Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [2014] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated,
- 0:03Berkshire's gain in net worth during 2014 was $18.3 billion,
- 0:08which increased the per share book value off both our Class A
- 0:12and Class B stock by 8.3%. Over the last 50 years, that is
- 0:17since present management took over, per share book value has
- 0:20grown from $19.00 to $146,186, a rate of 19.4% compounded
- 0:28annually. During our tenure, we have
- 0:31consistently compared the early performance of the S&P 500 to
- 0:35the change in Berkshires per share book value.
- 0:38We've done that because book value has been accrued but
- 0:41useful tracking device for the number that really counts
- 0:45intrinsic business value. In our early decades, the
- 0:49relationship between book value and intrinsic value was much
- 0:52closer than it is now. That was true because
- 0:55Berkshire's assets were then largely securities whose values
- 0:59were continuously restated to reflect their current market
- 1:02prices. In Wall Street parlance, most of
- 1:05the assets involved in the calculation of book value were
- 1:08marked to market. Today, our emphasis has shifted
- 1:11in a major way to owning and operating large businesses.
- 1:15Many of these are worth far more than their cost based carrying
- 1:18value, but that amount is never revalued upward, no matter how
- 1:23much the value of these companies has increased.
- 1:26Consequently, the gap between Berkshire's intrinsic value and
- 1:29its book value has materially widened.
- 1:32With that in mind, we have added a new set of data, the
- 1:35Historical Record of Berkshire Stock price, to the performance
- 1:38table on the facing page. Market prices, let me stress,
- 1:43have their limitations. In the short term, monthly or
- 1:46yearly movements of stocks are often erratic and not indicative
- 1:49of changes in intrinsic value. Over time, however, stock prices
- 1:54and intrinsic value almost invariably converge.
- 1:57Charlie M Unger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner and I
- 2:01believe that has been true at Berkshire.
- 2:03In our view the increase in Berkshires per share intrinsic
- 2:07value over the past 50 years is roughly equal to the 1826163
- 2:13percent gain in market price of the companies shares.
- 2:16All per share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's
- 2:20A shares. Figures for the B shares are
- 2:2211,500 THF those shown for a three The year at Berkshire.
- 2:28It was a good year for Berkshire on all major fronts except one.
- 2:32Here are the important developments.
- 2:34Our powerhouse Fibia Collection of Berkshire's largest non
- 2:38insurance businesses had a record 12.4 dollars billion of
- 2:42pre tax earnings in 2014, up $1.6 billion from 2013.
- 2:48The companies in this St. D group are Berkshire Hathaway
- 2:51Energy, formerly Mid American Energy, BNSFIMCI have called it
- 2:56his car in the past, Lou Brizo Landmarmon.
- 2:59Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning
- 3:03$393 million, was owned by us a decade ago.
- 3:07Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an
- 3:10all cash basis. In acquiring the 5th beat NSF,
- 3:14we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and for the remainder
- 3:19issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding
- 3:23by 6.1%. In other words, the $12 billion
- 3:27gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five
- 3:30companies over the 10 years PAN has been accompanied by only
- 3:34minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not
- 3:37simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per
- 3:41share results. If the USDOT economy continues
- 3:44to improve in 2015, we expect earnings of our Powerhouse 5 to
- 3:49improve as well. The game could reach $1 billion
- 3:53in part because of bolt on acquisitions by the group that
- 3:56half already closed or are under contract.
- 3:59Our bad news from 2014 comes from our Group of five as well
- 4:03and is unrelated to earnings. During the year, the NSF
- 4:07disappointed many of its customers.
- 4:09These shippers depend on us and service failures can badly hurt
- 4:13their businesses. BNSF is by far Berkshire's most
- 4:18important non insurance subsidiary and to improve its
- 4:21performance we will spend $6 billion on plant and equipment
- 4:26in 2015. That sum is nearly 50% more than
- 4:30any other railroad has spent in a single year and is a truly
- 4:34extraordinary amount whether compared to revenues, earnings
- 4:37or depreciation charges. The weather, which was
- 4:41particularly severe last year, will always cause railroads a
- 4:45variety of operating problems. Our responsibility is to do
- 4:49whatever it takes to restore our service to industry leading
- 4:52levels that can't be done overnight.
- 4:55The extensive work required to increase system capacity
- 4:59sometimes disrupts operations while it is under way.
- 5:02Recently, however, our outsized expenditures are beginning to
- 5:06show results. During the last three months the
- 5:09NSF performance metrics have materially improved from last
- 5:13year's figures are many. Dozens of smaller non insurance
- 5:17businesses earned $5.1 billion last year up from $4.7 billion
- 5:22in 2013. Here as with our Powerhouse 5 we
- 5:27expect further gains in 2015. Within this group we have two
- 5:32companies that last year earned between $400 million and $600
- 5:36million, six that earned between $250 million and $400 million
- 5:42and seven that earned between $100 million and $250 million.
- 5:47This collection of businesses will increase in both number and
- 5:51earnings. Our ambitions have no finish
- 5:53line. Berkshire's huge and growing
- 5:55insurance operation again operated at an underwriting
- 5:58profit in 2014 that makes 12 years in a row and increased its
- 6:03float during that 12 year stretch.
- 6:06Our float money that doesn't belong to us, but that we can
- 6:09invest for. Berkshire's benefit has grown
- 6:11from $41 billion to $84 billion, though neither that gain nor the
- 6:17size of our float is reflected in Berkshire's earnings.
- 6:20Float generates significant investment income because of the
- 6:24assets it allows us to hold throughout this letter as well
- 6:28as in the Golden anniversary letters included later in this
- 6:31report. All earnings are stated on a pre
- 6:34tax basis unless otherwise designated.
- 6:37Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $24 billion
- 6:41during the 12 year period including $2.7 billion earned in
- 6:452014 and all of this began with our 1967 purchase of National
- 6:51Indemnity for $8.6 million. While Charlie and I search for
- 6:55new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly
- 6:58making bolt on acquisitions. Last year was particularly
- 7:02fruitful. We contracted for 31 bolt on S
- 7:06scheduled to cost 7.8 dollars billion.
- 7:09In aggregate, the size of these transactions range from $400,000
- 7:14to $2.9 billion. However, the largest acquisition
- 7:18Duracell will not close until the second-half of this year.
- 7:22It will then be placed under MARM on jurisdiction.
- 7:25Charlie and I encourage bolt on S if they are sensibly priced.
- 7:29Most deals offered us aren't. They deploy capital and
- 7:32activities that fit with our existing businesses and that
- 7:36will be managed by our core of expert managers.
- 7:39This means no more work for us, yet more earnings, a combination
- 7:43we find particularly appealing. We will make many more of these
- 7:47bolt on deals in future years. Two years ago my friend Jorge
- 7:51Paolo Le Man asked Berkshire to join his 3G Capital Group in the
- 7:56acquisition of Heinz. My affirmative response was a
- 7:59Nobi Rainer. I knew immediately that this
- 8:02partnership would work well from both a personal and financial
- 8:05standpoint, and it most definitely has.
- 8:08I'm not embarrassed to admit that Heinz is run far better
- 8:11under Alex Behring Chairman and Bernardo he yes CEO then would
- 8:16be the case if I were in charge. They hold themselves to
- 8:19extraordinarily high performance standards and are never
- 8:23satisfied even when their results far exceed those of
- 8:26competitors. We expect to partner with 3G in
- 8:29more activities. Sometimes our participation will
- 8:32only involve A financing roll, as was the case in the recent
- 8:36acquisition of Tim horton's by Burger King.
- 8:39Our favorite arrangement, however, will usually be to link
- 8:43up as a permanent equity partner.
- 8:44Who in some cases contributes to the financing of the deal as
- 8:49well. Whatever the structure, we feel
- 8:51good when working with Jorge Paolo.
- 8:53Berkshire also has fine partnerships with Mars and
- 8:56Luciagia and we may form new ones with them or with other
- 9:00partners. Our participation in any joint
- 9:03activities, whether as a financing or equity partner,
- 9:07will be limited to friendly transactions.
- 9:10In October we contracted to buy Van to While Automotive, a group
- 9:14of 78 automobile dealerships that is exceptionally well run.
- 9:19Larry Van 2 while the company's owner, and I met some years ago.
- 9:23He then decided that if he were ever to sell his company, it's
- 9:26home should be Berkshire. Our purchase was recently
- 9:29completed and we are now Car guys.
- 9:32Larry and his dad Cecil spent 62 years building the group
- 9:36following a strategy that made owner partners of all local
- 9:40managers. Creating this mutuality of
- 9:43interests proved over and over to be a winner.
