Latest / The Plato Library / Sophist Section III
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: Part three of Sophist by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
- 0:07Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by
- 0:12Speaker 1: Jeffrey Edwards. Stranger. Let us inquire, then, how we come
- 0:18Speaker 1: to predicate many names of the same thing. Thetatus give
- 0:23Speaker 1: an example, Stranger, I mean that we speak of man,
- 0:28Speaker 1: for example, under many names that we attribute to him
- 0:32Speaker 1: colors and forms, and magnitudes and virtues and vices, in
- 0:37Speaker 1: all of which instances, and in ten thousand others, we
- 0:41Speaker 1: not only speak of him as a man, but also
- 0:44Speaker 1: as good and having numberless other attributes. And in the
- 0:49Speaker 1: same way, anything else which we originally supposed to be
- 0:53Speaker 1: one is described by us as many and under many
- 0:57Speaker 1: names Thetatus. That is true, Stranger. And thus we provide
- 1:03Speaker 1: a rich feast for tyros, whether young or old. For
- 1:07Speaker 1: there is nothing easier than to argue that the one
- 1:10Speaker 1: cannot be many or the many one. And greatest their
- 1:14Speaker 1: delight in denying that a man is good for man,
- 1:17Speaker 1: they insist is man, and good is good. I dare
- 1:22Speaker 1: say that you have met with persons who take an
- 1:24Speaker 1: interest in such matters. They are often elderly men whose
- 1:28Speaker 1: meager sense is thrown into amazement by these discoveries of theirs,
- 1:32Speaker 1: which they believe to be the height of wisdom. Thetitus,
- 1:37Speaker 1: certainly I have, Stranger, then, not to exclude anyone who
- 1:42Speaker 1: has ever speculated at all upon the nature of being.
- 1:45Speaker 1: Let us put our questions to them, as well as
- 1:48Speaker 1: to our former friends, Thetitus. What questions, Stranger, shall we
- 1:54Speaker 1: refuse to attribute being to motion and rest, or anything
- 1:58Speaker 1: to anything, and to assume that they do not mingle
- 2:02Speaker 1: and are incapable of participating in one another? Or shall
- 2:06Speaker 1: we gather all into one class of things communicable with
- 2:09Speaker 1: one another? Or are some things communicable and others not?
- 2:15Speaker 1: Which of these alternatives, Thetatus will they prefer? Thettus, I
- 2:20Speaker 1: have nothing to answer on their behalf. Suppose that you
- 2:23Speaker 1: take all these hypotheses in turn, and see what are
- 2:26Speaker 1: the consequences which follow from each of them. Stranger, very good,
- 2:32Speaker 1: and first, let us assume them to say that nothing
- 2:35Speaker 1: is capable of participating in anything else in any respect.
- 2:39Speaker 1: In that case, rest and motion cannot participate in being
- 2:44Speaker 1: at all. Thetatus they cannot, Stranger. But would either of
- 2:50Speaker 1: them be if not participating in being? Thetatus? No Stranger
- 2:57Speaker 1: then by this admission everything is in distantly overturned. As
- 3:01Speaker 1: well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest,
- 3:05Speaker 1: and also the doctrine of those who distribute being into
- 3:09Speaker 1: immutable and everlasting kinds. For all these add on a
- 3:13Speaker 1: notion of being, some affirming that things are truly in motion,
- 3:18Speaker 1: and others that they are truly at rest. Thetatus just
- 3:24Speaker 1: so stranger. Again, those who would at one time compound
- 3:30Speaker 1: and at another resolve all things, whether making them into
- 3:33Speaker 1: one and out of one creating infinity, or dividing them
- 3:38Speaker 1: into finite elements and forming compounds out of these, whether
- 3:42Speaker 1: they suppose the processes of creation to be successive or continuous,
- 3:47Speaker 1: would be talking nonsense. In all this if there were
- 3:50Speaker 1: no admixture. Thetatus true stranger, most ridiculous of all, will
- 3:58Speaker 1: demand themselves be who want to care out the argument,
- 4:01Speaker 1: and yet forbid us to call anything because participating in
- 4:05Speaker 1: some affection from another by the name of that other
- 4:09Speaker 1: thettus why so stranger? Why because they are compelled to
- 4:15Speaker 1: use the words to be apart from others in itself
- 4:23Speaker 1: and ten thousand more which they cannot give up, but
- 4:27Speaker 1: must make The connecting links of discourse, and therefore they
- 4:30Speaker 1: do not require to be refuted by others. But their enemy,
- 4:34Speaker 1: as the saying is, inhabits the same house with them.
- 4:38Speaker 1: They are always carrying about with them an adversary like
- 4:41Speaker 1: the wonderful ventriloquist eurycles, who out of their own bellies,
- 4:46Speaker 1: audibly contradicts them. Thetitus precisely so, a very true and
- 4:52Speaker 1: exact illustration, Stranger. And now, if we suppose that all
- 4:58Speaker 1: things have the power of communion with one another, what
- 5:01Speaker 1: will follow thetatus? Even I can solve that riddle, Stranger?
- 5:07Speaker 1: How thetatus why? Because motion itself would be at rest
- 5:13Speaker 1: and rest again in motion if they could be attributed
- 5:16Speaker 1: to one another stranger. But this is utterly impossible, Thetatus,
- 5:22Speaker 1: of course stranger. Then only the third hypothesis remains, Thetatus
- 5:29Speaker 1: true stranger. For surely, either all things half communion withal
- 5:35Speaker 1: or nothing with any other thing, or some things communicate
- 5:39Speaker 1: with some things and others not Thetatus certainly stranger. And
- 5:47Speaker 1: two out of these three suppositions have been found to
- 5:49Speaker 1: be impossible, Thetatus yes, stranger. Everyone then, who desires to
- 5:56Speaker 1: answer truly will adopt the third and remaining hypothesis of
- 6:00Speaker 1: the communion of some with some, Thetatus quite true, stranger.
- 6:06Speaker 1: This communion of some with some may be illustrated by
- 6:10Speaker 1: the case of letters, For some letters do not fit
- 6:13Speaker 1: each other, while others do. Thetitus, of course stranger. In
- 6:19Speaker 1: the vowels especially, are a sort of bond which pervades
- 6:22Speaker 1: all the other letters, so that without a vowel, one
- 6:25Speaker 1: consonant cannot be joined to another. Thetitas true stranger. But
- 6:32Speaker 1: does everyone know what letters will unite with what? Or
- 6:35Speaker 1: is art required in order to do so? Thetitus art
- 6:40Speaker 1: is required stranger? What art? Thetitus the art of grammar stranger?
- 6:47Speaker 1: And is not this also true of sounds high and low?
- 6:51Speaker 1: Is not he who has the art to know what
- 6:54Speaker 1: sounds mingle a musician, and he who is ignorant not
- 6:58Speaker 1: a musician? Thetitus, yes, stranger, And we shall find this
- 7:04Speaker 1: to be generally true of art or the absence of art. Thetetus,
- 7:09Speaker 1: of course stranger. And as classes are admitted by us
- 7:14Speaker 1: in like manner to be some of them capable and
- 7:17Speaker 1: others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would rightly
- 7:22Speaker 1: show what kinds will unite and what will not proceed
- 7:25Speaker 1: by the help of science in the path of argument.
