Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1969 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
Transcript
- 0:001969 Cordially Warren E Buffett WBGLK 122 Buffett Partnership
- 0:07Ltd 610 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, NE 68131 Telephone 0424110 January
- 0:1822nd 1969 Our performance in 1968.
- 0:22Everyone makes mistakes. At the beginning of 1968, I felt
- 0:27prospects for BPL performance looked poorer than at any time
- 0:30in our history. However, doing considerable
- 0:33measure to one simple but sound idea whose time had come,
- 0:37investment ideas, like women, are often more exciting than
- 0:40punctual. We recorded an overall gain of
- 0:43$40,032,691.00. Naturally, you all possess
- 0:49sufficient intellectual purity to dismiss the dollar result and
- 0:53demand an accounting off performance relative to the Dow
- 0:56Jones Industrial Average. We established a new market plus
- 1:0058.8% versus sin overall plus 7.7% for the Dow, including
- 1:06dividends which would have been received through ownership of
- 1:08the average throughout the year. This result should be treated as
- 1:12a freak, like picking up 13 spades in a bridge game.
- 1:16You bid the slam, make it look modest, pocket the money and
- 1:20then get back to work on the part scores.
- 1:22We will also have our share of hands when we go set.
- 1:25The following summarizes the year by year performance of the
- 1:28Dow, the partnership before allocation, 1/4 of the excess
- 1:32over 6% to the general partner and the results for limited
- 1:36partners. Year overall results Partnership
- 1:39results Limited partners from Dow. 1-2 Results Three 1957 -
- 1:458.4 percent 10.4 percent 9.3% 195838.5 percent 40.9 percent
- 1:5432.2% Nineteen 5920 percent 25.9 percent 20.9 percent 1960 - 6.2
- 2:03percent 22.8 percent 18.6% 196122.4 percent 45.9% Thirty
- 2:125.9 percent 1962 - 7.6 percent 13.9 percent 11.9% Nineteen
- 2:216320.6 percent 38.7% Thirty .5% Nineteen 6418.7 percent 27.8
- 2:31percent 22.3% 196514.2 percent 47.2 percent 36.9 percent 1966 -
- 2:4215.6 percent 20.4 percent 16.8% Nineteen 6719 percent 35.9
- 2:50percent 28.4 percent 19687.7 percent 58.8 percent 45.6%. 1
- 3:00based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends
- 3:03that would have been received through ownership of the Dow
- 3:06during that year. The table includes all complete
- 3:09years of partnership activity. 2 For 1957 to 61 consists of
- 3:14combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships
- 3:18operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but
- 3:22before distributions to partners or allocations to the general
- 3:26partner. 3 for 1957 to 61 computed on the basis of the
- 3:31preceding column of partnership results, allowing for allocation
- 3:35to the general partner based upon the present partnership
- 3:38agreement but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
- 3:42123 on a cumulative or compounded basis.
- 3:46The results are year overall results from partnership results
- 3:50limited partners. Dow Results 1957 - 8.4 percent
- 3:5610.4 percent 9.3 percent 19575826.9 percent 55.6% Forty
- 4:044.5 percent 19575952.3 percent 95.9% Seventy 4.7 percent
- 4:1419576042.9 percent 140.6 percent 107.2% 1950760174 .9 percent 251
- 4:26percent 181.6 percent 19576261.6 percent 299.8 percent 215.1
- 4:36percent 1950760395 .1 percent 454.5 percent 311.2% 1957 Sixty
- 4:474131.3 percent 608.7 percent 402.9 percent 1957 Sixty 5164.1
- 4:59percent 943.2 percent 588.5 percent 1957 Sixty 6122.9
- 5:09percent 1156 percent 700. 4.2%. 1957 Sixty 7165.3 percent 1606.9
- 5:22percent 932.6% Nineteen 5768 thousand 185.7 percent 2610.6
- 5:32percent 1403.5% Annual compounded 9.1 percent 31.6
- 5:39percent 25.3%. Rate investment Companies.
- 5:43On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the
- 5:46results of what were the two largest mutual funds.
- 5:50They stood at the top in size from 1957 through 1966.
- 5:54They are still number two and three that follow a policy of
- 5:58being typically 95 -, 100% invested in common stocks and
- 6:03the two largest diversified closed end investment companies
- 6:07year. Massachusetts Invv Investors
- 6:10Lehman 2 Tricont Dow Limited Trust One Stock 1-2 Partners
- 6:151957 - 11.4% - 12.4% - 11.4% minus. 2.4% - 8.4 percent 9.3
- 6:26percent 195842.7 percent 47.5%. Forty .8 percent. 33.2 percent
- 6:3538.5 percent 32.2% 19599 percent 10.3 percent 8.1 percent 8.4
- 6:44percent 20 percent 20.9 percent. 1960 - 1.0% - 0.6%.
- 6:52Two .5 percent. 2.8% - 6.2 percent 18.6% 196125.6 percent
- 7:0124.9 percent 23.6 percent 22.5 percent 22.4 percent. 35.9
- 7:09percent. 1962 - 9.8% - 13.4% - 14.4% - 10.0% - 7.6 percent
- 7:2011.9% 196320 percent 16.5 percent 23.7 percent 18.3
- 7:28percent 20.6%. Thirty .5% Nineteen 6415.9
- 7:34percent 14.3 percent 13.6 percent 12.6 percent 18.7
- 7:41percent 22.3% 196510.2 percent 9.8%.
- 7:47Nineteen percent 10.7 percent 14.2 percent 36.9 percent. 1966
- 7:54- 7.7% - 10.0% - 2.6% - 6.9% - 15.6 percent 16.8% 196720
- 8:06percent 22.8 percent 28 percent 25.4% Nineteen percent 28.4%
- 8:14Nineteen 6810.3 percent 8.1 percent 6.7 percent 6.8 percent
- 8:217.7 percent 45.6% Cumulative 189.3 percent 167.7 percent
- 8:29225.6% Two 100.2 percent 185.7 percent 1403.5% Results Annual
- 8:399.3 percent 8.6 percent 10.3 percent 9.6 percent 9.1 percent
- 8:4725.3%. Compounded rate 1 computed from
- 8:51changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of
- 8:54record during year 2 from 1968 Moody's Bank and finance manual
- 8:59for 1957 to 1967 estimated for nineteen 68124.
- 9:06It is interesting that after 12 years, these four funds, which
- 9:10presently aggregate well over $5 billion and account for over 10%
- 9:15of the investment company industry, have averaged only a
- 9:18fraction of one percentage point annually, better than the Dow.
- 9:22Some of the so-called Gogo funds have recently been rechristened
- 9:26Nogo fonts. For example, Gerald's Size
- 9:29Manhattan Fund, perhaps the world's best known aggressive
- 9:32investment vehicle, came in at -6.9% for 1968.
- 9:38Many smaller investment entities continued to substantially
- 9:41outperform the general market in 1968, but in nothing like the
- 9:45quantities of 1966 and 1967. The investment management
- 9:51business, which I used to severely chastise in this
- 9:54section for excessive lethargy, has now swung in many quarters
- 9:58to acute hypertension. One investment manager
- 10:00representing an organization with an old established name you
- 10:04would recognize handling mutual funds aggregating well over $1
- 10:08billion set upon launching a new advisory service in 1968.
- 10:14The complexities of national and international economics make
- 10:17money management a full time job.
- 10:20A good money manager cannot maintain a study of securities
- 10:23on a week by week or even a day by day basis.
- 10:27Securities must be studied in a minute by minute program.
- 10:30Wow, this sort of stuff makes me feel guilty when I go out for a
- 10:34Pepsi. When practiced by large and
- 10:36increasing numbers of highly motivated people with huge
- 10:40amounts of money on a limited quantity of suitable securities,
- 10:43the result becomes highly unpredictable.
- 10:46In some ways it is fascinating to watch and in other ways it is
- 10:50appalling. Analysis of 1968 results.
- 10:53All four main categories of our investment operation worked out
- 10:57well in 1968. Our total overall gain of
- 11:01$40,032,691.00 was divided as follows.
- 11:06Category Average Investment Overall Gain Controls 24,996,998
- 11:14Dollars $5,886,109 General's Private Owner $16,363,100 Twenty
- 11:251,994,736 Dollars General's Relatively 8,766,878 Dollars
- 11:35$4,271,825 Undervalued Workouts 18,980,602 Dollars $7,317,128.00
- 11:50Miscellaneous Primarily US 12,744,973 dollars $839,496
- 12:01Treasury bills Total income $40,309,294.00 less General
- 12:08expense $276,603.00, including interest.
- 12:14Overall gain $40,032,691.00. A few caveats, as mentioned in
- 12:21my letter two years ago, are again in order.
- 12:23Non doctoral candidates may proceed to next Section. 1 An
- 12:28explanation of the various categories listed above was made
- 12:31in the January 18th, 1965 letter.
- 12:35If your memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does
- 12:39not have the Pocketbook edition, we'll be glad to give you a
- 12:42copy. 2 The classifications are not ironclad.
- 12:46Nothing is changed retroactively, but the initial
- 12:49decision as to category is sometimes arbitrary.
- 12:53Sometimes later classification proves difficult, EG a workout
- 12:57that falls 125 through but that I continue to hold for reasons
- 13:01unrelated or only partially related to the original
- 13:04decision, like stubbornness. 3 percentage returns calculated on
- 13:09the average investment base by category would be significantly
- 13:13understated relative to partnership percentage returns
- 13:16which are calculated on a beginning investment base.
- 13:19In the foregoing figures, a security purchased by us at 100
- 13:23on January 1st, which appreciated at an even rate to
- 13:27200 on December 31st, would have an average investment of 150,
- 13:32producing a 66 to 23% result contrasted to a 100% result by
- 13:38the customary approach. In other words, the foregoing
- 13:41figures use a monthly average of market values in calculating the
- 13:45average investment for all. Results are based on a 100%
- 13:49ownership non leverage basis. Interest and other general
- 13:53expenses are deducted from total performance and not segregated
- 13:57by category. Expenses directly related to
- 14:00specific investment operations, such as dividends paid on short
- 14:04stock, are deducted by category when securities are borrowed
- 14:09directly and sold short. The net investment longs minus
- 14:12shorts is shown for the applicable categories Average
- 14:16investment 5. The foregoing table has only
- 14:19limited use. The results applicable to each
- 14:22category are dominated by one or two investments.
- 14:26They do not represent a collection of great quantities
- 14:28of stable data, mortality rates of all American males, or
- 14:32something of the sort from which conclusions can be drawn and
- 14:35projections made. Instead, they represent
- 14:39infrequent, non homogeneous phenomena leading to very
- 14:43tentative suggestions regarding various courses of action and
- 14:46are so used by US six. Finally, these calculations are
- 14:51not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the
- 14:54money and are subject to possible clerical or
- 14:57mathematical errors since they are not entirely SE1F checking
- 15:01controls. Overall, the controlled
- 15:03companies turned in a decent performance during 1968.
- 15:07Diversified Retailing Company Inc, 80% owned, and Berkshire
- 15:12Hathaway Incorporated, 70% owned, had combined after tax
- 15:15earnings of over $5 million. Particularly outstanding
- 15:20performances were turned in by Associated Cotton Shops, a
- 15:23subsidiary of DRC run by Ben Rosner, and National Indemnity
- 15:28Company, a subsidiary of BH run by Jack Ringwald.
- 15:32Both of these companies earned about 20% on capital employed in
- 15:36their businesses among Fortune's 500, the largest manufacturing
- 15:40entities in the country starting with General Motors, only 37
- 15:44companies achieved this figure in 1967.
- 15:48And our boys out shown such mildly better known but not
- 15:51better appreciated companies as IBM, General Electric, General
- 15:56Motors, Procter and Gamble, DuPont Control Data, Hewlett
- 16:00Packard, etcetera. I still sometimes get comments
- 16:03from partners like say Berkshire is up 4 points, that's great.
- 16:07Or what's happening to us, Berkshire was down three last
- 16:11week. Market price is irrelevant to us
- 16:14in the valuation of our controlling interests.
- 16:17We valued BH at 25 at year end 1967 when the market was about
- 16:2220 and 31 at year end 1968 when the market was about 37.
- 16:28We would have done the same thing if the markets had been 15
- 16:31and 50 respectively. Price is what you pay, value is
- 16:34what you get. We will prosper or suffer in
- 16:37controlled investments in relation to the operating
- 16:40performances of our businesses. We will not attempt to profit by
- 16:44playing various games in the securities markets.
- 16:47Generals private owner. Over the years this has been our
- 16:50best category measured by average return and has also
- 16:54maintained by far the best percentage of profitable
- 16:57transactions. This approach was the way I was
- 16:59taught the business and it formerly accounted for a large
- 17:03proportion of all our investment ideas.
- 17:06Our total individual profits in this category during 126, the 12
- 17:11year BPL history are probably 50 times or more are total losses.
