Latest / The Team House / Special Forces to CIA Officer in Afghanistan Fighting the Soviets | Mike Vickers | Ep. 248
Transcript
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- 0:37send us an email and we'll talk about special operations. Cobert ask me and
- 0:49the Team House with your hopes. Jack Murphy and David bark Hi, Everyone,
- 1:02Welcome to episode two hundred and forty eight of The Team House. I'm
- 1:04Jack Murphy here with Dave park Our guest on tonight's show is Michael Vickers.
- 1:10He is the author of By All Means Available. He served in tenth Special
- 1:15Forces Group as a CIA paramilitary officer and then went on to hold positions as
- 1:19the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Undersecretary
- 1:25of Defense for Defense Intelligence. And we're gonna split this interview into two parts
- 1:30since Mike had a pretty extensive career. Tonight, we're going to talk about
- 1:34his time in special Forces and at the Agency, and then we're going to
- 1:38have him back next Friday to discuss the latter portion of his professional career.
- 1:44Mike, thank you for joining us tonight. And Dave, do you want
- 1:46to give a quick shout out to our sponsor? Yeah, so, our
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- 2:43on Instagram, check them out for all your hockey needs. So, mister
- 2:47Vickers really appreciate your your patience with us and your being gracious with your time.
- 2:53We'll jump right into it here. Could you tell us a little bit
- 2:55about your origin story, sort of about how you grew up and how that
- 2:59took you led you towards governmental service. Sure. So, I grew up
- 3:04in southern California and went to Hollywood High School and had dreams of being a
- 3:09professional baseball player, football player, or quarterback. And my passions were much
- 3:16greater than my abilities. So as I completed high school, I started thinking
- 3:22about what else I wanted to do. And as it turned out, a
- 3:25high school teacher gave me a copy of the New York Times or put it
- 3:30in front of my desk when I was in the school library and it had
- 3:34an article about CIA's big paramilitary operation during the Vietnam War and Laos supporting the
- 3:40Homong tribesmen, and said, you might be interested in this, and you
- 3:44know, it was about secret armies. It's the first I had heard of
- 3:46it, and I thought, yeah, you know, I think I might
- 3:50want to be a CI officer. And so that kind of planted the seed,
- 3:53and then I thought the best path for doing that was to go into
- 3:57the Special Forces, which I did after a couple years of college and then
- 4:01became an officer and then actually then became a CIA operations officer. So tell
- 4:08us about landing in tenth Special Forces Group, and I mean this is during
- 4:12the Cold War, of course, what was tenth Group like at that time?
- 4:15What was your initial roles and duty positions? Yeah, So I completed
- 4:21the Special Forces Qualification course as a weapons sergeant in May nineteen seventy four and
- 4:29then was assigned to the tenth Group, which had two battalions at Fort Devons,
- 4:34Massachusetts time. And you know, as you know, special Forces groups
- 4:41are oriented toward different regions of the world. And after Vietnam the number of
- 4:46groups collapsed down to three, but the tenth Group had Europe and the Soviet
- 4:54Bloc, and basically the operational detachments were divided. Some of them would go
- 5:00hit. Their operational areas were Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and that's
- 5:06the part I was in. So I had Russian and Czech and then others
- 5:12had the stay behind mission if the Soviets overran Germany or Scandinavia or others.
- 5:17And so they learned Norwegian and German and French and Danish and that sort of
- 5:21thing. And the group was really a fantastic learning experience. You know,
- 5:29I was kind of the youngest guy on the team. Most of my teammates
- 5:34were Vietnam veterans. Some had participated in you know, very sensitive reconnaissance operations
- 5:42in Laos and North Vietnam with mac V SAG or you know, studies and
- 5:47observation groups that were doing these dangerous special reconnaissance missions. And then we also
- 5:54had a number of Eastern European emigrats, you know, who were born in
- 5:59Czechoslovakia or elsewhere. One of my group commanders was was born in Georgia,
- 6:05and one another Battan commander was born in Czechoslovakia. And so they were a
- 6:12great source of knowledge about you know, if we actually had to deploy into
- 6:15unconventional warfare operational areas, what it would be like to live there and everything
- 6:23else. So it was a tremendous learning experience for me, and you know,
- 6:28they sent me to a lot of training. Then. You know,
- 6:31in the post Vietnam era, we didn't have a lot of operations and so
- 6:36it was mostly a great deal of training till till the nineteen eighties, we
- 6:42did have one. You know, our job was mainly to prepare for World
- 6:46War three, and our job was either to do special reconnaissance behind enemy lines
- 6:55or direct action and then if there was a resistance movement unconventional war fair and
- 7:00one special mission we had a few of us in the group was to train
- 7:06with very small nuclear weapons, man portable nuclear weapons to actually try to stop
- 7:14the Soviet advances, you know, by interdicting the second Echelon. Forces had
- 7:18one potential combat deployment to Angola during that period. Angola had gone into a
- 7:25civil war, but it was aborted at the last minute and the president decided
- 7:31to go the covert action route rather than overt military or special operations used.
- 7:40Would you like to talk a little bit about one thing I thought was unique
- 7:43and interesting about your book was we talked about getting sent to Berlin to do
- 7:46like some clidestine tradecraft training. Yeah, so the Tenth Group in those days,
- 7:51you know, I mentioned two battalions in the group headquarters at Fort Devons,
- 7:58there was a battalion forward Bob Toltzen Bavaria. I later served in that
- 8:03unit. And then there was essentially a company size force in civilian clothes that
- 8:09was in Berlin called Detachment A changed its name in the nineteen eighties to something
- 8:15else, but they had a stay behind mission, you know, if the
- 8:18Soviets overran Berlin and then also potentially to go out into East Germany, you
- 8:26know, given the location of Berlin in the event of war, and so
- 8:31one of the training episodes I had was to go serve with them and do
- 8:37essentially urban unconventional warfare, you know, how we would sabotage facilities, and
- 8:43how we would clandestinely communicate so we couldn't be found out by the secret police,
- 8:48and so a lot of denied area trade crofts. And then you touched
- 8:54upon it the training with the special atomic demolition munition. Yeah, you tell
- 9:01us a little bit more about what that entailed. Yeah, so from the
- 9:07early I guess the late nineteen sixties and early nineteen in nineteen seventies up until
- 9:13the mid nineteen eighties, special operations forces mainly seals and Green Berets, a
- 9:20select portion of them were given this mission to train to place, to arm
- 9:26and place this device. And you know, so with all nuclear weapons,
- 9:31you have personal reliability programs. You know, you have to do extra vetting
- 9:35of the people selected for this and pretty intensive training. You know, it's
- 9:41really a no fail mission, so you'd have these operational readiness evaluations by nuclear
- 9:50inspectors to make sure you knew how to do everything, and the command and
- 9:54control for those things obviously directed from very on high so there's communications procedures you
- 10:03have to learn, and so it's pretty intensive training. And as I said,
- 10:09the standards were very high for that, and you know, it was
- 10:15probably considered one of the most risky missions, and I mean they were all
- 10:22risky in those days if general war broke out, but this thing in particular
- 10:28to have to you know, emplace it and had a timer on it that
- 10:31you know, you could arm, and then you'd have to get in an
- 10:35overwatch position to maintain custody of it, so you know, the kind of
- 10:39the gallows humor among those trained in it was as soon as you, you
- 10:43know, touch that dial, the thing, would you know I was in
- 10:46place that would detonate? And but yeah, it was. It was a
- 10:50very interesting experience. And then you know, learning how to parachute with it,
- 10:54either free fall or static line. And you could also scuba with it
- 11:01too, so that's hence the Seals or Special Forces scuba teams. I've actually
- 11:05been doing a lot of research on the green Light Teams recently, and I
- 11:09think that it's it's easy for us today to look back on it as a
- 11:13sort of strange Doctor Strangelove sort of esque mission. But what I'm struck by
- 11:18all the people I talked to is like, how deadly serious all of you
- 11:22guys were about this mission and completely ready to execute it if they were called
- 11:26upon. Yeah. Well, I mean, so some context. You know,
- 11:31beginning in the nineteen fifties, you know, Soviets had numerical superiority in
- 11:35Europe, and so we kind of went the route in the Eisenhower administration and
- 11:43through the sixties and seventies to make up for that numerical inferiority by having lots
- 11:48of tactical nuclear weapons, so artillery shills, minds, you know, things
- 11:54you can drop from air bombs from aircraft. And then this was just part
- 11:58of that family. You know that this was the Special Forces and seal role,
- 12:03you know, to go behind enemy lines with a small nuclear weapon.
- 12:07But you know, it was part of a part of a larger family,
- 12:09and it was a very very serious mission. So as a as you know,
- 12:16the kid, the teenager that read the New York Times article about special
- 12:20ops and Laus, I mean, was this will all of this sounds like
- 12:24a dream come true? Yeah? I had to pinch myself. I was
- 12:28really you know, you know, the path actually worked out in terms of
- 12:35you know, I I originally thought I would go into Special Forces for maybe
- 12:41you know, five years or something and then go to CIA. And I
- 12:46decided to become an officer and ended up staying for ten before I went to
- 12:52CIA. You know, so I really loved it. It was just a
- 12:54just a great experience. So you went to officer candidate school and then you
- 12:58got to do a pretty big venue change from Germany and tenth Group to third
- 13:05Battalion, seventh Group that was down at a Fort Googlik, Panama, Right,
- 13:09that's right. Yeah. I was on the Atlantic side of the canal
- 13:13zone rather than the Pacific side, so most of the forces in Panama were
- 13:16over on the Pacific side, but there was an infantry battalion and a Special
- 13:20Forces battalion on the Atlantic. And you know the reason I chose that.
- 13:26When I graduated from OCS, we didn't have an SF branch in those days,
- 13:31and so I was an infantry officer, went to Infantry officer training and
- 13:35the assignments officer came down to our class as we were getting our assignments and
- 13:41said, how would you like to go right back to Special Forces and be
- 13:45a detachment commander because you don't need to be a platoon leader. Given your
- 13:48enlisted experience, you could go right into company command. And I thought,
- 13:52well great, So I get a captain's job as a lieutenant, and then
- 13:56I had a captain's job as a captain. And you know, there were
- 14:01three assignments offered, the tenth Group, the fifth Group, and third of
- 14:05the seventh and it was very tempted to go back to the tenth Group.