- 7:28Speaker 1: And will he not ask, if the connecting links are universal,
- 7:32Speaker 1: and so capable of intermixture with all things? And again
- 7:36Speaker 1: in divisions, whether there are not other universal classes which
- 7:40Speaker 1: make them possible thettus to be sure, he will require science.
- 7:45Speaker 1: And if I am not mistaken the very greatest of
- 7:48Speaker 1: all sciences, stranger, how are we to call it? By zeus?
- 7:54Speaker 1: Have we not lighted unwittingly upon our free and noble science?
- 7:58Speaker 1: And in looking for the sophist, have we not entertained
- 8:01Speaker 1: the philosopher unawares? Satatus? What do you mean, stranger? Should
- 8:07Speaker 1: we not say that the division according to classes, which
- 8:10Speaker 1: neither makes the same other nor makes other the same,
- 8:14Speaker 1: is the business of the dialectical science, Satatus? That is
- 8:18Speaker 1: what we should say, Stranger. Then surely he who can
- 8:23Speaker 1: divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading
- 8:27Speaker 1: a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one
- 8:31Speaker 1: higher form. And again one form knit together into a
- 8:36Speaker 1: single whole, and pervading many such holes, and many forms
- 8:40Speaker 1: existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge
- 8:45Speaker 1: of classes, which determines where they can have communion with
- 8:48Speaker 1: one another, and where not status quite true stranger, and
- 8:55Speaker 1: the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only
- 8:57Speaker 1: to the philosopher, pure and true, Thetatus, who but he
- 9:02Speaker 1: can be worthy stranger in this region we shall always
- 9:07Speaker 1: discover the philosopher if we look for him. Like the sophist,
- 9:10Speaker 1: he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason Thetetus.
- 9:16Speaker 1: For what reason stranger? Because the sophist runs away into
- 9:20Speaker 1: the darkness of not being, in which he has learned
- 9:23Speaker 1: by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered because
- 9:27Speaker 1: of the darkness of the place. Is not that true Thetetus.
- 9:32Speaker 1: It seems to be so, stranger, And the philosopher, always
- 9:36Speaker 1: holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is
- 9:40Speaker 1: also dark from excess of light, for the souls of
- 9:43Speaker 1: the many have no eye which can endure the vision
- 9:46Speaker 1: of the divine. Thetetus. Yes, that seems to be quite
- 9:51Speaker 1: as true as the other. Stranger. Well, the philosopher may
- 9:55Speaker 1: hereafter be more fully considered by us if we are disposed.
- 10:00Speaker 1: But the sophist must clearly not be allowed to escape
- 10:03Speaker 1: until we have had a good look at him. They Titus,
- 10:06Speaker 1: very good, stranger, since then we are agreed that some
- 10:11Speaker 1: classes have a communion with one another and others not,
- 10:15Speaker 1: and some have communion with a few and others with many,
- 10:19Speaker 1: and that there is no reason why some should not
- 10:21Speaker 1: have universal communion withal Let us now pursue the inquiry
- 10:26Speaker 1: as the argument suggests, not in relation to all ideas,
- 10:29Speaker 1: lest the multitude of them should confuse us. But let
- 10:33Speaker 1: us select a few of those which are reckoned to
- 10:36Speaker 1: be the principal ones, and consider their several natures and
- 10:39Speaker 1: their capacity of communion with one another, in order that
- 10:43Speaker 1: if we are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness
- 10:46Speaker 1: the notions of being and not being, we may at
- 10:49Speaker 1: least not fall short in the consideration of them, so
- 10:53Speaker 1: far as they come within the scope of the present inquiry.
- 10:56Speaker 1: If peradventure, we may be allowed to assert the reality
- 10:59Speaker 1: of not being and yet escape unscathed Thettus, we must
- 11:04Speaker 1: do so, Stranger. The most important of all the genera
- 11:08Speaker 1: are those which we were just now mentioning being and
- 11:12Speaker 1: rest and motion. Thetatus, yes, by far, Stranger, And two
- 11:19Speaker 1: of these are as we affirm incapable of communion with
- 11:23Speaker 1: one another. Thetitus quite incapable, Stranger, whereas being surely has
- 11:30Speaker 1: communion with both of them. For both of them are Theatatus,
- 11:34Speaker 1: of course stranger. That makes up three of them, Theatatus,
- 11:40Speaker 1: to be sure stranger, And each of them is other
- 11:43Speaker 1: than the remaining two, but the same with itself, Theatatus
- 11:48Speaker 1: true stranger. But then what is the meaning of these
- 11:52Speaker 1: two words same and other? Are they two new kinds
- 11:57Speaker 1: other than the three, and yet always of necessity intermingling
- 12:01Speaker 1: with them? And are we to have five kinds instead
- 12:04Speaker 1: of three? Or when we speak of the same and other,
- 12:07Speaker 1: are we unconsciously speaking of one of the three first kinds? Thetitus.
- 12:13Speaker 1: Very likely we are stranger. But surely motion and rest
- 12:18Speaker 1: are neither the other nor the same. Thetitus. How is
- 12:22Speaker 1: that stranger? Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in
- 12:26Speaker 1: common cannot be either of them. Thetitus, why not stranger,
- 12:32Speaker 1: because motion would be at rest and rest in motion,
- 12:35Speaker 1: for either of them, being predicated of both, will compel
- 12:39Speaker 1: the other to change into the opposite of its own nature,
- 12:42Speaker 1: because partaking of its opposite. Theatatus quite true stranger. Yet
- 12:49Speaker 1: they surely both partake of the same and of the other. Thetatus, yes, stranger.
- 12:56Speaker 1: Then we must not assert that motion, any more than
- 12:59Speaker 1: rest is either the same or the other. Theatatus no,
- 13:04Speaker 1: we must not stranger. But are we to conceive that
- 13:08Speaker 1: being and the same are identical? Theatatus possibly stranger. But
- 13:14Speaker 1: if they are identical, then again, in saying that motion
- 13:18Speaker 1: and drest have being, we should also be saying that
- 13:21Speaker 1: they are the same. Thettus, which surely cannot be stranger.
- 13:27Speaker 1: Then being and the same cannot be one, thetatus scarcely stranger.
- 13:34Speaker 1: Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class,
- 13:37Speaker 1: which is now to be added to the three others.
- 13:40Speaker 1: Theatatus quite true stranger. And shall we call the other
- 13:45Speaker 1: a fifth class? Or should we consider being an other
- 13:48Speaker 1: to be two names of the same class? Theatatus very
- 13:53Speaker 1: likely stranger. But you would agree, if I am not mistaken,
- 13:57Speaker 1: that existences are relative as well as absolutely. Status certainly stranger,
- 14:04Speaker 1: and the other is always relative to other thetatus true stranger.