- 9:46Ventu Wireless now the 5th largest automotive group in the
- 9:50country with per dealership sales figures that are
- 9:53outstanding. In recent years Jeff RH Shore
- 9:56has worked alongside Larry, a successful arrangement that will
- 10:00continue. There are about 17,000
- 10:03dealerships in the country and ownership transfers always
- 10:06require approval by the relevant auto manufacturer.
- 10:10Berkshire's job is to perform in a manner that will cause
- 10:13manufacturers to welcome further purchases by us.
- 10:17If we do this and if we can buy dealerships at sensible price,
- 10:20oil build a business that before long will be multiples the size
- 10:24of Van 2 Wireless $9 billion of sales.
- 10:27With the acquisition of Van 2 wile Berkshire now owns 91 two
- 10:31companies that would be listed on the Fortune 500 where they
- 10:35independent Heinz is the 1-2. That leaves 4901 two fish in
- 10:40these a our lines are out five. Our subsidiary spent a record
- 10:44$15 billion on plant and equipment during 2014, well over
- 10:50twice there depreciation charges.
- 10:52About 90% of that money was spent in the United States,
- 10:56though we will always invest abroad as well.
- 10:59The mother lode of opportunities runs through America.
- 11:02The treasures that have been uncovered up to now are dwarfed
- 11:05by those still untapped. Through dumb luck, Charlie and I
- 11:09were born in the United States and we are forever grateful for
- 11:13the staggering advantages this accident of birth has given us.
- 11:17Berkshire's year end employees, including those at Heinz,
- 11:20totaled a record 340499, up 9754 from last year.
- 11:28The increase, I am proud to say, included no gain at headquarters
- 11:32where 25 people work. No sense going crazy.
- 11:36Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in
- 11:39each of its BIG4 investments. American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM
- 11:44and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares
- 11:47of IBM, increasing our ownership to 7.8% versus 6.3% at year in
- 11:542013. Meanwhile, stock repurchase
- 11:57asset Coca-Cola, American Express and Wells Fargo raised
- 12:01our percentage ownership of each.
- 12:03Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.1% to 9.2%.
- 12:08Our interest in American Express increased from 14.2% to 14.8%.
- 12:14In our ownership of Wells Fargo grew from 9.2% to 9.4%.
- 12:20And if you think tenths of a percent aren't important, ponder
- 12:23this math for the four companies.
- 12:25In aggregate, each increase of 110th of a percent in our
- 12:29ownership raises Berkshire's portion of their annual earnings
- 12:32by $50 million. These four invest EES possess
- 12:37excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both
- 12:40talented and shareholder oriented.
- 12:42At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non controlling but
- 12:46substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100%
- 12:50of a SOSO business. It's better to have a partial
- 12:53interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
- 12:57If Berkshire's year end holdings are used as the marker, our
- 13:01portion of the big four is 2014 Earnings before discontinued
- 13:05operations amounted to 4.7 dollars billion compared to $3.3
- 13:09billion only three years ago. In the earnings report to you
- 13:14however, we include only the dividends.
- 13:17We receive about $1.6 billion last year.
- 13:21Again, three years ago the dividends were $862 million, but
- 13:26make no mistake, the $3.1 billion of these companies
- 13:30earnings we don't report are every bit as valuable to us as
- 13:34the portion Berkshire records. The earnings these invest EES
- 13:38retain are often used for repurchase S of their own stock
- 13:41and move that enhances Berkshire's share of future
- 13:44earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime.
- 13:47They're retained earnings also fund business opportunities that
- 13:51usually turn out to be advantageous.
- 13:53All that leads us to expect that the per share earnings of these
- 13:57four invest EES in aggregate will grow substantially over
- 14:01time. Though 2015 will be a tough year
- 14:04for the group, in part because of the strong dollar.
- 14:07If the expected gains materialize, dividends to
- 14:10Berkshire will increase and even more important so will our
- 14:14unrealized capital gains for the package of four.
- 14:17Our unrealized gains already totaled $42 billion at year end.
- 14:22Our flexibility in capital allocation, our willingness to
- 14:26invest large sums passively in non controlled businesses gives
- 14:30USA significant advantage over companies that limit themselves
- 14:34to acquisitions they can operate.
- 14:36Our appetite for either operating businesses or passive
- 14:40investments double s our chances of finding sensible uses for
- 14:44Berkshires endless gusher of cash.
- 14:46I've mentioned in the past that my experience in business helps
- 14:49me as an investor and that my investment experience has made
- 14:53me a better businessman. Each pursuit teaches lessons
- 14:56that are applicable to the other, and some truths can only
- 14:59be fully learned through experience.
- 15:01In Fred SCH Weds wonderful book, Where are the Customers Yachts,
- 15:06A Peter Arno cartoon depicts A puzzled Adam looking at an eager
- 15:09Eve Wale caption says There are certain things that cannot be
- 15:14adequately explained to a virgin, either by words or
- 15:17pictures. If you haven't read SCH Weds
- 15:20book, buy a copy a tour annual meeting.
- 15:23It's wisdom and humor are truly priceless.
- 15:26Six among are no certain things. I would include two separate
- 15:30skills. The evaluation of investments in
- 15:33the management of businesses. I therefore think it's
- 15:36worthwhile for Todd Combs and Ted, we SC Hiller, our two
- 15:40investment managers, to each have oversight of at least one
- 15:43of our businesses. A sensible opportunity for them
- 15:47to do so opened up a few months ago when we agreed to purchase
- 15:50two companies that, though smaller than we would normally
- 15:54acquire, have excellent economic characteristics.
- 15:57Combined, the two earn $100 million annually on about $125
- 16:03million of net tangible assets. I've asked Todd and Ted to each
- 16:07take on one as Chairman, in which role they will function in
- 16:10the very limited way that ITO with our larger subsidiaries.
- 16:14This arrangement will save me a minor amount of work and more
- 16:18important, make the two of them even better investors than they
- 16:21already are. Witches to say among the best.
- 16:24Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we
- 16:29agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire's history.
- 16:34At the time. I called the transaction an all
- 16:37in wager on the economic future of the United States.
- 16:40That kind of commitment was nothing new for us.
- 16:43We've been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership
- 16:47Limited acquired control of Berkshire in 1965.
- 16:50For good reason. 2C. And I have always considered a
- 16:54bet on ever rising you S dot prosperity to be very close to a
- 16:58sure thing indeed. Who has ever benefited during
- 17:02the past 238 years by betting against America?
- 17:06If you compare our country's present condition to that
- 17:09existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes and wonder.
- 17:13In my lifetime alone, real per capita you S dot output has
- 17:18sextuple D. My parents could not have
- 17:20dreamed in 1930 of the world their son would see.
- 17:23Though the preachers of pessimism prattle endlessly
- 17:26about America's problems, I've never seen one who wishes to
- 17:30emigrate, though I can think of a few for whom he would happily
- 17:33buy a one way ticket. The dynamism embedded in our
- 17:36market economy will continue to work its magic.
- 17:39Gains won't come in a smooth or uninterrupted manner.
- 17:42They never have. And we will regularly grumble
- 17:45about our government. But most assuredly America's
- 17:49best days lie ahead. With this tailwind working for
- 17:52us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshires per share intrinsic
- 17:55value by one, constantly improving the basic earning
- 17:59power of our many subsidiaries, 2, Further increasing their
- 18:03earnings through bolt on acquisitions, 3, benefiting from
- 18:06the growth of our invest EES for repurchasing Berkshire shares
- 18:11when they are available at a meaningful discount from
- 18:13intrinsic value and five, making an occasional large acquisition.
- 18:18We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if
- 18:21ever, issuing Berkshire shares. Those building blocks rest on a
- 18:25rock solid foundation. A century hence, B NSF and
- 18:29Berkshire Hathaway Energy will still be playing vital roles in
- 18:33our economy. Homes and autos will remain
- 18:36central to the lives of most families.
- 18:38Insurance will continue to be essential for both businesses
- 18:42and individuals. Looking ahead, Charlie and I see
- 18:45a world made to order for Berkshire.
- 18:47We feel fortunate to been trusted with its management.
