Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Crypto Scams & Client Losses: What Lawyers Need to Know Now
Transcript
- 0:03I'm Philipp Ehring, shareholder of the Beverly
- 0:05Hills Bar Association's brand new blockchain
- 0:08and web3 law section and I'm happy to welcome
- 0:11you today to the program crypto scams and client
- 0:14losses what lawyers need to know now. A quick
- 0:19note about the section we are newly founded open
- 0:22to all level of experience and we will meet on
- 0:26the first Monday of every month starting next
- 0:28Monday November 3rd at 4 .30 p .m. If you are
- 0:32crypto curious, want to learn more about the
- 0:36fundamentals of blockchain or web3 or you are
- 0:39already a veteran in the fast -moving space,
- 0:42as far as that's possible already, you're more
- 0:46than welcome. Bring your questions, your war
- 0:48stories, your ideas for future sessions and you
- 0:52can also reach out via email at any time. Today's
- 0:55topic is urgent. Clients are being targeted through
- 0:58everything. from pick butchering schemes and
- 1:02fake exchange to hack wallets and social engineering
- 1:05exploits. As lawyers we are asked to move quickly
- 1:08and we are fortunate to have two outstanding
- 1:12speakers with deep knowledge and hands -on experience.
- 1:17Both work for WOM LLP. It is a boutique Los Angeles
- 1:22firm offering a spectrum of legal services to
- 1:25business facing complex legal challenges. and
- 1:29handle client matters across industry in a wide
- 1:32range of disputes from complex international
- 1:34tech -based litigation to shareholder partnership
- 1:37disputes and payment processing disputes and
- 1:40matters involving cryptocurrency and blockchain
- 1:42projects. First, we have Briana Dahlberg, partner
- 1:46at Roam LLP. Briana has successfully litigated
- 1:49copyright trademark, unfair competition, trade
- 1:53secret, antitrust, and commercial business disputes
- 1:55in state and federal courts. across the country.
- 1:59Her client range from individual creators to
- 2:02companies of all size in the entertainment, domain
- 2:06name, e -commerce, and payment processing industry.
- 2:10She brings the practical perspective we need
- 2:14when scams collide with complex platforms and
- 2:17IP. Second, Eugene Rhoam, founder and principal
- 2:21of Rhoam LLP. Eugene is an accomplished litigator
- 2:25and trial attorney representing clients in the
- 2:28US and the board on intellectual property, payment
- 2:31processing, domain name disputes, business litigation,
- 2:34and class actions. He's been in the trenches
- 2:39on many of these issues we will cover today.
- 2:42On behalf of the BHBA, thank you for being here
- 2:45for our sections kickoff. With that, please join
- 2:48me in welcoming Eugene Rome and Brianna Dahlberg.
- 2:50Let's dive in. Great. Thank you. Thank you for
- 2:55the introduction, Philip. As mentioned, Brianna
- 3:00and I are part of RoamLP and lately we've been
- 3:04doing a lot in the crypto space and it had occurred
- 3:07to us that while there are so many capable and
- 3:11really accomplished litigators throughout Los
- 3:14Angeles and certainly in Beverly Hills, crypto
- 3:18is a slightly different beast and we figured
- 3:22with all the outreach that we've had from clients
- 3:26as well as from colleagues, we thought it would
- 3:31make sense to provide kind of a summary or a
- 3:38cursory analysis of what some of the emergent
- 3:41issues are in crypto right now and how to navigate
- 3:46some of them when people reach out to the current
- 3:51attendees. So with that, let me share a PowerPoint
- 3:54and we'll go through the items that we'll be
- 3:57covering and we'll discuss each at length. All
- 4:10right, so on the agenda today, we'll cover pig
- 4:13butchering schemes and before we go on to account
- 4:15takeover social engineering and legal strategies,
- 4:18we'll also address just investor fraud in the
- 4:22context of cryptocurrency scams. So first, to
- 4:26pig butchering schemes. Pig butchering schemes,
- 4:29it's a long form financial scam that combines
- 4:32romance and trust building with investment fraud.
- 4:35And the term comes from the idea that a pig is
- 4:38fattened before the slaughter. How it practically
- 4:42works is that the fraudster will reach out through
- 4:47social media dating apps or messaging platforms
- 4:50and they'll connect with someone usually you'll
- 4:54get a text message the text message you'll say
- 4:59hey how are you or maybe it'll be something more
- 5:01sophisticated through telegram through signal
- 5:04and these people i'm sure people have watched
- 5:08the news and have seen that more recently a whole
- 5:12network in Cambodia was shut down But there are
- 5:15thousands and thousands of people using both
- 5:19direct intentional outreach, but also using technology
- 5:24to send millions, if not tens of millions of
- 5:27these texts, these Facebook requests, these Instagram
- 5:32questions or outreaches. And some of them hit,
- 5:37we know that they hit because, and we'll address
- 5:39that a little bit later, the statistics are staggering.
- 5:43in terms of how much money was actually lost
- 5:46through these big butchering schemes. Once contact
- 5:50is reached, there's some called the grooming
- 5:52period, and we'll address it. In fact, we can
- 5:55do that here. Trust is built, and it starts simple.
- 6:01Hey, how are you? In fact, my phone gets probably
- 6:04five a day for whatever reason. How are you?
- 6:07How are you? Are you in LA? Are you in Boston?
- 6:09What are you doing? Where are you? Someone responds.
- 6:15We know that someone responds because of the
- 6:17vast amount of funds lost through this. And they
- 6:22talk, and for a while it is such a studied system.
- 6:25It is so practiced, so sophisticated, where people
- 6:30really feel a connection to this person, another
- 6:34end, who could be either a bot or it could be
- 6:38just about anyone with an attractive profile
- 6:41pic. And of course, nothing about investments
- 6:45or nothing about crypto is broached initially.
