Latest / The Team House / Inside the Afghanistan Negotiations in Doha | Dante Paradiso | Ep. 275
Transcript
- 0:00Hey, guys, it's Jack. I just wanted to talk to you today
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- 1:03SB and I The Team House with your host Jack Murphy and David Bark.
- 1:17Hey, folks, welcome to episode two hundred and seventy five of The
- 1:19Team House. I'm Jack here with Dave. Our guest on tonight's show is
- 1:23Dante Paradiso. He is the current director for East African Affairs at the State
- 1:27Department. He is a career Foreign Service officer. He's the author of The
- 1:32Embassy, which we hope you guys will take a look at. He had
- 1:37many different assignments, many different travels around the world, including some hot spots
- 1:41in Africa and as well as Afghanistan. We're excited to talk to him tonight.
- 1:47First up, top, do you want to give your disclaimer? Yeah,
- 1:51just as a current serving Foreign Service officer, I have to say the
- 1:57views I expressed are my own and not necessarily those of the United States Government
- 2:00or the United States Department of State. Thank you, And I just want
- 2:05to tell people before we get started. If you want, you can check
- 2:07out our Patreon the links down the description. Consider supporting the team house keeping
- 2:12this show going. And if you sign up for five bucks a month,
- 2:15you get all of these episodes ad free, both the video and the podcast.
- 2:19And we really appreciate you guys supporting us. So, you know,
- 2:23you're the first State Department guy we've had on the show. We've talked a
- 2:28lot on here about you know, they say there's the three options. There's
- 2:30military action, there's covert action, and then there's diplomacy. We haven't really
- 2:35talked about the diplomacy so much, but I wanted to just kind of,
- 2:40like, before we get into your personal story, kick off the conversation a
- 2:44bit because I was thinking as I was I was reading in Foreign Affairs this
- 2:47week about like why this matters, Why diplomacy matters? And in this article,
- 2:54the authors write, China, in contrast with the United States, invests
- 3:00and the diplomatic resource is necessary to market its initiatives, speaking of like the
- 3:04Belton Road initiative and things like that. It has more embassies and representative offices
- 3:09around the globe than any other country, and Chinese diplomats frequently speak at conferences
- 3:14and publish a stream of articles about China's various initiatives in local news outlets.
- 3:19So we talk a lot about great power, competition and these other buzzwords.
- 3:23Nowadays a new era of strategic competition diplomatically, Why does it matter that China
- 3:30is out diplomating US. Yeah, it's a great question to start with.
- 3:38The core of diplomacy is the management of relations between countries. Right, you
- 3:46can't go to another country, you can't trade with another country, you can't
- 3:53conduct operations through another country, you can't fly over another country without agreement of
- 4:00that country. I think a lot of folks, you know, we were
- 4:05talking offline about global war and terror, there was a lot of freedom of
- 4:13movement within other countries that there was always tension about sovereignty, but there was
- 4:19a question of how sovereign some of these entities were. In an error of
- 4:26strategic competition, sovereignty is at a premium, and so if you look at
- 4:32how integrated the world is, it's basically impossible to get along without the diplomatic
- 4:38aspect because you're not doing military solutions. For whether you get the component parts
- 4:46to make your iPhone through a series of countries into a manufacturing base that then
- 4:51sells back to the United States. The global flow of oil goes from refinery
- 4:58processes to export into plastics. That whole network is based on agreements between nations
- 5:05on how to treat the flow of goods, services, and people. So
- 5:11it's kind of a critical component to our everyday life that we don't see because
- 5:16so much of what America is and is built on was built out of diplomatic
- 5:24relations. I mean, you take French support for US in the Revolutionary War.
- 5:27It goes back to that. But that's sort of the core of diplomacy
- 5:31is managing how we interact as America with other states, and if we fall
- 5:39behind China, if they have more embassies, more consulates. I don't mean
- 5:43to just put an arbitrary number on it, but what I mean is if
- 5:45they're conducting more diplomacy and building more relationships than we are, does that affect
- 5:49us from a security standpoint an economic standpoint? Well, you know, I'd
- 5:55say economic and security are completely tied together. But you know, just to
- 6:01give a very very simple example, you know, Rarer, it's critical minerals,
- 6:09things that are minded that go into the technology that we're relying on to
- 6:14put on this show that we use in our phones, in our pockets.
- 6:19If supply chains get locked up by one country, it doesn't have to be
- 6:25China, it could be any country. If that supply chain gets locked up
- 6:29and we haven't paid attention to it because we haven't put resources into the diplomatic
- 6:33relations that would keep that supply chain open for us, what is that going
- 6:40to do. It's going to have an effect on whether the availability of that
- 6:44technology for us, which directly affects our lives, our economy, and it'll
- 6:49do things like drive inflation, right because things are harder to get at.
- 6:55So when we take a country like China that is in vesting in building up
- 7:01ties around the world, if we were to scale back significantly, it would
- 7:09have knock on effects for US. So I think that's you know, when
- 7:13you're talking strategic competition, it's not always a zero sum game. Diplomacy fundamentally
- 7:17is about how to manage the relationship. You try to get to cooperation,
- 7:20but when you're talking strategic competition there is a bit of that zero sum factor
- 7:26that comes in. Fascinating. Yeah, so Dante, thank you first off
- 7:30for that, for that answer. But to back up a little bit,
- 7:33I want to pick up a little bit with your story, and I want
- 7:36you to literally start at the beginning if you could, because I was convinced
- 7:41that your name is a pen name. I was like, where did Dante
- 7:45Paradiso come from? Who were you born to, where did you grow up?
- 7:47And how did that take you eventually towards governmental service? Yeah, I
- 7:53don't know. I don't know where the government came into that, you know,
- 7:57I'm a classic New Yorker Irish Italian. Uh. You know, my
- 8:01my mom's side of the family was Staten Island through Brooklyn, via Ireland.
- 8:07My dad's side of the family was Italian, Southern Italian Bronx classic New York
- 8:13love story. They met in the stacks at the Columbia University and the sort
- 8:18of school of General ad not the not the she she part of the School
- 8:24General Studies, right, yeah, exactly, they were. They were working
- 8:26in the stacks. They met there. It was the late sixties. Said
- 8:31and here I am. I started, uh started my first steps, you
- 8:37know in h Up in that area, you know, steps of Saint John's
- 8:41and things like that. It got pulled out of you know, the States.
- 8:45They were a little bit Bohemian. My my my mother's father, so
- 8:48my grandfather was an illustrator. He illustrated classics, illustrated comics, John Wayne
- 8:54comics. He did pulp comics in the fifties. But back in those days
- 9:00that was a poor thing to do, Like you didn't make a lot of
- 9:03money. You just turn this stuff out and uh, but you know,
- 9:07there was a lot of artistry in the family. Uh. Come from a
- 9:13lineage of artists and filmmakers, and uh, they they decamped. My parents
- 9:20decamped from New York to uh, Spain. If you go back to the
- 9:24early seventies, this is Franco So this is fascist Spain. Uh and uh
- 9:28and uh they stayed there a couple of years and didn't didn't quite work out
- 9:35as artists, you know. Uh. Uh they came back and uh.
- 9:39You know, I grew up in mostly in Connecticut, uh, and then
- 9:43returned to the city for high school. Uh. And over that time,
- 9:46you know, uh, I watched a lot of film. Back in the
- 9:50day, we didn't have the access to you know, our kids have today
- 9:54to everything, so you know, but that started to influence me. Film
- 9:58and literature started to influence me about getting interested in the world and overseas things.
- 10:03And then, as in New Yorker, you're just all day, we're
- 10:07confronted with opinions, so you got to develop some and you get you interested
- 10:11in the rest of the world. So that's I think sort of where the
- 10:13origins of my international interests started. And so what was the next step after
- 10:16high school? I mean, you presumably go to college and some interest in
- 10:20foreign affairs. Yeah, it's it really I had kind of wanted to be
- 10:24a journalist. I had gotten interested in high school in journalism. I'd read
- 10:31a lot of you know, literature, you know, folks like Steinbeck or
- 10:35big influences on me. And then, you know, a child of the
- 10:41seventies and the eighties, I also grew up on a lot of the Great
- 10:45War films like Apocalypse. Now, you know, these are like seminal films,
- 10:48and so you you kind of want to challenge yourself physically and mentally,
- 10:54and you also want to see the world and you want to participate in something
- 10:58that's bigger than yourself. You know. I really thought journalism would be a
- 11:01great way to do that. I took a course when I was at Yale.
- 11:05They had these seminars that you could take, and they brought in a
- 11:09guy who was a journalist for the Christian Science Monitor who had published a book
- 11:13on Afghanistan, but this was Soviet Afghanistan. He'd gone in through Peshawar and
- 11:20describe what that was like. His name is EDG. Gerr Day, you
- 11:22know, tremendous reporter. Still does stuff at a Geneva. He's got a
- 11:28little company called Global Geneva that still talks global issues and serious journalism, you
- 11:35know, trying to tell you what's going on is not politicized, this is
- 11:39sort of the story. So he was co teaching this with a guy who
- 11:43had worked as a UN lawyer. And this was ninety one, and you
- 11:52know, the Cold War was ending, and what he was trying to do
- 11:56now with the withdrawal all of the Soviets from Afghanistan, it was a turbulent
- 12:03time. They were trying to do was start a d mining effort through the
- 12:07United Nations. And he was a lawyer and he was trying essentially to get
- 12:13the Soviets to cough up maps of where they put the minds so that you
- 12:18could actually protect civilians. And I started to see that there were maybe other
- 12:24avenues to go down rather than just journalism. We also didn't have any money
- 12:30as a family. So you know, when I saw a lot of successful
- 12:33journalists, I would I would talk to them. I would say, how'd
- 12:35you become a journalist? Oh? You know, I was a stringer.
- 12:39It's like, how'd you pay the rent while you were stringing? Because people
- 12:43could do that, you would you would string for a while. You know,
- 12:46you'd write a few articles. People in the community would get to know
- 12:50you, they'd maybe get you picked up by an organization. But you know,
- 12:52I mean I didn't have any money to go to a place to strength.
- 12:58I also, you know, it was I had the James Woods model
- 13:01in my mind from you know, Salvador. If you guys ever saw that
- 13:03movie from the from this early eighties, I don't think it's a great film.
- 13:07Yeah, but you know that was James when he was on the left,
- 13:11not on the right, So you know, different James Woods back then.
- 13:15But so I started to get interested in, as you know, is
- 13:20there a way through law that you could do something. But so I graduated
- 13:26Yale and was kicking around. I you know, wasn't quite sure what to
- 13:31do. And I got called out by a friend of mine to build trails
- 13:37in northern California on a trail crew for at risk youth. The crew was
- 13:43for at risk youth, and I went out there. You know, I
- 13:46took a friend of mine from from Yale, also one of my one of
- 13:50my old roommates. He came out too. So we spent a year doing
- 13:54that, and from that I joined Peace Corps. Interesting story though, because
- 13:58I had wanted to join a navy and i'd add an injury. And it
- 14:03was sort of between this program and the Navy, and they the Navy came
- 14:09back and they you know, I took the ASVAB test and they were like,
- 14:13man, you you scored really well. We're gonna put you on the
- 14:16nuclear program. And I said, I'm like terrible at math. I don't
- 14:20know what. I don't know what happened, but apparently I sent them too
- 14:26many X rays to prove that the leg was good, so they need more
- 14:30time. And I got the other offer, and I just went out and
- 14:33did the trail crew, you know. So and then later I had developed
- 14:37a little bit of respiratory condition, so that was that path was foreclosed to
- 14:43me. So anyway, I ended up in Peace Corps coming out of that
- 14:46other thing, and that was my first real introduction to embassies. I didn't
- 14:50know much about what embassies did, but what what embassies do in places.
- 14:56I went to Kenya and a lot of peace corps you get kind of dirty
- 15:01and unshowered over the over the years. And some embassy communities are real nice
- 15:09and they may open their houses to the Peace Corps. And so, you
- 15:13know, when you go into Nairobi, some people would go and stay with
- 15:16an embassy family and they would have a weekend that was you know, with
- 15:20a clean bed and a shower and things like that. I didn't actually have
- 15:24those relationships, but I started to talk to people who were in the embassy
- 15:28community and learn a little bit about what an embassy does. And I learned
- 15:31things like, we have jobs that you report on the politics of a country,
- 15:39So it's kind of like being a journalist, but for the government feed
- 15:41that information back that determines what are policy is going to be to the country,
- 15:46but you're living over there. And I got interested in that, and
- 15:50so it took a couple more details, and I came back and I went
- 15:58still didn't have any money. You know, volunteer service doesn't really get you
- 16:02at nor does a minimum wage work for a trail call, but I highly
- 16:07recommend that kind of work. By the way, it was fantastic time building
- 16:11trails in the Redwoods. But didn't have any money. And you know,
- 16:17my set of folks were like, so law school is where you end up,
- 16:21And I ended up in law. A lot of my law school colleagues,
- 16:26of course, you know sort of you know, we're in it for
- 16:30the money. I was in the sort of you know, idealistic camp.
- 16:37I guess still sort of hoping to do international law, and I would talk
- 16:41to people, how do you do how'd you do international law? And there
- 16:44was this lawyer who was a prosecutor, Pierre Prospery became a big name prosecutor
- 16:51in l A. He was I think he had Haitian roots, so he
- 16:56spoke some French. And when the International Criminal Tribunals came for Rwanda, they
- 17:04were looking for an American prosecutor because we had some funding relationship with it,
- 17:11and so he ends up out there. I said, you know, how
- 17:15do you get these jobs? I just fell into it. I don't know
- 17:18how I'm going to fall into that job. He had a unique skill set.
- 17:22There was a genocide, it happened in a Francophone place, and you
- 17:26end up with the skill set that matches. So but like a lot of
- 17:33us, I'm a nine to eleven product. So before nine to eleven,
- 17:41I interned with the State Department in Tanzania and that was ninety eight. So
- 17:51they sent me over for the summer to be a reporting officer as an intern,
- 17:56and that was the year that the bombing happened, and so I was
- 18:02in the bombing, came back, still needed money, so I took the
- 18:06corporate law job, and then I'm up in Boston the morning those planes would
- 18:14have flown right past my office. I had an office on the twenty seventh
- 18:15floor, and I was on the call with the client. And I'll never
- 18:22forget it because the first plane hit and I assumed it was like one of
- 18:26these little biplane things. And you know, because of the ninety three bombing
- 18:33that everybody forgets in the World Trade Center, I thought it was I immediately
- 18:36assumed it was a bombing. Nobody else does, right, but you know,
- 18:38I kind of just assumed this was a sort of bombing. I called
- 18:42a friend of mine. I was like, yeah, they tried again.
- 18:48He was in New York. He hadn't even heard anything. It was the
- 18:52first he'd heard of it. I go back on with the client. The
- 18:55client is asking me about the minutia of board minutes, and somebody runs in
- 19:02and says, you know, the tower is on fire, like this is
- 19:06It was a This was a jet plane that went into the tower. And
- 19:11so I said, look, this is New York. I'm a New Yorker.
- 19:14I'm up there in Boston but the guy is up in New Hampshire,
- 19:15and I said, I gotta I gotta go, and he goes, you'll
- 19:18call me back, I'll go. I gotta go. So so I went.
- 19:26I watched with everybody else the second tower fall, and I'll never forget
- 19:32that either, because the newscaster on the feed that I was watching did not
- 19:37realize the second the towers were collapsing. They were just reporting as the towers
- 19:41are sort of on fire. They were just they just didn't know. And
- 19:45then, of course, because we were in a high rise, you know,
- 19:49they we evacuated the building, walked home. Everybody's out on the streets
- 19:53just wandering around in a daze, kind of crazy. And then, because
- 20:00it's the corporate world, within a few days, we're back at work and
- 20:04it is you don't even know. I mean, everybody's talking about it.
