Latest / ACLED Audio / REPORT: Jihadist violence in the Asia-Pacific is concentrated in localized pockets of militancy, with risks of spillover
Transcript
- 0:06SPEAKER_00: Jihadist violence in the Asia-Pacific is concentrated in localized pockets of militancy, with risks of spillover.
- 0:14SPEAKER_00: Jihadist groups remain a persistent, if geographically bounded, source of violence in the Asia-Pacific in 2026, where violent activity is centered in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Philippines.
- 0:28SPEAKER_00: While the threat of growing militancy outside these countries remains limited in the immediate term, the presence of such entrenched insurgencies provides a sustained, if largely latent, risk of attacks across the wider region.
- 0:43SPEAKER_00: In the first nine months of the year, violence perpetrated by these groups has grown by a modest 8% compared to the first nine months of 2025.
- 0:54SPEAKER_00: Consistent levels of violence across the region, however, belie shifting fortunes for some of the region's longest-running insurgencies.
- 1:03SPEAKER_00: Pakistan's position as the center of jihadist activity in the region continues to strengthen as the Tehriq-i Taliban Pakistan doubles down on its contestation of state control in Hyber Pakhtunhwa province along the Afghan border.
- 1:22SPEAKER_00: Central and South Asia's other traditional hotspots, Afghanistan and India, continue to experience a longer-term contraction in activity associated with the dwindling capacity of Islamic State Khorasan Province and militant groups in India-administered Kashmir, respectively.
- 1:45SPEAKER_00: In Southeast Asia, groups in the Philippines south show signs of renewal, even as other traditional centers of activity, such as Indonesia, remain functionally inactive.
- 1:57SPEAKER_00: The threat of Jihadi militancy outside of these countries remains limited in the wider Asia Pacific, but by no means non-existent.
- 2:08SPEAKER_00: Jihadi groups in the region have shown an appetite to widen the fight beyond their narrow geographic footprints and continue to do so.
- 2:17SPEAKER_00: The Islamic State has long courted, thus far unsuccessfully, Muslim Malay separatist groups in southern Thailand, while a permissive operating environment in Afghanistan has been seen as a launch pad for potential activity in wider Central Asia, and Al-Qaeda has looked to strengthen its position in India and Bangladesh, signaling areas of risk for growing militancy in the coming years.
- 2:46SPEAKER_00: Equally, as seen with the December 2025 Bandi Beach attack in Sydney, Australia, the region continues to grapple with the wider geographic risk of lone wolf or cell-based attacks in places far removed from established areas of Islamist insurgent activity.
- 3:05SPEAKER_00: Afghanistan.
- 3:07SPEAKER_00: Risk profile.
- 3:09SPEAKER_00: ISKP attacks take the form of hit-and-run shootings and suicide bombings aimed at state and ideological targets, including Chinese interests, ethnic and religious minorities, and Taliban officials.
- 3:24SPEAKER_00: Militant training in the use of drones presents an emerging but as yet unrealized threat.
- 3:31SPEAKER_00: A decentralized cell structure allows ISKP to redirect attacks as and where it senses the highest potential to undermine the Taliban's narrative of consolidated control over the internal security situation.
- 3:47SPEAKER_00: The northern provinces, with a history of anti-Taliban sentiment, are most likely to attract ISKP attention.
- 3:57SPEAKER_00: ISKP and Al-Qaeda's presence in border regions increases the risk of transnational attacks in Central and South Asia.
- 4:06SPEAKER_00: The threat from jihadist groups in Afghanistan takes two forms: a transnational threat due to the permissive operating environment enjoyed by some groups, either by design or due to the Afghan-Taliban's limited capacity when it comes to counterterrorism operations, and a domestic threat.
- 4:25SPEAKER_00: Al-Qaeda benefits from the former, while the ISKP poses the single largest internal threat.
- 4:32SPEAKER_00: As a result of sustained security pressure from the Afghan-Taliban and neighboring states, ISKP is a much weakened force.
- 4:42SPEAKER_00: Violence involving ISKP in the first nine months of 2026 decreased from 15 events in the corresponding period in 2025 to only four in 2026.
