Latest / UK Column Radio / Macron's China Visit — What Went Wrong? | With Arnaud Bertrand

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Macron's China Visit — What Went Wrong? | With Arnaud Bertrand · UK Column Radio

0:01
Hello and welcome to another episode of the Silk and Steel
0:04
Podcast. I am your host Carl Zah.
0:08
Today I'm joined by Arnold Bertrand, a French entrepreneur
0:12
and long term resident of China and the prolific commentator on
0:17
Twitter. Arnold, I invited you today.
0:21
But first of all, welcome to to the show again.
0:25
And I welcome you to the show today to to talk about
0:30
specifically the Macron visit to China.
0:34
What has it accomplished and why is he even there?
0:40
Maybe we can just go from there, Arnold.
0:42
Sure. I mean, to be honest, it's a bit
0:46
strange because I mean there were some stated purposes for
0:52
his visit from from the French side.
0:56
So one of them was to speak about the, the trade imbalance
1:03
between China and, and France and, and Europe.
1:08
Another one was the the usual, you know, rhetoric on the
1:13
Ukraine war where they want China to, to help.
1:18
Even though, you know, at this stage, I don't think even Macron
1:23
believes that, that it is realistic, but at least that's
1:28
what they're telling the the French public.
1:31
And he also came with a very large French delegation of I
1:36
think something like 40 CEOs. So clearly another purpose of
1:41
the visit was was business simply to, you know, sign
1:45
contracts on the on so on and so forth.
1:49
And All in all, I guess last purpose of the visit was to, you
1:56
know, sort of position France as an interlocutor of of China,
2:04
which has to be fair, historically been been the world
2:09
of France because we were the first country in the West to
2:14
establish diplomatic relations with with China in the 1960s.
2:20
Nineteen 64 exactly if I remember correctly, with the
2:25
goal, which was almost 10 years before the Americans.
2:30
So there is this long tradition. France, as you know, I would say
2:35
you could call it a special relationship normally with with
2:39
China. So it was in in that tradition.
2:42
And in fact, you know, Macron was was shown a lot of respect
2:48
by China during his visit because she personally
2:53
accompanied him to Cituan. They visited Chengdu and Du
3:00
Jiangyang together, which is extremely rare that she goes
3:06
outside Beijing on some sort of a touristic visit with with a
3:11
foreign leader, especially a Western leader.
3:14
I checked, I think that no Chinese leader has ever done
3:17
that with any American president, for instance.
3:20
So it was a big mark of, of respect.
3:24
So actually in that regard, the visits from both sides went
3:30
pretty well. But as soon as Macron set foot
3:35
back in France, and this is a typical Macron move,
3:38
unfortunately, he started to threaten China by saying that
3:47
Europe would apply similar style tariffs on China than, you know,
3:54
Trump did this year, even though the Trump tariffs, of course,
3:59
came down. So, yeah, it's a bit bizarre.
4:04
What I wrote on Twitter is that it's it's it's like the complete
4:09
reverse of what you normally do. Normally you state your
4:13
grievances ahead of a visit and then you work things out during
4:19
the visit to at the end announce, you know, something
4:22
like, you know, all is good in the relationship, everything is
4:25
restored and so on. Macron goes to China, have a
4:28
nice visit and so on. On his way back, he's he, he, he
4:32
starts negotiating, which is, which is a bit strange and very
4:38
counterproductive, of course, because from China's standpoint,
4:43
I guess it's seen as, you know, we brought out the red carpet
4:46
for you. And then the first thing you do
4:49
when you go back to France is, you know, spit on us.
4:54
So that's not, that's not very proper, right?
4:58
So, yeah, that's, it's a bit depressing, but that, that's my
5:02
call for you. He he already did something a
5:06
bit similar to that the last time he came to China.
5:12
So yeah, it's, it's it's also why I found it a bit strange
5:16
that he's shown so much respect by the Chinese side, because
5:21
that was to be expected. So I, I don't know, can what's
5:26
going on exactly here. There is something I don't
5:29
understand. Well, I, I noted that on Twitter
5:33
that Macron seems to be way more popular in China than he he is
5:38
in his home country of France. You know, you know, you have all
5:41
these fans chasing him down in China.
5:45
You, you don't, you don't see that in France.
5:47
But yeah, I this is exactly what I was thinking.
5:52
I, I was recalling his last visit, which has always been
5:55
very also been very possibly received inside China.
5:59
There was a lot wall to wall coverage.
6:02
He was showing a lot of goodwill and he was actually talking the
6:06
talk. He the last visit he was talking
6:09
about Europe need to strike out with its strategic autonomy,
6:14
pilot an independent chart away, you know, not just blindly
6:19
follow America, which he got a lot of Flack for in the European
6:23
press. But then when he went back home,
6:28
I mean, it all that talk didn't really translate into action or
6:31
he was still pretty much following US lead on China.
