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063 - Lxiii The Arguments Of Those Who Would Deny To God The Knowledge Of Singulars · Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)

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  Speaker 1: Chapter sixty three of Suma Contragentilees, first Book on God
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  Speaker 1: by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the Fathers of the
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  Speaker 1: English Dominican Province. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
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  Speaker 1: Chapter sixty three. The arguments of those who would deny
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  Speaker 1: to God the knowledge of singulars. Now, there are some
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  Speaker 1: who endeavor to withhold knowledge of singulars from the perfection
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  Speaker 1: of God's knowledge, And in support of their contention, they
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  Speaker 1: proceed by seven ways. The first is from the very
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  Speaker 1: nature of singularity. For since the principle of singularity is
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  Speaker 1: signate matter, it seems impossible for singulars to be known
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  Speaker 1: by an immaterial power if all knowledge result from some
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  Speaker 1: kind of assimilation. Wherefore, in us those powers alone which
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  Speaker 1: use material organs apprehend singulars, for instance, the imagination, the senses,
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  Speaker 1: and so on, while our intellect, since it is immaterial,
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  Speaker 1: knows not singulars much less. Therefore, is the divine intellect
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  Speaker 1: cognizant of singulars, since it is furthest removed from matter. Hence,
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  Speaker 1: by no means does it seem possible that God should
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  Speaker 1: know singulars. The second argument is that singulars are not
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  Speaker 1: always either. Therefore they are always known by God, or
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  Speaker 1: they are known at one time and unknown at another.
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  Speaker 1: The first is impossible, since about what is not there
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  Speaker 1: can be no knowledge which is always about true things,
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  Speaker 1: and things which are not cannot be true. The second
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  Speaker 1: is also impossible, because the knowledge of the divine intellect
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  Speaker 1: is altogether unchangeable, as we have proved. The third argument
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  Speaker 1: proceeds from the fact that singulars do not all happen
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  Speaker 1: of necessity, but some contingently. Wherefore there can be no
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  Speaker 1: certain knowledge about them except when they are. For certain
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  Speaker 1: knowledge is that which cannot be deceived, and every knowledge
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  Speaker 1: of contingencies, since these are future, can be deceived because
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  Speaker 1: the event may prove the opposite of that to which
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  Speaker 1: the mind holds, since if the opposite could not happen,
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  Speaker 1: they would be necessary. Wherefore we can have no knowledge
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  Speaker 1: of future contingencies, but only a kind of conjectural estimate.
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  Speaker 1: Now we must suppose that all God's knowledge is most
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  Speaker 1: certain and infallible, as we have proved above. Moreover, it
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  Speaker 1: is impossible that God begin anew to know something on
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  Speaker 1: account of his unchangeableness as stated. Hence, it would seem
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  Speaker 1: to follow that he knows not contingent singulars. The fourth
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  Speaker 1: is based on the fact that the will is the
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  Speaker 1: cause of certain singulars. Now, an effect until it actually
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  Speaker 1: is cannot be known save in its cause, for only
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  Speaker 1: thus can it be before it begins to be in itself.
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  Speaker 1: But the movements of the will cannot be known for
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  Speaker 1: certain by anyone except the Willer, in whose power they are.
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  Speaker 1: Wherefore it seems impossible for God to have eternal knowledge
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  Speaker 1: of such singulars as have their cause in the Will.
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  Speaker 1: The fifth proceeds from the infinity of singulars, for the
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  Speaker 1: infinite as such is unknown, because whatever is known is
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  Speaker 1: in a way measured by the comprehension of the knower,
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  Speaker 1: since measurement is nothing else than a kind of certification
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  Speaker 1: of the thing measured. Wherefore every act dis Goard's the infinite.
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  Speaker 1: Now singulars are infinite, at least in potentiality. Therefore it
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  Speaker 1: seems impossible for God to know singulars. The sixth proceeds
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  Speaker 1: from the pettiness of singulars. For as the excellence of
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  Speaker 1: knowledge is gaged by the excellence of its object, so
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  Speaker 1: apparently the pettiness of the object conduces to pettiness of knowledge. Now,
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  Speaker 1: the divine intellect is supremely excellent. Therefore it is incompatible
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  Speaker 1: with its excellence that God should know the most trivial
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  Speaker 1: of singulars. The seventh argues from the presence of evil
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  Speaker 1: in certain singulars. For since the thing known is in
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  Speaker 1: a manner in the Knower, and since evil cannot be
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  Speaker 1: in God is proved above, it would seem to follow
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  Speaker 1: that evil and privation are entirely unknown to God and
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  Speaker 1: known only by an intellect that is in potentiality. Since
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  Speaker 1: privation can only be in that which is potential, hence
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  Speaker 1: it follows that God has no knowledge of singulars wherein
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  Speaker 1: evil and privation are to be found. End of Chapter
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  Speaker 1: sixty three, read by Michael Shane, Craig, Lambert Elsie