- 4:57SPEAKER_00: Nonetheless, ISKP's reliance on small dispersed cells allows it to extend its geographical reach and maximize impact in terms of casualties and spectacle.
- 5:11SPEAKER_00: ISKP attacks typically take the form of hit and run attacks on Taliban officials or high-profile mass fatality attacks against ideological targets such as ethnic and religious minorities and foreign nationals.
- 5:28SPEAKER_00: However, ISKP fighters have also reportedly received training in the use of drones, increasing the group's potential to use modified, commercially available drones to carry out attacks.
- 5:42SPEAKER_00: Of the four attacks claimed by the group in the first nine months of 2026, three targeted Taliban officials in Badakshan and Herat provinces.
- 5:53SPEAKER_00: Recent flashpoints of opposition to the Taliban, refer to the map in the report for details.
- 6:01SPEAKER_00: By focusing its attacks on areas where the Taliban's authority is already under pressure, whether from armed opposition groups or public discontent, ISKP is able to project a greater sense of insecurity than its isolated attacks otherwise would have.
- 6:19SPEAKER_00: Going forward, its reliance on decentralized cells will allow the group to shift the focus of its attacks to areas where it can best exploit any growing dissatisfaction with the Taliban.
- 6:33SPEAKER_00: Afghanistan's northern provinces bordering Central Asia are most vulnerable, especially given ISKP's recruitment outreach toward Central Asia and the local ethnic Tajik population's long-standing disquiet with the Taliban.
- 6:50SPEAKER_00: Attacks are likely to increase in Barakhshan in particular, where many ISKP fighters have relocated, with its border with China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region further increasing the symbolic value of staging attacks there.
- 7:05SPEAKER_00: This strategic targeting is also likely to extend to wider Taliban interests.
- 7:11SPEAKER_00: Chinese interests in particular are at increased risk of being targeted by the ISKP, which has sought to portray itself as a protector of Uyghur rights and courted East Turkestan Islamic Party militants.
- 7:26SPEAKER_00: The Taliban's outreach to China only makes it an even more attractive target.
- 7:32SPEAKER_00: The only ISKP attack in 2026 outside of Herat and Badakhshan struck a Chinese restaurant in Kabul.
- 7:40SPEAKER_00: As the Taliban solicits more foreign investments, these investments are also at risk of being targeted by the ISKP.
- 7:49SPEAKER_00: More broadly, ISKP's presence in Afghanistan's border provinces next to Central Asian states and Pakistan provides a staging ground for attacks beyond Afghanistan, which poses a threat to wider regional stability.
- 8:05SPEAKER_00: In such transnational ambitions, it is joined by Al-Qaeda, which reportedly continues to enjoy a permissive environment under the Taliban, especially in the country's southern regions.
- 8:18SPEAKER_00: At the moment, Al-Qaeda's role appears to be limited to providing guidance and training to other militant groups active in those areas, especially the TTP and the Ittahad ul-Mujahideen Pakistan.
- 8:34SPEAKER_00: However, a recent attack claimed by its Indian subcontinent faction in India and attempts to reignite networks in Bangladesh point toward nascent efforts by Al-Qaeda to play a more assertive role.
- 8:48SPEAKER_00: In any case, the threat from Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is primarily to states in the immediate neighborhood.
- 8:56SPEAKER_00: Pakistan.
- 8:57SPEAKER_00: Risk profile.
- 8:59SPEAKER_00: TTP attacks, which largely take the form of attacks on security posts and roadside ambushes, primarily target Pakistani security forces.
- 9:10SPEAKER_00: The TTP's growing strength makes it well positioned to adopt more sophisticated tactics, including increased use of drones and multi-pronged assaults.
- 9:21SPEAKER_00: Violence targeting civilians is increasing from both the TTP and ISKP.
- 9:29SPEAKER_00: The risk to civilians is higher from the TTP's more hard-line factions and splinter groups, while audacious, even if sporadic, attacks against civilians offer the IS, still in a relatively weaker position, an opportunity to maintain its relevance in a crowded jihadist field.
- 9:49SPEAKER_00: Pakistan is in the throes of a resurgent jihadist insurgency, and violence levels are once again set to surpass recent records in 2026.