- 20:10It's a thing. But it's back to you know, meet the client deadlines,
- 20:15and the clients are focused on a whole bunch of other things. They're
- 20:21focused on corporate governance issues, bankruptcy issues, finance issues. The next mezzanine
- 20:26round of a financing for a joint venture, is it going to be affected
- 20:30by the events that are happening, you know, does this effect our you
- 20:34know, the funding that's coming in, you know, because there's some turbulence
- 20:37in the markets. I said, okay, I'm working away. And then
- 20:42we go into Afghanistan because the Taliban refused to turn over bin Laden. And
- 20:51you know, this is you know, two thousand and one now, and
- 20:55I'm a year year and a half in and I'm walking around the luffer.
- 20:59But I'm just sort of I mean, I really enjoyed the partners I worked
- 21:03with. There were some terrific people there. But I would poke my head
- 21:06in I go, you know where at war. People would look at me
- 21:11like you're a little different, and I'm like you had this feeling like,
- 21:18okay, this is a there's something larger going on here. It's my city
- 21:23that's affected. Afghanistan is something that I'd been tracking, you know, all
- 21:27the way back from you know, high school. I think we all remember
- 21:30that National Geographic cover with the girl with the green eyes, you know,
- 21:33I mean that that thing was all seered into us. Then I'd studied the
- 21:37topic, and colleges I discussed, and so I just had a sense that
- 21:44you know, you got to join and a lot of other people, you
- 21:47know, joined the military at that time. You know, for me,
- 21:49I ended up with an offer from from the Foreign Service, and so I
- 21:55said, okay, I'm taking that and headed off to you know, see
- 22:00what I can contribute. Now. The Foreign Service they don't you know,
- 22:02they'll say, okay, you're you're coming in. You're going to go to
- 22:04Afghanistan, right, But that's that's sort of how I got in into the
- 22:10career. Can weind rewind it a little bit because you you were involved in
- 22:14a bombing and then and and I'd love to hear about short experience if you
- 22:19don't mind talking. No, absolutely, So this is August seventh, nineteen
- 22:23ninety eight. Dara Salaam was a you know, bustling but relatively sleepy,
- 22:33dusty port town. I had just gotten back from a trip to Arusha to
- 22:38visit the International Criminal Court where I was kind of reporting on the activities there
- 22:45so we could kind of see where our investment uh. And they again,
- 22:49they were prosecuting folks that were responsible for the genocide and kind of wanted to
- 22:56see how that effort was going. And this is in northern Tanzania, at
- 23:00the base of kiliman Jarro, and it was having a great summer. Again.
- 23:06I had been a Peace Corps volunteer in Kenya, so I knew the
- 23:08region had a little opportunity to go on safari. It's always great, you
- 23:12know. And I get back and we're in a morning staff meeting during the
- 23:22summer, particularly at embassies that are smaller in their footprint. You know,
- 23:29not every embassy is Embassy Beijing with you know, a thousand people working there.
- 23:34You know, some of our African embassies may have you know, fifteen
- 23:38twenty officers. The summer is generally transfer season, so you have a lot
- 23:45of interns, temporary duty people out there, very small staff. So they
- 23:51were about ten or eleven of us in the charge's office. I mentioned charge
- 23:56is the acting ambassador. We hadn't had ambassador appointed yet, or had the
- 24:03ambassador hadn't arrived at post yet. The charge was John Lang and just a
- 24:10regular morning staff meeting to go over you know, where are we with development
- 24:15assistance today? That kind of thing, you know, who's in, who's
- 24:18out of the office, and we hear a large boom is the best way
- 24:26I can describe it. And then there was a strange, pressurized feeling and
- 24:33I was sitting right next to the charge on a couch just like yours,
- 24:41and I slouch, which is good because normally if I was standing up,
- 24:48the entire window structure went over us and hit the back wall of the office.
- 24:56And folks were sitting sort of in an L shape like me, and
- 25:00they were covered with debris. But if you'd been standing, if any of
- 25:04us have been standing in front of that window, somebody would have been decapitated.
- 25:11So people were sort of cut up in shock, kind of wondering and
- 25:18it's dar As Salam, What what's going to happen in Daras Salaam? You
- 25:22know, you had the trouble in the east, out in Goma where you're
- 25:30talking about, you know, the Rwandans and the Eastern DRC issue with the
- 25:37Hutus and the Tutsis are still you know, fighting. This is ninety eight,
- 25:40right, so you're you're doing you know, I mean, there's still
- 25:44still fighting there. So was it something related to that? Could it have
- 25:47been some sort of you know, honestly, gas explosion? Right, That's
- 25:52that's more what you're thinking. You're not thinking you're going to be the epicenter
- 25:56of a of a terrorist attack. It just but the shape of the embassy
- 26:04was such that the bomb went off on a corner and blew out the whole
- 26:10corner. We were sort of tucked around in a second wing of the embassy,
- 26:15so we sort of got the blast came around. It had come in
- 26:21under a water truck, water delivery truck. Massive, massive hole. So
- 26:30we didn't know any of this though. We start making our way out.
- 26:33We go one direction and we decide, okay, we got to there seemed
- 26:38to be some damage where things had fallen in. I was trailing the whole
- 26:44group. Our charge was at the lead. He disappeared. He went down
- 26:49to our consular section and was digging out one of the consular officers who was
- 26:56the spouse of one of our marines who was buried under the rubb. She
- 27:00survived, so he had made it immediately did that. We made our way
- 27:07out, and you know, we had a wall in front of the embassy
- 27:11that was concrete gone vaporized. All of the motor pool which was parked out
- 27:21front on the street pancaked. All the frames melted completely, right, but
- 27:30we kept hearing pop pop pop pop. Sounded like gunfire. It was tires
- 27:34exploding from the residual heat. So We're all standing there. Everybody's in a
- 27:41daze, and trucks pull up and ladders come over. I think it was
- 27:49like, I don't know, fire trucks, I don't know who's coming.
- 27:52Maybe it was the local Tanzania. We made our way over the wall.
- 27:56There was a French embassy compound on the far side of a a road.
- 28:02We went over there and then I could see everybody was completely dazed, and
- 28:07so I started doing accountability and just got out. I said hey, and
- 28:11I remember my boss, Chris mcmowan later became an ambassador, a great diplomat,
- 28:17the head of the political section, just absent mindedly, you know,
- 28:19handed me a pen and I took it one of those old yellow sheets and
- 28:25started saying, who's here. In the end, we didn't lose any Americans,
- 28:30but we lost eleven of our Tanzanian colleagues, and there were some other
- 28:34folks that were, you know, vaporized on the street. And then you
- 28:40know, from that point on, we sort of regrouped and we figured we
- 28:45were going to go to our public affairs officer's house and we regrouped there.
- 28:51That was the sort of the the part that we were going to go back
- 28:53to if there was ever anything like this, it's not a contingency plan,
- 29:00and we may have gone to the charge's house first. We ended up at
- 29:06the public affairs house. I think we went to the charge's house first.
- 29:10I remember at some point there was like a fax machine or something and I
- 29:15saw a printed thing come in that said this is Israelis think this is Issama
- 29:22bin Laden. Oh wow that quickly, Yeah, it was like within hours,
- 29:29right. But the other thing that happened is where there were like,
- 29:34okay, so this is a bombing, where at the epicenter of bombing,
- 29:37we don't know what's going on. The Marines are trying to secure the premises
- 29:44small it's our Marine Security detachment and you know, for embassy workers, these
- 29:48guys are gold right. Our MSG's are our core defense. They're under the
- 29:55control of the RSO, so they're cut to the Regional security off right.
- 30:00So it's a unique arrangement. And the Regional Security officer was immediately liaising with
- 30:10you know, host country officials. But they're trying to secure it. So
- 30:14we still had a whole bunch of communications equipment in there. I had to
- 30:18go back with our communicator to with a sledgehammer yeah, this is how we
- 30:23did with a sledgehammer to bust up everything. Because the truth is, we
- 30:27weren't going to be able to really fully secure this compound. And you know,
- 30:33back in those days, there was still a lot of paper files around.
- 30:36Then we're burning things, you know, feeding them into an incinerator and
- 30:40stuff. These days it's a lot it's more efficient because there's just a lot
- 30:44less paper. We had paper file cabinets. You had to break into the
- 30:47cabinet and so I did a lot of you know, destruction of the of
- 30:52the sensitive items with a sledgehammer with by one other coworker who was her responsibility.
- 31:00She ran that shop. I'd never even been back there. I had
- 31:03no oh we got servers. I have no idea what's going on. So
- 31:07but then I remember, you know, seeing you know, this has bin
- 31:11laden and this is a terrorist attack. But in that early in those early
- 31:18moments, were like, okay, so you know, we got to need
- 31:22Washington support. And we find out Nairobi's been bombed. So it took us
- 31:29a little time, but we realized that this is a dual bombing. And
- 31:33then everybody was under lockdown because they thought that Campala was going to be bombed
- 31:37too, but that shifted everybody's attention because Nairobi's embassy. Our embassy was in
- 31:45essentially a suburban area at a crossroads of two large roads. It was a
- 31:49dispersed explosion. It crushed the embassy, it crushed the chancery right, blew
- 31:56out all our walls, pancaked everything, but we had a small foot print
- 32:00and there were virtually no civilians around in Nairobi. There was a it was
- 32:07a complex attack where there was like a grenade or something went off in advance,
- 32:12and they're in a downtown concentrated area, and two hundred and forty people
- 32:16were killed. And you also had secondary explosions so that people had heard some
- 32:22sort of initial disturbance. Kenyans had gone to the windows in these downtown offices
- 32:29and the windows were all blown over them. So it was this massive event,
- 32:35and you know, Washington's attention went to Nairobi because we were also we
- 32:40had lost Americans. You had a collapsed building in downtown, and you had
- 32:45thousands of people trying to be helpful, you know, complete chaos, whereas
- 32:50we were in this sort of more days discreete and we had crowds gathering,
- 32:55but you know again it was the nature of the area. So you know,
- 33:00that was it. That was the start of you know, for me,
- 33:04the global warrant at that time ben Laden was he still in Sudan or
- 33:08he had been exiled by that No, he was in Sudan. And so
- 33:12if you guys remember we the initial response was was to you know, drop
- 33:17some some missiles on what was claimed to be some sort of pharmaceutical factory.
- 33:23You know, I honestly lost the thread on you know, sort of what
- 33:28what happened. But that's how you know this. The Sudanese didn't want any
- 33:34part of him after that. That's how he ended up in Afghanistan, right
- 33:37right, because he was looking for safe space and we were putting pressure to
- 33:45on the Sudanese to turn him over and he just got out of Dodge.
- 33:49So that takes us through. Then you told us about nine to eleven propelling
- 33:54you towards foreign service. Tell us about I mean, it sounds like maybe
- 34:00this was your first overseas assignment. Was was Liberia the first one? So
- 34:07I count this because I was an acting political officer. It was an internship,
- 34:12but you know, I was doing the job and you know, so
- 34:15I count that the first formal assignment was Liberia in two thousand and three.
- 34:19So I go through the whole you know, you know process to bring us
- 34:23in. They give us, you know, ten eleven weeks of training,
- 34:27and then you're out the door and I get to Liberia in April of two
- 34:32thousand and three. So what's happening in April of two thousand and three.
- 34:37Charles Taylor is in Liberia. He's under extraordinary sanction arms embargo. They had
- 34:49just done an embargo on Timber to try to cut off revenues to Taylor because
- 34:55you know, he had sort of come to power running a lot of irregular
- 35:01units. There's a lot of stories about the early nineties and sort of you
- 35:07know, his legendary coming in at Christmas and you know, eventually eventually winning
- 35:15an essentially internal struggle to get control of Liberia. He was definitely on the
- 35:21on the wrong side of Washington policy, so he was on the outs.
- 35:27But he had allowed his troops to get because he wasn't paying them to sort
- 35:34of go loot in internal conflict that had broken out in neighboring Cote Devoir,
- 35:43and the Ivorians got mad and they allowed an insurgency to you know, crop
- 35:51up there magically, while there was another ongoing one on the border with Guinea
- 35:57and Sierra Leone. The Lord rebels, No, it's not the Lord of
- 36:02right. Yeah, it was like Liberians united for the Restoration of democracy.
- 36:08You know. So everybody's got there. And the other one was Modell in
- 36:12the south. So so Taylor was now facing two insurgencies from different bases while
- 36:21being under tremendous pressure, and Liberia was just sort of collapsing in on itself
- 36:30and turning into a real humanitarian catastrophe. They had, you know, several
- 36:36hundred thousand internally displaced people, and the war started to come into toward Monrovia.
- 36:45They started making gains because again, you know, people weren't really getting
- 36:50paid and the payment was looting, and the looting was driving chaos and so
- 36:53it was it was all manner of bad situation. And so so you know,
- 37:00my first assignment was to go into the embassy. I you know,
- 37:04you get a bid list of potential places you could go. You're matched with
- 37:12I had eighty nine people in my incoming class. There's eighty nine places you
- 37:17find. Everybody enters. They have different ideas of what they want to do
- 37:21with their careers. You know, there's certain people who they want those parish
- 37:23jobs. Not a lot of parish jobs for the entry level officers. You
- 37:30know, I think I put like Moscow as my number one. I was
- 37:32always interested in sort of seeing what the Russians were up to. But I
- 37:37had library pretty high, and not a lot of people had library a very
- 37:40high, so, you know, and it was because of the crisis experience
- 37:45I had, and that again the sense that you want to do something with
- 37:47your career, that you're part of something bigger, different. I knew there
- 37:52was conflict, and you know, this is opportunity to diplomacy because for me,
- 37:58I talked about the management of international relations because you started with China,
- 38:01you start with strategic competition, right, so that is the core. But
- 38:07the core core is war and peace. And you know what drew me was
- 38:13the same impulse that drew me to apply for the Navy to be interested in,
- 38:17you know, working on military issues, is that that if you can
- 38:22be part of something that stops a war, you know, that can that
- 38:29can be meaningful work, deeply meaningful work, which I just want to point
- 38:32out the Libera experience is detailed in your book here the Embassy, not just
- 38:37your experience but some of your colleagues as well that you went through there.
- 38:40And I'm afraid I haven't read it yet, but I plan too. It
- 38:45sounds really good homework for you guys. But absolutely so. I would love
- 38:51to hear because we always hear about embargos and we hear about sanctions. What
- 38:55is an embargo? How does US enforce that of art bargo? And then
- 39:00at a time like maybe when China wasn't so much a near peer, but
- 39:05like Russia may have, how if we put in an embargo or sanctions in
- 39:09another country decides to just ignore that, What are the recourses for us?
- 39:15This is a great and timely question. You know, sanctions I think were
- 39:22viewed It's a little bit before our time, but I think they were viewed
- 39:28as an alternative to military solutions and as a way to sort of shape behavior
- 39:36in a world that is completely dominated by the US dollar. Okay, the
- 39:43sanctions idea, there's certain things that you could always do, like deny entry
- 39:49to the country, an individual sanction on visas, which you know is perfectly
- 39:53reasonable. You commit you know, human rights abuses or something right is not
- 40:00going to invite you to to the United States is that you don't have no
- 40:02right to come here, right, you need to apply to come here legally.
- 40:07So but you know, there were there were a couple things. Uh.
- 40:12So it was born out of the discomfort with apartheid and how do we
- 40:20shape South African behavior or you know, the government's and I hate the word
- 40:28behavior because we're not you know, you know, it's not a parent child
- 40:32relationships. It's patronizing right for us. But how do you how do you
- 40:36shape or influence policies of a foreign government? And one way to do that
- 40:43was, you know, to try sanctions, and so it was a means
- 40:49to respond to apartheid. It was one of the core ways to do it.
