Latest / The Learning Corner by Precursor / Episode #11: Chris Neumann, Forbes, The Economist

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Episode #11: Chris Neumann, Forbes, The Economist · The Learning Corner by Precursor

• 0:00
  Something happened in your ecosystem that makes your start up less attractive, you can't run
• 0:04
  away from that.
• 0:04
  The same is true in venture.
• 0:05
  If something's happening in the macro that maybe imperils your model, you can't put your
• 0:09
  head in the sand.
• 0:10
  You have to say, hey.
• 0:10
  Look.
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  It's possible that that's where we're headed.
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  And if it is, what are we gonna do?
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  The number one thing to do is to stay alive and have a plan and make sure that you're there
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  when things play out.
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  It's the week of December 2nd.
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  Welcome to the learning corner, a Precursor Ventures podcast.
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  Welcome to the Learning Corner by Precursor.
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  I'm Mia Farnam, and I am joined by our GP and managing partner, Charles Hudson, where we'll
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  be talking through the articles and Goodreads that caught our team's attention from the past
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  week.
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  Our first article is by Chris Newman titled in Silicon Valley, no answer is an answer.
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  Chris writes about a unique but pretty well known cultural phenomenon in the tech world
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  where non responses from investors, founders, and partners often carry implicit meaning.
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  The piece dives into how this norm of letting things drift can oftentimes lead to confusion,
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  misaligned expectations, and wasted time.
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  Newman argues that learning to read between the lines and recognize when silence is in fact a
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  form of rejection, in some cases, just for now, is an essential skill for navigating the
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  ecosystem.
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  His perspectives shift the burden onto the person seeking clarity to take control of their
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  time and energy.
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  At Precursor, we do really try to close the loop on as many conversations with founders as
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  possible, and that's inclusive of the submission form on our website.
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  That being said, there are always cases where sometimes the loop doesn't end up getting
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  closed or an email is is missed and fall through the cracks.
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  That's actually different than what Chris is describing here, where an email is read and
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  there is no response whatsoever.
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  So would love to hear your thoughts, Charles, up with the hundreds of emails that hit your
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  inbox.
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  I emailed Chris and told him thank you for writing this post because I think there are,
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  like, 3 different things that happen to people in the valley.
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  One is, you know, people have written thousands of blog posts about how ghosting is evil.
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  And to me, ghosting means something really specific.
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  That's like you got multiple conversations in with somebody, and they just disappeared on
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  you.
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  And you feel like, hey.
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  Something was happening here.
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  There was movement, but, like, they just disappeared.
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  That feels, I think, weird.
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  I try not to do that.
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  I would be lying me if I said I've never unintentionally ghosted a founder where I've
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  gotten busy, and I've been, like, I've meant to write that person back and just things have
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  gotten in the way.
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  That I think people have a justifiable feeling of frustration.
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  We were like, hey.
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  I was 3 or 4 meetings in with this person.
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  Whether you're a GP talking to an LP or a founder talking to an investor, it feels weird.
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  We were like, we had, like, some kind of conversation and relationship, and it just
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  disappeared.
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  I think that's different than sending a cold email and hearing no response.
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  Like, I try to get back to everybody who responds to us even cold.
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  But sometimes I read emails.
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  I'm like, this is so irrelevant, and I don't really think this person put any thought into
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  sending this email.
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  I don't think I owe them a reply.
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  And early in my career when my boss had told me, it's like, no one owes you a reply.
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  Like, let go of the belief that anyone owes you a reply.
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  They have their priorities.
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  You may or may not fall into those.
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  Like, get over yourself.
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  And it was hard to hear, but I'm glad I heard that early in my career.
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  And, look, we send a lot of email on behalf of our portfolio companies.
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  You know, they're fundraising.
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  And they'll ask me, can you reach out to so and so?
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  I'll send that person an email.
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  Because Chris said, I'll wait a week or so.
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  I'll nudge them again.
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  And if they don't follow-up, I assume one of 2 things.
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  They had something else more important from their point of view that they were working on,
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  and they didn't feel like it was important to get back to me, or it simply isn't of interest,
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  and they don't really wanna get into why.
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  And I've had people like, will you ping them twice?
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  Can you ping them again?
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  I'm like, I mean, I could, but now we're getting into, like, crayonish desperation zone.
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  And you're probably actually doing, to the article's point, more harm than good.
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  Just last week, I had somebody where someone had sent me 2 emails to meet this person, and
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  I'd meant to reply.