- 14:11My former battalion commander had become the group commander and he just got the Medal
- 14:16of Honor award in Paris Davis this year. And but you know, the
- 14:24insurgencies were really heating up in Central America. That was the big focus.
- 14:28You know, had a a communist insurgency and i'll Salvador and then the Sandinistas
- 14:33had taken over in Nicaragua. And you know, it's always good to kind
- 14:37of follow the sound of guns, you know, to go where the action
- 14:41is. And so I learned Spanish and ended up in third Battalion, seventh
- 14:46Group. And as it turned out, I was getting you know, after
- 14:52the Iran rescue attempt and the taking of our should say it the other way,
- 14:56the taking of our hostages in Tehran and then the Iran rescue attempt,
- 15:01we became very concerned about other high threat embassies and so I was given essentially
- 15:07a troop command of two operational detachments that would go around to high threat embassies
- 15:13in Latin America, mainly Central America, but Colombia and others too, to
- 15:18make sure that if we needed to do a rescue, you know, our
- 15:20Special Mission Forces that they had the blueprints and you know, knew where the
- 15:26cameras were and you know, all the things you would need to do to
- 15:31rescue like that. So you know, it caused me to interact a lot
- 15:35with the State Department and with CIA, you know, across the region,
- 15:39and again a great learning experience. I thought it was really cool. As
- 15:43I was reading the book this I think you said it was the AST mission
- 15:46and then became the RST Mission. Uh. This this, this is that
- 15:50sort of nascent what we would call today well advanced force operations is probably the
- 15:56term that you probably use nowadays. As I was reading the book, I
- 16:02read about it this operation that you guys got sent down to Honduras, and
- 16:06I was like, oh, I remember hearing about this years and years ago,
- 16:07but I had no idea it was you could you explain a little bit
- 16:11more about like what the mission entailed and how you guys went over to sort
- 16:14of prepare the environment. Sure, so you know, the normal mission was
- 16:22you know, intelligence collection, so you know, visiting these embassies and making
- 16:26sure we had all the information we would need for a rescue beforehand. And
- 16:33then if there was an actual terrorist incident, then a small portion of my
- 16:40team would deploy to be the first on site where we'd been to this country
- 16:44several times and start preparing the environment for the rescue force that would come in,
- 16:52but also provide special operations advice to the ambassador and the country team,
- 16:56chief of station, ambassador, etc. And so in late April nineteen eighty
- 17:03two, a Honduras, Honduran terrorist group supported by Cuba, hijacked an airline
- 17:15or a Dash seven airliner, a prop plane in to Gousa Golf Bay Airport,
- 17:21the capital of Honduras, with fifty eight hostages on board, and ten
- 17:26of whom were Americans. And so we got deployed right away by Southcomb to
- 17:32the embassy to meet with the ambassador who I served with a lot of years
- 17:38and govern ended up becoming Ambassador multiple places, John Negra Ponte and then Deputy
- 17:45Secretary of State, and about military options, including bringing in some of our
- 17:52special mission forces to be in a position to do a rescue. And so
- 17:57they came in and there was a three day stand off with this a terrorist
- 18:03group with the hostages. I was up for three nights essentially, you know,
- 18:10with my little team, my four man team doing surveillance around the airfield
- 18:14and with our Army special operations counterparts, and we had one interesting incident,
- 18:23the terrorists had a homemade improvised explosive device with nitro glycerin on the plane,
- 18:30and you know, the airplane was getting really hot and nitro glycerin can become
- 18:37unstable when it gets hot like that. So the terrists actually asked for assistance
- 18:44in that regard and we had to scramble to how they would diffuse the bomb,
- 18:48and it turned out, you know, kitty litter was a pretty good
- 18:51field expedient to do, so we raced out to Tagusagalpa to procure some and
- 18:56that that kind of did the trick, and some of the hostages were able
- 19:02to escape from the plane on the third day and there gunfire, but fortunately
- 19:10they were only injured from the fall, not from the terra of shots.
- 19:14And then the terrorists decided to give up the ghost after three days for safe
- 19:18passage to Cuba. And and so that was incident number one. And then
- 19:22four months later, a similar terrorist group took one hundred and nine hostages in
- 19:29San Pedro Sula town in the north of Honduras, including three government ministers.
- 19:34So we did it all over again and went there and did a you know,
- 19:37ten day siege and it ended the same way with the negotiations and also
- 19:44showed the capabilities of you know that the concept worked as far as the reconnaissance.
- 19:48Yes, yes, so it was considered a model for the combat for
- 19:53other combatant commands to then follow Southcom's lead on having this kind of capability,
- 19:59and that eventually led to more special Operations intelligence units and then the rst s.
- 20:06As you mentioned when when you guys were developing this capability, you know,
- 20:10if you're you're developing capability, there's not necessarily groundwork that's been laid before,
- 20:15you know, laid before. How how did you guys go about that
- 20:18process? Yeah? So it was a you know, kind of a one
- 20:22of a kind unit at the time, made out of two O das and
- 20:25people were selected for their fluency and you know, civilian clothes and long hair,
- 20:32selected for their fluency in Spanish and their intelligence tradecraft in addition to other
- 20:37special operations skills and uh and then you know, had to have training.
- 20:48We were kind of ahead of our time on satellite communications. Uh, so
- 20:52we had really reliable communications. Uh, some technical surveillance, the vices and
- 21:00stuff that weren't organic to the to the Special Forces battalion that we had to
- 21:04procure commercially and learn how to use and so we were really building this from
- 21:10the ground up, including you know, learning how to put these target folders
- 21:14together, of what exactly was needed, and how to present it to the
- 21:18operators, you know, who would do the rescue. And so you needed
- 21:22to know a lot about close quarter battle and sniping and lots of other things.
- 21:26So right before I had that command, for a few months, I
- 21:30had a command of a sniper team, which also was useful, you know,
- 21:36personal preparation before I took this counter terrorism intelligence mission. And then let's
- 21:45talk a little bit about how you made that transition from Special Forces to the
- 21:48CIA, Like how did that take place for you? You know, So
- 21:56my original goal was to serve in the Special Force IS and learn more languages
- 22:00and get confident in all these disciplines and then go to CIA. And then
- 22:06I thought, well, maybe I'll make the Army a career. And you
- 22:08know, I went to OCS and had this command. But you know,
- 22:12as I was wrestling with it, I thought, Okay, I've had this
- 22:17great experience as a lieutenant and captain commanding this troop and participating in real operations,
- 22:23you know, but my next assignment would be infantry company command and a
- 22:27peacetime Army and I thought I wanted to join more of the Cold War fight.
- 22:33You know, I saw what was going on in Central America and what
- 22:37CIA was doing, and I thought, potentially I could contribute more if I
- 22:42went to CIA. And so I applied for the career Training program, and
- 22:48you know, got accepted and enjoined the agency. And the way I read
- 22:56it in the book, if I, if I understood correctly, you had
- 23:00some adventures before you even got trained as a CIA officer. Yeah, so
- 23:06the in my day, the Career Training program for operations officers, we had
- 23:11a ten week course, you know, kind of introduction to CIA and the
- 23:15intelligence community, all the different directorates, and learned how to write reports and
- 23:21do analysis and some basic trade craft, and learned about our satellites and you
- 23:26know, the science and technology side and et cetera. Had senior case officers
- 23:32come in and talk to us about agents they recruited and including Russians that were
- 23:37handled in Moscow, and you know, so it's pretty good training. And
- 23:41then you'd typically do two three month assignments on an operational desk to learn operations
- 23:49more. And then you would go to the operations course at what we call
- 23:53the farm, a special facility, and then in those days we also had
- 23:59a twelve week paramilitary operations course called Special Operations Training. And during my first
- 24:07assignment in Latin America Division, I was selected for this because there was a
- 24:19coup in Surinam and a former Dutch colony in northern Tip of South America,
- 24:29and we had assets in prison and the branch chief wanted to do a jail
- 24:37break essentially, and thought I had the right skills to help plan that with
- 24:41the assets and stuff, and so that was kind of my introduction to CI.
- 24:45And then lo and behold, a crisis occurred in Grenada as I was
- 24:51some weeks into this assignment working on this jail breake plan, and you know,
- 24:57we had six hundred medical students attending training in Grenada, American medical students,
- 25:03and you know, the situation deteriorated. The coup leaders killed the president
- 25:11of the country and some others, and President Reagan made the decision over a
- 25:17weekend to do the invasion of Grenada, his combination of Special Operations Forces and
- 25:22Marines. And I was before I had even completed my CIA operational training I
- 25:29was called into headquarters and said by the who was going to become the chief
- 25:33of station, A man named Bill Rooney, a very distinguished career in CIA,
- 25:38said you're going to Grenada with me and a communicator, and we were
- 25:41going in with the Special Operations Forces in the main effort in the south.
- 25:45And I didn't know that at the time. I was just told to come
- 25:52into headquarters and pack for two weeks on a Sunday, and so I thought
- 25:56I was going to be going to one of the bases supporting the operations,
- 26:00and so I packed a bunch of suits. And as soon as I got
- 26:03in and I was told I was going into combat, you know, I
- 26:07was glad I had a few casual clothes in my luggage, you know.
- 26:11And so we got weapons, we got a lot of cash so we could
- 26:15uh pay assets and stuff. And the Satcom radio got a briefing and had
- 26:19an airplane take us to a staging base and then went in with the invading
- 26:26forces. And so I went into combat with a Ralph Lauren polo shirt,
- 26:30some linen pants and some loafers and a weapon, and uh a big bag
- 26:33of cash and the set com uh, you know, you got to hand
- 26:37it to CIA. They go to Warren style. You know, this is
- 26:41not quite how we did it in the special forces and the military, the
- 26:45military elements you're linking up probably less you get CIA. I don't know,
- 26:51right right, yeah, and uh and so you know, our task was
- 26:55to establish a station and then you know, bring in people to uh interrogate
- 27:02Cuban prisoners and others, and then you know, we had some other things
- 27:07to do. That led to my first combat experience in Grenada. Uh,
- 27:14looking at an arms cash and in the very very forward lines where there was
- 27:19still a lot of combat. And it was a company of the eighty second
- 27:25that we were actually visiting at the time, and uh, you know,
- 27:27lo and behold, as soon as we got there, uh, Cubans attacked
- 27:33the position. And you know, all we had at the time were Browning
- 27:37high power pistols. And so I thought about it for you know, as
- 27:41we're faced down in the dirt, I thought about it for a few seconds,
- 27:44and I thought, I just saw a bunch of A k's and ammunition
- 27:47in this warehouse. You know, there were Cubans for the Grenadans, and
- 27:51I thought, you know, we could use some of those if we're going
- 27:53to get shot at and shoot back. So Low crawled over there, got
- 27:56some, gave gave one to my chief of station, and won for me
- 28:00and battle was over in ten minutes. But it was an interesting experience.