- 18:51Intrinsic business value As much as Charlie and I talk about
- 18:54intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what
- 18:57that number is for Berkshire shares, nor, in fact, for any
- 19:01other stock. In our 2010 annual report,
- 19:04however, we laid out the three elements, one of them
- 19:08qualitative, that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate
- 19:12of Berkshire's intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in
- 19:16full on pages 123 to 124. Here is an update of the two
- 19:21quantitative factors. In 2014, our per share
- 19:24investments increased 8.4% to $140,123 and our earnings from
- 19:32businesses other than insurance and investments increased 19% to
- 19:36$10,847 per share. 7 Since 1970, our per share investments have
- 19:44increased at a rate of 19% compounded annually and our
- 19:48earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip.
- 19:51It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over
- 19:54the ensuing 44 years has increased data rate very similar
- 19:59to that of our two measures of value.
- 20:01Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors.
- 20:04But our main focus is to build operating earnings.
- 20:07That's why we were pleased to exchange our Phillips 66 and
- 20:11Graham Holding stock for operating businesses last year
- 20:14and a contract with Procter and Gamble to acquire Duracell by
- 20:18means of a similar exchange set to close in 2015.
- 20:22Now let's examine the four major sectors of our operations.
- 20:26Each has vastly different balance sheet and income
- 20:29characteristics from the others, so we'll present them as four
- 20:32separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
- 20:36Though there are important and enduring advantages to having
- 20:39them all under one roof. Our goal is to provide you with
- 20:43the information we would wish to have if our positions were
- 20:46reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the
- 20:49absentee shareholders. But don't get any ideas.
- 20:53Insurance. Let's look first at insurance.
- 20:55Berkshires core operation. That industry has been the
- 20:58engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we
- 21:03acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National
- 21:07Fire and Marine for $8.6 million.
- 21:11Though that purchase had monumental consequences for
- 21:13Berkshire, its execution was simplicity itself.
- 21:17Jack Ringwald, a friend of mine who was the controlling
- 21:20shareholder of the two companies, came to my office
- 21:23saying he would like to sell. 15 minutes later, we had a deal.
- 21:27Neither of Jack's companies had ever had an audit by a public
- 21:30accounting firm, and I didn't ask for one, my reasoning 1.
- 21:34Jack was honest, and two, he was also a bit quirky and likely to
- 21:38walk away if the deal became at all complicated.
- 21:41On pages 128 to 129, we reproduce the 11/2 page purchase
- 21:47agreement we used to finalize the transaction.
- 21:50That contract was homemade. Neither side used a lawyer for
- 21:53Page. This has to be Berkshire's best
- 21:56deal. National Indemnity today has GA
- 21:59generally accepted accounting principles net worth of $111
- 22:03billion, which exceeds that of any other insurer in the world.
- 22:07One reason we were attracted to the property casualty business
- 22:11was its financial characteristics.
- 22:13PC insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later.
- 22:17In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers
- 22:21compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.
- 22:26This collect now, pay later model leaves PC companies
- 22:29holding large sums, money we call float that will eventually
- 22:32go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to
- 22:35invest this float for their benefit.
- 22:37Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount
- 22:41of float and insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in
- 22:45relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business
- 22:49grows, so does our float and how we have grown as the following
- 22:53table shows. Year flaw out in dollars
- 22:55Millions 1970 Dollars 3919 Eighty 237 1991 thousand 632 Two
- 23:06thousand 27,871 2010 65,832 2014 83,921 Further gains and float
- 23:18will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and our
- 23:22new commercial insurance operation are almost certain to
- 23:25grow at a good clip. National Indemnity's reinsurance
- 23:29division, however, is party to a number of runoff contracts whose
- 23:33float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a
- 23:36decline in float, it will be very gradual.
- 23:39At the outside, no more than 3% in any year.
- 23:43The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can
- 23:46never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large
- 23:49compared to our cash resources. This strength is a key pillar in
- 23:54Berkshire's Economic Fortress. 8 If our premiums exceed the total
- 23:58of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an
- 24:02underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our flow
- 24:06produces. When such a profit is earned, we
- 24:09enjoy the use of free money and better yet, get paid for holding
- 24:13it. Unfortunately, the wish of all
- 24:15insurers to achieve this hay result creates intense
- 24:19competition O vigorous indeed that it frequently causes the PC
- 24:23industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting
- 24:26loss. This loss, in effect, is what
- 24:29the industry pays to hold its float.
- 24:32Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance
- 24:35industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy,
- 24:39will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on
- 24:43tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.
- 24:47The prolonged period of low interest rates our country is
- 24:50now dealing with causes earnings on float to decrease, thereby
- 24:54exacerbating the profit problems of the industry.
- 24:57As noted in the first section of this report, Berkshire has now
- 25:01operated at an underwriting profit for 12 consecutive years,
- 25:05our pre tax gain for the period having totaled $24 billion.
- 25:09Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite
- 25:12profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of
- 25:17all of our insurance managers who know that while float is
- 25:20valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting
- 25:23results. That message is given at least
- 25:26lip service by all insurers at Berkshire.
- 25:29It is a religion. So how does our float affect
- 25:31intrinsic value? When Berkshire's book value is
- 25:34calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a
- 25:38liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could
- 25:41not replenish it. But to think a float is strictly
- 25:45a liability is incorrect. It should instead be viewed as a
- 25:49revolving fund. Daily we pay old claims and
- 25:52related expensesa huge $22.7 billion to more than 6,000,000
- 25:58claimants in 2014 and that reduces float.
- 26:01Just as surely we each day write new business and thereby
- 26:05generate new claims that add to float.
- 26:08If our revolving float is both cost less and long enduring,
- 26:12which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is
- 26:16dramatically less than the accounting liability owing
- 26:19$1.00. That in effect will never leave
- 26:21the premises because new business is almost certain to
- 26:25deliver a substitutious worlds different from owing $1.00 that
- 26:29will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced.
- 26:32The two types of liabilities are treated as equals.
- 26:35However, under GAAP a partial offset to this overstated
- 26:39liability is a $15.5 billion goodwill asset that we incurred
- 26:43in buying our insurance companies and that increases
- 26:46book value. In very large part this goodwill
- 26:49represents the price we paid for the float generating
- 26:52capabilities of our insurance operations.
- 26:55The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its
- 26:59true value. For example, if an insurance
- 27:02company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses,
- 27:05any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed
- 27:08valueless, whatever its original cost.
- 27:11Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire.
- 27:14Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance
- 27:18goodwill, what we would happily pay for float of similar quality
- 27:22were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it to be
- 27:25far in excess of its historic carrying value under present
- 27:29accounting rules with which we agree.
- 27:31The success value will never be entered on our books, but I can
- 27:35assure you that it's real. That's one riasona huge reason
- 27:39why we believe Berkshire's intrinsic business value
- 27:42substantially exceeds its book value.
- 27:44Berkshire's attractive insurance economics exist only because we
- 27:48have some terrific managers running disciplined operations
- 27:51that possess hard to replicate business models.
- 27:54Let me tell you about the major units.
- 27:56First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance
- 28:00Group, managed by AJ at Jane AJ. It insures risks that no one
- 28:05else has the desire or the capital to take on.
- 28:08His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most
- 28:13important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance
- 28:16business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire
- 28:18to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. 9
- 28:23Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk
- 28:26than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance
- 28:30industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega
- 28:35catastrophe, a loss about triple anything it has ever
- 28:38experienced, Berkshire as a whole would likely record a
- 28:41significant profit for the year because of its many streams of
- 28:45earnings. We would also remain awash in
- 28:47cash and be looking for large opportunities in a market that
- 28:51might well have gone into shock. Meanwhile, other major insurers
- 28:55Andre insurers would be far in the red if not facing
- 28:58insolvency. AJ It's underwriting skills are
- 29:01unmatched is mind moreover is an idea factory that is always
- 29:06looking for more lines of business he can add to his
- 29:09current assortment. Last year it old you about his
- 29:11formation of Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance.
- 29:15BHSI. This initiative took us into
- 29:17commercial insurance where we were instantly welcomed by both
- 29:21major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers
- 29:24throughout America. Previously, we had written only
- 29:27a few specialized lines of commercial insurance.
- 29:30BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who
- 29:35is widely respected in the insurance world.
- 29:38During 2014, Peter expanded his talented group, moving into both
- 29:43international business and new lines of insurance.
- 29:47We repeat last year's prediction that BHSI will be a major asset
- 29:51for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions
- 29:55within a few years. We have another reinsurance
- 29:57powerhouse in General Re managed by T Admat Ross.
- 30:02At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to 4
- 30:05disciplines. It must one understand all
- 30:08exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses, to
- 30:12conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure
- 30:15actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does.