- 17:16The cash register really rang on one simple industry idea
- 17:19implemented in several ways in this area.
- 17:22In 1968. We even received a substantial
- 17:25fee included in other income in the audit for some work in this
- 17:29field. Our total investment in this
- 17:31category, which is where I feel by far the greatest certainty
- 17:35regarding consistently decent results, is presently under
- 17:38$2,000,000 and I have nothing at all in the hopper to bolster
- 17:42this. What came through like the
- 17:44Johnstown flood in 1968 looks more like a leaky faucet in
- 17:48Altoona. For 1969 generals relatively
- 17:52undervalued. This category produced about 2/3
- 17:55of the overall gain in 1966 and 1967 combined.
- 18:00I mentioned last year that the great two year performance here
- 18:04had largely come from one idea. I also said we have nothing in
- 18:08this group remotely approaching the size or potential which
- 18:12formerly existed in this investment.
- 18:14It gives me great pleasure to announce that this statement was
- 18:17absolutely correct. It gives me somewhat less
- 18:20pleasure to announce that it must be repeated this year.
- 18:23Workouts. This category which was a
- 18:26disaster in 1967 did well during 1968.
- 18:30Our relatively heavy concentration in just a few
- 18:34situations per year, some of the large arbitrage houses may
- 18:37become involved in 50 or more workouts per annum gives more
- 18:41variation and yearly results than an across the board
- 18:44approach. I feel the average profitability
- 18:47we'll be as good with our policy in 1968 makes me feel better
- 18:51about that conclusion than 1967 did.
- 18:54It should again be stated that our results in the workout area
- 18:57as well as in other categories are somewhat understated
- 19:00compared to the more common method of determining results
- 19:03computed on an initial base figure and utilizing borrowed
- 19:07money, which is often a sensible part of the workout business.
- 19:11I can't emphasize too strongly that the quality and quantity of
- 19:14ideas is presently at an all time low, the product of the
- 19:18factors mentioned in my October 9th, 1967 letter, which have
- 19:23largely been intensified since then.
- 19:25Sometimes I feel we should have a plaque in our office, like the
- 19:28one at the headquarters of Texas Instruments in Dallas, which
- 19:31reads We don't believe in miracles, we rely on them.
- 19:35It is possible for an old overweight ball player whose
- 19:39legs and batting eye are gone to tag a fastball on the nose for a
- 19:42pinch hit home run, but you don't change your line up
- 19:45because of it. We have a number of important
- 19:48negatives operating on our future, and while they shouldn't
- 19:51add up to futility, they certainly don't add up to more
- 19:54than an average of quite moderate profitability
- 19:57memorabilia. As one of my older friends says,
- 20:00nostalgia just isn't what it used to be.
- 20:02Let's take a stab at it anyway. Buffett Associates Limited, the
- 20:06initial predecessor partnership, was formed May 5th, 1956 with 7
- 20:11limited partners. For family, three close friends
- 20:15contributing $105,000 and the general partner putting his
- 20:19money where his mouth was by investing $100.
- 20:23Two additional single family limited partnerships were formed
- 20:26during 1956 so that on January 1st, 1957 combined net assets
- 20:33were $303,726. During 1957 we had a gain of
- 20:3931,615.97 dollars, leading to the 10.4% figure shown on Page
- 20:461. During 1968 I would guess that
- 20:49the New York Stock Exchange was open around 1200 hours, giving
- 20:54us a gain of about $33,000 per hour.
- 20:57Sort of makes you wish they had stayed with the 5 to 12 hour 5
- 21:01day week doesn't it? Or roughly the same as the full
- 21:04year gain in 1957. 127 On January 1st, 1962, we
- 21:11consolidated the predecessor limited partnerships, moved out
- 21:15of the bedroom and hired our first full time employees.
- 21:18Net assets at that time were $7,178,500.
- 21:24From that point to our present net assets of $104,429,431.00.
- 21:31We have added one person to the payroll since 1963.
- 21:36Assets $9,405,400. Rent has gone from $3947 to
- 21:44$5823. Ben Rostner would never have
- 21:48forgiven me if I had signed a percentage lease.
- 21:50Travel from 3206 dollars to 3603 dollars and dues and
- 21:57subscriptions from $900 to $994.00.
- 22:01If one of Parkinson's laws is operating, at least the
- 22:04situation hasn't gotten completely out of control.
- 22:07In making our retrospective survey of our financial assets,
- 22:11our conclusion need not parallel that of Gypsy Rose Lee, who
- 22:15opined when reviewing her physical assets on her 55th
- 22:18birthday. I have everything I had 20 years
- 22:21ago. It's just that it's all lower.
- 22:24Miscellaneous. Although the investment
- 22:25environment is difficult, the office environment is superb.
- 22:29With Donna, Gladys, Bill and John, we have an organization
- 22:34that functions speedily, efficiently and pleasantly.
- 22:37They are the best. The office group along with
- 22:40spouses, 1 apiece. I still haven't figured out how
- 22:43I should handle that. Plural End children have over
- 22:46$27 million invested in BPL on January 1st, 1969.
- 22:52Assorted sizes and shapes of aunts, uncles, parents, in laws,
- 22:56brothers, sisters and cousins make the BPL membership list red
- 23:00like our crowd. Which so far as I am concerned,
- 23:04is exactly what it is. Within a few days you will
- 23:07receive 1. A tax letter giving you all BPL
- 23:11information needed for your 1968 federal income tax return.
- 23:15This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes 2.
- 23:19An audit from Pete Marwick Mitchell and Company.
- 23:22They have again done an excellent job for 1968 setting
- 23:26forth the operations and financial position of BPL as
- 23:30well as your own capital account. 3 A letter signed by me
- 23:34setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1st,
- 23:381969. This is identical with the
- 23:41figures developed in the audit. Let me know if anything in this
- 23:45letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying.
- 23:48My next letter will be about July 10th summarizing the first
- 23:52half of this year cordially. Warren E Buffett WBGLK 128
- 23:57Buffett Partnership Ltd, 610 Kiwit Plaza, Omaha, Nebraska
- 24:0368131 Telephone 0424110 May 29th, 1969 To my partners.
- 24:12About 18 months ago, I wrote to you regarding changed
- 24:15environmental and personal factors causing me to modify our
- 24:19future performance objectives. The investing environment I
- 24:23discussed at that time, and on which I have commented in
- 24:25various other letters, has generally become more negative
- 24:29and frustrating as time has passed.
- 24:31Maybe I am merely suffering from a lack of mental flexibility. 1
- 24:36observer commenting on security analysts over 40 stated they
- 24:39know too many things that are no longer true.
- 24:42However, it seems to me that one opportunities for investment
- 24:46that are open to the analyst who stresses quantitative factors
- 24:50have virtually disappeared after rather steadily drying up over
- 24:53the past 20 years. To our $100 million of assets
- 24:58further eliminates a large portion of this seemingly barren
- 25:01investment world since commitments of less than about
- 25:05$3,000,000 cannot have a real impact on our overall
- 25:08performance and this virtually rules out companies with less
- 25:12than about $100 million of common stock at market value and
- 25:163A swelling interest in investment performance has
- 25:20created an increasingly short term oriented and in my opinion
- 25:24more speculative market. The October 9th, 1967 letter
- 25:28stated that personal considerations were the most
- 25:31important factor among those causing me to modify our
- 25:34objectives. I expressed a desire to be
- 25:37relieved of the self-imposed necessity of focusing 100% on
- 25:42BPLI have flunked this test completely during the last 18
- 25:45months, the letter said. I hope limited objectives will
- 25:49make for more limited effort. It hasn't worked out that way.
- 25:53As long as I am on stage publishing a regular record and
- 25:57assuming responsibility for management of what amounts to
- 26:00virtually 100% of the net worth of many partners, I will never
- 26:04be able to put sustained effort into any non BPL activity.
- 26:08If I am going to participate publicly, I can't help being
- 26:12competitive. I know I don't want to be
- 26:14totally occupied with outpacing an investment rabbit all my
- 26:17life. The only way to slow down is to
- 26:20stop. Therefore, before your end, I
- 26:23intend to give all limited partners the required formal
- 26:26notice of my intention to retire.
- 26:28There are of course, a number of tax and legal problems in
- 26:32connection with liquidating the partnership, but overall I am
- 26:36concerned with working out a plan that attains the following
- 26:38objectives. 1 The most important item is that I have an
- 26:42alternative regarding money management to suggest to the
- 26:45many partners who do not want to handle this themselves.
- 26:49Some partners, of course, have alternatives of their own in
- 26:52which they have confidence and find quite acceptable.
- 26:55To the others, however, I will not hand over their money.
- 26:58With a good luck, I intend to suggest an alternative money
- 27:01manager to whom I will entrust funds of my relatives and others
- 27:05for whom I have lifetime financial responsibility.
- 27:09This manager has integrity and ability and will probably
- 27:13perform as well or better than I would in the future, although
- 27:16nowhere close to what he or I have achieved in the past.
- 27:19He will be available to any partner so that no minimum size
- 27:23for accounts will cause any of you a problem.
- 27:25I intend in the future to keep in general touch with what he is
- 27:30doing, but only on an infrequent basis, with any advice on my
- 27:34part largely limited to a negative type 2.
- 27:37I want all partners to have the option of receiving cash and
- 27:40possibly readily marketable securities there.
- 27:43We'll probably be only one where this will apply where I like
- 27:46both the prospects and price, but which 129 partners will be
- 27:50able to freely convert to cash if they wish.
- 27:53Three. However, I also want all
- 27:56partners to have the option of maintaining their proportional
- 27:59interests in our two controlled companies, Diversified Retailing
- 28:02Company Incorporated and Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated
- 28:06in one other small restricted holding.
- 28:08Because these securities will be valued unilaterally by me at
- 28:12fair value, I feel it is essential that if you wish, you
- 28:16can maintain your proportionate interest at such valuation.
- 28:19However, these securities are not freely marketable.
- 28:22Various SEC restrictions apply to control stock and non
- 28:26registered stock and they will probably be both non
- 28:29transferable and non income producing for a considerable
- 28:32period of time. Therefore, I want you to be able
- 28:35to go either way an hour liquidation.
- 28:38Either stick with the restricted securities or take cash
- 28:41equivalent. I strongly like all of the
- 28:43people running our controlled businesses.
- 28:45Joined now by the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company
- 28:49of Rockford, IL, a $100 million plus extremely well run bank
- 28:55purchased by Berkshire Hathaway earlier this year and want the
- 28:58relationship to be lifelong. I certainly have no desire to
- 29:02sell a good controlled business run by people I like and admire
- 29:06merely to obtain a fancy price. However specific conditions may
- 29:11cause the sale of 1 operating unit at some point.
- 29:14I believe we will have a liquidation program which will
- 29:17accomplish the above objectives. Our activities in this regard
- 29:21should cause no change in your tax planning for 1969.
- 29:25One final objective I would like very much to achieve, but which
- 29:28just isn't going to happen, is to go out with a bang.
- 29:31I hate to end with a poor year, but we are going to have one in
- 29:341969. My best guess is that at your
- 29:37end, allowing for a substantial increase in value of controlled
- 29:41companies against which all partners except me will have the
- 29:45option of taking cash, we will show a break even result for
- 29:491969 before any monthly payments to partners.
- 29:53This will be true even if the market should advance
- 29:56substantially between now and your end, since we will not be
- 30:00in any important position which will expose us to much upside
- 30:03potential. Our experience and workouts this
- 30:06year has been atrocious. During this period, I have felt
- 30:09like the bird that inadvertently flew into the middle of a
- 30:13badminton game. We are not alone in such
- 30:15experience, but it came at a time when we were toward the
- 30:19upper limit of what has been our historical range of percentage
- 30:22commitment in this category. Documenting one's boners is
- 30:26unpleasant business. I find selective reporting even
- 30:30more distasteful. Our poor experience this year is
- 30:33100% my fault. It did not reflect bad luck, but
- 30:37rather an improper assessment of a very fast developing
- 30:40governmental trend. Paradoxically, I have long
- 30:43believed the government should have been doing in terms of the
- 30:46problem attacked, not necessarily the means utilized.
- 30:49What it finally did, In other words, on an overall basis, I
- 30:54believe the general goal of the activity, which has cost us
- 30:57substantial money, is socially desirable and have so preach for
- 31:00some time. Nevertheless, I didn't think it
- 31:03would happen. I never believe in mixing what I
- 31:06think should happen socially with what I think will happen in
- 31:09making decisions. In this case, we would be some
- 31:12millions better off if I had, quite frankly, in spite of any
- 31:16factors set forth on the earlier pages, I would continue to
- 31:19operate the partnership in 1970 or even 1971 if I had some
- 31:24really first class ideas, Not because I want to, but simply
- 31:28because I would sell. Much rather end with a Goodyear
- 31:31than a poor one. However, I just don't see
- 31:34anything available that gives any reasonable hope of
- 31:36delivering such a Goodyear, and I have no desire to grope around
- 31:40hoping to get lucky with other people's money.
