Latest / Beyond The Horizon / Murder In Moscow: Judge Hippler's Order On Bryan Kohberger's Capital Punishment Motions (Part 1)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the program. Over
- 0:03Speaker 1: the past few days, we've been talking about Brian Colberger
- 0:07Speaker 1: a little bit, and we've been going over some of
- 0:09Speaker 1: the motions that his teammate to try and get the
- 0:12Speaker 1: death penalty removed. Well, in this episode, we're going to
- 0:16Speaker 1: begin taking a look at the memorandum decision and order
- 0:20Speaker 1: on the death penalty motions filed by the judge. So
- 0:24Speaker 1: let's dive into this memorandum decision and see what Judge
- 0:28Speaker 1: Hippler had to say. Case number CR zero one DASH
- 0:33Speaker 1: twenty four DASH three one sixty sixty five State of
- 0:36Speaker 1: Idaho Plaintiff first Brian C. Coberger, the defendant introduction. Defendant
- 0:43Speaker 1: is charged with one count of burglary and four accounts
- 0:46Speaker 1: of murder in the first degree in connection with the
- 0:48Speaker 1: deaths of four University of Idaho students. The state has
- 0:52Speaker 1: filed a notice of intent to seek death penalty pursuant
- 0:55Speaker 1: to Idaho Code Section eighteen for zero zero four afore
- 1:00Speaker 1: or the Court are twelve motions filed by defendant challenging
- 1:03Speaker 1: various aspects of Idaho's capital punishment scheme, collectively death penalty motions.
- 1:09Speaker 1: A hearing on the motions was held on November seventh,
- 1:11Speaker 1: twenty twenty four, following which the Court took matters under advisement.
- 1:16Speaker 1: The Court concludes relief and defendants favor is not warranted
- 1:20Speaker 1: on any of the motions two standards. The constitutionality of
- 1:25Speaker 1: Idaho's capital punishment scheme is a question of law State
- 1:29Speaker 1: versus Abdullah, one fifty eight, Idaho three eighty six four
- 1:32Speaker 1: to fifty, twenty fifteen. When a party challenges a statute
- 1:36Speaker 1: on constitutional grounds that bears the burden of establishing that
- 1:40Speaker 1: the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption
- 1:44Speaker 1: of validity State versus Manzaners, one fifty two Idaho four
- 1:48Speaker 1: ten four eighteen, twenty twelve. Further, when considering these challenges,
- 1:53Speaker 1: courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute
- 1:57Speaker 1: that upholds its constitutionality. The interpretation of a treaty is
- 2:02Speaker 1: a question of law, as are matters of statutory interpretation
- 2:05Speaker 1: Pocatello versus State, two thousand and eight, State versus Hall,
- 2:10Speaker 1: twenty eighteen. Whether there is an infringement on a defendant's right.
- 2:14Speaker 1: The speedy trial presents a mixed question of law. In fact,
- 2:17Speaker 1: State versus Clark one thirty five, Idaho, two thousand. A
- 2:21Speaker 1: review in court will defer to a trial court's findings
- 2:24Speaker 1: of fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence, and
- 2:28Speaker 1: will exercise free review of the trial court's conclusions of law.
- 2:33Speaker 1: A motion to trifur kate capital proceedings is a matter
- 2:36Speaker 1: of discretion United States versus Bolden A Circuit, two thousand
- 2:40Speaker 1: and eight. See also Armand versus Opportunity Management Company, one
- 2:46Speaker 1: fifty five, Idaho, twenty thirteen. Whether to order separate trials
- 2:50Speaker 1: for any claims or issues is discretionary. Consequently, a trial
- 2:55Speaker 1: court must one correctly perceive the issues as one of discretion,
- 2:59Speaker 1: two act within the outer boundaries of its discretion, three
- 3:04Speaker 1: act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
- 3:07Speaker 1: choices available to it, and four reach its decision by
- 3:11Speaker 1: the exercise of reason. State versus Gueta, one sixty nine, Idaho,
- 3:17Speaker 1: twenty twenty one. Three analysis a motion to strike State's
- 3:23Speaker 1: notice on grounds of arbitrariness. Defendant moves to strike the
- 3:26Speaker 1: State's notice on grounds at Idaho's capital sentencing scheme fails
- 3:30Speaker 1: to narrow the class of first degree murders who are
- 3:33Speaker 1: death eligible defendants, thus permitting an arbitrary and capricious selection
- 3:38Speaker 1: of defendants for death. He further argues Idaho's scheme is
- 3:41Speaker 1: unconstitutional due to geographic disparities as to who is selected
- 3:46Speaker 1: for the death penalty. These infirmities, according to Defendant, violate
- 3:50Speaker 1: his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment his
- 3:54Speaker 1: Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. The
- 3:58Speaker 1: Idaho constitutionis corollary provisions, as well as the right to
- 4:02Speaker 1: uniformity of justice provided by Article five, Section two, and
- 4:06Speaker 1: twenty six of the Idaho Constitution. In support of his argument,
- 4:11Speaker 1: Defendant relies in large part on a study conducted and
- 4:14Speaker 1: published in a law review article by Professor Eliza Cover
- 4:19Speaker 1: of the University of Idaho College of Law. In response,
- 4:23Speaker 1: the state contends that both arguments are foreclosed by binding precedent.
