Latest / The Fourcast / Could the Ukraine Russia war ever go nuclear? - Serhii Plokhi

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Could the Ukraine Russia war ever go nuclear? - Serhii Plokhi · The Fourcast

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It is extremely dangerous because what is happening in the
0:03
world now reminds me of the 1930s.
0:06
That's an alarming comparison. Some people would say that's
0:09
exaggerated when you consider how that ended.
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I certainly think that this is not exaggerated in worse
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situation now, because all of this populism and other things,
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it captured good part of Europe. Now the populism, the rise of
0:24
the authoritarian tendencies, US is right in the centre of that.
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So for Europe, is the plan to to wake up?
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Putin has done a lot of nuclear Sabre rattling.
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Yes. Is he serious?
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Hello and welcome to the forecast.
0:40
As Donald Trump and Vladimir Zelensky's latest meeting
0:43
reportedly descended into another shouting match behind
0:46
closed doors, the war in Ukraine feels as volatile as ever, and,
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according to some, more dangers for the world than at any time
0:54
since the Cold War. Our guest today is Sehi Prachi,
0:58
professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University and author
1:01
of The Nuclear Age. He warns that fear is once again
1:05
driving nations towards the bomb and that we could soon see
1:09
dozens more nuclear armed states.
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So it's about stumbling into new nuclear era.
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And what does that mean for global security and indeed for
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Ukraine's fight to survive? Sahi, good to see you again.
1:22
It's a pleasure. Let's start with the news, kind
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of the topical news this Budapest summer, which seems
1:27
quite an extraordinary idea when it was first mooted last week.
1:31
Is it going to happen, do you think?
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I would say it's 5050, but I would say that probably 90
1:41
against Stan that probably it will not produce any
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breakthrough if it happens because the positions, in
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particular the position of Russia is still the same.
1:53
They want to keep whatever they got on the battlefield and they
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also want Ukraine to surrender additional territories.
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So I go back in history at, at any sort of peace deal or
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ceasefire that the norm is that it goes along the existing front
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lines. So I I don't think that this is,
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this is the position that really suggests that we are going to
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witness the end of hostilities anytime soon.
2:25
But if Putin says no to the Budapest summit, which is 1 hell
2:28
of a gift, is he being a bit greedy here?
2:31
Because it's in Budapest, hosted by Viktor Orban, who is the
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closest thing that Putin has to a real friend in the European
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Union. It's a kick in the teeth for the
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European Union. Trump will be there.
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Zelensky, as far as he knows, is not going to show up.
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We know that in the last meeting between Zelensky and Trump,
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Trump more or less represented Vladimir Putin at the table.
2:52
Well, they had President Trump and and Putin had meeting in
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Alaska. So having meeting doesn't mean
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solving the issue. Solving the problem so.
3:04
But it's a diplomacy. It looks good for Putin, doesn't
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it? Or the summit in red.
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Carpets. The the the red carpet in
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Alaska. Yes, exactly that.
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That looked exceptionally good for Putin.
3:15
It means that he is back on the international arena.
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He can go to the United States and not be arrested.
3:23
And now going to Budapest means that he can go to Europe as
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well. So, yeah, it would be absolutely
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being whatever the, the the outcome of the Budapest summit
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would be. So we don't know.
3:35
We don't have the date yet. They haven't agreed on that.
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And what we see now from the Russian side, the the statements
3:45
come in that the the only condition on which Russia is
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prepared to stop fighting, it's when Russia gets more territory.
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And it's not just more territory, it's urban
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conglomerate and, and, and towns and cities in highly
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industrialized on bus area, which is apart from value, apart
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from people. It's also the the position that
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is very difficult to to take. It's not, it's not a field.
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So yeah, it would be a strategic, strategic defeat of
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major proportions for Ukraine, for the West and for the for the
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future of Europe, for. Sure.
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So just to be clear, say what you're saying is that the things
4:28
that Putin can't get on the battlefield where the front
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lines have been frozen for quite a long time?