- 14:10Speaker 1: But this would not be the case unless being in
- 14:13Speaker 1: the other entirely differed. For if the other like being,
- 14:17Speaker 1: were absolute as well as relative, then there would have
- 14:21Speaker 1: been a kind of other which was not other than other.
- 14:24Speaker 1: And now we find that what is other must of
- 14:28Speaker 1: necessity be what it is in relation to some other,
- 14:32Speaker 1: Thetitus that is the true state of the case stranger.
- 14:37Speaker 1: Then we must admit the other as the fifth of
- 14:40Speaker 1: our selected classes. Thettus yes stranger, and the fifth class
- 14:46Speaker 1: pervades all classes, for they all differ from one another,
- 14:51Speaker 1: not by reason of their own nature, but because they
- 14:54Speaker 1: partake of the idea of the other. Thetitus quite true stranger.
- 15:00Speaker 1: Then let us now put the case with reference to
- 15:03Speaker 1: each of the five Thetitus how stranger. First there is motion,
- 15:09Speaker 1: which we affirm to be absolutely other than rest. What
- 15:13Speaker 1: else can we say? Thetitus, it is so stranger, and
- 15:18Speaker 1: therefore is not rest. Thetitus certainly not stranger, and yet
- 15:24Speaker 1: is because partaking of being Thetatus true stranger. Again, motion
- 15:31Speaker 1: is other than the same Thettus just so stranger, and
- 15:36Speaker 1: is therefore not the same Thetitus, it is not stranger.
- 15:41Speaker 1: Yet surely motion is the same, because all things partake
- 15:45Speaker 1: of the same Thettus very true stranger. Then we must admit,
- 15:51Speaker 1: and not object to say that motion is the same
- 15:54Speaker 1: and is not the same. For we do not apply
- 15:57Speaker 1: the terms same and not the same in the same sense.
- 16:02Speaker 1: But we call it the same in relation to itself,
- 16:05Speaker 1: because partaking of the same and not the same, because
- 16:10Speaker 1: having communion with the other, it is thereby severed from
- 16:13Speaker 1: the same, and has become not that but other, and
- 16:17Speaker 1: is therefore rightly spoken of as not the same. Thettus
- 16:22Speaker 1: to be sure stranger. And if absolute motion, in any
- 16:26Speaker 1: point of view, partook of rest, there would be no
- 16:29Speaker 1: absurdity in calling motion stationary. Thetetus quite right, that is,
- 16:35Speaker 1: on the supposition that some classes mingle with one another
- 16:38Speaker 1: and others not stranger. That such a communion of kinds
- 16:43Speaker 1: is according to nature, we had already proved before we
- 16:46Speaker 1: arrived at this part of our discussion. Thetitus certainly stranger.
- 16:52Speaker 1: Let us proceed. Then, May we not say that motion
- 16:55Speaker 1: is other than the other, having been also proved by
- 16:58Speaker 1: us to be other than the same and other than
- 17:01Speaker 1: rest Thetitus that is certain stranger. Then, according to this view,
- 17:07Speaker 1: motion is other and also not other, Thetitus true stranger.
- 17:14Speaker 1: What is the next step? Shall we say that motion
- 17:17Speaker 1: is other than the three and not other than the fourth?
- 17:20Speaker 1: For we agreed that there are five classes about and
- 17:24Speaker 1: in the sphere of which we propose to make inquiry.
- 17:27Speaker 1: Thetitus surely we cannot admit that the number is less
- 17:31Speaker 1: than it appeared to be just now stranger. Then we
- 17:35Speaker 1: may without fear contend that motion is other than being
- 17:39Speaker 1: Thetitus without the least fear stranger. The plain result is
- 17:44Speaker 1: that motion, since it partakes of being, really is and
- 17:48Speaker 1: also is not Thetitus. Nothing can be plainer. Stranger, then,
- 17:54Speaker 1: not being necessarily exists in the case of motion and
- 17:58Speaker 1: of every class, for the nature of the other entering
- 18:01Speaker 1: into them all makes each of them other than being,
- 18:05Speaker 1: and so non existent. And therefore of all of them
- 18:08Speaker 1: in like manner we may truly say that they are not,
- 18:12Speaker 1: and again, inasmuch as they partake of being, that they
- 18:15Speaker 1: are and are existent Thetatus. So we may assume stranger.
- 18:22Speaker 1: Every class then has plurality of being and infinity of
- 18:26Speaker 1: not being thettus. So we must infer stranger, and being
- 18:31Speaker 1: itself may be said to be other than the other
- 18:34Speaker 1: kinds thettus certainly stranger. Then we may infer that being
- 18:40Speaker 1: is not in respect of as many other things as
- 18:43Speaker 1: there are for not being these, it is itself one
- 18:47Speaker 1: and is not the other things, which are infinite in number.
- 18:51Speaker 1: Thettus that is not far from the truth, stranger, and
- 18:56Speaker 1: we must not quarrel with this result, since it is
- 18:59Speaker 1: of the nature of class is to have communion with
- 19:01Speaker 1: one another. And if anyone denies our present statement viz.
- 19:05Speaker 1: That being is not et cetera, let him first argue
- 19:09Speaker 1: with our former conclusion, i e. Respecting the communion of ideas,
- 19:14Speaker 1: and then he may proceed to argue with what follows
- 19:17Speaker 1: thettus nothing can be fairer, stranger. Let me ask you
- 19:22Speaker 1: to consider a further question, thetatus. What question, stranger? When
- 19:28Speaker 1: we speak of not being, we speak, I suppose, not
- 19:31Speaker 1: of something opposed to being, but only different thetitus. What
- 19:36Speaker 1: do you mean, stranger? When we speak of something as
- 19:39Speaker 1: not great? Does the expression seem to you to imply
- 19:43Speaker 1: what is little any more than what is equal? Thettus
- 19:47Speaker 1: certainly not stranger. The negative particles ooh and me, when
- 19:54Speaker 1: prefixed to words, do not imply opposition, but only difference
- 19:58Speaker 1: from the words, or more correctly, from the things represented
- 20:02Speaker 1: by the words which follow them. Thettus quite true, Stranger.
- 20:08Speaker 1: There is another point to be considered. If you do
- 20:10Speaker 1: not object thetitus, what is it, stranger? The nature of
- 20:16Speaker 1: the other appears to me to be divided into fractions,
- 20:19Speaker 1: like knowledge, Thetitus, how so stranger, Knowledge, like the other,
- 20:25Speaker 1: is one. And yet the various parts of knowledge have
- 20:28Speaker 1: each of them their own particular name, and hence there
- 20:32Speaker 1: are many arts and kinds of knowledge. Thetatus quite true stranger.
- 20:38Speaker 1: And is not the case the same with the parts
- 20:40Speaker 1: of the other, which is also one, Thetatus very likely.