- 40:53An embargo where you stop sending uh you know, aid has a you
- 41:01know, is a way to express our own policy directly into a country.
- 41:07So, you know, the most famous examples are from the you know,
- 41:13the Carter years, where they introduced really human rights into the as a as
- 41:17a core part of our calculus. In the late seventies, and so we
- 41:21started trying to scale back military assistance to right wing governments in Latin America.
- 41:27And then when Reagan came in. He flipped it and he said, no,
- 41:29no, no, those are our allies. We're not giving it up
- 41:31to the Sandinistas. And so we're gonna we're going to turn the aid back
- 41:37on. So the embargo would be, hey, we're stopping that. So
- 41:40sanctions work if a country doesn't have friends, Okay, if the country has
- 41:47a lot of friends, sanctions don't work. Liberia didn't have a lot of
- 41:50friends. So, and we were at a moment in history where Russia and
- 41:57the Cold War was over. You're talking late nineties, early two thousands.
- 42:01China had not exceeded. They just acceeded to the WTO thanks to US.
- 42:07They were not an economic powerhouse. They did not have all these diplomatic resources.
- 42:10They were still very much dealing with China and and and you know,
- 42:17Russia's army was in complete disarray. They were at a point of you know,
- 42:22uh, not a lot of you know, it was the Yelts and
- 42:23years moving into early early putin. So the the KGB had not re established,
- 42:30you know, full control over things. And so here you have an
- 42:32isolated country that's running a cash economy right where the key sources of revenue or
- 42:39shipping registry. It's run out of Virginia. And you know timber that they
- 42:45were selling, and so if you sanction that, meaning you you get agreement
- 42:49at the Security Council that countries will not buy Liberian timber. There's no market
- 42:54for it. So when they go in and pull in to a port with
- 42:58the Liberian timber, it can't be offloaded. So now there's no revenue coming
- 43:05in. Now what are you doing. You're starving that country of the resources
- 43:07to do what buy guns to perpetuate the regime. It's a way to put
- 43:12pressure on the regime in that case. You know, eventually the objective really
- 43:16was to just have Charles Taylor leave, but you know the core objective was
- 43:22to steer them back to democratic elections. That's what we were trying to do.
- 43:27How did that go when you got there in two thousand and three?
- 43:30How did things kind of unfold in Liberia? Yeah? Well, what had
- 43:34happened was the sanctions were somewhat effective again, but it was part in just
- 43:37the sort of the way the country was being run. Where money would come
- 43:40in, it would be cash dispersed. They weren't doing a sophisticated banking section.
- 43:45There so the regime was collapsing, and you know, our thinking was
- 43:52that the war was going to be going on indefinitely, and so our role
- 43:57was to try to get the groups to the peace table. And I think
- 44:02Taylor started taking some hits in the south part of the southern part of the
- 44:08country because of again this new insurgency that had come up. I think it
- 44:15started. I think he was going to try to play the long game and
- 44:17go to peace talks and kind of draw it out. But the rebels didn't
- 44:22really have the ability to overthrow them, and so peace talks were initiated.
- 44:29They started up these trilateral peace talks in Ghana, and right at the start
- 44:36of the peace talks, a court for Sierra Leone, a special court that
- 44:42we are Congress was funding with an American prosecutor again for crimes that they accused
- 44:50Charles Taylor of committing in Sierra Leone. More backstory to why Charles Taylor was
- 44:54on everybody's blacklist was, if you guys remember the Sierra Leone, you know,
- 45:00conflict was horrific. You know, they would do things like, you
- 45:05know, cut the arms off children and pile them in a pile in the
- 45:08middle of the village and I mean just horrific, horrific crimes. So Taylor
- 45:15was in trouble with this Special Court. The Special Court unseals an indictment for
- 45:21the head of State of Liberia while he was out of the country in Ghana.
- 45:28This led the complete chaos back in Liberia where they were like, oh
- 45:31my god, are the President's gone. All of his militia, you know,
- 45:37started panicking, and so the Ghanaians were like, you're asking us,
- 45:43the court is asking us to We invited this guy for peace talks, to
- 45:46bring the parties together, and you're gonna tell us we're supposed to arrest him.
- 45:51They flew him back. They flew him back to Liberia because Liberia was
- 45:55melting down. And who gets who's the victims? The victims of the population
- 46:00that's at the mercy of you know, militia that are completely loyal to one
- 46:06guy who thinks their guy has been taken off the board and they're gonna loot
- 46:12and they're gonna rape and pillage and do damage. And then you also had
- 46:17rebel groups that were basically doing the same thing. So the rebel groups took
- 46:21that as a momentum play. Taylor returns he gets back command and control.
- 46:24But the rebels, you know, the other rebels, the lord attacks the
- 46:30city and they made it, you know, further than people thought. Over
- 46:35the course of the a three month period, the rebels attacked Monrovia three times
- 46:43and they ended up taking half the city and driving everybody into the center of
- 46:49the city. By everybody, I mean tens of thousands of displaced people and
- 46:53people who had lived in the city in the part of the city that the
- 46:57rebels had come in. They all came streaming into the uh the embassy,
- 47:02into the variety of the environs of the embassy. Because Liberia has such a
- 47:07unique relationship with the US, we essentially gave money to found the country.
- 47:14The idea was to give former slaves a homeland back in in the in Africa.
- 47:22Liberia is like liberty. Yeah, yeah, that's right. So so
- 47:25the whole idea of Liberia. So there's has been this long, unique historical
- 47:30relationship between Liberia and the United States. Far too complicated. We could do
- 47:37a whole nother podcast on that, but but for the for these purposes,
- 47:42you know, folks had sort of crowded around the embassy. What was amazing
- 47:47was at the low point. We had about six officers and seven marines and
- 47:54our local guards. So embassies, the embassy secure posture is generally reliant on
- 48:02host country security. Hear, the host country security or contract security, but
- 48:08there's also a relationship between the host country security and our contract security. So
- 48:14in Liberia, because of the ongoing conflict, we had contract security, but
- 48:19those are local Liberians, just as we had local Tanzanians that provide the bulk
- 48:24of the security for an embassy. So it's very unique dynamic. And your
- 48:30marines are really sort of inside the perimeter, you know, protecting the core
- 48:34things of the chancery. So you had seven marines and that, and that
- 48:40was sort of dealing with hundreds of thousands of people at the gate saying what
- 48:45are you going to do to help us out? What's also happening right at
- 48:50this time Iraq, Iraq. So from a US government military standpoint, from
- 49:00a Defense Department standpoint, particularly Rumsfeld, it was we do not need this
- 49:09problem. You guys are out. Colin Powell was Secretary of State and he's
- 49:16like, this is our credibility for all of our defense and security architecture in
- 49:22West Africa. So everybody will look to see what we are doing in Liberia.
- 49:29If the United States is committed to its partners, and we had been
- 49:32spending a lot of money on building up echoas the economic community of West African
- 49:37States, but from a military training standpoint to handle regional security problems, putting
- 49:45money into Nigeria Ghana, but it had been a mixed result. In the
- 49:53mid nineties, there had been Echo echoass missions that the Nigerians had gone into
- 49:58Liberian It didn't work out so well for anybody. So, you know,
- 50:04Colin Powell said, no, no, we have reasons to be there.
- 50:07There's a humanitarian crisis. We shouldn't just you know, abandon the folks in
- 50:12a country that we have a deep historical relationship to. We've got broader issues.
- 50:16And then there's always in the global War on terror world, the core
- 50:23belief right was ungoverned spaces are going to lead to places that you know,
- 50:29Al Qaeda and others can take root. And so this is the counter argument
- 50:35to just what are we doing. It's totally chaotic because if you look at
- 50:37it from a diplomatic security standpoint, a military standpoint, you say, you've
- 50:44got no way to exfiltrate the airport is twenty miles away. Your neighbor is
- 50:52you know, through the jungle. There are no roads going out there that
- 50:57are passable. It's you know, two days drive out through Sierra Leone.
- 51:02You can't convoy out. You can't convoy out through Guinea or you know,
- 51:09you know Cote dey Voors because rebels hold that territory. So what did we
- 51:15do. The first thing we did is the French came sent a warship.
- 51:20I got in touch with the one French attache who was there, and we
- 51:24conducted an evacuation. But the ambassador, John Blaney, said, hey,
- 51:30here's the case for staying. And I think it's my estimation that the Liberians
- 51:37want us to stay. That means the rebels and the government who were trying
- 51:44to get the head of state out, they still want us. He's making
- 51:49that assessment right, And so that's a call because if you look at it
- 51:55sort of tactically, if you're looking at threat streams, you're isolated. You
- 52:00don't have the assets. So we evacuated everybody onto this front. By everybody,
- 52:05I mean we called Americans that were in town and said hey, if
- 52:09you can make it to the embassy, well we'll get you out with the
- 52:13French, because the French were evacuating the UN and other foreign nationals. The
- 52:16Lebanese whoever was around, not a lot of It wasn't a big tourist destination.
- 52:22In two thousand and three, they got everybody out and a second rebel
- 52:29attack happened. Right again, I told you there were three attacks. So
- 52:32now you know the number one response for US is at the time we had
- 52:38a fast platoon that would come down from Europe to augment embassy security. The
- 52:45ambassador of course asked for the fast platoon. Rumsfeld held it wouldn't act on,
- 52:50it wouldn't send down, wouldn't let the platoon go down to starve us
- 52:53out real stuff. So they end up because of the high level differences in
- 53:04the cabinet between Rumsfeld and Powell, and Powell being the advocate to actually get
- 53:10something done here, we end up getting half the platoon and uh and we
- 53:20got some some seals to augment our security. So they went in. Yeah,
- 53:24they went in and uh so, so we had this this small augmentation,
- 53:30but everybody had mixed signals because some people were getting the signal that we're
- 53:37going to send an aircraft carrier and we did send an aircraft carrier, and
- 53:42the ambassador sent a cable because we needed to request a NEO to get the
- 53:46aircraft carrier to get out non competent evacuation operation. Right, and Don didn't
- 53:53care for that. I'm sure so well, so so well he wanted it
- 53:58at that point, he did well because the NEO is the way to get
- 54:00us out. What the ambassador did was he requested the neo, but the
- 54:07embassy would stay open with a core staff of two or three people to work
- 54:13the diplomacy. And that said, you know, that led to you know,
- 54:19just real, real, real fights. So the rebels pull out,
- 54:24they get beaten back, and we're in this sort of stasis. Charles Taylor
- 54:30can't leave, he can't go back to peace talks because he's under indictment and
- 54:34doesn't know if he's going to get rolled up. President Bush goes on television
- 54:38and says, Charles Taylor needs to go. Now. We talk about sanctions,
- 54:44we talk about the effect of diplomacy. Right, if you go back
- 54:47to if you said this today, a foreign leader may just say, what
- 54:52are we talking about? Who's going to remove me? Right? I've got
- 54:55friends, I've got other spate. Charles Taylor is looking, what did we
- 54:59just done to Saddam Hussein when we said Saddam Hussein has to do it?
- 55:02Right? He doesn't know, yeah, as a factual matter, that he's
- 55:07under indictment. Potential ships are coming, He's seeing more marines coming into the
- 55:14country. Right. He doesn't know that this is not an assassination operation,
- 55:20has no idea right right. It's also weird because to get all these people
- 55:24into the country. We're in touch with his national security advisor and his team
- 55:29saying, hey, don't shoot at our helicopters because we're bringing people in.
- 55:34So we're working with the guy. We're trying to remove fairly complicated stuff because
- 55:40I once had an analyst tell me that Americans politicians, you know they they
- 55:50or administrations. I say, they just don't understand like foreign mentalities, and
- 55:55that if they like shake hands with somebody, then that somebody thinks that America
- 56:04has their back, and they don't understand like that. They don't understand that
- 56:08that could shift two months or three months down the road if somebody else comes
- 56:14into office or somebody else's appointed to a position like that. Americans just don't
- 56:22understand that. So many of these people think very long term and Americans think
- 56:25very short term when it comes to politics or political Yeah, the way I'll
- 56:29put it, I mean our strength is a country is we're optimistic and forward
- 56:34looking. I mean, this is you know, and and and you know,
- 56:37folks who you know are your audience, are people who believe in purpose,
- 56:45believe in the country, believe in that that we stand for things right.
- 56:52But by definition that means we're very forward looking and we tend to allid
- 56:59history. We just tend to do it. And you know, I think
- 57:04a good example is, you know, going back a few years, we
- 57:08were on the wrong side from the African National Congress, from Mandela's party,
- 57:14were on the wrong side of the apartheid debate. Right when Mandela came in
- 57:17to us, Americans were like, this is a great story, right,
- 57:22He's a voice of the people. He's preaching a peaceful right, not a
- 57:29retributive thing. This is the story we all want to hear. It's a
- 57:32new multicultural South Africa, all of that, and so we love South Africa,
- 57:40right, and and multiple administrations, you know, looked at South Africa
- 57:45as this shining model of multi ethnic democracy, triumph of you know, progressive
- 57:52politics, right, South Africans are like, well, you've still got half
- 57:57of our people sanctioned as terrorists. So we didn't forget right, we were
- 58:02happy that you're you're happy with Mandela, but you they didn't forget that part
- 58:08of the history. We tend to be like, but that was that was
- 58:14like like that was like that was that was yesterday, and so you know
- 58:19this is true again, you know, there's a so there's a an ahistorical
- 58:27element to us foreign policy. We're looking at we're very much looking forward.
- 58:31And look, you guys have dealt with it a new rack. Yeah,
- 58:35you deal with it in places. Hey, uh, you know, we
- 58:38just we were I mean, we were supporting Saddam against the Iranians, right,
- 58:49and then all of a sudden, now we're on the wrong side of
- 58:51Saddam. So we gave all these terms to like fulfill. He did it.
- 58:57He thinks he thinks that like we're like cope aesthetic now and then it's
- 59:01like, oh, good off, he's got to go like yeah, I
- 59:04mean, and so that can lead to i'd seen some difficult outcomes or just
- 59:13misunderstanding. So again, the core for diplomats and the core for analysts,
- 59:20the people who are charged with the long term view is for your ambassador class
- 59:27and for those to learn the history, understand the history, understand the environment
- 59:31which you're operating in. As we define we, our administration, our Congress
- 59:37define us interests today, you've got to interpret that in a way for the
- 59:43local audience so they understand where we're coming from, so that you can say,
- 59:46Okay, you know, I recognize the history. I understand where we've
- 59:51come from. But here's why I'm saying the relationship has to get to a
- 59:54different place or here's where the relationship needs to be today, because the policy
- 59:59won't necessarily be taking the history into account. So rather wrap up Liberia for
- 1:00:05us because I'd like to make sure we have enough time to talk about Afghanistan.