- 30:19Three, set of premium that on average will deliver a profit
- 30:23after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are
- 30:27covered. And four, be willing to walk
- 30:29away if the appropriate premium can't be obtained.
- 30:32Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the 4th.
- 30:36They simply can't turn their back on business that is being
- 30:39eagerly written by their competitors.
- 30:41That old line, the other guy is doing it, so we must as well.
- 30:45Spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than
- 30:48insurance. TAT has observed all four of the
- 30:51insurance commandments and it shows in his results.
- 30:55General Residential huge float has been considerably better
- 30:58than cost free under his leadership and we expect that on
- 31:02average to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic
- 31:06about General Residential international life reinsurance
- 31:09business, which has grown consistently and profitably
- 31:12since we acquired the company in 1998.
- 31:16It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Rhee,
- 31:19it was beset by problems that cost commentators, and me as
- 31:23well briefly to believe I had made a huge mistake.
- 31:26That day is long gone. General Rhee is now a gem.
- 31:30Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth
- 31:3364 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely,
- 31:38who joined the company at 18 and completed 53 years of service in
- 31:422014. Tony became CEO in 1993 and
- 31:47since then the company has been flying.
- 31:49There is no better manager than Tony.
- 31:51When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was
- 31:55blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed
- 31:58compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry.
- 32:02It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it
- 32:05deserved to succeed. No one likes to buy auto
- 32:08insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes
- 32:11to drive. The insurance consequently
- 32:13needed is a major expenditure for most families.
- 32:16Savings matter to the man. Only a low cost operation can
- 32:20deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the
- 32:23people reading this letter can save money by ensuring with
- 32:26GEICO. So stop reading and go to
- 32:29geico.com or call 800 three 6-8 273410 Geico's cost advantage is
- 32:36the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market
- 32:39share year after year. We ended 2014 at 10.8% compared
- 32:45to 2.5% in 1995 when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.
- 32:50The company's low costs create a Moat and enduring one that
- 32:54competitors are unable to cross. Our gecko never tires of telling
- 32:59Americans how GEICO can save them important money.
- 33:01The Gecko, I should add, has one particularly endearing quality.
- 33:06He works without pay. Unlike a human spokesperson, he
- 33:09never gets a swelled head from his fame, nor does he have an
- 33:13agent to constantly remind you show valuable he is.
- 33:16I love the little guy. In addition to our three major
- 33:19insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most
- 33:23of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance
- 33:26world. In aggregate, these companies
- 33:29area growing operation that consistently delivers an
- 33:32underwriting profit. Indeed, over the past decade,
- 33:36they have earned $2.95 billion from underwriting while growing
- 33:40their float from $1.7 billion to $8.6 billion.
- 33:46Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers
- 33:49underwriting profit, year and float.
- 33:51Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises.
- 33:55The customer pays money now. The insurer promises to pay
- 33:59money in the future should certain unwanted events occur.
- 34:02Sometimes the promise will not be tested for decades.
- 34:06Think of life insurance bought by people in there. 20 Yes.
- 34:09Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to
- 34:13pay, even if economic chaos prevails when payment time
- 34:17arrives, is all important. Berkshire's promises have no
- 34:21equal a fact affirmed in recent years by certain of the world's
- 34:24largest and most sophisticated PC insurers who wish to shed
- 34:29themselves of huge and exceptionally long lived
- 34:32liabilities. That is, these insurers wish to
- 34:35seed these liabilities, most of them potential losses from
- 34:39asbestos claims to a reinsurer. They needed the right one,
- 34:43though. If our insurer fails to pay a
- 34:45loss, the original insurer is still on the hook for it.
- 34:49Choosing a reinsurer therefore that down the road proves to be
- 34:53financially strapped or a bad actor threatens the original
- 34:57insurer with getting huge liabilities right back in its
- 34:59slap. Last year, our premier position
- 35:02and reinsurance was reaffirmed by our writing a policy carrying
- 35:06a $3 billion single premium. I believe that the policies size
- 35:11has only been exceeded by our 2007 transaction with Lloyd's in
- 35:16which the premium was $7.1 billion.
- 35:19In fact, I know of only eight PC policies in history that had a
- 35:23single premium exceeding $1 billion.
- 35:26And yes, all eight were written by Berkshire.
- 35:29Certain of these contracts will require us to make substantial
- 35:33payments 50 years or more from now when major insurers have
- 35:36needed an unquestionable promise that payments of this type will
- 35:40be made. Berkshire has been the party the
- 35:42only Portaido call. Berkshire's great managers,
- 35:46premier financial strength and a variety of business models
- 35:49protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the
- 35:52insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is
- 35:55a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get
- 35:59more valuable with time. 11 regulated capital intensive
- 36:03businesses. We have two major operations be
- 36:07NSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy be he that share
- 36:10important characteristics distinguishing them from our
- 36:13other businesses. Consequently, we assigned them
- 36:16their own section in this letter and split out their combined
- 36:20financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income
- 36:23statement. A key characteristic of both
- 36:25companies is their huge investment in very long lived
- 36:29regulated assets with these partially funded by large
- 36:33amounts of long term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire.
- 36:37Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning
- 36:40power that even under terrible economic conditions, will far
- 36:44exceed its interest requirements.
- 36:47Last year, for example, BNSFS interest coverage was more than
- 36:518 colon one. Our definition of coverage is
- 36:54pre tax earnings interest note bit D interest a commonly used
- 36:58measure we view as seriously flawed.
- 37:01ATB he. Meanwhile, 2 factors ensure the
- 37:04company's ability to service its debt under all circumstances.
- 37:08The first is common to all utilities, recession resistant
- 37:12earnings, which result from these companies offering an
- 37:15essential service on an exclusive basis.
- 37:17The second is enjoyed by few other utilities, a great
- 37:21diversity of earnings streams which shield us from being
- 37:25seriously harmed by any single regulatory body.
- 37:28Recently, we have further broadened that base through our
- 37:31$3 billion Canadian acquisition of Alta Link, an electric
- 37:36transmission system serving 85% of Alberta's population.
- 37:41This multitude of profit streams, supplemented by the
- 37:44inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, has
- 37:48enabled be he and its utility subsidiaries to significantly
- 37:52lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both
- 37:55us and our customers everyday. Our two subsidiaries power the
- 37:59American economy in major ways. Sid 129 BNSF carries about 15%
- 38:06measured by ton miles of all intercity freight, whether it is
- 38:09transported by truck, rail, water, air or pipeline.
- 38:14Indeed, we move more ton miles of goods than anyone else, a
- 38:18fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our
- 38:23economy's circulatory system. BNSF, like all railroads, also
- 38:28moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel efficient
- 38:31and environmentally friendly way, carrying it on a freight
- 38:35about 500 miles sun a single gallon of diesel fuel.
- 38:38Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much
- 38:42fuel. Sid 129 BH ES utilities serve
- 38:46regulated retail customers in 11 states.
- 38:49No utility company stretches further.
- 38:52In addition, we area leader in renewables from a standing start
- 38:5610 years ago. B he now accounts for 6% of the
- 39:00country's wind generation capacity and 7% of its solar
- 39:04generation capacity. Beyond these businesses, B, he
- 39:07owns two large pipelines that deliver 8% of our country's
- 39:11natural gas consumption, the recently purchased electric
- 39:15transmission operation in Canada and major electric businesses in
- 39:18the UK and Philippines. And the beat goes on.
- 39:22We will continue to buy and build utility operations
- 39:26throughout the world for decades to come.
- 39:28B can make these investments because it retains all of its
- 39:31earnings. In fact, last year the company
- 39:34retained more dollars of earnings by far than any other
- 39:38American Electric utility. We and our regulators see this
- 39:42100% retention policy as an important advantage, one almost
- 39:46certain to distinguish BE from other utilities for many years
- 39:50to come. When BE completes certain
- 39:52renewables projects that are underway, the company's
- 39:55renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion in addition.
- 40:00We have conventional projects in the works that will also cost
- 40:03many billions. We relish making such
- 40:05commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns in on
- 40:09that front, we put a large amount of trust in future
- 40:13regulation. Our confidence is justified both
- 40:16by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will
- 40:20forever need massive investments in both transportation and
- 40:24energy. It is in the self-interest of
- 40:26governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will
- 40:29ensure the the continued flow of funds to essential projects.