- 4:27Speaker 1: If further argues that Professor Covers article should be afforded
- 4:30Speaker 1: little if any weight, given foundational issues and lack of
- 4:34Speaker 1: relevance one constitutional requirements of a capital punishment scheme. In
- 4:40Speaker 1: imposing capital punishment, Idaho has a constitutional responsibility under the
- 4:44Speaker 1: eighth and fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution to tailor
- 4:48Speaker 1: and apply its law in a manner that avoids the
- 4:51Speaker 1: arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty Godfrey versus Georgia,
- 4:56Speaker 1: nineteen eighty. To accomplish this, Idaho's capital sentencing scheme must
- 5:00Speaker 1: provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
- 5:04Speaker 1: which the penalty is imposed from the many cases in
- 5:08Speaker 1: which it is not, quoting greg versus Georgia four twenty
- 5:12Speaker 1: eight US nineteen seventy six. Constitutional review of a state's
- 5:17Speaker 1: capital punishment scheme addresses two separate aspects of the decision
- 5:20Speaker 1: making process, the eligibility decision and the selection decision Talapia
- 5:26Speaker 1: versus California, five twelve, nineteen ninety four. States must comply
- 5:30Speaker 1: with the requirements of both for their respective schemes to
- 5:33Speaker 1: be constitutional. Kansas versus Marsh five forty eight, two thousand
- 5:38Speaker 1: and six a eligibility standards. The eligibility decision imposes a
- 5:44Speaker 1: narrowing requirement on a state capital scheme. To pass constitutional muster,
- 5:49Speaker 1: a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of
- 5:52Speaker 1: persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify
- 5:56Speaker 1: the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
- 6:00Speaker 1: compared to others found guilty of murder low in Fiel
- 6:04Speaker 1: verse Phelps for eighty four US nineteen eighty eight, quoting
- 6:08Speaker 1: xand verse Stevens for sixty two, nineteen eighty three. State
- 6:12Speaker 1: legislatures can satisfy the narrowing function in one of two ways,
- 6:17Speaker 1: one by narrowing the definition of capital offense, or two
- 6:21Speaker 1: by more broadly defining capital offenses and providing for narrowing
- 6:25Speaker 1: by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase
- 6:30Speaker 1: Idea two forty six see Zanut for sixty two. Statutory
- 6:35Speaker 1: aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage
- 6:40Speaker 1: of legislative definition. They circumscribe the class of persons eligible
- 6:44Speaker 1: for the death penalty. For states that have attempted to
- 6:47Speaker 1: satisfy the narrowing requirement through the enactment of statutory aggravators,
- 6:52Speaker 1: the United States Supreme Court requires the Trier effect must
- 6:56Speaker 1: convict the defendant of murder and find one aggravating circumstance
- 7:00Speaker 1: or its equivalent at either the guilt or penalty phase.
- 7:04Speaker 1: The aggravating circumstance must meet two requirements. First, the circumstance
- 7:08Speaker 1: may not apply to every defendant convicted of murder. It
- 7:11Speaker 1: must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder. Second,
- 7:16Speaker 1: the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague Tilapia five twelve,
- 7:22Speaker 1: US at nine seventy two. That said, if a particular
- 7:26Speaker 1: statutory aggravator is vague, state courts are permitted to further
- 7:29Speaker 1: define the aggravator through a limiting construction so as to
- 7:33Speaker 1: allow the state to meet its constitutional obligation to provide
- 7:36Speaker 1: some guidance to the sentencer and avoid the arbitrary and
- 7:40Speaker 1: capricious infliction of death a Ravi versus Creach, five oh
- 7:43Speaker 1: seven US four sixty three, four seventy three, nineteen ninety three,
- 7:48Speaker 1: quoting Walton versus Arizona, four ninety seven, nineteen ninety B.
