Latest / The Vault: The Epstein Files / The OIG Report Into Jeffrey Epstein's Death: Conclusions And Recommendations (Chapter 7) (Part 2)

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The OIG Report Into Jeffrey Epstein's Death: Conclusions And Recommendations (Chapter 7) (Part 2) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the program. In
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  this episode, we're going to continue taking a look at
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  the OIG report into the circumstances surrounding the death of
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  Jeffrey Epstein. Section A. Mcc new York staff failed to
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  ensure that Epstein had a cell mate on August ninth,
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  as instructed by the Psychology Department on July thirtieth. On
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  July thirtieth, twenty nineteen, the mcc new York Psychology Department
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  sent an email to over seventy BOP staff members stating
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  that Epstein needs to be housed with an appropriate cell mate.
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  The psychology departments directive that Epstein have an appropriate cell
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  mate arose out of the events that occurred on July
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  twenty third, twenty nineteen, when Epstein was found lying on
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  the floor of his cell with a piece of orange
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  cloth around his neck. Epstein's cell mate at the time,
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  Inmate one, told mcc new York staff that Epstein had
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  tried to hang himself and another inmate housed on the
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  same shoe tier at the same time, Inmate two, corroborated
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  several aspects of Inmate one's account. Epstein's account of what
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  had occurred varied. Epstein initially told mcc new York staff
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  that he thought his cellmate had tried to kill him,
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  but thereafter he repeatedly said he did not know what
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  had occurred. Epstein later asked two different mcc new York
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  staff members if he could be housed with the same
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  cell mate Epstein initially accused of having tried to harm him.
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  As a result of this incident, Epstein was placed on
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  suicide watch and then psychological observation consistent with the psychology
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  departments directive. The captain and the Shoe Lieutenant each told
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  the OIG that they verbally informed Shoe staff of Epstein's
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  cell mate recD requirement. These and other witnesses said staff
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  members regularly assigned to the Shoe knew that Epstein needed
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  to have a cell mate. However, despite the Psychology departments
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  widely disseminated July thirtieth email instruction and the subsequent verbal
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  direction provided by the Captain and the Shoe Lieutenant, Epstein
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  was left without a cell mate. On August ninth, less
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  than twenty four hours later, Epstein died by suicide. One.
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  Failure to make required notifications regarding the need to assign
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  Epstein a cell mate. The OIG's investigation and review revealed
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  that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, mcc new York staff
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  assigned to the Shoe failed to notify their superiors that
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  Epstein's cellmate in May three had been transferred out of
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  mcc new York and therefore Epstein needed to be assigned
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  a new cell mate. The failure to make these require
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  notifications and the supervisor's failure to properly supervise the Shoe
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  staff discussed further below, resulted in Epstein being housed without
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  a cellmate at the time of his death, which was
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  contrary to the Psychology Departments directive issued just ten days earlier.
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  BOP standards of conduct require that employees obey the orders
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  of their superiors at all times. Mcc new York post
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  orders for the Shoe require, among other things, that all
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  Shoe officers maintain a log of pertinent information regarding inmate activity,
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  detailing time, persons involved, if pertinent, and the event which
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  must be logged into truscope. Importantly, the Shoe post orders
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  clarify that they are not intended to describe in detail
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  all of the officer's responsibilities. Good judgment and common sense
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  are expected in all situations not covered in these post orders.