- 40:33It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our
- 40:37operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators
- 40:40and the people they represent. 12 Last year we fully met this
- 40:45objective at B He. Just as we have in every year of
- 40:48our ownership, our rates remain low, our customer satisfaction
- 40:53is high in our record for employee safety is among the
- 40:56best in the industry. The story at BNSF, however, as I
- 41:00noted earlier, was not good in 2014, a year in which the
- 41:04railroad disappointed many of its customers.
- 41:07This problem occurred despite the record capital expenditures
- 41:10that the NSF has made in recent years, with those having far
- 41:14exceeded the outlays made by Union Pacific, our principal
- 41:18competitor. The two railroads are of roughly
- 41:20equal size measured by revenues, though we carry considerably
- 41:24more freight measured either by car loads or 10 miles.
- 41:28But our service problems exceeded Union Pacific's last
- 41:31year, and we lost market share as a result.
- 41:34Moreover, you P dot S earnings be a tours by a record amount.
- 41:39Clearly, we have a lot of work to do.
- 41:42We are wasting no time. As I also mentioned earlier, we
- 41:46will spend $6 billion in 2015 on improving our railroads
- 41:51operation. That will amount to about 26% of
- 41:54estimated revenues, a calculation that serves as the
- 41:57industry's yardstick. Outlays of this magnitude are
- 42:00largely unheard of among railroads.
- 42:03For us, this percentage compares to our average of 18% in 2009 to
- 42:092013 and to you P dot S projection for the near future
- 42:13of 16 to 17% are huge investments will soon lead to a
- 42:18system with greater capacity and much better service.
- 42:22Improved profits should follow. Here are the key figures for
- 42:25Berkshire Hathaway Energy and BNSF.
- 42:28Berkshire Hathaway Energy 89.9% owned earnings in millions
- 42:34manufacturing, service and retailing operations.
- 42:37Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront.
- 42:41Let's look though at a summary balance sheet, an earnings
- 42:44statement for the entire group Balance sheet 123,114 inches
- 42:50millions Earnings for 2012 and 2013 have been restated to
- 42:55exclude Marm On's leasing operations which are now
- 42:59included in the finance and financial products section.
- 43:02Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page
- 43:0649. In contrast, the operating
- 43:09expense figures above are non GAAP and exclude some purchase
- 43:13accounting items, primarily the amortization of certain
- 43:16intangible assets. We present the data in this
- 43:19manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers
- 43:22more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of
- 43:26the businesses aggregated in the table then do gap figures.
- 43:30I want to explain all of the adjustments.
- 43:32Some are tiny and arcane, but serious investors should
- 43:35understand the disparate nature of intangible assets.
- 43:39Some truly deplete over time, while others in no way lose
- 43:43value. 4 Software. As a big example, amortization
- 43:47charges are very real expenses. The concept of making charges
- 43:51against other intangibles, such as the amortization of customer
- 43:55relationships, however, arises through purchase accounting
- 43:59rules and clearly does not reflect reality.
- 44:02Gap accounting draws no distinction between the two
- 44:04types of charges. Both that is are recorded as
- 44:08expenses when earnings are calculated, even though from an
- 44:11investor's viewpoint they could not be more different.
- 44:14In the gap compliant figures we show on page 49, amortization
- 44:18charges of $1.15 billion have been deducted as expenses.
- 44:23We would call about 20% of these real, the rest not.
- 44:27The non real charges once non existent at Berkshire have
- 44:31become significant because of the many acquisitions we have
- 44:34made. Non real amortization charges
- 44:37will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more
- 44:40companies. The GAP compliant table on page
- 44:4367 gives you the current status of our intangible assets.
- 44:47We now have $7.4 billion left to amortize of which $4.1 billion
- 44:53will be charged over the next five years.
- 44:56Eventually of course, every dollar of non real cost becomes
- 44:59entirely charged off. When that happens, reported
- 45:03earnings increase even if true earnings are flat.
- 45:06Depreciation charges, we want to emphasize are different.
- 45:10Every dime of depreciation expense we report is a real
- 45:13cost. That's true.
- 45:15Moreover, at most other companies when CEO Stout EBITDAS
- 45:20evaluation guide wire them up for a polygraph test, our public
- 45:25reports of earnings will of course continue to conform to
- 45:28GAP to embrace reality. However, you should remember to
- 45:32add back most of the amortization charges report to
- 45:35get back to our many manufacturing, service and
- 45:39retailing operations. They sell products ranging from
- 45:42lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector's
- 45:45businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible
- 45:49assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits
- 45:52that run from 25% after tax to far more than 100%.
- 45:57Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.
- 46:02A few, however, have very poor returns, the result of some
- 46:06serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation.
- 46:10I was not misled. I simply was wrong in my
- 46:13evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the
- 46:16industry in which it operates. Fortunately, my blunders
- 46:20normally involved relatively small acquisitions.
- 46:23Our large buys have generally worked out well, and in a few
- 46:27cases, more than well. I have not, nonetheless, made my
- 46:31last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks.
- 46:35Not everything works out as planned.
- 46:37Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an
- 46:40excellent business. They employed an average of $24
- 46:44billion of net tangible assets during 2014 and despite their
- 46:49holding large quantities of excess cash and using little
- 46:53leverage, earned 18.7% after tax on that capital.
- 46:57Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad
- 47:01investment if it is bought for too high a price.
- 47:04We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets
- 47:08for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the
- 47:11large figure we show for goodwill.
- 47:13Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital
- 47:17we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value
- 47:21of these businesses in aggregate exceeds their carrying value by
- 47:26a good margin, and that premium is likely to widen.
- 47:29Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying
- 47:33value in both the insurance and regulated industry segments is
- 47:37far greater. It is there that the truly big
- 47:40winners reside. We have far too many companies
- 47:43in this group to comment on them individually.
- 47:45Moreover, there competitors both current and potential Read this
- 47:49report. In a few of our businesses we
- 47:51might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers.
- 47:54In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an
- 47:58evaluation of Berkshire, therefore we only disclose what
- 48:01is required. You can find a good bit of
- 48:03detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 97
- 48:08to 115, Finance and Financial Products.
- 48:12This year we include in this section.
- 48:14MARM owns very sizable leasing operations whose wares are rail
- 48:18cars, containers and cranes. We have also restated the
- 48:22previous two years to reflect that change.
- 48:25Why have we made it? At one time there was a large
- 48:28minority ownership at Marmont and I felt it was more
- 48:31understandable to include all of the company's operations in one
- 48:35place. Today we own virtually 100% of
- 48:38Marmont, which makes me think you will gain more insight into
- 48:41our various businesses if we include Marm ONS leasing
- 48:45operations under this heading. The figures for the many dozens
- 48:49of Marm ONS other businesses remain in the previous section.
- 48:52Our other leasing and rental operations are conducted by
- 48:55Court Furniture and XDRA Semi trailers.
- 48:59These companies are industry leaders and have substantially
- 49:02increased their earnings as the American economy has gain
- 49:06strength. Both companies have invested
- 49:08more money in new equipment than have many of their competitors
- 49:12and that's paying off. Kevin Clayton has again
- 49:14delivered an industry leading performance at Clayton Homes,
- 49:18the largest home builder in America.
- 49:21Last year, Clayton sold 30,871 homes, about 45% of the
- 49:27manufactured homes bought by Americans.
- 49:30When we purchased Clayton in 2003 for $1.7 billion, its share
- 49:35was 14%. Key to Clayton's earnings is the
- 49:38company's $13 billion mortgage portfolio.
- 49:41During the financial panic of 2008 and 2009, when funding for
- 49:46the industry dried up, Clayton was able to keep lending because
- 49:50of Berkshires backing. In fact, we continued during
- 49:54that period to finance our competitors retail sales as well
- 49:57as our own. Many of Clayton's borrowers have
- 49:59low incomes and mediocre FICO scores, but thanks to the
- 50:03companies sensible lending practices, it's portfolio
- 50:07performed well during the recession, meaning a very high
- 50:10percentage of our borrowers kept their homes.
- 50:13Our blue collar borrowers in many cases proved much better
- 50:17credit risks than their higher income brethren.
- 50:20At MARM ONS railroad car operation lease rates have
- 50:23improved substantially over the past few years.
- 50:26The nature of this business, however, is that only 20% or so
- 50:31of our leases expire annually. Consequently, improved pricing
- 50:35only gradually works its way into our revenue stream.
- 50:39The trend though is strong. Our 105,000 car fleet consists
- 50:44largely of tank cars, but only 8% of those transport crude oil.
