Latest / Defensive Line Shorts / The Defensive Line Shorts — Episode 8: The OPM breach
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_01: Welcome to The Defensive Line Shorts,
- 0:02SPEAKER_01: the series of short,
- 0:03SPEAKER_01: standalone episodes where we take one control or one breach
- 0:07SPEAKER_01: and pull out what matters for defenders.
- 0:09SPEAKER_01: Today,
- 0:10SPEAKER_01: it's one of the most damaging data breaches in United States government history,
- 0:14SPEAKER_01: the attack on the Office of Personnel Management, or OPM.
- 0:18SPEAKER_01: I'm Carter, and I'm an intelligence analyst.
- 0:21SPEAKER_01: I'll take you through what happened and why the data mattered so much.
- 0:25SPEAKER_01: With me, as ever, is Lizzie.
- 0:27SPEAKER_00: Thanks, Carter.
- 0:28SPEAKER_00: I'm Lizzie and I'm a blue teamer.
- 0:30SPEAKER_00: I'll be pulling out the lessons for defenders,
- 0:32SPEAKER_00: especially the ones that apply far beyond government.
- 0:35SPEAKER_01: A quick note first.
- 0:37SPEAKER_01: This briefing is drafted and read by AI, but reviewed and edited by humans.
- 0:42SPEAKER_01: OPM is essentially the HR department for the U.S. federal government.
- 0:46SPEAKER_01: Crucially, it handled background checks for security clearances.
- 0:49SPEAKER_01: So it held the forms people fill in to get vetted,
- 0:52SPEAKER_01: their life history,
- 0:53SPEAKER_01: past addresses,
- 0:54SPEAKER_01: family, finances, health, and anything that might make them vulnerable to blackmail.
- 1:00SPEAKER_01: If you're a foreign intelligence service trying to recruit spies,
- 1:03SPEAKER_01: that is close to the perfect dataset.
- 1:05SPEAKER_01: Congress investigated afterwards,
- 1:07SPEAKER_01: and its report, published in September 2016, describes two intrusions.
- 1:14SPEAKER_01: That's a defensible choice.
- 1:15SPEAKER_01: Evict too early and you may miss backdoors.
- 1:29SPEAKER_01: But in that time, HackerOne took manuals and documents about OPM systems.
- 1:34SPEAKER_01: The report called it, in effect, a roadmap.
- 1:37SPEAKER_01: And because logging was poor, the full extent of what they took was never known.
- 1:41SPEAKER_01: Then, in May 2014, a second intruder It was spotted in April 2015, almost by accident.
- 2:11SPEAKER_01: OPM was rolling out a tool that inspected encrypted web traffic,
- 2:14SPEAKER_01: and it flagged a strange certificate for a domain called opmsecurity.org.
- 2:19SPEAKER_01: It wasn't OPMs.
- 2:21SPEAKER_01: And there's a lovely detail here.
- 2:25SPEAKER_01: The U.S. government never formally named
- 2:41SPEAKER_01: And
- 2:48SPEAKER_01: unlike a password, none of this can be changed.
- 2:51SPEAKER_01: You can't reset your fingerprints or your life history.
- 2:54SPEAKER_01: Some of the people affected worked undercover or in intelligence roles,
- 2:58SPEAKER_01: and the data could help a foreign service spot them or work out who might be open
- 3:02SPEAKER_01: to pressure.
- 3:03SPEAKER_01: Those consequences last for decades, not months.
- 3:07SPEAKER_01: Lizzie, there's a lot here.
- 3:09SPEAKER_01: Where would you start?
- 3:10SPEAKER_00: With the front door.
- 3:11SPEAKER_00: Because a contractor's credentials were enough to walk in.
- 3:15SPEAKER_00: The first lesson is MFA on every route into your network,
- 3:19SPEAKER_00: including accounts belonging to suppliers and contractors.
- 3:22SPEAKER_00: VPN, email, remote desktop, file transfer, all of it.
- 3:27SPEAKER_00: OPM did roll out two-factor authentication after the first intrusion,
- 3:31SPEAKER_00: but it took until 2015 to finish.
- 3:34SPEAKER_00: By then, Hacker2 already had persistence.
- 3:38SPEAKER_00: And here's the painful bit.
- 3:40SPEAKER_00: OPM had bought smart cards back in 2009 that could have given everyone strong authentication.
- 3:46SPEAKER_00: For supplier and remote access today,
- 3:48SPEAKER_00: I'd aim for phishing-resistant methods wherever the supplier can support them.
- 3:52SPEAKER_00: The second lesson is one I see all the time, tools that are bought but never finished.
- 3:58SPEAKER_00: OPM's web inspection upgrade was only about 60% deployed when it caught Hacker 2.