- 1:00:07Yeah, for sure. So you know, in the end, what
- 1:00:13was interesting in Liberia is the ambassador wouldn't leave. He won. He had
- 1:00:20the backing of Colin Powell. It was a gutsy move because you know,
- 1:00:25if it goes wrong, you end up with, you know, a situation
- 1:00:30like Mexonity, and you're the person avery blame exactly. And the messer knew
- 1:00:35that. He gave us all an option he said to the whole you know,
- 1:00:38the country team, very few of us, but he said, anybody
- 1:00:40wants to leave, you can, you can check out. We had a
- 1:00:45extraordinary defense attage and she and I worked together to establish contact with the rebels
- 1:00:57and we got the numbers for the and eventually what happened was again you can
- 1:01:06read the details you know at your own leisure, But eventually what happened was
- 1:01:13we had the rebels owning half the city and Charles Taylor and his group in
- 1:01:19the other half of the city, and civilians caught in between mortars dropping on
- 1:01:23everybody. It was like fish in a barrel. Bad scenes, very tough
- 1:01:29time. We were able to go in and convinced Charles Tayler to leave,
- 1:01:37not us. That was done at senior levels, and he was convinced that
- 1:01:42he's going to have to leave. He ends up going to Nigeria. On
- 1:01:45the ground, we crossed the front lines with a small contingent of folks that
- 1:01:52had deployed from JTF Liberia. JTF was stood up and it deployed in through
- 1:01:59the embassy and we took a contingent of folks from JTF Liberia. We got
- 1:02:06an echo mill and West African peacekeepers were able to come in and we were
- 1:02:12able to broker a local ceasefire that got the rebels to voluntarily pull out of
- 1:02:16the capital and allow for the broader peace agreement to take hold, because otherwise
- 1:02:22they could have just fought until the end. It allowed the broader peace agreement
- 1:02:27to take hold that was hashed out in Ghana and we were able to end
- 1:02:30the war. So it was the core stuff of diplomacy, as I talked
- 1:02:34about. So after Liberia, tell us about your kind of entry into Afghanistan,
- 1:02:43how that begins for you. Yeah, So after Liberia, I went
- 1:02:46off to Beijing, and then I was in Ethiopia. And in Ethiopia I
- 1:02:55did a TDY to CJTFO, you know, our counter terrorism platform in Jibouti,
- 1:03:04And so I'd had some experience working with a command staff. And when
- 1:03:12two thousand and nine rolled around and there was a big push to get a
- 1:03:15civilian complement to the military effort. As we started to surge troops into Afghanistan,
- 1:03:24they were looking to fill these billets that had been created by General Ikenberry.
- 1:03:30Ikenberry, as you know, had been the commander of the forces over
- 1:03:34there, US Forces over there. I don't know if he was commander,
- 1:03:37but he was. I guess he was. And then he became ambassador.
- 1:03:39He was made ambassador under President Obama. But rather than have a traditional political
- 1:03:45advisor that's a State Department person attached to a commanding officer, he had this
- 1:03:51idea that as the military elements ramp up and you've got you know, two
- 1:04:00all the way up to your you know, command headquarters, that you would
- 1:04:05pair civilian leaders that would report back to him and the embassy, but be
- 1:04:11sort of co equals with the military commanders at each level as I've described,
- 1:04:17you know. So I took one of these jobs. It was a brigade
- 1:04:23level. They called it senior civilian representative, so they would have it down
- 1:04:27at the you know, battalion level. They even had it down at the
- 1:04:30company level in some provinces, so company senior civilian representative, you know,
- 1:04:35battalion, brigade, and then division. Up at division, we had an
- 1:04:40ambassador rank person or a senior person that was going to be you know,
- 1:04:45paired with the generals up there. So I was paired with initially Task Force
- 1:04:51Mountain Warrior, and I went down and Randy George, who's now the Chief
- 1:04:56of Staff of the Army is you know the uh he's you know, was
- 1:05:01the brigade commander and UH sixty five hundred troops. We were responsible for N
- 1:05:10two KL so that was Nangahar, Kunar, Logman and Norristan. And you
- 1:05:16know, we didn't have a lot of presence up in Norris Stan at that
- 1:05:19time. Uh, you know, but we had thirty five cops and fobs
- 1:05:27scattered throughout the four provinces. Uh, and it was you know, pretty
- 1:05:32intense combat operations. The main effort was under the crystal and it was down
- 1:05:40south, so we were, you know, the supporting effort per the campaign
- 1:05:46plan. But you know it was very clear that we needed we were you
- 1:05:53know, going heavy into coin. Well this was this was this was a
- 1:05:58coin centered approached to the to the war. So, I mean we've talked
- 1:06:02a lot about on the show, including about Nurse Stand specifically from a military
- 1:06:06infantry special ops perspective. I mean, what was it like for you as
- 1:06:11a diplomat to dovetail with that effort and as you talk about, you know,
- 1:06:15wage of accounter insurgency. So you know, again we talked a little
- 1:06:20before the show that it was interesting because when I was in Liberia, the
- 1:06:28command element from the JTF. They sent a liaison from the ships into my
- 1:06:33office, right and you know, I said, take this space, set
- 1:06:39up what you need to set up. We're going to be hand in glove.
- 1:06:41But you're coming in on an embassy platform under Chief Admission authority because it
- 1:06:46was not an active combat role. I mean it was they were in a
- 1:06:50combat zone, but you're fundamentally embedding with us to achieve the diplomatic outcome,
- 1:06:57you know, in Afghanistan, and the civilians were embedded and relied one hundred
- 1:07:02percent on the military downrange. We were opening some consulates. We had a
- 1:07:08couple of consulates open up in Bombyan for example, that you know had a
- 1:07:12slightly different footprint because the Taliban had just not penetrated there the same way they
- 1:07:16had self drive for example. But I was embedded, and this civilian complement
- 1:07:26to the military was going to be you know, development experts, So yeah,
- 1:07:30USAID, Department of Agriculture, and then you know, you State Department,
- 1:07:36diplomats. The idea in the you know, counterinsurgency operation of course,
- 1:07:43was that you were going to work by with and through your partners, and
- 1:07:45you were going to build governance in the in the provinces, because the core
- 1:07:51issue in Afghanistan fundamentally was nobody liked the government, and the government each didn't
- 1:08:00go down to the village level. I mean two thousand and nine, ten
- 1:08:05years into the war. Nine years into the war, you know, you
- 1:08:13had a unitary government that would appoint people down to the district level, but
- 1:08:18those people were not from the district. The people were not from the province
- 1:08:25at the provincial level. So the idea, of course was to instill We
- 1:08:31also had rule of law experts like lawyers that went out and the idea was
- 1:08:34to first explain to the Afghan people the constitution that the Afghan people had crafted
- 1:08:42for themselves, right because it was just not understood, explain to them the
- 1:08:46benefits of kabble to people who had very little interaction with Kabble other than the
- 1:08:53officials that were given that they could see very clearly were kind of looting the
- 1:08:57money that we were pouring in. So, but this is the idea right
- 1:09:02now, when the structure is such that we're embedded. The truth is is
- 1:09:08you know, you you know, it's going to take a commander who is
- 1:09:12also given the task of doing governance and development. It's actually built into their
- 1:09:16subordinate plans. Right. So you're talking to a battalion commander. They're supposed
- 1:09:23to go out and they have the relationship with the provincial governor, They've got
- 1:09:27the relationship with their company. Commander has the relationship with people the state department
- 1:09:32person in theory should lead on that. But you know, I think in
- 1:09:36Afghanistan, given that these were military leads and the military was providing all the
- 1:09:42platform and sustainment, where it was effective, Where it worked in terms of
- 1:09:46the civilian military relationship was where the civilian understood, how can I be of
- 1:09:53use to you, the commander? Right, And again I say, in
- 1:09:56my own organization, this is a controversial position. You're supposed to lead.
- 1:10:00Well, I'm not leading a brigade commander with sixty five hundred people. I
- 1:10:04had forty people in four provinces that are all reliant on what the command provides.
- 1:10:10Right. So the dynamic you work out is that it's partially advisory,
- 1:10:18partially consultative. But I also just you know, road right, So when
- 1:10:26we needed to do things that would help brief up, we could brief up.
- 1:10:30I also report it. This was an interesting dynamic because what you find
- 1:10:34is is that in a true embedded relationship, by being out of channel,
- 1:10:41I could provide the commanders because I wasn't reporting to them, I could provide
- 1:10:47them a perspective, frank conversation. The other thing is is I could send
- 1:10:51things up my channels. He could send things up his channels if we had
- 1:10:58blockages in there of our channels that were trying to get done, so you
- 1:11:01could you could work, you know, the embassy could hear something that could
- 1:11:05be useful that could be then spoken to at the senior command level because the
- 1:11:09commander can't speak to up the chain that way, right, So there's there's
- 1:11:13these interesting dynamics that develop in that in that thing. But you know,
- 1:11:18fundamentally you're an in bed and what you're trying to do collectively is to essentially
- 1:11:25instill confidence in a government that nobody had confidence. It's due to the nature
- 1:11:30and structure of this government. It sounds like you really accepted this role and
- 1:11:34kind of dove into it in this sense that you weren't a subbortinate, but
- 1:11:38you also weren't a superior. It was a partnership. Even though that was
- 1:11:42that's not the standard role for State department when dealing with the military. Are
- 1:11:46you aware of and you don't have to spill any tea or anything, but
- 1:11:49are you aware of other instances where that type of relationship was not so successful
- 1:11:56when it was? No? Absolutely, listen, I had you know,
- 1:12:00there was heavy pressure to show civilian leadership, right, and that that was
- 1:12:04all the way through, and so all the time you would see in the
- 1:12:09field, even in my aor people that were subordinate to me that were reporting
- 1:12:15up to me, but they didn't have a good relationship. Their sense was,
- 1:12:18Hey, this battalion commander, they're supposed to take me to my meeting.
- 1:12:23Yeah, you know, it's not happening. You're in the middle of
- 1:12:26combat operations. These are combat foot patrols. If you're engaging, the engagement
- 1:12:32is with intentionality that has to meet the commander's intent for both force pro and
- 1:12:40to generate the effects that they're being asked to do as part of the counterinsurgency
- 1:12:45effort. And you would see those relationships break down, and you would walk
- 1:12:48into a combat outpost and you would see your military command on one side,
- 1:12:56or your security detail for example, for civilians eating in the cafeteria on the
- 1:13:01other side, you know, and you know that's not an effective relationship in
- 1:13:06a combat se right, So so you know there's that would break down.
- 1:13:11And then of course you know in other areas, right, there's just this
- 1:13:17You know, you have to come at it from a sense of mission and
- 1:13:21trust, and you have to have the mindset of, hey man, we
- 1:13:27are here. You know, General Miller always used to ask people in Afghanistan,
- 1:13:32why are you here? The answer is to protect the homeland? Right
- 1:13:38in Afghanistan, that was very much so we were there because fundamentally this tied
- 1:13:42back to nine to eleven, Right, that's the core purpose of being there.
- 1:13:45But that can break down in you know, the day to day operational
- 1:13:54things and we go into our tribal put on our tribal hats of I'm supposed
- 1:14:00to do governments or you guys think short term, we think long term or
- 1:14:04whatever whatever the tropes are that they breed the agency during this timeframe. I
- 1:14:10mean, for you and the people you worked with, I mean, how
- 1:14:14how did the capacity building side of it go? Like success is failures?
- 1:14:17I mean, what do you think you know? For me, there was
- 1:14:24a part in my biography we didn't touch that much on. I was a
- 1:14:27corporate lawyer right before I came right for two years, I did finance and
- 1:14:30insolvency. What else is So we talked about what was happening in Liberia,
- 1:14:34what was happening in two thousand and nine in Afghanistan. Afghan back in the
- 1:14:41States, the financial crisis boring billions of dollars. In Afghanistan, we had
- 1:14:47senior leaders talking glowingly about our burn rate and our spend rate. I'm sitting
- 1:14:54there with the private sector view going, this is absolutely unsustainable. What effects
- 1:15:00are we achieving? Well, I remember, you know. Then Colonel George
- 1:15:05said, Okay, we got Commander's Emergency Response funds right, you know,
- 1:15:13the SERP program right to you know, allow our commanders on the ground to
- 1:15:19sort of build things for people. So you're gonna win hearts and minds,
- 1:15:23classic hearts and mind stuff. So he said, can I get a roll
- 1:15:29up of all the SERP projects that we've done in the nine years we've been
- 1:15:32here in you know, Nangahar, for example. Okay, can we overlay
- 1:15:36that with the projects that the UN has done in the area, and then
- 1:15:43can we also ask what the USAID has done and what the you know why,
- 1:15:47because here's the kind of stuff we were doing. You're in the Kunar
- 1:15:54River Valley. It's rocks. They've had rocks for millennia. They know how
- 1:16:04to do retaining walls for their farms. We were paying two hundred thousand dollars
- 1:16:12to build a retaining wall. We were hyper inflating this economy while you knew
- 1:16:19the American public would have been outraged because the American public is losing six hundred
- 1:16:24thousand jobs a year and freaking out and we're in you know, you know,
- 1:16:29we're hitting ten percent on unemployment and you could see this disconnect. So
- 1:16:34what effects are being achieved? A growing insurgency, massive wastage of US government
- 1:16:45resources, and a great construction boom in Dubai for all the Afghan officials that
- 1:16:54we were funding, right, this is what was happening. And if you
- 1:16:58asked Afghans, which anybody who was out there with Afghans did, corruption was
- 1:17:02their number one issue. The Taliban was not it. Right, of course,
- 1:17:09if you were frontline shinwar in Nangahar, you've got tribal and issues with
- 1:17:16the Taliban. But remember most villages were ungoverned. I mean they're governed by
- 1:17:23their own village rules. The unitary state didn't come down there, so you
- 1:17:29could see very clearly that this was not achieving the effects. The second thing
- 1:17:33is is that as part of counterinsurgency, part of the initial thing was protect
- 1:17:41the population centers right go to the collapse into the population centers, because what
- 1:17:45we had done was a theory of interdiction for a while. If you got
- 1:17:49there. In you know, two thousand and one, we started to expand
- 1:17:55the ink spots out through places like Norris Stan and we're putting you know,
- 1:17:59these common outposts out there. Why oh, because the guys are coming through
- 1:18:05these ungoverned spaces. I think it was the you know, I think the
- 1:18:12mindset that we collectively as a government had was been Lodden planned nine to eleven
- 1:18:16from a cave, right. I think this is the what led. So
- 1:18:21you got to go out there to the Corngall. You've got to go into
- 1:18:26capillary valleys off capillary valley of capillary valleys to find these guys. The reality
- 1:18:32was, and you know, General George was always articulate on this. He
- 1:18:38said, the reason we're being shot at in the corn Cornngall is because we're
- 1:18:42in the cornball, right, Yeah, and if you looked at it from
- 1:18:46an interdiction standpoint, if they wanted to pass the corn gall you just go
- 1:18:53on the opposite side of the ridge. Remember we're also pre drone. We
- 1:18:58had started to you know, like this is like the very early days.
- 1:19:00I remember seeing a kid somebody opened it up and you know, there was
- 1:19:04like a tiny little it was like the old balsa would thing that you would
- 1:19:09fly as a kid. You know, they put a camera on. But
- 1:19:11like, we didn't have hardly any of the real you know surveillance. We
- 1:19:15had you know, stuff up in the sky, uh, you know,
- 1:19:18much higher altitude. But again, you guys will know competing demands, limited
- 1:19:25resources. So you've got all of these things. If these guys wanted to
- 1:19:29bypass us, they could just hike right past. You would have no ideas.
- 1:19:32So and then where did where was bin Laden in the end? Right?
- 1:19:36Where was his command and control? Probably in play? Probably this is
- 1:19:41pure speculation, but is in places like Jalalabad. Why because they have access
- 1:19:45to you know, food, resource, communications, the internet and you know
- 1:19:48the road that never got hit? Ever, what was the road that never
- 1:19:54got hit in Nangahar? All of our guys were getting hit with massive IEDs
- 1:19:59every time they We're on all of the all of the surface streets. It's
- 1:20:02the main road, you know, from the Kyra Pass to the base.
- 1:20:08So this also tells you what we knew. Everybody knew it. I don't
- 1:20:13know it as a factual. Here's the specific intel that I'm now referring to.
- 1:20:16We all knew the Taliban a making money off the war. The Afghan
- 1:20:24government's making money off the war. Everybody's invested in it. So you ask
- 1:20:27what kind of effects you're achieving. You could see very clearly we're not achieving
- 1:20:30the sustained you know, self government government. You know, the sustained self
- 1:20:39government. You know, where are the revenues coming from that Afghanistan is going
- 1:20:43to use to run itself while doing this, the government is largely funded by
- 1:20:48the international community, and the security forces were funded by US. So it's
- 1:20:57it's not a self sustaining model. Yeah, that's that's where we were.