- 28:06So I think you said you spent like a week crawling around Grenada and then
- 28:11showed up back home, you know, covered in dirt and your Ralph Laurent
- 28:15Polo shirt that you've been wearing for a week. Yeah, so it was
- 28:18actually almost two weeks. And we had another mission where we were told to
- 28:25apprehend a Libyan intelligence officer on the island who had been ordered by Kadafi to
- 28:32take American hostages. And before we could capture him, he had fled to
- 28:37the Soviet embassy. But we had this chase around Saint George's, the capitol.
- 28:44And yeah, toward the end of the operation that when the training staff
- 28:52learned that I had been in combat for ten days, they weren't too happy
- 28:56about it, and so they said, okay, war's over for you,
- 28:59come home, And so I hit hitched a military flight to Barbados, took
- 29:06off, went into the bathroom, took off all my dirty clothes, threw
- 29:08them in the trash can you know, put on some fresh civilian clothes,
- 29:12took my AMEX card out, bought a plane ticket, you know, for
- 29:15the States, and came home. I'm really surprised you didn't get like a
- 29:21deal with Ralph Florin after that, and like they didn't develop it, They
- 29:23didn't develop a new combat line of leisure wear. Yeah, there you go.
- 29:33So now you finally have the opportunity to go to the farm and become,
- 29:36you know, a formalized officer. Yeah. So before that, you
- 29:41know, when I came into the agency, I had Czech, Russian,
- 29:45and Spanish, and I was debating whether I would go to Latin America where
- 29:49the wars were, or you know, to Moscow or somewhere for a first
- 29:53assignment. And so I thought I would get a sign to Soviet operations when
- 29:59I came back from Grenada. That's what I had requested, and they called
- 30:03me in. As it turned out, we invaded Grenada on a Tuesday,
- 30:10the Sunday before the marine barracks were blown up in Leven and then months before
- 30:17that our embassy had been blown up by you know what today we know is
- 30:21his Balla. And so I was called in and said the near East Division
- 30:26wants you assigned to them for a special counter terrace and task force to identify
- 30:32the perpetrators and develop response options, et cetera. And I said, you
- 30:36know, I don't know anything about the Middle East, you know, and
- 30:38and well it's a directed assignment and they want you. And so that was
- 30:42my introduction to the to the Middle East to work with our station there on
- 30:48assets who could report on his Bala and then develop various strike options. And
- 30:56then after that I went to the farm, I mean, just to wrap
- 31:02up of Beirut. I mean, was there any kind of kind of final
- 31:04thoughts or did anything come out of that time that you spent there that you
- 31:07thought was notable or important or even personal reflections? Yeah? So, I
- 31:15mean one, you know, Grenada was this great exhilarating experience and it felt
- 31:22like a real extension of what I'd been doing in Special Forces, particularly the
- 31:27last years as an officer in Latin America. And you know, I knew
- 31:33the people we were going in with, and so it was like old home
- 31:36week for me. And the operation. You know, there were problems,
- 31:37but the operation was generally a success. With Lebanon, you know, we
- 31:42had a peacekeeping force in there with the Marines who did not have good rules
- 31:49of engagement, very restrictive rules of engagement, and you know, it was
- 31:55really kind of muddled policy for a country that was, you know, essentially
- 32:00heading into civil war and sectarian conflict and the same thing. Our station had
- 32:07similar challenges, you know, and so Americans started getting kidnapped, including our
- 32:12chief of station, the late Bill Buckley, and tortured and killed. And
- 32:16so it really was a searing experience for me in terms of you know,
- 32:22failed policy of you know, we weren't in it to win it, and
- 32:29we essentially put ourselves in a position where we were we were very vulnerable and
- 32:37and you know, and as I said, it was my introduction into the
- 32:39Middle East. And then later, you know, decades later when I was
- 32:45involved in Rock and others, you know, seeing that sectarian conflict again,
- 32:49back all those memories. Yeah, when when you did go to the farm.
- 32:52Now now you're going to the farm, but you've already had combat experience
- 32:57as a CIA officer, a CIA employee. Did that help you or hurt
- 33:00you? Or didn't nobody there know about it? Now they knew about it,
- 33:05and it was both, you know, they the chief instructor pulled me
- 33:09aside. You know, I got an award for heroism, and one of
- 33:15the top agency officials came down and they talked about it, and you know,
- 33:19some of the instructors were, Okay, let's test this guy's metal some
- 33:22more, you know, so he doesn't think he's too big for his breeches
- 33:24and all that. But others, you know, we were impressed. And
- 33:29one guy said to me, geez, you really just you know, picked
- 33:32up the weapons and did this. You know, I don't know if I
- 33:36could have done that in that situation. And this guy had served in mostly
- 33:38Europe, and I thought, well, you know, this is kind of
- 33:42what I'd been trained to do for ten years, so this kind but yeah,
- 33:46so it was a mixture actually of both. You know, some let's
- 33:51screw with them a little bit, and then others, you know, I
- 33:53was a little bit of a special class. But some of them were sort
- 33:57of like, okay, you can handle well, let's see how you handle
- 34:00the seedier sides of Virginia. Sure, right, can you man up?
- 34:09Yeah? Yeah, right? And after the forum, you got what I
- 34:15as I recall you describing your book as sort of your dream assignment, you
- 34:20got assigned to a ground branch. Yeah, so you know, after the
- 34:24operations course where you're trained to recruit and handle agents, then we had this
- 34:29special operations course including another airborne school, you know, five parachute jobs,
- 34:35which was old hat, but you know, it was sort of like a
- 34:38Special Forces qualification course again not as strenuous, but same basic tactics and techniques.
- 34:45And then as I came out again, was thinking about where I would
- 34:52go for an assignment, which the division or part of the world, you
- 34:55know, Soviet East, European or Latin America. The what today is the
- 35:00Special Activity Center. Then it was called International Activities because it had counter terrorism
- 35:06and counter narcotics as well as the paramilitary stuff. The division chief there said
- 35:12to me, we would like you to come to this division because we're creating
- 35:16a program to fast track a few officers for leadership of our covert action that
- 35:22would combine case officer work with management of these covert action programs. And said,
- 35:30we want you to be the first case and so how you can argue
- 35:34with the senior official and on a fast track to the top. So I
- 35:37did, and then he said where do you want to go? You want
- 35:39to go to El Salvador. What would you like for a first tour,
- 35:43And there's a lot of wars going on, and so if you don't mind,
- 35:45I'd like to go to ground branch first and then do the case officer
- 35:50stuff next. And said sure. So I got assigned a ground branch in
- 35:55Special Operations Group, and then within a couple of weeks I was told that
- 36:02they were creating this new position for the Afghanistan Covert Action Program, combining two
- 36:08jobs into one. Essentially the program officer overall oversight of management of the program,
- 36:19which had been a senior CIA case officer, and then the chief Paramilitary
- 36:23Advisor, who had been a Marine colonel on detail, and they were combining
- 36:28them into two and interviewed a bunch of candidates and thought I was the right
- 36:31guy for the job. So it was really like the job of a lifetime
- 36:35for me, you know. And I thought, you know, instead of
- 36:38just fighting Soviet surrogates in Central America or elsewhere, now we've got the main
- 36:45enemy in Afghanistan, and you know, and so it really seemed like the
- 36:50job of a lifetime. Prior to that, though, you know, you're
- 36:52going to volunteering to go to grammar and trait was that a did some people
- 37:00consider that like a misstep in a career as it wasn't really attached to a
- 37:06larger division or whatever, and like did it have legitimacy in the in the
- 37:10wider agency at the time, Yes, and no. I mean there were
- 37:19a lot of paramilitary operations going on that hadn't been before, you know,
- 37:24Central America and Afghanistan, and so that raised the important you know, they
- 37:29were first one since Laos in a way. But yeah, in those days,
- 37:37ground branch officers didn't become chiefs of station. Later they would integrated more
- 37:43into the director of Operations. And so that's why I kind of chose the
- 37:49general operations track. I knew I could do the paramilitary stuff, but I
- 37:53didn't want to just do that, you know, since aspirations to become a
- 38:00the station and other things, and so you know, and my reasoning was
- 38:06just this is a unique time. We're in a lot of wars, and
- 38:08I have skills that can contribute to this, and so I want to do
- 38:12this first. But I knew I'd have to do the other stuff, right,
- 38:15so as you get on the Afghan program, I would be remiss if
- 38:20I didn't ask you. I mean, you dedicated your book to gust and
- 38:23Bert Dunn, and I'd love to ask you about those two gentlemen, if
- 38:28you could tell us about coming onto the program and working with them. Sure.
- 38:32So, the Near East and South Asia Division was responsible for agency operations
- 38:42from Morocco to Bangladesh and essentially divided in half, you know, the the
- 38:46Arab Israeli world up to the you know, Arabian Gulf, the Gulf States
- 38:52in Iraq and then Iran over to Bangladesh for South Asian operations. And Gustavriccados,
- 39:00a veteran case officer in Greek American was the chief of South Asian Operations.
- 39:07And so he's the guy who wanted to create this new position as program
- 39:14officer and chief paramilitary advisor into one and brought me in. And then Bert
- 39:22Dunn was his boss. Burt Dunn had just come in as the chief of
- 39:27Near East Division and Bert was one of the founding members of Special Forces West
- 39:34Virginia lawyer founding members of Special Forces in nineteen fifty two, and I had
- 39:42been in the eighty second before that, you know, and his Army time
- 39:45and then joined the CIA after law school and his first assignment was in Pakistan
- 39:53and learned Pashto. He is the agency's most fluent Pashto speaker. Set up
- 40:00the Pakistani Special Forces and went all over you know, the tribal areas.
- 40:05UH in those days we had the U two flights over the Soviet Union out
- 40:08of Peshawar, Gary Powers and all that, and so it was involved in
- 40:14that too. And he'd served in all these difficult places around the world.