6:36
Now for his latest kind of tirade against China, who do you
6:41
think his audience is? You know, who is he speaking to
6:44
on this, You know, raising terror on China?
6:47
So a quite common theory in Europe and in France is that so
6:53
Macron is at the end of his political career in France.
6:56
Clearly, in fact, in many ways he's not in power anymore
7:00
because he's kind of a lame duck president, right?
7:04
He doesn't even have control over over the government
7:07
anymore. So he's just, you know,
7:09
representative role. And he has like 2 years left on
7:13
his on his mandate even a bit less and he will be gone.
7:19
And so a common theory is that he's aiming for a top EU role as
7:27
the next step in his career, maybe something like van der
7:31
Leyen's position. And that's therefore his
7:37
rhetoric. Because if you if you look at
7:39
his rhetoric, he's not speaking on behalf of France, he's
7:42
speaking on behalf of Europe. So he's saying Europe will put
7:45
in place those, those tariffs. Well, actually it doesn't have
7:50
the power to say that because at at this stage, you know, he, he
7:54
can only speak for France, right?
7:55
He can't speak for Europe. And I'm pretty sure that other
7:59
European countries such as Germany, for instance, will find
8:05
issue with what Michael is saying because, you know, even
8:08
though they export less and less to China, it's still a very
8:11
important trade partner for for them.
8:15
So my guess is that he's starting to position himself as
8:21
kind of the tough guy for Europe, defending Europe's
8:26
interests on, on, so on and so forth.
8:30
But my take is that by doing what he just did, he antagonises
8:38
China, of course, and he antagonises other European
8:43
countries while I wait you, you, you're not speaking for us.
8:47
Like at least, I don't know, a concert with us before, you
8:52
know, starting a trade war with with China, maybe.
8:56
So, yeah, it's it's, it's it's not exactly logical from a
9:02
political standpoint, but yeah. And, and it's it's fairly this
9:10
sort of attitude is fairly typical of of Macron where he's
9:16
famous in France for what we call Omenton, which means at the
9:20
same time or in the meanwhile, where basically we he he will
9:25
try to cater to every audience at the so it it doesn't have a
9:30
backbone basically. So where is is going to you can
9:35
find declaration of him, which are like borderline Marxists
9:41
like to attract the extreme left and then borderline fascists to
9:49
extract the extreme right. And and that's a bit the same
9:53
thing he did there. If you listen, you know, in in
9:56
China, I spoke to students at university and I listened to him
10:00
and I was like, wow, I agree with every word of what he's
10:03
saying. Like we the world should be
10:06
together. We shouldn't, you know, I have
10:10
divisive rhetoric concerned like, wow, yeah, sure.
10:13
Of course that's that's great. And then the first thing just
10:17
when it comes back to France is like, you know, I've extremely
10:21
divisive rhetoric, which, which is all about threatening China
10:25
and, you know, almost Trumpian like rhetoric.
10:29
So yeah, it's it's that's my crown for you.
10:35
Yeah, I mean, I, I guess I understand why he's always given
10:40
a such grand reception in China because from Chinese
10:44
perspective, you know, China, remember France as Charles de
10:49
Gaulle's France, you know, when de Gaulle actually pilot a
10:53
independent policy, you know, including quitting NATO,
10:57
recognizing China. And I, I guess the hope is that
11:03
Macron maybe at least could pick up some crown of the GAO or, or,
11:08
or picking up some mantle, but that, that's obviously misplaced
11:12
because, you know, Macron, as you say, he knows how to talk to
11:16
the talk to the right audience. You know, he switch, he geared
11:20
to her, his, his, his audience. But the, but the problem is
11:24
today we live in such an interconnected world.
11:27
It's not like what you say in Europe will not be heard back in
11:32
China. I mean, like people, we'll just
11:35
think, OK, you, you this guy is not serious.
11:38
Yes, you can't you can't trust him at his words.
11:42
Does so. So I mean, but did his so is his
11:46
trip just mostly for commercial purposes and did did that did he
11:52
accomplish his goal just, you know, a signed contract for the
11:55
French companies in China? Not obvious.
11:58
There were talks of China being a lot of Airbus planes, for
12:03
instance, but apparently they didn't concretize.
12:08
So, you know, they, both sides said that they, they signed like
12:14
12, you know, understandings around certain topics and so on.
12:23
But this is kind of lukewarm stuff.
12:26
I, I don't think there were any like big orders of, for, for,
12:33
for French companies, at least I haven't seen any, any public
12:36
announcements around that. So I think that's, that was
12:42
pretty disappointing from, from a French business standpoint.
12:47
Of course, I have no idea why that is the case.
12:51
You know, some theories on regarding the Airbus planes is
12:55
that China wants to retain also leverage with Trump because
13:01
orders of planes is always, you know, big leverage.