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More or less he. Thinks he can get from Trump as
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a concession. That is the, the, the, the, that
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is certainly the plan that that is certainly the, the position.
4:43
And it's more than just negotiation position from which
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he starts. That's what he says again and
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again that he wants to get. So.
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So the new battlefield in this war is actually inside Trump's
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head. Certainly, certainly that's what
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is happening. The the the battle is for the
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position of the United States, for the position of the US
5:04
president. And as we know that Frontline is
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moving back and forth quite often, so.
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Hard to keep up. One, one day it's the Russia
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winning, another day it's Ukraine backed by the European
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leaders, which are a very important, very important
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participants in that battle, not just in the battle on the on the
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in, on Ukraine frontline, but also American frontline.
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So after last Friday's meeting in the Oval Office between Trump
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and Zelensky, things seem to be relatively positive.
5:37
He didn't get his Tomahawk missiles.
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You know, Trump wasn't particularly friendly towards
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Zelensky. But then we heard afterwards
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that behind closed doors, the meeting was almost as ugly as
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the public. You know, disaster back in
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February. Well, that, that means that
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there probably in the future will be more ups and downs in,
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in, that's in, in those relationships.
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It also indicates that Zelensky was not intimidated.
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And from what we can tell from the previous story of
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relationship between the two leaders, the, the, the, the
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quarrel today doesn't mean that there can be some sort of
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understanding tomorrow and, and vice versa.
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So that, that that's a roller coaster.
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And I was in September in Ukraine for two weeks.
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People there take this really hard.
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So the, the at stake is, of course, the survival of the
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country, their personal survival.
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And this news, they don't, they don't help it.
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It goes back and forth, back and forth.
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The hopes are going up. And then, then suddenly,
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suddenly there is a major, major disappointment.
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But even but in the back and forth, and, you know, one day
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Trump says that Ukraine could win all this territory back and
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then the next day says they should suck it up and deal with
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their losses. Do you think that Trump
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fundamentally understands what Putin wants, which is for
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Ukraine to stop existing as an independent nation state, and
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what the Ukrainians insist on, which is their survival as an
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independent nation state? From the public pronouncements,
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I don't think that there is. I don't see that there is an
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understanding that. Trump doesn't get it.
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Or his advisors, if they get that they, they, they, they keep
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it as, as, as a deepest secret. So it's, it's not, it's not
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certainly in the public, it's not in the pronouncements.
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And it's very much the whole thing is about the territory.
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And, and, and at stake is of course not, not, not just
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territory or any territory. It's it's the survival of
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Ukraine. How do you think future
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historians will interpret victory in this war?
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Looking at the region and its tough neighborhood in which
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Ukraine is, Ukraine now goes through the process of really
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establishing its independence in face of the resurgent empire.
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And this is the story, this is the situation in which Poland
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and and Romania and other East and Central European countries
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were before that. None of them really stayed in
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the borders in which it was born or emerged after World war.
8:21
The border shift, the border shift in the region.
8:23
Yeah, the border shift in the region.
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But what is important, important is sovereignty, the survival and
8:30
sovereignty. So that's.
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The sense of nationhood. You know, the Poles have a very
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strong sense of Polish nation, despite the fact that their
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border ceased to exist in the 19th century.
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Exactly, exactly. So that's that's assurance of
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survival and that assurance also of success, political but also
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economic. Look at at Polish, Polish
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economy today, how again the the the entire country was shifted
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after the World War 2, acquiring some territories, losing others.
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So my position was that the victory for Ukraine is survival,
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survival as a sovereign state. If that doesn't happen, then it
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is not a victory. But it hopes to survive as a
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sovereign state inside secure borders, even if they've shifted
9:14
somewhere. Exactly, security.
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Security is the core is is is is extremely important.
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So think of adding that it. It's always puzzled me that
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Europe, an economy 10 times the size of Russia's, you know, a
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fragmented but very healthy arms industry and A, and a very
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particular cause which most European member states seem to
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buy into, that this is European and Western values at stake
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here, that they've not stood up to Vladimir Putin, you know, in
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a most robust way, especially when they say this is
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existential not just for Ukraine but also for us, right.