- 10:00SPEAKER_00: While different groups, with their own aims and differing capabilities, are active in the region, the TTP is by far the most dominant actor, accounting for over 90% of all jihadist violence in the first nine months of 2026.
- 10:16SPEAKER_00: Although much smaller than the TTP, IS activities, through the group's Khorasan Province Affiliate in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and its Pakistan Province affiliate in the rest of the country, are also escalating.
- 10:31SPEAKER_00: The number of events carried out by IS between January and September 2026 is already higher than that in all of 2025.
- 10:41SPEAKER_00: The other main actor is the IMP, a conglomerate of three jihadist groups led by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, which was formerly referred to as the Good Taliban for its accommodating stance toward Pakistan, but has now turned against the state.
- 10:58SPEAKER_00: Crucially, these groups have not yet engaged in clashes among themselves on a significant scale, allowing most of their resources to be directed outwards.
- 11:08SPEAKER_00: The overwhelming majority of jihadist violence is concentrated in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtun Kwa province, a result of both the militant group's operational strengths in the area and the TTP's ideological mission there.
- 11:24SPEAKER_00: This is likely to continue as a strategic choice, with the TTP betting on facing less military pressure as long as its activities remain geographically limited.
- 11:36SPEAKER_00: But if growing internal rivalries prompt a change in approach, it would be well positioned to expand into other parts of the country.
- 11:45SPEAKER_00: In 2026, its activities in some of Khyber Pakhtun Kwa's districts, which provide a gateway to Punjab, such as Dara Ismail Khan and Kohat, increased, as did its presence in the Pashtun-inhabited parts of northern Balochistan.
- 12:03SPEAKER_00: Major urban centers are also at risk of isolated high-profile attacks by smaller groups, such as those carried out by the Jamaat ul-Ahr in Karachi in June and by the IS in Islamabad in February.
- 12:20SPEAKER_00: Striking cities that have largely been spared violence in recent years allows these smaller groups to grab headlines and make a mark on a scale which is outsized given their limited resources.
- 12:33SPEAKER_00: The threat from the TTP and the IMP is largely local and directed against the Pakistani state with an aim of challenging its control and establishing sharia in the country's northwestern tribal belt.
- 12:48SPEAKER_00: Pakistani security forces therefore face the brunt of their attacks, and as a result, the majority of overall jihadist violence, refer to the chart in the report for details.
- 13:01SPEAKER_00: These attacks mostly take the form of security post attacks and roadside ambushes.
- 13:08SPEAKER_00: The growing strength of the jihadist movement has, however, also given rise to more emboldened tactics.
- 13:16SPEAKER_00: In 2026, TTP militants substantially increased their use of both drones and suicide bombings.
- 13:24SPEAKER_00: After the JUA broke away in July, a desire to prevent splits with its more impatient and hard-line factions could drive the TTP toward even more aggressive tactics.
- 13:37SPEAKER_00: Nevertheless, violence targeting civilians, both from the TTP and IS is increasing.
- 13:45SPEAKER_00: The number of TTP attacks against civilians in the first nine months of 2026 is already nearly the same as that in all of 2025.
- 13:56SPEAKER_00: Targeted attacks against off-duty or retired security personnel account for the majority of such violence, but attacks against local tribes are also escalating.
- 14:08SPEAKER_00: With locals having formed informal militias to dispel the TTP from their areas, more and more civilians now find themselves in the crosshairs of violence.
- 14:18SPEAKER_00: As for the more sectarian-driven IS, violence targeting civilians has always formed a much higher proportion of its overall activity compared to the other jihadist groups, and this violence is only increasing.
- 14:34SPEAKER_00: With IS not yet in a position to meaningfully confront Pakistani security forces, violence against soft civilian targets is likely to escalate in an attempt to maintain its relevance in a crowded jihadist field.
- 14:50SPEAKER_00: The targets are likely to remain similar, sectarian and religious minorities and socio-political religious leaders whom the IS regards as apostates for participating in Pakistan's political system are the most vulnerable.
- 15:06SPEAKER_00: The Philippines.
- 15:08SPEAKER_00: Risk profile.
