Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / SSHole: an OpenSSH login flaw that treats an error as a yes
Transcript
- 0:03Good morning, and welcome to Decrypted.
- 0:05I'm Belinder. It's Tuesday, the tenth of November, twenty twenty-six, and this is the morning edition.
- 0:11ess-ess-aitch-hole: an open-ess-ess-aitch login flaw that treats an error as a yes.
- 0:18A lock that opens when it cannot work out the answer is not a lock.
- 0:23That is the short version of ess-ess-aitch-hole, a flaw in open-ess-ess-aitch, the program behind S S H, the
- 0:30encrypted way administrators log in to servers.
- 0:32It is tracked as C V E twenty twenty-six, one two three one five eight, and Sisa added it on 9 November to its
- 0:40Kev list, the flaws known to be exploited in real attacks.
- 0:44open-ess-ess-aitch shipped the fix, version 10.
- 0:476p2, on 5 November. Exploit code was public within hours, and the first successful break-ins followed within two
- 0:55days. What actually went wrong.
- 0:58On Linux, a locked account stores a single asterisk where its password hash would be, meaning no password can
- 1:05ever match. The trouble is on systems using the musl C library, which includes Alpine Linux, a common base for
- 1:11containers. Hand musl's hashing routine an absurdly long password and it fails, and it reports that failure with
- 1:18the same asterisk. open-ess-ess-aitch then compares the asterisk with the asterisk and concludes the guest is
- 1:24on the list. Think of a doorman told that a blank line on the guest list means nobody may enter.
- 1:30When his clipboard jams he reads out "blank", the visitor says "blank" back, and in he walks.
- 1:36Previdian describes the affected setup as open-ess-ess-aitch before 10.
- 1:406p2 on Linux with musl and without the optional login layer, where a password between 256 and 1024 characters
- 1:50succeeds for some account configurations.
- 1:52What the attackers did. GreyNoise recorded the first public exploit on 5 November and the first successful
- 2:00exploitation just before 1am U T C on 7 November.
- 2:04Its dashboard counts 18 confirmed post-exploitation sessions from six addresses.
- 2:09Previdian saw 21 attempts from 13 addresses in nine countries.
- 2:14Small beside the tens of millions of ordinary S S H attempts GreyNoise logged, but the flaw is trivial to use.
- 2:21One cluster dropped a Python runtime and an implant called tack Agent, which GreyNoise says never registered
- 2:27with its control server. What a defender sees.
- 2:31A successful password login to an account that should never accept one is the tell.
- 2:36Check for accounts with an asterisk in /etc/shadow, then look for password logins to them, new S S H keys and
- 2:44unfamiliar startup services.
- 2:46The fix is to update to 10.
- 2:486p2 or switch off S S H password logins entirely, which is a one-line change and the better habit anyway.
- 2:55The Secure by Design lesson.
- 2:58This is opinion, not advice, but the design error is old: an error value and a legitimate value that look identical.
- 3:06A security check must fail closed, so that "I could not compute an answer" can never be mistaken for "yes".
- 3:13Storing a placeholder in the same field as real data invites exactly this confusion.
- 3:19The cost is modest. Inventory the container images you pull from the internet, rebuild the Alpine-based ones
- 3:25on a patched version, and stop admins holding passwordless root over S S H.
- 3:30A key-only login has no password check to bypass.
- 3:33As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 3:37That was Decrypted, with me, Belinder.
- 3:41The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:45Thanks for listening. Stay patched, and stay sceptical.