- 6:49Hey, how are you? Oh, you're not the Peter I
- 6:51was looking for. Oh, what's your name? And this
- 6:54conversation just goes and goes and it's very
- 6:57well crafted when you try and unpack it after
- 7:00the fact. When you look at it, how they slowly
- 7:03piece by piece establish a connection, establish
- 7:07a relationship with the target. And then, you
- 7:11know, they move on to family issues. Oh, are
- 7:14you seeing anyone? Are you with someone? But
- 7:17somehow, somehow these scammers get their hooks
- 7:22into the target. And after things completely
- 7:27unrelated to investments are discussed, after
- 7:30all that is done, there is a little line, by
- 7:33the way, you know, oh, I'm busy this weekend.
- 7:36actually attending a crypto conference or, you
- 7:40know, I've got this complicated trade that I'm
- 7:42engaged in or something like that. And at the
- 7:45right time, at a precisely right time, this little
- 7:47hook is floated, dropped into this water of victims
- 7:56and somebody. And the question is, what is it?
- 8:01What we've seen, usually, is people go, oh, you
- 8:04know, I've made 200 % in one month, 300 % in
- 8:08one month. And to us, when we look at it, after
- 8:12the fact, it looks just wild. Because the people
- 8:17that actually become the victims in the pigbutting
- 8:20scam are not, they're not stupid, they're not
- 8:23unsophisticated. I think a lot of times they're
- 8:25trusting, a lot of times they are lonely. And
- 8:28somehow, all of that leads to them simply believing
- 8:33what they're told. And what they're told is,
- 8:35oh, look, I made 200%, 300%. Typically, they're
- 8:42led to online platform, basically a website,
- 8:46which looks like it could well be a trading platform.
- 8:50And you look, and it looks... could be just like
- 8:54Coinbase, could be like Binance, could be like
- 8:56anything else. But it looks like a platform where
- 8:59there's a way to deposit money and you can see
- 9:02the trading activity. And this person, this fraudster,
- 9:08tells you what to do. And maybe initially, there's
- 9:11an address you send a little bit of Bitcoin,
- 9:14a little bit of Ethereum or something along those
- 9:16lines. And they tell you, oh, look here, trade
- 9:19here, trade there. buy this, I'll tell you when
- 9:23to sell. And it works like a charm. Why does
- 9:25it work? Well, it works because they control
- 9:28the platform. The platform is simply a function
- 9:31of engineering and software programming completed
- 9:35on the part of the fraudsters. It's not tied
- 9:39to any real markets. It's not tied to anything
- 9:42that actually functions with a distribution channel.
- 9:46Rather, all it is is it's like a video game.
- 9:49where they're the ultimate operator. And that
- 9:55$500 that you sent to them suddenly is now $2
- 9:59,000. And you go, oh my God, I found the golden
- 10:03ticket. And I found it through this person. It's
- 10:05actually very nice to me and is genuinely interested
- 10:07in me. And this euphoria kind of materializes.
- 10:13So what's next? You go, hey, can I invest more?
- 10:16Can I take the money out and they go of course
- 10:18and sometimes they actually allow funds to be
- 10:22taken out where the profits are Distributed through
- 10:27their own systems to the victims and Apologize
- 10:32I see my camera flashing And the reason they
- 10:39do that in the right circumstance is to generate
- 10:42this trust so then when you see that the system
- 10:44works that you can make 2 ,000, 3 ,000%, 400
- 10:48% on your investment within a matter of days
- 10:50or months, you go, well, can I invest more? And
- 10:53that's what they look for. And that's the escalation.
- 10:57And you're told, look, the more you invest, the
- 10:59more you make, there are different ways through
- 11:03which funds are collected. These are really sophisticated
- 11:07in a lot of cases. Sometimes the funds are collected
- 11:11when they provide an address by which to send
- 11:14Bitcoin. Other times it's Ethereum. There are
- 11:17times it could be a stablecoin. But in addition
- 11:20to that, they'll ask for wires. And in our review
- 11:26of it, there are banks in Asia whose business
- 11:31appears to be, if not exclusively, but substantially,
- 11:34to receive funds originating from these scams.
- 11:38the same players come up time and time and time
- 11:41again. That conversation is a bit beyond the
- 11:44scope of this presentation. So once we get to
- 11:48level four, this escalation, where the victim
- 11:50starts investing more and more and more, the
- 11:53perpetrators at some point see that they're tapped.
- 11:58And that's when the conversations turn a little
- 12:01bit. Now it's not, can you put more in? Now the
- 12:05victim is saying, look, I'd like to take some
- 12:07money out. There's always some kind of a stalling
- 12:10period. Can't do it now. The exchange is locked
- 12:13up. Right now there's some kind of a conversion
- 12:16happening. But in the meantime, if you want to
- 12:20invest more, there's always some kind of a great
- 12:23play on the horizon. You're going to make double,
- 12:25you're going to make triple. When the victim
- 12:28finally senses that something is completely amiss,
- 12:32usually family steps in or someone says, listen,
- 12:35you've been sending money God knows where. And
- 12:38they ask for it back That's where they're told
- 12:43look invest more me, you know You'll double it
- 12:47and then we'll return it all to you when none
- 12:49of that works the play The we see time and time
- 12:55again is this taxes issue That's when the scammer
- 12:58becomes very aggressive and says listen if you
- 13:01want your money you can have your money But you
- 13:08have to pay taxes on all the money that you've
- 13:10made and time and time again, you know people
- 13:14I guess feel that they're in too deep and They
- 13:18will find borrow however get the funds to wire
- 13:23these reported taxes to the scammer and at that
- 13:26point in time a hundred percent of the time all
- 13:29communication sees at that point basically this
- 13:33slaughter is complete and and the money's gone.
- 13:41And we'll address in a minute what the remedies
- 13:44are, but let me navigate back to the statistics
- 13:47of this, and they are staggering. Chain Analysis
- 13:55is a company that can track the movement of crypto
- 14:03on the blockchain, and it has found that these
- 14:07criminal networks have received more than 75
- 14:09billion from various victims, which in the scope
- 14:15of four or five years, which is a staggering
- 14:18amount. And additional statistics from the FBI
- 14:23indicates that these big butchering losses are
- 14:29about 69 million in 2023 alone, in Maryland alone.
