Latest / Dark Perimeter: Real Breaches, Real Stakes / The Breach Files — Episode 5: "God Mode"
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_01: September 10, 2023, 2 40 in the afternoon.
- 0:04SPEAKER_01: The Bellagio.
- 0:06SPEAKER_01: A player sits down at a slot machine, inserts$20, and nothing happens.
- 0:11SPEAKER_01: The screen is dark.
- 0:12SPEAKER_01: They move to the next machine.
- 0:14SPEAKER_01: Dark.
- 0:15SPEAKER_01: The next row.
- 0:16SPEAKER_01: Dark.
- 0:17SPEAKER_01: At the check-in counter, a line is forming.
- 0:20SPEAKER_01: The reservation system is down.
- 0:22SPEAKER_01: Staff are writing room assignments on paper.
- 0:24SPEAKER_01: The key card kiosks are offline.
- 0:27SPEAKER_01: Guests are being manually escorted to rooms and let in by hotel engineers with physical override keys.
- 0:33SPEAKER_04: What is happening?
- 0:34SPEAKER_04: I need status from every department right now.
- 0:37SPEAKER_04: Gaming floor online or offline?
- 0:39SPEAKER_04: Reservations, online or offline?
- 0:42SPEAKER_04: Somebody talk to me.
- 0:43SPEAKER_00: Gaming floor is offline.
- 0:45SPEAKER_00: Reservations offline.
- 0:47SPEAKER_00: The CM is throwing alerts I've never seen before.
- 0:50SPEAKER_00: We have ransomware.
- 0:51SPEAKER_00: MGM has ransomware.
- 0:54SPEAKER_01: Ten hours earlier, a member of Scattered Spider had found something useful on LinkedIn.
- 0:59SPEAKER_01: Scattered Spider is not a nation state.
- 1:01SPEAKER_01: They are not a shadowy Eastern European crime syndicate.
- 1:05SPEAKER_01: They are, predominantly, English-speaking teenagers and young adults, Americans mostly, with some British members, who organize on Telegram and Discord and communicate in a vernacular that sounds more like a gaming lobby than a criminal enterprise.
- 1:19SPEAKER_01: Their average member age in 2023 was 19.
- 1:23SPEAKER_01: They had, by that September, successfully breached dozens of major corporations.
- 1:29SPEAKER_03: Got him.
- 1:30SPEAKER_03: IT manager 10 years at MGM, still listed as employed.
- 1:35SPEAKER_03: Name, title, employee ID in the bio.
- 1:39SPEAKER_03: That's all we need.
- 1:41SPEAKER_01: The call to MGM's IT help desk lasted approximately 10 minutes.
- 1:46SPEAKER_03: Yeah, hey, this is David, David Chen, IT infrastructure manager.
- 1:51SPEAKER_03: I'm getting locked out of my account.
- 1:54SPEAKER_03: Yeah, I've been traveling for a conference, and I think something happened with my credentials.
- 1:59SPEAKER_03: Can you help me get back in?
- 2:01SPEAKER_03: Sure I can help with that.
- 2:03SPEAKER_03: Can I get your employee ID?
- 2:05SPEAKER_03: Yeah, it's let me pull that up.
- 2:08SPEAKER_03: It's M-774912.
- 2:12SPEAKER_03: And can you verify the last four of your employee badge number?
- 2:16SPEAKER_03: 8834.
- 2:18SPEAKER_03: Okay, and I'm going to send a verification to the email on file.
- 2:21SPEAKER_03: So that's actually the problem.
- 2:23SPEAKER_03: I can't access that email because I'm locked out.
- 2:26SPEAKER_03: That's the whole thing.
- 2:28SPEAKER_03: Is there another way you can verify?
- 2:30SPEAKER_03: I have my manager's contact if you need.
- 2:33SPEAKER_03: One second.
- 2:34SPEAKER_03: Let me see what I can do.
- 2:36SPEAKER_01: The help desk operator, following a recovery process designed for legitimate locked-out employees, reset the account and issued a temporary credential.
- 2:45SPEAKER_01: The call ended.
- 2:47SPEAKER_01: Scattered Spider was inside MGM's Active Directory.
- 2:51SPEAKER_01: Over the next several hours, they moved laterally through MGM's environment with the patience of professionals.
- 2:57SPEAKER_01: They identified domain controllers, they mapped the network.
- 3:01SPEAKER_01: They located the systems that ran the casino floor, the slot machines, the gaming management systems, the hotel property management platform, and they deployed ransomware across all of it simultaneously.
- 3:14SPEAKER_01: The timing was deliberate.
- 3:15SPEAKER_01: A Sunday afternoon, peak occupancy, maximum operational disruption.
- 3:21SPEAKER_04: We're looking at full shutdown of gaming operations.
- 3:24SPEAKER_04: Reservations, digital key.
- 3:26SPEAKER_04: The loyalty program database is encrypted.
- 3:28SPEAKER_04: Digital payment on the floor is down.
- 3:30SPEAKER_04: We're cash only.
- 3:32SPEAKER_04: I need to know: do we pay?
- 3:34SPEAKER_00: FBI guidance is do not pay.
- 3:37SPEAKER_00: The moment we pay, we confirm the model works.
- 3:40SPEAKER_00: We become a target forever.
- 3:42SPEAKER_04: The floor is losing$10 million a day, every day.
- 3:45SPEAKER_04: Tell me what option two looks like.
- 3:48SPEAKER_00: Option two is we rebuild.
- 3:50SPEAKER_00: We restore from backups where we have them.
- 3:52SPEAKER_00: We rebuild where we don't.
- 3:54SPEAKER_00: We estimate four to six weeks to full restoration.
- 3:58SPEAKER_01: MGM chose not to pay.
- 4:00SPEAKER_01: The restoration took 11 days for basic operations and weeks more for full recovery.
- 4:06SPEAKER_01: The company disclosed$100 million in total impact in its quarterly earnings.
- 4:11SPEAKER_01: Across the street, Caesars Entertainment had faced the same attack two weeks earlier.
- 4:16SPEAKER_01: Caesars had paid.
- 4:18SPEAKER_01: Approximately$30 million.
- 4:20SPEAKER_01: Their systems were restored within days.
- 4:23SPEAKER_01: They disclosed the breach quietly in an SEC filing.
- 4:26SPEAKER_02: Scattered Spider, also known by the aliases UNC 3944 and Octotempest, is responsible for breaches at over a hundred organizations between 2022 and 2024, including telecommunications companies, financial services firms, gaming operators, and technology companies.
- 4:48SPEAKER_02: The group employs social engineering, sim swapping, and identity-based attacks that do not rely on technical exploits.
- 4:56SPEAKER_02: Their entry point is almost invariably a phone call to a help desk.
- 5:02SPEAKER_01: The arrests came slowly.
- 5:04SPEAKER_01: A 17-year-old in Walsall, England, a 19-year-old in Scottsdale, Arizona, others in Florida.
- 5:10SPEAKER_01: The prosecutions stretched into 2025.
- 5:14SPEAKER_01: Several members were still active even as others were indicted.
- 5:18SPEAKER_01: The help desk operator who reset the account was following procedure.
- 5:22SPEAKER_01: The procedure had no mechanism to verify that the person on the phone was who they claimed to be.
- 5:28SPEAKER_01: The LinkedIn profile was public.
- 5:30SPEAKER_01: The employee ID format was guessable.
- 5:33SPEAKER_01: The recovery flow was designed for convenience.
- 5:36SPEAKER_01: The call lasted 10 minutes.
- 5:38SPEAKER_01: The cleanup lasted 10 months.
- 5:40SPEAKER_01: This is the breech files.