Latest / SleepWise: Learn Softly, Sleep Deeply / Money Printing, Explained Gently for Sleep | A SleepWise Story
Transcript
- 0:00Good evening and welcome back to Sleep Wise.
- 0:03Tonight we drift into one of the strangest and quietest stories
- 0:08of the modern world, the story of money and the careful
- 0:13machinery that keeps it standing.
- 0:16It is a story of paper and promises, of printing presses
- 0:21and central banks of trust that build slowly and sometimes thins
- 0:28without anyone quite noticing. That may sound like a subject
- 0:33for textbooks and serious offices, but tonight we will
- 0:39approach it softly. No charts, no jargon, no need to
- 0:45remember every figure. We will simply move slowly
- 0:50through the idea and let it unfold at the pace of breath.
- 0:56Money is one of those things so familiar that we almost stop
- 1:02seeing it. A coin in a pocket, a note
- 1:06tucked into a wallet, a number that appears on a screen when a
- 1:10wage arrives. It moves through our days
- 1:14quietly doing its work, asking nothing of us but our continued
- 1:19belief in it. And there, in that small word
- 1:24belief, lies one of the deepest mysteries of ordinary life.
- 1:30For a piece of paper has no intrinsic worth.
- 1:34A linen note printed with intricate patterns is in itself
- 1:39only that linen and ink. A coin is only metal.
- 1:45A digital balance is only an entry in a Ledger maintained by
- 1:50someone else. And yet these small things
- 1:54command the movement of food, of housing, of medicine, of Labor.
- 2:00They do this not because of what they are, but because of what we
- 2:05have agreed they mean. This agreement is older than
- 2:09nations. Long before central banks, long
- 2:13before printed money, people exchanged grain for tools, salt
- 2:18for cloth, shells for cattle. Somewhere along the way, certain
- 2:24objects became trusted enough to serve as middle steps.
- 2:29A merchant in one market would accept a piece of silver because
- 2:35she knew another merchant in another market would also accept
- 2:40it. The thing itself mattered less
- 2:44than the shared confidence that surrounded it.
- 2:48We have inherited this strange arrangement and refined it
- 2:53across centuries. The money in our pockets today
- 2:57is more abstract than the silver of ancient markets.
- 3:01And yet it works. For the same reason we believe
- 3:05it will work. The people we hand it to believe
- 3:10it will work. The shops that receive it
- 3:14believe their suppliers will too.
- 3:18A long, invisible chain of confidence runs beneath every
- 3:23ordinary purchase, and most days we never feel it to night.
- 3:29We will trace the quiet story of that belief, how it has held,
- 3:35how it has sometimes broken, and how in our own century it has
- 3:41come to rest on institutions. Most of us rarely think about
- 3:47central banks with their careful committees and their power to
- 3:51create new money with a keystroke.
- 3:56There is no need to follow every step closely.
- 3:59Just let the shape of the story arrive.
- 4:02If these slow journeys help you rest, you can follow Sleep Wise
- 4:08and share it with someone who might enjoy falling asleep while
- 4:13learning something new. And now, with the night around
- 4:19us and the world's quiet machinery of money still gently
- 4:23turning, let us begin to understand why this machinery
- 4:31matters. We begin not in a modern central
- 4:34bank, but in a city that learned almost a century ago what
- 4:40happens when money loses its meaning entirely.
- 4:45The city is Berlin. The year is 1923.
- 4:52Germany has emerged from the First World War defeated,
- 4:57indebted and bound by the Treaty of Versailles to pay reparations
- 5:03of a magnitude few economies could absorb.
- 5:07To finance the war years, the government had quietly suspended
- 5:12the gold backing of its currency in 1914 and run the printing
- 5:17presses harder than peacetime had ever required.
- 5:22By the early 1920's, the mark was already drifting downward.
- 5:27Then in January 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr
- 5:34industrial region. After Germany fell behind on
- 5:38payments. The German government responded
- 5:42by paying striking Ruhr workers with freshly printed money.
- 5:48The drift became a fall. At the centre of the operation
- 5:52sat the Reichsbank, led by its president, Rudolf Havenstein.
- 5:58Under his direction, more than 130 printing firms and nearly
- 6:04woben 800 presses worked around the clock to produce bank notes
- 6:09in ever larger denominations. The numbers on the notes climbed
- 6:14past anything an ordinary person could comprehend.
- 6:20Bills of 100 million marks one billion, 100 billion.
- 6:28Each issue trying to catch a value that was already moving
- 6:32away from it. The texture of daily life began
- 6:36to bend. A loaf of bread that had cost
- 6:39about 250 marks in January 1923 cost roughly 200 billion marks
- 6:48by November. Wages were paid twice a day and
- 6:52spent immediately because by evening, the morning's pay would
- 6:58buy less. Photographs from the period show
- 7:01children using bundled banknotes as building blocks and
- 7:05householders feeding marks into stoves because the paper was
- 7:10cheaper than firewood. Pensioners who had saved across
- 7:15a lifetime found that their savings now bought a single
- 7:20newspaper or nothing at all. It was not chaos in the
- 7:24cinematic sense. People still went to work, still
- 7:28tried to feed their families, still wrote letters and rode
- 7:33trams. But the quiet contract beneath
- 7:36ordinary life had cracked. The word 1000 stopped meaning
- 7:42much, then million, then billion.
- 7:47Numbers grew so large that they emptied themselves of feeling.
- 7:52The end came not from one decisive act, but from a careful
- 7:58rebuilding of belief. In November, Nyah 23, Germany
- 8:04introduced a new currency called the Renton Mark, backed
- 8:09nominally by mortgaged German land.
- 8:13A new official, Jalmar Shacht, was appointed currency
- 8:17commissioner. The new notes were issued in
- 8:20strictly limited quantity and, remarkably, almost overnight,
- 8:26prices began to stabilize. The crisis ended not because the
- 8:33underlying problems had been solved, but because people chose
- 8:37tentatively to believe in the new arrangement.
- 8:41The Weimar experience left a long shadow over German thinking
- 8:45about money. It is one of the reasons the
- 8:48modern Bundesbank and later the European Central Bank, treat
- 8:54price stability with such seriousness.
- 8:57Decades later, on a different continent, another currency
- 9:02would walk a similar path. Zimbabwe in the late 1990s had
- 9:09been one of the more productive economies in southern Africa,
- 9:13with a strong agricultural sector and a relatively stable
- 9:18currency. The Zimbabwean dollar,
- 9:22introduced at independence in 1980, had once traded at near
- 9:27parity with the US dollar. But around the year 2000,
- 9:33several pressures began to compound.
- 9:37A government land reform program disrupted commercial farming.
- 9:42Agricultural output fell sharply, foreign investment
- 9:47retreated, and tax revenues weakened.
- 9:52The state's expenses did not. To cover the widening gap, the
- 9:58Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe began to issue increasing amounts of
- 10:02new currency. Gideon Gono, who became governor
- 10:07in 2003, presided over this period.
- 10:11As output fell and money expanded, prices climbed.
- 10:16Inflation moved from high to alarming to almost
- 10:20incomprehensible. By 2007 and into 2008.
- 10:26The numbers entered a territory economists could no longer
- 10:30measure with precision because by the time figures were
- 10:34gathered, prices had already moved again.
- 10:38Independent estimates suggest that monthly inflation in
- 10:42Zimbabwe peaked around 79.6 billion percent in November
- 10:502008. To make sense of such a figure,
- 10:53imagine prices roughly doubling every 24 hours.
- 10:58The denominations on the banknotes climbed in step.