- 20:45Speaker 1: But will you tell me how stranger? There is some
- 20:49Speaker 1: part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful
- 20:52Speaker 1: Thettus there is stranger. Shall we see that this has
- 20:57Speaker 1: or has not a name? Thetitus it has, for whatever
- 21:01Speaker 1: we call not beautiful is other than the beautiful, not
- 21:05Speaker 1: than something else stranger. And now tell me another thing,
- 21:09Speaker 1: Thetitus what stranger is the not beautiful anything? But this
- 21:15Speaker 1: an existence parted off from a certain kind of existence,
- 21:19Speaker 1: and again, from another point of view, opposed to an
- 21:22Speaker 1: existing something Thetitus true stranger. Then the not beautiful turns
- 21:29Speaker 1: out to be the opposition of being to being Thetitus
- 21:33Speaker 1: very true stranger. But upon this view is the beautiful
- 21:37Speaker 1: a more real and the not beautiful a less real existence?
- 21:41Speaker 1: Thetitus not at all stranger, and the not great may
- 21:46Speaker 1: be said to exist equally with the great, thettus yes stranger,
- 21:52Speaker 1: And in the same way the just must be placed
- 21:55Speaker 1: in the same category with the not just. The one
- 21:58Speaker 1: cannot be said to have any more existence than the other,
- 22:01Speaker 1: thetatus true stranger. The same may be said of other things.
- 22:06Speaker 1: Seeing that the nature of the other has a real existence,
- 22:10Speaker 1: the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist,
- 22:14Speaker 1: thetatus of course stranger. Then, as would appear, the opposition
- 22:20Speaker 1: of a part of the other and of a part
- 22:22Speaker 1: of being to one another, is, if I may venture
- 22:25Speaker 1: to say so, as truly essence, as being itself, and
- 22:29Speaker 1: implies not the opposite of being, but only what is
- 22:33Speaker 1: other than being, thetatus beyond question stranger, What then shall
- 22:38Speaker 1: we call it? Thetatus clearly not being? And this is
- 22:43Speaker 1: the very nature for which the Sophist compelled us to search, stranger,
- 22:48Speaker 1: and has not this, as you were saying, as real
- 22:51Speaker 1: an existence as any other class. May I not say
- 22:54Speaker 1: with confidence that not being has an assured existence and
- 22:58Speaker 1: a nature of its own, just as the great was
- 23:01Speaker 1: found to be great, and the beautiful beautiful, and the
- 23:04Speaker 1: not great not great, and the not beautiful not beautiful.
- 23:08Speaker 1: In the same manner not being has been found to
- 23:11Speaker 1: be and is not being, and is to be reckoned
- 23:15Speaker 1: one among the many classes of being. Do you, theattus,
- 23:18Speaker 1: still feel any doubt of this? Thetatus none? Whatever? Stranger,
- 23:24Speaker 1: do you observe that our skepticism has carried us beyond
- 23:27Speaker 1: the range of parmenides prohibition? Thetetus in what stranger we
- 23:33Speaker 1: have advanced to a further point and shown him more
- 23:36Speaker 1: than he forbade us to investigate? Thettus? How is that? Stranger? Why?
- 23:42Speaker 1: Because he says not being never is? And do thou
- 23:46Speaker 1: keep thy thoughts from this way of inquiry? Thettus, Yes,
- 23:51Speaker 1: he says, so, stranger. Whereas we have not only proved
- 23:56Speaker 1: that things which are not are, but we have shown
- 23:59Speaker 1: what form of being not being is. For we have
- 24:02Speaker 1: shown that the nature of the other is and is
- 24:05Speaker 1: distributed over all things in their relations to one another,
- 24:09Speaker 1: and whatever part of the other is contrasted with being.
- 24:12Speaker 1: This is precisely what we have ventured to call not
- 24:16Speaker 1: being theaetetus and surely, Stranger, we were quite right. Stranger.
- 24:22Speaker 1: Let not anyone say then, that while affirming the opposition
- 24:26Speaker 1: of not being to being, we still assert the being
- 24:29Speaker 1: of not being. For as to whether there is an
- 24:32Speaker 1: opposite of being, to that enquiry we have long said goodbye.
- 24:36Speaker 1: It may or may not be, and me or may
- 24:39Speaker 1: not be capable of definition. But as touching our present
- 24:43Speaker 1: account of not being, let a man either convince us
- 24:46Speaker 1: of error, or so long as he cannot, he too
- 24:49Speaker 1: must say, as we are saying, that there is a
- 24:52Speaker 1: communion of classes, and that being indifference or other traverse
- 24:57Speaker 1: all things and mutually interpenetratey rate, so that the other
- 25:01Speaker 1: partakes of being, and by reason of this participation is,
- 25:06Speaker 1: and yet is not that of which it partakes, but other,
- 25:09Speaker 1: and being other than being. It is clearly a necessity
- 25:13Speaker 1: that not being should be, and again being, though partaking
- 25:18Speaker 1: of the other, becomes a class other than the remaining classes,
- 25:22Speaker 1: and being other than all of them, is not each
- 25:26Speaker 1: one of them, and is not all the rest. So
- 25:29Speaker 1: that undoubtedly there are thousands upon thousands of cases in
- 25:33Speaker 1: which being is not, and all other things, whether regarded
- 25:37Speaker 1: individually or collectively, in many respects, are and in many
- 25:41Speaker 1: respects are not. Theaetetus true stranger. And he who is
- 25:47Speaker 1: skeptical of this contradiction must think how he can find
- 25:51Speaker 1: something better to say, or if he sees a puzzle,
- 25:54Speaker 1: and his pleasure is to drag words this way, and
- 25:57Speaker 1: that the argument will prove to him that he is
- 26:00Speaker 1: not making a worthy use of his faculties. For there
- 26:03Speaker 1: is no charm in such puzzles, and there is no
- 26:06Speaker 1: difficulty in detecting them. But we can tell him of
- 26:09Speaker 1: something else, the pursuit of which is noble and also difficult,
- 26:13Speaker 1: say Titus, what is it stranger? A thing of which
- 26:18Speaker 1: I have already spoken? Letting alone these puzzles as involving
- 26:22Speaker 1: no difficulty, he should be able to follow and criticize
- 26:25Speaker 1: in detail every argument. And when a man says that
- 26:29Speaker 1: the same is in a manner other, or that other
- 26:32Speaker 1: is the same, to understand and refute him from his
- 26:35Speaker 1: own point of view, and in the same respect in
- 26:38Speaker 1: which he asserts either of these affections. But to show
- 26:41Speaker 1: that somehow and in some sense the same is other,
- 26:45Speaker 1: or the other same, or the great small or the
- 26:48Speaker 1: like unlike. And to delight in always bringing forward such
- 26:52Speaker 1: contradictions is no real refutation, but is clearly the new
- 26:56Speaker 1: born babe of someone who is only beginning to approach
- 26:59Speaker 1: the problem problem of being Thetatus to be sure stranger.
- 27:05Speaker 1: For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all existences
- 27:08Speaker 1: from one another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of
- 27:12Speaker 1: an educated or philosophical mind. Thetatus why so stranger, The
- 27:19Speaker 1: attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation of all reasoning.