- 31:43I am not attuned to this market environment, and I don't want to
- 31:46spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don't
- 31:49understand just so I can go out a hero.
- 31:52Therefore we will be liquidating holdings throughout the year
- 31:56working toward a residual of the controlled companies, the one
- 31:59investment letter security, the one marketable security with
- 32:03favorable long term prospects 130 and the miscellaneous stubs
- 32:09etcetera of small total value, which will take several years to
- 32:12clean up in the workout category.
- 32:15I have written this letter a little early in lieu of the mid
- 32:18year letter. Once I made a decision I wanted
- 32:20you to no. I also wanted to be available in
- 32:23Omaha for a period after you receive this letter to clear up
- 32:27anything that may be confusing in it.
- 32:29In July, I expect to be in California.
- 32:32Some of you are going to ask what do you plan to do?
- 32:35I don't have an answer to that question.
- 32:37I do know that when I AM 60, I should be attempting to achieve
- 32:41different personal goals than those which had priority at age
- 32:4420. Therefore, unless I now divorce
- 32:46myself from the activity that has consumed virtually all of my
- 32:50time and energies during the 1st 18 years of my adult life, I am
- 32:55unlikely to develop activities that will be appropriate to new
- 32:58circumstances in subsequent years.
- 33:01We will have a letter out in the fall, probably October,
- 33:04elaborating on the liquidation procedure, the investment
- 33:07advisor suggestion, etcetera. Cordially Warren E Buffett WBGLK
- 33:12131 Buffett Partnership Ltd 610 Kiwit Plaza Omaha in Nebraska
- 33:2068131 Telephone 0424110 October 9th, 1969 to my partners.
- 33:29Here is my present estimate of the BPL calendar for the months
- 33:32to come. One this letter to tell you
- 33:34something of Bill Rohan, the money manager within my
- 33:37knowledge, who ranks the highest when combining the factors of
- 33:40integrity, ability and continued availability to all partners.
- 33:45I also want to comment upon the present range of expectations
- 33:49involved in deciding on a bond stock mix. 2 Late November, The
- 33:53required 30 days formal notice of my intent to retire from the
- 33:57partnership at the end of the year. 3 early December.
- 34:01A package of publicly available material as well as some general
- 34:04comments by me relating to our controlled companies.
- 34:08Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated, owning the textile business,
- 34:11Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, IL,
- 34:15National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine
- 34:19Insurance Company, and Sun newspapers and Diversified
- 34:22Retailing Company owning Hot Shield Cone and Company and
- 34:26associated cotton shops. I want you to have ample time to
- 34:29study the material relating to such companies before you make
- 34:33any decision to hold, sell or buy such securities.
- 34:37After distribution to you in early January, I will solicit
- 34:40written questions from partners. I don't want to talk to you
- 34:43individually about such companies as I want all partners
- 34:46to obtain exactly the same information and then have a
- 34:50further mailing late in December giving all questions received
- 34:53relating to these companies along with my answers.
- 34:57If possible, I still anticipate having a plan enabling partners
- 35:00to promptly convert such controlled company holdings to
- 35:03cash if they wish. For about January 5th a a cash
- 35:08distribution amounting to at least 56%, probably more
- 35:12depending upon what percentage of our remaining holdings are
- 35:15sold before your end of your January 1st, 1969 capital.
- 35:19Less any distributions, the regular monthly payments many of
- 35:23you receive or borrowings by you during 1969 be your proportional
- 35:28share of our holdings in diversified retailing company
- 35:31incorporated in Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated by which
- 35:36if you dispose of them will bring 30 percent, 35%.
- 35:40My estimate of value will be made at year end of your January
- 35:431st, 1969 capital. We may make substantial
- 35:47additional sales before year end.
- 35:50If so, the early January cash distribution will be somewhat
- 35:54larger than the 56% mentioned above.
- 35:57If we don't, such sales will be made during the first half of
- 36:001970 and an interim distribution made.
- 36:03Residual assets will be sold at appropriate times and I believe
- 36:07not more than 10% of our present asset value will remain after
- 36:11June 30th, 1970 pending a final distribution when all assets and
- 36:16liabilities have been cleaned up.
- 36:18Unless there is a further substantial decline in the
- 36:21market, I still expect about a break even performance before
- 36:25any monthly payments. For 1969.
- 36:28We were lucky. If we had not been in
- 36:30liquidation this year, our results would have been
- 36:32significantly worse. Ideas that look potentially
- 36:36interesting on a continuing basis have on balance performed
- 36:39poorly. To date we have only two items
- 36:42of real size left. One we are selling as I write
- 36:45this and the other is a holding of limited marketability
- 36:49representing about 7 to 12% of that outstanding stock of Blue
- 36:53Chip stamps, which we may via a registered public offering
- 36:57around year end depending upon market conditions and other
- 37:00factors. 132 March 5th 1st, 1970 John Harding expects to leave
- 37:07Buffett Partnership Limited and open a branch office in Omaha
- 37:11for Ruan, Kniff and Styers. Bill Scott and I will be
- 37:15available at BPL offices to help any partners who are desirous of
- 37:19purchasing bonds tax free or taxable.
- 37:23We will set aside the month of March to make our services
- 37:26available without cost to those who want to acquire bonds.
- 37:29Because of some experience we have in analysis and purchasing,
- 37:33as well as the access we have to wholesale markets, I think it is
- 37:38likely we can save material elements of cost as well as help
- 37:41select better relative values. For those of you who wish to
- 37:44invest in bonds after April first, however, we want to be
- 37:49out of any form of personal advisory activity 6 After March
- 37:531970, Bill and I will continue to office in Kiewit Plaza,
- 37:58spending a very minor portion of our time completing the wind up
- 38:02of BPL. This will mean filing tax
- 38:04returns for 1970 and probably 1971, resolving minor assets and
- 38:09liabilities, etcetera. Now to Bill Ruan.
- 38:13We met in Ben Graham's class at Columbia University in 1951, and
- 38:17I have had considerable opportunity to observe his
- 38:20qualities of character, temperament, and intellect since
- 38:23that time. If Susie and I were to die while
- 38:26our children are minors, he is one of three trustees who have
- 38:30carte blanche on investment matters.
- 38:32The other two are not available for continuous investment
- 38:35management for all partners, large or small.
- 38:38There is no way to eliminate the possibility of error when
- 38:41judging humans, particularly in regard to future behavior in an
- 38:46unknown environment. However, decisions have to be
- 38:49made, whether actively or passively, and I consider Bill
- 38:53to be an exceptionally high probability decision on
- 38:56character and a high probability one on investment performance.
- 39:00I also consider it likely that Bill will continue as a money
- 39:03manager for many years to come. Bill has recently formed a New
- 39:07York Stock Exchange firm, Rowan Kniff and Styers Incorporated,
- 39:1285 Broad St. New York, NY 10004, telephone
- 39:18number 212-344-6700. John Harding presently plans to
- 39:24establish an office for the firm in Omaha about March 1st, 1970.
- 39:30Bill manages accounts individually on a fee basis and
- 39:33also executes brokerage for the accounts, presently with some
- 39:37portion of the brokerage commissions used to offset a
- 39:40portion of the investment advisory fee.
- 39:43His method of operation allows monthly withdrawals on a basis
- 39:46similar to BPL as a percentage of capital and unrelated to
- 39:50realized or unrealized gain or loss.
- 39:53It is possible he may form some sort of pooled account, but such
- 39:57determinations will be made between him and those of you who
- 40:00elect to go with him. I, of course, will not be
- 40:04involved with his operation. I am making my list of partners
- 40:07available to him and he will be writing you fairly soon
- 40:10regarding a trip he plans to make before you end to Omaha,
- 40:14Los Angeles and. Chicago, so that those of you
- 40:17who wish to meet him may do so. Any of you who are going to be
- 40:20in New York during the next few months can contact him directly.
- 40:24Bill's overall record has been very good, averaging fairly
- 40:27close to BPLS, but with considerably greater variation.
- 40:31From 1956 to 1961 and from 1964 to 1968, a composite of his
- 40:38individual accounts averaged over 40% per annum.
- 40:41However, in 1962, undoubtedly somewhat as a product of the
- 40:46euphoric experience of the earlier years, he was down about
- 40:4950% as he reoriented his thinking, 1963 was about break
- 40:55even. While two years may sound like a
- 40:57short time when included in a table of performance, it may
- 41:00feel like a long time when your net worth is down 50%.
- 41:04I think you run this sort of short term risk with virtually
- 41:07any money manager operating in stocks and it is a factor to
- 41:11consider in deciding the portion of your capital to commit to
- 41:14equities. To date in 1969, Bill is down
- 41:18about 15%, which I believe to be fairly typical of most money
- 41:22managers. Bill, of course, has not been in
- 41:25control situations or workouts, which have usually tended to
- 41:29moderate the swings in BPL year to year performance.
- 41:33Even excluding these factors, I believe his performance would
- 41:36have been somewhat more volatile, but not necessarily
- 41:39poorer by any means than mine. His style is different and while
- 41:43his typical portfolio under most conditions would tend to have a
- 41:47mild overlap with mine, there would always be very significant
- 41:51differences. 133 Bill has achieved his results working
- 41:55with an average of $5 to $10 million.
- 41:59If I consider the three most likely negative factors in his
- 42:02future to be 1, the probability of managing significantly larger
- 42:06sums. This is a problem you are going
- 42:08to have rather quickly with any successful money manager and it
- 42:12will tend to moderate performance.
- 42:14I believe Bill's firm is now managing $20 to $30 million, and
- 42:19of course, they will continue to add accounts to the possibility
- 42:24of Bills becoming too involved in the detail of his operation
- 42:27rather than spending all of his time simply thinking about money
- 42:30management. The problems of being the
- 42:32principal factor in an NYSE firm, as well as handling many
- 42:37individual accounts, can mean that he, like most investment
- 42:40advisors, will be subject to pressures to spend much of his
- 42:44time in activities that do nothing to lead to superior
- 42:47investment performance. In this connection, I have asked
- 42:51Bill to make his services available to all BPL partners,
- 42:54large or small, and he will, but I have also told him he is
- 42:58completely a free agent if he finds particular clients
- 43:01diverting him from his main job. 3 The high probability that even
- 43:05excellent investment management during the next decade will only
- 43:09produce limited advantages over passive management.
- 43:12I will comment on this below. The final point regarding the
- 43:15negatives listed above is that they are not the sort of
- 43:18drawbacks leading to horrible performance, but more likely the
- 43:22sort of things that lead to average performance.
- 43:24I think this is the main risk you run with Bill, and average
- 43:28performance is just not that terrible a risk.
- 43:31In recommending Bill, I am engaging in the sort of activity
- 43:34I have tried to avoid in BPL portfolio activities, a decision
- 43:39where there is nothing to gain personally and considerable to
- 43:42lose. Some of my friends who are not
- 43:44in the partnership have suggested that I make no
- 43:47recommendation sense. If results were excellent it
- 43:50would do me no good, and if something went wrong I might
- 43:53well get a portion of the blame. If you and I had just had a
- 43:56normal commercial relationship, such reasoning might be sound.
- 44:00However, the degree of trust partners have extended to me and
- 44:04the cooperation manifested in various ways preclude such a
- 44:08hands off policy. Many of you are professional
- 44:11investors or close thereto and need no advice from me on
- 44:14managers. You may well do better yourself.
- 44:18For those partners who are financially inexperienced, I
- 44:21feel it would be totally unfair for me to assume a passive
- 44:24position and deliver you to the most persuasive salesman who
- 44:27happened to contact you early in 1970.
- 44:31Finally, a word about expectations.
- 44:34A decade or so ago was quite willing to set a target of 10
- 44:37percentage points per annum better than the Dow.
- 44:40With the expectation that the Dow would average about 7%, this
- 44:44meant an expectancy for us of around 17%, with wide variations
- 44:49and no guarantees of course, but nevertheless an expectancy.
- 44:54Tax free bonds at the time yielded about 3%.
- 44:58While stocks had the disadvantage of a regular
- 45:00performance, overall they seemed much the more desirable option.
- 45:04I also stressed this preference for stocks in teaching classes,
- 45:08participating in panel discussions, etcetera.
- 45:11For the first time in my investment lifetime, I now
- 45:14believe there is little choice for the average investor between
- 45:17professionally managed money in stocks and passive investment in
- 45:20bonds. If correct, this view has
- 45:23important implications. Let me briefly and in somewhat
- 45:27oversimplified form set out the situation as I see it when I am
- 45:31talking about the situation for say a taxpayer in a 40% federal
- 45:36income tax bracket who also has some state income tax to pay.
- 45:40Various changes are being proposed in the tax loss which
- 45:43may adversely affect net results from presently tax exempt
- 45:47income, capital gains and perhaps other types of
- 45:51investment income. More proposals will probably
- 45:53come in the future. Overall, I feel such changes
- 45:56over the years will not negate my relative expectations about
- 46:00after tax income from presently tax free bonds versus common
- 46:04stocks and may well even mildly reinforce them too.