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What, in essence do you think is going on there?
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Well, certainly the EU has a difficulty of really translating
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and transforming its economic power into first political will
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to defend itself, to defend values, to defend the the, the
10:12
type of the of the economy, to defend the level of prosperity.
10:17
And the reason for that is that Europe really didn't function as
10:23
1 Organism almost ever. And after 1945, it relied really
10:32
on the United States to provide protection.
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And what is happening now, it's a very, very difficult and
10:39
challenging process for for Europe, finding enough unity,
10:44
finding enough ways of how, how to survive together.
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Because on their own European countries can survive E European
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countries who were under or most of them who were under the
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Russian control, under the Soviet control before that
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understand that the Finland countries, countries in northern
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Europe understand that. But talking to Germany, it's
11:08
already becomes difficult. France and and Spain again, they
11:12
are on board. But for them it's, it's it's
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more a theoretical threat than than a real one.
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Ukraine, by heroically, really fighting back, buys time for
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Europe to put it's act together because in the new world you're
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really now, you can't be sure that the United States will show
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up when it matters and Europe has to find a way to protect
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what it got. So this is, at the end of the
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day, this really is as far as you're concerned about the
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survival of Europe. It is, it is because we already
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see that Putin goes there and bribes individual leaders and
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countries and Slovakia and, and Hungary already are playing, it
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doesn't look like on European team on, on, on many issues.
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And it can take 1 country one after another.
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He he, he, he was very, very influential and tragically
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continues to be in Germany, for example, and support for either
12:15
far right or far left, any anti anti system sort of political
12:22
forces. It's certainly the one of the
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tools that he hasn't he uses. So yeah, Ukraine, Ukraine is, is
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fighting not just for European values, which is true.
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It wants to stay democratic. It wants to to to stay
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sovereign, but it's also for Europe and interests of Europe.
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What is the bigger factor in dividing Europe in its response
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to Russia? Is it the constant potential of
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a nuclear threat from Vladimir Putin?
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Is it the fact that you know your perception of the Russian
12:57
threat recedes as your geography expands?
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Is it internal politics? Or all three.
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Geography matters when it comes to Europe and you see a
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different reaction to Putin's actions, as I already said,
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between let's say Poland and, and, and Spain or Portugal.
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But geography becomes less important when it comes to
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nuclear weapons course. And the biggest concern for
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Putin using nuclear weapons in Ukraine was really registered
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not in Europe, but in Washington.
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So the, the, the potential and, and Trump keeps talk, you know,
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at least till recently about the, whether Zelensky wants to
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bring the third World War because everyone understands
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that the third World War can be, can be only nuclear.
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So nuclear kind of descends this, this geography and, and
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geographic, geographic divisions.
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And what I, what I write about in my book, it's, it's certainly
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the history of the, of the nuclear age, starting with HG
14:03
Wells and imagining, imagining the, the nuclear war back in
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1913, but it ends with the, with the war in Ukraine.
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Apart from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, we have also
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something that we never saw in history before.
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That's so-called Atoms For Peace.
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Nuclear power plants are turning into weapons for war as Russia
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takes over Chernobyl first and then the Parisian nuclear plant.
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And that is a real danger, isn't it, that these become massive
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dirty bombs in the heart of Europe?
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Exactly. Dirty bomb.
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That's that that that's the term.
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And I think it's a much more real possibility and threat than
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the use of nuclear weapons, because use of nuclear weapons,
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that means breaking the taboo that exists since the times of
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki and paying a political and economic
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price because China is is not particularly keen on anyone
14:58
using nuclear weapons at this point, or India for that matter.
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So Putin can lose the only allies or the biggest allies
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that he has, but so-called accident of the nuclear power
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plant when it's impossible to prove who, who's who was
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responsible for what and what happened.
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That's, that's, that's, that's. It seems to me a much more
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immediate danger. Let's talk, you write in your
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brilliant book about also nuclear Saber rattling.