13:05
And so, you know, they can always say tell Trump if you
13:08
play nice with us, we can buy Boeing planes, for instance.
13:12
So, you know, I'm, I'm sure there are those types of of
13:16
consideration or maybe also, you know, future leverage with, with
13:21
Europe as well. Maybe they don't want to play
13:23
the Airbus card right now and reserve that order for, for the
13:28
future. So, yeah, but yeah, only know
13:32
the trip seems to have been relatively unproductive at at
13:38
most levels. Like the joke in, in, in, in
13:41
French media is that the only thing it got was a panda because
13:46
there was a, a, a promise of, you know, replacement panda
13:53
being sent to a, to a zoo in France because two pandas were
13:57
sent back to China because they were old on the bit sick.
14:01
So that was agreed upon. But it's it's pretty much the
14:06
only very concrete thing that's that came out of the trip then.
14:11
Why? The question is why is he doing
14:14
this trip during the last leg of his presidency when he is in
14:19
fact the lame duck president? It's just for his legacy, you
14:24
know, like why? What's the point?
14:27
Yeah, it's, I mean, I, I, I think he's, he's relatively
14:32
diplomatically incompetent to be an ass because China is
14:37
obviously very important to, to France and to Europe.
14:41
And we do have subjects with China.
14:43
I mean, you know, we this trade rebalancing thing from Europe
14:52
standpoint is an issue. We have a growing issue.
14:56
But uncompetitiveness in in Europe where you know what
15:02
French media are saying these days is that we are the emerging
15:05
countries and China is the developed country.
15:08
And now we need to inverse things where we're the ones in
15:13
need of of technology transfers from from China.
15:18
And then, of course, you know, China could also help, you know,
15:25
in, in terms of leverage vis a vis the USI think this would be
15:30
a smart geopolitical positioning for Europe where you're kind of
15:37
the pivot in the middle, right, Where you, you we would have our
15:44
own China cards that we can have with respect to, to Trump.
15:49
So when Trump pushes too much, we can tell him, you know, we
15:53
have the Chinese on the other side who offer much better deals
15:57
on the on, you know, so you could do something interesting
16:03
in in, in many respects. But the way this played out it,
16:10
it looks like Micron came with a pretty arrogant attitude, pretty
16:20
unrealistic objectives that weren't achieved and nothing was
16:29
achieved. And it comes back and it starts
16:31
threatening China, which undermines this whole trip.
16:34
I mean, then it's a waste of time, I think.
16:37
And I generally think it it could have been productive
16:40
because China really, you know, now granted him a lot of
16:45
respect, showed that the door was open and so on.
16:48
So let's capitalize on, on, on that.
16:51
You know, we have this Goodwin on the Chinese side.
16:54
Why not capitalize on it instead of, you know, closing the door
16:58
shut? So yeah, it's, it's just, it's
17:01
sad, to be honest. What does France hope to get
17:06
from its interaction with China? I mean, what, what, what are the
17:09
French national interests involved when it comes to China?
17:13
What kind of relationship does France or the French Lee hope to
17:17
have with China at this point? I, I think there are two things
17:22
that are the objectives interest on there is the delusions of,
17:30
of, of the current French leadership.
17:32
So let's look at the delusions first of all, where they want to
17:39
rebalance trade with China, where basically their ideal
17:45
scenario is they sell as much to China as China sells to them.
17:53
But for that, obviously you need to have things to sell to China
17:57
that China is interested in buying, right, Obviously.
18:03
And, and, and that's the issue. The issue is in Europe right
18:08
now, and particularly in France, we've become quite uncompetitive
18:13
in, in many industries to the extent that, you know, the
18:20
Chinese are like, why would we buy your stuff when the stuff
18:24
that we make at home are, you know, much better quality.
18:28
So cars are a great example of that.
18:31
There was a moment where, you know, French cars were fairly
18:35
popular in China. They were mostly located in
18:38
Wuhan. Wuhan was actually the French
18:41
car city in China. That's why to this day there is
18:45
a French school in Wuhan because there were so many French car
18:49
executives living there. But, you know, drive around in
18:54
China these days and it's, it's almost impossible to see a
19:01
single French car simply because they're not attractive to
19:06
Chinese customers, right? So they have their own cars.
19:10
German cars are still to some extent competitive, even though
19:14
that's on the way down. Tesla is still to some extent
19:18
competitive, also on the way down.
19:20
But French cars, you know, pretty much gone and, you know,
19:27
otherwise we have, you know, the typical French stuff like
19:31
fashion or cosmetics or, you know, alcohol, wine and so on.
19:38
But that also is on the way down.
19:42
So, you know, just looking at wine, for instance, I just
19:47
recently saw that one of the foremost French critics of wine,
19:53
actually I did a tour of China, of Chinese vineyards and he was
19:58
astonished to see that the quality, as he said, on average
20:03
was better than in France. So he didn't say that the best
20:08
Chinese wine were better than the best French wine.