- 46:08I am talking about expectations over the next 10 years, not the
- 46:11next weeks or months. I find it much easier to think
- 46:15about what should develop over a relatively long period of time
- 46:19than what is likely in any short period.
- 46:21As Ben Graham said, in the long run the market is a weighing
- 46:25machine, in the short run a voting machine.
- 46:29I have always found it easier to evaluate weights dictated by
- 46:32fundamentals then votes dictated by psychology. 134 Three purely
- 46:38passive investment in tax free bonds will now bring about 6 to
- 46:4212%. This yield can be achieved with
- 46:45excellent quality and locked up for just about any period for
- 46:48which the investor wishes to contract.
- 46:50Such conditions may not exist in March when Bill and I will be
- 46:54available to assist you in bond purchases, but they exist today.
- 46:59For the 10 year expectation for corporate stocks as a group is
- 47:02probably not better than 9% overall, say 3% dividends and 6%
- 47:08gain in value. I would doubt that gross
- 47:10national product grows more than 6% per annum.
- 47:14I don't believe corporate profits are likely to grow
- 47:16significantly as a percentage of GNP, and if earnings multipliers
- 47:21don't change and with these assumptions and present interest
- 47:24rates they shouldn't, the aggregate valuation of American
- 47:27corporate enterprise should not grow at a long term compounded
- 47:31rate above 6% per annum. This typical experience in
- 47:35stocks might produce for the taxpayer described earlier, 1 to
- 47:3834% after tax from dividends and 4 to 34% after tax from capital
- 47:44gain, for a total after tax return of about 6 to 12%.
- 47:49The pre tax mix between dividends and capital gains
- 47:51might be more like 4% and 5%, giving a slightly lower after
- 47:56tax result. This is not far from historical
- 47:59experience and overall I believe future tax rules on capital
- 48:03gains are likely to be stiffer than in the past five.
- 48:07Finally, probably half the money invested in stocks over the next
- 48:10decade will be professionally managed.
- 48:13Thus, by definition, virtually the total investor experience
- 48:17with professionally managed money will be average results,
- 48:20or 6 to 12% after tax. If my assumptions above are
- 48:24correct, my judgement would be that less than 10% of
- 48:27professionally managed money, which might imply an average of
- 48:31$40 billion just for this superior segment handled
- 48:34consistently for the decade, would average 2 points per annum
- 48:38over group expectancy. So-called aggressively run money
- 48:42is unlikely to do significantly better than the general run of
- 48:46professionally managed money. There is probably $50 billion in
- 48:50various gradations of this aggressive category now, maybe
- 48:54100 times that of a decade ago and $50 billion just can't
- 48:59perform. If you are extremely fortunate
- 49:02and select advisors who achieve results in the top 1% to 2% of
- 49:06the country, but who will be working with material sums of
- 49:09money because they are that good, I think it is unlikely you
- 49:13will do much more than four points per annum better than the
- 49:16group expectancy. I think that odds are good that
- 49:19Bill Ruan is in this select category.
- 49:21My estimate therefore is that over the next decade the results
- 49:26of really excellent management for our typical taxpayer after
- 49:30tax might be 1 to 34% from dividends and 7 to 34% from
- 49:36capital gain or nine, 1.2% overall. 6th The rather
- 49:40startling conclusion is that under today's historically
- 49:43unusual conditions, passive investment in tax free bonds is
- 49:47likely to be fully the equivalent of expectations from
- 49:51professionally managed money in stocks, and only modestly
- 49:54inferior to extremely well managed equity money. 7A word
- 49:58about inflation. It has very little to do with
- 50:01the above calculation except that it enters into that 6%
- 50:05assumed growth rate in GNP and contributes to the causes
- 50:09producing 6 to 12% on tax free bonds.
- 50:13If stocks should produce 8% after tax and bonds 4%, stocks
- 50:17are better to own than bonds, regardless of whether prices go
- 50:21up, down or sidewise. The converse is true if bonds
- 50:25produce 6 to 12% after tax and stocks 6%.
- 50:30The simple truth, of course, is that the best expectable after
- 50:34tax rate of return makes the most sense given a rising,
- 50:38declining or stable dollar. All of the above should be
- 50:42viewed with all the suspicion properly accorded to assessments
- 50:45of the future. It does seem to me to be the
- 50:48most realistic evaluation of what is always an uncertain
- 50:52future. I present it with no great
- 50:54feeling regarding its approximate accuracy, but only
- 50:57so you will know what I think. At this time, you will have to
- 51:00make your own decision as between bonds and stocks, and if
- 51:04the latter, who advises you on 135 such stocks.
- 51:09In many cases, I think the decision should largely reflect
- 51:12your tangible and intangible temperamental needs for
- 51:15regularity of income and absence of large principal fluctuation,
- 51:20perhaps balanced against psychic needs for some excitement and
- 51:24the fun associated with contemplating and perhaps
- 51:27enjoying really juicy results. If you would like to talk over
- 51:30the problem with me, I will be very happy to help.
- 51:33Sincerely Warren E Buffett WEBGLK 136 Buffett Partnership
- 51:40Ltd 610 Kiewit Plaza Omaha, NE 68131 Telephone 0424110 December
- 51:505th, 1969 To my partners, this letter is to supply you with
- 51:55some published information relating to our two controlled
- 51:58companies in there for principal operating components as well as
- 52:02to give you my general views regarding their operations.
- 52:06My comments are not designed to give you loads of detailed
- 52:09information, prospective style, but only my general slant as I
- 52:13see the businesses at this time. At year end, BPL will own
- 52:17800,000 of 1,000,000 shares outstanding of Diversified
- 52:21Retailing Company, 1st Manhattan Company and Wheeler Munger and
- 52:26Company will each own 100,000 shares.
- 52:29DRC previously owned 100% of Hotchild Cone and Company of
- 52:34Baltimore and currently owns 100% of Associated Retail
- 52:37Stores, Formerly named Associated Cotton Shops.
- 52:41On December 1st, the DRC sold its entire interest in HK Too
- 52:46Supermarkets General Corporation for $5,045,205.00 of cash plus
- 52:52non interest bearing SGC notes for $2,000,000 DO 2-170 and
- 52:58$4,540,000 due February 1st 71. The present value of these notes
- 53:05approximates $6.0 million. So effectively DRC received
- 53:10about $11 million on the sale. Various warranties were made by
- 53:14DRC in connection with the sale and while we expect no claims
- 53:19pursuant to the contract, a remote contingent liability
- 53:22always exists while warranties are in force.
- 53:26Associated Retail Stores has a net worth of about $7.5 million.
- 53:31It is an excellent business with a strong financial position,
- 53:34good operating margins and a record of increasing sales and
- 53:38earnings in recent years. Last year's sales were about
- 53:42$37.5 million and net income about $1 million.
- 53:47This you should see new records in sales and earnings with my
- 53:51guess on the latter to be in the area of $1.1 million after full
- 53:56taxes. DRC has $6.6 million in
- 54:00debentures outstanding prospectus with full description
- 54:03of the business as of December 18th, 1967 and the debenture
- 54:08terms will be sent you upon request.
- 54:10Which have one unusual feature in that if I or an entity
- 54:15controlled by me is not the largest shareholder of DRC, the
- 54:19debenture holders have the right to present their debentures for
- 54:22payment by the company at par. Thus, DRC has tangible net
- 54:26assets of about 11.50 dollars to $12.00 per share, an excellent
- 54:31operating business and substantial funds available for
- 54:35reinvestment in other operating businesses on an interim basis.
- 54:39Such funds will be employed in marketable securities.
- 54:43Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated has 983,582 shares outstanding,
- 54:49of which BPL owns 691441 BHS. Three main operating businesses.
- 54:55The Textile Operation, The insurance operation conducted by
- 54:59National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine
- 55:02Insurance Company, which will be collectively called the
- 55:05Insurance Company and the Illinois National Bank and Trust
- 55:09Company of Rockford, IL. It also owns Sun newspapers Inc,
- 55:13Blacker Printing Company and 70% of Gateway Underwriters, but
- 55:17these operations are not financially significant relative
- 55:21to the total. The textile operation presently
- 55:24employs about $16.00 per share in capital and while I think it
- 55:28has made some progress relative to the textile industry,
- 55:31generally cannot be judged A satisfactory business.
- 55:35Its return on capital has not been sufficient to support the
- 55:38assets employed in the business and realistically, an adequate
- 55:42return has less than an even chance of being averaged in the
- 55:46future. It represents the best segments
- 55:48of the business that existed when we purchased Control 4 1/2
- 55:53years ago. Capital from the other segments
- 55:55has been 137 successfully redeployed, first on an interim
- 56:01basis into marketable securities and now on a permanent basis
- 56:05into insurance and banking. I like the textile operating
- 56:09people. They have worked hard to improve
- 56:11the business under difficult conditions and despite the poor
- 56:15return, we expect to continue the textile operation as long as
- 56:19it produces near current levels. The insurance operation of which
- 56:23BH owns virtually 100% in the bank where BH owns 97.7% present
- 56:29day, much happier picture. Both are first class businesses
- 56:33earning good returns on capital and stacking up well on any
- 56:37absolute or comparative analysis of operating statistics.
- 56:41The bank has about $17.00 per share of net tangible assets
- 56:45applicable to BH and the insurance company, approximately
- 56:48$15. I would estimate their normal
- 56:51current earning power to be about $4.00 per share compared
- 56:55to about 3.40 dollars from operations pro forma in 1968.
- 57:00With good prospects for future growth on the combined $32 of
- 57:04tangible net assets in the bank and insurance company, adding in
- 57:08the textile business and miscellaneous assets and
- 57:11subtracting parent company bank debt of about $7.00 million, it
- 57:16gives a tangible net asset value of about $43 per share.
- 57:20For BH, we're about $45.00 stated book value, allowing for
- 57:24the premium over tangible assets paid for the bank. 1 caveat when
- 57:29I talk above of tangible net assets, I am valuing the $75
- 57:33million of bonds held by the insurance company and bank at
- 57:37amortized cost. This is an accord with standard
- 57:40accounting procedures used in those industries and also in
- 57:44accord with the realities of their business operations, where
- 57:47it is quite unlikely that bonds will have to be sold before
- 57:50maturity. At today's historically low bond
- 57:53prices, however, our bonds have a market value substantially
- 57:57below carrying value, probably on the order of $10 per share of
- 58:02BH stock. Between DRC and BH, we have 4
- 58:05main operating businesses, with three of them, in my opinion,
- 58:09definitely first class by any of the usual standards of
- 58:12evaluation. The three excellent businesses
- 58:14are all run by men over 60 who are largely responsible for
- 58:18building each operation from scratch.
- 58:21These men are hard working, wealthy and good,
- 58:24extraordinarily good. Their age is a negative, but it
- 58:27is the only negative applicable to them.
- 58:29One of the reasons I am happy to have a large segment of my
- 58:32capital in BH and DRC is because we have such excellent men in
- 58:37charge of the operating businesses.
- 58:39We have various annual reports, audits, interim reports, proxy
- 58:43materials, prospectuses, etcetera, applicable to our
- 58:47control holdings and we will be glad to supply you with any item
- 58:51you request. I also solicit your written
- 58:53questions, and we'll send to all partners the questions and
- 58:56answers shortly before your end. Don't hesitate to ask any
- 59:00question at all that comes to mind.
- 59:02If it isn't clear to you, it probably isn't clear to others,
- 59:06and there is no reason for any of you to be wondering about
- 59:09something that I might clear up. DRC and BH presently pay no
- 59:13dividends and will probably pay either no dividends or very
- 59:17modest dividends for some years to come.
- 59:20There are a number of reasons for this.
- 59:22Both parent companies have borrowed money.
- 59:24We want to maintain a good level of protection for depositors at
- 59:28the bank and policyholders at the insurance company.
- 59:31Some of the operating companies have very satisfactory ways to
- 59:34utilize additional capital and we are hopeful of finding new
- 59:38businesses to both diversify and augment our earning power.
- 59:42My personal opinion is that the intrinsic value of DRC and BH
- 59:46will grow substantially over the years.
- 59:49While no one knows the future, I would be disappointed if such
- 59:53growth wasn't at a rate of approximately 10% per annum.
- 59:56Market prices for stocks fluctuate at great amplitudes
- 59:59around intrinsic value, but over the long term intrinsic value is
- 1:00:04virtually always reflected at some point in market price.
- 1:00:08Thus, I think both securities should be very decent long term
- 1:00:11holdings and I am happy to have a substantial portion of my net
- 1:00:15worth invested in them. You should be unconcerned about
- 1:00:19short term price action when you own the securities directly,
- 1:00:22just as you were unconcerned when you own them indirectly
- 1:00:25through BPLI. Think about them as businesses,
- 1:00:28not stocks. And if the business does all
- 1:00:31right over the long term, so will the stock.