- 1:21:02It was knowable, it was seeable, so you know, and I think
- 1:21:08anybody down range would have would have felt felt that. So after a few
- 1:21:15years when we started, you know, to come out. You know,
- 1:21:19I actually wrote on this in twenty eleven, after I had left, I
- 1:21:23said, we should be honest with where this is going. This is like
- 1:21:27twenty eleven, twenty twelve, I wrote this, and I said we should
- 1:21:30just be honest that the core thing, particularly after we got in Laden,
- 1:21:36was we we have achieved the national security objective, which was to take bin
- 1:21:42Laden off the off the off the board. That's a good thing. We
- 1:21:47also gave Afghanistan. Look, we've poured resources into other countries. They've stood
- 1:21:51up, you know, obviously, the famous examples of Germany and Japan and
- 1:21:56South Korea. You know, South Korea, you know, we So there's
- 1:22:00a It's not like pouring in resources to a partner means a partner is going
- 1:22:03to be forever dependent. It's just the way Afghanistan ended up developing, the
- 1:22:10way the economy developed, the way the officials chose to interact with us,
- 1:22:15what they chose to do with the resources. You know. One of the
- 1:22:17things I like when I think back on Afghanistan is you can see it as
- 1:22:25a failure from a certain perspective, but on the other hand, I look
- 1:22:28at it as we achieved national security effects that we needed to achieve. We
- 1:22:33gave our partners every chance to go in a different route. The fact that
- 1:22:39it didn't go there is not for lack of you know, generations of soldiers,
- 1:22:45civilians, contractors, you know, people who put good faith into trying
- 1:22:51to make it work. That to me, that work doesn't go away.
- 1:22:58And for all of us who have Afghan friends, you know, people that
- 1:23:01we know have experienced difficulty, who are still stuck back there, some who've
- 1:23:06made it out. I mean, you know, that partnership was real,
- 1:23:12you know, but it was overcome by the structures that we're employee. Yeah,
- 1:23:17Afghanistan is really interesting because, like you, I feel like people talk
- 1:23:23about losing the war in Afghanistan and it's sort of like, well, we
- 1:23:25won, like we won in the first thirty days. Then we decided to
- 1:23:29just stay after the party was already over, and then it was just became
- 1:23:33very nebulous. And you know you mentioned like you know Germany and Japan,
- 1:23:39Well there you're funding a government that is building projects in a tribal area,
- 1:23:43which I don't think. I don't know if any administration ever really got in
- 1:23:46a tribal area like Afghanistan. That's not there's no there's no Afghanistan National identity.
- 1:23:54Really like when you fund somebody, you're funding a tribe and it's going
- 1:23:58to their tribe members who they install in all the different regions. Like it's
- 1:24:02we went in there and we tried to impose a federal system where we have
- 1:24:05Yeah, it's like, no, it's a system of tribes, Like,
- 1:24:09well, shut up, you're going to have a federal system. Yeah,
- 1:24:11yeah, I mean, I you know, I strongly agree with that.
- 1:24:15As as the as the core it's a unitary state where people were being appointed
- 1:24:18from a central government. I always the way I always looked at it was
- 1:24:26imagine, look, I'm a New Yorker man, if I'm if you send
- 1:24:30me to Texas to tell somebody how to run their town, it's not going
- 1:24:34to go that way, right. And so as a result, you know,
- 1:24:38it was interesting that we as a as a as a as a core
- 1:24:45self government like govern your own like this is the core of in the DNA
- 1:24:49of America, that we were fundamentally supporting a structure that does have models of
- 1:24:55Pakistan runs that model. There are other countries in the region. It's not
- 1:24:58like it's a you know, and they had a history of a monarch in
- 1:25:01Afghanistan, they used to central authority, but that we would be the ones
- 1:25:05to say that this is the model that has to be and not approach it
- 1:25:13differently, because obviously the model they got constructed and put together was put together
- 1:25:17by people from the diaspora and things like that, and you know, yeah,
- 1:25:23they brought in, you know, a number of constituents, but fundamentally
- 1:25:28it was our money that kept backing that particular system. So it made it
- 1:25:34hard I think for us, you know, as a government to reassess that
- 1:25:41just the collective weight the accretion of the project over years. The other thing
- 1:25:48though, in the accretion though, is interesting because remember that Rumsfeld on this
- 1:25:54case didn't want troops on the ground, right, It felt strongly that we
- 1:25:59shouldn't get ourselves involved. Now he contradicts himself by then running the whole Iraq
- 1:26:04war, right, And it's a contradiction is the reasons he had were very
- 1:26:10well founded to not get involved in Afghanistan. He just blew those out of
- 1:26:14the water in a rock. But the accretion of our forces there came from
- 1:26:20a demand signal from the Afghans and also international partners, including the NGO community,
- 1:26:27who was saying, hey, there's not enough security you can't go in
- 1:26:30this war in Iraq and just forget Afghanistan. So it was a weird dynamic
- 1:26:34where there was a demand signal from communities that you wouldn't naturally say would have
- 1:26:42a demand signal for US forces. Now by two thousand and nine, when
- 1:26:45you're coming in with a heavy footprint, suddenly that signal is, oh my
- 1:26:47god, you're escalating the war. But it was you know, I think
- 1:26:51that we we ended up having multiple missions, right, because it's also backed
- 1:26:59in the whole you know, neo conservative worldview, which is create democratic society.
- 1:27:04So one is democratic society is as partners for us and expand democracy that
- 1:27:11came out of the bush hears. You know, you're doing that with your
- 1:27:14aid people who are like, hey, the reason for this is to because
- 1:27:17we can't abandon the people. If you abandon the people, you know you're
- 1:27:20going to end up with an ungoverned space, a humanitarian catastrophe. So that's
- 1:27:26irrationale for the war, and we sort of drifted away from Hey, the
- 1:27:30core reason we're we're the Taliban is they didn't turn over bin Laden, and
- 1:27:33had they turned over been Laden, we wouldn't have been at war, but
- 1:27:39we went into a whole bunch of other justifications, and you know, so
- 1:27:44that's how we ended up where we were. Well to fast forward a bit.
- 1:27:47I mean, you've had some other experiences too. I hope if we
- 1:27:51can't get into tonight another time for sure, but I want to fast forward
- 1:27:57a little bit because you were involved in sort of the end game Afghanistan as
- 1:28:00well. I was wondering if you could talk to us a bit about that.
- 1:28:03Yeah, sure, I was. You know, I got an assignment.
- 1:28:09There was a unique assignment that in twenty eighteen, they stood up a
- 1:28:15peace and reconciliation section in the embassy, thinking that we needed to get a
- 1:28:20peace process going because there was no discussions of note with the Taliban. And
- 1:28:28they started this section with the idea that there would be bottom up, that
- 1:28:33we would be reaching out to the provinces and at the district level and trying
- 1:28:38to see if there are folks out there that can reach out and start to
- 1:28:45build some consensus around a national way forward that comes bottom up. But about
- 1:28:54a year after they stood that up, or almost soon after they stood it
- 1:29:00up, not even a year soon after they stood that up, President Trump
- 1:29:03came into office. And decided that we should just do a top down approach,
- 1:29:09that it's time to rept this war up, and that means a direct
- 1:29:15negotiations with the Taliban. And so this section which reported to Ambassador Bass through
- 1:29:25the DCM. Karen Decker also served as Ambassador Khalil Zad, who became the
- 1:29:31special envoy that was going to take on the direct negotiations. It was going
- 1:29:38to support him when he was in Kabble because the negotiations were not going to
- 1:29:43happen in Kabble. The negotiations, you know, the Taliban were not in
- 1:29:46Kabble at the time. They were in Doha and they were in Pakistan and
- 1:29:53so where we were going to engage them was going to be somewhere other than
- 1:29:57Kable. But we had to keep the government closely informed. It was a
- 1:30:03choice to and you know, certainly a Taliban ask that we negotiate directly with
- 1:30:10the Taliban and not include the government of Afghanistan. The Taliban always were clear
- 1:30:16that they only wanted to negotiate with us, that the central government was a
- 1:30:23proxy government for us, and so as a way to catalyze the negotiations,
- 1:30:29we were going to talk to the Taliban directly and then essentially keep the government's
- 1:30:36equities close at heart and keep them briefed very closely of what we would be
- 1:30:44doing. The government never felt that they were a true partner in the Afghan
- 1:30:50government never felt that they were a true partner in that process ever. But
- 1:30:55this was the arrangement. And so when Ambassador Khalil's out in his team came
- 1:30:59in to Kabble, my office became the support structure to go to all the
- 1:31:03meetings, take the notes, and provide feedback and input into that process.
- 1:31:10But again working for Ambassador Bass, so it was an interesting dynamic. And
- 1:31:17then what happened was after we got to agreement, I left and I came
- 1:31:26back for the last let's say five months in Doha working directly for Ambassador Jhalilzad.
- 1:31:34We had a military touch point that was under General Miller's command with the
- 1:31:41Taliban. So for the last, you know, year after the agreement,
- 1:31:45this was to kind of give the Taliban a touch point with us because they
- 1:31:50would keep complaining that we violated the agreement, and we could from a military
- 1:31:56perspective explain, no, no, no, no, we're in complyingiens with
- 1:32:00the agreement. And I became the ambassador Khalilzad's representative on that group that was
- 1:32:08reporting to General Miller. Can you tell us what so Trump wanted out of
- 1:32:14Afghanistan? You guys were trying to make it happen. What were the US's
- 1:32:19chief goals and you know, sort of hardlaments, soft liments. What were
- 1:32:24the Taliban's chief goals their hard limits, their soft limits for making this agreement
- 1:32:29happen. Well, I think for making the agreement happen. You know,
- 1:32:33I was not in the room for the negotiation phase of the agreement. I
- 1:32:38got there when the agreement was all but done, and we can talk a
- 1:32:42little bit about that period, you know, when I arrived on the scene.
- 1:32:45But you know, the Taliban were always clear that it would be basically
- 1:32:49to give them the government. That was it, that there was going to
- 1:32:55be a new government, and it was going to be a Taliban led government.
- 1:32:58That was their objective from the beginning. The real question was whether there
- 1:33:04was any accommodation possible, meaning you know, the goal ultimately for US would
- 1:33:12be that they would be brought into the existing construct in some way, shape
- 1:33:15or form, so you can call it power sharing, not predetermined by US
- 1:33:20so Ambassador khalilza did not want us to predetermine it. But what the goal
- 1:33:25was to get the Afghan government leadership into the room with the Taliban to negotiate
- 1:33:30that. So his objectives, Ambassador Khalilzad's objectives and what I think, you
- 1:33:36know, essentially the deal with the administration was was if we're coming out and
- 1:33:42the intent is to end this war, the American war in Afghanistan, if
- 1:33:46we just come out, it'll be chaotic, it'll be dangerous, and we
- 1:33:50get nothing. There's nothing we leave behind, right we At the time,
- 1:33:56the thinking was that it would be likely a civil war that the Taliban couldn't
- 1:34:01just win because there's so many other constituencies in a loaded country, right that
- 1:34:06you would have a rerun of the early nineties where there was this horrific civil
- 1:34:12war. You know, the Taliban had done a lot of work and this
- 1:34:16obviously became apparent later eroding all of those other constituencies, either buying them off.
- 1:34:23Something was happening, because in the end we did not see a civil
- 1:34:29war breakout. We saw the Taliban take Cobble with less than three thousand people
- 1:34:34six million people, less than three thousand people there were more than enough capabilities
- 1:34:39to defend Cobble, and you know, yet everybody went to ground. The
- 1:34:43whole thing dissolve. So that tells you that the Taliban had made a lot
- 1:34:46of inroads all around the countries, particularly in the north. You know,
- 1:34:51for anybody who had been up there in previous years to then go back in
- 1:34:57twenty nineteen and twenty twenty and find out the North is basically you know,
- 1:35:02you know, Mazarli, Mazar sharif Is is basically nearly under Taliban control.
- 1:35:08You're like, you've lost the how can you lose the problems? For me,
- 1:35:11I knew things were over when it was a couple of weeks is maybe
- 1:35:15maybe it was a month before Ghani fled the country. His office put out
- 1:35:19like a press release about building a hydro electric dam in Kunda's and like,
- 1:35:24we have this big plan, We're going to build this hydro electric dam.
- 1:35:27It's like, well, Kunda has already fell of the Taliban, you're talking
- 1:35:30about building it, Like the priorities are so off and so weird. Yeah,
- 1:35:33that is like you just knew this wasn't going to end. It was
- 1:35:36sort of there were a lot of mismatches going on there. But so the
- 1:35:41core objectives that that Investad Khalilza was trying to get at was one to get
- 1:35:46the Taliban to break with al Qaeda and transnational terrorism al Qaida specifically because of
- 1:35:53the history, but also transnational terrorism, that you're not going to use Afghanistan
- 1:35:58as a platform to attack other entries. Second, and you know, second
- 1:36:02equally, you know, critical priority is that our withdrawal be not a hostile
- 1:36:11withdrawal, that that when we come out, they're not going to be attacking
- 1:36:15us on the x filtration. That we're going to get to an agreement.
- 1:36:18You know. The third critical point was that the Afghans would have the opportunity
- 1:36:27to come to a peace agreement that we would be committing to, you know,
- 1:36:32a peace agreement. And so, you know, he viewed these goals
- 1:36:39as all very interlocking goals. There's four elements and I am forgetting one.
- 1:36:45But so was there any sort of was there any with that peace agreement or
- 1:36:50or aside from that, was there any sort of thought of amnesty for like
- 1:36:57the Afghan national forces who'd against the Taliban, or was there any like no,
- 1:37:02because because it was never presupposed, never that the Afghan government would collapse.
- 1:37:08You know, what you're dealing with in peace agreements. Often in these
- 1:37:12kind of piece agreements is what we euphemistically call security sector reform, which means
- 1:37:17you bring the irregular elements. In this case, it would be the Taliban
- 1:37:23into the professional military that has been built right. Right, So we've all
- 1:37:28seen the images of these guys driving around in our funded APCs, right,
- 1:37:31But the idea would have been, rather than to have the unit dissolved,
- 1:37:34the expertise dissolved, the logistics supply channel dissolve, they're coming into these existing
- 1:37:42structures that in theory are functional and operational, right, and we're not losing
- 1:37:48all of that capacity to a civil war. So it was never amnesty for
- 1:37:55the Afghan government. If anything, the question would be, Oh, the
- 1:37:58other thing that the Taliban very much wanted was removal of sanctions. Individual Taliban
- 1:38:02are all sanctioned because they're terrorists, right, Okay, so you know they've
- 1:38:08killed people, including Americans, so they're on sanctions, you know, individual
- 1:38:12sanction, financial travel, et cetera. So the Taliban of course wanted that
- 1:38:16that peace removed. But for us, it's okay, you know, if
- 1:38:20we're going to go down that path, you are going to break the ties
- 1:38:25with al Qaeda, and you are going to commit to not becoming a terrorist
- 1:38:29state, right to state sponsors terresponding to that, well, I mean they
- 1:38:32negotiated that they would essentially do that. The reality on the ground is that
- 1:38:41we killed you know, Zawahiri, who was celebrating, you know. With
- 1:38:47that said, I will say that's a good example of why it was once
- 1:38:53we got out, we actually achieved the biggest, the second biggest effect that
- 1:38:58we could have achieved, probably because we weren't there, because he's not being
- 1:39:01hidden by those guys and he thought he was in a safe space. Right
- 1:39:04So, so in some senses we achieved the effect on that particular target,
- 1:39:09and that is a significant target, right. So, but but it is
- 1:39:15in the agreement, right the county that their counter terrorism commitments are in the
- 1:39:19agreement, and you know, even you know, to this day, there's
- 1:39:25you know, you can see that they have gone full Taliban right in terms
- 1:39:30of how they're governing the country, in terms of where they are. But
- 1:39:35you know, there's still the idea for the Taliban, and it will eventually
- 1:39:41fade that there could be some sort of arrangement with the United States that can
- 1:39:45achieve these other effects that they want, and so that that element is there,
- 1:39:50the core thing that that was achieved because the other pieces didn't come together.