- 50:48One further fact about our rail operation is important for you
- 50:52to know. Unlike many other lessors, we
- 50:55manufacture our own tank cars, about 6000 of them in a good
- 50:59year. We do not book any profit when
- 51:01we transfer cars from our manufacturing division to our
- 51:04leasing division. Our fleet is consequently placed
- 51:07on our books at a organ price. The difference between that
- 51:11figure and a retail price is only slowly reflected in our
- 51:14earnings through smaller annual depreciation charges that we
- 51:18enjoy over the 30 year life of the car.
- 51:21Because of that fact ass well as others, Marmont's rail fleet is
- 51:25worth considerably more than the $5 billion figure at which it is
- 51:29carried on our books. Exclude shares held by pension
- 51:33funds of Berkshire subsidiaries held under contract of sale.
- 51:36For this amount, Berkshire has one major equity position that
- 51:40is not included in the table. We can buy 700 million shares of
- 51:45Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5
- 51:49billion. At year end, these shares were
- 51:52worth 12.5 dollars billion. We are likely to purchase the
- 51:56shares just before expiration of our option.
- 51:59In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of
- 52:03America is, in effect, our 4th largest equity investment and
- 52:08one we value highly. Attentive readers will notice
- 52:11that Tesco, which last year appeared in the list of our
- 52:14largest common stock investments, is now absent.
- 52:17An attentive investor, I'm embarrassed to report, would
- 52:21have sold Tesco shares earlier. I made a big mistake with this
- 52:25investment by dawdling. At the end of 2012, we owned
- 52:28415,000,000 shares of Tesco, then and now the leading food
- 52:33retailer in the You K and an important grocer in other
- 52:37countries as well. Our cost for this investment was
- 52:40$2.3 billion and the market value was a similar amount.
- 52:45In 2013, I soured somewhat on the company's then management
- 52:49and sold 114 million shares, realizing a profit of $43
- 52:54million. My leisurely pace and making
- 52:57sales would prove expensive. Charlie calls this sort of
- 53:00behavior thumb sucking. Considering what my delay cost
- 53:03us, he is being kind. During 2014, Tesco's problems
- 53:08worsened by the month. The company's market share fell,
- 53:11its margins contracted and accounting problems surfaced.
- 53:15In the world of business, bad news often surfaces serially.
- 53:18You see a cockroach in your kitchen as the days go by.
- 53:22You meet his relatives. We sold Tesco shares throughout
- 53:26the year and are now out of the position.
- 53:28The company we should mention has hired new management and we
- 53:32wish them well. Our after tax loss from this
- 53:35investment was 444 dollars million, about 15 of 1% of
- 53:40Berkshire's net worth. In the past 50 years we have
- 53:44only once realized an investment lost that at the time of sale
- 53:47cost us 2% of our net worth. Twice we experienced 1% losses.
- 53:53All three of these losses occurred in the 1974 to 1975
- 53:58period when we sold stocks that were very cheap in order to buy
- 54:01others we believe to be even cheaper.
- 54:04Our investment results have been helped by a terrific tailwind.
- 54:07During the 1964 to 2014 period, the S&P 500 rose from 84 to
- 54:142059, which with reinvested dividends, generated the overall
- 54:19return of 11,196% shown on page 2.
- 54:24Concurrently, the purchasing power of the dollar declined a
- 54:27staggering 87%. That decrease means that it now
- 54:30takes $1.00 to buy what could be bought for 13 inches 1965 as
- 54:36measured by the Consumer Price Index.
- 54:38There is an important message for investors in that disparate
- 54:41performance between stocks and dollars.
- 54:44Think back to our 2011 annual report, in which we defined
- 54:48investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now
- 54:52with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power
- 54:55after taxes have been paid on nominal gains in the future.
- 54:59The unconventional but inescapable conclusion to be
- 55:03drawn from the past 50 years is that it has been far safer to
- 55:07invest in a diversified collection of American
- 55:10businesses than to invest in securities Treasuries, for
- 55:14example, whose values have been tied to American currency.
- 55:17That was also true in the preceding half century, a period
- 55:21including the Great Depression and two world wars.
- 55:24Investors should heed this history to 1° or another.
- 55:28It is almost certain to be repeated during the next
- 55:30century. Stock prices will always be far
- 55:33more volatile than cash equivalent holdings over the
- 55:36long term. However, currency denominated
- 55:39instruments are riskier investments, far riskier
- 55:42investments than widely diversified stock portfolios
- 55:46that are bought over time and that are owned in a manner
- 55:48invoking only token fees and commissions.
- 55:51That lesson has not customarily been taught in business schools,
- 55:55where volatility is almost universally used as a proxy for
- 55:59risk. Though this pedagogic assumption
- 56:02makes for easy teaching, it is dead wrong.
- 56:05Volatility is far from synonymous with risk.
- 56:08Popular formulas that equate the two terms lead students,
- 56:12investors, and CEOs astray. It is true, of course, that
- 56:16owning equities for a day or a week or a year is far riskier in
- 56:20both nominal and purchasing power terms and leaving funds
- 56:24and cash equivalents. That is relevant to certain
- 56:27investors, say investment banks, whose viability can be
- 56:30threatened by declines in asset prices and which might be forced
- 56:34to sell securities during depressed markets.
- 56:37Additionally, any party that might have meaningful near term
- 56:40needs for funds should keep appropriate sums in Treasuries
- 56:44or insured bank deposits. For the great majority of
- 56:47investors, however, who can and should invest with a multi
- 56:51decade horizon, quotational declines are unimportant.
- 56:54Their focus should remain fixed on attaining significant gains
- 56:58in purchasing power over their investing lifetime.
- 57:01For them, the diversified equity portfolio fought over time will
- 57:05prove far less risky than dollar based securities. 18 If the
- 57:10investor instead fears price volatility, erroneously viewing
- 57:14it as a measure of risk, he may ironically end up doing some
- 57:18very risky things. Recall, if you will, the pundits
- 57:22who six years ago bemoaned falling stock prices and advised
- 57:26investing in safe treasury bills or bank certificates of deposit.
- 57:30People who heeded this sermon are now earning a pittance on
- 57:34sums they had previously expected would finance a
- 57:36pleasant retirement. The S&P 500 was then below 700.
- 57:41Now it is about 2100. If not for their fear of
- 57:45meaningless price volatility, these investors could have
- 57:49assured themselves of a good income for life by simply buying
- 57:52a very low cost index fund whose dividends would trend upward
- 57:57over the years and whose principal would grow as well,
- 58:00with many UPS and downs to be sure.
- 58:03Investors, of course, can by their own behavior make stock
- 58:07ownership highly risky. And many do.
- 58:10Active trading attempts, tow time, market movements,
- 58:14inadequate diversification, the payment of high and unnecessary
- 58:18fees to managers and advisors, and the use of borrowed money
- 58:22can destroy the decent returns that a lifelong owner of
- 58:25equities would otherwise enjoy. Indeed, borrowed money has no
- 58:29place in the investor's toolkit. Anything can happen anytime in
- 58:33markets, and no advisor, economist or TV commentator
- 58:38indefinitely, not Charlie Noriken, tell you when chaos
- 58:41will occur. Market forecasters will fill you
- 58:44rear, but will never fill your wallet.
- 58:46The Commission of the investment sins listed above is not limited
- 58:49to the little guy. Huge institutional investors,
- 58:53viewed as a group, have long underperformed the
- 58:56unsophisticated index fund investor who simply sits tight.
- 59:00For decades, a major reason has been fees.
- 59:03Many institutions pay substantial sums to consultants
- 59:06who in turn recommend high fee managers.
- 59:10And that is a fool's game. There are area few investment
- 59:12managers, of course, who are very good, though in the short
- 59:16run it's difficult to determine whether a great record is due to
- 59:20luck or talent. Most advisors, however, are far
- 59:24better at generating high fees than they are at generating high
- 59:27returns. In truth, their core competence
- 59:30is salesmanship. Rather than listen to their
- 59:33siren songs, investors large and small should instead read Jack
- 59:37Be Ogles, the little book of common sense Investing.
- 59:40Decades ago, Ben Graham pinpointed the blame for
- 59:43investment failure using a quote from Shakespeare.
- 59:47The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.
- 59:51The Annual Meeting The annual meeting will be held on
- 59:54Saturday, May 2nd in D at the CenturyLink Center.
- 59:58Last year's attendance. OF 39,000 set a record and we
- 1:00:02expect a further increase this year as we celebrate our golden
- 1:00:06anniversary. Be there when the doors open at
- 1:00:097:00 AM. Berkshire's talented Carries
- 1:00:12Oval will again be in charge. Carrie joined us six years ago
- 1:00:15at the age of 24 as a secretary. Then, four years ago, I asked
- 1:00:21her to take charge of the meeting, a huge undertaking
- 1:00:23requiring a multitude of skills, and she jumped at the chance.