- 40:22He'd been chief in Afghanistan, he'd served in Pakistan, India, UH supporting
- 40:29Tibetan insurgents when we were doing that in the sixties against China, served in
- 40:36Vietnam, and then UH in Africa, and so he was my kind of
- 40:40Both of them were really my kind of guys, you know, street smart,
- 40:44but also you know, a guy who went to the sound of guns
- 40:49and had you know, the Special Forces background, and so we just clicked
- 40:52and and and they were very good to me. And as the program,
- 41:00I mean, I'd love to hear in your words how this program evolved as
- 41:02it sort of got off the ground and there was a presidential finding for Afghanistan.
- 41:07And the impression I get reading through your book is that as time went
- 41:12on, the spigot became fully open, like we were really about sticking it
- 41:16to the Soviets in Afghanistan. Yeah, So, you know, as background,
- 41:24there was, you know, there was kind of this great game you
- 41:29know, first between the Russians and the British and then the nineteenth century and
- 41:32then later in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union for
- 41:37influence in Afghanistan, you know, and the Soviets generally got the better of
- 41:43the deal. They built a tunnel, they trained a lot of Afghan military
- 41:47officers, you know, and then they started underground communist parties in the sixties,
- 41:53and we focused on agriculture in the south and Helman Province, and you
- 42:00know, up to that period. And then in nineteen seventy three, the
- 42:06king's cousin overthrew him after you know, several decades of royal rule, and
- 42:13the Prime Minister ran the country for five years, and then he was overthrown
- 42:17in nineteen seventy eight by the communist parties with Soviet support, launching a communist
- 42:24revolution in Afghanistan, and immediately it triggered resistance, you know, trying to
- 42:30impose land reform, which really means land appropriation, and then you know,
- 42:37atheism, you know, just not going to fly in Afghanistan, and the
- 42:45communist Afghan government asked for Soviet assistance, and Soviets were given a lot,
- 42:52but didn't want to intervene, you know, until they did finally. And
- 42:59so before the Soviets intervened in December, late December nineteen seventy nine, that
- 43:07summer, there were a couple of what we call non lethal findings to provide
- 43:12political and psychological support to the resistance and money essentially in communications support. And
- 43:22then when the Soviets invaded in force, then three days after that, President
- 43:28Jimmy Carter signed a lethal finding authorizing CI, the third finding authorizing CIA to
- 43:32support the resistance, you know, fully with and so within ten days CI
- 43:38actually had weapons starting flowing to the resistance. But for the first five years,
- 43:45President Carter's last year and President Reagan's first term, the program was reasonably
- 43:53big. It was we had a lot of foreign partners and Saudi's obviously Pakistan,
- 44:01the Saudis matched this dollar for dollar, and so the US government budget
- 44:06was sixty million, and the Saudi's matched that, so it was one hundred
- 44:09and twenty million dollars a year. But analysts thought there was no chance that
- 44:15the resistance could defeat the Soviets. The policy goal in the finding was just
- 44:21to make the occupation as costly as possible for the Soviets. So the war
- 44:27kind of settled into this stalemate, and the resistance was lightly equipped, mostly
- 44:31with small arms, not a lot of heavy weapons, mortars and anti tank
- 44:36weapons and rocket launchers and stuff. Very few surface air missiles, you know,
- 44:42handful of them twenty or so. Not a lot of training, communication,
- 44:46not a lot of intelligence. But they were still holding their own against
- 44:51the Soviets. And then in the summer of nineteen eighty four, Congressman Charlie
- 44:59Wilson from Texas, who had was on the House Defense Appropriation Subcommittee, really
- 45:07wanted to expand the funding for the program. So CIA went in for a
- 45:13ten percent budget increase, and Wilson quadrupled the budget, you know, three
- 45:17hundred percent increase, which you don't see every day, and that's right at
- 45:22the you know, and so that naturally caused a lot of concern in CIA
- 45:29about, you know, can we execute this, you know, is it
- 45:31too much money? Can the resistance absorb it? And that's exactly the moment
- 45:37that I got the job, and I thought, hell, yeah, we
- 45:39can exec right exactly, here's got to do with this, you know,
- 45:47And so yeah, developing plans and everything else, and so a series of
- 45:55things led to a big change. That was the first one that you know,
- 46:00the funding just went way up and the Saudis agreed to match it.
- 46:05And then five years into the war, we were getting some criticism in Congress,
- 46:12you know, and Central America was already very controversial. You know,
- 46:15he had a thing called the Bowl and Amendment that suspended aid to the contrast
- 46:19for a while and other things. But the controversy on Afghanistan was you know,
- 46:24some Republicans felt that the Pakistanis were a corruption problem. The Pakistanis were
- 46:34keeping all the weapons for themselves and they weren't getting into the resistance, and
- 46:37so we had to show that and that Sea Ice management of the program wasn't
- 46:44very good because we were letting the Pakistanis control the end distribution, and so
- 46:51we had to address that. And then on the left side of the Aisle,
- 46:57there was concern that this was a hopeless war and we're just fighting to
- 47:00the last last Afghan and it was a moral and so that triggered a National
- 47:05Security Council review of the program how to deal with these political problems, you
- 47:09know, from both left and right. But as any good NSC review,
- 47:14it also said, okay, what are we trying to do here? We're
- 47:16five years into this thing. What should we revisit our goals and the inner
- 47:25what today we would call a paper principles committee meeting. The NSC staff circulated
- 47:36documents with questions at the State Department, Defense Department, and CIA were supposed
- 47:39to answer about, you know, our goals and what we thought we should
- 47:43do, and one of them was, instead of you know, stay the
- 47:47course, et cetera, it was to change our goal to defeating the Soviets
- 47:52and drive them out by all means available. It was in the working papers,
- 47:57and I'd like the phrase I remembered at thirty years later, and you
- 48:00know, made it the title of my book. But I thought, that's
- 48:02the one we want to do with all this new money. And you know,
- 48:07it didn't really have an idea yet totally how we would do that,
- 48:09but reprogrammed everything I could in terms of more heavy weapons, this, more
- 48:15of that. But I knew it wasn't going to be enough yet, and
- 48:22lo and behold, George Schultz at the State Department and his key deputies went
- 48:29along with this. CIA's leadership did under Bill Casey, Casper Weinberger and Defense
- 48:35did you know on the policy side, And so our goal then became to
- 48:40defeat the Soviets and drive them out. And President Reagan signed a top secret
- 48:45National Security Decision Directive which has been mostly declassified for the past decade with that
- 48:52goal in mind. That that was that was our aim there and so in
- 48:57a sense, now we had a hunting license to do what was required to
- 49:01do that. And so then that triggered, okay, do one can we
- 49:06get all our partners to escalate with us? And so that meant resting strategic
- 49:14control, so we controlled the strategy from the pakistanis, you know, and
- 49:16that would help solve this issue of are they controlling too much or diverting things?
- 49:22But also for us to put in all these new weapons and both quantity
- 49:29and quality, and then getting our suppliers. The Chinese were a big ally
- 49:32of ours and our largest arms supplier, and Egypt was another would they agree
- 49:37with the escalation and not only escalation and quantity, but also in more advanced
- 49:44weapons. You know, rocket launchers from the Chinese surface the air missiles.
- 49:50You know, that would really make our partners more vulnerable. And you know
- 49:54Pakistan in terms of subversion and maybe in vain Asian uh. You know,
- 50:00the Chinese with diplomatic repercussions when their weapons are found, you know, surface
- 50:06stair missiles or shooting down aircraft. And so I had to go to all
- 50:09these countries with the top leadership of their intelligence services to try to get them
- 50:17to go along with the escalation, and they all did within six months.
- 50:22And then that included trying to get a more advanced surface stare weapon. You
- 50:27know, in COVID action programs, you want a plausible deniability. You know,
- 50:34so what you know covert means for your listeners is you're concealing the sponsor
- 50:39of the operation, but not the operation because you're influencing events. You know,
- 50:43you're supporting a war, you're doing political action or whatever it is.
- 50:50But you don't want the United States rule to be a parent. Uh.
- 50:54You know, even if people suspect it, you're not acknowledging it. And
- 51:00you know, so in paramilitary operations, the ones that are kind of the
- 51:07most deniable were when you're using the enemy's weapons, which is what the Afghan
- 51:10program was for the first five years. And then you know, you can
- 51:15lift up the skirt a little more by going to Western weapons and then even
- 51:20more with US weapons, And within twelve months we kind of went to the
- 51:23spectrum in certain high areas. You know, we went for Western surface to
- 51:28air missiles, a British blowpipe, and then eventually the US stinger, you
- 51:32know, so further escalations in that regard. And so first the Britz turned
- 51:39us down on the blowpipe, and then we went back to them and Prime
- 51:43Minister Thatcher agreed, and so we started that program up. And then we
- 51:47went back to Congress and said, you know, we now have a strategy
- 51:53and a real detailed plan, and we know you just get you quadrupled our
- 52:00budget, but we actually need double that. You know, if you'll just
- 52:02double it one more time and take us up to a billion billion two,
- 52:07we think we can actually achieve this objective in a couple of years. And
- 52:10lo and behold, Charlie Wilson came through again that summer and transferred money from
- 52:19the Department of Defense, and the Saudi's matched it, and so within less
- 52:23than twelve months, the program had increased by a factor of more than ten,
- 52:29you know, from like one hundred and twenty million to almost one point
- 52:31two billion, where it leveled up, and then lots of you know,
- 52:37we went from twenty surfaced air missiles, some of which didn't work, you
- 52:40know, damn near two thousand, and increased our training by factor of ten,
- 52:46and you know, all sorts of other things, and so the temple
- 52:50of combat went up, the number of aircraft shot down, the size of
- 52:52ambushes, the attacks on urban areas and bases, shelling with rockets, shelling
- 52:59into you know, all that just increased dramatically. And at the same the
- 53:06same time, Mikhaile Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in March eighty
- 53:12five, just as we were beginning on this escalation path all of eighty five,
- 53:17took us top general from Eastern Europe East Germany and put them in charge
- 53:22and got two years to win the war. We'll give you twenty five thousand
- 53:25more troops to the one hundred and five that the Soviets had there already.