15:27
Right. Putin has done a lot of nuclear
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Saber rattling. He mentions the nuclear threat
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periodically. Yes.
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Is he serious? So far, certainly that was the
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most successful Russian psychological operation of the
15:41
war because it certainly influenced thinking in
15:44
Washington during Biden administration.
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That in in turn, influenced the question of how much Ukraine was
15:53
getting weapons. What sort of gap?
15:55
What sort of gap? Don't give them anything too
15:57
powerful in case you provoke the nuclear bear.
16:00
Exactly because the the the the whole game was about at the
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so-called red lines in the head of Putin, whether they existed
16:08
or not, where were they? And that there was general
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agreement at that time that Crimea is one of them.
16:14
So the idea was give Ukraine enough to to hold the line, but
16:20
not enough to somehow be able to get into the Crimea.
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But that's really important, isn't it?
16:26
Because if you're never going to give Ukraine more to actually
16:29
win this war, and if, if, if victory means pushing the
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Russians back to the original borders and making sure they
16:36
never cross your front, your borders ever again, then you
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have to engage with the possibility of a nuclear threat.
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Because it's possible that that Putin would use.
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It you, you, you have and in that sense, and again, that's
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that's what I'm saying in in trying to argue in my book that
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we have to relearn certain not just lessons, but also skills of
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the Cold War because we survived the Cold War because of the
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existence of thing that Winston Churchill defined as balance of
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terror. And I write about that as
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balance of fear, because Russia is not the only nuclear power in
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the world. And if only the West is scared
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of the of the Russian nuclear power and Russia is not scared
17:26
of the Western one we don't have.
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You don't have a balance of fear you.
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Don't have the? Balance.
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You don't have deterrence. You don't, you don't have
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deterrence exactly so. And it's, it sounds very kind of
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reckless, what I am saying, But that's, that's the reality.
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That's how we survived the Cold War.
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But how did we end up in a point where the Russians are not
17:46
afraid of the nuclear threat from the West, whether it's the
17:51
United States or indeed France and and Britain?
17:54
Well, because on some point we really believed in the idea that
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history came to an end. Maybe not in Fukuyama's
18:03
understanding of the victory of liberal democracy, but the end
18:07
of the big wars, the brutal force and other things.
18:11
And new generations came, politicians, new electorate
18:17
showed up, and so on and so forth.
18:18
So we, we assumed that that eternal peace actually arrived.
18:23
And now we know with the war in Ukraine, which is the largest
18:27
war in Europe since 45, potentially the largest war in
18:30
the world, that that was a moment that was a peace, peace
18:38
period that unfortunately as as everything in the world, good
18:43
and bad comes to an end. It came to an end.
18:46
But you're what you're arguing in your book is that the reason
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why we had the peace is because there was this balance of fear.
18:52
The very existence of nuclear weapons was so unimaginable as a
18:57
military tool on the battlefield that we had this balance of
19:01
fear. And if we had no global war,
19:02
plenty of regional wars, no global wars for almost 8
19:05
decades. Yes, yes, I'm not.
19:07
I'm not the first one to argue that, of course, certainly, but,
19:10
but, but certainly I'm I my own research demonstrates that I
19:15
don't have any other explanation for why we have this the
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longest, probably the peace in the modern history.
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I mean global peace. Of course there are original
19:25
wars. So have we become flabby in the
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West, in Europe? Have we become complacent
19:30
because we didn't think that those global wars could ever
19:33
happen again? We got used to nuclear
19:34
deterrence. Yes, yes.
19:36
And anyone who was talking about, let's say investing in
19:43
the defences was considered to be a war monger and and and so
19:47
on and so forth. So people, people focused on
19:51
different things and but again, the, the, the, the peace benefit
19:55
of the fall of the Berlin Wall came to an end.
19:57
So we have we have to learn the lessons of the Cold War because
20:03
for for generations historians of the Cold War were asking
20:07
question how did it happen that the grand airlines of World War
20:12
2 deteriorated in this horrible thing called.
