Latest / The Vault: The Epstein Files / Virginia Robert's Rejects Ghislaine Maxwell's Summary Judgement Push (Part 6) (6/9/26)

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Virginia Robert's Rejects Ghislaine Maxwell's Summary Judgement Push (Part 6) (6/9/26) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

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  Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
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  We're going to pick up where we left off with
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  Virginia Roberts response to Gawaine Maxwell's attempt to get a
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  summary judgment. See Defendant's defamatory statement was not opinion as
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  a matter of law, as this court previously held correctly,
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  defendant stating that Miss Roberts's claims of sexual assault or
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  lies is not an expression of opinion. First, statements that
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  Robert's claims against defendant are untrue have been shown to
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  be untrue, and our obvious lies have a specific and
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  readily understood factual, meaning that Roberts is not telling the
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  truth about her history of sexual abuse and the defendant's role,
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  and that some verifiable investigation has occurred and come to
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  a definitive conclusion proving the fact. Second, these statements, as
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  they themselves allege, are capable of being proven true or false,
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  and therefore constitute actionable fact and not opinion. Third, in
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  their full context, while defendant statements have the effect of
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  generally denying plaintiff's story, they also clearly constitute fact to
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  the reader. Roberts versus Maxwell, one sixty five ft su Pp.
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  Three D one forty seven one fifty two SDNY twenty sixteen.
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  The Court further explained, Plaintiff cannot be making claims shown
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  to be untrue that our obvious lies without being a liar. Furthermore,
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  to suggest individual is not telling the truth about her
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  history of having been sexually assaulted as a minor constitutes
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  more than a general denial. It alleges something deeply disturbing
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  about the character of an individual willing to be publicly
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  dishonest about such reprehensible crimes. Defendant statements clearly imply that
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  the denials are based on facts separate and contradictory to
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  those that Plaintiff has alleged. Defendant argues that somehow the
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  context of the entire statement tested against the understanding of
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  the average reader, should be the press release as a whole,
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  being read only by journalists. This is an unreasonable construct,
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  because the ultimate audience for a press release is the public. Indeed,
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  the purpose of a press release is to reach readers. Unsurprisingly,
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  Defendant cites no case that holds that journalists might somehow
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  believe that statements of fact are opinion while others do not.
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  This Court has previously covered this ground when it clearly stated.
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  Sexual assault of a minor is a clear cut issue.
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  Either transgression occurred or it did not. Either a Maxwell
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  was involved or she was not. The issue is not
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  a matter of opinion, and there cannot be differing understandings
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  of the same facts that justify diametrically opposed opinion as
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  to whether defendant was involved in plaintiff's abuse as plaintiff
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  has claimed, each plaintiff is telling the truth about her
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  story and defendant's involvement, or the defendant is telling the
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  truth and she was not involved in the trafficking and
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  ultimate abuse of the plaintiff. Roberts verse Maxwell, one six
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  five f Dot supp At one fIF two SDNY, twenty sixteen.
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  The same conclusion applies now. At the motion to this
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  miss stage, defendant had not yet produced the statement she
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  issued to the press. The statement is now in evidence,
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  so there is no ambiguity as to what defendant released
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  to the press. The absurdity of defendant characterizing his statement
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  calling Miss Roberts a liar as mere opinion is revealed
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  by the fact that the defendant was the one who
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  was sexually trafficking and otherwise abusing Miss Roberts. No reasonable
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  person in any context would construe that as defendant's mere
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  opinion on the subject, since defendant knew she was abusing
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  Miss Roberts, and indeed, this argument is contradicted by the
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  defendant's own deposition testimony question, do you believe that Jeffrey
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  Epstein sexually abused minors? Answer? I can only testify to
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  what I know. I know that Virginia is a liar,
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  and I know what she testified is a lie. So
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  I can only testify to what I know to be falsehoods,
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  and half those falsehoods are enormous, And so I can
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  only categorically deny everything she has said. And that is
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  the only thing that I can talk about, because I
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  have no knowledge of anything else. CEE mccauleay, declaration at
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  Exhibit eleven, Maxwell Deposition, April seventeenth, twenty sixteen. Defendant slightly
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  contends in her motion that mister Bardon's arguments in the
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  press release constitute pure opinion, attempting to disclaim any involvement
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  in making the defamatory statement. However, it is not mister
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  Barton's statement nor his opinion that is that issue here.
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  At issue here is defendant statement a statement attributable to
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  her that she approved, whose publication she commanded, and for
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  which she hired a public relations representative to dissem x
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  eight to at least thirty journalists for publication. While mister
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  Barton could possibly have had his own opinion as to
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  whether or not his client abused Miss Roberts, defendant cannot
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  express an opinion on a binary yes or no subject
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  where she knows the truth. As this Court previously articulated
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  statements that Robert's claims against defendant are untrue have been
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  shown to be untrue, and our obvious lies have a
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  specific and readily understood factual meaning. Roberts versus Maxwell one
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  six five f Dot supp Dot three d at one
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  fifty two. Again, at the very least, the jury must
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  pass on such issues. D the pre litigation privilege does
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  not apply to defendant's press release. One defendant fails to
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  make a showing that the pre litigation privilege applies. Defendant's
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  next argument seeks refuge in their pre litigation privilege. If
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  we understand the argument correctly, defendant seems to be saying
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  that because she was contemplating an unspecified and never filed
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  lawsuit involving the British press she somehow had a green
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  light to make whatever defamatory statement she wanted about Miss Roberts.