- 15:10SPEAKER_00: Daula Islamiyyah, D.I., the Bang Samoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, BIFF, and the Abu Sayaf maintain distinct operational footholds in the Bang Samoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, BARMM, and surrounding areas.
- 15:30SPEAKER_00: The Lake Lanao area for D.I.
- 15:33SPEAKER_00: Maute Group, the Maguindanao Provinces for DI, Hassan Group, and the BIFF, and Basilan and Sulu for Abu Sayaf.
- 15:44SPEAKER_00: ISS-inspired groups mainly target the National Police and the military, and BARMM organs of power under the new parliamentary order are now likely also seen as targets.
- 15:58SPEAKER_00: Jihadist violence in the Philippines has fallen significantly since the Marawi siege of 2017, when IS-inspired militants, most notably the Mao Te group, engaged in a spectacular offensive that sought to wrest control of the important Muslim-majority city, destroying it in the process.
- 16:19SPEAKER_00: Despite this, the threat of violence has never fully disappeared, and occasional deadly attacks are ongoing.
- 16:27SPEAKER_00: Of these different groups, which have varying levels of connection to IS, the two most active are DI, particularly its subgroups, the Hassan group and the Mao Te group, and the BIFF.
- 16:41SPEAKER_00: Meanwhile, the Abu Sayaf, which seemed mostly dormant in recent years, was involved in a particularly lethal clash against government forces in October 2026 that left ten government soldiers and an auxiliary dead.
- 16:57SPEAKER_00: Clear geographical differences between the groups have emerged.
- 17:02SPEAKER_00: The Maute group is most active around the Lanao Lake area close to the city of Marawi, while the Hassan group and BIFF overlap, operating closer to the border areas of the Maguindanao provinces and the Special Geographic Area, SGA, a group of barangays, villages, from a neighboring region that voted to join the BARMM.
- 17:28SPEAKER_00: The Abu Sayaf, meanwhile, has largely stayed within its traditional areas of operation of Basilan and Sulu.
- 17:36SPEAKER_00: Refer to the map in the report for details.
- 17:40SPEAKER_00: Sporadic clashes between government forces and these groups have often been deadly in 2026.
- 17:47SPEAKER_00: They arise from both ambushes by the militants and military excursions deep into rebel hiding places in densely forested hinterlands.
- 17:57SPEAKER_00: The militants also use explosives against both state forces and civilians, though a noticeable shift from bombs to grenades over the past year may mean that their bomb-making capacities are currently constrained.
- 18:12SPEAKER_00: Still, the militants seem determined to keep up a tit-for-tat.
- 18:17SPEAKER_00: On March 28, for example, D.I and BIFF militants killed five police officers on patrol in Sharif Agwak Town, Maguindanao del Sur, in an apparent retaliation for intensifying anti-insurgency operations, which killed a Hassan group leader on March 8.
- 18:38SPEAKER_00: These developments were followed by months of relative quiet until the next major government offensive, when the military and police killed seven BIFF militants in Tugunan town, Cotabato, on September 19, 2026.
- 18:55SPEAKER_00: Islamist extremist groups have long coexisted with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, MILF, the former separatists with partly Islamist roots whose decades-long rebellion concluded in the 2014 peace agreement that established the BARM.
- 19:15SPEAKER_00: Still, a gulf now separates the MILF from these groups as the former rebels have cooperated with state forces against them and become more deeply entrenched in the new parliamentary order.
- 19:29SPEAKER_00: The question is whether the new parliamentary reality following the BARMM's September elections will prove resilient enough to capture the political investment of the broader moral public, the same public from which Islamist militants seek to build their base.
- 19:48SPEAKER_00: After decades of war, the BARMM lags behind most of the country in several measures of progress.
- 19:56SPEAKER_00: The new BARMM government thus has its work cut out.
- 20:02SPEAKER_00: The price of failure would be the resurgence of Islamist militants, who maintain enough of a foothold to offer religious violence as an answer to the Moro people's long standing marginalization.
- 20:14SPEAKER_00: In this new reality, the MILF, including through new organs of power in the BARMM, can expect to be in the crosshairs of Islamist militants, on top of the usual targets in the military and police.