- 7:54Speaker 1: Selection standards. The selection decision aspect of capital sentencing determines
- 7:59Speaker 1: whether a death eligible defendant should actually receive the death
- 8:03Speaker 1: penalty Tilapia, five point twelve that nine seventy two. This
- 8:08Speaker 1: phase requires individualized sentencing and must be expansive enough to
- 8:13Speaker 1: accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to assure the assessment
- 8:18Speaker 1: of the defendant's culpability. What is important at the selection
- 8:22Speaker 1: stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the
- 8:25Speaker 1: character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.
- 8:29Speaker 1: That requirement is met when a jury can consider relevant
- 8:32Speaker 1: mitigating evidence of the character and record of the defendant
- 8:36Speaker 1: and circumstances of the crime. Two. Idaho Supreme Court is
- 8:42Speaker 1: found Idaho's capital scheme to be constitutionally narrow. Idaho has
- 8:47Speaker 1: opted to satisfy the constitutionality imposed eligibility requirements through the
- 8:51Speaker 1: adoption of statutory aggravators in addition to statutorily carving out
- 8:56Speaker 1: a class of murders ie first degree, to which the
- 8:59Speaker 1: death penalty team may apply. Under Idaho law, first degree
- 9:03Speaker 1: murder is a potential capital crime if such person killed,
- 9:07Speaker 1: intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life,
- 9:11Speaker 1: irrespective of whether such person directly committed the acts that
- 9:15Speaker 1: cause death. IC nineteen dashed two five one five. If
- 9:20Speaker 1: an individual falls into this category, at least one of
- 9:23Speaker 1: the eleven statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances, several of which are
- 9:28Speaker 1: subject to limiting constructions, must be found beyond a reasonable
- 9:32Speaker 1: doubt for the individual to be death eligible id at
- 9:36Speaker 1: Section nineteen two five one five at nine. Defendant contends
- 9:41Speaker 1: Idaho's scheme has so many aggravating circumstances so broadly construed
- 9:46Speaker 1: that the aggravator is accomplished no narrowing and create a
- 9:49Speaker 1: greater risk of arbitrary death sentences. However, the Idaho Supreme
- 9:54Speaker 1: Court is determined that Idaho's approach accomplishes the narrowing function
- 9:58Speaker 1: in the eligibility phase is required by the US Constitution.
- 10:03Speaker 1: Hall one sixty three, Idaho. At. Seven, eighty eight, citing
- 10:07Speaker 1: State verse would one thirty two Idaho. Eighty eight, one
- 10:10Speaker 1: oh two nine sixty seven, p. Two d seven oh two,
- 10:14Speaker 1: nineteen ninety six, Noting that while a particular aggravator may
- 10:19Speaker 1: apply to many murders, the court concluded no one aggravator
- 10:22Speaker 1: applies to every first degree murder, which is all the
- 10:25Speaker 1: narrowing required by Tilapia. Consequently, defendants argument is foreclosed by Hall. Moreover,
- 10:32Speaker 1: in challenging Idaho's scheme, Defendant and properly focuses on the
- 10:36Speaker 1: statutory aggravating factors in the aggregate rather than individuality. This
- 10:43Speaker 1: approach was rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in state
- 10:46Speaker 1: versus Harriston, one thirty three Idaho, nineteen ninety nine. They're
- 10:51Speaker 1: The defendant argued that the combination of all statutory aggravators
- 10:54Speaker 1: applied equally to all first degree murder defendants, and therefore
- 10:58Speaker 1: did not provide a meaningful distinction between those deserving of
- 11:02Speaker 1: the death penalty and those who were not. Id At
- 11:05Speaker 1: Fible eight p. Dot two d At eleven eighty two,
- 11:10Speaker 1: the Court found no legal basis for considering the aggregate
- 11:13Speaker 1: effect of Idahose aggravators, noting that each aggravator must be
- 11:17Speaker 1: considered individually, citing a Ravi five h seven US at
- 11:21Speaker 1: four seventy. Narrowing in the eligibility phase of capital proceedings
- 11:26Speaker 1: focuses on whether the sentencer is required to find at
- 11:29Speaker 1: least one aggravating fact beyond the murder itself. Because the
- 11:34Speaker 1: defendant felt to challenge any one particular aggravating circumstance, the
- 11:38Speaker 1: court refuses to find Idaho's capital scheme arbitrary and capricious.