- 27:24Speaker 1: For only by the union of conceptions with one another
- 27:27Speaker 1: do we attain to discourse of reason. Thetatus true, stranger,
- 27:33Speaker 1: and observe that we were only just in time in
- 27:36Speaker 1: making a resistance to such separatists and compelling them to
- 27:40Speaker 1: admit that one thing mingles with another. Theatatus why so stranger?
- 27:46Speaker 1: Why that we might be able to assert discourse to
- 27:49Speaker 1: be a kind of being. For if we could not,
- 27:52Speaker 1: the worst of all consequences would follow. We should have
- 27:55Speaker 1: no philosophy. Moreover, the necessity for determining the nature of
- 27:59Speaker 1: discourse presses upon us at this moment. If utterly deprived
- 28:03Speaker 1: of it, we could no more whole discourse, And deprived
- 28:06Speaker 1: of it we should be if we admitted that there
- 28:09Speaker 1: was no admixture of natures at all. Thettus very true.
- 28:14Speaker 1: But I do not understand why at this moment we
- 28:17Speaker 1: must determine the nature of discourse stranger. Perhaps you will
- 28:21Speaker 1: see more clearly by the help of the following explanation.
- 28:25Speaker 1: Thetitus what explanation, stranger not being has been acknowledged by
- 28:30Speaker 1: us to be one among many classes diffused over all
- 28:34Speaker 1: being Thetatus true stranger, and thence arises the question whether
- 28:40Speaker 1: not being mingles with opinion and language. Thettus, how so stranger.
- 28:47Speaker 1: If not being has no part in the proposition, then
- 28:50Speaker 1: all things must be true. But if not being has
- 28:53Speaker 1: a part, then false opinion and false speech are possible.
- 28:57Speaker 1: For to think or to see. What is not is falsehood,
- 29:01Speaker 1: which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.
- 29:04Speaker 1: Thetetus that is quite true stranger. And where there is falsehood,
- 29:10Speaker 1: surely there must be deceit. Thetitus, yes, stranger, And if
- 29:16Speaker 1: there is deceit, then all things must be full of
- 29:18Speaker 1: idols and images and fancies. Thettus to be sure stranger.
- 29:24Speaker 1: Into that region, the sophist, as we said, made his escape,
- 29:28Speaker 1: and when he had gone there, denied the very possibility
- 29:31Speaker 1: of falsehood. No one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood,
- 29:36Speaker 1: inasmuch as not being did not in any way partake
- 29:39Speaker 1: of being. Thetatus true stranger and now not being has
- 29:45Speaker 1: been shown to partake of being, and therefore he will
- 29:49Speaker 1: not continue fighting in this direction. But he will probably
- 29:52Speaker 1: say that some ideas partake of not being in some not,
- 29:56Speaker 1: and that language and opinion are of the non partaking class,
- 30:00Speaker 1: and he will still fight to the death against the
- 30:03Speaker 1: existence of the image making and fantastic art in which
- 30:07Speaker 1: we have placed him, because, as you will see, opinion
- 30:11Speaker 1: and language do not partake of not being, and unless
- 30:14Speaker 1: this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood.
- 30:18Speaker 1: And with the view of meeting this evasion, we must
- 30:21Speaker 1: begin by inquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and imagination,
- 30:26Speaker 1: in order that when we find them, we may find
- 30:29Speaker 1: also that they have communion with not being, and having
- 30:33Speaker 1: made out the connection of them, may thus prove that
- 30:36Speaker 1: falsehood exists. And therein we will imprison the Sophist if
- 30:40Speaker 1: he deserves it, or if not, we will let him
- 30:43Speaker 1: go again and look for him in another class. Theaetetus
- 30:48Speaker 1: certainly stranger. There appears to be truth in what was
- 30:50Speaker 1: said about the Sophist at first that he was of
- 30:53Speaker 1: a class not easily caught, for he seems to have
- 30:56Speaker 1: abundance of defenses which he throws up, and which must, ever,
- 31:00Speaker 1: one of them, be stormed before we can reach the
- 31:02Speaker 1: man himself. And even now we have, with difficulty got
- 31:06Speaker 1: through his first defense, which is the not being of
- 31:09Speaker 1: not being. And lo here is another, For we have
- 31:12Speaker 1: still to show that falsehood exists in the sphere of
- 31:15Speaker 1: language and opinion, and there will be another and another
- 31:18Speaker 1: line of defense without end, Stranger, Anyone, say Titus, who
- 31:23Speaker 1: is able to advance even a little, ought to be
- 31:26Speaker 1: of good cheer. For what would he who is dispirited
- 31:29Speaker 1: at a little progress do if you are making none
- 31:32Speaker 1: at all, or even undergoing a repulse. Such a faint heart,
- 31:36Speaker 1: as the proverb says, will never take a city. But
- 31:40Speaker 1: now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours,
- 31:44Speaker 1: and what remains is easier, say Titus, very true Stranger. Then,
- 31:50Speaker 1: as I was saying, let us first of all obtain
- 31:53Speaker 1: a conception of language and opinion, in order that we
- 31:56Speaker 1: may have clearer grounds for determining whether not being has
- 31:59Speaker 1: any concern with them, or whether they are both always true,
- 32:04Speaker 1: in neither of them ever falls thettus true Stranger. Then,
- 32:09Speaker 1: now let us speak of names, as before we were
- 32:12Speaker 1: speaking of ideas and letters, For that is the direction
- 32:16Speaker 1: in which the answer may be expected, thettus, And what
- 32:20Speaker 1: is the question at issue about names? Stranger? The question
- 32:25Speaker 1: at issue is whether all names may be connected with
- 32:28Speaker 1: one another, or none, or only some of them? Thetitus.
- 32:33Speaker 1: Clearly the last is true, Stranger. I understand you to
- 32:37Speaker 1: say that words which have a meaning when in sequence
- 32:41Speaker 1: may be connected, but the words which have no meaning
- 32:44Speaker 1: when in sequence cannot be connected. Thettus, What are you saying, Stranger?
- 32:50Speaker 1: What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent?
- 32:53Speaker 1: For there are two sorts of intimation of being which
- 32:57Speaker 1: are given by the voice Thetitus. What are they? Stranger?
- 33:02Speaker 1: One of them is called nouns, In the other verbs,
- 33:06Speaker 1: Thetitus describe them stranger. That which denotes action we call
- 33:11Speaker 1: a verb, thettus true stranger. In the other, which is
- 33:17Speaker 1: an articulate mark said on those who do the actions,
- 33:20Speaker 1: we call a noun, thettus quite true, Stranger. A succession
- 33:26Speaker 1: of nouns only is not a sentence any more than
- 33:30Speaker 1: of verbs without nouns. Thettus, I do not understand you, stranger.
- 33:36Speaker 1: I see that when you gave your assent, you had
- 33:38Speaker 1: something else in your mind. But what I intended to
- 33:41Speaker 1: say was that a mere succession of nouns or of
- 33:44Speaker 1: verbs is not discourse. Thetitas, what do you mean, stranger?