- 1:00:27Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the
- 1:00:32best in the hundreds who work with her.
- 1:00:34She is aided by our entire Home Office crew who enjoy pitching
- 1:00:37in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.
- 1:00:41And yes, we also try to sell our visiting shareholders our
- 1:00:45products while they're here. In fact, this year we will
- 1:00:48substantially increase the hours available for purchases.
- 1:00:52Opening for business at the CenturyLink on Friday, May 1st
- 1:00:56SD from noon to 5P dot m.aswellastheusual7a.m.to 4:00
- 1:01:02PM on meeting day. So bring a smile to Charlie's
- 1:01:05face and do some serious shopping.
- 1:01:07Get up early on Saturday morning at 6:20 AM.
- 1:01:11Norman and Jake, 2 Texas Longhorns, each weighing about a
- 1:01:15ton, will proceed down 10 TH Street to the CenturyLink.
- 1:01:19Aboard them will be a couple of our Just in Boot executives who
- 1:01:23do double duty as Cowboys. Following the steers will be
- 1:01:26four horses pulling a Wells Fargo Stagecoach.
- 1:01:29Berkshire already markets planes, trains and automobiles.
- 1:01:33Adding steers and stagecoaches to our portfolio should seal our
- 1:01:37reputation as America's all-purpose transportation
- 1:01:40company. 19 at about 7 Colon 30 AM on Saturday, we will have our
- 1:01:46fourth international newspaper tossing challenge.
- 1:01:49Our target again will be a Clayton home porch located
- 1:01:52precisely 35 feet from the throwing line.
- 1:01:56When I was a teenager, in my 1 brief flirtation with honest
- 1:01:59labor, I tossed about 500,000 papers, so I think I'm pretty
- 1:02:03good. Challenge me, humiliate me,
- 1:02:07knock me down a peg. I'll buy a dilly bar for anyone
- 1:02:09who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than ito.
- 1:02:13The papers will run 36 to 42 pages and you must fold them
- 1:02:18yourself. No rubber bands allowed.
- 1:02:20They'll present a special prize to the 12 or under contestant
- 1:02:24who makes the best toss. Deb, Boss and Neck will be the
- 1:02:27judge. At 8:30 AMA new Berkshire movie
- 1:02:30will be shown. An hour later we will start the
- 1:02:33question and answer period, which, with a break for lunch at
- 1:02:36CenturyLink stands, will last until 3:30 PM.
- 1:02:40After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the Annual
- 1:02:44meeting at 3:45 PM. This business session typically
- 1:02:48lasts only 1/2 hour or so. Your venue for shopping will be
- 1:02:51the 194,300 square foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in
- 1:02:56which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be
- 1:03:00for sale. If you don't get your shopping
- 1:03:02done on Friday, slip out while Charlie's talking on Saturday
- 1:03:06and binge on our bargains. Check the terrific BNSF railroad
- 1:03:10layout. Also, even though I'm 84, it
- 1:03:13still excites me. Last year you did your part as
- 1:03:16is Hopper, and most of our businesses racked up record
- 1:03:19sales. In a nine hour period on
- 1:03:21Saturday, we sold 1385 pairs of Justin Boots, that's a pair
- 1:03:26every 23 seconds, 13,440 lbs of CS candy, 7276 pairs of Wells
- 1:03:34Lamont work gloves and 10,000 bottles of Heinz ketchup.
- 1:03:38Heinz has a new mustard product, so both mustard and ketchup will
- 1:03:42be available this year by both. Now that we are open for
- 1:03:45business on Friday as well, we expect new records in every
- 1:03:50precinct. Brooks, our running shoe
- 1:03:52company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to
- 1:03:55offer at the meeting after you purchase a pair with them the
- 1:03:59next day at our third annual Berkshire 5K and 8:00 AM race
- 1:04:04starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating
- 1:04:07will be included in the Visitor's guide that will be
- 1:04:10sent to you with your credentials for the meeting.
- 1:04:13Entrance in the race will find themselves running alongside
- 1:04:15many of Berkshire's managers, directors and associates.
- 1:04:20Charlie and I, however, will sleep in.
- 1:04:23A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number
- 1:04:26of the company's top counselors from around the country.
- 1:04:29Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be
- 1:04:33able to give you a shareholder discount, usually 8%.
- 1:04:36This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in
- 1:04:41which we operate. One supplemental point, The
- 1:04:44discount is not additive. If you qualify for another
- 1:04:47discount, such as that available to certain groups, bring the
- 1:04:50details of your existing insurance and check out our
- 1:04:53price. We can save many of you real
- 1:04:55money. Be sure to visit the Bookworm.
- 1:04:57It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new
- 1:05:02titles. Last year, many shareholders
- 1:05:05purchased Max Olson's compilation of Berkshire letters
- 1:05:07going back to 1965, and he has produced an updated edition for
- 1:05:12the meeting. We also expect to be selling an
- 1:05:14inexpensive book commemorating our 50 years.
- 1:05:18It's currently a work in process, but I expect it to
- 1:05:21contain a wide variety of historical material, including
- 1:05:25documents from the 19 TH century.
- 1:05:27An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with
- 1:05:30this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will
- 1:05:34need for admission to both the meeting and other events.
- 1:05:37Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire
- 1:05:40weekend. If you were coming from far
- 1:05:42away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha.
- 1:05:46The drive between the two cities is about 21 two hours and it may
- 1:05:50be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly
- 1:05:54if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha.
- 1:05:57The savings for a couple could run to $1000 or more.
- 1:06:01Spend that money with us at Nebraska Furniture Mart located
- 1:06:04on a 77 acre site on 72 and D Street between Dodge and
- 1:06:09Pacific. We will again behaving Berkshire
- 1:06:12Weekend discount pricing. Last year in the week
- 1:06:15surrounding the meeting the store did a record
- 1:06:17$40,481,817.00 of business. AN average week for NF Ms. Omaha
- 1:06:25store is about $9,000,000.20. To obtain the Berkshire discount
- 1:06:30at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April
- 1:06:3428th TH and Monday, May 4th TH inclusive, and also present your
- 1:06:39meeting credential. The period special pricing will
- 1:06:42even apply to the products of several prestigious
- 1:06:45manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against
- 1:06:49discounting, but which in the spirit of our shareholder
- 1:06:52weekend, have made an exception for you.
- 1:06:54We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10:00 AM to
- 1:06:599:00 PM, Monday through Friday. Tenna dot AM dot TO9 Colon 30 PM
- 1:07:04on Saturday and 10:00 AM to 8:00 PM on Sunday from 5 Colon 30P
- 1:07:09dot m.to 8:00 PM on Saturday and FM is having a picnic to which
- 1:07:14you are all invited. At Borschi IMS we will again
- 1:07:17have two shareholder only events.
- 1:07:20The first will be a cocktail reception from 6:00 PM to 9:00
- 1:07:23PM on Friday, May 1st St. The second, the main gala, will
- 1:07:28be held on Sunday, May 3rd Rd. from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM.
- 1:07:33On Saturday, we will remain open until 6:00 PM.
- 1:07:37In recent years, our three day volume has far exceeded our
- 1:07:40sales in all of December. Normally a jeweler's best month,
- 1:07:44we will have huge crowds at Borschi IMS throughout the
- 1:07:47weekend. For your convenience, therefore,
- 1:07:50shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April
- 1:07:5327th TH through Saturday, May 9th TH.
- 1:07:57During that period, please identify yourself as a
- 1:08:00shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a
- 1:08:03brokerage statement that shows you area.
- 1:08:06Berkshire holder on Sunday in the mall outside of Borschi IMS
- 1:08:10Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, well
- 1:08:14bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob
- 1:08:17Ham and Sharon OS Berg, 2 of the world's top bridge experts,
- 1:08:22available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday
- 1:08:25afternoon. Don't play them for money.
- 1:08:27My friend Ariel Shing will be in them all as well on Sunday,
- 1:08:31taking on challengers at table tennis.
- 1:08:34I met Ariel when she was 9, and even then I was unable to score
- 1:08:38a point against her. Now she's a sophomore at
- 1:08:41Princeton, having already represented the United States in
- 1:08:44the 2012 Olympics. If you don't mind embarrassing
- 1:08:48yourself, test your skills against her beginning at 1:00
- 1:08:51PM. Bill Gates and I will lead off
- 1:08:53and try to S often her up. Gor Otts and Piccolos will again
- 1:08:57be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on
- 1:08:59Sunday, May 3rd Rd. Both will be serving until 10:00
- 1:09:03PM with Gorats opening at 1:00 PM and Piccolos opening at 4:00
- 1:09:07PM. These restaurants are my
- 1:09:10favorites and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening.