20:16
Cold War, which is a good question to ask and discuss, but
20:20
now I think much more important for our own survival is the
20:23
question, what did we do right during the Cold War that we are
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still around and have this conversation today and, and go
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back and try to to distill that and then and then try to use it
20:38
to implement in this new. And what did we do right?
20:42
First of all, we got lucky in, in cases like the Cuban Missile
20:47
crisis. But the other thing was that
20:50
again, thinking about the Cuban missile crisis, the position of,
20:55
of President Kennedy that he, he decided that he, he, he, he
21:00
can't retreat because what was there was Khrushchev's blackmail
21:04
by moving those missiles there, you, you, you take a strong
21:08
stand and you, you indicate that you, you are, you are prepared
21:13
to respond in kind. That's, that's again, as I say,
21:18
especially in the new environment created by the last
21:21
30 years. That's sounds that as most
21:23
irresponsible thing to be said. But, but as a historian, that's,
21:28
that's how I see the Cold War and that's how I see where was
21:31
the secret that there was no, no beacon global war between 1945
21:37
in 1991 or 1989, depending on how you how you look at the end
21:43
of the Cold War. So considering the fact that we
21:46
have an actual and very bloody war happening in Europe right
21:50
now, considering the fact that I'm sorry, Mr. Putin, we know
21:53
who the aggressor is and it's. You the the fact.
21:57
That we've got Trump in the White House who's not holding a
22:00
firm line. How dangerous is that for us?
22:03
Well, it is it is extremely dangerous because we are in the
22:06
new world on in many ways, the what is happening in the world
22:12
now reminds me of the 1930s Great Depression, Great
22:17
Recession, the rise of populism, nationalism, aggression, use of
22:22
the minorities card and nationality card.
22:26
So the the the that's. An alarming comparison.
22:29
Some people would say that's exaggerated when you consider
22:32
how that ended, but you would say no.
22:35
I, I, I, I certainly think that this is not exaggerated.
22:38
And the, the question is how we can preclude it from going
22:43
where, where it is going. It, it looks like we know where
22:46
it can end. So that, that, that's, that
22:49
that's, that's an alarm bell that we should take seriously
22:52
and not dismiss that as so. But but where, where I was
22:57
heading with all of that, that to a degree, we're in worse
23:01
situation now than we were back in the 1930s because all of this
23:06
populism and other things, it captured good part of Europe.
23:11
But US was saved to a degree by Atlantic Ocean or by, by, by
23:15
something else. Now, the populism, the rise of
23:18
the authoritarian tendencies, US is right in the center of that.
23:23
And that is really challenge for Europe, but also opportunity for
23:27
Europe. So it's time, it's time to grow
23:31
up and it it's time to start thinking and relying on on
23:37
Europe and European enormous economic, economic potential to
23:44
find the way how to defend Europe in the situation where
23:49
there are clear signs that that US tries to retreat on the
23:57
other, on the other side of the Atlantic.
23:59
And again, we can say, OK, this is this is President Trump.
24:03
But the reorientation of American foreign policy toward
24:07
the Pacific started under Obama that those were also hopes and
24:12
expectations of President Biden. But then of course the war in
24:15
Ukraine started, so we are witnessing a major shift on the
24:19
international arena. So for Europe is the time to to
24:23
wake up and not to dismiss parallels with 1930s as as just
24:28
pure exaggeration. So to be clear, you've got in
24:31
Russia an actual aggressor, you know, against the sovereign
24:35
European territory. You've got in China a an
24:38
opportunistic at best, confrontational worst former
24:43
ally and market that is being decoupled.
24:46
You've got in the United States, you know, an Uncle Sam who's
24:51
become rogue, let's put it this way, unreliable who may not show
24:55
up. So what you're left with is the
24:57
survivors club of liberal democracy in the the European
25:01
Union in in Europe. You put it exceptionally well.