- 11:02The Reserve Bank issued $1,000,000 notes, then billion
- 11:07dollar notes. In January 2009, it issued a
- 11:12$100 trillion note. The figure on the paper was so
- 11:17large it almost looked like a typographical error.
- 11:21In practice, a single note bought less than a bus fare.
- 11:26Across Harare, the texture of daily life shifted, as it had in
- 11:32Berlin. Shop shelves emptied because
- 11:36importers could not predict prices.
- 11:40People queued for bread at dawn. Wages were spent immediately,
- 11:45often in the same hour they were received.
- 11:48Where the Weimar story had its wheelbarrows, the Zimbabwean
- 11:53story had its persistent shopkeepers updating prices
- 11:59several times a day and households turning to barter and
- 12:05to U.S. dollars passed hand to hand.
- 12:09In April 2009, the Zimbabwean dollar was effectively abandoned
- 12:15for everyday use. The country moved to a basket of
- 12:19foreign currencies, primarily the US dollar and the South
- 12:24African Rand. The official currency was not
- 12:27loudly buried. It simply faded out of use,
- 12:32replaced by quieter substitutes. Like the Weimar episode, the
- 12:37Zimbabwean experience was not caused by ordinary central bank
- 12:42policy. It emerged from collapsing
- 12:46productive capacity, lost institutional credibility and a
- 12:52state that found the printing press easier than the
- 12:55alternatives. These are extreme cases, the far
- 13:01end of a long spectrum, but they are useful to hold in mind
- 13:05tonight. Beneath every bank note, in
- 13:08every pocket, lies an institution, a promise, and a
- 13:14great deal of quiet trust. In our own century, that
- 13:18institution has a name we hear, often without thinking about it
- 13:23carefully, the central bank. For most of human history, the
- 13:30people who made money were rulers.
- 13:34Kings stamped their faces onto coins.
- 13:38Empires set the weight of silver in their denarii.
- 13:43The right to issue currency was bound to the right to govern,
- 13:49and the value of money to the trust placed in the sovereign
- 13:53behind it. That arrangement still echoes
- 13:56faintly in our own time. But the institution that issues
- 14:01money today is no longer a king. It is a central bank, a small,
- 14:08careful technical organization usually housed in a serious
- 14:12building run by economists and lawyers rather than monarchs.
- 14:19And although central banks are now woven into every advanced
- 14:24economy, they are surprisingly recent.
- 14:28The Federal Reserve, the central Bank of the United States, was
- 14:33founded in December 1913. That may sound like a long time
- 14:40ago, but it is younger than the automobile, younger than the
- 14:44airplane, younger than electricity in most American
- 14:49homes at the time. Before the Federal Reserve, the
- 14:54United States had passed through long stretches of banking
- 14:58instability with periodic panics in which depositors lost
- 15:04confidence in private banks and rushed to withdraw their
- 15:08savings. the Fed was created to provide a steady hand during
- 15:14such moments. The Bank of England is far
- 15:18older. Founded in 1694, originally to
- 15:22help finance government debt, it evolved across centuries into
- 15:27the model that many later central banks would borrow from.
- 15:31The Bank of Japan was founded in 1882.
- 15:35The German Bundesbank emerged in its modern form in 1957, deeply
- 15:42shaped by the Weimar memory. The European Central Bank, the
- 15:48youngest of the major institutions, was established in
- 15:521998 to manage the new euro. These institutions do many quiet
- 15:59things. They set short term interest
- 16:02rates, the cost of borrowing money in their respective
- 16:06economies. They serve as lenders of last
- 16:10resort to commercial banks during moments of stress.
- 16:15They oversee the soundness of the banking system.
- 16:19And, crucially, they have the power to create new money
- 16:24electronically, with the key strokes of authorized officials.
- 16:30This last power is the one that matters most for tonight's
- 16:36story. It is worth pausing on that idea
- 16:39because it can sound stranger than it is.
- 16:44When a central bank creates money, it does not typically run
- 16:49physical printing presses. Except for the small portion
- 16:53that circulates as paper and coin.
- 16:57Most modern money exists as digital entries in the accounts
- 17:03commercial banks hold at the central bank.
- 17:07When the central bank chooses to expand the money supply, it
- 17:11credit these accounts. The new money is real in every
- 17:16sense that matters. It can be lent out, spent and
- 17:21used to purchase assets. But it began as a decision
- 17:26recorded in a Ledger. That power is enormous, and
- 17:31central bankers have long known it.
- 17:35Through most of the 20th century, they used it with great
- 17:39caution. The story of how that caution
- 17:43slowly loosened is one of the quieter dramas of modern
- 17:48economic history, and it is where our journey turns next.
- 17:56To understand what central banks do today, it helps to know what
- 18:01they used to be constrained by. For most of the 20th century,
- 18:06the major currencies of the world were tethered to something
- 18:10physical. Most often, that something was
- 18:15gold. The idea was simple.
- 18:18In principle, a currency was worth a certain amount of gold,
- 18:22and that promise stood behind every bank note.
- 18:26If you held a dollar or a pound, you held a small claim on the
- 18:32gold reserves of the issuing country.
- 18:35This arrangement, called the gold standard, dominated
- 18:40international finance through the 19th century and the early
- 18:46decades of the 20th. The discipline it imposed was
- 18:50real. A country could not simply print
- 18:53more money than the gold in its vaults would justify, because
- 18:58doing so would invite a run on those reserves.
- 19:04If too many holders demanded to convert their notes into metal,
- 19:09the arrangement could break. Central banks under the gold
- 19:14standard were less the masters of money than its keepers.
- 19:20The system did not survive the First World War.
- 19:23Most combatant nations suspended gold convertibility in 1914 to
- 19:30finance the war by printing money and borrowing.
- 19:35Attempts to restore the old system after the war were
- 19:38uneven, and the Great Depression of the 1930s shattered what
- 19:43remained of it. By the end of the 1930's, the
- 19:48world's monetary order was in pieces.
- 19:52Then in July 1944, with the Second World War still under
- 19:58way, delegates from 44 nations gathered at a mountain resort in
- 20:04Bretton Woods, NH, over 3 weeks. They negotiated a new
- 20:10International Monetary system. The agreement tied the major
- 20:15currencies to the US dollar at fixed exchange rates and tied
- 20:20the dollar to gold at $35 per oz.
- 20:25The dollar became the anchor. Gold remained somewhere behind
- 20:31it. For nearly three decades, this
- 20:34arrangement held trade. Expanded.
- 20:37Currencies were predictable. The painful instabilities of the
- 20:421920s and 1930s seemed to have been laid to rest.
- 20:48But the system carried a quiet tension.
- 20:52The United States issued the dollars the rest of the world
- 20:56needed for trade, and as it did so, more dollars circulated
- 21:01abroad than there was gold in American vaults to redeem them.
- 21:05By the late 1960s, foreign governments and central banks
- 21:11were aware of this gap. Some, notably France, began
- 21:16converting their dollar reserves into gold, drawing down American
- 21:22holdings. Pressure mounted.
- 21:26On August 15th, 1971, President Richard Nixon appeared on
- 21:32American television and announced that the United States
- 21:37would no longer convert dollars into gold at the fixed rate.
- 21:42The link between the dollar and gold, already strained, was
- 21:48simply cut. It is hard to overstate how
- 21:51quietly enormous this moment was.
- 21:55From that evening forward, every major currency in the world was,
- 21:59in technical terms, Fiat. Its value rested not on metal in
- 22:05a vault, but on the credibility of the institution that issued
- 22:11it. The central bank had become the
- 22:15sole guardian of the value of money.