- 14:33And finally, just to drive the point home that
- 14:36these statistics are valid and real, the DOJ
- 14:40just recently, this was this month, announced
- 14:43that they seized 127 ,000 Bitcoin, that's $15
- 14:47billion worth, from a massive crypto scam run
- 14:51by the Prince Holding Group. And it's Chairman
- 14:53Chenzi, who apparently is a fugitive from justice.
- 15:00This is not one or two. people operating this,
- 15:05not even 10 or 50. This is thousands of people,
- 15:08a lot are the victims of human trafficking. They
- 15:12operate from these massive centers. These are
- 15:14just large buildings in Southeast Asia where
- 15:18all the operations are these scams. The number
- 15:26of players are significant in this scam. Again,
- 15:31this is a little beyond the scope of this overview
- 15:34presentation, but we'll be distributing this
- 15:38PowerPoint to all the attendees and you'll have
- 15:42a chance to review it. What do you do? A client
- 15:47calls and says, look, I've seen that on TV, but
- 15:50it looks like I'm a victim of this pick butchering
- 15:52scam. So there's ICE3, which is the Internet
- 15:56Crime Complaint Center. It's a government entity.
- 16:00It's basically FBI. It's an FBI related department.
- 16:06The problem, and this is from colloquial conversations,
- 16:11the problem with them is they'll only take on
- 16:13a loss that's in excess of 10 million and one
- 16:15that happened within the last maybe three, four,
- 16:19five days a week of being contacted. They are
- 16:24not staffed with a lot of people. and they're
- 16:29inundated because these scams happen all the
- 16:32time. There's legal action, and we'll address
- 16:35that in a little bit. There are also crypto consulting
- 16:38companies. What they can do is sometimes track.
- 16:42The unique thing about crypto, and this may be
- 16:45redundant for some of the people who are deeper
- 16:47in the space, but everyone says it's anonymous.
- 16:50It is anonymous to a degree, but it's trackable
- 16:55because every transaction moves along the blockchain
- 16:57that way. I guess payments would look on a financial
- 17:02ledger. So you can see where Bitcoin goes from
- 17:06one address to another, to another, to another.
- 17:09There are games that people play such as setting
- 17:12it to something called a mixer. A mixer is a
- 17:15situation where it's a service where you can
- 17:19send your crypto and for a fee they'll mix it
- 17:22up with other people's cryptocurrency. run it
- 17:25through a million different transactions between
- 17:27wallets, and then distribute to you your funds
- 17:30net of the fees that they charge, the arguments
- 17:34that whether or not these services are legal,
- 17:38illegal, or primarily illegal. But fundamentally,
- 17:41they make it more difficult to track. Sometimes
- 17:45if someone moves, this rarely happens because
- 17:50the fraudsters are very sophisticated, but if
- 17:53they move the crypto from say Coinbase to their
- 17:56own account in Binance, the consulting companies
- 18:00can often get the funds frozen and then there
- 18:03could be a process for getting access to them.
- 18:09Friendly law enforcement, human assets, platform
- 18:12personnel can all help in the right situation
- 18:15and with the right guidance. We've seen wallets
- 18:18be frozen. We've seen foreign law enforcement
- 18:22actually arrest perpetrators who were identified
- 18:26through KYC know your customer a material submitted
- 18:29to exchanges They were used to launder the funds
- 18:33through but these are complicated Complicated
- 18:37paths towards recovery Now the next subject is
- 18:42an account takeover before we go there I think
- 18:46one thing that would make sense to address is
- 18:50just pure investment fraud in the context of
- 18:52crypto. So I'll stop sharing and I'll let Briana
- 18:56address that subject. Great. Yeah, so before
- 19:01we get into account takeovers and social engineering,
- 19:05I did want to cover a different type of crypto
- 19:08investment scheme that our firm has seen and
- 19:11we've represented victims in that differs from
- 19:15the Pig butchering scheme where you know, those
- 19:18are often romance Scams, they're usually conducted
- 19:22fully online where the scammer has a fake persona
- 19:25And then they're not usually You know, it's typically
- 19:30like a fake a fake website. They may not actually
- 19:33have any coins in a blockchain By contrast, we've
- 19:35seen a different different type of investment
- 19:37scam where the scammer purports to be a developer
- 19:42of a new cryptocurrency or maybe an insider connected
- 19:46to a new cryptocurrency. They may be introduced
- 19:50to the victim by someone that they know. They'll
- 19:53befriend people in the victim's network, get
- 19:56an introduction. They'll meet with them in person.
- 19:59They're not misrepresenting their identity in
- 20:01the same way as the pig butchering scheme. But
- 20:06they'll get an audience and then they deliver
- 20:09a very smooth and sophisticated investment pitch.
- 20:12They promote it as an investment opportunity
- 20:14like it's a new startup or something. They will
- 20:19present technical materials, white papers explaining
- 20:23all the new features and typically it's some
- 20:27new features, some new technical innovation that
- 20:29supposedly distinguishes what the scammer is
- 20:32offering versus existing cryptocurrencies like
- 20:36Bitcoin. It will have faster transaction time,
- 20:43more environmentally friendly, more secure. And
- 20:46they go into detail and provide very specific
- 20:48metrics and information about all these aspects
- 20:51of the new coin that they've supposedly developed.
- 20:56And then the picture is that this is going to
- 20:57become the next Bitcoin. You have an opportunity
- 21:00to get into it early. It's going to take off.
- 21:03It's going to be used as real currency. The world's
- 21:06going to switch away from using Bitcoin and Ethereum
- 21:08and move on to whatever the new coin is. And
- 21:11in fact, the scammer may actually have developed
- 21:16something. It's surprisingly simple for anyone
- 21:21to create a new cryptocurrency coin. That's because
- 21:25Bitcoin's code is open source. Anyone can copy
- 21:28the code for Bitcoin, just change a few settings.
- 21:32It doesn't take much time and then you have a
- 21:34new coin based on bitcoins recycle code you give
- 21:38it a new name And then you have a new coin that
- 21:43you can use It of course it doesn't have the
- 21:46actual technical Attributes or the innovations
- 21:49that they've promised but the this the scammers
- 21:53are Relying on the fact that the the victim is
- 21:57not technology is not technically sophisticated
- 22:01enough to vet all of the representations that
- 22:03are being made. It's not as if they have the
- 22:05ability to look at the code of what's actually
- 22:07developed or compare what's being done. And the
- 22:11presentation is so smooth. These people are so
- 22:14sophisticated. The victims will take their word
- 22:17for it. There's no regulatory approval. Nobody's
- 22:24auditing a new crypto coin. Anybody can do it.