- 1:39:56The governance piece, the peace agreement between Taliban in the Afghans was not
- 1:40:01tied to the timetable of our withdrawal. Right, so in theory we would
- 1:40:10come out and that wouldn't have been didn't necessarily have to be done. The
- 1:40:14idea was to have it done. But you know, it wasn't. It
- 1:40:17wasn't. It didn't talk to us a little bit about that. It's I
- 1:40:20mean, the deal is negotiated. Eventually we signed a deal. Yeah,
- 1:40:26what happens next? And how do things? You know, I think we
- 1:40:29all agree that the way we ended up pulling out of there was not ideal.
- 1:40:32Yeah, so so first of all, you know, there were some
- 1:40:39stops and starts to to to how that that came forward. You know,
- 1:40:43Trump hit a pause after a US soldier was killed, right, you know,
- 1:40:47on the eve of the signing, and was that sort of like if
- 1:40:50we if we follow through this now, it'll look like it like it's an
- 1:40:56image issue or they're not holding their their deal. They're not I can't.
- 1:41:00I can't speak for President Trump. I mean we know his words. He
- 1:41:03said, what kind of people are these? You know? You know,
- 1:41:06I think the thinking, you know, the Taliban explanation was we weren't in
- 1:41:11the scope of the peace agreement yet because we hadn't signed it, right,
- 1:41:15I mean, that's that was their mentality. He's like, hey, you're
- 1:41:18gonna you know, that's what he said. What kind of people would do
- 1:41:21this? Yeah, so he he hit he hit the pause button. We
- 1:41:30then conducted negotiations in Doha that were off book negotiations where Ambassa khalilza the the
- 1:41:39agreement, the US Alberian agreement was all but done and then it was paused
- 1:41:45and there was no It was called off I mean we didn't know whether it
- 1:41:48was a permanent pause. When you say off book, you mean like informal
- 1:41:51essentially, I'm going to say informal to not use other words. You know
- 1:41:58it was. It was because we were no longer negotiating with the Taliban formally,
- 1:42:03right, but behind the scenes, I now do that, so now
- 1:42:09each other. So now you know, Inbassador Khalilzad said, well, let's
- 1:42:12not lose what we have. We've got the US to alband agreement is basically
- 1:42:17ready to go. We can make some adjustments. I would like to take
- 1:42:21a run at how can we get the Taliban? The Taliban said, hey,
- 1:42:25we'll come back to the table. But it's you guys, you know,
- 1:42:28so what is ambassador you know Leo Zady? He One of the big
- 1:42:32goals of the Trump administration was free American hostages. They put a lot of
- 1:42:38time and effort into that that they felt that Americans should not be left overseas.
- 1:42:43Now, you know, I think all of us understand the very difficult
- 1:42:46choices made with Americans that are hostage overseas. And you know, we've had
- 1:42:50a long standing policy that we weren't going to negotiate on hostages. And there's
- 1:42:59a very good reason for that, which it introduces moral hazard. You pay
- 1:43:02four million dollars for somebody, the next person is eight, it becomes an
- 1:43:05economy and or it becomes a series of political objectives that they can get.
- 1:43:11And we always pay a lot more, you know, for Americans. We
- 1:43:15trade a lot more, We give up a lot more than other people you
- 1:43:19know, are willing to do. But you know, it's not just the
- 1:43:24Trump administration, you know, this administration, every administration has committed to you
- 1:43:29know, it's our top thing is protecting Americans overseas. So you make trade
- 1:43:33offs when you deem that there's an opportunity. So what Investador Leo Zad realizes,
- 1:43:41we could bring somebody home safely. And what we're going to do is
- 1:43:46use this as an opportunity to sort of go back and test a few things.
- 1:43:51And one of the things was whether the Taliban really had command and control,
- 1:43:56whether they could deliver what roll Miller was asking for, which is,
- 1:44:02if we're going to go into a US Taliban scenario, we need to see
- 1:44:05a reduction of violence, a serious reduction of violence. Because the Taliban view
- 1:44:10was always we're not going to attack you, but we are going to come
- 1:44:14after the Afghan government because they're not party to the agreement, of course,
- 1:44:18because they didn't want them to party the unit. They wanted the power.
- 1:44:21And our point to the Taliban was always, Okay, you know that's not
- 1:44:28good. You should be negotiating with the government, but if you attack our
- 1:44:32partners, we are going to defend our partners, right, Okay. So
- 1:44:38we were still engaged in combat operations against the Taliban, but it was not
- 1:44:43in theory, not direct right. So one of the things to test was
- 1:44:47whether you could actually have a ceasefire, whether you could get to a point.
- 1:44:51We couldn't get in ceasefire, but we were going to have a reduction
- 1:44:56of violence. And so one of the operations for these negotiating to get the
- 1:45:02return our people was we needed to have the Taliban stand down in an area
- 1:45:12and not attack if we were sending our special operations forces in to the area
- 1:45:16to pick up a guy that you don't even know if he's alive. Right,
- 1:45:21So we worked out that agreement. The mission happened. The Taliban did
- 1:45:28have a ceasefire. They actually ended up in a firefight with the Afghan government
- 1:45:31at one point, which they blamed on the government, and we spent months
- 1:45:39trying to unstick in this military touch point. It all worked, The agreement
- 1:45:44was eventually signed, We returned to the table, we got a hostage freed,
- 1:45:50and the agreement happens. I exit the scene for a while at that
- 1:45:56point. Now we go into implementation. We're drawing down. But we had
- 1:46:00COVID, so it that, you know, really jacked up a lot of
- 1:46:05things. You know, there were a lot fewer meetings within Afghanistan. A
- 1:46:09lot of stuff was being done virtually at this point, you know, and
- 1:46:15part of the agreement was prisoner releases. So this was a huge thing.
- 1:46:19The Taliban were supposed to get back FI up to five thousand prisoners. The
- 1:46:25government didn't want it. They didn't negotiate for it, so they didn't want
- 1:46:28to give them up, and so we did a lot of stop and start
- 1:46:30over these prisoners, trying to get the two sides to the table. All
- 1:46:35of this was happening while we're drawing down, and the Taliban were slowly making
- 1:46:43some inroads, right, So I get recalled back and you know, they
- 1:46:49started calling me and say, hey, we have this this gap. We
- 1:46:53need somebody to be in their military touch point, to be partnered with the
- 1:46:58general General Klein. It was General Tooley who was the main guy for fifteen
- 1:47:02months talking to the Taliban every day. You know, that guy wore one
- 1:47:09out for him. Yeah, pour one out for him, I mean,
- 1:47:12you know, really truly, but nearer to the end. As as as
- 1:47:16we got closer to the end, he was replaced by General Klein, and
- 1:47:21so I was going to be the civilian counterpoint to this. So Zol's representative.
- 1:47:26These guys are reporting to General Miller, they're conveying essentially to the Taliban.
- 1:47:30Hey, we are we are on the trajectory that we said we're on,
- 1:47:36which was for April first, right, well it was I think it
- 1:47:40was May first, because the Taliban were not attacking us in a way you
- 1:47:48know, of course some you know, and it was a deconfliction channel too,
- 1:47:53like, okay, so if you're not attacking us, why why did
- 1:47:56we have seven rounds drop on Bogrum last night? Oh it wasn't us,
- 1:48:00Or we're going to investigate, or it's a rogue command or whatever, you
- 1:48:02know, but you're you're trying to deconflict so you don't get people killed on
- 1:48:06the way out. And so I came back to that, and what had
- 1:48:13happened was we have the change in administration. And during the change in administration,
- 1:48:17you can understand, you come in, you've got a deal on the
- 1:48:20table to get out. There's a lot of equities in Washington saying okay,
- 1:48:28let's let's not come out. I mean, you know this is this was
- 1:48:32a controversial thing, yeah, that President Trump did because look, huge equities
- 1:48:40within the defense establishment we're operating under the mow the grass theory that it's a
- 1:48:46relatively low cost to stay in Afghanistan and this will not become a terroristaent and
- 1:48:51we cannot be kicked out. With some number of troops that are supporting the
- 1:48:57are enabled, you can keep like two thousand people in the contrary and just
- 1:49:00maintain a counter terroristy. So I'm not going to put numbers because that was
- 1:49:04always a controversy. Yes, a small platform, but again with our Afghan
- 1:49:09enablers and with or sorry with our enablers for the Afghans. But also remember
- 1:49:14the Europeans are also in there, NATO is in there. So you know
- 1:49:16when we looked at we had eight thousand troops, well we're actually at a
- 1:49:18sixteen thousand troops strength because you have your partner nations are in there, right,
- 1:49:23so you're at a higher level. But you can understand. So there
- 1:49:27was a constituency within the Defense Department which was very much like why are we
- 1:49:31doing that? There's still the neo, you know, conservative approach of a
- 1:49:35ungoverned space. Then there's people who are like you're on the doorstep of Pakistan,
- 1:49:41China, Iran rushes over there, strategic environment to be there, right,
- 1:49:47you know. And then there's the State Department, which is you know,
- 1:49:53hey, we educated a generation of women, We've got partners in here.
- 1:49:58This is a valuable partner in the region. And let's economic we're also
- 1:50:03emotionally tied to this subject. And there's the emotional ties to the entire US
- 1:50:09government establishment that has worked under the GAT framework for twenty years building this thing.
- 1:50:15Right, We're deeply vested. So, you know, I think President
- 1:50:19Trump made very much the right decision because, as you guys know back home,
- 1:50:28outside of the foreign policy establishment, it's why are we still in Afghanistan.
- 1:50:33I don't think we should be spending any money over there. I don't
- 1:50:36know why people are dying over there. Why are we fighting a war even
- 1:50:41though we could convince ourselves that this war was against somebody else. So I
- 1:50:45think, you know, President Trump made a decision that was difficult to make.
- 1:50:50That's why people don't make it because if you, if you choose to
- 1:50:54come out, you're the one who gave up the al Qaeda scenario. Parties
- 1:51:00were kind of done with this war. Well, so here's this is where
- 1:51:02I'm going with this, right, So when the new administration comes in,
- 1:51:06it's got to take on board all of these inputs. This is a logical
- 1:51:11thing for any new administration. Sure, let's examine and remember President Biden's position
- 1:51:15from back in two thousand and nine was not come out entirely, but keep
- 1:51:19it just as a counter and it's a CT presence. Now we know that
- 1:51:26the CT presence was enabled by the military flight print. Right, the logistics
- 1:51:31of a landlocked country through which you've got to go through in Afghanistan don't really
- 1:51:35allow you that pure CT presence if you have two thousand people. But his
- 1:51:42position wasn't radically different from President Trump's position, with the exception he would have
- 1:51:48kept a CTVY. Now would President Trump if that had been you know,
- 1:51:53sort of at the end, would that have been you know, an outcome
- 1:51:56because we don't know, because you know, there there were still moments at
- 1:52:02which you could have paused this trajectory, right, So we don't know the
- 1:52:08administration chain they took. The Biden administration took a prudent pause. There's no
- 1:52:13question you have to take the inputs. You have to come with a fresh
- 1:52:15set of eyes, assess this, and remember you're getting it from a lot
- 1:52:19of other people. The problem is is we had a deal and that deal
- 1:52:26was May first, and as part of that deal, the Taliban we're not
- 1:52:29attacking the ex filtration. So if you're going to abrogate that particular term of
- 1:52:35the deal, you are exposing us to risk. General Miller, as the
- 1:52:41commander, understood that crystal clear. Right. So the advice that tends to
- 1:52:49go up is, well, I think we should keep a certain level and
- 1:52:54maintain because we've got force pro we've got all these other equities. But if
- 1:52:59they were going to come out, which is what they ended up doing,
- 1:53:04then you better get out under the terms that we agreed because otherwise the Taliban
- 1:53:11are telling us and where are the Taliban telling us? In the military touch
- 1:53:14point? Right, you're telling us this in the military touchpoint. So the
- 1:53:18people that we're interacting directly face to face with the Taliban are very few in
- 1:53:24the US government. There's Ambassador Khalilzad directly his deputy from time to time,
- 1:53:30but really Ambassador Khalilzad, right, and General Miller through is a military touch
- 1:53:38point, right, that's it, right, This is how we're communicating with
- 1:53:42the Taliban, and what we're hearing is, hey, what are you doing?
- 1:53:47What is this pause? What's going on? Okay, now we're be
- 1:53:50on the scope. When the Biden administration came and said August thirty first,
- 1:53:56and first they said September eleventh, I think prudently back to to August thirty
- 1:54:00first. The Taliban said, we don't accept that. Where did they say
- 1:54:06it? They told us in this touch point. They didn't accept it,
- 1:54:12but they said we don't trust you. You know, we heard you were
- 1:54:16coming out before. You know, again under the Obama mystery, we were
- 1:54:19supposed to have a significant drawdown and it just ended up being ramped back up.
- 1:54:25So we had to keep delivering the message we are coming out militarily.
- 1:54:30But you guys got to get to the peace talks, and we did start
- 1:54:36to get the Afghan government and the Taliban to finally meet face to face.
- 1:54:40The problem was is as we started to move out district after districts started to
- 1:54:45fall, they just can you can come up with any theory you want.
- 1:54:53The reality was I mean, and look, the beauty of Afghan maps was
- 1:54:59again always goes to that village level. Right that you look at the map,
- 1:55:04it says, hey, this is this is Afghan government controlled if you
- 1:55:10looked at at the village level, none of the villages where Afghan. They
- 1:55:13may have been Taliban, they may not have been, but they certainly weren't
- 1:55:15governed. The district center was controlled. That was the space. So now
- 1:55:21those district centers are gone, and now you're seeing, okay, well they
- 1:55:26haven't gone after the provincial capitals, but you're watching the map go red from
- 1:55:32May June July, and this is all open source stuff that you know they
- 1:55:38did. You know, I found I don't you know, use Twitter anymore
- 1:55:42at all, gotten off that platform. But at the time they were Twitter
- 1:55:45accounts from rando's doing spectacularly good. This battle happened, or the Taliban have
- 1:55:55now taken this village, this village, this thing with pin drops. I
- 1:56:00would then call my Afghan contacts or talk to the Taliban and they would confirm
- 1:56:05that these places are gone. And I don't know who the randos are that
- 1:56:10are dragging the stuff on open source. The military is briefing in the Commander
- 1:56:15Update brief. There's a lot of open sources feeding into that stuff because what
- 1:56:18are we also losing. We're losing intelligence networks, and we're losing our intelligence
- 1:56:23network because we're reducing all those not only that we're losing assets because now Syncom's
- 1:56:30losing assets to pake on, you know, because you have the larger battle
- 1:56:35for resources within our government. So this all starts happening and you can kind
- 1:56:40of see the thing coming down. So a I think a prudent decision made,
- 1:56:45which is that we we stick to the agreement. An irritant that produces
- 1:56:51a significant vulnerability and the reality now shifting on the ground. I think there
- 1:57:01are a lot of people who will argue, okay, well that you know
- 1:57:06that it was a red flags and all of this stuff right. The challenges
- 1:57:12is when you look at it from a Washington perspective, and again, you
- 1:57:17know, I can't emphasisize enough. You guys know, people working on Afghanistan
- 1:57:25worked in good faith. You know, we're trying to get to the right
- 1:57:29outcome. There's very few there are cases where you say, oh, what
- 1:57:32did we do this? This government, we overthrew this government, we tried
- 1:57:35to do is no. People were trying, you know, working to try
- 1:57:40to get you know, from your line soldiers to your diplomats, to Inveassador
- 1:57:44Khaliozad to General Miller, different perspectives, different approaches, but definitely trying to
- 1:57:49do the right thing for the United States and also for our Afghan partners.