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  On August ninth, the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
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  the Evening Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, and CO. Tobin
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  Noel were each assigned to the MCC New York Shoe
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  as their permanent quarterly assigned post and served as the
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  shoe Officer in charge during their respective shifts. The OIG
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  investigation found that of these employees knew that Epstein was
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  required to have a cell mate at all times per
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  the Psychology departments directive. The OIG further found on August ninth,
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  the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, the Evening Watch
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  Shoe Officer in Charge, and Noel each became aware at
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  various times during their respective shifts that Epstein's cellmate in
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  May three had been transferred from the institution with all
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  of his belongings, a status known to all MCC New
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  York staff members is meaning the inmate was being permanently
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  transferred out of the institution. Specifically, the OIG investigation found
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  that on the morning of August ninth, the day Watch
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  Shoe Officer in Charge NC one, who was also assigned
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  to the Shoe Review the mcc new York Daily Call
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  Out List, a document that identifies all inmates who were
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  leaving their house units each day, which listed in May
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  three as being scheduled to depart MCC New York with
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  all of his belongings. At approximately eight thirty am, CO
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  one escorted Inmate three from the Shoe two receiving and
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  discharge to be transferred out of the institution, and the
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  day Watch Shoe Officer in charge escort at Ebstein from
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  the Shoe to the Attorney Conference Room for his daily
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  meeting with his attorneys. During this escort, the day Watch
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  Shoe Officer in Charge and CO one discussed the need
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  to assign Epstein with a new cellmate due to May
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  three's transfer. The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge told
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  the OIG and stated in a memorandum that he prepared
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  following Epstein's death, that he notified his relief the evening
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  watch Shoe Officer in charge of the need to assign
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  Epstein a new cellmate, and that he likely notified an
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  unspecified lieutenant. However, the OIG did not credit the day
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  Watch Shoe Officer in charge his account because no other
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  witnesses or evidence confirmed that he had in fact passed
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  on information regarding Epstein's need for a new cellmate, either
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  to a supervisor or to his relief. The OIG investigation
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  also found that during the next shift in the mcc
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  New York Shoe, both the evening watch Shoe officer in
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  charge and Noel became aware that Epstein was without a
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  cell mate. The evening watch Shoe officer in charge told
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  the OIG that when he escorted Epstein to his cell
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  after Epstein's telephone call, he saw that in May three
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  was not there, and then he, Noel, and the material
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  handler discussed the need for Epstein to have a new cellmate.
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  The evening watch Shoe officer in charge also told the
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  OIG that he notified an unspecified supervisor. However, other witnesses
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  did not corroborate his account. Noel told the OIG that
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  she was unaware of both that Epstein needed to have
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  a cell mate and that Inmate three had been removed
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  from the institution. Noel told the OIG that she went
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  to Ebstein's cell at approximately ten PM, a time of
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  day when all inmates were secured in their cells, and
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  may have plugged in Epstein's medical device forum. The OIG
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  did not credit Noel's statements that she did not know
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  that Epstein needed a cell mate or that in May
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  three had been removed from the shoe based on contradictory
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  witness statements, including her own regarding shoe staff's knowledge of
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  Epstein's cellmate requirements and Inmate three's transfer out of the shoe.
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  The OIG investigation concluded that on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
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  the day Watch Shoe officer in charge, the Evening Watch
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  Shoe officer in charge, and nowel Feld to notify a
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  supervisor as required after Epstein's cellmate was permanently removed from
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  the MCC New York Shoe, which constituted in a violation
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  of BOP standards of conduct. Additionally, they're in action violated
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  mcc new York Shoe post orders because none of these
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  individuals documented the fact that Epstein needed a new cell
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  mate as required. Finally, all of these officers failed to
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  exercise good judgment and common sense as required by the
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  shoe post orders by not immediately under taking steps through
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  their chain of command to ensure that a high profile
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  inmate who had been released from Suicide Watch and psychological
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  Observation ten days earlier had an appropriate cell mate. Section
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  two failure to adequately supervise shoe staff. The OIG also
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  found that mcc new York's supervisory personnel failed to effectively
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  perform their duties, which contributed to the fact that Epstein
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  was housed without a cellmate at the time of his death.
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  Rather than passively relying on a notification from subordinates. Supervisory
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  personnel also had an obligation under federal regulations to put
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  forth honest effort in the performance of their duties, which
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  included supervision of shoe personnel. The OIG's investigation revealed that
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  the Captain and the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day
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  Watch Activities Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operation Lieutenant, and the
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  Morning's Watch Operations Lieutenant, among other mcc new York staff,
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  received an email from the US Marshall Service USMS on
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  August eighth, twenty nineteen, notifying them that inmate three was
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  scheduled to be transferred to another facility the following day.