25:05
Yeah, I, I, I Thank you. I've been thinking about it a
25:07
lot like you. And so this survivors club is
25:10
divided, right? It's possible that some of the
25:13
most powerful nations in this club are going to be run by far
25:16
right wingers, the Afd in Germany, Ras Oblomo Nacional in
25:20
France, who are flirting with authoritarianism themselves.
25:25
Yes, the, the, the, this is what is happening.
25:27
And again, the, I think as a historian, what that reminds me
25:32
about is 1930s. So what that means is that the
25:37
frontline, we were talking about the, the frontline in Ukraine,
25:40
the frontline in the US in, in President Trump's head.
25:43
So for Europe, the frontline is not only there where Ukrainians
25:49
are keeping, keeping the Russian forces or where the, the Poles
25:55
are trying to shoot down the Russian drones or, or the, the
26:00
intercept the, the, the, the planes are trying to intercept
26:04
the, the Russian jets in, in Northern Europe.
26:07
The frontline is within, within each individual country itself.
26:11
And that's the frontline between democracy and whatever forces
26:15
are that presents threat to that democracy.
26:18
Again, it's, it's, it's, it maybe sounded as, as a
26:26
exaggeration, but again, what, what you are saying and that
26:30
that's what certainly I, I, I see when and what I, what I read
26:35
and, and what, what I feel being in Europe that is that that is
26:41
the reality. There is more than more than one
26:44
frontline. And thank God the one within
26:46
within European Union is political.
26:49
Are we sleepwalking in Europe towards catastrophe?
26:53
I hope not, because at least the, the language that is being
26:58
used is the right language, including in Germany.
27:03
The, the pronouncements that are being made in, in support of
27:08
Ukraine are, are, I think, very real and strong.
27:12
So the, the task is really to match the, the, the rhetoric
27:17
and, and, and, and, and, and deeds.
27:20
Because again, at this point, US stopped supplying Ukraine with
27:26
the, the weapons and it's now Europe that is, that is buying
27:30
those weapons. So that's already the act that
27:33
demonstrates that at least on certain level, there is
27:36
serialization How, how dangerous it is.
27:38
So I hope we are not sleepwalking.
27:40
But just briefly. I mean, Trump has been much more
27:43
hostile towards Zelensky than towards Putin in public at
27:46
least. He's been much more hostile
27:48
towards the European Union as a body then he has been even to
27:51
Zelensky. He's called it a way of fleecing
27:53
the United States. This isn't helpful for the
27:57
survival of Europe. Well, it is.
28:01
Or maybe it is. Exactly it.
28:02
Depends. Maybe it's concentrating
28:04
European minds. OK.
28:06
So is the rhetoric like that because that's a great power
28:09
rhetoric toward a smaller or medium, medium sized countries?
28:13
Well, that's maybe what what Europe needs the the that sort
28:18
of wake up call not not just coming from Russia, but also
28:22
from the United. So in if you're going back to
28:24
the 1930s, we had an emerging Winston Churchill, right?
28:28
You know, we had, you know, the Charles de Gaulle.
28:30
We had, you know, FDR in the United States.
28:34
Who are the Churchills of today? Well, I'm, I'm, I'm looking
28:38
around. I, I, I, I, I don't see many of
28:41
them, but I, I'm sure that the, the, really the situations like
28:46
that, the, the, the, the times of, of trial, they produce
28:51
leaders. They produce leaders.
28:53
So I hope within a year another maybe electoral cycle, we we'll
29:00
see that. And there is the, there is some
29:02
hope in Germany now there is some hope in, in other places as
29:06
well. So I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm sure
29:08
the leaders, if there is a demand for, for, for a
29:11
particular leader, that leader will show up.
29:14
I hope we have enough time for that.
29:16
I hear what you're saying, but you're not going to make me
29:17
sleep any better. That say, hey Ploy, Professor
29:20
Ploy, thank you very much indeed.
29:22
My pleasure. That's it for this episode of
29:24
The Forecast. Hope you enjoyed it.
29:26
Sobering stuff. Until next time, goodbye.