- 1:00:34I want to stress that I will not be in a managerial or
- 1:00:37partnership status with you regarding your future holdings
- 1:00:40of such securities. You will be free to do what you
- 1:00:43wish with your stock in the future.
- 1:00:45And so of course, well, I, I 138 think that there is a very high
- 1:00:50probability that I will maintain my investment in DRC and BH for
- 1:00:55a very long period. But I want no implied moral
- 1:00:58commitment to do so, nor do so, nor do I wish to advise others
- 1:01:02over on indefinite future period regarding their holdings.
- 1:01:06The companies of course, will keep all shareholders advised of
- 1:01:10their activities and you will receive reports as issued by
- 1:01:13them, probably on a semi annual basis.
- 1:01:16Should I continue to hold the securities, as I fully expect to
- 1:01:19do, my degree of involvement in their activities may vary
- 1:01:23depending upon my other interests.
- 1:01:25The odds are that I will take an important position on matters of
- 1:01:28policy, but I want no moral obligation to be other than a
- 1:01:32passive shareholder should my interests develop elsewhere.
- 1:01:36We presently plan to make the initial BPL cash distribution on
- 1:01:40January 5th, which will now come to at least 64% of January 1st,
- 1:01:451969 capital less any distributions including monthly
- 1:01:50payments you have received from us since January 1st, 1969.
- 1:01:55There is now pending a public offering headed by Merrill
- 1:01:58Lynch, Pierce, Finnerand Smith of our Blue Chip Stamps
- 1:02:03holdings, which if completed this month as expected, should
- 1:02:06bring the figure to at least 70%.
- 1:02:09If you wish Bill and me to give you our ideas regarding bonds in
- 1:02:12March, you should purchase U.S. Treasury bills maturing in late
- 1:02:16March with the applicable portion of the January 5th
- 1:02:19distribution. Then advise us in the last week
- 1:02:22of February of the amount you wish to invest in bonds and we
- 1:02:26will let you know our thoughts about the middle of January.
- 1:02:29As soon as the exact amounts are figured and shares are received
- 1:02:32from the transfer agent after having been registered in your
- 1:02:35name, we will distribute the DRC and BH stock applicable to your
- 1:02:40partnership interest and subsequently advise you of your
- 1:02:43tax basis and acquisition date attributable to the stock.
- 1:02:47Such shares will be legend as described in the enclosed letter
- 1:02:51from Munnen, Seidler and Ryan. These stock certificates are
- 1:02:55valuable and should be kept in a safe place.
- 1:02:58In past letters I had expressed the hope that BPL could supply a
- 1:03:01mechanism whereby you could, if you wished, automatically
- 1:03:05convert your DRC and BH to cash. I have had two law firms
- 1:03:09consider extensively the status of these shares in your hands
- 1:03:13following the liquidation and the accompanying letters which
- 1:03:16should be saved and kept with the shares give their
- 1:03:18conclusions. As you can see, it is not an
- 1:03:21area that produces simple clear cut guidelines.
- 1:03:25I see no prudent way to implement the alternatives I had
- 1:03:28previously been considering. Therefore, you must follow the
- 1:03:31guidelines they set forth if you wish to dispose of your shares.
- 1:03:35As you probably realize, the restrictions on subsequent sale
- 1:03:38apply more severely to Susie and me because of my continued
- 1:03:42insider position than they probably do to you.
- 1:03:45Substantial quantities of securities often are sold via
- 1:03:49the private sale option described in paragraph three of
- 1:03:52the opinion. If the rules become clearer or
- 1:03:55more simplified in the future, we'll be sure to let you know.
- 1:03:59At the time of distribution of DRC and BH, I will advise you of
- 1:04:03the values applied to such shares at 1969 your end.
- 1:04:07You will receive our audit and tax letter about the end of
- 1:04:10January. It presently appears that sale
- 1:04:12of our blue chip shares and a substantial increase in value of
- 1:04:16DRC and BH will bring our overall gain for the year too,
- 1:04:21slightly over 6%. My next letter will be in late
- 1:04:24December summarizing the questions and answers regarding
- 1:04:27DRC and BH and also supplying a final estimate on the January
- 1:04:325th cash distribution. Warren E Buffett Webbie GLK
- 1:04:37Enclosures Legal opinion Munnen, Seidler and Ryan, Concurring
- 1:04:42opinion. Munger Tolls Hills and
- 1:04:44Rickershawser 1968 annual report Berkshire Hathaway Inc 1969 semi
- 1:04:51Annual report Berkshire Hathaway, Inc April 3rd, 1969
- 1:04:57Letter to shareholders Berkshire Hathaway, Inc 1968 Annual report
- 1:05:02Diversified Retailing 139 Company, Inc Financial
- 1:05:07information regarding associated retail stores Incorporated
- 1:05:11Financial information regarding Illinois National Bank and Trust
- 1:05:15Company 1969 best report National Indemnity company 1969
- 1:05:21Best report National Fire and Marine Insurance Company 140
- 1:05:26Buffett Partnership Ltd 610 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, NE 68131
- 1:05:34Telephone 0424110 December 26th in 1969 to my partners, our
- 1:05:41plans regarding the initial cash distribution have been finalized
- 1:05:45and we expect to mail to you on January 3rd a check dated
- 1:05:49January 5th, 1970 for approximately 64% of your
- 1:05:54January 1st, 1969 capital, less any distributions made to you,
- 1:05:59including monthly payments since January 1st, 1969.
- 1:06:04If you have taken no monthly payments during 1969, there will
- 1:06:08be a small interest adjustment in your favor.
- 1:06:11If you have had loans from BPL, there will be an interest
- 1:06:14charge. I couldn't be more delighted
- 1:06:17about the action of the bond and stock markets from the
- 1:06:20standpoint of the timing of our liquidation.
- 1:06:23I believe practically all partners, whether they would
- 1:06:25have invested in bonds or stocks, will be far better off
- 1:06:29receiving the cash now than if we had liquidated at the end of
- 1:06:33last year. Those seeking income will
- 1:06:35receive about 40% more after tax on the same principal investment
- 1:06:39than they would have achieved only a year ago at what then
- 1:06:43seemed like generous yields. Our tax picture is virtually
- 1:06:46complete and it appears that you will have ordinary income
- 1:06:49dividends plus interest income, less ordinary loss for federal
- 1:06:53tax purposes of about 334% of your January 1st, 1969 capital.
- 1:07:00Item 1. N Enclosed letter.
- 1:07:02No significant long term capital gain or loss and a short term
- 1:07:06capital loss of about 8 to 12% off your January 1st, 1969
- 1:07:12unrealized appreciation. Item 3.
- 1:07:14These estimates are just rough approximations.
- 1:07:17Definitive figures will reach you in early February.
- 1:07:21The sale of our 371,400 shares of Blue Chip Stamps was not
- 1:07:25completed in 1969. When the stock went into
- 1:07:29registration, it was selling at about $24.00 per share.
- 1:07:33The underwriters indicated a range where they expected to
- 1:07:36offer our shares along with others, with Heavyweight placed
- 1:07:39on a comparison with Sperry and Hutchinson shortly before the
- 1:07:43stock was to be offered. With the Dow Jones Industrials
- 1:07:46much lower but S&H virtually unchanged, they indicated a
- 1:07:51price below their former range. We reluctantly agreed and felt
- 1:07:55we had a deal, but on the next business day they stated that
- 1:07:58our agreed price was not feasible.
- 1:08:01We then withdrew in a much smaller offering was done.
- 1:08:04I intend to hold our block of Blue Chip Stamps and BPL for a
- 1:08:08more advantageous disposal or eventual distribution to our
- 1:08:12partners. The odds are decent that we will
- 1:08:14do better in this manner, even if it takes a year or two, even
- 1:08:18if we have participated in a very large sale into a somewhat
- 1:08:22distressed market. Unless there is a material
- 1:08:25change in the market in the next few days, I plan to value our
- 1:08:28blue chip holdings at year end at the price received by selling
- 1:08:32shareholders on the public offering after underwriting
- 1:08:35discount and expenses. Various questions have been
- 1:08:38asked pursuant to the last letter.
- 1:08:40One, if we are not getting a good return on the textile
- 1:08:43business of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated, why do we continue
- 1:08:47to operate it? Pretty much for the reasons
- 1:08:50outlined in my letter. I don't want to liquidate a
- 1:08:52business employing 1100 people when the management has worked
- 1:08:56hard to improve their relative industry position with
- 1:08:59reasonable results. And as long as the business does
- 1:09:02not require substantial additional capital investment, I
- 1:09:05have no desire to trade severe human dislocations for a few
- 1:09:09percentage points additional return per annum.
- 1:09:12Obviously, if we faced material compulsory additional investment
- 1:09:16or sustained operating losses, the decision might have to be
- 1:09:20different, but I don't anticipate such alternatives.
- 1:09:23141 To how large is our investment in Sun newspapers,
- 1:09:28etcetera, and do we intend to expand in the newspaper, radio
- 1:09:32and TV business? The combined investment in Sun,
- 1:09:35Blacker Printing and Gateway Underwriters is a little over
- 1:09:39$1.00 per share of Berkshire Hathaway and earns something
- 1:09:42less than $0.10 per share. We have no particular plans to
- 1:09:46expand in the communication field. 3 What does Gateway
- 1:09:50Underwriters do? Gateway Underwriters serves
- 1:09:52primarily as a general agent for National Indemnity Company in
- 1:09:56the state of Missouri. 4 are their good second men to take
- 1:10:01over from the men running the three excellent operating
- 1:10:04businesses. In any company where the founder
- 1:10:06and chief driving force behind the enterprise is still active,
- 1:10:10it is very difficult to evaluate second men.
- 1:10:13The only real way to see how someone is going to do when
- 1:10:16running a company is to let him run it.
- 1:10:19Some of our businesses have certainly been more one man
- 1:10:22shows than they typical corporation.
- 1:10:24Subject to the foregoing caveat, I think that we do have some
- 1:10:27good second men coming along. Five, in what area do you plan
- 1:10:32to invest the cash and diversified retailing company
- 1:10:35and do you intend to stick primarily to the retailing
- 1:10:37field? While we prefer the retailing
- 1:10:40field, we do not preclude anything that will make sense.
- 1:10:43We have been looking without success for two years for an
- 1:10:46intelligent acquisition for DRC, so we are not about to rule out
- 1:10:50any industry if the business looks good.
- 1:10:53Pending such time as we find one or more operating businesses to
- 1:10:56buy, the money will be invested in marketable securities. 6 Why
- 1:11:01didn't DRC payout the money it received on the sale of Hotchild
- 1:11:05Cone and Company? In addition to the fact that
- 1:11:07such a payment would constitute A dividend taxable insignificant
- 1:11:11part ass ordinary income, there are restrictions in the bond
- 1:11:15indenture which prevents such a payout without turning over
- 1:11:18control of the company to the bondholders. 7 Will distribution
- 1:11:23of the DRC stock cause the DRC debentures to be called?
- 1:11:26After distribution of the stock that will be the largest
- 1:11:29stockholder in DRC and hence the call provision will not apply. 8
- 1:11:35How would we know if the DRC debentures were called?
- 1:11:38All stockholders and debenture holders would find out directly
- 1:11:42from the company through regular or special reports that the
- 1:11:45company issues to its security holders.
- 1:11:47There is no intention at all of calling the debentures. 9 Why
- 1:11:52did you not register our Berkshire Hathaway and
- 1:11:54Diversified Retailing shares so that the stock, when received by
- 1:11:58the partners, would be freely marketable?
- 1:12:00We considered this possibility but rejected it for both
- 1:12:03practical and legal considerations.
- 1:12:06I will just discuss the practicalities since they would
- 1:12:09independently dictate the decision we made. 142 There is
- 1:12:14presently no existing market for Diversified Retailing, and our
- 1:12:17holdings of Berkshire Hathaway are probably four or five times
- 1:12:21the present floating supply of this stock.
- 1:12:24An attempt to quickly buy or sell a few 1000 shares can
- 1:12:27easily move BH stock several points or more.
- 1:12:31We own 691,441 shares where we to distribute these stocks to
- 1:12:37you via a registration without an underwriting and with the
- 1:12:41possibility that a substantial portion would be offered for
- 1:12:44Sale by many sellers operating individually but virtually
- 1:12:48simultaneously. There is a real likelihood,
- 1:12:51particularly in a stock market environment such as we have seen
- 1:12:55recently, that the market for these two stocks would be little
- 1:12:58short of chaotic. It has not seemed to me that
- 1:13:01this was the kind of situation with which I should leave you,
- 1:13:04both from the standpoint of the price level which might prevail,
- 1:13:08as well As for the reason that different partners might well
- 1:13:10have to liquidate it, widely varying price levels.