- 33:50Speaker 1: I mean that words like walks, runs, sleeps, or any
- 33:55Speaker 1: other words which denote action. However many of them you
- 33:59Speaker 1: string together do not make discourse, Thetitus. How can they stranger?
- 34:05Speaker 1: Or again, when you say lion, stag, horse, or any
- 34:11Speaker 1: other words which denote agents. Neither in this way of
- 34:14Speaker 1: stringing words together do you attain to discourse. For there
- 34:18Speaker 1: is no expression of action or inaction, or of the
- 34:22Speaker 1: existence of existence or non existence indicated by the sounds.
- 34:27Speaker 1: Until verbs are mingled with nouns. Then the words fit,
- 34:31Speaker 1: and the smallest combination of them forms language and is
- 34:34Speaker 1: the simplest and least form of discourse. Thetitus. Again, I ask,
- 34:40Speaker 1: what do you mean, stranger? When anyone says a man learns,
- 34:45Speaker 1: should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences? Thetitus? Yes, stranger, Yes,
- 34:53Speaker 1: For he now arrives at the point of giving an
- 34:55Speaker 1: intimation about something which is or is becoming, or has
- 34:59Speaker 1: become or will be. And he not only names, but
- 35:03Speaker 1: he does something by connecting verbs with nouns. And therefore
- 35:07Speaker 1: we see that he discourses. And to this connection of
- 35:10Speaker 1: words we give the name of discourse, Thetitus true stranger.
- 35:17Speaker 1: And as there are some things which fit one another
- 35:20Speaker 1: and other things which do not fit, so there are
- 35:23Speaker 1: some vocal signs which do and others which do not,
- 35:26Speaker 1: combine and form discourse, Thetitus quite true stranger. There is
- 35:32Speaker 1: another small matter, thettus. What is it, stranger? A sentence
- 35:37Speaker 1: must and cannot help having a subject, Thetitus true stranger,
- 35:43Speaker 1: and must be of a certain quality, Thetitas certainly stranger.
- 35:49Speaker 1: And now let us mind what we are about Thetitas.
- 35:53Speaker 1: We must do so, Stranger, I will repeat a sentence
- 35:57Speaker 1: to you, in which a thing and an action are combined,
- 36:00Speaker 1: and by the help of a noun and a verb.
- 36:02Speaker 1: And you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks,
- 36:05Speaker 1: the Titus. I will, to the best of my power, stranger, Theatitas.
- 36:10Speaker 1: Since not a very long sentence, Theatitus not very stranger.
- 36:17Speaker 1: Of whom does the sentence speak? And who is the subject?
- 36:21Speaker 1: That is what you have to tell, the Titus of me,
- 36:24Speaker 1: I am the subject, Stranger or this sentence again, the
- 36:29Speaker 1: Titus what sentence, Stranger, Thetitus with whom I am now
- 36:35Speaker 1: speaking is flying. Thetitus that also is a sentence which
- 36:40Speaker 1: will be admitted by everyone to speak of me and
- 36:44Speaker 1: to apply to me, Stranger. We agreed that every sentence
- 36:48Speaker 1: must necessarily have a certain quality the Titus yes, Stranger.
- 36:54Speaker 1: And what is the quality of each of these two
- 36:57Speaker 1: sentences Thetitus the one, as I imagine, is false, and
- 37:02Speaker 1: the other true Stranger? The true says what is true
- 37:06Speaker 1: about you? Theatitus yes, stranger. In the false sens what
- 37:11Speaker 1: is other than true? Theatatus yes, Stranger, and therefore speaks
- 37:17Speaker 1: of things which are not as if they were. Theatitus
- 37:21Speaker 1: true Stranger, and says that things are real of you
- 37:24Speaker 1: which are not. For, as we were saying, in regard
- 37:28Speaker 1: to each thing or person, there is much that is
- 37:31Speaker 1: and much that is not. Theatatus quite true, Stranger. The
- 37:36Speaker 1: second of the two sentences, which related to you, was
- 37:40Speaker 1: first of all an example of the shortest form consistent
- 37:43Speaker 1: with our definition, thettus yes. This was implied in our
- 37:48Speaker 1: recent admission stranger. And in the second place, it related
- 37:52Speaker 1: to a subject Thettus yes, stranger, who must be you
- 37:58Speaker 1: and can be nobody else else Thetitus unquestionably stranger. And
- 38:04Speaker 1: it would be no sentence at all if there were
- 38:07Speaker 1: no subject, For, as we proved, a sentence which has
- 38:11Speaker 1: no subject is impossible. Thetitus quite true, Stranger, When other
- 38:18Speaker 1: then is asserted of you as the same, and not
- 38:22Speaker 1: being as being such a combination of nouns and verbs
- 38:26Speaker 1: is really and truly false discourse. Thetitus most true, Stranger.
- 38:32Speaker 1: And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved to
- 38:37Speaker 1: exist in our minds, both as true and false. Thetitus,
- 38:41Speaker 1: how so, stranger, you will know better if you first
- 38:45Speaker 1: gain a knowledge of what they are and in what
- 38:48Speaker 1: they severally differ from one another. Thetitus, give me the
- 38:52Speaker 1: knowledge which you would wish me to gain. Stranger, are
- 38:56Speaker 1: not thought in speech? The same with this exception, that
- 39:00Speaker 1: what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the
- 39:03Speaker 1: soul with herself. Thettus quite true, stranger. But the stream
- 39:09Speaker 1: of thought which flows through the lips, it is honorable,
- 39:12Speaker 1: is called speech. Thetitus true, stranger, And we know that
- 39:18Speaker 1: there exists in speech Thetitus. What exists stranger? Affirmation Thetitus, yes,
- 39:27Speaker 1: we know it, stranger. When the affirmation or denial takes
- 39:31Speaker 1: place in silence and in the mind. Only have you
- 39:34Speaker 1: any other name by which to call it but opinion?
- 39:37Speaker 1: Thetitus there can be no other name stranger. And when
- 39:41Speaker 1: opinion is presented not simply, but in some form of sense,
- 39:46Speaker 1: would you not call it imagination? Theatitus certainly stranger, in
- 39:51Speaker 1: seeing that language is true and false, and that thought
- 39:55Speaker 1: is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion
- 39:58Speaker 1: is the end of thinking, and imagination or fantasy is
- 40:02Speaker 1: the union of sense and opinion. The inference is that
- 40:06Speaker 1: some of them, since they are akin to language, should
- 40:08Speaker 1: have an element of falsehood as well as of truth.
- 40:11Speaker 1: Thetatus certainly stranger. Do you perceive then that false opinion
- 40:17Speaker 1: in speech have been discovered sooner than we expected, For
- 40:21Speaker 1: just now we seem to be undertaking a task which
- 40:24Speaker 1: would never be accomplished Thetetus I perceive stranger? Then let
- 40:30Speaker 1: us not be discouraged about the future. But now having
- 40:33Speaker 1: made this discovery, let us go back to our previous classification.