- 22:26There's even platforms that are available where
- 22:29the scammer doesn't even have to know how to
- 22:31do the actual coding themselves. It's very quick
- 22:35and simple to just develop something. Then once
- 22:41they have a new coin they've developed, there
- 22:44are ways that the scammer will make it look legitimate.
- 22:47They may get the coin listed on platforms, on
- 22:52exchanges. But in fact, if they get the coin
- 22:57listed on exchanges out of the United States,
- 23:00these foreign exchanges aren't necessarily doing
- 23:03any vetting about what they allow to be listed
- 23:05on their platforms. There's certain exchanges
- 23:07that will just list anything where they pay the
- 23:10fee. It's pay to play. They're not checking the
- 23:13marketing promises. They're not checking the
- 23:16performance claims. It's very minimal paperwork.
- 23:21Maybe the exchange is asking for for an opinion
- 23:25letter from from the scammer and then there we've
- 23:28seen you know lawyers will sign like a form letter
- 23:30you know saying that it's all good and you know
- 23:34it's very problematic but the exchange accepts
- 23:36the money they put the coin up there and then
- 23:39the scammer can show the victims like look this
- 23:41is a real coin it's really being traded it really
- 23:44exists and the victim will go on to the exchange
- 23:47website see that there's trading activity going
- 23:48on but it's not a sign of legitimate legitimacy.
- 23:53All of the training activity is the scammer themselves,
- 23:58parties related to the scammer. They're just
- 23:59trading the coin back and forth with themselves
- 24:01to make it look as if there's something going
- 24:02on here when really it's all fake. Another way
- 24:07the scammers try to create legitimacy is through
- 24:11celebrity endorsements, influencer endorsements.
- 24:15It's the same kind of thing as getting it listed
- 24:17on a platform. The victim sees that these parties
- 24:21have endorsed it, they assume, oh, that means
- 24:23it must be legitimate. In fact, the celebrity
- 24:26or their influencer, whoever's guiding them,
- 24:29they're not vetting it closely. They're not looking
- 24:32to make sure that it has all of the claims that
- 24:34the scammer is saying. They're just getting paid
- 24:37for the endorsement in most cases. They're not
- 24:42necessarily looking into it too closely. And
- 24:45then along the same line, the scammers may have
- 24:48partnerships with existing retailers, financial
- 24:54institutions, crypto ATM companies. We've even
- 24:59seen it where they announced that they have insurance
- 25:04policies. If anything happens to your investment,
- 25:07we're insured, don't worry. Partnerships with
- 25:10wallets. Some of these partnership announcements,
- 25:16it may just be a blatant misrepresentation. The
- 25:20partnership doesn't exist. There's no actual
- 25:22insurance policy that's supporting the victims'
- 25:28assets in the cryptocurrency. Or the scammer
- 25:30might have a real relationship, but it's a paid
- 25:33-for endorsement. Again, we've seen that they
- 25:35take the proceeds and a lot of it is spent on
- 25:38marketing activity to create the impression that
- 25:42it's legitimate, that it's taking off, that something's
- 25:44going to happen with a new coin. We've also seen
- 25:48cases where they get on financial podcasts, they
- 25:51get on investment podcasts, promoting the new
- 25:55opportunity. And again, it's all a paid endorsement.
- 25:59The audience for these types of content may not
- 26:03understand that, that this is not authentic.
- 26:07And then lastly, a lot of these scams have a
- 26:11Ponzi scam kind of component where they ask the
- 26:15victim, to recruit other people. They may pay
- 26:18out a small return, you know, similar to the
- 26:22pig butchering schemes that Eugene covered. They
- 26:24gain the victim's trust. You know, you see you're
- 26:27making a great return on this. And so not only
- 26:29does the victim invest more money, but they persuade
- 26:32the victim to recruit more people in their own
- 26:35personal network, refer more people to them to
- 26:39invest. And so then it builds and builds like
- 26:42a pyramid scheme from there. As far as what can
- 26:47the victim do once they realize it's a scam and
- 26:52they're not getting their money back? Similar
- 26:56remedies to pig bitching. You can take legal
- 27:02action. There's fraud claims, conversion. We've
- 27:07pursued claims for a violation of California's
- 27:10Penal Code 496 for civil theft. But there's also
- 27:15potential securities fraud violations or causes
- 27:20of action for selling unregistered securities.
- 27:24Whether a cryptocurrency qualifies as a security
- 27:27under the securities laws, it's a really complicated
- 27:30question just kind of outside of the scope of
- 27:31this program. And it's really dealt with on a
- 27:35case -by -case basis. But in the cases that we've
- 27:37seen where something is being promoted as an
- 27:41investment, you know, it's clearly qualifies
- 27:46as a security under the Howey Test under the
- 27:48relevant securities laws. And again, you know,
- 27:53as Eugene mentioned before, there are crypto
- 27:57experts who specialize in tracing where the assets
- 28:03went. Like if the victim was investing in the
- 28:06opportunity by sending the scammer cryptocurrency,
- 28:11you know, there are people that can track where
- 28:12did that money go? Use that to track that down.
- 28:17This is also an area where, you know, sometimes
- 28:20law enforcement is willing to pursue these cases,
- 28:24you know, there have been some very high profile
- 28:25ones that the Department of Justice has has gone
- 28:28into. It depends on the size of the loss and
- 28:31the number of the number of victims again. And
- 28:37with that, I will turn it back over to Eugene.
- 28:42Thank you. So yeah, thanks for addressing that.