- 53:30So we had this dual escalation, you know, ours covert and there's over,
- 53:35and within twelve months we had won that battle of the surges, and
- 53:37Gorbachev started looking for the exit. Mike, when just out of curiousity,
- 53:43when you're going around and selling, you know, partner nations on the idea
- 53:47of increasing their investments, increasing the weaponship to Afghanistan, things like that,
- 53:52do you need a different pitch for each country, Like, because Afghanistan isn't
- 53:58like necessarilyrategically necessary for anybody. Is it just the idea of bleeding the Soviet
- 54:05Union? Yeah, So it differed in each case. So, you know,
- 54:09with China, they had had a border clash in nineteen sixty nine and
- 54:15we had you know, the Opening to China led by Henry Kissinger and Nixon,
- 54:22and then consolidated in the normalization of relations under President Carter and started an
- 54:29intelligence partnership with the Chinese and then started supporting the Afghan program because they wanted
- 54:36to weaken the Soviets and have them tied down in a war, because you
- 54:40know, they were worried about a Soviet invasion of China from the north.
- 54:45You know, Soviet priorities were NATO number one, you know that was the
- 54:50Big War, China number two, and then maybe Iran number three. In
- 54:52Afghanistan, was kind of number four there, which is why we thought there
- 54:57were limits on their ability to escalate. And so with the Chinese, it
- 55:01was really more a case of they're already in it, are they willing to
- 55:05go in it even more with more sophisticated weapons and numbers of weapons, And
- 55:12you know, there was a debate about whether they would. The National intelligence
- 55:15officer for China told me, there's no way they will give you these surface
- 55:19their missiles, and they ended up doing it, you know. And where
- 55:22with Pakistan, you know, it was a function of the Islamic world not
- 55:29liking these infidels invading a Muslim country and so that you know, affected Egypt
- 55:35and Pakistan. And then with Pakistan there was really the risk of you know,
- 55:42cross border raids with special forces, airstrikes, sabotaged by the KGB and
- 55:47Afghan Secret Service, and maybe an invasion because the Soviets would do these big
- 55:53sweeps, you know, search and destroy missions right up to the border.
- 55:58And so it was a little different and they were in it, but it
- 56:00took some convincing more about the risk of you know, escalation that would directly
- 56:07affect them as the frontline state. I meant, I should have mentioned Saudi
- 56:10Arabia to another one, you know, was mostly helping fund the program,
- 56:15but again it was the invasion of a Muslim country. And then with the
- 56:19Brits, you know, it was more high technology. You know, we
- 56:22were partnering on intelligence collection and other things and support for resistance commanders, but
- 56:30it was it was really, you know, do we want to stick it
- 56:34to the Soviets with this advanced weapon that they're not going to you know,
- 56:37that shoots down more aircraft And same for the US decision. So yeah,
- 56:42you know, the pitch was tailored to their own interests in Afghanistan. In
- 56:45each case, I think you answered at least half of my next question,
- 56:50but because you talked about it in the book, at some point I wanted
- 56:53to ask you about the covert operation cooperation that you mentioned with China, which
- 57:00this interesting historical interlude, almost impossible to imagine something like that happening today,
- 57:06But I just wanted to see if I can tease out of you a little
- 57:09bit any sort of a cultural observations about their approach to warfare, covert operations,
- 57:16or anything else that you took away from those numerous meetings where you interfaced
- 57:20directly with the Chinese intelligence apparatus. Yeah, so, you know, it
- 57:29was very interesting in a sense that you know, they had the long Chinese
- 57:35Civil War, and you know, Mao had been dead for almost a decade,
- 57:44but and Dung Chaoping actually approved this big escalation. But you know,
- 57:50so in our initial discussions, we had big debates about guerrilla warfare strategy and
- 57:58you know, so try different visions about how to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan.
- 58:05You know, is it really lots of people armed with aks or is
- 58:08it combined arms and stuff, which I was pushing and more, you know,
- 58:13win shift the anti air balance more in the insurgents favor and stuff.
- 58:16And so that took some convincing. You know. We went back and forth,
- 58:20and you know, you know, they're saying to me, look,
- 58:23we really know guerrilla warfare. You know, we we overthrew our own government
- 58:28this way. And I'd say, well, yeah, I know something about
- 58:30it too, and here's why I think we need to do this, and
- 58:35they finally, you know, went along. But it was very interesting.
- 58:40It was very interesting culturally in a sense that their negotiating style, you know,
- 58:49you weren't allowed to when you made presentations. They would just say continue,
- 58:52continue, with no break, you know. And if you said you
- 58:57couldn't ask them questions when they were talking for thirty minutes and they didn't want
- 59:01any interruption, you know, if I'd say, well, okay, you
- 59:05want me to elaborate on this or something, they don't just continue, you
- 59:07know. And so we were really almost like ships passing in the night.
- 59:13And then, you know, as they often, as I later learned they
- 59:15do with businesses a lot, you don't clinch the deal until the very end.
- 59:20And so it looked like we weren't going to get everything we want.
- 59:22We were heading to the air we got some things. We were heading to
- 59:25the airport, and they're waiting for us at an airport lounge with drinks and
- 59:30stuff. Was the head of armaments for the PLA. It's okay, read
- 59:34everything better late than never, but yeah, it was, you know,
- 59:39and I I imagined myself when I was in Special Forces, you know,
- 59:49in the tenth Group, where we had this World War three mission and you
- 59:53know, to liberate Eastern Europe. You know, I thought this would be
- 59:58if this ever came to pass, this be you know, T. E.
- 1:00:00Lawrence and all this great stuff. But I also thought, I'd read,
- 1:00:04you know, about World War two and OSS and China and others,
- 1:00:08and I knew about the border conflict that they had had in sixty nine.
- 1:00:15I'd study that as I was completing my bachelor's degree, and I thought,
- 1:00:19well, maybe I'd find myself on the side of the Chinese against the Russians.
- 1:00:22You know, that would be really exotic, you know, Eastern Europe,
- 1:00:25I kind of know, but this one would be exotic. And lo
- 1:00:29and behold, they became my partner to fight in Afghanistan. You know,
- 1:00:31I didn't have the imagination to think about that. But as far as the
- 1:00:39end game in Afghanistan, I mean, the obvious end of the conflict is
- 1:00:44the Soviet withdraw When did you know it was over? Really in sort of
- 1:00:52early nineteen eighty six. Gorbachev gave this open speech in February eighty six about
- 1:01:00bleeding wound and we've got to extricate ourselves from this, and our escalation was
- 1:01:08just starting. I mean, we had we had flows of stuff going there
- 1:01:14through nineteen eighty seven, and you know, this meant strengthening the logistics system
- 1:01:20from ships to what you do at ports, to railroads to trucks, to
- 1:01:23warehouses and then to Toyota land cruisers and even you know, ten thousand mules.
- 1:01:29You know, I grew up in Hollywood. I didn't know a damn
- 1:01:30thing about mules, and suddenly I find myself dealing with China about you know,
- 1:01:36ten thousand of these things. And it turns out Chinese mules were better
- 1:01:39for Afghanistan than Tennessee mules, which you know, who would think, but
- 1:01:44there's the mountains and so, you know, it really was pretty clear in
- 1:01:54eighty six. But then you had this dance of negotiations. First, Soviet
- 1:02:01six regiments come out that summer, but the Soviets are hoping that we'll leave
- 1:02:07the Afghan government in place, and so there's negotiations about that, and the
- 1:02:12US rightly holds firm and then eventually Gorbachev says, okay, we just want
- 1:02:19out. We don't care what kind of government is there. In that sense
- 1:02:22the deal. And then from the time the agreement was signed, they withdrew
- 1:02:30in two big phases, and so that was not quite a year, like
- 1:02:35nine months, but you know, so it just played out in slow motion,
- 1:02:38but the writing was on the wall. Their tactic shifted there once we
- 1:02:44started shooting down so many aircraft. They started flying above surface to air missile
- 1:02:49range, which meant they couldn't do close order support very well. They didn't
- 1:02:53do offensive operations as much anymore. You know, they just kind of hunkered
- 1:02:57down to their bases. And you know, so it was pretty clear.
- 1:03:00And also they announced this policy, like we did in Vietnam, the Afghanization,
- 1:03:07you know, to basically shift to an indirect role where the Afghan their
- 1:03:12communist Afghans are going to do the fighting and the Soviets are going to support
- 1:03:15them but not do the combat. And and you know, so we saw
- 1:03:20all that and that that kind of you know, led to the led to
- 1:03:23the endgame. What was important was holding their feet to the fire, you
- 1:03:30know, really sustaining this through this period. And this is where I really
- 1:03:32give. I think there's important lessons from President Reagan in this is that,
- 1:03:37you know, as relations were really warming between Reagan and Gorbachev and uh,
- 1:03:44you know, bring breakthroughs in diplomacy, we kept the heat on in Afghanistan,
- 1:03:49pressure and still said, look, we want to do business with you.
- 1:03:52This can be great, but you know, we disagree on this one
- 1:03:55thing. And you know, he ended up getting his way. Yeah.