- 40:37Speaker 1: Thettus what classification stranger? We divided image making into two sorts,
- 40:44Speaker 1: the one likeness making, the other imaginative or fantastic. Thetatus
- 40:50Speaker 1: true stranger, and we said that we were uncertain in
- 40:54Speaker 1: which we should place the Sophist. Thettus we did say,
- 40:58Speaker 1: so stranger in our hands began to go round more
- 41:02Speaker 1: and more when it was asserted that there is no
- 41:05Speaker 1: such thing as an image, or idle or appearance, because
- 41:08Speaker 1: in no manner, or time or place can there ever
- 41:11Speaker 1: be such a thing as falsehood, theatatus true stranger. And now,
- 41:17Speaker 1: since there has been shown to be false speech and
- 41:20Speaker 1: false opinion, there may be imitations of real existences. And
- 41:24Speaker 1: out of this condition of the mind an art of
- 41:26Speaker 1: deception may arise thetatus quite possible stranger. And we have
- 41:32Speaker 1: already admitted in what preceded that the Sophist was lurking
- 41:36Speaker 1: in one of the divisions of the likeness, making art Thetatus,
- 41:40Speaker 1: yes stranger. Let us then renew the attempt, and in
- 41:44Speaker 1: dividing any class, always take the part to the right,
- 41:47Speaker 1: holding fast to that which holds the sophist. Until we
- 41:50Speaker 1: have stripped him of all his common properties and reached
- 41:54Speaker 1: his difference or peculiar then we may exhibit him in
- 41:58Speaker 1: his true nature, first to our ourselves, and then to
- 42:01Speaker 1: kindred dialectical spirits. Thetitus very good, Stranger. You may remember
- 42:08Speaker 1: that all art was originally divided by us into creative
- 42:11Speaker 1: and acquisitive. Thetitas, yes, Stranger, and the Sophist was flitting
- 42:17Speaker 1: before us in the acquisitive class, in the subdivisions of hunting, contests, merchandise,
- 42:23Speaker 1: and the like. Thetitas very true, Stranger. But now that
- 42:29Speaker 1: the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear that
- 42:32Speaker 1: we must begin by dividing the art of creation. For
- 42:35Speaker 1: imitation is a kind of creation of images, however, as
- 42:39Speaker 1: we affirm, and not of real things. Thetitus quite true, Stranger.
- 42:45Speaker 1: In the first place, there are two kinds of creation, Thetitas,
- 42:50Speaker 1: what are they, Stranger, One of them is human, and
- 42:53Speaker 1: the other divine. Thetitus I do not follow, Stranger, every power.
- 42:59Speaker 1: As you may remember, our saying originally, which causes things
- 43:02Speaker 1: to exist not previously existing, was defined by us as creative.
- 43:07Speaker 1: Thetitus I remember, Stranger, looking now at the world and
- 43:12Speaker 1: all the animals and plants, at things which grow upon
- 43:15Speaker 1: the earth from seeds and roots, as well as at
- 43:19Speaker 1: inanimate substances which are formed within the earth fusal or
- 43:23Speaker 1: non fusal. Shall we say that they come into existence
- 43:27Speaker 1: not having existed previously by the creation of God. Or
- 43:31Speaker 1: shall we agree with vulgar opinion about them Thettus. What
- 43:35Speaker 1: isn't stranger the opinion that nature brings them into being
- 43:40Speaker 1: from some spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Or shall we say
- 43:45Speaker 1: that they are created by a divine reason and a
- 43:47Speaker 1: knowledge which comes from God? Thetitus. I dare say that,
- 43:52Speaker 1: owing to my youth, I may often waver in my view.
- 43:55Speaker 1: But now, when I look at you and see that
- 43:57Speaker 1: you incline to refer them to God, I defer to
- 44:00Speaker 1: your authority, Stranger, nobly, said Thetatus. And if I thought
- 44:06Speaker 1: that you were one of those who would hereafter change
- 44:08Speaker 1: your mind, I would have gently argued with you and
- 44:11Speaker 1: forced you to assent. But as I perceive that you
- 44:15Speaker 1: will come of yourself, and without any argument of mine,
- 44:18Speaker 1: to that belief which, as you say, attracts you, I
- 44:22Speaker 1: will not forestall the work of time. Let me suppose then,
- 44:25Speaker 1: that things which are said to be made by nature
- 44:28Speaker 1: are the work of divine art, and that things which
- 44:31Speaker 1: are made by man out of these are works of
- 44:34Speaker 1: human art. And so there are two kinds of making
- 44:37Speaker 1: and production, the one human and the other divine. Thetatus
- 44:42Speaker 1: true Stranger. Then now subdivide each of the two sections
- 44:47Speaker 1: which we have already Thettus, how do you mean, Stranger,
- 44:52Speaker 1: I mean to say that you should make a vertical
- 44:54Speaker 1: division of production or invention, as you have already made
- 44:58Speaker 1: a lateral one thettus I have done so, Stranger. Then
- 45:03Speaker 1: now there are in all four parts or segments. Two
- 45:07Speaker 1: of them have reference to us and are human, and
- 45:09Speaker 1: two of them have reference to the gods and are divine,
- 45:13Speaker 1: Thetatus true Stranger. And again in the division which was
- 45:18Speaker 1: supposed to be made in the other way, one part
- 45:21Speaker 1: in each subdivision is the making of the things themselves.
- 45:25Speaker 1: But the two remaining parts may be called the making
- 45:27Speaker 1: of likenesses. And so the productive art is again divided
- 45:31Speaker 1: into two parts. Thettus tell me the divisions once more, Stranger.
- 45:37Speaker 1: I suppose that we and the other animals, and the
- 45:40Speaker 1: elements out of which things are made, fire, water, and
- 45:44Speaker 1: the like, are known by us to be each and
- 45:46Speaker 1: all the creation and work of God, Thetatus true Stranger.
- 45:52Speaker 1: And there are images of them which are not them,
- 45:56Speaker 1: but which correspond to them. And these are also the
- 45:59Speaker 1: creation of a wonderful skill Theatitus. What are they stranger,
- 46:05Speaker 1: the appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or
- 46:08Speaker 1: by may, such as a shadow when darkness arises in
- 46:11Speaker 1: a fire, or the reflection which is produced when the
- 46:15Speaker 1: light is bright and smooth objects meet on their surface
- 46:18Speaker 1: with an external light and creates a perception the opposite
- 46:22Speaker 1: of our ordinary sight. Thetitus, Yes, and the images, as
- 46:26Speaker 1: well as the creation, are equally the work of a
- 46:29Speaker 1: divine hand, Stranger. And what shall we say of human art?
- 46:34Speaker 1: Do we not make one house by the art of
- 46:36Speaker 1: building and another by the art of drawing, which is
- 46:39Speaker 1: a sort of dream created by man for those who
- 46:41Speaker 1: are awake. Theatitus quite true, Stranger, and other products of
- 46:47Speaker 1: human creation are also twofold and go in pairs. There
- 46:52Speaker 1: is the thing with which the art of making the
- 46:54Speaker 1: thing is concerned, and the image with which imitation is Concernedus.