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  In both cases, I got busy.
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  And And the person who I was supposed to meet, you know, was like, hey, I see we're gonna both
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  be at the same event.
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  I'll just introduce myself there.
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  I was like, oh, alright.
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  Like, problem solved.
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  So sometimes the answer is, like, find another way or another channel.
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  Don't continue to hammer the person through the same channel.
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  And if you're asking people to do this stuff on your behalf, like, let them be the guide.
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  Let them sort of manage those relationships.
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  They maybe have a better context on how often and how much is too much.
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  So I don't know.
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  Like, I think though, Mia, if I could go back in time and undo anything, I didn't fund 1.
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  I was like the person Chris wrote this article about.
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  I mean, they were LPs.
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  I was like, hey.
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  It's been 5 times since I've emailed you, and I still haven't heard back whether you're
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  interested in our fund.
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  And, of course, if you've emailed somebody 5 times with no response, that is the answer.
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  And I think in a selling context, you wouldn't get that upset if a prospect just said, like,
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  you sent a cold email to someone you thought might be interested in your product, and they
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  didn't reply.
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  You wouldn't be as upset.
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  But I get it.
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  When you're a founder, like, you are the product to some extent, and so it is easier to
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  take it much more personally than if you're sending cold email on behalf of IBM and nobody
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  replies.
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  You're like, it's just part of the job.
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  There are some folks that you really don't want or don't need seeing the sausage being being
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  made.
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  And so if you know that they're not interested, maybe it's okay to just keep them out of the
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  updates, etcetera, and I'll meet you at a time that I know will be better suited for your
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  strategy.
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  How do you kind of wage that as a founder when you're pre seed?
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  And, like, maybe I'm not around by the time that I need to
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  Yeah.
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  Come back to
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  you.
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  Also, I just have come to learn.
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  I never know what's going on in somebody else's inbox or their life.
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  And I've sometimes had people who are normally very responsive.
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  I've sent them stuff, and they haven't replied.
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  And I follow-up, and they don't you know, I'm like, well, that's weird.
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  And then I'll see them 2 months later, and it turns out there was some terrible thing
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  happening in their life.
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  And I'm like, gosh.
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  Had I known that, I would have been able to contextualize the thing I was asking you about.
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  And even I would have said this is a lot less important than the thing you're dealing with
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  they're trying to solve.
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  The next topic comes from Forbes.
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  It's titled LP predictions for venture capital in 2025.
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  This piece outlines some broader insights from LPs about the evolving DC landscape, including
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  the ongoing liquidity crunch, increased focus on fund manager differentiation, and a shift
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  toward concentrated portfolios.
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  One prediction from the article is that LPs are gonna start placing greater value on smaller
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  specialized funds rather than large generalist ones.
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  They argue that focus and expertise will drive stronger returns in a market where capital
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  efficiency is becoming critical.
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  This week, you released on your substack an essay outlining 3 different future states of
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  early stage venture.
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  I would love for you to walk through those at a high level because I know you actually have one
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  scenario that greatly differs from that last takeaway that I just provided from the article
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  about smaller specialized funds rising and larger funds taking a back seat.
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  Yeah.
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  I'll get to the slide in a second.
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  I read this article.
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  I was like, I hope most of these things are true because it would be great for anybody
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  who's a fund manager if, you know, especially if you're a small fund, if LPs are more
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  interested in small funds and are gonna be more active in allocating and care about manager
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  differentiation, that sounds great as somebody who runs a small fund.
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  But, you know, we had our annual meeting.
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  I can't believe it's been 2 or 3 weeks now.
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  And, you know, one of the slides I presented was this 3 different future states of venture,
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  because I think seed is a 20 year old ish asset class at this point.
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  It's very clear to me that the conditions under which seed was created are different than the
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  conditions that exist today.
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  So as I explained our LPs, I'm like, look.
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  Historically, seed has been this link in the chain of the venture value ecosystem.
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  Seed funds do a lot of the 0 to 1 work, predominantly with first time founders.
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  And the series a funds come and pick from that pool of companies, the ones that have made the
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  most progress, seem the most promising, or otherwise the most interesting.
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  And those companies graduate and move on, and seed funds continue to be, to some extent, kind
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  of like a finishing school for people who have a rough idea of what they wanna build, and it's
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  very symbiotic.
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  The seed funds take a lot of the early 0 to 1 risk.