- 1:57:55So if you look at it from Washington's perspective, the analog, the historical
- 1:57:59analog is the civil war. And you have to think that with thousands of
- 1:58:04Afghan police and officers and the armaments that we dumped into Cobble itself, that
- 1:58:14at a minimum you would have a several large inkspots as provincial centers, maybe
- 1:58:19the Taliban would sweep through parts of the country, but that at the end
- 1:58:24you're going to have some sort of bad civil war if you can't get to
- 1:58:27a deal. And certainly that was Ambassador Jalilzad's analysis, that it would be
- 1:58:30a civil war, not an outright victory, not a dissolution of the Afghan
- 1:58:36forces. So I think what was happening was the reality was we were built
- 1:58:44on quicksand again, you know, the agency said, hey, you know,
- 1:58:48I think there was some assessment at some point where they said it's got
- 1:58:51six months or whatever, you know, earlier in the process, that it's
- 1:58:55not going to last maybe a year or whatever. But I think it is
- 1:58:59a really good argument that the Afghan government would defend itself, at least in
- 1:59:04Kabble, that they were equities of all of these troops and all of these
- 1:59:09families, that they would defend themselves, which meant that your time horizon would
- 1:59:14be longer. Right. General Miller clearly said, once we're beyond the agreement,
- 1:59:20we've got to come out faster. And so they were pulling out,
- 1:59:25and you know, I think my assessment is that no matter how you came
- 1:59:32out the twenty year relationship, once that military piece is out, it was
- 1:59:36going to be chaotic. Are there mitigants that could have you know, stopped
- 1:59:45you know, some of the scenes that we saw. Yeah, there are
- 1:59:49things that we can do better as a government, right, But in the
- 1:59:57end, the outcome was the right outcome, right, And that's fundamentally what
- 2:00:03we have to focus on, because you know, I said this to you,
- 2:00:08you know, before we were taping. If you look at the world
- 2:00:11today and the battle space and the change in technology, if we're opposing Russia
- 2:00:19in Ukraine and we're you know, crosswise with you know, Iran, and
- 2:00:27you see the damage the Huthis are inflicting, I find it impossible to believe
- 2:00:31that that stuff wouldn't be hitting US forces and US diplomats if we were still
- 2:00:38in Afghanistan today, because you know, we would be beyond the scope of
- 2:00:42any agreement. And it's also folks that the Taliban do business with, you
- 2:00:47know, are ramped up and the technology has changed because for the first time
- 2:00:51ever, some of your guess appoint is you have to look to the air
- 2:00:56now in a way that we've never had to look to protect embassy platform.
- 2:01:00It's also a question of like priorities. We're trying to counter Russia, China,
- 2:01:04Iran, and then somewhere after that, we're also looking at the global
- 2:01:10war on terror, counter terrorism North Korea. I mean, you get to
- 2:01:15a certain point where it's like, can we maintain these long term you know,
- 2:01:18quote unquote sustainable counterinsurgency campaigns in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria,
- 2:01:25and elsewhere while also trying to confront some of these larger nation states. The
- 2:01:30logistics chain, the cost I mean, there are many in our defense establishment
- 2:01:38and you know, and you know, also on the state side. I
- 2:01:41think that would argue that these costs are relatively minimal. I don't. I
- 2:01:45don't agree with that, and I don't think most Americans would agree that.
- 2:01:49You know, nine billion dollars a year or whatever whatever cost is just simply
- 2:01:54because again the complexity of sustaining operations in Afghanistan was immense. And saw that
- 2:02:00when BOGRAM closed. Because now you've got a single point of failure, which
- 2:02:04is that runway at Karzai International Airport one way in and one a out.
- 2:02:11Could you convoy outshore? But you're convoying hours and hours and hours. I
- 2:02:15mean it's very very easy to you know, take out those you know,
- 2:02:19convoys. So I mean this is operationally, you're you're stuck at that point.
- 2:02:27So when you look at this, you know, sort of global force
- 2:02:30posture and global diplomatic posture. This cost if you're under if you're really drawn
- 2:02:36deeper into the war, which we would have been had we stayed, because
- 2:02:41again, you know, all of this technology would have flowed in there.
- 2:02:45The Russians would have loved to hit us. I am sure, and I'm
- 2:02:47not a Russian expert. It just stands to reason that you know that we
- 2:02:53would have more Tower twenty two's if we were still there. So the outcome
- 2:02:59was the right outcome. And you know, again, you know what I
- 2:03:03mentioned before is what's unique about this is we had two presidents that are from
- 2:03:09radically different perspectives on virtually everything. Right, that understood I think where the
- 2:03:16American public was on this issue and understood the American public was not, you
- 2:03:24know, aware of supportive of pouring money into this particular war anymore. And
- 2:03:31so the decision was made across both administrations. So when we go back to
- 2:03:40execution again, things that you can do, some of the things are just
- 2:03:44going to be what they were. I'll give you a very good example.
- 2:03:48You know, it's a really tough conversation for State Department people when we have
- 2:03:54to pull up out of an embassy. When I was in Liberia and it
- 2:03:57was a potential for us to pull up star and pull out, and sometimes
- 2:04:01the security posture and the logistics to sustain the place are not viable. Maybe
- 2:04:08the country wants us out, maybe we're directly under attack, so it's not
- 2:04:12viable. The large number of people who work for the embassy that run generators,
- 2:04:18that run your human resources in many countries are our foreign service nationals.
- 2:04:24These are local Liberians, local Hong Kongers, local you know people, many
- 2:04:32of whom have put twenty thirty year careers in with US. Right, just
- 2:04:39like all the military interpreters that we hear about that in Afghanistan worked with US
- 2:04:43for ten fifteen years in traditional evacuation. By traditional I mean historical evacuations.
- 2:04:54The answer is they stay in place. We don't take them out. If
- 2:04:59they are in titled to a special immigrant visa, they've worked for US for
- 2:05:02a certain amount of time, we can bring them and their families home.
- 2:05:08But it's not happening generally in evacuation. This would be the normal course.
- 2:05:12If you work your twenty years, you apply, an interagency committee looks and
- 2:05:16says, this person is who they say they are. They've got recommendations through
- 2:05:19the years, and we're going to give their family a chance to come to
- 2:05:24the States and say a reward. And you know, in places where people
- 2:05:30you know don't have difficult circumstances, you don't use a lot of SIVs where
- 2:05:35they have difficult circumstances. It's an option. Most people don't want to really
- 2:05:39leave their country, but it's a nice thing. Now. In Afghanistan,
- 2:05:44you heard we had a lot of people that would be targeted, and so
- 2:05:47we had a bigger program, but we worked with people across the spectrum for
- 2:05:56twenty years that we've invested in relationships that anybody who was in country has friends
- 2:06:01or you know, contacts or that was a good person or people that they've
- 2:06:04saved your life, right, literally saved your life. So in Afghanistan,
- 2:06:12sorry, in a normal situation, the answer is to local staff is you
- 2:06:16don't come. We will try to help you. We will try to keep
- 2:06:20your salary on the books for another year. We'll try to get back.
- 2:06:24But you and I had to have those conversations in Liberia. We cannot take
- 2:06:28you out. That is a hard conversation. You are keeping the lights on
- 2:06:32so I can get the messages back to work the diplomacy. But if I
- 2:06:36am ordered to leave, I can't take you in Afghanistan because like in Iraq,
- 2:06:44we had this we basically, if you worked for us for a short
- 2:06:46period of time, we were going to give you the option of an SIV.
- 2:06:50Basically most of our staff had an option. And then we had all
- 2:06:55these other relationships that were you know, contracting relationships with people meaning they didn't
- 2:07:02work for the embassy, but they may have worked for a military contractor who
- 2:07:05was supporting our fob Right, we felt a certain obligation to try to get
- 2:07:15a lot more people out. And then we also had made twenty years of
- 2:07:20commitment to Afghan women girls. There were vulnerable groups of people that we've We've
- 2:07:26had our Congress sit with them, we've had you know, and then you
- 2:07:29look and you say, well, here's a woman author. For example,
- 2:07:32there's a book, The Secret Gate that came out about this about a DS
- 2:07:38agent who became a State Department Foreign Service officer. Well DS is foreign service,
- 2:07:43but he became a political officer and he came in and you know,
- 2:07:49evacuated an author. Why did the author come out? The author came out
- 2:07:54because as a matter of policy, we said, we're going to try to
- 2:07:57take out some of you know, as many of our friends as we can
- 2:08:00and vulnerable people. So if you're looking at an after action, what did
- 2:08:07that do? That was a magnet for everybody to come to the airport.
- 2:08:11Now, if you've worked the issue, are you really going to criticize and
- 2:08:16say, hey, just leave everybody, just leave. By the way,
- 2:08:22you know, there's a ton of American citizens in Afghanistan, but a lot
- 2:08:26of folks who you know, were Afghan and now they're American, So we
- 2:08:33have an obligation to them but what were they doing there. They were doing
- 2:08:35there because they were trying to get They were there on vacation, visiting family,
- 2:08:39you know, things that we wouldn't conceive of in a war zone.
- 2:08:43But they're there because they thought the state was going to be there. Right
- 2:08:46now, they're caught off guards, but they also have very tough choices.
- 2:08:50Do you leave the family that is under US immigration law under all that not
- 2:08:56entitled to come out? Right? But now you have these moral questions.
- 2:09:01The American citizen is saying, hey, you know, I've got one daughter
- 2:09:05who's in America, but my other daughter came back with me, you know,
- 2:09:11right, Or my other daughter was here, she was in the immigration
- 2:09:13process. All of those people, some of them are entitled to come out.
- 2:09:18Many are attached to people who are entitled to come out. If you
- 2:09:24say no, right, you might mitigate people trying to get to the airport,
- 2:09:30but probably you wouldn't because people would not, you know, have a
- 2:09:33sense. And so as a result, there was a magnet coming to the
- 2:09:37airport and what did that do? That introduced a ton of vulnerabilities, and
- 2:09:39we saw the very tragic outcome of that. Do you want to tee up
- 2:09:45the question. Yeah, for Dante, you know, I'm curious because something
- 2:09:50you mentioned has kind of stuck with me, Like when I wonder if,
- 2:09:52for you know, people in state, people in the Department of Events,
- 2:09:56people in the administrator like administration of workers, when they look get it an
- 2:10:00effort in Afghanistan and they say, well, you know, for nine billion
- 2:10:03a year or whatever like that, or how much ever it is for nine
- 2:10:07billion dollars, like that's not a high price to pay. I wonder if
- 2:10:11how many of those opinions would change if they were forced to go out and
- 2:10:16walk patrols with the troops walking. There's you know that that like we look
- 2:10:20at this as a monetary thing, but there's also you know, a generation
- 2:10:26of war fighters who are also living with you know, sort of the consequences
- 2:10:31of that war and then the moral injury of how we left, how we
- 2:10:35left, you know a lot of the Afghan partners and things like that.
- 2:10:37Listen, this is an excellent question, right, and it's a core question
- 2:10:43that any of us have worked on the issue. Because I will tell you
- 2:10:46that the way you framed it, you would say, okay, it was
- 2:10:52people. People who have that perspective are only looking at the monetary costs.
- 2:10:56Right. You know, some of the people who are framing are those same
- 2:11:01people who are out there because because there's still the theory that we operate under,
- 2:11:09which is it's better to take the fight into the field forward rather than
- 2:11:16have to fight it back here. Now there's another theory, which is it
- 2:11:20really doesn't matter what happens in Afghanistan if we protect the homeland. In the
- 2:11:28homeland, your border control is working, your port access is working. We
- 2:11:33all take off our shoes at the airport so we don't get a shoe bomber.
- 2:11:37Right, that's a these are This is a theory. There's no right
- 2:11:41answer. But those people I would still say, would say, yeah,
- 2:11:46I don't minimize the physical cost of families, the cost and loss of lives,
- 2:11:54but we're trying to protect the homeland. And if so, again,
- 2:11:58I come back to good eight. I don't run into a lot of people
- 2:12:01who are dismissive it's just that cost. But but I do agree that the
- 2:12:09further you are from the front, the further you are from a combat outpost
- 2:12:15or an embassy, the easier it is to put it in economic terms rather
- 2:12:18than the human toll. I agree with that but some of the people making
- 2:12:22those decisions do have that. But it's the calculus is you know what,
- 2:12:30three thousand people were lost in nine to eleven, so we're trying to prevent
- 2:12:33a nine to eleven. We're trying to prevent you know, what the houthis
- 2:12:35are doing right now. So but it's a great question. Okay, M
- 2:12:41Corbyn, thank you very much. How big of a headache is the leasing
- 2:12:43agreement for Jibouti? But now you're talking my current job, you know,
- 2:12:50listen, I have to go into State Department speaking. Jibouti is a critical
- 2:12:56counter terrorism partner. We can see the we can see the challenges the Red
- 2:13:00Sea, so we want to make sure that our partners feel, you know,
- 2:13:07that we appropriately view the relationship as a strong strategic partner. Out of
- 2:13:15curiosity, have you ever had from any of these partners? Obviously there's there's
- 2:13:20the monetary there, you know, all types of diplomat diplomatic things. Has
- 2:13:24there ever been a really weird request that just caught you off guard or you
- 2:13:28know anything that that like the an ambassador or something like anything, not an
- 2:13:33ambassador, but like, have there ever been concessions that they wanted or or
- 2:13:37things that struck like you or or like Americans is odd, you mean,
- 2:13:46from our partners, from our partners. You know, there's I mean,
- 2:13:56you know, when you're in a foreign country, you there's just different things
- 2:14:01happen and you don't really understand. I'm not going to give an example.
- 2:14:07The example I want to give you is a funny one because it just popped
- 2:14:09into my mind, not because I'm you know, trying to avoid a formal
- 2:14:15government request. I just didn't have one right away. I'm negotiating with General
- 2:14:20Cobra, and we're trying to get General Cobra to withdraw his forces from Liberia
- 2:14:28from Monrovia, and he ends up doing it. So then I go back
- 2:14:33to his headquarters, right and they're trying to sort of figure out what their
- 2:14:41new posture will be in the sort of post war era. And this is
- 2:14:46what he figured out. He throws down a giant lump of stone and he
- 2:14:52goes, this is a raw diamond. You and me, we can sell
- 2:14:58this. And I was like, General Cobra, I don't want to read
- 2:15:05you kindle the war. I don't want to get shot. I'm like,
- 2:15:09you know, this is a great I you know, sorry, I this
- 2:15:11is not my laying, you know, and I'm trying to so, I
- 2:15:15mean, things come. You know, you don't quite know what is uh
- 2:15:18what you're going to be dealing with it on a daily basis, but uh,
- 2:15:22yeah, that's the example that pops into my is. It was not
- 2:15:24a formal government request, but it was yeah, ahead of the of the
- 2:15:28rebel contingent. Thank you, Devin. Thank you very much, very generous.
- 2:15:33I would like to know your action in a nuclear war setting. Wait,
- 2:15:39if a nuclear bomb dropped, what would you do? Die? Probably?
- 2:15:43What would I do in a nuclear by Yeah, I mean, look
- 2:15:46like everybody, if I'm not vaporized immediately, I'm going to go find my
- 2:15:50family and you know, try to go to ground. Thanks definitely appreciate it.
- 2:15:54Uh Colly, thank you very much. We define success in Afghani stand
- 2:16:00as a strong, stable central government ignoring ignoring reality. Did this mislignement ensure
- 2:16:09failure? I would say that again. I want to be clear. I
- 2:16:18think we achieved our core strategic mission in Afghanistan, which is we took the
- 2:16:22leadership of al Qaida off the board and the ideological gravity center of that organization
- 2:16:31off the board. And that's the organization that killed you know, three thousand
- 2:16:35Americans. Right, So I feel strongly that that core national security objective.