- 1:13:14The more sophisticated partners might have an important edge on
- 1:13:17the less sophisticated ones, and I believe many partners might
- 1:13:21have no chance to realize the prices I anticipate using for
- 1:13:24year end valuation. This would rightly seem most
- 1:13:28unfair to you since I would have received some allocation of 1969
- 1:13:33BPL profits based upon these year end valuations.
- 1:13:36If the markets were to become distressed, I would probably
- 1:13:40come in for criticism, whether I personally bought at lower
- 1:13:43prices or perhaps more so if I refrain from buying.
- 1:13:47Were we to attempt to sponsor an underwriting and connection with
- 1:13:51a registration for those partners who might wish to sell,
- 1:13:54there would be, in my opinion, the likelihood that the result
- 1:13:58would still be far less than satisfactory.
- 1:14:01We have just been around this track with our holdings of Blue
- 1:14:04Chip Stamps where we watched the price of our stock go from 24 to
- 1:14:0816 to 12 after announcement of the underwriting of which we
- 1:14:12originally were to be a part. I did not want this sort of
- 1:14:15result for the partners with respect to their holdings of
- 1:14:18Berkshire and Diversified. It is my belief that by
- 1:14:22confining sales to private placements, those partners who
- 1:14:25wish to sell will realize more for their stock.
- 1:14:28With the sophisticated partners having no marketing edge on the
- 1:14:31less knowledgeable then would be achieved through an
- 1:14:34underwriting. At this time also, the stock
- 1:14:37should be more likely to find its way into the hands of long
- 1:14:40term investment minded holders which should mean less volatile
- 1:14:44markets in the future. We have had several phone calls
- 1:14:47from persons indicating that they wish to make private sales.
- 1:14:50We anticipate there will be no difficulty in effectuating such
- 1:14:54sales at prices related to our year end valuations.
- 1:14:58Those partners who would prefer an underwritten distribution
- 1:15:00always have the option of having a registration of their own.
- 1:15:04I will be glad to facilitate this by placing all partners in
- 1:15:08touch with each other who indicate to me their desire to
- 1:15:11sell via a registered underwriting at their expense
- 1:15:15and through an underwriter of their choice.
- 1:15:17In this way, the expense of an underwriting, which can be
- 1:15:20considerable, would be borne by the selling partners and not by
- 1:15:24the partners as a whole. I have also had partners ask if
- 1:15:27they could participate in a registered offering in the
- 1:15:29future if I should sell shares in this manner.
- 1:15:32I think it is almost certain I will never sell stock via public
- 1:15:36offering, but should it ever happen, I will be glad to let
- 1:15:40any of you participate in any underwritten offering in which I
- 1:15:43might be involved. In all probability, if it ever
- 1:15:47did happen, your stock would already be free, although mine
- 1:15:50would still be restricted. I cannot make the same
- 1:15:53commitment to you regarding any private sale I might make in the
- 1:15:57future, just as I can't expect you to restrict any sale options
- 1:16:01you might have in order to include me. 10 Will you let us
- 1:16:04know if you sell your holdings of BH or DRC?
- 1:16:08You would undoubtedly know from corporate communications,
- 1:16:11reports in the press and reports to government agencies.
- 1:16:14If I disposed of my holdings. I have no intention at all of
- 1:16:17doing so in the foreseeable future.
- 1:16:20I merely make no commitment not to.
- 1:16:22However, former BPL partners will have no priority over other
- 1:16:27BH or DRC security holders in obtaining information relating
- 1:16:31to their corporate activities. 11 Should I hold my BH or DRC
- 1:16:36stock? 143?
- 1:16:38I can't give you the answer on this one.
- 1:16:40All I can say is that I'm going to do so and I plan to buy more.
- 1:16:43I am very happy to have a material portion of my net worth
- 1:16:47invested in these companies on a long term basis.
- 1:16:50Obviously, I think they will be worth significantly more money 5
- 1:16:54or 10 years hence compared to most stocks.
- 1:16:57I think there is a low risk of loss.
- 1:16:59I hope their price patterns follow a rather moderate range
- 1:17:02related to business results rather than behaving in a
- 1:17:05volatile manner related to speculative enthusiasm or
- 1:17:09depression. Obviously, I cannot control the
- 1:17:11latter phenomena, but there is no intent to promote the stocks
- 1:17:15allow much of the distasteful general financial market
- 1:17:18activity of recent years. 12 Can I give either BH or DRC shares
- 1:17:24to my wife or children? We are advised by counsel that
- 1:17:27this is permissible, but of course the same restrictions on
- 1:17:31transfer that applied to you would apply to the donee of the
- 1:17:34gift. 13 Why are you waiting until March to give us your
- 1:17:38suggestions regarding bonds? January and February promise to
- 1:17:42be very busy months. Many partners may want to talk
- 1:17:45to me about their questions and objectives regarding bonds.
- 1:17:48I want to have all important BPL matters out of the way before I
- 1:17:52talk with any of them on an individual basis.
- 1:17:55I make no forecasts regarding the bond market or stock market.
- 1:17:59It may be higher or lower in March than now.
- 1:18:02After my October letter, several partners became very eager to
- 1:18:06buy bonds immediately. To date they are much better off
- 1:18:09by waiting. The excellent quality tax free
- 1:18:12bonds I talked about at that time with yields of 6 -, 12% can
- 1:18:16now be bought to yield about 7% cordially.
- 1:18:19Warren E Buffett WBGLK 144 Buffett Partnership Ltd 610
- 1:18:26Kiewit Plaza Omaha, Nebraska 68131 Telephone 0424110 February
- 1:18:3525th, 1970 To my partners This letter will attempt to provide a
- 1:18:40very elementary education regarding tax exempt bonds with
- 1:18:43emphasis on the types and maturities of bonds which we
- 1:18:47expect to help partners in purchasing next month.
- 1:18:50If you expect to use our help in the purchase of bonds, it is
- 1:18:54important that you carefully read and if necessary, reread
- 1:18:58this letter as it will serve as background for the specific
- 1:19:01purchases. I suggest if you disagree with
- 1:19:03me as to conclusions regarding types of bonds or maturities,
- 1:19:07and you would have been right and I would have been wrong if
- 1:19:10you had disagreed with me on the latter point either one or two
- 1:19:13years ago, you may well be correct.
- 1:19:15But we cannot be of assistance to you in the purchase of bonds
- 1:19:19outside our area. We will simply have our hands
- 1:19:22full concentrating in our recommended area.
- 1:19:25So we'll be unavailable to assist or advise in the purchase
- 1:19:28of convertible bonds, corporate bonds or short term issues.
- 1:19:32I have tried to boil this letter down as much as possible.
- 1:19:36Some of it will be a little weighty, some a little over
- 1:19:38simplified. I apologize for the shortcomings
- 1:19:41in advance. I have a feeling I am trying to
- 1:19:43put all the meat of a 100 page book in 10 pages and have it
- 1:19:48read like the funny papers. I am sure you understand that
- 1:19:51our aid in the purchase of bonds will involve no future
- 1:19:54assistance regarding either these specific bonds or general
- 1:19:58investment decisions. I want to be available at this
- 1:20:00time to be of help because of the unusual amount of cash you
- 1:20:04have received in one distribution from us.
- 1:20:07I have no desire to be in the investment counseling business
- 1:20:10directly or indirectly and will not be available for discussion
- 1:20:14of financial matters after March 31st.
- 1:20:17The mechanics of tax free bonds For those who wish our help, we
- 1:20:21will arrange the purchase of bonds directly from municipal
- 1:20:24bond dealers throughout the country and have them confirm
- 1:20:27sale of the bonds directly to you.
- 1:20:29The confirmation should be saved as a basic document for tax
- 1:20:33purposes. You should not send a check to
- 1:20:35the bond dealer since he will deliver the bonds to your bank
- 1:20:39along with a draft, which the bank will pay by charging your
- 1:20:41account with them. In the case of bonds purchased
- 1:20:45in the secondary market issues already outstanding, this
- 1:20:48settlement date will usually be about a week after confirmation
- 1:20:52date, whereas on new issues the settlement date may be as much
- 1:20:56as a month later. The settlement date is shown
- 1:20:59plainly on the confirmation ticket.
- 1:21:01In the case of new issues, this will be the second and final
- 1:21:05ticket rather than the preliminary when issued ticket,
- 1:21:08and you should have the funds at your bank ready to pay for the
- 1:21:11bonds on the settlement date. If you presently owned Treasury
- 1:21:14bills, they can be sold on a couple of days notice by your
- 1:21:17bank upon your instructions, so you should experience no
- 1:21:20problems in having the money available on time.
- 1:21:24Interest begins to accrue to you on the settlement date even if
- 1:21:27the bond dealer is late in getting them delivered to your
- 1:21:30bank. Bonds will be delivered in
- 1:21:32negotiable form, so-called bearer form, which makes them
- 1:21:36like currency with 145 coupons attached.
- 1:21:40Usually the bonds are in $5000 denominations and frequently
- 1:21:45they can be exchanged for registered bonds, sometimes at
- 1:21:48considerable expense and sometimes free.
- 1:21:51It depends upon the terms. Bonds in registered form are non
- 1:21:55negotiable without assignment by you, since you are the
- 1:21:58registered owner on the transfer agents books.
- 1:22:01Bonds trade almost exclusively on a bearer basis, and it is
- 1:22:05virtually impossible to sell registered bonds without
- 1:22:08converting them back into bearer form.
- 1:22:10Thus, unless you are going to own great physical quantities of
- 1:22:14bonds, I recommend keeping bonds in bearer form.
- 1:22:17This means keeping them in a very safe place and clipping the
- 1:22:20coupons every six months. Such coupons, when clipped, can
- 1:22:25be deposited in your bank account just like checks.
- 1:22:28If you have $250,000 in bonds, this probably means about 50
- 1:22:32separate pieces of paper, $5000 denominations, and perhaps 6 or
- 1:22:388 trips a year to the safe deposit section to cut and
- 1:22:41deposit coupons. It is also possible to open a
- 1:22:44custody account with a bank where for a fairly nominal cost,
- 1:22:48they will keep the bonds, collect the interest, and
- 1:22:51preserve your records for you. For example, a bank will
- 1:22:54probably perform the custodial service for you for about $200 a
- 1:22:58year on a $250,000 portfolio. If you are interested in a
- 1:23:03custodial account, you should talk to a trust officer at your
- 1:23:06commercial bank as to the nature of their services and cost.
- 1:23:09Otherwise, you should have a safe deposit box taxation.
- 1:23:13The interest received upon the deposit of coupons from tax free
- 1:23:17bonds is, of course, free from federal income taxes.
- 1:23:21This means if you are at a 30% top federal income tax bracket,
- 1:23:25a 6% return from tax free bonds is equivalent to about 8 to 12%
- 1:23:30from taxable bonds. Thus, for most of our partners,
- 1:23:34excluding minors or some retired people, tax free bonds will be
- 1:23:38more attractive than taxable bonds.
- 1:23:41For people with little or no income from wages or dividends,
- 1:23:45but with substantial capital, it is possible that a combination
- 1:23:49of taxable bonds to bring taxable income up to about the
- 1:23:5225% or 30% bracket plus tax free bonds will bring the highest
- 1:23:57total after tax income. Where appropriate, we will work
- 1:24:01with you to achieve such a balance.
- 1:24:03The situation in respect to state income taxes is more
- 1:24:06complicated. In Nebraska, where the state
- 1:24:09income tax is computed as a percentage of the federal income
- 1:24:13tax, the effect is that there is no state tax on interest from
- 1:24:17tax free bonds. My understanding of both the New
- 1:24:20York and California law is that tax free bonds of entities
- 1:24:24within the home state are not subject to state income tax, but
- 1:24:28tax free bonds from other states are subject to the local state
- 1:24:31income tax. I also believe that the New York
- 1:24:34City income tax exempt tax free bonds of entities based within
- 1:24:39the state of New York, but taxes those from other states.
- 1:24:42I am no expert on state income taxes and make no attempt to
- 1:24:46post myself on changes taking place within the various states
- 1:24:49or cities. Therefore, I defer to your local
- 1:24:52tax advisor, but simply mention these few general impressions so
- 1:24:56that you will be alert to the existence of a potential problem
- 1:25:00in Nebraska. There is no need to have any
- 1:25:02local considerations enter into the after tax calculation.
- 1:25:07Where out of state issues are subject to local taxation, the
- 1:25:10effective cost of your state or municipal income tax is reduced
- 1:25:14by the benefit received from deducting it on your federal
- 1:25:17income tax return. This, of course, varies with the
- 1:25:21individual. Additionally, in some states
- 1:25:23there are various taxes on intangible property which may
- 1:25:26apply to all tax free bonds or just those of out of state
- 1:25:30entities. There are none of these in
- 1:25:31Nebraska, but I cannot advise on the other states.
- 1:25:35When bonds are bought at a discount from par and later are
- 1:25:38sold or mature, come due and get paid, the difference between the
- 1:25:42proceeds and cost is subject to capital gain or loss treatment.