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  The series a funds harvest the stuff that's winning.
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  It's very beautiful symbiotic relationship.
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  It's great.
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  Doesn't feel to me like that's likely gonna be what the next 10 years look like.
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  So I was like, alright.
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  Well, what could the next 10 years look like?
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  One scenario is big funds and small funds just operate really differently, but there's still
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  some overlap.
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  So, you know, big funds now, whenever I talk to folks at Lightspeed or Excel or the big funds,
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  and I ask them, like, you know, what does big enough look like for you?
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  It's really 5 to $10,000,000,000 exit, and we've done enough venture math on Learning
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  Corner to know that, you know, if you've got a multibillion dollar fund, you need outcomes in
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  the 10 to $20,000,000,000 range for your 10 to 20% ownership stake to matter in the context of
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  your fund.
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  But for a $100,000,000 fund, a $1,000,000,000 outcome is great.
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  A couple of them is phenomenal, but a $1,000,000,000 outcome doesn't really help a
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  $5,000,000,000 fund solve its problems.
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  So I was like, what if you end up with the universe in which there are small funds that
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  are happy with a set of outcomes and big funds which need outcomes that are almost an order of
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  magnitude bigger?
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  And we're all venture capitalists.
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  We're all in the same industry, but we have really different business models.
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  And this notion that seed is a finishing school for series a for the big funds just breaks
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  down, and there's sort of 2 different venture ecosystems that operate really differently.
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  But the third one, which I'll admit as a small fund manager was the most uncomfortable to
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  examine, but you can't run away from things that are scary, is what if big funds just take
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  over the seed business?
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  You know, most multistage funds have seed investing programs that are bigger than most
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  seed funds.
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  And my presumption is they can raise those funds whenever they want.
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  And to me, what that means is big multistage funds are a permanent fixture in seed.
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  They're gonna be here as long as they wanna be here, and they're gonna probably start cherry
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  picking more of the repeat founders, the proven folks, people who don't want 1 on 5, but who
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  want 10 on 50.
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  And the big funds can write that check, and I'd argue most seed funds cannot build an entire
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  portfolio of 10 on 50 entry point investments.
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  The math just doesn't work.
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  I talked to an LP who told me, well, what if all of the returns come from repeat proven
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  founders?
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  I was like, well, if that's the case, if that's your belief, you should actually only allocate
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  to the big multistage funds because my belief is they're gonna capture a disproportionate
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  share of those founders, in which case you're left with the world where smaller seed funds
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  are fighting over a much smaller pool of alpha, and it becomes much harder to make the argument
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  that smaller funds have a role in the ecosystem from an LP standpoint when you can capture most
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  of the gains of seed by giving your money to a big fund.
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  Now, look, I think there's a big difference between 0% of the alpha and seed coming from
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  repeat people at a 100%.
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  I don't think either of those extremes is right.
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  But the closer you get to 65, 75% of the dollar returns in seed coming from the pool of people
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  that are likely gonna be attracted to multistage funds, the harder the case is to
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  make for being a small seed specialist manager.
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  And I think in the same way, I would tell a founder, hey.
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  If something happened in your ecosystem that makes your start up less attractive, you can't
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  run away from that.
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  The same is true in venture.
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  As if something's happening in the macro that maybe imperils your model, you can't put your
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  head in the sand and you can't also wish it away.
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  You have to say, hey, look.
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  It's possible that that's where we're headed.
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  And if it is, what are we gonna do?
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  So, you know, I have lots of thoughts about what we would do if it turns out we're in some
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  combination of world 2 and world 3.
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  And, the number one thing to do is to stay alive.
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  It's to stay alive and have a plan and make sure that you're there when things play out,
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  just like it is with a start up.
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  One of the quotes from Integra Global Advisors was 2025 will be one of the best VC vintages in
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  many years.
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  While in an aggregate, on an index level, I can get on that train.
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  I do feel like we're missing some caveats here that could quickly shift how successful your
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  fund could be even if you start in a really favorable year for fund managers.
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  So would love to know what those could be from your POV, and I feel like we touched on a
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  little bit of those in your last response.
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  I also think, like, this whole notion that 2025 is gonna be a great vintage year.
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  I'm like, I think every year is gonna be a great vintage year.
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  I'm an optimist.
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  But you don't know for 7 to 10 years.
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  So I actually don't know what you do with that information.
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  If someone says 2025 is gonna be a great year, I'm like, great.
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  You should allocate now.
