:05SPEAKER_01: If you're thinking about your own organization,
- 7:07SPEAKER_01: a useful question is,
- 7:09SPEAKER_01: which suppliers or systems could stop us operating if they vanish tomorrow?
- 7:13SPEAKER_01: Then, for the most critical ones, what's the manual fallback and has anyone practiced it?
- 7:19SPEAKER_01: And for incident response,
- 7:20SPEAKER_01: keep the option of switching off SMB across the estate in your back pocket.
- 7:25SPEAKER_01: It's disruptive,
- 7:26SPEAKER_01: but during an outbreak like WannaCry,
- 7:28SPEAKER_01: it stops the spread without waiting for a patch.
- 7:31SPEAKER_01: Finally, EDR on endpoints and servers is a valuable extra layer.
- 7:35SPEAKER_01: It isn't enough on its own, but it gives you a chance to contain things quickly.
- 7:40SPEAKER_00: So, three takeaways.
- 7:41SPEAKER_00: Make patching routine and rehearsed so an emergency isn't
- 7:45SPEAKER_00: the first time you've patched a system.
- 7:47SPEAKER_00: Where you can't patch, use compensating controls.
- 7:50SPEAKER_00: Nothing exposed to the internet and no workstation-to-workstation SMB.
- 7:54SPEAKER_00: And know which suppliers you depend on because healthcare has shown us what happens
- 7:58SPEAKER_00: when they go down.
- 7:59SPEAKER_00: That's this episode of The Defensive Line Shorts.
- 8:02SPEAKER_00: For weekly coverage,
- 8:03SPEAKER_00: subscribe to The Defensive Line Weekly on Substack
- 8:06SPEAKER_00: and wherever you get your podcasts.
- 8:08SPEAKER_00: Until next time, stay defensive!