- 22:20The decade that followed the end of the gold link did not go
- 22:24smoothly. Freed from the discipline of
- 22:27metal, but inheriting a world of rising oil prices, labor
- 22:32tensions, and growing government spending, the major economies of
- 22:37the 1970s drifted into a strange new condition.
- 22:43Prices rose, Growth slowed. Unemployment climbed.
- 22:49Economists, who had long assumed that inflation and unemployment
- 22:54moved in opposite directions, found themselves facing both at
- 23:00once. They gave it a name that
- 23:03captured the discomfort of the period, stagflation.
- 23:07In the United States, consumer price inflation, which had
- 23:12hovered around 1 or 2% for most of the post war period, climbed
- 23:17past 5% in the early 1970s, then passed 10% by 1974, then settled
- 23:26uneasily before climbing again toward the end of the decade.
- 23:31The 1973 oil embargo, when Arab oil producing nations cut
- 23:37exports in response to Western support for Israel during the
- 23:41Yom Kippur War, quadrupled the price of crude almost overnight.
- 23:48A second oil shock followed in 1979 after the Iranian
- 23:53revolution. The cost of nearly everything
- 23:56that moved on wheels or warmed to home rose with it.
- 24:01Through these years, the Federal Reserve responded cautiously,
- 24:06raising interest rates at times but reluctant to push the
- 24:10economy into recession. The result was that inflation
- 24:15became embedded in expectations. Workers demanded higher wages
- 24:22because they expected higher prices.
- 24:26Businesses raised prices because they expected higher wages.
- 24:31The spiral fed itself. In August 1979, President Jimmy
- 24:37Carter appointed Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve.
- 24:44Volcker was a towering man, both literally and in reputation,
- 24:48known for his disciplined mind and willingness to make
- 24:52unpopular decisions. He took the position with a
- 24:56clear conviction inflation had to be broken, and the only tool
- 25:01that would break it was a sharp and sustained rise in interest
- 25:06rates. He moved quickly.
- 25:08By 1980 and into 1981, the Federal Reserve pushed its
- 25:14benchmark interest rate above 19%.
- 25:19Borrowing costs across the economy followed.
- 25:22Mortgages, business loans and consumer credit became
- 25:28punishingly expensive. The result was the deepest
- 25:32recession the United States had experienced since the 1930s.
- 25:37Unemployment rose past 10%. Farmers, builders, and small
- 25:43business owners suffered visibly.
- 25:47Volcker received death threats. Members of Congress called for
- 25:53his removal, but the strategy worked.
- 25:56By the mid 1980s, inflation had fallen to around 4% and
- 26:02continued downward. The painful medicine had broken
- 26:06the spiral, and the experience left a generation of central
- 26:11bankers with a deep conviction. Price stability, once lost, was
- 26:18extraordinarily costly to restore.
- 26:22Far better to protect it carefully year after year than
- 26:26to let it slip and face another Volcker recession.
- 26:31That conviction became the foundation of modern central
- 26:36banking. It would shape the next decades
- 26:39in ways no one quite anticipated.
- 26:43When Paul Volcker stepped down in August 1987, his successor
- 26:49inherited an institution that had recovered its credibility.
- 26:55Inflation was tamed, the economy was growing, and the Federal
- 27:01Reserve was widely regarded as one of the most respected
- 27:05institutions in American public life.
- 27:09The new chairman was Alan Greenspan, A quietly spoken
- 27:14economist with a long career in private consulting and a
- 27:18reputation for careful technocratic thinking.
- 27:23He would hold the position for more than 18 years.
- 27:28Greenspan's first Test came almost immediately on October
- 27:3419th, 1987, a date that would be remembered as Black Monday.
- 27:39The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 22% in a single trading
- 27:45day. Markets around the world
- 27:48followed. There was real fear of a
- 27:50cascading collapse, a repeat of 1929 and the new electronic age.
- 27:57The Federal Reserve, only weeks into Greenspan's tenure,
- 28:02responded with unusual speed. It issued A brief statement
- 28:07affirming its readiness to provide liquidity to the
- 28:10financial system, and it cut short term interest rates.
- 28:16The panic subsided. Within months, markets had
- 28:22stabilized. The lesson was noted carefully,
- 28:26not just by economists but by investors.
- 28:30The Federal Reserve, it seemed, would not stand passively while
- 28:35markets fell. It would act, and the experience
- 28:39of seeing it act decisively and successfully planted a quiet
- 28:45expectation that would grow. Over the years, the pattern
- 28:50repeated. In 1998, a large hedge fund
- 28:56called Long Term Capital Management, run partly by Nobel
- 29:01winning economists, ran into severe trouble after the Russian
- 29:06government defaulted on its debt.
- 29:09The fund's positions were so large and so interconnected with
- 29:14the major banks that its collapse threatened the broader
- 29:18system. The Federal Reserve coordinated
- 29:22a rescue and cut interest rates to calm the markets.
- 29:27Again, the strategy worked. Then came the.com crash of 2000
- 29:34and 2001. Technology stocks, which had
- 29:39soared through the late 1990s on optimism about the new Internet
- 29:44economy, fell sharply when many of those companies failed to
- 29:49generate profits. The broader stock market
- 29:54followed. The Federal Reserve, under
- 29:57Greenspan cut interest rates aggressively, from around 6 1/2%
- 30:03in 2000 to 1% by 2003. By this point, a phrase had
- 30:11entered the language of financial markets, the Greenspan
- 30:15put. The term came from the world of
- 30:19options trading, where a put option protects a holder against
- 30:25losses. The idea was that the Federal
- 30:28Reserve under Greenspan would reliably cut rates and ease
- 30:33conditions whenever markets fell significantly.
- 30:38Investors began to factor that expectation into their
- 30:42decisions. It was not a formal policy.
- 30:46Greenspan himself never described his approach in those
- 30:50terms. But the pattern had become
- 30:53recognizable. Each crisis was met with lower
- 30:57rates and more liquidity. Each time, the strategy seemed
- 31:03to work, and each time the implicit promise to markets grew
- 31:08a little stronger. Something subtle was happening
- 31:12through these years, though it was difficult to see while it
- 31:16was happening. With each successive crisis, the
- 31:20response of the world's major central banks grew a little
- 31:25larger. The rates cut a little deeper.
- 31:29The easing held in place a little longer.
- 31:33What had begun as emergency intervention slowly became
- 31:38expected practice. In 1987, the Federal Reserve had
- 31:44cut rates and provided liquidity for a few weeks before
- 31:48withdrawing the support. In 1998, the easing lasted
- 31:53longer and ran widerafterthe.com crash. the Fed kept its
- 31:58benchmark rate at 1% through 2003 and 2004, the lowest level
- 32:05in nearly half a century. Each step seemed reasonable in
- 32:11isolation. Each step was also a step
- 32:15further from the cautious posture of the Volcker years.
- 32:20Outside the United States, the pattern was visible, too.
- 32:24The European Central Bank, founded in 1998 to manage the
- 32:30new euro, was younger and more conservative by design, but it
- 32:36also cut rates significantlyduringthe.com
- 32:40aftermath, The Bank of England followed similar contours.
- 32:45The Bank of Japan, dealing with its own long slowed down
- 32:50following the collapse of its real estate and stock market
- 32:54bubbles in the early 1990s, had already cut its policy rate
- 32:59effectively to 0 by 1999. It was the first major central
- 33:06bank to discover what happens when rates run out of room to
- 33:11fall. A new orthodoxy was forming.
- 33:15Central banks could and should smooth the business cycle.
- 33:20They could lean against downturns with lower rates and
- 33:25looser conditions. They could prevent recessions
- 33:29from deepening into something worse.
- 33:32The painful boom and bust patterns of earlier eras, this
- 33:37thinking went, were not inevitable.