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  But you're still not gonna know for 7 to 10 years.
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  I think the biggest delta for the 2020 3 to 2026 vintage funds, I think, is gonna be what
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  happens with AI.
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  If you just look at the amount of venture dollars that have gone into that theme, and you
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  know me and me, I'm not a thematic investor, I think we're basically the venture business is
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  leveraged to AI right now.
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  If AI turns out to produce tons and tons of winners or even a few mega winners like OpenAI
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  or Anthropic, it's very possible that, like, those will look like great vintages.
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  If it turns out that AI doesn't perform to expectations, there are so many venture dollars
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  crowded into that theme.
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  I'm not sure how any of those vintages look great at an index level.
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  So it's funny.
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  I think a lot of people said 2024 is gonna be a great vintage because it's so hard to
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  fundraise.
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  And I'm like, but if everyone thinks it's gonna be a great vintage because it's hard, people
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  still have to allocate.
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  Final topic is an article from The Economist.
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  It's titled, has Sequoia Capital outgrown its business model?
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  The article examines how Sequoia, one of the most iconic names in venture, is adapting to a
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  vastly different competitive landscape.
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  It highlights the firm's efforts to return to its roots, focusing more on early stage
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  investing while grappling with the challenges of maintaining its dominance in a market
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  flooded with new entrants.
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  The piece notes, quote, the number of smart founders is not a function of the amount of
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  money available.
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  I think you actually said something quite similar a few podcasts ago.
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  This highlights the increasingly crowded field of venture capital where firms vying for a
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  limited pool of high quality opportunities.
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  To combat this, Sequoia is deploying a handful of strategies, like scaling down its
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  international operations, doubling down on initiatives like Arc, its start up school, and
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  more.
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  So whether or not you believe that Sequoia should feel like they need to make massive
• 13:56
  changes to stay at the top of their game, on a more general note, it's clear that venture
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  firms adapt in cycles in response to market shifts.
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  I feel like we're probably experiencing 1 right now as opposed to being more proactive and
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  being more adaptable and knowing that we can't be comfortable forever.
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  So from your perspective, Charles, this ties into something that you were alluding to in the
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  last topic.
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  What are some of the things that Precursor maybe had to embrace or deploy to continue
• 14:23
  growing irrespective of a turbulent market?
• 14:26
  Yeah.
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  I mean, look, I would never bet against Sequoia.
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  They're incredibly good at what they do.
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  They've been very good across generations for a long time.
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  And whenever I talk to the partners there, they have almost maniacal paranoia about staying on
• 14:40
  top, and I find when you maniacal paranoia about staying on top, you tend to adapt and
• 14:45
  change and be aggressive.
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  And so I would be the last one to suggest that Sequoia's in deep trouble.
• 14:50
  They're quite good at what they do.
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  But I do think that line you mentioned for me is the fundamental question I have about
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  venture right now.
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  As more money floods into this asset class and as more money gets concentrated in a smaller
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  number of companies, I think that the number of really successful people who start companies is
• 15:06
  an independent variable to capital.
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  It'd be great if just pouring more money into venture meant more smart people would have good
• 15:12
  ideas.
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  I think it's the other way around.
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  I think, in general, it's money that chases good ideas, not money that creates good ideas.
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  I think a lot about our firm.
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  10 years ago, simply being a pre seed focused fund was a differentiator.
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  It isn't anymore.
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  There are lots of other people who've recognized that pre seed is interesting.
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  And so we've had to broaden the way we talk about what we do, and we do some pre seed and
• 15:32
  seed now, whereas in the beginning, it was mostly pre seed.
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  I would say in the beginning, I didn't feel like we needed to spend as much time with
• 15:39
  repeat founders because I didn't think that was our thing.
• 15:42
  And I was pleasantly surprised by the number of those folks who were interested in taking our
• 15:46
  capital.
• 15:46
  But those investments happen on prices and terms that are very different than our core
• 15:51
  model.
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  And getting comfortable with that idea took me some time.
• 15:55
  There's been a lot of things we did, ironically, that people do now.
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  Like, we started doing 30 minute video or phone meetings only as a first meeting, I wanna say
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  in 2017 and 2018.
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  And that was largely because San Francisco traffic was so bad that asking people to come
• 16:11
  to Union Square where our old office was didn't make any sense.
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  So I was like, let's just do the first one.
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  And our LPs were like, how can you get to know people on the phone and on videos?
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  Like, what we do.