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  To prove such a remarkably claimed defendant relies on case
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  law involving such mundane topics as cease and desist letters
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  sent to opposing parties and the like. Obviously, such arguments
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  have no application to the press release that defendants sent
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  out worldwide attacking Miss Roberts veracity. The problems with the
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  defendant's argument are legion for starters. There is no record evidence,
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  not even defendant's own testimony, suggesting that she was contemplating
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  litigation against Miss Roberts, or that her press release was
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  related to contemplated litigation against Miss Roberts. Tellingly, the only
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  evidence defendant sites of any alleged contemplated litigation is the
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  self serving post talk partial waiver of attorney client privilege
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  found in the Barden Declaration. As discussed above, the declaration
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  fails to establish that there was good faith anticipated in
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  litigation between her and Miss Roberts, particularly when evidence in
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  the record contradicts such assertions. At the very least, it
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  is a matter of fact for the jury to decide.
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  In another case, in which a defendant attempted to claim
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  pre litigation privilege applied to statements made to the press.
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  This court denied some rejudgment and held to prevail on
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  a qualified privileged defense. Defendant must show that his claim
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  of privilege does not raise triable issues of fact that
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  would defeat it. Block versus First Blood Associates. Six ninety
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  one f Dot su Pp. Six point eighty five, six
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  ninety nine and seven hundred Sweet Jay sdn Y nineteen
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  eighty eight, denying some rejudgment on the preltigation qualification privilege
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  affirmative defense because there was a genuine issue as to
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  malice and appropriate purpose. Defendant's claim here likewise fails. First
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  defendants testimony makes no mention of any contemplated lawsuit, much
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  less any contemplated lawsuit against Miss Roberts. Second defendant has
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  offered no witnesses who will testify that she intended to
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  bring any lawsuit. Third, she did not, in fact bring
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  any such lawsuit. The only evidence is a post talk
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  declaration written by her attorney. Finally, it must be remembered,
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  as explained at length above, the defendant had sexually trafficked
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  defendant and was attempting to continue to conceal her criminal acts.
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  Whether her statements had an appropriate purpose Block six ninety
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  one ft supp Dot At six ninety nine through seven hundred,
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  Sweet Jay, or or rather efforts by a criminal organization
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  to silence its victims, is obviously contested. Accordingly, obvious issues
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  of fact exist as to whether or not defendant contemplated
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  litigation distorting reality. Defendant further argues statements pertinent to a
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  good faith anticipated litigation made by attorney or their agents
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  under their direction before the commencement of litigation or privileged
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  MSJA at thirty three, the record evidence shows that defendant
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  attorneys did not make the defamatory statement. Further, defendant's attorneys
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  agents did not make the defamatory statement. The defendant did,
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  and there was no statement made by anyone before the
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  commencement of litigation because litigation never commenced. Accordingly, the case
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  defendant sites where attorneys are making statements or where clients
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  are making statements to their attorneys regarding judicial proceedings, including malpractice,
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  are wholly in opposite, as detailed below. Similarly, in Black
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  versus Green Harbor Homeowners Association Incorporated, nineteen a Dot D
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  Dot three D nine sixty two, nine sixty three, seven
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  ninety eight and dot y dot s dot two D
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  seven fifty three, seven fifty four, and two thousand and
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  five cited by Defendant, the court held a privilege applied
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  to a letter sent by a Home Association board of
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  directors to the association's members informing them of the status
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  of litigation to which the association was a party, and
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  to the association's letter to the state Attorney General, sent
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  to discharge its duties to the association. In this case,
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  litigation was actually pending, the communication was sent by a
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  party to that litigation as part of its duties, and
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  the communication itself concerned the litigation. The defendant's press release
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  fits none of those descriptions. Unsurprisingly, Defendant cites no case
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  in which a court has held that this or any
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  qualified privilege extends to internationally disseminated press releases defaming a
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  non party to the purported anticipated litigation. Regardless of whether
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  or not Barden had a hand in drafting the statement.
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  Another disputed issue of fact for the jury. Defendant issued
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  the statement, instructed that it be published, and the statement
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  she issued was attributed to her and not her attorney,
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  or is it agents. Accordingly, all the case law defendant
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  sites about attorney making a statement, or a client making
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  a statement to their attorney, or a malpractice carrier is
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  in opposite two defending his foreclothes from using the pre
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  litigation privilege because she acted with malice. In any event,
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  because defendant acted with malice, she cannot avail herself of
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  the pre litigation privilege. As this Court has explained denying
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  Defendant's motion to dismiss, there is no qualified privilege under
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  New York law when such statements are spoken with malice,
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  knowledge of their falsity, or a reckless disregard for the truth.