- 33:40They could be managed. There was a great deal of
- 33:44confidence in this view. By the mid 2000s, economists
- 33:49spoke of the Great Moderation, a period of unusually stable
- 33:54growth and low inflation across the advanced economies.
- 34:01Central bankers were widely praised.
- 34:05Greenspan was called the Maestro.
- 34:08Beneath that confidence, however, certain quieter
- 34:13dynamics were building. Low interest rates encouraged
- 34:18borrowing. They pushed investors to seek
- 34:21higher returns in riskier places.
- 34:25They lifted asset prices, particularly in housing.
- 34:30The American housing market climbed steadily through the
- 34:34early 2000s, supported by easy credit and by financial
- 34:39innovations that allowed mortgages to be bundled,
- 34:44repackaged and sold worldwide. For a time, this all seemed to
- 34:50be working. Homeowners felt wealthier.
- 34:54Banks reported strong profits. Mortgage lenders extended credit
- 35:00to borrowers who would have been turned away in earlier decades.
- 35:05But each layer of confidence rested on the layer beneath it.
- 35:10And beneath all of them quietly lay an assumption that house
- 35:15prices would continue to rise, that the central bank would
- 35:21continue to manage things smoothly, and that the system
- 35:26was stronger than it had ever been.
- 35:29None of those assumptions, however, would survive the
- 35:32events of 2007 and 2008. Let us slow our breath for a
- 35:40moment before stepping into what came next.
- 35:44The years we have travelled through were ones of confidence,
- 35:48of careful management, of an institution growing steadily
- 35:54more central to the world's economy.
- 35:57The crisis that arrived in 2008 did not come from nowhere.
- 36:01It came from the slow accumulation of small risks
- 36:06beneath that confidence, and from the discovery of how
- 36:10connected the system had become. The first cracks appeared in
- 36:152007. American homeowners with
- 36:18subprime mortgages, loans extended to borrowers with
- 36:23weaker credit, began to fall behind on their payments.
- 36:28House prices, which had risen for years, began to fall.
- 36:34The bundled mortgage securities sold around the world, often
- 36:38rated as safe by major credit agencies, began to lose value.
- 36:44Banks that held these securities or that had insured them faced
- 36:50unexpected losses through 2007 and into 2008.
- 36:55The strain intensified. The investment bank Bear
- 37:00Stearns, a name with more than 80 years of history, collapsed
- 37:05in March 2008 and was sold in a rushed deal to JP Morgan Chase
- 37:11with Federal Reserve support. The mortgage giants Fannie Mae
- 37:16and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship in September.
- 37:21The system trembled. Then on September 15th, 2008,
- 37:27the investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.
- 37:32It was one of the largest bankruptcies in history.
- 37:36Unlike Bear Stearns months earlier, Lehman was allowed to
- 37:41fail. The decision was debated then
- 37:44and is still debated now. What was undeniable was the
- 37:49effect. Within days, credit markets
- 37:52around the world froze. Banks stopped lending to one
- 37:56another. Money market funds treated as
- 37:59nearly as safe as cash faced, runs.
- 38:03The American International Group, an insurance giant,
- 38:08required an emergency loan from the Federal Reserve to avoid
- 38:13collapse. The financial architecture that
- 38:17quietly underpinned global trade was suddenly visible, and it was
- 38:22shaking. At the center of the response
- 38:24stood Ben Bernanke, who had succeeded Greenspan as chairman
- 38:30of the Federal Reserve in February 2006.
- 38:35Bernanke was a scholar of the Great Depression, a quietly
- 38:40spoken academic from Princeton who had spent his career
- 38:44studying exactly the kind of crisis now unfolding around him.
- 38:49His professional life had prepared him to recognize what
- 38:54was happening and to act quickly.
- 38:57The Federal Reserve cut interest rates aggressively.
- 39:02By December 2008, the benchmark rate had reached a range of 0 to
- 39:071/4 of 1%, effectively as low as conventional policy could go.
- 39:15Economists called this the 0 lower bound.
- 39:19Beyond it, the traditional tool of monetary policy could no
- 39:24longer be used. This was the moment when the old
- 39:29toolbox ran out. The Federal Reserve had cut
- 39:33rates as far as they could go. The crisis continued.
- 39:40Unemployment was rising. Banks were still fragile.
- 39:44Something else would have to be tried, and what came next would
- 39:49change the practice of central banking in America and across
- 39:54the developed world. What the Federal Reserve did
- 39:58next had been discussed in academic papers and tried by the
- 40:03Bank of Japan, but never at this scale by the American central
- 40:08bank. It was called quantitative
- 40:12easing. The name itself is gentle and
- 40:16technical, but the underlying action was significant.
- 40:20With interest rates at 0, the Federal Reserve began creating
- 40:25new money and using it to purchase assets directly from
- 40:31the financial system. The mechanics set out simply
- 40:36worked like this. The Federal Reserve creates new
- 40:40electronic money in its own accounts.
- 40:44It uses that money to buy government bonds and other
- 40:49securities from banks and financial institutions.
- 40:54The sellers receive freshly created money in their accounts
- 40:58at the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Reserve adds the
- 41:02purchase securities to its own balance sheet.
- 41:07The amount of money in the financial system grows.
- 41:10The supply of those assets in private hands shrinks.
- 41:16The hope was that this would lower long term interest rates,
- 41:21encourage lending, support asset prices, and nurse the economy
- 41:27back to health. The first round, later called QE
- 41:32One, began in November of 2008. The Federal Reserve committed to
- 41:39purchasing up to $600 billion in mortgage-backed securities.
- 41:46Over the following months, this expanded to include longer term
- 41:51government bonds. The numbers grew with each
- 41:54phase. QE 2 was announced in November
- 41:58of 2010 with another 600 billion in Treasury purchases.
- 42:05QE 3 began in September of 2012. Without a fixed end date, the
- 42:13Federal Reserve would simply continue buying assets each
- 42:17month until the labor market improved.
- 42:21The effect on the Federal Reserve's own balance sheet was
- 42:25striking. Before the crisis, the Fed had
- 42:30held roughly $900 billion in assets accumulated over decades
- 42:37of ordinary central banking. By the end of 2014, that figure
- 42:43had grown to over $4 trillion. The institution had expanded its
- 42:49balance sheet by more than four times what had taken nearly a
- 42:54century to build. This was not the printing of
- 42:58physical bank notes. No new currency was being
- 43:02trucked from a mint to flood the streets.
- 43:06The expansion happened almost entirely as digital entries in
- 43:12the accounts banks held at the Federal Reserve.
- 43:16But it was money creation in the truest sense.
- 43:19New financial assets had been called into existence by an act
- 43:25of central bank authority. There was a great deal of debate
- 43:28at the time about whether this would work and whether it was
- 43:32wise. Some economists warned that it
- 43:36would lead to runaway inflation. Others argued that without it,
- 43:41the recession would have deepened into something far
- 43:45worse, perhaps another Great Depression.
- 43:49The Federal Reserve under Bernanke leaned on the
- 43:54historical lesson he had studied for decades.
- 43:58The failure of central banks to act in the early 1930s, he
- 44:02believed, had turned a recession into catastrophe.
- 44:07He would not repeat that mistake.
- 44:10What began at the Federal Reserve did not stay at the
- 44:14Federal Reserve. Across the Atlantic and across
- 44:18the Pacific, other major central banks faced their own versions
- 44:23of the same problem. Their economies were stalling.
- 44:28Their interest rates were approaching 01 by 1.
- 44:34They reached for the new tools. The European Central Bank,
- 44:39headquartered in Frankfurt, faced a particularly delicate
- 44:44situation. The eurozone contained 19
- 44:49countries with shared currency but separate fiscal policies.
