Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / The Polish plant hack that proved the NCSC's new OT guidance right
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Wednesday, the twelfth of August.
- 0:06The Polish plant hack that proved the N C S C's new O T guidance right.
- 0:12This week Poland's national C E R T published a forensic account of how attackers shut down a steam turbine
- 0:21at a heat-and-power plant serving around 50,000 residents.
- 0:25They got in through a "private" mobile network that nobody had treated as hostile.
- 0:30Days earlier, the N C S C quietly added its first worked example for the water sector to its secure connectiv
- 0:39ity principles for operational technology.
- 0:41Put those two things together, and you've got the clearest Secure by Design lesson UK critical infrastructur
- 0:49e operators will get this month.
- 0:51The guidance already exists.
- 0:53And here's what happens when the assumption behind it goes unchallenged.
- 0:57Next. How a wind farm became a way into a power station.
- 1:03On 29 December 2025, attackers broke into a Polish combined heat and power plant.
- 1:11C E R T Polska's follow-up report, published this week, traces the path.
- 1:17It starts with a compromised firewall at a wind farm.
- 1:21Then a cellular router, sitting on a private A P N.
- 1:25That's a dedicated mobile data channel, normally reserved for one operator's own kit.
- 1:31The A P N had no client isolation, so any device on it could reach any other.
- 1:37That let the attackers find a P L C at the heat plant that was still running default administrator credentia
- 1:45ls. From there, they bridged onto the operational technology network over S S H.
- 1:51Then they located three further PLCs, switched them into S T O P mode and password-protected them.
- 1:59That halted the steam turbine, and the water treatment system that makes process water.
- 2:04Staff restored the plant quickly enough that nobody lost heat.
- 2:09But C E R T Polska called it the first real-world case of a private A P N used as an attack path into critica
- 2:18l infrastructure. And it warned that the same "trust the A P N" configuration is common well beyond Poland.
- 2:26And finally. What the N C S C is telling water and energy operators.
- 2:32The mistake was treating a private A P N as safe simply because it was not the public internet.
- 2:39That's precisely the assumption the N C S C's secure connectivity principles for operational technology exist
- 2:46to correct.
- 2:49Reduce what is exposed. Centralise and monitor connectivity, rather than letting individual sites bolt on the
- 2:57ir own routes. And treat every boundary, cellular or otherwise, as actively defended, rather than inherited as
- 3:05trustworthy.
- 3:12ples to a legacy-heavy network.
- 3:14It's the first content the N C S C has co-authored with practitioners from its Industrial Control Systems Com
- 3:20munity of Interest. It's not dramatic reading.
- 3:23But it is concrete design guidance for people who actually run water and energy infrastructure.
- 3:29If you're a UK operator, read it against your own private APNs, cellular routers and remote access paths.
- 3:38Especially with the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill continuing through Parliament, set to widen formal ove
- 3:44rsight of UK critical infrastructure operators.
- 3:47Nobody defends default credentials once they turn up in an incident report.
- 3:52That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:58Thanks for listening.