- 2:16:41Now when you're talking about what came and what we were trying to achieve in
- 2:16:46terms of the stability, it's less sort of that objective. Then. I
- 2:16:54think there are alternate history lines as we've talked about that certainly us. I
- 2:17:01think the bigger, you know, the bigger mistakes that were made were hyper
- 2:17:09inflating an economy that couldn't handle it, that it blatantly enabled corruption. So
- 2:17:16we fueled a completely dependent structure that wasn't serving the benefit of the people that
- 2:17:24in theory, we were trying to help. And again it gets back to
- 2:17:28why we as Americans supporting a unitary state. By unitary state, I mean
- 2:17:33a central government that appoints the governing structures the governors and the district governors of
- 2:17:41the provinces in the outlying areas, and all the resources flow back to centrally
- 2:17:46led ministries. This is the type of stuff that drives us crazy in America.
- 2:17:50And so I, you know, the fact that we worked so much
- 2:17:54on that project, if I had had a stronger say, you know,
- 2:18:01and had been a senior person I would have been looking more at, you
- 2:18:05know, what are the relationships of the tribes, and how do we do
- 2:18:09you know, a looser confederation of peoples that you know will fundamentally be willing
- 2:18:18to accept some money far smaller amounts to tell us when al Qaeda shows up
- 2:18:24and ted them over and that's it, and then leave the Afghans to sort
- 2:18:28out a different construct, rather than we didn't fully impose it, but we
- 2:18:33funded it so much that so I think the you know, you know,
- 2:18:37I hope I'm being responsive to the answer. I don't think it was a
- 2:18:41preordained failure, but I do think that the structure as it developed was definitely
- 2:18:46not the right structure, and there are other things that probably could have should
- 2:18:50have been tried earlier in the process. I mean, once we were,
- 2:18:54once I got there in two thousand and nine, we were we were far
- 2:18:58down the road supporting a unitary state, and that was our problem. I
- 2:19:03think we should have looked at other models. That's my own view, Ian
- 2:19:07Brown, Thank you very much. What are Dante's thoughts about the Diplomatic Security
- 2:19:13Service? How did he work with him? Thanks? Guy. I mean,
- 2:19:18I can't say enough positive things about my colleagues in diplomatic security and again
- 2:19:26the marine security guards that work for them at embassies. I'm a field person.
- 2:19:30Most of my career has been overseas. You know, those folks are
- 2:19:35responsible for not only our safety of us, safety of the chancery, but
- 2:19:41they're maintaining the relationships with all the local security apparatus, right because fundamentally we're
- 2:19:48in somebody else's country, we are relying on them. You know, a
- 2:19:52strong RSO and a strong RSO contingent is completely tie in and has the context.
- 2:20:01So when you need to evacuate somebody from a country when there's a real
- 2:20:05crisis, that person being able to do it. And you know, my
- 2:20:09colleagues are excellent. The other thing is is that they are tasked with and
- 2:20:13you guys know this. If you look at threat streams, we would close
- 2:20:18everywhere because you're constantly under thread, right if your focus is on threatstreams,
- 2:20:22and the RSO has to have the judgment, and they do. We have
- 2:20:26exceptional RSOs throughout the world who are looking at these threat streams that we're all
- 2:20:33seeing in different channels and they have to go to the ambassador, the chief
- 2:20:35of mission and say, hey, we got this or it's time to go.
- 2:20:43And so like in Liberia, if you can imagine the pressure that Ted
- 2:20:48Collins and Brad Lynn are rs and aarso we're under. You not only have
- 2:20:52the Washington pressure, but it's if I give the ambassador the wrong advice,
- 2:20:58I don't think we can hold that. If I say I think we can
- 2:21:00hold this compound, the compound's overrun, right, I mean not only do
- 2:21:03I maybe get killed, I get the ambassador killed, but I've you know,
- 2:21:09destroyed the US credibility in the region. We've lost a platform, I
- 2:21:15mean huge ramification. The ambassador, as the chief of mission with the authority,
- 2:21:22will make the final call unless it's taken away and Washington decides we don't
- 2:21:28think the ambassador has it right. We're gonna We're gonna order the ambassador out.
- 2:21:31But the RSO is the critical counsel to the ambassador on how to handle
- 2:21:37the riot that is out front of your embassy, how to handle uh,
- 2:21:41you know, the civil war uh that that's broken out. You know,
- 2:21:45what does this mean for the security of our personnel? So I can't say
- 2:21:50enough positive things about it because you don't see, you know, all of
- 2:21:54the things that are prevented on a daily basis by that, you know.
- 2:21:58Uh, I again, thank you very much. Hit the likes, guys,
- 2:22:03let's get to that one hundred. Hopefully we got there already. Thanks.
- 2:22:05Thanks again. We appreciate Collie. Thank you very much. Does the
- 2:22:11United States government facilitating private hostage negotiations example of the Burnham's undermine the stated policy
- 2:22:20no negation, no negotiation with good question? So this is a really good
- 2:22:24question. I really have to caveat it that it's you know, I'm not
- 2:22:30familiar with that particular example in terms of what what that means the facilitation.
- 2:22:37I'll say this that, uh, it's a very that you know, hostage
- 2:22:43negotiation stuff is very, very difficult. We have a commitment as a government
- 2:22:48to recover our people safely, right, but there's a moral hazard every time
- 2:22:56you're doing it, and you're dealing with the emotions and lives of family members
- 2:23:01and communities. But you're balancing that against the reality that the more you pay
- 2:23:07into a system, and I don't mean monetary, but whatever transactions you do
- 2:23:11on hostage release can introduce more hostages. So these are very very tough calls
- 2:23:20on whether or not that's right. So in terms of is there moral hazard?
- 2:23:28And I can't answer that specific case because I don't know it, but
- 2:23:30as a general principle, you know, negotiations introduced that and then you know,
- 2:23:37we have to The Burnhams were in the Philippines and it was a big
- 2:23:41deal in the early two thousands getting them out of there. There were missionaries
- 2:23:46and when they were finally rescued, I believe the wife made it out.
- 2:23:50In the husband I believe was killed if I remember correctly. Yeah, I'm
- 2:23:56not. I'm not familiar with it. I will say that, you know,
- 2:23:58there's some you know, again not my area of expertise, there's some
- 2:24:05areas of policy that are you know, under consideration because we I think we
- 2:24:09used to have a law that private citizens couldn't do their own negotiation. You
- 2:24:15sort of understood it because again it was to try to prevent the moral hazard
- 2:24:18and try to prevent people from getting deeper into a situation that they're unfamiliar with
- 2:24:24and you know, producing something. But you know, a change in policy
- 2:24:30there would make some sense in the sense that, look, if a family
- 2:24:33member wants to try, they should be aware of the risks that they're undertaking.
- 2:24:37But we as a government shouldn't you know, I think there's a strong
- 2:24:41case to be made that it's not our role to stop it, right,
- 2:24:46but you know, but it's because of those kind of very very difficult situations
- 2:24:52that the policy gets gray. Sure, tell us a little bit about where
- 2:25:00you're at now, you're the Director of East African Affairs at the State Department.
- 2:25:03What does that entail. That entails you know, an office within the
- 2:25:11State Department, in a what we call a regional bureau, is sort of
- 2:25:16your primary touch point for the embassies in the reporting back. So when an
- 2:25:20embassy reports what's going on in a country, you know, they will you
- 2:25:26know, feed their views and that information into a policy process on how we
- 2:25:33respond to whatever the country is doing. If somebody wants to you know,
- 2:25:39join bricks, do we have a do we have a policy response? Should
- 2:25:41we encourage them not to? Should do we have an alternative for them?
- 2:25:46You know those kind of things. So the office is the primary pooler and
- 2:25:50gatherer of information for the embassies. And then the second thing is is where
- 2:25:56the you know, we provide a regional and country specific perspective into interagency deliberations
- 2:26:07over whatever policy is being cooked up. Hey, we want to you know,
- 2:26:13we want to train police. Okay, good ideas. Should we be
- 2:26:18training these police? Right? You know, how are we balancing the human
- 2:26:22rights considerations with the hardcore national security considerations. So it's a lot of it's
- 2:26:31a lot of internal conversation. And then of course we are a touch point
- 2:26:35for the embassies here from the foreign missions. You know, in places where
- 2:26:46we have intensive negotiations, we may support those negotiations. Maybe there's a trade
- 2:26:50treaty, there's that they bring in our expertise on. Maybe there's some other
- 2:26:54kind of bilateral dialogue. We support a lot of things like that. You
- 2:27:00bring their foreign minister over, we bring the secretary together and we discuss the
- 2:27:05issues. So you're trying to manage the relations with countries where there's sort of
- 2:27:11primary regional policy expertise on that. And folks out there that are interested in
- 2:27:20your book, which I mean, I think you described it to me before
- 2:27:24that it's really about what it's like to be existing in a crisis in a
- 2:27:28US embassy abroad. In this book. Where can people find it? They
- 2:27:33can find it on Amazon. The book is the Embassy Story of War and
- 2:27:39Diplomacy. Just a couple quick points on it. It is designed, it's
- 2:27:46written in narrative nonfiction. There's a brief section that you've got to get through
- 2:27:50and intro. You don't have to read it on history a little dry.
- 2:27:54What I do is the reason I wrote it is to put you in an
- 2:27:58embassy in a crisis. So it was based on my own personal observations and
- 2:28:03experiences. But I also did extensive interviews with everybody that was involved in the
- 2:28:09crisis at the time, and I was sort of at the nerve center.
- 2:28:13So you've got, you know, chapters built around the perspective of the rso
- 2:28:18more or less chapters built around the perspective of the ambassador, of a local
- 2:28:24staff member, and they're woven together to take you through an extraordinary summer in
- 2:28:31which again three rebel attacks, the X, the end of the Charles Taylor
- 2:28:35regime, and a peace agreement that has endured to today. That's fantastic.
- 2:28:41I don't know if I've ever heard of a book of that nature work.
- 2:28:45Coolly, Yeah, yeah, yeah, I'm looking forward to it. And
- 2:28:50is there anything else that you want to plug? Is there where can people
- 2:28:52find you? I know you're currently a government official. Do you have any
- 2:28:58sort of public faith seeing places that you want to direct people at the shop
- 2:29:03or yeah, no, no, I might you know, if you if
- 2:29:07you want to see the uh the travel version of the Foreign Service and see
- 2:29:11some you know, travel photography, you can go to my Instagram account parody
- 2:29:16so d X if you just want to reach out to me and you have
- 2:29:18further questions. You know, I think one of the things that your platform
- 2:29:22does is give people a chance to connect. So you can just find me
- 2:29:26on LinkedIn under my name, because you know, I'm always happy to engage
- 2:29:31people and you know, build the community of interests for for people who might
- 2:29:37be interested in pursuing the field of foreign service. What like what's a good
- 2:29:46age to start that, what are some good in roads and what does the
- 2:29:48Foreign Service look for in candidates? Yeah, I mean the Foreign Service.
- 2:29:54There are a couple of ways in I'm not that familiar with the sort of
- 2:29:58non traditional mid career ways. They're trying to open up that process and make
- 2:30:03it a little more flexible. The traditional way is there's a Foreign Service exam.
- 2:30:09You should find out from State gut doug gov where you can you can
- 2:30:13find the information on the exam and it's a written exam, followed by an
- 2:30:18oral exam, followed by security and medical clearances if you pass it. You
- 2:30:22know, the preparation for the career can be varied. Obviously, Folks with
- 2:30:31you know, military background is excellent. We're fortunately getting a lot of folks
- 2:30:37that are using it as a second career. You can enter at any point.
- 2:30:41The retirement age is sixty five. You know, you're going to have
- 2:30:45to come in, you know, in your late fifties if you want a
- 2:30:48couple tours overseas. The thing is is that you know, you're not going
- 2:30:52to become an ambassador if you start when you're fifty five, right, because
- 2:30:56it's just you're not going to be have the time to work your way up
- 2:31:00through the system. But there's a tremendous number of uh, you know,
- 2:31:05great assignments out there. There's a lot of different aspects to foreign service life.
- 2:31:11So, you know, I'm a political officer by you know, by
- 2:31:15they call it cone. What do you what do you guys call it skill
- 2:31:18code? Right, political officer that's you know, essentially reporting on the political
- 2:31:24dynamics in a country. But there are also management officers that just sort of
- 2:31:30run the affairs of an embassy. You know, make sure that we have
- 2:31:33our motor pool set, you know, make sure that your financial stuff is
- 2:31:37being run. We have public affairs officers and of course consular officers. And
- 2:31:43if you know, immigration is your thing and you want to help, you
- 2:31:48know, bring people to the States, you want to keep people out of
- 2:31:50the states. You know, you're going to be working on visas, You're
- 2:31:54going to be working on family reunification, and the critical component of American city
- 2:32:00and services, which is, you know, when somebody's in trouble overseas,
- 2:32:03you get thrown in jail, the embassy is going to visit track you.
- 2:32:07We can't run your court case for you, but it's it's those kind of
- 2:32:11things, sort of helping Americans through evacuations, in extremists and all that.
- 2:32:16Those are all aspects. And then there are specialized roles, which is you
- 2:32:20know, like diplomatic security. Those are you know, folks come in in
- 2:32:24diplomatic security or it t people you know, if you have a general interest
- 2:32:30in living overseas representing the country, but you know, are not as as
- 2:32:37interested in the the core diplomatic sit in the meeting with the foreign minister and
- 2:32:45write reports on that. Then you know some of those other roles or ways
- 2:32:48to contribute, you know, you know, to the inner agency platform.
- 2:32:54And I want to you know, shout out everybody that is part of an
- 2:32:58embassy team, because State Department provides the core platform, right, but a
- 2:33:05country team at an embassy, you know, like if you go to Thailand,
- 2:33:09it's like fifty four agencies. I didn't even know we had fifty four
- 2:33:11agents. Yes, right, I'm like, I don't know there's d A.
- 2:33:16I can go through the entire litany of the US government and apparently and
- 2:33:20find it in Tily. You go to a smaller embassy, you know,
- 2:33:24you're going to find two or three agencies. Usually you're going to have a
- 2:33:28Defense attache there and you might have a USA I D person or whatever.
- 2:33:31So it really depends. There's a lot of you know, folks that are
- 2:33:35doing foreign affairs and doing embassy work, so they should all get credit for
- 2:33:41that. Dante, thank you so much for coming in to do this interview
- 2:33:46tonight, even if you came in under an alias, that's okay. I
- 2:33:50really appreciate it. And we will be back on Wednesday with Adam Gamal,
- 2:33:54the author of the unit. So that's Wednesday at noon, so it'll be
- 2:34:00a neon interview. It'll odd for us, but I hope you guys will
- 2:34:05check out the embassy. The books available on Amazon, and there's going to
- 2:34:09be a link down the description as well. You guys can go and check
- 2:34:11it out. Thank you, And you know, I hope that we can
- 2:34:16have you back sometime in the future because there's a few other things here that
- 2:34:18we didn't quite get to tonight and could probably yeah, no, it absolutely
- 2:34:26could. And you know, I have no idea maybe you'll have another book
- 2:34:31to come and talk about as well. Yeah, it's great. It's a
- 2:34:35it's a real honestly and honor to be here. And you know, you
- 2:34:39guys have you know, phenomenal guests. You know, love this love this
- 2:34:43program, and it's thank you. We all learned, we all learned from
- 2:34:46it. Yeah, thank you, appreciate it. And uh so that's it.
- 2:34:50We'll see you guys on Wednesday. Take care out there, have a
- 2:34:54nice weekend.