- 44:54After the 2008 crisis, a follow on sovereign debt crisis
- 45:00erupted, with Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy facing
- 45:05severe pressure on their government bonds.
- 45:10Investors began to question whether the eurozone itself
- 45:15could hold together. Some countries were shut out of
- 45:19borrowing markets. In July of 2012, the president
- 45:24of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, gave a short
- 45:29speech in London that has since become famous.
- 45:33He said the ECB would do, in his words, whatever it takes to
- 45:39preserve the euro. The phrase was carefully chosen.
- 45:44Markets understood immediately that the central bank was
- 45:48prepared to use its balance sheet on a scale not previously
- 45:53contemplated. Bond yields in stressed
- 45:57countries began to fall as soon as Draghi finished speaking.
- 46:02The ECB later followed through with its own large scale asset
- 46:08purchase programs beginning in 2015.
- 46:14By the late 20 tens, its balance sheet had grown several times
- 46:19over. The eurozone had become
- 46:22accustomed to extraordinary central bank support in Japan.
- 46:28The experience was in some ways the deepest.
- 46:33The Bank of Japan had been wrestling with low growth and
- 46:37low inflation since the early 1990s, when its asset price
- 46:43bubble had collapsed and left behind decades of slow recovery
- 46:49rates. There had been at or near 0 for
- 46:52years before the rest of the world joined them.
- 46:57I An April of 2013, under its newly appointed governor,
- 47:04Haruhiko Kuroda, the Bank of Japan launched what it called
- 47:10quantitative and qualitative monetary easing.
- 47:15The central bank committed to doubling the country's monetary
- 47:19base within two years, purchasing government bonds at
- 47:23an aggressive pace. Even the Bank of England, with
- 47:27its long history of monetary discipline, joined the new
- 47:32approach. Its first quantitative easing
- 47:36program began in March of 2009 and successive rounds followed.
- 47:43By the mid twenty 10's, the major central banks of the world
- 47:48were running similar experiments in parallel.
- 47:52The combined size of their balance sheets had grown into
- 47:56the 10s of trillions of dollars. Interest rates across the
- 48:01developed world were unusually low.
- 48:05In some places, including parts of Europe and Japan, short term
- 48:11rates fell below 0 into the strange territory of negative
- 48:17interest rates. Depositors were being charged to
- 48:21hold money in certain accounts. The world had entered an era of
- 48:26monetary policy unlike anything in its recorded history.
- 48:30Here is where the story takes an unexpected turn, and where it is
- 48:35worth slowing down for a moment to consider what happened.
- 48:40Common intuition and a great deal of older economic theory
- 48:45would have predicted one obvious outcome from all this monetary
- 48:50expansion. If central banks were creating
- 48:54trillions of dollars of new money, prices in the broader
- 48:58economy ought to rise. Goods should cost more.
- 49:03Wages should climb. Inflation, the textbooks
- 49:08suggested, would arrive in proportion to the printing.
- 49:12For more than a decade after 2008, it did not.
- 49:18Across the United States, the eurozone, Japan and the United
- 49:22Kingdom, consumer price inflation remained stubbornly
- 49:27low through the 20 tens. Central banks had set an
- 49:32inflation target of around 2 per cent, considered the level of
- 49:38mild healthy price growth for most of the decade.
- 49:43They undershot it. Some quarters saw inflation
- 49:47drift below 1 per cent. Japan flirted with outright
- 49:53deflation, the slow falling of prices that economists generally
- 49:59consider more dangerous than mild inflation.
- 50:04This was a puzzle economists discussed at length.
- 50:09The amount of new money created by central banks dwarfed any
- 50:13peacetime monetary expansion in modern history.
- 50:18By traditional measures, it ought to have produced visible
- 50:23inflation, perhaps even severe inflation.
- 50:27It did not. Some who had predicted runaway
- 50:31inflation in the early 20 tens were left year after year
- 50:36wondering when their forecasts would come true.
- 50:40There were partial explanations. The global financial system was
- 50:45deleveraging, with banks and households repaying old debts
- 50:49rather than taking on new ones, which absorbed some of the new
- 50:53liquidity. Globalization continued to pull
- 50:57manufactured goods prices downward as production moved to
- 51:02lower cost regions. Technological progress kept many
- 51:08prices flat or falling. Wages in advanced economies grew
- 51:14slowly, restrained by globalization and by quieter
- 51:19changes in labor markets. But there was another effect
- 51:23that ran through every advanced economy, even if it was less
- 51:29often discussed alongside consumer prices.
- 51:33Asset prices rose substantially. Stock markets reached new highs
- 51:39through the 20 tens. Government bonds rallied as
- 51:44their yields fell. House prices in major cities,
- 51:48particularly London, New York, Sydney and Toronto, climbed to
- 51:53levels that strained the budgets of ordinary working families.
- 51:59The wealth of those who owned assets grew.
- 52:03The position of those who did not stayed the same.
- 52:07This produced a strange decade. Economists could honestly report
- 52:13that inflation, measured through a basket of consumer goods,
- 52:18remained calm. Anyone trying to buy a home,
- 52:22however, or save toward retirement, or invest in the
- 52:26major asset classes, was living in a world where prices had
- 52:31risen substantially. There were, in effect, two
- 52:36stories about prices unfolding at the same time.
- 52:40Where the new money had gone was the question economists would
- 52:46spend years trying to answer. To understand why a decade of
- 52:51unprecedented money creation produced so little consumer
- 52:56price inflation, it helps to look more closely at how newly
- 53:02created central bank money actually moves through an
- 53:07economy. When a central bank purchases
- 53:10bonds from a commercial bank, the seller receives an
- 53:14electronic credit in its reserve account at the central bank.
- 53:20That reserve money is not the same as the money you spend in a
- 53:25shop. It sits inside the banking
- 53:28system used by banks to settle transactions with one another
- 53:34and to meet regulatory requirements.
- 53:39For the new money to reach the broader economy, commercial
- 53:43banks would need to lend it out and borrowers would need to
- 53:47spend it. Only then would it touch goods,
- 53:52services, wages and consumer prices.
- 53:56In the years after 2008, that final step was less complete
- 54:02than expected. Banks, recovering from the
- 54:07crisis and facing stricter new regulations, were cautious about
- 54:12lending. Households and businesses
- 54:16scarred by the recession were cautious about borrowing.
- 54:21Much of the new central bank money therefore stayed inside
- 54:25the financial system, held as bank reserves or used to bid up
- 54:31the prices of financial assets. There is a useful, if
- 54:35simplified, way to picture this. Imagine the financial system as
- 54:42an upper floor of a great house, with a broader economy on the
- 54:46floor below. Quantitative easing flooded
- 54:51water on to the upper floor. The water raised the level there
- 54:56substantially. Some of it eventually trickled
- 55:00down through the pipes into the floor below, but much of it
- 55:04remained where it had been poured.
- 55:07This helps explain the strange pattern of the 20 tens.
- 55:11Asset prices, which respond directly to the abundance of
- 55:16money in the financial system, rose sharply.
- 55:20Consumer prices, which respond more to wages and to supply and
- 55:26demand in the wider economy, rose only mildly.
- 55:31The link between money creation and inflation, once taught as
- 55:35nearly automatic, turned out to be more conditional than the
- 55:40older textbooks had suggested. It also helps explain why
- 55:45hyperinflation did not arrive. Weimar Germany and Zimbabwe had
- 55:52not simply printed money. They had printed money into
- 55:56economies whose productive capacity had collapsed and whose
- 56:01institutional credibility was broken.
- 56:05New money chased A shrinking supply of goods and prices ran
- 56:10wild. The post crisis advanced
- 56:13economies, by contrast, had functioning industries, working
- 56:18supply chains, deep institutional trust, and
- 56:22significant slack in their labor markets.
- 56:26New money entered a system that could absorb it.
- 56:30But this lesson came with a quieter warning.
- 56:35The conditions that allowed monetary expansion to coexist
- 56:40with stable consumer prices were not permanent.
- 56:45They depended on the broader economy continuing to function
- 56:49smoothly and on people continuing to trust the
- 56:52institutions that managed money. Both of those assumptions would
- 56:58be tested in the events of the early twenty 20's.
- 57:03The test arrived sooner than anyone expected.
- 57:07In the early months of 2020 a new virus moved across the world
- 57:14and within weeks the global economy was undergoing something
- 57:20it had never experienced quite this way before.
- 57:25Governments closed borders. Workplaces shuttered.
- 57:29Restaurants, theatres, airports and shops fell quiet.
- 57:35Demand for some things collapsed almost overnight, while demand
- 57:41for others, like home delivery and digital services, suddenly
- 57:46surged. For central banks, the speed of
- 57:50the shock left little time for measured deliberation.
- 57:56Within days of the worst of the early panic, the Federal Reserve
- 58:01cut interest rates back to near 0, where they had not been since
- 58:07the previous crisis. It announced new lending
- 58:11facilities, and it returned almost immediately to
- 58:16quantitative easing on a scale that surprised even those who
- 58:21had grown used to the tool. The numbers tell part of the
- 58:25story. In the spring of that year, the
- 58:30Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet by roughly $3
- 58:35trillion in a matter of months. By comparison, the entire first
- 58:41round of quantitative easing a decade earlier had been about
- 58:46600 billion. What had been an experimental
- 58:51measure was now being deployed almost casually, at speeds and
- 58:56sizes never previously contemplated.
- 58:59Other major central banks moved in the same direction at the
- 59:03same pace. The European Central Bank
- 59:07launched a new pandemic emergency purchase program.
- 59:12The Bank of England restarted its asset purchases.
- 59:17The Bank of Japan expanded its already enormous program.
- 59:23The combined response of the world's major central banks
- 59:27across that year exceeded the total monetary expansion of the
- 59:33previous decade. This was not central bank action
- 59:37alone. Governments around the world
- 59:40also acted with unusual speed, sending direct payments to
- 59:46households, supporting payrolls and propping up businesses that
- 59:52could not operate. The combined fiscal and monetary
- 59:57response was unprecedented in peacetime.
- 1:00:01There were good reasons for the urgency.
- 1:00:04Without rapid action, the sudden collapse in economic activity
- 1:00:09could have cascaded into widespread bankruptcies, mass
- 1:00:14unemployment and a financial crisis layered on top of the
- 1:00:20public health crisis. The painful memory of the
- 1:00:23previous decade was still fresh. Policy makers were determined
- 1:00:29not to let that happen again. For a time, the response
- 1:00:34appeared to work. Financial markets, which had
- 1:00:38fallen sharply in the early weeks of the shock, recovered
- 1:00:43quickly. Stock indexes returned to
- 1:00:47previous highs and then climbed beyond them.
- 1:00:51Household savings, supported by direct payments and reduced
- 1:00:56spending opportunities, grew during the early months of the
- 1:01:01pandemic. But beneath the calm financial
- 1:01:05surface, conditions were shifting in ways that would soon
- 1:01:10make themselves visible. The system that had absorbed
- 1:01:16monetary expansion so quietly during the 20 tens was no longer
- 1:01:21the same system it had been then.
- 1:01:24Slowly at 1st, and then unmistakably, something began to
- 1:01:30change. Through the second year of the
- 1:01:33pandemic, as economies reopened and people returned to spending,
- 1:01:38prices started to rise. At first, the increases were
- 1:01:43dismissed as temporary, the result of supply chain hiccups,
- 1:01:48shipping costs, the shortage of a few specific goods.
- 1:01:53Used cars climbed, lumber climbed, then groceries, then
- 1:02:00rents, then services. By the middle of the following
- 1:02:04year, the pattern was undeniable.
- 1:02:08Consumer price inflation in the United States crossed levels not
- 1:02:14seen in 4 decades, reaching a peak above 9% in the summer.
- 1:02:21The eurozone followed with inflation pushed further by an
- 1:02:26energy crisis as Russia's invasion of Ukraine disrupted
- 1:02:30gas supplies. The United Kingdom climbed past
- 1:02:3510%. Even Japan, which had spent
- 1:02:40decades trying to coax inflation back to its modest 2% target,
- 1:02:46began to see prices rise. Several forces were at work, and
- 1:02:51economists are still debating how to weigh them.
- 1:02:55Supply chains designed for the careful efficiency of previous
- 1:03:00decades had been disrupted in ways that took years to mend.
- 1:03:07Workers in many sectors had not returned to the labor market in
- 1:03:11the same numbers as before, leaving wages to climb and
- 1:03:16services and hospitality. Energy prices spiked.
- 1:03:23Shipping costs multiplied. The pile of household savings
- 1:03:28accumulated during the pandemic now poured into spending on
- 1:03:32goods that could not be supplied fast enough.
- 1:03:37But there was also the simpler explanation, the one Sum had
- 1:03:41been warning about for years. An enormous amount of new money
- 1:03:47had been created. Government stimulus had moved it
- 1:03:50directly into households. Consumer demand had surged.
- 1:03:56Productive capacity had not kept pace.
- 1:04:00The conditions that had quietly absorbed monetary expansion
- 1:04:04during the previous decade were no longer holding the new money
- 1:04:09inside the financial system. This time, the money had reached
- 1:04:14the broader economy, and the broader economy was beginning to
- 1:04:20rise. For ordinary people, the
- 1:04:24experience was vivid in a way inflation statistics rarely
- 1:04:29managed to convey. Grocery bills climbed visibly
- 1:04:34each month. Rents rose by amounts that left
- 1:04:38some tenants unable to renew their leases.
- 1:04:42Heating a home through a European winter became a serious
- 1:04:46financial decision. Wages also rose, but often more
- 1:04:51slowly than prices, leaving many families slightly worse off in
- 1:04:56real terms. There was nothing approaching
- 1:05:00the extreme cases we visited earlier in the night.
- 1:05:04The Weimar wheelbarrows and the Zimbabwean trillion dollar notes
- 1:05:10belong to a different category, a place where institutional
- 1:05:16trust has collapsed and the printing press is the only
- 1:05:21remaining tool. The advanced economies of the
- 1:05:24early twenty 20s remained far from that territory, but for the
- 1:05:30first time in a generation, the abstract idea of inflation had
- 1:05:35become a daily reality across much of the developed world, and
- 1:05:42central banks faced a question they had not faced in decades.
- 1:05:48For nearly 15 years, central bankers had been engaged
- 1:05:52primarily in supporting fragile economies, lowering rates,
- 1:05:57expanding balance sheets and providing reassurance to nervous
- 1:06:03markets. The instinctive direction of
- 1:06:06policy had been ease and more ease.
- 1:06:11Now, suddenly, the direction had to reverse.
- 1:06:15The Federal Reserve, under its chair, Jerome Powell, began the
- 1:06:21turn in early spring. For a few months, officials
- 1:06:27hesitated, hoping the surge in prices might prove transitory.
- 1:06:33By the time it became clear that inflation was settling in rather
- 1:06:37than passing through, the central bank had to move
- 1:06:40quickly. Interest rates, held near 0 for
- 1:06:45two full years, began to climb. The pace was the fastest in four
- 1:06:52decades. Within about 18 months, the
- 1:06:56benchmark rate rose from near 0 to above 5 per cent.
- 1:07:02The European Central Bank followed, raising rates for the
- 1:07:06first time in more than a decade and continuing to raise them
- 1:07:11through successive meetings. The Bank of England moved in
- 1:07:16parallel. Even the Bank of Japan, the most
- 1:07:21reluctant of the major central banks, eventually began to step
- 1:07:25away from its long experiment in negative rates around the world.
- 1:07:32The cost of borrowing rose. Mortgages became more expensive.
- 1:07:39Business loans tightened. The cheap money of the previous
- 1:07:44decade became once again costly money.
- 1:07:47The mood inside central banks shifted along with the policy.
- 1:07:52Speeches began to invoke the memory of Volcker.
- 1:07:56Officials emphasized that they would do what was necessary,
- 1:07:59even at the cost of slowing their economies, to bring
- 1:08:04inflation back toward target credibility.
- 1:08:08The quiet assets central banks had spent decades building was
- 1:08:13once again at stake. The memory of the 1970s of
- 1:08:20inflation, embedded in expectations and spirals fed by
- 1:08:26hesitation, was a memory they all carried.
- 1:08:30For households and businesses, the reversal was felt as a
- 1:08:35different kind of pressure. House prices in some major
- 1:08:40cities, which had been carried higher by years of low rates,
- 1:08:45began to soften. Mortgage payments for those on
- 1:08:49variable rates climbed sharply. Small businesses that had taken
- 1:08:55on debt during the cheap money years found their interest costs
- 1:09:00rising. The financial markets,
- 1:09:04accustomed to gentle and steady accommodation, experienced
- 1:09:08periods of unusual stress. A handful of regional banks in
- 1:09:14the United States failed in the spring of 2023, partly because
- 1:09:20their long dated bond holdings had lost value as rates rose.
- 1:09:25Yet gradually the strategy began to bite.
- 1:09:30Inflation in the United States came down from its peak towards
- 1:09:35something closer to 3%. The eurozone and the United
- 1:09:40Kingdom followed similar paths, though more slowly.
- 1:09:45By the middle of the decade, central bankers were beginning
- 1:09:49to cautiously cut rates again, no longer fighting an emergency
- 1:09:55but trying to navigate a slower, more delicate adjustment.
- 1:09:59The Volcker memory had not faded.
- 1:10:03It had quietly done its work again.
- 1:10:08Let us take a quiet moment now to look back across the journey
- 1:10:13we have taken and ask a question that has been gathering beneath
- 1:10:18the surface of the story all along.
- 1:10:21Why, across more than 3 decades, have central banks leaned more
- 1:10:26and more heavily on monetary easing?
- 1:10:30Why has each crisis met a larger response than the one before?
- 1:10:36Why have the tools, once reserved for moments of true
- 1:10:41emergency become familiar instruments, deployed almost
- 1:10:46reflexively when economies stumble?
- 1:10:49There is no single answer, but there are several quieter forces
- 1:10:54that have shaped the pattern. The 1st is the genuine fear of
- 1:11:00repeating the 1930's. The Great Depression cast a long
- 1:11:05shadow over 20th century economic thought.
- 1:11:10The failure of central banks to act decisively in those years
- 1:11:15the bank runs, the deflation, the mass unemployment, the
- 1:11:20descent into political chaos that followed became the
- 1:11:24cautionary tale every modern central banker carries inside
- 1:11:29them. When a crisis arrives, the
- 1:11:32instinct is to act quickly and on a scale large enough to make
- 1:11:37sure history does not repeat. The second is the difficulty of
- 1:11:43fiscal action in modern democracies.
- 1:11:47In an earlier age, governments might have responded to
- 1:11:51recessions by spending public money directly through
- 1:11:56infrastructure programs or direct hiring.
- 1:11:59But political polarization, concerns about public debt, and
- 1:12:05the slower pace of legislatures have made fiscal responses
- 1:12:10harder to assemble, especially quickly.
- 1:12:14Central banks, by contrast, can act within hours.
- 1:12:20Monetary policy has filled a space that fiscal policy might
- 1:12:25have occupied. The third is the simple
- 1:12:28mathematics of low rates. Once interest rates approach 0,
- 1:12:34the traditional tool of rate cuts runs out of room.
- 1:12:39To do more, central banks must reach for less conventional
- 1:12:43instruments like quantitative easing or new lending programs.
- 1:12:49Each crisis that begins with rates already low tends to
- 1:12:53require a larger and more creative response than the one
- 1:12:58before, because the conventional move is already exhausted.
- 1:13:04The 4th is harder to name, but no less real.
- 1:13:09Each rescue, by softening one painful adjustment, tends to
- 1:13:14leave the system slightly more leveraged, slightly more
- 1:13:19dependent on cheap money, slightly more fragile in the
- 1:13:23face of the next shock. When the next shock arrives, the
- 1:13:28response must be larger, because the system has grown larger and
- 1:13:34more sensitive to the conditions the previous rescue helped
- 1:13:38create. The cycle is not vicious,
- 1:13:42exactly, but it does grow. None of this is the product of
- 1:13:48any single decision or any single person's failure.
- 1:13:54It is the slow accumulation of reasonable choices made under
- 1:13:59pressure, each one defensible in its moment, each one quietly
- 1:14:05raising the cost of the next. This is the world we live in, a
- 1:14:11world held steady by a careful institution doing important work
- 1:14:16with imperfect tools, in a system that has grown stranger
- 1:14:22and more dependent on its judgments with each passing
- 1:14:27decade. It is worth returning briefly to
- 1:14:31the two stories we visited at the beginning of our journey.
- 1:14:36The Weimar wheelbarrows, the Zimbabwean trillion dollar
- 1:14:41notes. These are the images that come
- 1:14:45most easily to mind when people speak of money losing its value,
- 1:14:51and they shape the way many of us instinctively think about
- 1:14:55printing money. If you create enough of it, the
- 1:14:59intuition runs, prices will eventually explode.
- 1:15:05But the story we have walked through tonight suggests a more
- 1:15:09careful picture. Hyperinflation, the kind that
- 1:15:14turns a loaf of bread into a billion mark transaction, is not
- 1:15:19the natural end point of monetary expansion.
- 1:15:23It is a specific and rare outcome that requires several
- 1:15:29conditions to come together at once.
- 1:15:32The first condition is the collapse of productive capacity.
- 1:15:37In Weimar Germany, the rural occupation had paralyzed the
- 1:15:42country's industrial heartland and the wider economy was
- 1:15:46already weakened by the war and by reparations.
- 1:15:51In Zimbabwe, the agricultural sector that had once fed the
- 1:15:56country had been disrupted and the wider economy was
- 1:16:01contracting sharply. New money cannot drive prices to
- 1:16:06extreme levels on its own. It needs a shortage of goods to
- 1:16:11chase. When the economy can still
- 1:16:14produce, new money is absorbed by expanding output.
- 1:16:19When it cannot, the same money piles onto a shrinking pile of
- 1:16:24bread, fuel and basic necessities.
- 1:16:29The second condition is the loss of institutional credibility.
- 1:16:35In both Weimar and Zimbabwe, the central bank was not seen as an
- 1:16:40independent guardian of money. It was seen, accurately, as an
- 1:16:46instrument of a struggling government trying to finance its
- 1:16:50commitments through the printing press.
- 1:16:53Once that perception sets in, no quantity of newly issued
- 1:16:59currency can hold its value because the public no longer
- 1:17:04believes anyone is in charge of restraining it.
- 1:17:08The third condition is the absence of alternatives.