- 1:25:46There are minor exceptions to this statement as unfortunately
- 1:25:51there are two most general statements on investments and
- 1:25:53taxes, but they will be pointed out to you should they affect
- 1:25:56any securities we recommend. This reduces the net after tax
- 1:26:00yield by a factor involving the general rate of future capital
- 1:26:04gains taxes and the specific future tax position of the
- 1:26:08individual. Later on, we will discuss the
- 1:26:11impact of such capital gains taxes in calculating the
- 1:26:14relative attractiveness of discount bonds versus full
- 1:26:18coupon bonds. Finally, one most important
- 1:26:21point, although the law is not completely clear, you should
- 1:26:24probably not contemplate owning tax free bonds if you have or
- 1:26:28expect to have general purpose bank or other indebtedness. 146
- 1:26:34the law excludes the deductibility of interest on
- 1:26:36loans incurred or continued to purchase or carry tax free
- 1:26:40bonds, and the interpretation of this statute will probably tend
- 1:26:44to be broadened as the years pass.
- 1:26:46For example, my impression is that you have no problem if you
- 1:26:49have a mortgage against real property, unless the debt was
- 1:26:53incurred in order to acquire municipal bonds, in deducting
- 1:26:56the mortgage interest on your federal tax return even though
- 1:26:59you own tax free bonds at the same time.
- 1:27:02However, I believe that if you have a general bank loan, even
- 1:27:05though the proceeds were directly used to purchase
- 1:27:08stocks, a handball court, etcetera, and the tax free bonds
- 1:27:11are not used for security for the loan, you are asking for
- 1:27:15trouble if you deduct the interest and at the same time
- 1:27:18are the owner of tax free bonds. Therefore, I would pay off bank
- 1:27:23loans before owning tax free bonds.
- 1:27:25But I leave detailed examination of this question to you and your
- 1:27:29tax advisor. I merely mention it to make you
- 1:27:31aware of that potential problem. Marketability.
- 1:27:35Tax free bonds are materially different from common stocks or
- 1:27:38corporate bonds in that there are literally hundreds of
- 1:27:41thousands of issues with the great majority having very few
- 1:27:44holders. This substantially inhibits the
- 1:27:47development of close active markets.
- 1:27:50Whenever the city of New York or Philadelphia wants to raise
- 1:27:53money, it sells perhaps 2030 or 40 non identical securities
- 1:27:58since it will offer an issue with that many different
- 1:28:01maturities. A 6% bond of New York coming due
- 1:28:04in 1980 is a different animal from a 6% bond of New York
- 1:28:09coming due in 1981. One cannot be exchanged for the
- 1:28:12other and a seller has to find a buyer for the specific item he
- 1:28:16holds. When you consider that New York
- 1:28:18may offer bonds several times a year, it is easy to see why just
- 1:28:22this one city may have somewhere in the neighborhood of 1000
- 1:28:26issues outstanding. Grand Island NE may have 75
- 1:28:30issues outstanding. The average amount of each issue
- 1:28:34might be $100,000 and the average number of holders may be
- 1:28:386 or 8 per issue. Thus it is absolutely impossible
- 1:28:42to have quoted markets at all times for all issues, and
- 1:28:45spreads between bids and offers may be very wide.
- 1:28:49You can't set forth in the morning to buy a specific Grand
- 1:28:52Island issue of your choosing. It may not be offered at any
- 1:28:55price anywhere. And if you do find one seller,
- 1:28:59there is no reason why he has to be realistic compared to other
- 1:29:02offerings of similar quality. On the other hand, there are
- 1:29:06single issues such as those of the Ohio Turnpike, Illinois
- 1:29:09Turnpike, etcetera, that amount too $200 million or more and
- 1:29:14have thousands of bondholders owning a single entirely
- 1:29:17homogeneous and an interchangeable issue.
- 1:29:20Obviously here you get a high degree of marketability.
- 1:29:24My impression is that marketability is generally a
- 1:29:26function of the following three items in descending order of
- 1:29:30importance. One, the size of the particular
- 1:29:33issue to the size of the issuer. A $100,000 issue of the State of
- 1:29:37Ohio will be more marketable than a $100,000 issue of Podunk
- 1:29:42Ohio. And three, the quality of the
- 1:29:44issuer. By far the most sales effort
- 1:29:47goes into the selling of new issues of bonds.
- 1:29:50An average of over $200 million per week of new issues comes up
- 1:29:55for sale and the machinery of bond distribution is geared to
- 1:29:58get them sold large or small. In my opinion, there is
- 1:30:02frequently insufficient differential and yield at time
- 1:30:05of issue for the marketability differences that will exist once
- 1:30:09the initial sales push is terminated.
- 1:30:11We have frequently run into markets and bonds where they
- 1:30:14spread between bid and asked prices may get to 15%.
- 1:30:18There is no need to buy bonds with the potential for such
- 1:30:22grotesque markets, although the profit spread to the dealer who
- 1:30:25originally offers them is frequently wider than on more
- 1:30:28marketable bonds, and we will not be buying them for you.
- 1:30:31The bonds we expect to buy will usually tend to have spreads
- 1:30:35reflecting the difference between what you would pay net
- 1:30:37for such bonds on purchase and receive net on sale at the same
- 1:30:41point in time of from 2% to 5%. Such a spread would be
- 1:30:45devastating if you attempted to trade in such bonds, but I don't
- 1:30:49believe it should be a deterrent for a long term investor.
- 1:30:52The real necessity is to stay away from bonds of very limited
- 1:30:56marketability, which frequently are the type local bond dealers
- 1:31:01have the greatest monetary incentive to push specific areas
- 1:31:04of purchase. We will probably concentrate our
- 1:31:07purchases in the following general areas.
- 1:31:09One large revenue producing public entities such as toll
- 1:31:12roads, electric power districts, water districts, ETC. 147 Many
- 1:31:18of these issues possess high marketability, are subject to
- 1:31:22quantitative analysis, and sometimes have favorable sinking
- 1:31:25fund or other factors which tend not to receive full valuation in
- 1:31:30the marketplace. To Industrial Development
- 1:31:32Authority bonds, which arise when a public entity holds title
- 1:31:36to property leased to a private corporation.
- 1:31:39For example, Lorraine, Ohio holds title to an $80 million
- 1:31:43project for US Steel Corp. The Development Authority Board
- 1:31:47issued bonds to pay for the project and has executed a net
- 1:31:51and absolute lease with US Steel to cover the bond payments.
- 1:31:55The credit of the city or state is not behind the bonds, and
- 1:31:59they are only as good as the company that is on the lease.
- 1:32:02Many top grade corporations stand behind an aggregate of
- 1:32:06several billion dollars of these obligations, although new ones
- 1:32:09are being issued only in small amounts, $5,000,000 per project
- 1:32:14or less, because of changes in the tax loss.
- 1:32:17For a period of time there was a very substantial prejudice
- 1:32:20against such issues, causing them to sell at yields
- 1:32:24considerably higher than those commensurate with their inherent
- 1:32:27credit standing. This prejudice has tended to
- 1:32:30diminish, reducing the premium yields available, but I still
- 1:32:33consider it a most attractive field.
- 1:32:36Our insurance company owns a majority of its bonds in this
- 1:32:39category. Three public Housing Authority
- 1:32:41issues for those of you who wish the very highest grade of tax
- 1:32:45free bonds. In effect, these bonds bear the
- 1:32:48guarantee of the US government, so they are all rated AAA.
- 1:32:52In states where local taxes put a premium on buying in state
- 1:32:56issues and I can't fill your needs from 1:00 and 2:00, my
- 1:33:00tendency would be to put you into Housing Authority issues
- 1:33:03rather than try to select from among credits that I don't
- 1:33:06understand. If you direct me to buy
- 1:33:08obligations of your home state, you should expect substantial
- 1:33:11quantities of Housing Authority issues.
- 1:33:14There is no need to diversify among such issues, as they all
- 1:33:18represent the top credit available for state obligations
- 1:33:22of a direct or indirect nature. You will notice I am not buying
- 1:33:25issues of large cities. I don't have the faintest idea
- 1:33:28how to analyze in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, etcetera.
- 1:33:33A friend mentioned the other day when Newark was trying to sell
- 1:33:36bonds today, very fancy rate, that the mafia was getting very
- 1:33:39upset because Newark was giving them a bad name.
- 1:33:42Your analysis of a New York City, and I admit it is hard to
- 1:33:46imagine them not paying their bills for any extended period of
- 1:33:50time, would be as good as mine. My approach to bonds is pretty
- 1:33:54much like my approach to stocks. If I can't understand something,
- 1:33:58I tend to forget it. Passing an opportunity which I
- 1:34:00don't understand, even if someone else is perceptive
- 1:34:04enough to analyze it and get paid well for doing it, doesn't
- 1:34:07bother me. All I want to be sure of is that
- 1:34:10I get paid well for the things I do feel capable of handling, and
- 1:34:14that I am right when I make affirmative decisions.
- 1:34:17We will probably tend to purchase somewhere between 5 and
- 1:34:2010 issues for most of you, however, if you wish to limit me
- 1:34:23to your home state, but it may be fewer issues and perhaps
- 1:34:27those will only be housing authorities.
- 1:34:29We will try not to buy in smaller than $25,000 pieces, and
- 1:34:34we'll prefer larger amounts where appropriate.
- 1:34:37Smaller lots of bonds are usually penalized upon resale,
- 1:34:40sometimes substantially. The bond salesman doesn't
- 1:34:44usually explain this to you when you buy the $10,000 of bonds
- 1:34:47from him, but it gets explained when you later try to sell the
- 1:34:51$10,000 to him. We may make exceptions where we
- 1:34:54are buying secondary market issues in smaller pieces, but
- 1:34:58only if we are getting an especially good price on the buy
- 1:35:00side. Because of the small size of the
- 1:35:03offering callable bonds, we will not buy bonds where the issuer
- 1:35:07of the bonds has a right to call retire the bonds on a basis
- 1:35:10which substantially loads the contract in his favor.
- 1:35:14It is amazing to me to see people buy bonds which are doing
- 1:35:1740 years, but where the issuer has the right to call the bonds
- 1:35:20at a tiny premium in five or ten years.
- 1:35:23Such a contract essentially means that you have made a 40
- 1:35:27year deal if it is advantageous to the issuer and
- 1:35:30disadvantageous to you in a five year deal if the initial
- 1:35:33contract turns out to be advantageous to you and
- 1:35:36disadvantageous to the 148 issuer.
- 1:35:40Such contracts are really outrageous and exist because
- 1:35:44bond investors can't think through that implications of
- 1:35:47such a contract form and bond dealers don't insist on better
- 1:35:50terms for their customers. One extremely interesting fact
- 1:35:54is that bonds with very unattractive call features sell
- 1:35:57at virtually the same yield as otherwise identical bonds which
- 1:36:01are non callable. It should be pointed out that
- 1:36:04most Nebraska bonds carry highly unfair call provisions.
- 1:36:08Despite this severe contractual disadvantage, they do not offer
- 1:36:12higher yields than bonds with more equitable terms.
- 1:36:15One way to avoid this problem is to buy bonds which are totally
- 1:36:18non callable. Another way is to buy discount
- 1:36:21bonds were the right of the issuer to call the bond is at a
- 1:36:24price so far above your cost as to render the possible call
- 1:36:28inconsequential. If you buy a bond at 60, which
- 1:36:31is callable at 103, the effective cost to you of
- 1:36:35granting that issuer the right to prematurely terminate the
- 1:36:38contract, which is a right you never have, is insignificant.
- 1:36:42But to buy a bond of the Los Angeles Department of Water and
- 1:36:46Power at 100, to come due at 100 in 1999, or to come do at 104 in
- 1:36:521974, depending on which is to the advantage of the issuer and
- 1:36:57to your disadvantage, is the height of foolishness when
- 1:37:00comparable yields are available on similar credits without such
- 1:37:03an unfair contract. Nevertheless, just such a bond
- 1:37:07was issued in October, 1969, and similar bonds continue to be
- 1:37:12issued every day. I only right at such length
- 1:37:15about an obvious point, since it is apparent from the continual
- 1:37:19sale of such bonds that many investors haven't the faintest
- 1:37:22notion how this loads the dice against them, and many bond
- 1:37:25salesman aren't about to tell them maturity and the
- 1:37:29mathematics of bonds. Many people in buying bonds
- 1:37:32select maturities based on how long they think they're going to
- 1:37:35want to hold bonds, how long they're going to live, etcetera.
- 1:37:40While this is not a silly approach, it is not necessarily
- 1:37:43the most logical. The primary determinants in
- 1:37:46selection of maturity should probably be 1 the shape of the
- 1:37:49yield curve to your expectations regarding future levels of
- 1:37:53interest rates, and three, the degree of quotational
- 1:37:56fluctuation you are willing to endure or hope to possibly
- 1:38:00profit from. Of course, 2 is the most
- 1:38:03important, but by far the most difficult upon which to comment
- 1:38:07intelligently. Let's tackle the yield curve
- 1:38:09first. When other aspects of quality
- 1:38:11are identical, there will be a difference in interest rates
- 1:38:15paid based upon the length of the bond being offered.