- 1:04:00The as we kind of get towards the end of part one of our interview
- 1:04:04with you, I wanted to ask a couple of questions that are sort of
- 1:04:08like big picture things that I think maybe you're uniquely qualified to answer. At
- 1:04:14the time, we've talked at length about supporting the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan. At
- 1:04:17the same time, there were paramilitary programs supporting Unida in Angola and the FDN
- 1:04:23or the Contras in Nicaragua. I was wonder if you could talk a little
- 1:04:26bit about these three anti essentially anti Soviet covert operations around the world and what
- 1:04:32was the global strategy behind them. Yeah, And there was also a brief
- 1:04:39period of supporting Cambodians against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, although it was very,
- 1:04:50very small, so you know it really we started this period on defense
- 1:05:01in Central America. You know, Nicaragua had fallen to the Sandinistas, you
- 1:05:08know, and there was a sense that the Soviets and their Cuban allies and
- 1:05:12others were really on the march, and insurgency really exploded in El Salvador,
- 1:05:17and you know, so we were counterinsurgency and essentially dealing there. And then
- 1:05:25the country program is kind of the first big one in a sense because Afghanistan
- 1:05:30is this We're doing what we can there, but there's no thought you're going
- 1:05:35to win where we really didn't want to lose in We certainly didn't want to
- 1:05:39have more countries fall to communism in Central America, but there was even a
- 1:05:44hope, well, maybe we could defeat them in Nicaragua and at least in
- 1:05:46our backyard, you know. So it starts off fairly modest, and then
- 1:05:50as you moved to nineteen eighty four when the country program becomes politically controversial and
- 1:05:57has this hiatus and it's you know, it's doing so so we've had a
- 1:06:01lot of success and counterinsurgency in Alsalvador, but not as much, you know,
- 1:06:06on the offensive side in Nicaragua. And then as Afghanistan escalates, that
- 1:06:13then becomes the real main effort, and so people's minds changed between this is
- 1:06:18hopeless too, maybe we can win there, and if we win here it
- 1:06:23really matters. You know, this is the main enemy in the in the
- 1:06:28big Enchilada, where if you win in Nicaragua, you know, you move
- 1:06:30upon on the chessboard rather than a queen. And then Angola picks up,
- 1:06:35I think in eighty six or so, and you know, the Cubans had
- 1:06:43sent a big proxy army into Angola, twenty some thousand troops, and that
- 1:06:49kicks in as well. And then President Reagan gives the Reagan Doctrine speech,
- 1:06:58which is will support anti commune insurgencies. And I want to say that's early
- 1:07:04early eighty five if I remember right, and it provides kind of the strategic
- 1:07:10framework for this global irregular war that kind of came in parts, essentially and
- 1:07:16at different times and different emphasis. And it's tied to a broader strategy of
- 1:07:25restricting technology transfer, hurting the Soviets with low oil prices, you know,
- 1:07:32other things to kind of weaken the weaken the system. And then of course
- 1:07:38the Reagan build up. You know that they really can't match this defense,
- 1:07:44yeah, and that you know, missile defense. And then since the late
- 1:07:49seventies, we started shifting our strategy, our conventional strategy in Europe to deep
- 1:07:58attack. You know, we knew we couldn't, you know, up until
- 1:08:01say nineteen seventy six, our strategy was to trade space for time, essentially
- 1:08:06to withdraw under pressure of a Soviet advance, and every war game showed that
- 1:08:14they could break through on multiple fronts, and it just didn't work. Once
- 1:08:17we developed the precision weapons and the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and other things,
- 1:08:24the first stealth aircraft, the F one seventeen, the Army tactical missile
- 1:08:29system, you know that's finally getting to Ukraine today. The joint Surveillance and
- 1:08:36Market Acquisition JSTARS that really worried the Soviets about their strategy, that you know,
- 1:08:44all the second echelan forces would be vulnerable and you know, rather than
- 1:08:46having a tank battle right up at front, those reinforcing forces could get hit.
- 1:08:51And that's what the Soviet general staff back Gorbachev because as they looked out,
- 1:08:58you know, ten twenty years, they thought, we're just going to
- 1:09:00fall further behind the United States and technology and we got to do something to
- 1:09:04revitalize our system to catch up. And so all that weighed them down.
- 1:09:11Do you think that all of the I would add two support for Solidarity Poland
- 1:09:15you know that was keeping them alive, you know, do you think that
- 1:09:19all these uh, these these counter sort of Soviet wars that we fought that
- 1:09:25you know, are challenging because you can't you can't always mold the the indigenous
- 1:09:30peoples that that you are your proxy soldiers. Right, they're doing their thing.
- 1:09:35But do you think that all those led up to Gorbachev to to the
- 1:09:41you know, because in eighty nine we saw the fall of the Berlin Wall
- 1:09:44like that. Do you think that we basically defeated the Soviet unions through these
- 1:09:48even if we didn't win in the specific places all the time? Yeah,
- 1:09:53so I think, you know. And in Nicaragua the result was a little
- 1:09:59more ambigu because the Sandinist has got defeated an election in nineteen ninety, but
- 1:10:04you know, pressure from the insurgents. In Angola, we really defeated the
- 1:10:10Cubans, and in Afghanistan defeated the Soviets, and it was the only defeat
- 1:10:15the Red Army had suffered in its history, so real blow to its credibility
- 1:10:18and claim on resources. And same with the KGB, and you know,
- 1:10:24and I do think that had a big effect on the Soviets. You know,
- 1:10:28it's not the only thing that led to the disillusion of the Soviet Empire.
- 1:10:32Gorbachev's critical in that, in a sense, not using force in Eastern
- 1:10:36Europe when you know, the wall starts cumbling down and Solidarity gets elected and
- 1:10:43you know all that, But the defeat of the Red Army was was a
- 1:10:46big deal, you know, another sort of like big picture. And this
- 1:10:51is more of an institutional question, and I hope I won't start a food
- 1:10:56fight with this one. But the differences between the Special Activities Division and Special
- 1:11:00Forces, or between ground branch and special forces, what are the pros and
- 1:11:05cons of each? Why do we maintain these two in some ways parallel capabilities.
- 1:11:12Yeah, so that's a question that's been debated over the decades. You
- 1:11:15know, should CIA just focus on intelligence and not covert action and particularly paramilitary
- 1:11:19covert action where you know, the military has very strong capabilities, and so
- 1:11:26you know, part of the reason for that is the political benefits of covert
- 1:11:31action to begin with. You know, So the way I like to describe
- 1:11:35it, if we're going to support an insurgency against the hostile power in peace
- 1:11:43time, presidents overwhelmingly defer to CIA there. So it's not a question of
- 1:11:48capabilities, it's a question of plausible deniability and escalation control. And you know,
- 1:11:56if we had special forces doing Afghanistan It's not that they couldn't do it
- 1:12:00technically, it's that you run a higher risk that you're going to trigger a
- 1:12:03direct war than if CI is doing it. You're still killing Soviets, you
- 1:12:08know, I mean, it's still a war. It's just that it provides
- 1:12:11this level of control that President seems to go to. And then when you
- 1:12:17go to war, you know, particularly a big war, you don't have
- 1:12:26enough CI for that, and then there's no reason not to use your military,
- 1:12:30you know, for that. And then all these other missions counter terrorism
- 1:12:33and you know that require real surgical skill and everything that's properly the military,
- 1:12:40you know, and those things occur in peace time. But you know,
- 1:12:44so there's this kind of division of labor based on you know, the politics
- 1:12:48of it and whether covert or over makes sense or whether you know, and
- 1:12:55then CIA essentially working through partners with a smaller footprint rather than you know,
- 1:13:05something more muscular. You know, as you get to the more muscular side,
- 1:13:10you get to DoD And you know that's true in a number of areas,
- 1:13:15whether it's drones or whether it's cyber you know, you have these equal
- 1:13:20you have capabilities in both areas, but for different purposes. So I think
- 1:13:26it serves the country. It gives the president more options, and it serves
- 1:13:30the country well to have both. But you got to know the limitations of
- 1:13:33both. There's sort of this idea or rumor I guess that Republican presidents will
- 1:13:41lean more heavily on the military and Democratic presidents will lean more heavily on the
- 1:13:45CIA. Do you think that's an actual thing or is it just sort of
- 1:13:51whomever. I don't think that bears out necessarily in history. I mean,
- 1:14:00the you know, from the last two decades of the Cold War and maybe
- 1:14:09parts of the last twenty years. You know, the differences in general about
- 1:14:15aggressive foreign policy have differentiated the parties until recently, you know, when you
- 1:14:20know you've got all this isolationism strain creeping in. But you know, part
- 1:14:27of the reason I think analysts explain that Republicans won five out of six presidential
- 1:14:32elections in the late Cold War is because they were trusted more on national security.
- 1:14:36So I think it rather than military or CIA, I think it's more
- 1:14:42how aggressively you use either one. There's still nuances in both. Like I
- 1:14:46said, you know what Carter started, Reagan continued, and then Reagan escalated,
- 1:14:53but it took a while and then you know, after nine to eleven,
- 1:15:02President Bush, for the invasion of Afghanistan went with essentially a CI led
- 1:15:08plan because it was very rapid, and you know, of course the military
- 1:15:12was going to fold in on that. You know, ce I wasn't going
- 1:15:15to fight the Afghan War by themselves, but you needed airpower and you needed
- 1:15:17special forces and all that. But you know, the initial options that the
- 1:15:24military came up with weren't unconventional. They were airstrikes or massive invasion, and
- 1:15:30President Bush didn't want to you know, air strikes were too little and massive
- 1:15:33invasion too late, you know. So you know, so that's what kind
- 1:15:39of drove it. Do we have any questions? And then the other thing
- 1:15:42that drives it is our foreign partners. You know a lot of times,
- 1:15:45for their own risk, they'll want to deal with CI or intelligence channels because
- 1:15:51they think it provides them more more protection, and you know, and then
- 1:15:58it's it's also flexible, like we can, uh, you know, if
- 1:16:01CI needs certain capabilities that the Department of Defense has, we can loan them
- 1:16:06to them, you know, so you know, and so then it's just
- 1:16:10a question of what authority. Do you want right? I think we have
- 1:16:14a few of viewer questions. Yeah, we have some great questions. First
- 1:16:18off, Rory, thank you very much for the donation. I didn't see
- 1:16:20a question. If there is one, please art and chat and we'll keep
- 1:16:24an eye out for it. Andrew Dunbar, thanks buddy. Do you have
- 1:16:28any funny anecdotes about dealing with the State Department? Seems like s after the
- 1:16:33diplomatic service would be a bit of a culture clash. Well, yeah,
- 1:16:43I don't know how funny they are. But you know, when I was
- 1:16:46dealing uh on the counter Terrorism Intelligence collection, you know, in case our
- 1:16:54embassies were seized by terrorists, you know, the diplomat the ambassadors and the
- 1:17:01diplomats thought, okay, this is a good thing to have. I want
- 1:17:04someone to come and rescue me if things go bad. And so, you
- 1:17:09know, I dealt with the security people and the ambassador and the cheapest station
- 1:17:14and they were all they were in high thread areas. So they were supportive
- 1:17:17of having the military and you know, prepare for this and you know more,
- 1:17:25I think what your listener is referring to is approaches to foreign policy decisions
- 1:17:31and use of force. The inner agency where we do have differences of opinion,
- 1:17:35you know. Sometimes that's where the different departments you know, can diverge
- 1:17:42sometimes. But on what I did there, I don't think. And then
- 1:17:45also generally I wouldn't say all ambassadors, but lots of ambassadors welcome all the
- 1:17:51help they can get, you know, so they've got us, you know,
- 1:17:56whatever sized country team. But you know, if you can send them
- 1:17:59a few people that will really augment them and do something for them useful,
- 1:18:02they generally welcome it. You know. It's it's more for their empire and
- 1:18:08more more ability to do good things, you know, in in their particular
- 1:18:12country. So yeah, I didn't I didn't really have that experience. They
- 1:18:15didn't look at you as outavis knuckle driggers who should like sit in a corner
- 1:18:19and only come out when you know, breaking. They'd laugh like, you
- 1:18:25know, like the one ambassador you know, I mentioned John Negroponte earlier that
- 1:18:30I served with over several decades, you know, when we were both in
- 1:18:34the bush to administration. He said, I remember you as a Special Forces
- 1:18:40captain, and you know you wanted to take pictures of my bathroom and all
- 1:18:43this other stuff if you were being held in your bathroom. We're gonna want
- 1:18:47to know how to get in there. Spencer Devns, thank you very much.