- 1:17:13In a modern advanced economy, people who lose faith in their
- 1:17:18currency can shift their savings into other assets.
- 1:17:23They can hold dollars, EUR, gold or property.
- 1:17:28But the institutions and laws underpinning the currency itself
- 1:17:33remained stable. In Weimar and Zimbabwe, the
- 1:17:37choices were starker and the entire monetary system was under
- 1:17:42strain. Modern advanced economies have
- 1:17:46not been close to these conditions.
- 1:17:49Even during the most aggressive periods of monetary expansion,
- 1:17:53their industries function. Their supply chains, though
- 1:17:58sometimes strained, still operate.
- 1:18:02Their central banks remain widely trusted.
- 1:18:05Their citizens still keep most of their savings in their
- 1:18:09domestic currency. The institutional foundations
- 1:18:13are intact. This does not mean the
- 1:18:16foundations are eternal, only that they have not yet been
- 1:18:20seriously threatened. The painful lesson of the Weimar
- 1:18:26and Zimbabwean stories is not that printing money inevitably
- 1:18:32leads to ruin. It is that the conditions for
- 1:18:36genuine monetary collapse are specific, and that institutions,
- 1:18:41once broken, are extraordinarily costly to rebuild.
- 1:18:46If you spend long enough thinking about money, you
- 1:18:51eventually arrive at a strange realization.
- 1:18:56The thing itself is almost nothing.
- 1:19:01A bank note is paper and ink. A coin is metal, a digital
- 1:19:10balance is an entry in a database.
- 1:19:15And yet these almost nothing things organize the lives of
- 1:19:19billions of people govern who eats and who does not, who
- 1:19:24travels and who stays, who is housed and who is not.
- 1:19:32The whole great machinery of modern life rests on something
- 1:19:37we have agreed to believe in together.
- 1:19:41This is what gives money its peculiar character.
- 1:19:46It is not quite a physical thing and not quite an idea.
- 1:19:51It is a social contract made and remade every day by everyone who
- 1:19:57accepts it, holds it, spends it, and saves it.
- 1:20:03The contract works because almost everyone participates in
- 1:20:08it almost all the time. When the contract weakens, the
- 1:20:14whole arrangement begins to tremble when it breaks.
- 1:20:18The wheelbarrows appear. The history we have travelled
- 1:20:23tonight reveals this character from many angles.
- 1:20:28The gold standard was an attempt to bind money to something
- 1:20:34tangible in the hope that physical metal could anchor
- 1:20:39belief. Bretton Woods carried that hope
- 1:20:44forward in modified form. The end of dollar convertibility
- 1:20:50in 1971 cut the last formal tether.
- 1:20:55And yet money continued to function because the trust that
- 1:21:00had once rested in metal now rested in institutions.
- 1:21:07The Volcker years showed that this institutional trust, once
- 1:21:12damaged by inflation, could be rebuilt only at great cost.
- 1:21:18The decade of quiet quantitative easing showed that even
- 1:21:24unprecedented monetary expansion could coexist with stable prices
- 1:21:32so long as the trust held. There is a long human history of
- 1:21:38improvising money when official currencies fail.
- 1:21:43In prisoner of war camps during the Second World War, cigarettes
- 1:21:48became currency traded for food, services and small comforts.
- 1:21:57In post war Germany, before the new currency was introduced,
- 1:22:02American cigarettes again served as a medium of exchange.
- 1:22:08In modern crises across Africa and Latin America, mobile phone
- 1:22:14airtime minutes have been traded as money passed between
- 1:22:20strangers as carefully as bank notes.
- 1:22:24The instinct to create a shared medium of exchange seems to be
- 1:22:31very deep in US. When the official channels fail,
- 1:22:36we improvised new ones. What this suggests is that money
- 1:22:42is at root less about paper or metal or digital ledgers than
- 1:22:48about a particular kind of human cooperation.
- 1:22:53We agreed to accept these tokens because we trust that others
- 1:22:59will too. The institution behind the
- 1:23:02currency simply formalizes that trust, gives it rules, and tries
- 1:23:10to protect it from the pressures that might erode it.
- 1:23:15To understand modern central banking is to understand that
- 1:23:19the institution is not, in the end, managing paper or numbers.
- 1:23:27It is managing belief, and belief, once well established,
- 1:23:34is one of the most durable things in human life.
- 1:23:39When it falters, however, it can falter quickly.
- 1:23:46And now the night has grown deeper, and the story can slow.
- 1:23:52We began with the strangeness of money itself.
- 1:23:57Paper, metal, digital entries held in pockets and accounts and
- 1:24:03wallets doing their quiet work across billions of lives.
- 1:24:09We travelled through the wheelbarrows of Berlin, the
- 1:24:14trillion dollar notes of Harare, and arrived at the careful
- 1:24:19institutions of our own century, with their committees and
- 1:24:24balance sheets and the keystrokes that bring new money
- 1:24:30into being. We watched central banks lean
- 1:24:34further into the printing press with each crisis, and saw how
- 1:24:39their intervention slowly grew larger, more frequent and more
- 1:24:47essential. We watched, too, how the system
- 1:24:51absorbed an extraordinary expansion of money for more than
- 1:24:57a decade before quietly beginning to feel its weight.
- 1:25:02Through all of it, the deeper truth has stayed the same.
- 1:25:08Money is a shared agreement held together by institutions and by
- 1:25:16trust. It works because we believe it
- 1:25:21works, and because the people around us believe the same.
- 1:25:28The central bank is the institution that watches over
- 1:25:34that belief, doing its difficult work in quiet rooms, often
- 1:25:41unnoticed, sometimes criticized, occasionally celebrated.
- 1:25:49It is not perfect. The tools it carries are
- 1:25:54imperfect. The world it manages is more
- 1:25:58complicated than its models can fully capture.
- 1:26:03But it is what stands between ordinary life and the kind of
- 1:26:09crisis we've visited in the early hours of this journey.
- 1:26:14Perhaps that is the feeling to keep tonight.
- 1:26:19Not the dates, not the technical names, not the precise figures,
- 1:26:25but the mood of it, the sense that the steady coin in your
- 1:26:30pocket, the steady price on the menu, the steady number in your
- 1:26:36account, is the product of a long chain of human effort and
- 1:26:42human trust. The chain runs from ancient
- 1:26:47marketplaces, through Royal Mints, from the gold standard,
- 1:26:53through Bretton Woods, from the Volcker recession, through the
- 1:26:58quiet decade of low rates and all the way to the careful
- 1:27:04committees meeting today in Washington, Frankfurt and Tokyo.
- 1:27:11Most of the time the chain holds now and then, in particular
- 1:27:19places and times. It breaks, and people pay a
- 1:27:25terrible price for the breaking. The world we live in tonight is
- 1:27:30not Weimar. It is not Zimbabwe.
- 1:27:35Its institutions remain trusted. Its currencies remain accepted.
- 1:27:43Its central banks remain at their posts, doing their quiet
- 1:27:49work. The challenges of the coming
- 1:27:52decades will be real. The temptation to lean on
- 1:27:57monetary expansion in the next crisis will be real.
- 1:28:03The questions of how much money is too much and which conditions
- 1:28:09might one day shift the answer will continue to occupy serious
- 1:28:15mines. But none of that needs solving
- 1:28:19tonight. You do not need to predict the
- 1:28:22next crisis or trace the next reversal.
- 1:28:26You only need to rest knowing that beneath the calm of the
- 1:28:32night, vast institutions hum on balancing risks and stabilizing
- 1:28:41prices, keeping the quiet machinery of money in motion.
- 1:28:47While you sleep, the world slows, and so do we.
- 1:28:53Good night.