- 47:01Speaker 1: Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge,
- 47:04Speaker 1: that there are two kinds of production, and each of
- 47:07Speaker 1: them twofold. In the lateral division, there is both a
- 47:10Speaker 1: divine and a human production. In the vertical there are
- 47:14Speaker 1: realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes Stranger.
- 47:19Speaker 1: And let us not forget that of the imitative class.
- 47:22Speaker 1: The one part was to have been likeness making and
- 47:25Speaker 1: the other fantastic. If it could be shown that falsehood
- 47:29Speaker 1: is a reality and belongs to the class of real being, Thetitus, yes, stranger.
- 47:36Speaker 1: And this appeared to be the case. And therefore, now,
- 47:39Speaker 1: without hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as too,
- 47:43Speaker 1: thettus true stranger. Then now let us again divide the
- 47:48Speaker 1: fantastic art thettus. Where shall we make the division stranger?
- 47:54Speaker 1: There is one kind which is produced by an instrument,
- 47:56Speaker 1: and another in which the creator of the appearance is
- 47:59Speaker 1: himself instrument thettus What do you mean, stranger? When anyone
- 48:05Speaker 1: makes himself appear like another in his figure or his voice.
- 48:08Speaker 1: Imitation is the name for this part of the fantastic art, thettus, Yes, stranger.
- 48:16Speaker 1: Let this then be named the art of mimicry. In
- 48:18Speaker 1: this the province assigned to it. As for the other division,
- 48:22Speaker 1: we are weary and will give that up, leaving to
- 48:26Speaker 1: someone else the duty of making the class and giving
- 48:29Speaker 1: it a suitable name. Thetitus. Let us do as you say,
- 48:33Speaker 1: assign as fear to the one, and leave the other stranger.
- 48:38Speaker 1: There is a further distinction, thetetus, which is worthy of
- 48:41Speaker 1: our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell
- 48:44Speaker 1: you Thetitus let me hear, Stranger. There are some who imitate,
- 48:50Speaker 1: knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know.
- 48:54Speaker 1: And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater
- 48:58Speaker 1: than that which divides ignorance from knowledge? Theatitus, There can
- 49:03Speaker 1: be no greater Stranger, was not the sort of imitation
- 49:07Speaker 1: of which we spoke just now the imitation of those
- 49:10Speaker 1: who know? For he who would imitate you would surely
- 49:13Speaker 1: know you and your figure? Theatitus naturally stranger. And what
- 49:20Speaker 1: would you say of the figure or form of justice
- 49:22Speaker 1: or a virtue in general? Are we not well aware
- 49:25Speaker 1: that many, having no knowledge of either, but only a
- 49:28Speaker 1: sort of opinion, do their best to show that this
- 49:31Speaker 1: opinion is really entertained by them by expressing it as
- 49:35Speaker 1: far as they can in word. Indeed, Theatitus, yes, that
- 49:40Speaker 1: is very common, Stranger. And do they always fail in
- 49:43Speaker 1: their attempt to be thought just when they are not?
- 49:47Speaker 1: Or is not the very opposite true, Sattus, the very
- 49:50Speaker 1: opposite stranger. Such a one then should be described as
- 49:54Speaker 1: an imitator, to be distinguished from the other, as he
- 49:58Speaker 1: who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows Thetitus
- 50:02Speaker 1: true Stranger. Can we find a suitable name for each
- 50:06Speaker 1: of them? This is clearly not an easy task, for
- 50:10Speaker 1: among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas which
- 50:13Speaker 1: prevented them from attempting to divide genera into species. Wherefore
- 50:17Speaker 1: there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the
- 50:20Speaker 1: sake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the
- 50:22Speaker 1: imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance, that
- 50:27Speaker 1: which coexists with science, a scientific or learned imitation Thetitus
- 50:34Speaker 1: granted stranger. The former is our present concern, for the
- 50:39Speaker 1: Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those
- 50:43Speaker 1: who have knowledge Thetitus very true Stranger. Let us then
- 50:48Speaker 1: examine our imitator of appearance, and see whether he is
- 50:52Speaker 1: sound like a piece of iron, or whether there is
- 50:55Speaker 1: still some crack in him Thetitus. Let us examine him strange. Indeed,
- 51:01Speaker 1: there is a very considerable crack, For if you look,
- 51:04Speaker 1: you find that one of the two classes of imitators
- 51:07Speaker 1: is a simple creature who thinks that he knows that
- 51:10Speaker 1: which he only fancies. The other sort has knocked about
- 51:14Speaker 1: among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is
- 51:17Speaker 1: ignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know. Thetitus,
- 51:22Speaker 1: there are certainly the two kinds which you describe stranger.
- 51:27Speaker 1: Shall we regard one as the simple imitator, the other
- 51:30Speaker 1: as the dissembling or ironical imitator? Sattus a very good stranger.
- 51:36Speaker 1: And shall we further speak of this latter class as
- 51:39Speaker 1: having one or two divisions? Satitus, answer yourself, stranger. Upon consideration,
- 51:46Speaker 1: then there appear to me to be two. There is
- 51:49Speaker 1: the dissembler who harangues a multitude in public in a
- 51:53Speaker 1: long speech, and the dissembler, who, in private and in
- 51:57Speaker 1: short speeches compels the person who is converse with him
- 52:00Speaker 1: to contradict himself. Thetitus, what you say is most true, stranger?
- 52:06Speaker 1: And who is the maker of the longer speeches? Is
- 52:09Speaker 1: he the statesman or the popular orator? Thetitus the latter stranger?
- 52:15Speaker 1: And what shall we call the other? Is he the
- 52:18Speaker 1: philosopher or the sophist? Thetitus the philosopher he cannot be,
- 52:23Speaker 1: for upon our view he is ignorant. But since he
- 52:26Speaker 1: is an imitator of the wise, he will have a
- 52:29Speaker 1: name which is formed by an adaptation of the word saphos.
- 52:33Speaker 1: What shall we name him? I am pretty sure that
- 52:36Speaker 1: I cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and
- 52:39Speaker 1: very Sophist stranger? Shall we bind up his name as
- 52:44Speaker 1: we did before, making a chain from one end of
- 52:46Speaker 1: his genealogy to the other. Thetitus, by all means stranger.
- 52:52Speaker 1: He then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows,
- 52:56Speaker 1: who belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the
- 52:59Speaker 1: art of causing self contradiction, is an imitator of appearance,
- 53:04Speaker 1: and is separated from the class of fantastic, which is
- 53:08Speaker 1: a branch of image, making into that further division of creation,
- 53:12Speaker 1: the juggling of words, a creation human and not divine.
- 53:16Speaker 1: Anyone who affirms the real Sophist to be of this
- 53:19Speaker 1: blood and lineage will say the very truth. Thetitus, undoubtedly
- 53:26Speaker 1: and of Sophist by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, read
- 53:32Speaker 1: by Geoffrey Edwards, metic coordinated by bart Delieu, proof listened
- 53:38Speaker 1: by Repunzelina recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards