Latest / Saladin: The Muslim Leader Who Defeated Crusaders — Fexingo History / Saladin's Forgotten Fleet: The Naval Ambition That Failed
Transcript
- Lucas: So we've talked a lot about Saladin's campaigns on land — Hattin, Jerusalem, Arsuf. But there's one dimension that's easy to overlook: the water. Saladin tried to build a Mediterranean navy, and it largely failed. Luna: A navy? I don't think I've ever heard that mentioned. Lucas: Most people haven't. The sources — Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad, Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani — they focus on cavalry and sieges. But Saladin knew that to truly control the coast, he needed ships. The Crusader states were constantly resupplied by sea from Europe. If he could cut that lifeline, he could starve them out. Lucas: So around 1179, after his victory at Jacob's Ford, he started pouring resources into shipbuilding. He established arsenals at Cairo and Alexandria, and later at Acre after he captured it in 1187. He even tried to recruit skilled shipwrights from the Maghreb and the Byzantine world. Luna: But the Crusaders were famous for their naval superiority. How did he think he could match them? Lucas: He didn't need to match them ship for ship. His strategy was more about disruption — using small, fast vessels to raid supply convoys, and occasionally building larger galleys to challenge blockades. He also experimented with Greek fire, which his engineers copied from captured Frankish ships. Lucas: The problem was timber. Egypt had plenty of flax for sails and rope, but good shipbuilding wood — oak, pine — was scarce. He had to import it from Anatolia, which meant dealing with the Seljuks of Rum, and that was expensive and unreliable. Luna: So the fleet was always a step behind. Lucas: Exactly. The most dramatic failure came during the siege of Acre, 1189 to 1191. When the Crusaders under Guy de Lusignan and later Richard the Lionheart besieged the city, Saladin's army camped outside, but his navy couldn't break the Frankish blockade. Ships from Genoa, Pisa, and Venice ruled those waters. Lucas: Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani, Saladin's secretary, describes a desperate attempt in 1190: Saladin's admiral, a man named Abu al-Hasan al-Maghribi, tried to slip a relief convoy into Acre's harbor at night. But the Franj had chains and booms across the entrance, and war galleys patrolling. The mission failed, and several ships were captured. Luna: Did Saladin ever consider building a bigger fleet after that? Lucas: He did, but the resources were stretched. After Acre fell to Richard in 1191, Saladin lost his main port on the coast. He also had to deal with succession worries — his health was declining. Baha ad-Din says he was still ordering new ships built in Egypt as late as 1192, but they never became a decisive force. Lucas: There's also a fascinating detail from the historian al-Maqrizi, writing later under the Mamluks. He claims Saladin once planned to build a canal from the Nile to the Red Sea to move ships overland and attack Crusader ports from the south. But the project was abandoned because of cost and engineering challenges. Luna: That would have been incredible — a medieval Suez Canal before its time. Lucas: Right. It shows how far he was thinking. But ultimately, his navy was an afterthought compared to his army. And that strategic weakness meant that even after he captured Jerusalem, the Crusaders could always land fresh troops on the coast and rebuild. The Third Crusade proved that. Luna: So in a way, the failure at sea is what made his land victory incomplete. Lucas: Exactly. And it's something we don't talk about enough. You know, episodes like this remind me why we keep digging into the sources. There's always another layer. Luna: And that's why we don't run ads on these conversations. If you want to support that kind of deep dive, the link is buy me a coffee dot com slash fexingo. Lucas: Yeah, every bit helps keep this ad-free. Anyway, back to the fleet — some historians argue that if Saladin had focused more on naval power earlier in his reign, the Crusader states might have fallen decades sooner. Luna: But he was a product of his environment. Kurdish warlords from the mountains didn't grow up thinking about ships. Lucas: That's a good point. His whole military tradition was based on cavalry and swift land campaigns. The sea was a foreign element. Even his admirals were mostly former pirates or converted Christian captains. He never developed a native naval officer class. Luna: So it wasn't just resources — it was a cultural blind spot. Lucas: I think so. And that blind spot had consequences. When the Mamluks took over after the Ayyubids, they learned from Saladin's mistakes. Baybars and Qalawun built a real navy, and they eventually crushed the last Crusader strongholds at Acre in 1291. But that was a century later. Luna: So Saladin's dream of a Muslim Mediterranean fleet was finally realized, just not by him. Lucas: Exactly. And it raises a question: what if he had lived longer, or if his successors had prioritized the sea? But history doesn't do what-ifs. It leaves us with the evidence, and the evidence says Saladin's navy was his Achilles' heel. Luna: A fascinating and overlooked part of his story. Lucas: It really is. And it shows that even the greatest commanders have limits. For Saladin, the horizon ended at the shoreline.