- 11:45Speaker 1: Defendant contends, however, that Harriston did not reach the question
- 11:48Speaker 1: of whether Idaho's statutory scheme as the whole failed the
- 11:51Speaker 1: narrowing function. Rather, he contends the Court's ruling was on
- 11:55Speaker 1: whether a court could still determine who deserved death, not
- 11:59Speaker 1: on whether the statle jigatory structure had failed the narrowing function.
- 12:04Speaker 1: Defendant points out that at the time of Hairston, judges,
- 12:08Speaker 1: not juries, could still determine whether to impose the death penalty. Thus,
- 12:12Speaker 1: defendant posits that whether idahosts statutory scheme as a whole
- 12:16Speaker 1: has provided sufficient narrowing to prevent juries from arbitrarily imposing
- 12:21Speaker 1: death is a matter of first impression. Defendant's attempt to
- 12:25Speaker 1: distinguish Hairston is misplaced. The court squarely held that there
- 12:28Speaker 1: was no basis to consider whether the aggravators collectively performed
- 12:32Speaker 1: the narrowing Rather, the relevant question was whether the applicable
- 12:36Speaker 1: aggravator individually performed the narrowing idea at fibleweight p Dot
- 12:41Speaker 1: two d at eleven eighty two. Defendant has provided no
- 12:45Speaker 1: basis for why analysis should be different when a jury
- 12:48Speaker 1: rather than a judge makes the determination. Indeed, in Telapia,
- 12:52Speaker 1: which was decided post ring, the United States Supreme Court
- 12:55Speaker 1: reiterated that the narrowing analysis focuses on the individual aggravator.
- 13:01Speaker 1: Tilapia five twelve US at nine seventy two, noting the
- 13:05Speaker 1: Trier effect must find one aggravating circumstance, and the aggravating
- 13:09Speaker 1: circumstance must apply only to a subclass of defendants and
- 13:13Speaker 1: may not be unconstitutionally vague. Consequently, defendants narrowing argument is
- 13:18Speaker 1: further foreclosed by Harriston, which is binding on this Court. Additionally,
- 13:23Speaker 1: the Eighth Amendments narrowing analysis is typically confined to the
- 13:27Speaker 1: eligibility phase. The narrowing effect of the selection phase and
- 13:31Speaker 1: mandatory appellet review that focuses on who ultimately receives the
- 13:35Speaker 1: death penalty cannot be ignored. See Adalgo three ninety p.
- 13:39Speaker 1: Dot three d at seven ninety two, noting that a
- 13:42Speaker 1: narrowing challenge to Arizona's capital scheme cannot focus solely on
- 13:47Speaker 1: the statutory aggravating circumstances because the selection phase and mandatory
- 13:51Speaker 1: appellet review provide further narrowing. For a death penalty scheme
- 13:55Speaker 1: to be constitutional, both the eligibility phase and selection phase
- 13:59Speaker 1: mustntin safeguards to ensure that the process is neutral and
- 14:03Speaker 1: principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in
- 14:07Speaker 1: the sentencing decision. Idaho selection phase requires the jury weigh
- 14:12Speaker 1: all the mitigating circumstances against each applicable aggravating circumstance and
- 14:17Speaker 1: determine whether the imposition of the death penalty would be
- 14:20Speaker 1: unjust I see section nineteen Dash two five one five
- 14:24Speaker 1: eight A. The jury must unanimously agree that the death
- 14:28Speaker 1: penalty is warranted. If the death penalty has imposed, the
- 14:32Speaker 1: sentence is then reviewed by the Idaho Supreme Court to
- 14:35Speaker 1: determine one whether the sentence of death was imposed under
- 14:39Speaker 1: the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor,
- 14:43Speaker 1: and two whether the evidence supports the jury or judge's
- 14:47Speaker 1: findings of statutory aggravating circumstances. Thus, importantly, eligible defendants are
- 14:53Speaker 1: further narrowed through these phases, which defendants arguments does not consider.
- 14:58Speaker 1: All right, we're going to wrap up right here, and
- 15:00Speaker 1: in the next episode we're gonna pick up with three.
- 15:02Speaker 1: Defendant has not demonstrated Idaho's capital scheme is geographically arbitrary.
- 15:08Speaker 1: All of the information that goes with this episode can
- 15:10Speaker 1: be found in the description box.