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  If any of these supervisors had read the email attachment,
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  they would have known of the need to assign Epstein
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  a new cellmate. Instead, many of these individuals told the
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  OIG that they believed that inmate Iree had gone to
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  court on August ninth, and they were unaware that he
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  would not return and Epstein needed a new cell mate.
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  The Shoe lieutenant shift on August eighth ended over in
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  an hour before the USMS sent the email notification, and
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  he was not working on August ninth. In his absence,
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  The day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day Watch Activities Lieutenant,
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  the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the Morning Watch Operations
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  Lieutenant had oversight of the Shoe during their respective shifts,
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  and the Captain had oversight over all of the lieutenants.
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  The OIG found that the failure of these individuals to
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  adequately supervise Shoe staff and ensure that a high profile
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  inmate who had recently been on suicide watch and psychological
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  observation had an appropriate cellmate constituted a job performance failure
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  Part three failure to have a contingency plan for the
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  assigning of Epstein a cellmate. Additionally, the OIG found that
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  the warden's failure to have a backup cell mate assignment
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  for Epstein constituted poor judgment. The evening Watch Shoe Officer
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  in charge told the OIG that although he knew that
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  Epstein needed to be assigned another cell mate, SHOE staff
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  couldnt just put anyone in the cell with Epsteen. The
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  Warden confirmed this in his OIG interview when he explained
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  that he and BOP executive leadership selected inmate three as
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  Epstein cellmate following the events of July twenty three, twenty nineteen.
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  The Warden told the OIG that no inmates were pre
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  vetted to serve as Epstein cellmate if Inmate three left
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  mcc New York. The Northeast Regional Director, the Warden, and
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  the Captain all told the OIG that if inmate three
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  had been removed as Epstein's cellmate, they would have had
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  to review a new list of potential cellmate candidates to
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  ensure that Epstein was housed with an appropriate inmate. This
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  selection process, which involved the multiple steps undertaken by high
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  level BOP management, would be difficult to accomplish in short
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  periods of time and ultimately may have impeded Shoe Officer's
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  ability to house Epstein with a cellmate. On August ninth,
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  twenty nineteen. Section four lack of candor BOP policy requires
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  that during the course of an official investigation, employees are
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  to cooperate fully by providing all pertinent information that they
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  might have. Full cooperation requires truthfully responding to questions. As
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  discussed above, The day Watch Shoe Officer in charge and
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  the Evening Watch Shoe Officer in charge told the OIG
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  that they notified supervisory personnel regarding the need to assign
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  Epstein a new cellmate. Based on a lack of corroborating
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  evidence for these assertions, the OIG found that they lacked
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  candor in their OIG interviews, in violation of BOP policy. Similarly,
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  the OIG found that Noel lacked candor in violation of
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  BOP policy when she said she did not know that
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  Epstein needed a cellmate or that his then cell mate
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  in May three had been transferred out of Shoe. The
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  OIG also found that the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant lacked
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  candor in her interview with the OIG and violation of
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  BOP policy when she said she was not aware that
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  Epstein was required to be housed with the cellmate. Her
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  statement is contradicted by the fact that she was one
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  of the mcc New York staff members who responded to
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  the July twenty third, twenty nineteen incident involving Epstein, which
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  resulted in him being placed on suicide watch and psychological observation.
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  She was a recipient of the psychology departments July thirtieth,
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  twenty nineteen email identifying the cellmate requirement and the statements
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  of multiple witnesses who told the OIG that Epstein's cellmate
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  requirement was widely disseminated verbally by mcc new York leadership.
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  All to end this one here and then in the
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  next episode, we're going to be taking a look at
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  Part B. Mcc new York staff failed to conduct mandatory
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  rounds and inmate counts, resulting in Epstein being unobserved for
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  hours before his death. All of the information that goes
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  with the episode can be found in the description box.