- 28:46There are basically, these are just conventional
- 28:48frauds, the same people that will sell you stock
- 28:52in a company that will go nowhere now see a more
- 28:55exotic opportunity in crypto because everyone's
- 28:58watching TV and maybe in stocks, you know, some
- 29:00people have made some money, but that's an old
- 29:04version of rags to riches or immediate Kind of
- 29:08gratification immediate riches story, but with
- 29:10crypto You see them you see the 20 year old billionaires
- 29:15and If not them why not you and the opportunities
- 29:19right there like Brianna said These people say
- 29:23all the right things The crypto is faster. This
- 29:27new coin is faster. This coin is insured This
- 29:30coin is bound to be adaptable. Bitcoin is expensive
- 29:34to transact in, but not this new coin that we've
- 29:37created. Bitcoin takes a lot of energy to transact
- 29:41in or to mine, but not this one. The white papers
- 29:45are long, they're complex, and most importantly,
- 29:50they're completely unvetted. You can put just
- 29:53about anything into a paper and presented to
- 29:56people's truth. And we've seen that time and
- 29:58time again. Statements being made that absolutely
- 30:01have no connection to reality. And any expert
- 30:04who looks at it says, look, this is just a fraud
- 30:08on its face. Of course, the people who market
- 30:13in these types of coins, they do not pitch the
- 30:18experts. They pitch people who have some... made
- 30:21some easy money and are ready to kind of make
- 30:24another killing of the new investment, which
- 30:26often fails. The former head of the SEC, Gary
- 30:29Gensler, has said that this industry is awash
- 30:32with scams and fraud and he was not wrong. Having
- 30:37said that, we'll move on to the next subject
- 30:45in this space, which is the account takeovers.
- 30:49Account takeovers are situations where the fraudsters
- 30:54somehow get access to a person's, whether it's
- 30:59a Coinbase account, it could be their Binance
- 31:02account, crypto .com, or it could actually be
- 31:04their wallet. In other words, they gain access
- 31:09to anywhere, any repository, where cryptocurrency
- 31:12is being held. How do they do it? Credential
- 31:17theft, they hack into a computer, find their,
- 31:20maybe they use the same passwords across a number
- 31:23of different accounts, whether it's email or
- 31:27their calendar software or Facebook. There's
- 31:32a whole gray market or black market, if you will,
- 31:35on the dark web where you can buy millions and
- 31:39millions of people's account credentials. And
- 31:43through that, these people are tenacious, sophisticated,
- 31:47they have a lot of technology at their disposal
- 31:50and a lot of skill and they just penetrate and
- 31:54penetrate and penetrate until they find whether
- 31:57they are the passwords or the key phrases or
- 32:02whatever it is that they need to log into someone's
- 32:05actual account and cash out the funds. This is
- 32:11a particularly attractive industry for this kind
- 32:14of activity, because speaking of traditional
- 32:20accounts with assets, for example, if someone
- 32:25manages to hack into a Wells Fargo account belonging
- 32:28to a person, well, you still have to move the
- 32:31funds out. Typically, there's not a direct way
- 32:33of wiring it. And even if there is, you have
- 32:37to wire it or send it to Another account which
- 32:41means that someone else had to have come into
- 32:43a bank shown their ID Set up the account. There
- 32:47is a paper trail. That's the KYC part of it,
- 32:49but with crypto wallets and foreign exchanges
- 32:54There's no and mixers there is no such requirements
- 33:00someone can literally buy a crypto wallet online
- 33:04a trezor or ledger and Use that address as the
- 33:10address that collects the funds. That said, if
- 33:14reports are made, some of these addresses will
- 33:16remain in the FBI and DOJ and other entities'
- 33:22files. So certain addresses are marked. But that
- 33:27doesn't mean that you cannot pull funds out of
- 33:29them. So if the transaction happens abroad, or
- 33:32it happens between two criminal actors, which
- 33:35happens all the time, then yes, the funds will
- 33:39remain tainted, but they can be used. And so
- 33:44crypto is a very attractive area in which this
- 33:47is done. Sim swapping is an interesting one.
- 33:49That's where people have basically called, this
- 33:53happened to a early tech investor. I think his
- 33:57name is Gary Kremen. Someone managed to gain
- 34:01access to his phone. the SIM card credentials
- 34:05and managed to direct the transfer. At the time,
- 34:09it was about $20 million worth of cryptocurrency.
- 34:11I think right now it would probably be in the
- 34:12hundreds of millions. He was able to recover
- 34:17a substantial part of it because the person who
- 34:19did it was a 20 -year -old New York citizen,
- 34:23but usually it's more professional, not amateurish
- 34:27players that are abroad and the crypto gets scattered
- 34:30all over the place. Companies like Chain Analytics
- 34:34and others will map out where funds have gone,
- 34:40but just because they can map it doesn't mean
- 34:43that they can always be recovered. So the typical
- 34:53The typical structure of one of these account
- 35:00takeovers is there's reconnaissance and credential
- 35:03threat. I apologize. Let me read this. So here's
- 35:31a typical structure of this. Someone does steal
- 35:34the credit login credentials. They get into an
- 35:38account, they take over it. Sometimes they change
- 35:42the passwords right away. They change the contact
- 35:44information right away. There's other techniques
- 35:46that makes it more difficult for the account
- 35:48holder and the platform administrator to take
- 35:52any kind of remedial action. And then they liquidate
- 35:57the funds in the account, usually the crypto
- 35:59byte. sending it somewhere else and the final
- 36:03step is the laundering one. Laundering is where
- 36:08they send it through mixers, they send it to
- 36:11willing brokers somewhere else who will trade
- 36:14it for a lesser amount in a different crypto.
- 36:17But ultimately the funds are gone. Just to demonstrate
- 36:23or discuss how sophisticated some of these systems
- 36:27are for the account control and evasion portion.
- 36:32What we've seen is situations where someone will
- 36:40actually change the two factor authorization
- 36:42settings, will modify the recovery email, but
- 36:46it's gone as far as in the case of one of our
- 36:50clients, they actually managed to squeeze in
- 36:56a software update into his computer. So right
- 37:00as they had him provide the key code to effectuate
- 37:06the transfer, and right when he realized what
- 37:11was happening, his computer started updating
- 37:14and he watched in horror for the next seven and
- 37:17a half minutes while the computer was resetting.
- 37:20And once it was reset, he was back in his account
- 37:23which had gone from 890 000 to about five dollars
- 37:29in assets and unfortunately we we see different
- 37:35variations of this exact thing um time and time
- 37:40again and the techniques used are very sophisticated
- 37:43and they're ever -changing so it appears that
- 37:47there's literally thousands of people dedicated
- 37:50to the singular objective of figuring out how
- 37:54to take over someone's account. That's why it's
- 37:57critical that people protect both their devices,
- 38:01their passwords, and I'll get into the social
- 38:05engineering aspects of crypto fraud in a second,
- 38:08but that's part and parcel of it where through
- 38:11social engineering, a fraudster will gain a certain
- 38:16part of information necessary to access a protected
- 38:19device or a protected account. And then we'll
- 38:26implement the takeover. And literally, one morning
- 38:30you look, you have all of these coins in your
- 38:33account, and the very next one, they're gone.
- 38:35We've seen people penetrate cold storage, which
- 38:40is just a... Crypto wallets that are not connected
- 38:45to the internet so you can't log into it, but
- 38:47you can reset them And that also might be a discussion
- 38:53for a different panel, but you can reset You
- 38:59can reset Wallets cold wallets and Basically
- 39:06your wallet that you reset with the credentials
- 39:08for the hacked one becomes the new wallet with
- 39:12all of the assets in it. So the question that
- 39:29we're always asked when we're called is what
- 39:31can you do? So let's assume that the account
- 39:34takeover happened on Coinbase. Well, obviously
- 39:39Maybe not obvious. There are two tracks. One
- 39:43is the legal track, the other one is the expert
- 39:48-driven effort to recover the coins themselves.
- 39:52Focusing on the legal track for the time being,
- 39:56there's a claim for a breach of contract, breach
- 39:58of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
- 40:00dealing, one for negligence, conversion because
- 40:04cryptocurrency is personal property. and also
- 40:10certain claims of false advertising and misrepresentation
- 40:12of security measures, which happens all the time
- 40:15because all these platforms tell you that they're
- 40:17so secure, so secure, and they have all of these
- 40:20sophisticated techniques that they implement,
- 40:23which I would say 99 % of the people reading
- 40:26those statements don't understand, but it does
- 40:29generate some trust. And these platforms are
- 40:33generally speaking pretty secure, but they always
- 40:38have... an Achilles heel and we'll address that
- 40:42a little bit later, but even Coinbase had one
- 40:45and it was a big deal and it happened literally
- 40:48this year. So these are the more kind of pedestrian
- 40:54claims that can be brought. Of course, there
- 40:56are very restrictive terms of services. There
- 40:59are arbitration agreements, mandatory arbitration,
- 41:01prohibitions and class actions and limitation
- 41:05of damages. And so you'll You also have to contend
- 41:08with the fact that the hack is a criminal act
- 41:12by third party. Presumably there's some immunity
- 41:15there. Ultimately, these platforms have a lot
- 41:19of money and are not that willing to part with
- 41:22it. And so they will defend the cases. Another
- 41:29way of... Another set of claims that can be brought
- 41:32is the violation of the EFTA, that's Electronic
- 41:35Funds Transfer Act, Reg E. There are some complex
- 41:40theories that were actually recently validated
- 41:43by a federal court in New York under the EFTA,
- 41:47where claims can be brought against these platforms.
- 41:50So long as the statutory framework is followed
- 41:53and you notify them of the transfer, they have
- 41:55an obligation under the law to take remedial
- 41:57action potentially. If someone is older, elder
- 42:01abuse claims can be brought and it's an unusual
- 42:05situation where such claims are brought but by
- 42:09statute the people would fit within it. Consumer
- 42:14protection or unfair unfair business practices
- 42:16is another claim. CLRA is an interesting one
- 42:20because under a recent case, a California case,
- 42:24the California Supreme Court or I apologize the
- 42:26Court of Appeals has stated that the CLRA's injunctive
- 42:31relief provisions are not subject to arbitration
- 42:34and therefore allow the class action to proceed
- 42:37where solely injunctive relief was sought. There
- 42:43are strategic considerations there as well. Obviously,
- 42:45if you're just representing one victim, you may
- 42:47want to arbitrate or litigate the case directly,
- 42:50but CLRA should not be overlooked because it
- 42:53does provide a different path that's immune,
- 42:56at least in part, to the mandatory arbitration
- 43:00provisions and class action waivers in those
- 43:03agreements. And that's point eight B. And we
- 43:10can discuss some of these remedies a little bit
- 43:13more during the Q &A portion of this presentation.
- 43:19Social engineering. So social engineering is
- 43:22the use of deception, impersonation, or psychological
- 43:25pressure to manipulate someone into performing
- 43:28actions that compromise their credentials or
- 43:31wallets or their assets. How's it done? Fishing,
- 43:40again, you get text messages, you'll get... SMS
- 43:45phishing spear phishing. I do not want to cover
- 43:48all of these because each one merits its own
- 43:51discussion but a typical situation is if someone
- 43:55calls you Calls you by your name calls you on
- 43:58the phone Speaks in a very elegant accent and
- 44:03tells you listen And it's usually sophisticated.
- 44:06They're not going to call right away and say
- 44:08hey, we're calling from Coinbase. What's your
- 44:10password? Obviously that doesn't work Everyone's
- 44:14red flags go up and they hang out. What do they
- 44:16do instead? They will call and say, hey, in my
- 44:20case, Eugene, you know, we're calling from Coinbase.
- 44:25We're looking at your account. By the way, they've
- 44:27managed to do it so that the phone number they're
- 44:30calling from, if you Google Coinbase phone, Google
- 44:34somehow shows the same exact number. I'm not
- 44:38sure how that was done, whether it was done at
- 44:40the Google level or whether they're using some
- 44:41kind of masking software on the phones, but you
- 44:44look it up and it's the same 800 number. You
- 44:46go, okay. They say, look, we know that in your
- 44:51account, you've got 58 Bitcoin, maybe some Ethereum
- 44:55and some stable coins. We're seeing a lot of
- 44:58weird activity. And so just be careful. You go,
- 45:04hey, no harm, no foul. They haven't asked me
- 45:06for anything. Sounds good. I'll make sure to
- 45:08be careful. Then you get another call a little
- 45:11bit later. We're still seeing all this activity.
- 45:14Please change your password. You go again. Okay.
- 45:16You're not asking for anything. Not a problem.
- 45:19Change your password. Some time goes by. You
- 45:22think it's all done. They call and they say,
- 45:25look, someone's trying to transfer funds from
- 45:27your Coinbase account. We can't stop it. You
- 45:29go, what do I do? At this point in time, you're
- 45:31trusting them. They knew everything about you.
- 45:33They knew your date of birth. They knew your
- 45:35address. They knew exactly how much crypto you
- 45:38had in your account. So at this point, you do
- 45:41believe that it's Coinbase calling. And they
- 45:43say, look, here's what you got to do. Move it
- 45:45to this wallet that we've set up. They'll send
- 45:48you a link. And then it'll be safe from this
- 45:54hack that's happening in your account. and so
- 45:56many people even people who are very sophisticated
- 45:58people that we do represent who ordinarily are
- 46:02cautious and intelligent and insightful somehow
- 46:05they succumb to these techniques that are just
- 46:08incredibly incredibly powerful and they will
- 46:15move the funds and much like in the other scams
- 46:22the funds are gone within a matter of seconds
- 46:25and you can actually go online and you see it
- 46:28dripping out of your account. It happens in all
- 46:33kinds of ways, airdrops, impersonation of platforms,
- 46:38the sim swapping attacks, fake investment or
- 46:42recovery scams. We've had our own experts complain
- 46:45to us that the reason they have such bad reviews
- 46:48online is not because they've done anything,
- 46:53but because someone else has pretended to be
- 46:57that very expert company, has onboarded clients
- 47:00who are probably the victims of their own fraud
- 47:03and scams, charged them an upfront fee, and then
- 47:06disappeared. And so the people have reached out
- 47:11and said, look, there's a company out there.
- 47:14We work with them. They're actually an upstanding
- 47:17company. When we ask them to send us copies of
- 47:20their correspondence or engagement letters with
- 47:22them, and we've sent copies to the company, and
- 47:24the company says, look, these aren't our engagement
- 47:26letters. This is yet another scam. So basically,
- 47:29these scams go into multiple innings, if you
- 47:33will, until they manage to bleed someone completely
- 47:37dry. I alluded to the fact that some of these
- 47:49techniques are very sophisticated. Well, this
- 47:51one is probably the most sophisticated of them.
- 47:56Basically, these hackers managed to purchase
- 48:00a substantial set of customer information from
- 48:04Coinbase contractors operating in India. So in
- 48:07May of 2025, Coinbase actually announced that
- 48:10this happened. The CEO, Brian Armstrong, came
- 48:13out and said that rather than pay the ransom
- 48:17of 20 million the hackers demanded he was going
- 48:20to instead offer the 20 million dollar reward
- 48:23for information leading to the attackers arrest.
- 48:26I don't know if anyone collected that 20 million
- 48:28but what I do know is that a whole lot of people
- 48:31lost a lot more than 20 million dollars that
- 48:35was being sought and what I also know is that
- 48:38Coinbase is not exactly rushing to refund the
- 48:42money even though this is clearly their fault.
- 48:45The current position appears to be the lack of
- 48:51causation or Coinbase's assertion that the plaintiffs
- 48:57cannot demonstrate causation between this leak
- 49:00and the theft. But when someone calls you and
- 49:04has all of your information, your date of birth,
- 49:09your account balances, the street that you live
- 49:12on, your mother's maiden name, That certainly
- 49:17generates the requisite trust and coupled with
- 49:20the other techniques that the scammers use, these
- 49:24Coinbase users did provide information that led
- 49:28to their accounts being drained. So the causal
- 49:31connection is there, but evidently not in the
- 49:34eyes of Coinbase. Here's the anatomy of a social
- 49:41engineering attack. The difference between the
- 49:51social engineering attacks and account takeovers
- 49:54is that the attack hinges on user deception,
- 49:57not a system breach. So in a social engineering
- 49:59scam, it's the user that ultimately provides
- 50:03the keys to their account as opposed to someone
- 50:07jumping onto the platform without their knowledge
- 50:09and transferring out their resources. Recovery
- 50:14is rare and legal claims are not as powerful.
- 50:23because other than in the Coinbase example here,
- 50:26usually platforms say, look, someone got into
- 50:29your account, someone accessed, you gave the
- 50:31person the keys to your account, you can't really
- 50:33fault us for it. Still, you can track where the
- 50:39funds went. You can potentially bring legal claims
- 50:44for certain acts of negligence stemming from
- 50:48inadequate security mechanisms, but they are
- 50:51a lot more difficult. And with that, we would
- 50:57like to turn it over to question and answer portion
- 51:01of this discussion. Eugene, I've got the Q &A
- 51:08open. I see it. You see it? Yeah. So one of the
- 51:13questions is, what responsibility do financial
- 51:16institutions have with large unexpected transfers
- 51:20out of the person's account, particularly seniors.
- 51:25So I think we touched on that very question earlier.
- 51:32It largely depends. So why were the funds transferred
- 51:37out? That's the question. How are they transferred
- 51:41out? Was it social engineering, in which case
- 51:43maybe someone called a senior? Told them hey,
- 51:47I'd like to access your account and For whatever
- 51:52reason they provided the information I think
- 51:54in that case the platform would have somewhat
- 51:57limited exposure because ultimately While there
- 52:01really is fraud the fraud in that case would
- 52:03not be the result of the platform's Emission
- 52:09that said a lot of the platforms are running
- 52:11all kinds of AI analytics and so The effect of
- 52:17that is they can always detect unusual activity.
- 52:20Sometimes when they're aware that there's been
- 52:23a spike in a particular type of fraud, they will
- 52:26block certain substantial transfers before the
- 52:29transfers occur until they're validated. And
- 52:34we've seen that in the case of a client of a
- 52:38client where over 10 million was transferred
- 52:42out, even though the platform itself has said,
- 52:46look we're not going to hit send on this but
- 52:52ultimately the liability is small in the event
- 52:55of social engineering now if the account was
- 52:58taken over and it was done through a flaw on
- 53:02the platform, I think the claims are substantial.
- 53:04I think there's a claim for negligence. I think
- 53:06there's a claim for breach of contract, breach
- 53:08of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There
- 53:10is an elder abuse claim that's technically available,
- 53:13though I've not seen it litigated through the
- 53:15appellate level, but based on the statutory prescriptions,
- 53:19it's there. And that is a better claim. That
- 53:24said, much like a bank account being drained
- 53:28by someone to whom you give a debit card and
- 53:32you're a PIN. The responsibility is often perhaps
- 53:39minimal, sometimes not even realistic. So let's
- 53:48see what else we have. We have a question from
- 53:50Kate Brown. Do you want to address it? How do
- 53:53we protect consumers when the current administration
- 53:56is pro -crypto and Bitcoin and have pardoned
- 53:59offenders? I think that's more of a policy question.
- 54:03Yeah, that's a difficult one. It's hard to know
- 54:11the environment. Also, we're aware of all these
- 54:13pending... Investigations and enforcement actions
- 54:17that have been going on and now it's kind of
- 54:19hard to know like what's the status have the
- 54:21priorities and enforcement changed with the with
- 54:25the administration So, yeah, I mean I'd say it's
- 54:30challenging I mean, I'm not sure how we How we
- 54:35address that There's another one in terms of
- 54:38our record of recovering assets. That's a really
- 54:40tricky question. I don't think there could be
- 54:43ever a record, each case is different. Each case
- 54:48is different, the players are different, the
- 54:50parties are different. It's a very, very difficult
- 54:53question to answer. Sometimes if you add quickly,
- 54:57depending on the organization, maybe you can
- 55:00get a wallet frozen and you start talking to
- 55:02the operator. For example, where there's a like
- 55:06circle .io where there is an actual entity behind
- 55:10it, as opposed to a fully decentralized situation
- 55:14like Bitcoin. So that's a complex question. There's
- 55:18also a question about specific points of contact
- 55:21within the DOJ for crypto fraud. As I mentioned,
- 55:24there's ICE 3, but they are completely overwhelmed.
- 55:33So an FBI report can be made and We've made them,
- 55:36in the case of a client, they lost 14 million
- 55:39dollars to one of these romance scams, big butchering
- 55:41scams. And maybe, Brianna, you can address that
- 55:46and also the next question about whether or not
- 55:47there are international organizations that help
- 55:50coordinate investigations. Sure. I mean, I don't
- 55:53know if there's one international organization
- 55:56that coordinates assisting victims. I will say
- 56:01that, you know, in the case of the the client
- 56:04who lost the $14 million to the big butchering
- 56:07scam. It involved a number of different jurisdictions.
- 56:12We had to trace where the money went. It went
- 56:14to certain bank accounts in Hong Kong. Certain
- 56:18actors were in Singapore. There's a lot of different
- 56:22coordination. We ended up making reports to the
- 56:26authorities in a number of different countries.
- 56:30Ultimately, the Hong Kong police force was able
- 56:34to track the accounts that we provided and freeze
- 56:38those accounts. And so they are pursuing it.
- 56:45It remains to be seen, will they put the perpetrators
- 56:50in jail? Can they track down where they're actually
- 56:53located? But we were able to trace the money
- 56:55and get it frozen successfully. working through
- 56:59the authorities in other jurisdictions. Yeah,
- 57:02so authorities sometimes can help, but they only
- 57:04will get involved in a really substantial amount.
- 57:07I think there are really open questions as to
- 57:09the liability of the foreign banks that either
- 57:13willingly or willfully blindly assist these scammers
- 57:20because we see the same players over and over
- 57:23again. And it's never a single transfer. So what
- 57:26these fraudsters will do is they'll set up 30
- 57:30different companies. They're all shell companies,
- 57:32all have the same address. And KYC has to be
- 57:37really thin on them. But each company will receive
- 57:40a wire for 120 grand, 150 grand. The wires themselves,
- 57:44they've gotten crafty because local banks are
- 57:46not going to... authorized without further conversation
- 57:51a wire that says investment in crypto that's
- 57:54going from You know a California residents account
- 57:57to a Hong Kong bank They'll probably call the
- 58:00person have a conversation with them So instead
- 58:03they're telling the victims to say hey, it's
- 58:05for farming equipment or for you know plastics
- 58:08or something like that Which is unfortunate these
- 58:12people trusting in these? Romancers will do so,
- 58:17but their problem then is, in my view, that it's
- 58:21very difficult for them to go back to their own
- 58:23bank and say, why did you authorize me to send
- 58:25this wire? We think you were asleep at the wheel.
- 58:28You were negligent. The bank can come back and
- 58:32say, well, you're the one that committed bank
- 58:34fraud by identifying the reason for the wire
- 58:39transfer that wasn't actually what it was. So
- 58:42I think these victims are being squeezed from
- 58:45both sides. They're sending money kind of into
- 58:49space, into a space where it's virtually impossible
- 58:53to get it back. But at the same time, I think
- 58:56they will have limited remedies domestically
- 59:00with their own banks, with their own institutions
- 59:02because they were led to initiate the transfers
- 59:08in a way that makes them almost not deliberately
- 59:13complicit in the fraud but complicit in this
- 59:16effort to mask the reason for the transfers out
- 59:18and I think it ends up biting them after the
- 59:21fact when they start looking for ways to be made
- 59:24whole. Ultimately, it's a very tricky path and
- 59:28sometimes requires in the cases that we handle
- 59:32both the legal aspect of it but also the tracing
- 59:36and the freezing and we have colleagues who can
- 59:39literally serve search warrants in Ukraine, in
- 59:43Dubai, in other European countries on people
- 59:46who come up in the KYC. I think we're right at
- 59:53the absolute end of our presentation. I don't
- 59:58know if someone from BHBA wants to jump on and
- 1:00:00tell us what to do next. And well, this concludes
- 1:00:03today's presentation. Thank you so much, Eugene
- 1:00:05and Brianna, for your time today. And thank you
- 1:00:07so much to our members for joining us. Have a
- 1:00:10great afternoon, everyone. Thank you all. Thank
- 1:00:13you.