- 1:18:56From your perspective, What does the United States need to address PRC going
- 1:19:01into the rest of this century? When does your recommendation need to be done
- 1:19:05by ah So, I have a chapter in the book called Winning the New
- 1:19:12Cold War that deals with how to compete how to prevail over China over several
- 1:19:17decades, and Russia is an ally of China as well, and you know,
- 1:19:27probably the biggest factor, since they're a global power and an integrated world,
- 1:19:31is really the economic and technological competition. We've been the dominant economic power
- 1:19:40in the world for a century and we never had a rival in the twentieth
- 1:19:44century that had more than fifty percent of our GDP, So we had this
- 1:19:47economic escalation dominance. You know. World War two is the best example of
- 1:19:53that. You know, we get surprised at the beginning, but then we
- 1:19:56mobilize American industry and you know, we flood the Pacific with and you know,
- 1:20:00other things and landing craft to go to D Day and all that.
- 1:20:04And you know that may not be as true in the twenty first century.
- 1:20:09If China continues to grow. Now they've been stumbling. And then you also
- 1:20:12have this revolution and technology with AI and quantum and that can remake the world,
- 1:20:16and we don't want to be on the losing end of that. And
- 1:20:19then those things translate into like the original Cold War, into competitions for global
- 1:20:26influence, you know, all around Africa or Latin America and elsewhere. And
- 1:20:34as warfare has evolved, you know, our position has been eroded in the
- 1:20:40Western Pacific. So China kind of went to school on the US military more
- 1:20:45than any other country in Desert Storm. In the aftermath of Desert Storm,
- 1:20:48and the big conclusion the Chinese drew out of this was terrible idea to give
- 1:20:54the United States six months to build up massive combat power right on border and
- 1:21:00then beat your brains in, you know. And so they developed this anti
- 1:21:03access strategy to try to prevent US force, hurt the ones that are in
- 1:21:09the region by attacking air bases and surface ships and then prevent the reinforcements or
- 1:21:14make it very costly for them to come in. And they've they've pursued that
- 1:21:16strategy for several decades. And now you have these new warfare domains, space
- 1:21:21and cyber that are inherently global. And while the Chinese are pretty powerful opposite
- 1:21:29Taiwan. You know, once you get out of missile range. You know,
- 1:21:32if we were both projecting power, say to Africa or somewhere, you
- 1:21:36know, the US would dominate, and we'd like to keep it that way.
- 1:21:40So we have undersea dominance, you know, we have really more and
- 1:21:45long range strike, we have better space systems. I'd like to keep it
- 1:21:50that way because the way for China to become a global military power is to
- 1:21:54gain advantages in those areas. And you know, so there's a number of
- 1:21:59things you have to do to strengthen regional and global deterrence. But then you
- 1:22:03got to win this Cold War, which might be from proxies and influence and
- 1:22:08a lot of the covered action and the special ops stuff that you know below
- 1:22:13direct conflict. Because you know, another characteristic of the old Cold War in
- 1:22:16this one is nuclear weapons tends to put a little bit of a break on
- 1:22:21conventional war. You can't do world too the way you know you otherwise would,
- 1:22:27and so that means you got to get at your adversary through more devious
- 1:22:30ways. And uh, you know, we've got our work work cut out
- 1:22:34for US for there, uh and corporate thank you very much, if possible,
- 1:22:42any commentary on the lasting impact of the ISI. Director General Ahamed gool
- 1:22:49Ah So, uh, he's funny question. So he he came in late
- 1:23:00in the Soviet Afghan War and it was a conventional armor officer and wanted to
- 1:23:09shift the insurgency into conventional battle essentially, and ordered assaults on cities, which
- 1:23:18played right into Soviet and commonists Afghan government hands. You know, like,
- 1:23:26you make yourself a big target and stay there long enough, we'll pound you.
- 1:23:30You know, you don't want to do daylight assaults on cities generally,
- 1:23:32but particularly when your enemy has artillery superiority and air superiority and you know,
- 1:23:40everything else. So he was a pretty disruptive force in the endgame of Afghanistan
- 1:23:47and then became very anti US and so over time, you know, supported
- 1:23:55the Taliban and others. Over time, really became an agitator for uh,
- 1:24:05you know, essentially not partnering with the US and everything else. So he's
- 1:24:12he's not my favorite Pakistani spencer. Day devins, thank you very much.
- 1:24:20He has a couple of questions coming up. He's in a meeting, so
- 1:24:24He's going to get to these later. H Do you see any sort of
- 1:24:27scenario where we risk becoming Eisenhower's feared garrison state while we try to maintain escalation
- 1:24:33dominance with an adversary that could have a larger DDP than we do. Yeah.
- 1:24:39So that's the challenge of the economics is that, I say, now,
- 1:24:42China may have peaked, and they're you know, they're emphasizing political control
- 1:24:45over economic growth, and so they're kind of killing their golden goose right now.
- 1:24:50So it may not be as dire as as we think, but you
- 1:24:54know, they could, they could recover, and you know, the genius
- 1:25:00of Eisenhower was to recognized that the Cold War would be fought hopefully short of
- 1:25:13conventional war because of nuclear weapons. And in fact, you know, he
- 1:25:15emphasized nuclear weapons very dramatically in his strategy, the National Security Strategy, the
- 1:25:21New the New Look. But he also thought it was very important to put
- 1:25:26the United States in a long term competition on a sustainable fiscal path. You
- 1:25:30know, we had spent a lot of money mobilizing for Korea, you know,
- 1:25:33demobilized after World War Two and then ramped up for Korea, and it
- 1:25:39really created a lot of budget problems and everything, and so Eisenhower kind of
- 1:25:43put us on a steady state where innovation was emphasized. Nuclear weapons would be
- 1:25:49used to deter war and hopefully bring an end if you if you had one.
- 1:25:57But also all these innovations in you know, after Sputnik and the space
- 1:26:02race, NASA and DARPA was created, and then the NRO and and so
- 1:26:09you know, it was a and then used covert action, you know,
- 1:26:12to compete in the Third World, and so it was a pretty effective grand
- 1:26:16strategy, you know. And then even on the economic side, you know,
- 1:26:18the interstate highway system, you know, and so it's a good model
- 1:26:25for you know, you know, at the end of the day, I
- 1:26:30think who wins this new Cold War between US and China and its allies will
- 1:26:34be who has the strongest overall system, which means our domestic power base,
- 1:26:39you know, which it's got resilient, you can't spend yourself into oblivion.
- 1:26:43And you know, and one of you know, one of the dangers of
- 1:26:45great powers is they you know, both we and the Soviets made these mistakes
- 1:26:50in the Cold War is you know, strategies and art not a science.
- 1:26:57So you can overreach and make yourself vulnerable peripheral things, or you can underreach
- 1:27:01and not do anything, and then the world really gets bad for you.
- 1:27:04And you know we've done over various periods of time, you know, and
- 1:27:11you want to find that realm where you're adding to your power, not depleting
- 1:27:15it, and then taking advantage of your adversary when they make a mistake,
- 1:27:19you know, And that's what we eventually did in the late Cold War,
- 1:27:23you know. You know, I like to describe the Cold War. We
- 1:27:26started off pretty strong, you know, the first decade and a half.
- 1:27:30We kind of had trouble in the middle couple decades, and then we finished
- 1:27:32strong and that was enough to win it. Great answer also from censor,
- 1:27:41If it's possible, how would you seek to make COVID action programs immune to
- 1:27:45the polls of US domestic uh, domestic political theater. I'm not sure it
- 1:27:50works like that. Yeah. So you know, Intelligence emphasizes our republican or
- 1:28:00a government where a couple committees in Congress do the oversight for the American people
- 1:28:04to keep things secret. But you know, one of the tests of a
- 1:28:09covert action program is, you know, it ought to be consistent with broader
- 1:28:15US foreign policy interests and goals, and when it's too disjointed from that,
- 1:28:21you know, and then the likelihood that it's going to get leaked by opponents
- 1:28:27goes up as well, you're going to have trouble. You know, you're
- 1:28:29going to have controversy. And so you know, you'd like the test of
- 1:28:33it is you'd like the American people to say, Okay, yeah, I
- 1:28:36see, I see why my government's doing that. It's in our interest,
- 1:28:40and I see why it was secret, you know, rather than what the
- 1:28:43hell are you doing right right? You know? And so and so we've
- 1:28:47had both over decades, and you know, hopefully we've learned how to do
- 1:28:54that. You know, the answer is not to do COVID action. I
- 1:28:57mean, presidents will differ on you know, how aggressive they want to be.
- 1:29:01But you know, when it succeeds, it really succeeds very well.
- 1:29:05And it's generally our biggest programs that are the most successful. But then we've
- 1:29:12also had spectacular failures like Bay of Pigs and others. You just got you
- 1:29:16know, got to avoid the dumb shit and do the smart ship right.
- 1:29:21And unfortunately, sometimes you don't know if it's dumb shit or s harshit until
- 1:29:25it's already Yeah, right, I mean sometimes that's right. How involved or
- 1:29:33aware should the average American be about national security topics? And how would you
- 1:29:39amend current engagement? Well, I think we're very affected by what goes on
- 1:29:48in the rest of the world, and you know, it's incumbent upon our
- 1:29:51political leaders, you know, to make that case. And then you know,
- 1:29:58and I think engagement is important, and you know, and one of
- 1:30:01the reasons we're connected is not just trade and and and others, all of
- 1:30:06that that matters. It's also the reach of weapons, you know, and
- 1:30:12the destructiveness of weapons, so beginning with nuclear weapons, but also now there's
- 1:30:18more ways to reach intercontinental distances, cyber being one example. You know,
- 1:30:24So the two oceans don't protect us in the way they have in the past,
- 1:30:28and you know, what happens overseas matters to us. And it's the
- 1:30:33same thing, you know, as terrorists go from a local or regional problem
- 1:30:39to ones with global ambitions or extra regional you know, it affects our interests
- 1:30:44more. And and so you know, generally, when we've disengaged, we've
- 1:30:54paid a price for it down the road. Now that doesn't mean over engagement.