• 16:21
  And we started doing Fintech in Africa, and a lot of our LPs were like, gosh.
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  I don't know.
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  How do so I don't know.
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  I think you have to always ask yourself, like, where are the opportunities and, like, what are
• 16:29
  the things that we could be doing that we aren't doing, and why aren't we doing them?
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  I think, nowadays, on the one hand, precede's a lot more competitive than it used to be, but
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  I'm also like we've been doing it long enough that we have a pretty good brand.
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  So I'm glad we started 10 years ago.
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  I tell a lot of fund managers, I couldn't pull out the deck we used for precursor 10 years ago
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  and raise on that deck today because the world is different.
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  To raise a brand new fund today, I'd need a really different story and approach than we
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  needed 10 years ago.
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  And the irony is, like, the reason it was a great idea to start 10 years ago is because
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  most people thought it was a bad idea to do pre seed.
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  So I'm always asking myself, like, what are the things that other people think are bad ideas
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  today that will feel like good ideas in a few years?
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  And that's also, like, the website submissions.
• 17:13
  A lot of people, like, why would you spend time on that?
• 17:15
  I'm like, well, because eventually, if we can get good in convincing people that applying on
• 17:19
  the website gets real eyes on your business plan and you could actually get money that way,
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  it basically uncaps the number of people we can meet top of funnel.
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  And a lot of people are like, well, I don't wanna deal with cold website.
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  I'm like, great.
• 17:32
  By the time it's important to be good at it, we'll be good at it because we've been working
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  at it for many years now.
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  And I'm always asking myself, like, what are the things that people think are, like, not
• 17:40
  important or not good ideas today that 3 to 5 years from now you wanna be good at?
• 17:45
  The article also mentions Sequoia's attempt to build deeper founder relationships through
• 17:49
  programs like Arc, which is their startup school.
• 17:52
  So it's very common for multibillion dollar funds to have accelerators and incubators and
• 17:56
  studios within a fund.
• 17:58
  But do you think that this high touch hands on approach is a necessary component for all types
• 18:02
  of VC funds to stay competitive in their earliest stages?
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  I have sort of a weird view of how competition works in venture.
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  I think most people in venture compete with a really small set of people that they consider
• 18:13
  to be their peers, and the rest of the industry to them is noise.
• 18:17
  And when I talk to people at the really large multistage firms, while they're theoretically
• 18:22
  concerned about smaller seed firms that are nipping at their heels, they spend most of
• 18:27
  their time worrying about, are we beating our peer set of firms for the most competitive?
• 18:32
  So, you know, if you're at Lightspeed, like, am I beating Indexed Excel, Greylock, and Sequoia
• 18:36
  for the deals I really care about?
• 18:38
  Because when you lose at that level, that's generally who you lose to.
• 18:41
  And so my belief is that, like, if firms at that level feel like they want to make
• 18:46
  investments in these programs, I think it's only to attract a really specific founder
• 18:51
  archetype and one that they feel like having this program gives them an edge.
• 18:55
  I mean, that was the whole original thesis for these platform teams is that it would give you
• 18:59
  either a marketing edge in winning deals or give you a post winning improvement in your
• 19:05
  odds of success advantage because your platform team would help those founders, you know, solve
• 19:10
  problems or whatever.
• 19:10
  And it almost doesn't matter which one of those things is true.
• 19:14
  It could be either or both.
• 19:15
  I think there was a window of time where having a platform team, if other people didn't have
• 19:19
  it, was an advantage.
• 19:20
  Now they all have them, so they're table stakes.
• 19:22
  You don't get bonus points for having one.
• 19:26
  And so I think, like, Andreessen's got speed runs.
• 19:29
  Sequoia's got arc.
• 19:30
  I think there's always gonna be an arms race for the big funds to figure out what can we do.
• 19:35
  Some of them have technical fellows, but there's always gonna be a desire to get in
• 19:38
  front of the top 1% of founders and to build that relationship 3 to 6 months earlier than
• 19:44
  your competitors and to build it deeper and better.
• 19:46
  So the fact that they're they're continuing to innovate tells me that they feel like they
• 19:50
  can't be complacent.
• 19:51
  Well, we are all out of time today.
• 19:52
  Thank you, Charles, for joining.
• 19:53
  Thank you to our listeners for tuning in.
• 19:55
  Please like and subscribe, and we will talk to you all next week.
• 19:58
  Thank you.
• 20:03
  Bye.