- 4:03SPEAKER_00: Its endpoint tool was running in alert-only mode,
- 4:06SPEAKER_00: and when it was switched on, It lit up with dozens of high priority alerts.
- 4:10SPEAKER_00: So I'd treat deployment as the job, not the purchase.
- 4:14SPEAKER_00: Have a plan, track coverage, and report it to senior people.
- 4:18SPEAKER_00: Nobody should be comfortable with a security tool that's half switched on.
- 4:22SPEAKER_00: And I'd add the human side of that.
- 4:24SPEAKER_00: The report describes a tool purchase delayed for more than a year
- 4:27SPEAKER_00: by internal approvals and pushback from desktop teams about adding more agents
- 4:32SPEAKER_00: to machines.
- 4:33SPEAKER_00: Those are normal organizational frictions.
- 4:36SPEAKER_00: The fix is making security rollouts attract priority with a senior sponsor
- 4:40SPEAKER_00: so they don't quietly stall.
- 4:42SPEAKER_01: And that's something the report makes very clear, isn't it?
- 4:45SPEAKER_01: This wasn't just a technical failure.
- 4:47SPEAKER_01: OPM had been warned for years.
- 4:50SPEAKER_01: Its inspector general reported serious weaknesses from as early as 2008.
- 4:55SPEAKER_01: Security staff were often part-time,
- 4:57SPEAKER_01: without a security background,
- 4:58SPEAKER_01: and reported to the people who ran the systems they were meant to challenge.
- 5:02SPEAKER_01: And the report describes constant tension between keeping things running and making them secure.
- 5:07SPEAKER_01: Availability?
- 5:08SPEAKER_01: Usually one.
- 5:10SPEAKER_01: I want to be fair though.
- 5:11SPEAKER_01: OPM had a lot of old systems,
- 5:13SPEAKER_01: and securing legacy technology without breaking it is genuinely hard.
- 5:18SPEAKER_01: Many organizations would recognize that struggle.
- 5:20SPEAKER_00: Which is why the next lesson is about being able to see what happened.
- 5:25SPEAKER_00: Poor logging meant OPM could never say exactly what HackerOne took.
- 5:29SPEAKER_00: I think of logs like CCTV.
- 5:32SPEAKER_00: Nobody watches every camera, but when something happens, you need the footage.
- 5:36SPEAKER_00: So I'd make sure you're collecting and keeping logs from the systems that matter most.
- 5:41SPEAKER_00: Identity, remote access and your most sensitive data stores.
- 5:45SPEAKER_00: Keep them long enough to cover a long intrusion.
- 5:48SPEAKER_00: HackerOne may have been inside since 2012.
- 5:51SPEAKER_00: Next, privileged accounts.
- 5:53SPEAKER_00: Both intruders got domain admin,
- 5:55SPEAKER_00: so I'd reduce the number of domain admins,
- 5:58SPEAKER_00: keep admin accounts separate from everyday ones, and put MFA on them too.
- 6:03SPEAKER_00: And one cheap, clever idea, canary tokens.
- 6:06SPEAKER_00: These are fake files or credentials placed where an attacker would look,
- 6:10SPEAKER_00: like a document called clearance database passwords.
- 6:14SPEAKER_00: Nobody legitimate should ever open it, so if someone does, you get a very high quality alert.
- 6:20SPEAKER_00: And finally, protect your internal documentation.
- 6:23SPEAKER_00: The manuals Hacker1 took made Hacker2's job easier.
- 6:27SPEAKER_00: Architecture diagrams and admin guides don't need to be open to everyone.
- 6:31SPEAKER_01: It's also worth hearing what's happened since.
- 6:33SPEAKER_01: In 2017,
- 6:35SPEAKER_01: the FBI arrested a Chinese national accused of supplying Sekula,
- 6:39SPEAKER_01: a malware tool linked to the OPM attack.
- 6:42SPEAKER_01: In 2022, a $63 million class action settlement was agreed for people affected.
- 6:48SPEAKER_01: And by early 2025, reporting showed only around 7% of that money had been claimed.
- 6:54SPEAKER_01: We'll come back to a very similar attacker playbook,
- 6:57SPEAKER_01: reading internal documentation first,
- 6:59SPEAKER_01: in our episode on the review of the 2023 Microsoft Exchange breach.
- 7:04SPEAKER_01: So, three takeaways.
- 7:05SPEAKER_01: Put MFA on every external route in,
- 7:08SPEAKER_01: including supplier That's this episode of The Defensive Line Shorts.
- 7:11SPEAKER_01: For weekly analysis,
- 7:12SPEAKER_01: subscribe to The Defensive Line Weekly on Substack
- 7:14SPEAKER_01: and wherever you get your podcasts.
- 7:15SPEAKER_01: Until next time, stay defensive.