- 1:30:58It just means you can't completely disengage. You know, you get you
- 1:31:01use economy of force in a lot of places and that's enough. But you
- 1:31:05can't just up and leave and say I don't care about the place my You
- 1:31:10know, you mentioned cyber a couple times, and I'm curious about your position
- 1:31:15on this. And obviously, sometimes the cybergangs are in China or in Russia,
- 1:31:18they're in a non permissive environment. But you know, we do see
- 1:31:23like ransomware attacks on hospitals where a hospital will get locked down. If if
- 1:31:29a group of armed people were to go into that hospital and lock it down,
- 1:31:33we have specific reactions to it. Do you feel as though the US
- 1:31:39government should start viewing certain types of cyber attacks as actually offense of military or
- 1:31:45acts of war or acts of terrorism and treat them as such. It's a
- 1:31:49great question. So so one, you know, cyber is this unique weapon
- 1:31:56that it you know, it can be is by states. It can be
- 1:32:00used, you know, to harass and destroy, you know, distributed denial
- 1:32:05of service attacks and then really destructive attacks. It can be used for intelligence
- 1:32:14collection as well as force, et cetera. So it has a lot of
- 1:32:17a lot of different attributes. And so where a lot of supposedly non governmental
- 1:32:28cyber actors or operate hostile territory and hurting you, you have to have some
- 1:32:33kind of diplomatic or some response because they're operating on this guy's territory, probably
- 1:32:43with his and they're hurting you. You know, So mainly a problem right
- 1:32:49now in Russia, but it's also China, China as well. And then
- 1:32:57you know, as you mentioned, we had this experience, you know,
- 1:33:00when I was under Secretary of Defense for intelligence, North Korea whacked Sony Pictures
- 1:33:06and the Iranians whacked Saudi Arabian oil, you know, ad Cake and others,
- 1:33:12big destructive attacks. And as you said, had North Koreans walked into
- 1:33:16Sony and blew up those computers, there'd be no doubt about a response.
- 1:33:21But you know, if you do it with cyber it's this, well what
- 1:33:25is it? And you know it's just a computer and or thirty thirty thousand
- 1:33:30computers or whatever the case is. But so we have a ways to go
- 1:33:34in this nascent field to develop you know, in a way it was easier
- 1:33:43to develop strategy in the nuclear world after the advent of nuclear weapons than it
- 1:33:47has been. You know, cyber has been around now for a couple of
- 1:33:50decades, and we're still struggling with what does it mean and how has it
- 1:33:56fit in the world of force, and what's acceptable all intelligence collection and what's
- 1:34:00not. You know, So, like this intellectual mass on a massive scale,
- 1:34:04this intellectual property theft, you know, like one of the things I
- 1:34:09thought in the Cold War against the Soviet Union, you know, where we
- 1:34:14really didn't interact economically and we restricted technologies. They got some of them,
- 1:34:18but I thought, you know, you really can't steal your way to economic
- 1:34:24competitiveness, you know, so they're trying to get our computers through you know,
- 1:34:28clandestine means and stuff like that, and it seemed like we had enormous
- 1:34:31advantage cyber and the Chinese have changed my views about that, right, given
- 1:34:36massive gains they've made economically from taking intellectual property, it looks like crime pays
- 1:34:44right. So right, and it's also tough because we've had people on the
- 1:34:47show in the counterintelligence industry or from you know, the FBI, the CIA
- 1:34:53who are like when every you know, Chinese national or Chinese descendant who has
- 1:35:00relatives in mainland are a potential spy for the United States, Like, how
- 1:35:03do you stop how do you stop your technology from walking out the doors when
- 1:35:09the Chinese government can walk up to and go, hey, I saw your
- 1:35:11grandmother last week, right, Yeah? Yeah, So, I mean,
- 1:35:15you know, the FBI's job jar has grown dramatically with this ology problem and
- 1:35:21the proliferation, you know, the traditional counterintelligence problem of I've got you know,
- 1:35:27one hundred intelligence hostile intelligence officers working in this country has changed pretty dramatically.
- 1:35:33And then you've got you know, still international terrorist extremists and domestics.
- 1:35:39So they got that. Yeah, maybe we'll do one more before we let
- 1:35:43Mike, we have we have like three more if that's okay, because one
- 1:35:46of them, like is a very generous donation. I want to make sure
- 1:35:49we get to it. I read in your bio that in nineteen seventy eight
- 1:35:53you went over over to Hereford, UK and completed a British SASU could course.
- 1:35:58How did you get that opportunity and how was that experience for you?
- 1:36:01It's also in the book By All Means Available, which I hope you guys
- 1:36:04would go and take a look at. Yeah. So you know, we
- 1:36:10were just starting to develop precision counter terrorism capabilities in the late nineteen seventies,
- 1:36:16you know, after the Munich massacre in seventy two and some airline hijackers or
- 1:36:25hijackings, and you know, so the Israelis were ahead of us and the
- 1:36:28Brits were ahead of us in certain ways, and then we started building this
- 1:36:32capability and I was fortunate enough. I was in a Special Forces unit in
- 1:36:36Germany at the time and Bob Tolt's part of the tenth Group, and I
- 1:36:41got selected to go to this training early on. And you know, it
- 1:36:46not only gave me some new tactical skills this close quarter battle and they had
- 1:36:51a lot to teach us. Then today, you know, we're the best
- 1:36:56force in the world in those areas, but and have been for the past
- 1:37:00a couple of decades. But you know it, it started me really on
- 1:37:05this counter terrorism track that became a pretty big part of my career, along
- 1:37:10with unconventional warfare and you know other parts that you know, so it was
- 1:37:15more than just tactical training in a sense that you know, got me thinking
- 1:37:19about precision counter terrorisms and operations and all that goes into it and stuff.
- 1:37:26So it's a great experience So we have four questions. Off, I'm only
- 1:37:30going to ask one of them and then we'll get the other three next show.
- 1:37:32We don't want to keep you too late. We know you're on a
- 1:37:34timeline. Mohammed Sabani, thank you very much for the very genest nation love
- 1:37:41the show is always y'all. What actions, if any, can be taken
- 1:37:45for America to compete in hardware chip production with the entire rare earth processing and
- 1:37:49supply chain being owned by Chinese? Also, how can America protect its infrastructure
- 1:37:55from cyber attacks? Yeah, two great questions really at the heart of this
- 1:38:00new competition. So one, you know, we've got this chip acts to
- 1:38:03try to repatriate production that had gone overseas the past couple of decades. Uh.
- 1:38:10In advanced chips, you know, we really are still ahead. But
- 1:38:14then you want to restrict some of that. So I think, you know,
- 1:38:15and that's companies like Nvidia, you know, the GPUs and stuff that's
- 1:38:23been subject of some administration restrictions and things. I want to maintain that lead.
- 1:38:30Uh, there are certain areas we're behind in you know, precision,
- 1:38:35you know how many things you can fit on a chip and stuff the scale
- 1:38:41nanometers and things that Taiwan Semiconductor, you know, is more advanced than us,
- 1:38:46but it's it's it's just a critical area. It's an area that you
- 1:38:49know, we invented, we dominated. It had military implications as well as
- 1:38:57commercial economic and you know it's going to be just as important in this century.
- 1:39:03And then the caller. Two other parts to that one, you know,
- 1:39:10the de risking of supply chains. Now that I think there's more we're
- 1:39:15discovering more rare earth's everywhere. You know, China has pretty big dominance now,
- 1:39:21but you know they're all over the world and including in the United States,
- 1:39:26you know, Wyoming and elsewhere, and so we just got to have
- 1:39:29the right policies to go after them, and then the relationships with with with
- 1:39:33some foreign governments to compete in that area. And then you know where we're
- 1:39:40dependent in pharmaceuticals as we saw and many you know, in COVID and medical
- 1:39:45supplies. You know, you got to de risk. That doesn't mean decoupled
- 1:39:48completely, but you have to have alternative sources to supply and assured sources supply
- 1:39:55doesn't mean everything has to be in the United States. Just can't all be
- 1:39:57in China. Right then, on cyber security. You know, that's a
- 1:40:04tough one because the public private partnership only goes so far because you know,
- 1:40:14we've got a free market system and it's sense. You know, companies don't
- 1:40:17want to tell you all their vulnerabilities or you know, for lots of reasons.
- 1:40:23And so you know, our cyber command commander has three missions, essentially
- 1:40:29to support combatant commanders, to defend all of DoD's networks, but then to
- 1:40:33defend the United States against the massive attack, you know, something that's beyond
- 1:40:39crime and everything else. But he's the only commander who really can't see the
- 1:40:44battlefield. You know, he sees partner that field or if he can,
- 1:40:46if he can target the attacker, you know where it's coming from, he
- 1:40:50can see that. But you know, if the attacks, if he doesn't
- 1:40:55see the point of origin and it's hitting all these other places that he doesn't
- 1:41:00have visibility on. He got a challenge with that. And so you know,
- 1:41:06and I you know, there's a big debate about cyber offense and cyber
- 1:41:12defense. You know, I think some of the advances in AI are going
- 1:41:15to really enable the offense going forward. We need a lot of you know,
- 1:41:19attention to this and and you know if quantum computing comes around in the
- 1:41:25next decade or so. So yeah, I mean it's great. Those are
- 1:41:30both really strategic questions and it's not something national security councils typically are trained or
- 1:41:39you know, to kind the problem. Well, Mike, I really appreciate
- 1:41:43you, you know, being willing to tackle so many of these difficult subjects.
- 1:41:45And this turned out to be a pretty wide ranging interview. Actually,
- 1:41:49I hope that all of you out there will go and check out his memoir
- 1:41:53by all means available. I read it. It was terrific. And we
- 1:41:58will have Mike back next Friday for part two, where I'm sure we'll have
- 1:42:00more of these policy discussions, and we'll also be talking about the latter part
- 1:42:05of his career, where he served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
- 1:42:09Ops and Low Intensity Conflict ASD Soulick and also headed up USDI. So again,
- 1:42:15Mike, you thank you very much for taking the time for this interview.
- 1:42:19Thank you both, and we will see all of you next Friday.
- 1:42:24Also, real quick, make sure you check out Jack and I being interviewed
- 1:42:27on the Cleared Hot podcast with Andy Stump. He was generous enough to invite
- 1:42:30us out to Montana and it's out there now. Sat around and shot the
- 1:42:33ship for a while. So and Mike thanks so much. We will see
- 1:42:36you on Friday. Okay, take care, nights.