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  Roberts versus Maxwell, one sixty five f. Supp. Dot three,
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  d at one fifty five. Citing Block six ninety one
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  F Dot supp Dot at six ninety nine, Sweet j
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  sdn Y, nineteen eighty eight, there is ample record evidence
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  that defendant acted with malice in issuing the press release,
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  thereby making the litigation privilege in applicable see Block six
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  ninety one FT supp At seven hundred. Here, sufficient evidence
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  has been adduced to support the inference that defendant acted
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  with malice and may not therefore claim a qualified privilege
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  under New York law, a genuine issue as to malice,
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  an appropriate purpose has properly been raised and is sufficient
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  to preclude some rejudgment. For example, Miss Schuberg testified that
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  defendant recruited her for sex with Epstein, thus corroborating Miss
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  roberts own account of defendant's involvement in abusing her with Epstein.
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  For another example, Jeffrey Epstein's pilot testified that defendant flew
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  with Miss Roberts on at least twenty three flights, thus
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  corroborating Miss roberts claims against the defendant. C. Mccaulay's declaration
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  at Exhibit fifteen Robert's deposition at thirty four three through ten.
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  For another example, Tony Figueroa testified that defendant asked him
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  for assistance in recruiting Gros for Epstein, more testimony that
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  corroborates Miss roberts claims against the defendant. And again, just
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  to interject, this is why we went through that Virginia
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  Roberts deposition. All of these core documents dove tell into
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  each other, and when you put them all together you
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  begin to see the truth scope of what Jeffrey Epstein
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  was up to. Defendant statements that Miss Roberts was lying
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  and her claims of sexual abuse where obvious lies, were
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  not pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation, but instead
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  they were made for inappropriate purpose, ie To bully, harass, intimidate,
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  and ultimately silence Miss Roberts. As the record of evidence shows,
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  defendant knew the statements were false because Defendant engaged in
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  and facilitated the sexual abuse of this minor child. Therefore,
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  they were made for the inappropriate purpose of bullying, harassment,
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  and intimidation. See Front versus Khalil, twenty four and y
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  Dot three d Dot seven thirteen seven twenty twenty fifteen. Simply,
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  defendant sexually trafficked Miss Roberts and then tried to silence
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  Miss Roberts to keep her crime secret, circumstances that prevent
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  her from using privileges designed to shield legitimate legal disputes
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  from court interference. New York case law fully confirms that
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  pre litigation qualified privileges do not apply to this case. Historically,
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  statements made in the course of litigation were entitled to
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  privilege from defamation's claims, so that those discharging a public
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  function may speak freely to zealously represent their clients without
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  fear of reprisal or financial hazard. Court of Appeals case
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  somewhat extended this privilege by holding that statements made by
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  attorneys prior to the commencement of the litigation are protected
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  by a qualified privilege if those statements are pertinent to
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  a good faith anticipation litigation idea at seven eighteen. Although
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  it is well settled that statements made in the court
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  of litigation are entitled to absolute privilege, the Court is
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  not directly adj dressed whether statements made by an attorney
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  on behalf of his or her client in connection with
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  prospective litigation are privileged. To advance the goals of encouraging
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  communication prior to the commencement of litigation, we hold that
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  statements made prior to the commencement of an anticipated litigation
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  are privileged, and that the privilege is lost when a
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  defendant proves that statements were not pertinent to a good
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  faith anticipation litigation. The Court of Appeals reason for allowing
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  this qualified privilege could not be more clearer. When litigation
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  is anticipated, attorneys and parties should be free to communicate
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  in order to reduce or avoid the need to actually
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  commence litigation. Attorneys often send cease and desist letters to
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  avoid litigation. Applying privilege to such preliminary communication encourages potential
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  defendants to negotiate with potential plaintiffs in order to prevent
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  costly and time consuming judicial intervention idea at seven, nineteen twenty.
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  Under this rationale, the Khil found that an attorney letters
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  to the potential defendant were privileged because they were sent
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  in an attempt to avoid litigation by requesting, among other things,
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  that Khalil returned the alleged stolen propriety information and cease
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  and desist in his use of that information. Here, quite
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  unlike Khalil, the defendant statements were one made by a
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  non attorney defendant through GAO two concerning a non party
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  to an alleged anticipated litigation, three knowingly false statements, and
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  four contained in a press release directed at and disseminated
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  to the public at large. The defendant statements cannot be
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  considered pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation, such that
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  the qualified privilege should apply. Finally, though it strains credulity
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  to even entertain the prospect, if defendant could make even
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  colorable showings on these basic issues, it would remain an
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  issue of fact for the jury to determine whether or
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  not Defendant's press release calling Miss Roberts sex abuse claims
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  obviously lies, was any type of cease and desist statement
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  or a statement that acted to reduce or avoid or
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  resolve any anticipated litigation. Summary judgment is obviously inappropriate here
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  as well. All right, folks, we're going to wrap up
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  right there, and in the next episode we'll pick up
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  where we left off. All of the information that goes
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  with this episode can be found in the description box.