20:11
So I think, I think if you look at the, you know, the top
20:14
Bordeaux Grand Prix and Sun were still above China.
20:17
He just spoke about the the average standard that he thought
20:22
was was better at this stage in China.
20:24
So you can see a trajectory. Where bit by bit the Chinese are
20:29
going to be like, why would we import very expensive French
20:33
wine when we actually have three decent wine in China?
20:37
And same thing for fashion. You're starting to see, you
20:42
know, luxury fashion brands in China appear on on.
20:47
So bit by bit you're starting to see a pattern where the Chinese
20:52
are like, you know, we, we need less and less stuff for, from
20:55
France. And so the solution from the
21:00
French side is not to, to, to be kind of dictatorial, but that's
21:08
on say, no, we, we want you to buy your stuff even though you
21:14
don't want to. That was the time of the 19th
21:18
century. That was the problem with the
21:20
the IT was the exact same issue with the Opium War.
21:23
That's why the opium war happened because there was a
21:26
huge trade imbalance. China was selling much more
21:30
stuff to Britain that Britain was was selling to China.
21:36
And so they forced the Chinese to buy opium as as a as a
21:41
result. But they could do that at the
21:45
time because their military superiority, right?
21:48
So there were the Opium wars on the one on, on the forced opium
21:52
done China's fraud. That's not possible that that,
21:56
you know, China is too powerful. The French army I, I, I saw the
22:00
other day in one day the Chinese Navy in terms of tonnage
22:07
launched in a single day as many military ships than the entire
22:13
French Navy in one day. So, you know, that's, that's the
22:18
situation right now. So the solution is therefore to
22:25
make an effort on our side to gaining competitiveness on
22:28
trying to find a way to develop products that's that's that are
22:33
interesting to the to the change market or to become extremely
22:37
protectionist on our side to dramatically reduce the amount
22:42
of of Chinese imports. But that's shooting ourselves in
22:48
the foot because then it makes our companies even less
22:52
competitive when you're it's the, the India story, when when
22:56
you completely close, it's yourself down to, to the
23:00
exterior world. Sure, you protect your company.
23:04
Sure you the, the, the, the, the trade is balanced somehow.
23:13
But then because there is no competition, because your
23:15
companies are so insulated from competition, then they're
23:20
completely uncompetitive on, on the global level on on.
23:24
So we probably don't want that. So that's the reality.
23:29
So that's the first thing. The second thing is there is
23:33
expectations on the Ukraine war. So the expectation is that
23:37
somehow China will side, will side with Europe against Russia.
23:44
But that is also very unrealistic.
23:46
Like, why would China go effectively declare war on its
23:51
biggest neighbor, by the way, the one it has been warring with
23:57
for millennia? You know, that's why they build
24:03
the great world, right to. So why would they, you know,
24:09
start again, this sort of pattern with a great being
24:13
aggressive to their northern neighbor just to please
24:17
Europeans that that's just delusional.
24:19
They will they will never do that.
24:20
So there is this expectation from from Europe, but it it
24:24
won't happen. What China can do and what it
24:28
proposed to do, because the, the proposed peace plan in in 2023
24:34
was to play the role of moderator where they, they tell
24:39
the European side, you know, Russia's position, that the
24:43
Russia side, Euro's position, they try to find a genuinely
24:47
mutually agreeable compromise. But at this stage, Europe
24:52
doesn't want to compromise that that is the key characteristic
24:55
of of Europe right now. They're just, you know, very set
25:00
in their in, in, in their ideology on the very unrealistic
25:07
because they want to defeat Russia, which is just not
25:12
possible at this stage. So there is a big gap over
25:17
between what Europe wants from China on what can be
25:23
realistically achieved. So the solution is more changing
25:30
our mindset in Europe to be much more realistic because we can't
25:33
get things from China. But if we understand China and
25:37
if we're realistic about it, if if we keep asking for things
25:41
that are just way out there and, and just not possible, of
25:44
course, we will never get anything.
25:46
And the only thing we will achieve is an antagonistic
25:50
relationship which serves no one.
25:54
Yeah, One thing I remember you tweeting about the the French
25:59
report, how now we are the, now the table has flipped, we are
26:04
the emerging economy. We're expecting to get
26:07
technological transfer from China.
26:09
So dude, was was the expectation that, you know, Macron's visit
26:14
will facilitate some more Chinese investment into France,
26:18
you know, that that would tie with the Chinese technological
26:22
transfer, Was that also expectation?
26:25
Yeah. There is an expectation.
26:27
And I think to be honest, from China's side, that could be
26:31
something that they can, you know, that they could consider
26:38
because, you know, this is this is fair.
26:43
I will say because China did that a lot to to the West as
26:48
well in, in a, in a mutually agreeable way, not not as a
26:52
diktats basically company by company, OK, you want access to
26:57
our markets, but we need help developing for this or, or that
27:02
technology. So let's find a win win here.
27:05
So you could very much imagine, you know, something similar
27:10
where, you know, let's say Huawei is allowed to sell its
27:17
its phones or something to to the European market.
27:22
But you know, they help Europe in in some ways, you know,
27:27
commit to taking some suppliers for Europe or opening a factory
27:33
in Europe or, you know, something like that.
27:37
But I think the issue is that Europe wants to do it the in,
27:44
in, in a diktat way where they want to set to you some rules at
27:49
the European levels saying no, China needs to give us their
27:53
technology, they want access to the European market and so on.
27:57
In in a confrontational way on the on that sort of approach
28:03
never really works with China. It's, it's, it's very much
28:06
against the culture, which is all about mutual respect.
28:13
So I think there needs to be again, a mindset shift in Europe
28:19
where they need to understand the way China works, where you
28:25
can, you can actually get things from China.
28:27
The, the Chinese are, you know, businessmen, negotiators.
28:33
They're they're very pragmatic as soon as you treat with them
28:43
as equals and with respect. I think that's the basic thing
28:48
that's that needs to be understood on which very much
28:52
isn't the case still in France. I mean, when you listen to
28:57
people in France, the French media and so on, it's we're,
29:00
we're still, you know, you can still hear almost like 19th
29:06
century rhetoric on, on China where, you know, we still view
29:11
them as, as almost like, you know, uncivilized tribe that
29:19
needs Western enlightenment and so on.
29:22
Like it's, it's insane. It's insane.
29:27
How, how, how we are like, let me give you an example.
29:32
Recently there was a French MP. The only thing he tweeted was
29:38
Taiwan is Chinese, which is true if you look at it under any
29:45
angle, like politically is true, you know, even from the
29:50
Taiwanese angle because it's independence.
29:55
So, you know, even in that constitution, it's true that
29:59
Taiwan is Chinese is true from a cultural standpoint, Taiwan is
30:06
Chinese because it's mostly Han Chinese living there.
30:11
They speak, you know, Chinese and so on and so forth.
30:15
So there is no controversy at all with that statement.
30:18
Taiwan is Chinese. But that created a huge outcry
30:22
in France. And you had like all French
30:25
media saying like this is like, you know, CCP propaganda on the
30:31
Taiwan, Taiwan is a is a sovereign country, you know,
30:37
like complete historical revisionism.
30:43
So that's that's France right now still in that, you know,
30:53
express And of course, that is not conducive to understanding
30:57
China and treating them with respect.
30:59
And therefore, you know, getting some actual concrete things done
31:04
with China. We're shooting ourselves in the
31:05
foot, I think. I mean, it is power is very
31:10
baffling from the Chinese perspective because it's like,
31:14
what what does France have to do with Taiwan?
31:17
Does Europe have to do with Taiwan?
31:19
This is like, you know, Europe is not even a major colonial
31:23
power that's deeply involved in the region anymore.
31:26
Why? Why do you care?
31:28
And, and also that's actually, it is official position of all
31:34
the major countries around the world to recognize that, you
31:38
know, 1 China principle that, that, that Taiwan is part of
31:42
China and the only Rep legal representative of China is the
31:45
government in Beijing. So, you know, it's, it's kind of
31:49
baffling why there would even be a, a, a media storm over a
31:55
statement like this. Like what does, what does, you
31:58
know, Taiwan issue have to do with France?
32:01
What does it have to do with Europe?
32:05
Yeah, it's crazy. And the most buffering thing is
32:09
that it's getting worse. Like if you reread what was
32:15
written about Taiwan under the Gulf for instance, it was
32:20
actually much more reasonable even though at the time we were
32:24
during the Cold War so you would think that the anti communism
32:30
would be much more virulent. And even though at the time
32:36
France was way more powerful than it is today.
32:39
So if there had been a Taiwan war or Taiwan issue, we could
32:44
actually have done something about it.
32:46
But no, we were, you know, way more reasonable.
32:50
Like I was reading the book of the goes right hand man at the
32:58
time, a guy called Alan Perfitt and he was describing Taiwan as
33:02
China's Alsace Lauren. You know, in France, we had we
33:08
had an issue where we had lost Alsace Lauren to the to the
33:11
Germans on the on during, you know, decades.
33:15
The battle cry in France was we need to get back Alsace Lauren,
33:18
which we did in the First World War.
33:22
And it's true to some, to some degree.
33:24
It is China's as as Lauren. I mean, it matters as much to
33:29
China as it did as as Lauren did to us.
33:33
So, so there was some pragmatism, some understanding
33:40
that is largely gone at least from the from the mainstream.
33:44
Right now the mainstream is basically completely aligned on
33:49
Taiwan, align very much with that, you know, liberal
33:55
internationalists, you know, we need to kind of end of history
34:02
Fukuyama pipeline, which is somewhat bizarre because that
34:09
line is disappearing from everywhere.
34:12
The the US is moving out of it as as is obvious from their
34:17
latest national security strategy.
34:20
So Europe is less powerful, is the less bastion of this type of
34:26
supremacist Western thinking, which it cannot act upon because
34:32
it's not powerful at all anymore.
34:34
So yeah, it is. It's just pure ideology.
34:38
It's just bizarre. How how how did that happen
34:45
though? How did, how did kind of the
34:47
France, how did the kind of the neoliberal internationalist or
34:54
some people say globalist ideology take over France?
34:58
You know how? Because that was obviously not
35:01
the case back in 1960s. Yeah, so I, I think during the
35:09
Cold War, after the goal on the all all the way until the, the
35:14
Cold War, there was a pretty vivid intellectual ferment in in
35:20
France where, you know, a lot of French intellectuals were
35:25
communists, even Maoists. There were an enormous amount
35:30
of, of Maoists in, in, in France.
35:33
Some of the biggest French philosophers were very devoted
35:39
Maoists on the, on some very famous film makers as well.
35:44
Like, you know, when, when my dad was young, you could see
35:48
some movies in the, in the cinema in France praising the
35:54
Cultural Revolution on the Red Guards.
35:56
Like that was France at the time.
35:58
It's crazy to think right now, but, you know, France was very
36:01
much like that. But then the end of the Cold War
36:06
came on, on the, you know, there was sort of this triumph of of
36:13
the the the liberal internationalist slash globalist
36:19
line. And all those intellectuals sort
36:23
of, you know, did their Mia culpa saying, yeah, we were, we
36:30
were stupid on the sorry and on. So very few stayed on the Maoist
36:35
line, but few did, but very, very few.
36:41
And that's been the case since then basically that there was a
36:44
shift then maybe helps by the US, which is, you know, very
36:51
strong influence networks in in France on the, you know, a lot
36:55
of top French leaders were invited to the US on the, you
37:02
know, even maybe paid sometimes on some sort of scholarships and
37:05
so on. So anyway, there there was an
37:09
eradication of this alternative thinking in France basically, at
37:15
least in in the mainstream. And we're still on that plane.
37:21
And you know, what you need to understand about European
37:25
thinking is that it's actually quite ideology is very strong.
37:35
You know, you can remember during the middle age we used to
37:38
burn people at the stake if they were thinking wrongly, right?
37:42
It's in Europe that there was the Inquisition.
37:44
So anyone that was considered heretical, like, you know,
37:50
thinking wrong, we would literally burn them.
37:55
So that's we come from from that sort of tradition.
38:01
If you deviate from the mainstream thinking, it's, it's
38:05
actually very violent the the ecosystem, the atmosphere in
38:11
France. So like that guy that MPI was
38:14
speaking about earlier who tweeted just Taiwan is Chinese.
38:21
The reaction from the media is, is extraordinarily violent.
38:26
Like there was no one defending him except maybe people from his
38:30
French political group. Still, I'm, I'm not even sure,
38:37
but that's like it's, it's social death for the guy.
38:41
And so it's a very heavy intellectual atmosphere where
38:45
maybe some people want to express other thoughts, but they
38:50
know that if they if they do so, then it's it's social death.
38:58
So yeah, that that's the environment.
39:02
Speaking of ideological struggle, another thing I fail
39:06
to understand is the the the Ukraine issue.
39:10
I mean, Uus for the longest time Europe has been following
39:13
Washington's lead on the whole Ukraine crisis.
39:18
Now Washington wants to wash his hands of of the Ukraine want to
39:22
have a speech, a settlement with Russia.
39:25
Why I failed on From my perspective, I'm baffled why
39:28
Europe didn't just simply go along with that.
39:31
And why are they are, are they sick?
39:34
They, they saying they're going to pick up the slag.
39:36
If, if, if Washington refused to support Ukraine, they will do it
39:41
themselves. Like, but why that was, that was
39:45
like in a Washington LED project from the beginning.
39:49
Why, why these kind of attachment to that whole
39:53
project? I I I failed to understand
39:55
because wouldn't making peace be better for everyone, especially
40:00
for people in Europe? Yeah, I mean it is a bit
40:07
baffling. I agree with you.
40:09
So on, on it's it's hard to explain exactly why.
40:13
So one line of thinking is that it's actually a way to
40:22
manufacture consents for independence military in Europe.
40:30
So, you know, showing the European population there is war
40:38
in Europe, Ukraine is in Europe, we have an enemy which is
40:41
Russia. Hence the need to increase our,
40:45
our military budget on, you know, as a result, you know,
40:49
cuts your pensions, cuts social expenses and so on and so forth.
40:53
You need that sort of of justification.
40:59
Another line of, of thinking is, is, is that, you know, quite few
41:07
things keep the European projects alive, like can act as
41:17
a as some sort of, you know, federating idea on having an
41:27
enemy. Having a war is always a very
41:29
useful thing to kind of unite different peoples around
41:38
something common. Like the US has used that a lot,
41:42
right? Where they're not united,
41:47
they're actually very divided the United States, but you know,
41:52
so fun. They've used walls as as a way
41:55
to ready their population around, around the common goal.
42:00
So I think that the EU plays a lot on that using Ukraine, the
42:08
the boogeyman of of Russia as some sort of of writing cry,
42:14
right? Yeah, those are, if I want to be
42:20
generous, those are the two explanations, most likely
42:25
explanations that that I can see.
42:29
And then maybe it's simply that Europe, you know, often
42:38
functions at the lowest common denominator.
42:42
You need to put 27 people in agreement on something, which is
42:47
not easy because those are quite different nations like the
42:53
Baltics, which are extremely, extremely hostile to Russia,
42:59
right? In fact, the whole of most of
43:02
Houston Europe is. And then you have some countries
43:08
which are, you know, more more favorable, like like Hungary and
43:12
so on. And each has a vice, each has a
43:18
vote, equal vote. And, and, and when you have such
43:24
disagreement, often the best course of action is simply
43:29
nothing like you just stay the course.
43:32
There is paradises. You just, you know, keep doing
43:36
the same thing over and over again.
43:40
And in the absence of a very charismatic leader who can
43:44
propose a alternative vision on someone who is ready to, you
43:49
know, change course completely on, you know, maybe Trump, Trump
43:53
on say, you know, we are going to be the ones to negotiate
44:02
with, with Russia. I will speak with with Putin.
44:05
We will propose our own deal. And we won't let Trump do that.
44:10
Like that takes an enormous amount of political courage.
44:13
Like who in Europe could do that today?
44:15
You just don't have any vandalism if unless yeah, there
44:24
is like Macron doesn't have any, any credibility because he's
44:31
absolutely hated by by Russia. So yeah, it's, it's also an
44:38
absence of, you know, charismatic, visionary popular
44:43
leaders who can propose a positive vision.
44:49
What, what is, what is the future of European project at
44:53
this point? I mean, I, I just Speaking of
44:57
Europe and you mentioned there's many differences among its
45:00
member nations. I remember the Nesperia case.
45:04
The Dutch economic minister was brought before EU to ask about
45:10
why he did not inform EU or China about his decision to
45:15
seize Nesperia from the Chinese parent company Wintech.
45:19
And he said, oh, this because the less people know about it,
45:24
the better. That's we don't have time to
45:27
inform everybody including EU because you know, then then the
45:32
Chinese might have the time to act, which is which make me
45:38
question, so who is setting the policy here?
45:42
If I like an individual economic minister of Netherland, in this
45:47
case, he apparently his action actually impacted all of you as
45:55
a whole, because, you know, he created the whole semiconductor
45:58
supply chain crisis by the seizing of Nesperia that
46:02
impacted the German and the French automakers.
46:06
Yet he he decided, OK, I I don't need to apparently I don't need
46:09
to consult with anybody, including the EU politicians.
46:14
I can just go ahead and make this decision on my own.
46:18
And and which he stood by and he said he would do it again, you
46:22
know, even even know what had happened.
46:24
What is what is your I want your take on like the future of the
46:31
EU project? Yeah, I mean, I'm basically it's
46:40
it's it's very clear that things don't work today.
46:43
Right on, on the Nixterior case is a great example because it
46:51
shows there is no strategy, there is no coordination, it's
46:53
just a mess. What I always say when it comes
46:59
to Europe is there is either too much Europe or not enough.
47:04
But but the, the amount right now is, is is not OK.
47:08
So either Europe becomes, you know, almost like a federation,
47:14
like an actual state with, you know, the power of a state
47:19
coordination. It can really impose things on
47:22
its members. And it is coherent on the, you
47:25
don't have this mess where all 27 need to agree on, on
47:29
everything, which leads to paralysis and so on, where, you
47:33
know, that would enable some sort of coherence strategy to
47:40
emerge from, from this whole thing.
47:42
Because you have, you know, federal government deciding on
47:46
the top, on the, you know, this is our way.
47:49
This is the European way. We, we, we go for it or you have
47:56
less Europe where, you know, you give back some of the
48:03
sovereignty that was taken away from European nations to them.
48:08
And then, you know, it's really countries which, which are,
48:13
which are in charge. So this is, you know, nations
48:17
with their their sovereignty being able to to decide most
48:21
things. But the current sort of mix of
48:23
both is, is clearly very messy and and doesn't work.
48:28
So, you know, like it's the the famous Kissinger sentence
48:33
Europe. Who do I call?
48:35
There is no one you call. It's it's just, it's just a
48:38
mess. You don't know who who to speak
48:41
with, who speaks for Europe. Like Michael yesterday on on his
48:46
way back from from from China, he was behaving as if he was
48:50
picking for Europe, but he doesn't.
48:52
Van der Leyen often acts as if she speaks for Europe, but she
48:56
doesn't, she doesn't have any power to speak for Europe,
49:00
especially on foreign affairs. You know, it's, it's just weird
49:06
on, on you arrive at the stage where it's just weak on the
49:10
without, without advice on the reduced to, you know, having to
49:16
look, you know, pathetic as it as it does today.
49:20
So, yeah, I think it's either or either you you really build a
49:26
concrete European project, which is, you know, actually a
49:30
country, a federation and so on, or you're like, OK, we, we went
49:34
too far with Europe. Let's give back their advice to
49:38
to European nations on on some of their power.
49:45
So do do you think there's any hope for either the European
49:52
elite or the French elite in particular to have adopt A more
49:59
realistic approach in dealing with China?
50:02
Because right now, as you mentioned earlier, the their
50:05
expectations in their dealing with China totally does not,
50:09
does not match reality on the ground.
50:13
What, what what would it take in your opinion, would make them to
50:17
come, to come to a grip with a reality?
50:27
So first of all, I think that people in France actually are
50:33
more pragmatic than we sometimes assume.
50:39
But I think there is a lot of fear of speaking out as I was
50:43
speaking about the this sort of intellectual heaviness on, on
50:49
the social consequences if you speak out.
50:51
But when you speak with the average person, they're actually
50:56
quite, I mean, not always of course, but they remain fairly
51:01
pragmatic. So let me just give you an
51:02
example. I just wrote a book on China, on
51:06
democracy in China, on the ID for the book didn't come from
51:10
me. It came from a friend of mine
51:12
who is educated in the best cruise in France and he's a
51:15
partner of Mackenzie in France, and he's never been to China.
51:22
But on his own, independently, always being in France, he came
51:26
to the conclusion that, you know, China was a democracy and
51:30
maybe even more democratic than France on that case, very
51:33
educated, best cruise in France, you know, top job McKinsey and
51:37
Swan. So it shows that it's possible
51:40
those people exist, right? So it's about changing, changing
51:47
sort of the I don't think it will take much.
51:50
The DNA is there. Some of the right ideas are in
51:55
people's mind. It's, it's about lifting the,
51:59
the, the heaviness that's, that's in the, in the mainstream
52:05
on, on sort of liberating people to, you know, be more pragmatic
52:10
on ridiculing the, the ideology which so many people can see is,
52:17
is ridiculed anyway. But it's just, it's taken
52:19
seriously right now. And so no one can say it's
52:22
ridiculous. But if, if people started to say
52:26
so, then I think things could change quite, quite fast.
52:33
Maybe I'm too optimistic, but I think so.
52:36
I, I, I like to leave on the optimistic note and that that it
52:41
does offer a glimmer of hope. What is there any other topic
52:46
that that you wish to discuss today that we have not covered
52:50
Arnold? No, I think, I mean, when when
52:53
it comes to macro and France, that's that's sort of, I guess
52:57
the other big thing these days is the national security
53:01
strategy of the US But you know, that would be another hour or so
53:07
to discuss it. It's a it's a big thing.
53:10
So yeah, maybe there you go. Next opportunity to come back on
53:14
your contest. Yeah, exactly.
53:16
Next episode next episode we're going to have Arnold Bertrand
53:19
back on my show so we can go over the latest published US
53:24
National Security papers because that's very interesting because
53:27
you kind of lay out this. There's a new strategic priority
53:32
of United States and, and it's kind of drastic departure.
53:36
As you pointed out in your tweet from the past, when you know US
53:41
and, and there's there's less ideological language, you know
53:45
talking about spreading democracy and and and and
53:48
values. It's very more realist take on
53:56
international relations and geopolitics.
53:58
And yeah, we, but unfortunately, where are the?
54:02
Interestingly, actually, yeah, yeah.
54:04
Just interestingly, the there is still some ideological language,
54:08
but not towards China or Russia anymore, but towards Europe.
54:12
So it's kind of shifted. That's quite that's quite funny.
54:17
Yeah, well, OK, that that is a whole episode by itself.
54:20
So, so so look forward to that. I'm going to have Arnold back to
54:24
discuss that because that is a very important topic.
54:27
And for people who want to follow you Are Arnold your work?
54:30
Where would they go? I mean on Twitter, on sub stack,
54:37
Arno Bertrand, just my name so it's easy.
54:41
OK. Well, thank you.
54:42
Thank you very much Arnold, for making the time to speak to us.
54:45
Thank you for. People for people are listening.
54:48
Thank you for tuning in. Until next time, bye bye.