- 1:38:18For example, a top grade bond being offered now might have a
- 1:38:22yield of 4.75% if it came due in six or nine months, 5% in two
- 1:38:28years, 5.25% in five years, 5.5% in 10 years, and 6.25% in 20
- 1:38:35years. When long rates are
- 1:38:37substantially higher than short rates, the curve is said to be
- 1:38:40strongly positive. In the US government bond market
- 1:38:45rates recently have tended to produce a negative yield curve.
- 1:38:49That is, a long term government bond over the last year or so
- 1:38:52has consistently yielded less than a short term 1.
- 1:38:56Sometimes the yield curve has been very flat, and sometimes it
- 1:38:59is positive out to a given point such as 10 years, and then
- 1:39:03flattens out. What you should understand is
- 1:39:05that it varies often vary substantially, and that on an
- 1:39:09historical basis the present slope tends to be in the high
- 1:39:12positive range. This doesn't mean that long
- 1:39:15bonds are going to be worth more, but it does mean that you
- 1:39:18are being paid more to extend maturity than in many periods.
- 1:39:22If yields remain constant for several years, you would do
- 1:39:25better with longer bonds than shorter bonds, regardless of how
- 1:39:29long you intended to hold them. The second factor in determining
- 1:39:33maturity selection is expectations regarding future
- 1:39:36rate levels. Anyone who has done much
- 1:39:39predicting in this field has tended to look very foolish,
- 1:39:42very fast. I did not regard rates as
- 1:39:45unattractive one year ago and I was proved very wrong almost
- 1:39:49immediately. I believe present rates are not
- 1:39:51unattractive and I may look foolish again.
- 1:39:54Nevertheless, a decision has to be made and you can make just as
- 1:39:58great a mistake if you buy short term securities now and rates
- 1:40:01available on reinvestment in a few years are much lower.
- 1:40:05The final factor involves your tolerance for quotational
- 1:40:08fluctuation. This involves the mathematics of
- 1:40:10bond investment and maybe a little difficult for you to
- 1:40:14understand. Nevertheless, it is important
- 1:40:16that you get a general 149 grasp of the principles.
- 1:40:21Let's assume for the moment a perfectly flat yield curve and a
- 1:40:24non callable bond. Further, assume present rates
- 1:40:27are 5% and that you buy 2 bonds, one due in two years and one due
- 1:40:32in 20 years. Now assume one year later that
- 1:40:35yields on new issues have gone to 3% and that you wish to sell
- 1:40:39your bonds, forgetting about market spreads, commissions,
- 1:40:42etcetera. You will receive 1019.60 dollars
- 1:40:47for the original 2 year $1000 bond now with one year to run
- 1:40:52and 1288.10 dollars for the 19 year bond, originally 20 years.
- 1:40:58At these prices, a purchaser will get exactly 3% on his money
- 1:41:03after amortizing the premium he is paid in cashing the stream of
- 1:41:075% coupons attached to each bond.
- 1:41:10It is a matter of indifference to him whether to buy your 19
- 1:41:14Year 5% bond at 1288.10 dollars or a new 3% bond which we have
- 1:41:20assumed is the rate current one year later at $1000.
- 1:41:25On the other hand, let's assume rates went to 7%.
- 1:41:28Again, we will ignore commissions, capital gains taxes
- 1:41:32on the discount, etcetera. Now the buyer will only pay
- 1:41:35$981.00 for the bond with one year remaining until maturity
- 1:41:40and 791.60 dollars for the bond with 19 years left.
- 1:41:46Since he can get 7% on new issues, he is only willing to
- 1:41:49buy your bond at a discount sufficient so that accrual of
- 1:41:53this discount will give him the same economic benefits from your
- 1:41:565% coupon that a 7% coupon at $1000 would give him.
- 1:42:01The principle is simple. The wider the swings and
- 1:42:04interest rates and the longer the bond, the more the value of
- 1:42:07a bond can go up or down on an interim basis before maturity.
- 1:42:12It should be. Pointed out in the first example
- 1:42:14where rates went to 3%, our long term bond would only have
- 1:42:18appreciated to about $1070 if it had been callable in five years
- 1:42:24at par, although it would have gone down just as much if 7%
- 1:42:28rates had occurred. This just illustrates the
- 1:42:31inherent unfairness of call provisions.
- 1:42:34For over 2 decades, interest rates on tax free bonds have
- 1:42:37almost continuously gone higher in buyers of law.
- 1:42:41Term bonds have continuously suffered.
- 1:42:43This does not mean it is bad now to buy long term bonds.
- 1:42:46It simply means that the illustration in the above
- 1:42:49paragraph has worked in only One Direction for a long period of
- 1:42:53time and people are much more conscious of the downside risks
- 1:42:57from higher rates than the upside potential from lower
- 1:43:00once. If it is a 50 to 50 chance as to
- 1:43:03the future general level of interest rates and the yield
- 1:43:06curve is substantially positive, then the odds are better in
- 1:43:09buying long term non callable bonds than shorter term ones.
- 1:43:13This reflects my current conclusion and therefore I
- 1:43:17intend to buy bonds within the 10 to 25 year range.
- 1:43:21If you have any preferences within that range, we will try
- 1:43:24to select bonds reflecting such preferences, but if you are
- 1:43:27interested in shorter term bonds we will not be able to help you
- 1:43:31as we are not searching out bonds in this area.
- 1:43:34Before you decide to buy a 20 year bond, go back and read the
- 1:43:37paragraph showing how prices change based upon changes in
- 1:43:41interest rates. Of course, if you hold the bond
- 1:43:44straight through, you're going to get the contracted rate of
- 1:43:47interest, but if you sell earlier you're going to be
- 1:43:50subject to the mathematical forces described in that
- 1:43:53paragraph, for better or for worse.
- 1:43:56Bond prices also change because of changes in quality over the
- 1:43:59years, but in the tax free area this has tended to be and
- 1:44:04probably will continue to be a relatively minor factor compared
- 1:44:08to the impact of changes in the general structure of interest
- 1:44:11rates discount versus full coupon bonds.
- 1:44:14You will have noticed in the above discussion that if you now
- 1:44:17wanted to buy a 7% return on a 19 year bond, you had a choice
- 1:44:22between buying a new 19 year bond with a 7% coupon rate or
- 1:44:26buying a bond with a 5% coupon at 791.60 dollars which would
- 1:44:32pay you $1000 in 19 years. Either purchase would have
- 1:44:36yielded exactly 7% compounded semi annually to you.
- 1:44:40Mathematically, they are the same in the case of tax free
- 1:44:44bonds. The equation is complicated,
- 1:44:46however, by the fact that the $70 coupon is entirely tax free
- 1:44:51to you, whereas they bond purchased at a discount gives
- 1:44:54you tax free income of $50 per year, but a capital gain at the
- 1:44:58end of the 19th year of 208.40 dollars.
- 1:45:03Under the present tax law, you would owe anything from a
- 1:45:06nominal tax if the gain from realization of the discount was
- 1:45:09your only taxable income in the 19th year, up to a tax of over
- 1:45:14$70 if it came on top of very large amounts of capital gain at
- 1:45:18that time. The new tax law provides for
- 1:45:21capital gain rates of 35% and even slightly higher on an
- 1:45:25indirect basis in 1972 in thereafter for those realizing
- 1:45:29very large 150 gains. In addition to this, you might
- 1:45:34have some state taxes to pay on the capital gain.
- 1:45:37Obviously under these circumstances you are not going
- 1:45:40to pay the 791.60 dollars for the 5% coupon and feel you are
- 1:45:46equally as well off as with the 7% coupon at $1000.
- 1:45:50Neither is anyone else. Therefore, identical quality
- 1:45:54securities with identical maturity sell a considerably
- 1:45:57higher gross yields when they have low coupons and are priced
- 1:46:01at discounts than if they bear current high coupons.
- 1:46:04Interestingly enough, for most taxpayers, such higher gross
- 1:46:08yields overcompensate for the probable tax to be paid.
- 1:46:12This is due to several factors. First, no one knows what the tax
- 1:46:15law will be when the bonds mature, and it is both natural
- 1:46:19and probably correct to assume the tax rate will be stiffer at
- 1:46:22that time than now. Second, even though a 5% coupon
- 1:46:27on a $1000 bond purchased at 791.60 dollars due in 19 years
- 1:46:33is the equivalent of A7 percent coupon on a $1000 bond purchased
- 1:46:38at par with the same maturity, people prefer to get the higher
- 1:46:41current return in their pocket. The owner of the 5% coupon bond
- 1:46:46is only getting around 6.3% current yield on his 791.60
- 1:46:52dollars, with the balance necessary to get him up to 7%
- 1:46:56coming from the extra 208.40 dollars he picks up at the end.
- 1:47:01Finally, the most important factor affecting prices
- 1:47:04currently on discount bonds and which will keep affecting them,
- 1:47:07is that banks have been taken out of the market as buyers of
- 1:47:10discount tax free bonds by changes brought about in bank
- 1:47:14tax treatment through the 1969 Tax Reform Act.
- 1:47:17Banks have historically been the largest purchasers and owners of
- 1:47:21tax free bonds, and anything that precludes them from one
- 1:47:25segment of the market has dramatic effects on the supply
- 1:47:28demand situation in that segment.
- 1:47:31This may tend to give some edge to individuals in the discount
- 1:47:34tax free market, articularly those who are not likely to be
- 1:47:37in a high tax bracket when the bonds mature or are sold.
- 1:47:42If I can get a significantly higher effective after tax
- 1:47:44yield, allowing for sensible estimates of your particular
- 1:47:48future tax rate possibilities, I intend to purchase discount
- 1:47:51bonds for you. I know some partners prefer full
- 1:47:54coupon bonds even though their effective yield is less, since
- 1:47:58they prefer to maximize the current cash yield, and if they
- 1:48:02will so advise me, we will stick to full coupon issues or very
- 1:48:06close thereto in their cases. Procedure I intend to be in the
- 1:48:09office solidly through March, including every Saturday except
- 1:48:13March 7th, and we'll be glad to see any partner or talk with him
- 1:48:17by phone. To aid in scheduling, please
- 1:48:20make an appointment with Gladys or me.
- 1:48:22The only request I make is that you absorb as much as possible
- 1:48:26of this letter before we talk. As you can see, it would be an
- 1:48:29enormous problem if I had to explain each item to all of you.
- 1:48:33If you decide you want us to help you in buying bonds, you
- 1:48:36should let us know. One, whether you want to
- 1:48:38restrict purchases to your home state for local tax reasons. 2
- 1:48:42Whether you want to restrict us to full coupon issues or let us
- 1:48:45use our judgement as to where you get the best value. 3 Your
- 1:48:49preference as to maturity in the 10 to 25 year range or if you
- 1:48:53prefer to let us use our judgement in that area for how
- 1:48:57much you want to invest. We may end up several percent
- 1:48:59short of the figure you name, but we will never go over 5 on
- 1:49:03what bank the bonds should be drafted.
- 1:49:06We will advise you by phone or letter as we buy bonds.
- 1:49:09Bill and John will be doing much of the mechanical work.
- 1:49:13Needless to say, none of us will have any financial interest in
- 1:49:17any transaction. Should you have any 151
- 1:49:21questions regarding the mechanics, please direct them to
- 1:49:23John or Bill as I will probably be swamped in there.
- 1:49:27We'll be more familiar with specific transactions after
- 1:49:30March 31st. I don't expect to be around the
- 1:49:33office for several months, therefore, if you want to talk
- 1:49:36things overcome in by then. The completion of all purchases
- 1:49:40may go into April, but Bill will be taking care of this and the
- 1:49:43mechanics will all be set up. You should realize that because
- 1:49:47of the enormous diversity of issues mentioned earlier, it is
- 1:49:50impossible to say just what will be bought.
- 1:49:53Sometimes the tax free bond market has more similarities to
- 1:49:57real estate than the stocks. There are hundreds of thousands
- 1:50:00of items of varying comparability, some with no
- 1:50:03sellers, some with reluctant sellers and some with eager
- 1:50:06sellers. Which may be the best by depends
- 1:50:09on the quality of what is being offered, how well it fits your
- 1:50:12needs and the eagerness of the seller.
- 1:50:14The standard of comparison is always new issues where an
- 1:50:18average of several $100 million worth have to be sold each week.
- 1:50:22However, specific secondary market opportunities, issues
- 1:50:26already outstanding may be more attractive than new issues and
- 1:50:30we can only find out how attractive they are when we are
- 1:50:33ready to make bids. Although markets can change, it
- 1:50:36looks as if we will have no difficulty in getting in the
- 1:50:39area of 6 to 12% after tax except from Housing Authority
- 1:50:44issues on bonds in the 20 year maturity range cordially Warren
- 1:50:48E Buffett, Webbie GLK 152.