- 1:09:13Remember to make a reservation at Gorats.
- 1:09:16Call 402-551-3733 on April 1st SD, but not before for Piccolos.
- 1:09:24Call 402-346-2865 at Piccolos. Order a giant root beer float
- 1:09:31for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.
- 1:09:34We will again have the same three financial journalists
- 1:09:37leave the question and answer period at the meeting, asking
- 1:09:40Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to
- 1:09:43them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail
- 1:09:46addresses are Carol Loomis, who retired last year after 60 years
- 1:09:51at Fortune but remains the expert on business and financial
- 1:09:55matters, and who may be emailed at loomisbrkgmail.com,
- 1:09:59becky.quickofcnbc@berkshirequestionscnbc.com and and Andrew Ross Sorkin of
- 1:10:06The New York Times, atersorkanytimes.com.
- 1:10:09From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the
- 1:10:12six he or she decides are the most interesting and important.
- 1:10:17The journalists have told me your question has the best
- 1:10:20chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending
- 1:10:24it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire related and include
- 1:10:27no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them.
- 1:10:31In your e-mail let the journalist know if you would
- 1:10:33like your name mentioned if your question is asked.
- 1:10:36We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow
- 1:10:39Berkshire this year. The insurance specialist will be
- 1:10:42Gary Ransom of Dowling and Partners.
- 1:10:45Questions that deal with our non insurance operations will come
- 1:10:47from Jonathan Brandt of Rua Northeast, CUNNIFF and Gold far
- 1:10:52banned Greg Warren of Morningstar.
- 1:10:54Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask
- 1:10:58questions that add to our owners understanding and knowledge of
- 1:11:01their investment. Neither Charlie Norie will get
- 1:11:04so much as a clue about the questions headed our way.
- 1:11:07Some will be tough for sure, and that's the way we like it.
- 1:11:10All told, we expect at least 54 questions which will allow for
- 1:11:14six from each analyst and journalist and for eighteen from
- 1:11:18the audience. Last year we had 62 in total.
- 1:11:21The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means
- 1:11:24of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 AM on the morning
- 1:11:29of the Annual Meeting. Each of the 11 microphones
- 1:11:32installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to
- 1:11:36speak, a drawing. While I'm in the subject of our
- 1:11:40owners gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I
- 1:11:43believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to
- 1:11:47new information that Berkshire releases and should also have
- 1:11:50adequate time to analyze it. That's why we try to issue
- 1:11:53financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays, and why
- 1:11:58our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday.
- 1:12:00We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or
- 1:12:05analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders.
- 1:12:09We get terrific help at meeting time from literally thousands of
- 1:12:12Omaha residents and businesses who want you to enjoy
- 1:12:16yourselves. This year, because we expect
- 1:12:18record attendance, we have worried about a shortage of
- 1:12:22hotel rooms. To deal with that possible
- 1:12:24problem, Airbnb is making a special effort to obtain
- 1:12:28listings for the period around meeting time and is likely to
- 1:12:31have a wide array of accommodations to offer.
- 1:12:34Air BNBS services may be especially helpful to
- 1:12:38shareholders who expect to spend only a single night in Omaha and
- 1:12:42are aware that last year a few hotels required guests to pay
- 1:12:46for a minimum of three nights. That gets expensive.
- 1:12:49Those people on a tight budget should check the Airbnb website.
- 1:12:53For good reason. I regularly extol the
- 1:12:56accomplishments of our operating managers.
- 1:12:58They are truly All Stars who run their businesses as if they were
- 1:13:02the only asset owned by their families.
- 1:13:05I believe the mindset of our managers also to be as
- 1:13:08shareholder oriented as can be found in the universe of large
- 1:13:12publicly owned companies. Most of our managers have no
- 1:13:15financial need to work. The joy of hitting business home
- 1:13:18runs means as much to them as their paycheck.
- 1:13:21Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work
- 1:13:26with meet our corporate office. This group efficiently deals
- 1:13:30with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements.
- 1:13:34Files a 24,100 page federal income tax return and overseas
- 1:13:39the filing of 3400 state tax returns.
- 1:13:43Responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries.
- 1:13:46Gets out the annual report. Prepares for the country's
- 1:13:49largest annual meeting. Coordinates the boards,
- 1:13:53activities in the list goes on and on.
- 1:13:55They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and
- 1:13:58with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and
- 1:14:02pleasant. Their efforts go beyond
- 1:14:04activities strictly related to Berkshire.
- 1:14:07Last year they dealt with the 40 universities selected from 200
- 1:14:11applicants who sent students to Omaha for AQ and a day with me.
- 1:14:15They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange
- 1:14:19my travel and even get me hamburgers and French fries
- 1:14:22smothered in Heinz ketchup. Of course for lunch, no CEO has
- 1:14:27it better. I truly do feel like tap dancing
- 1:14:29to work every day. Last year for the annual report
- 1:14:33we dropped our 48 year old no pictures policy who says I'm not
- 1:14:37flexible and run a photo of our remarkable Home Office crew that
- 1:14:41was taking a tour Christmas lunch.
- 1:14:43I didn't warn the gang of the public exposure they were to
- 1:14:46receive so they didn't have on their Sunday best.
- 1:14:49This year was a different story. On the facing page you will see
- 1:14:53what our group looks like when they think someone will be
- 1:14:55noticing however they dress. Their performance is mind
- 1:14:59boggling. Come meet them on May 2nd ND and
- 1:15:02enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.
- 1:15:04February 272,000 and 15. Warren E Buffett, Chairman of
- 1:15:09the Board 22 Berkshire Hathaway, Inc Acquisition Criteria We are
- 1:15:15eager to hear from principals or their representatives about
- 1:15:18businesses that meet all of the following criteria.
- 1:15:21One large purchase SATly is $75 million of pre tax earnings
- 1:15:26unless the business will fit into one of our existing units.
- 1:15:292 demonstrated consistent earning power.
- 1:15:31Future projections are of no interest to us, nor are turn
- 1:15:35around situations. 3 Businesses earning good returns on equity
- 1:15:39while employing little or no debt for management in place.
- 1:15:43We can't supply it. 5 Simple business as if there's lots of
- 1:15:46technology, we won't understand it. 6 An offering price.
- 1:15:50We don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking
- 1:15:53even preliminarily about a transaction when price is
- 1:15:57unknown. The larger the company, the
- 1:15:59greater will be our interest. We would like to make an
- 1:16:02acquisition in the five to $20 billion range.
- 1:16:05We are not interested, however, and receiving suggestions about
- 1:16:10purchases we might make in the general stock market.
- 1:16:13We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers.
- 1:16:16We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast
- 1:16:19answer customarily within 5 minutes as to whether we're
- 1:16:22interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but
- 1:16:25we'll consider issuing stock when we receive as much an
- 1:16:29intrinsic business value as we give.
- 1:16:31We don't participate in auctions.
- 1:16:33Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions
- 1:16:36that don't come close to meeting our tests.
- 1:16:38We found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a
- 1:16:42lot of people will call hoping to sell you their Cocker
- 1:16:45spaniels. A line from a country song
- 1:16:47expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds or auction
- 1:16:51like sales. When the fondant ring, you'll
- 1:16:54know it's me. 23 Berkshire Past, present and future In the
- 1:16:59beginning, on May 6th, 1964, Berkshire Hathaway, then run by
- 1:17:04a man named C Barry Stanton, sent a letter to its
- 1:17:08shareholders offering to buy 225,000 shares of its stock for
- 1:17:1211.375 dollars per share. I had expected the letter.
- 1:17:17I was surprised by the price. Berkshire then had 1583680
- 1:17:23shares outstanding. About 7% of these were owned by
- 1:17:26Buffett Partnership Limited BPL, an investing entity that I
- 1:17:30managed and in which I had virtually all of my net worth.
- 1:17:34Shortly before the tender offer was mailed, Stanton had asked me
- 1:17:38what price BPL would sell its holdings.
- 1:17:41I answered 11.50 dollars and he said fine, we have a deal.
- 1:17:46Then came Berkshire's letter, offering an eighth of a
- 1:17:49pointless I bristled at Stanton's behavior and didn't
- 1:17:53tender. That was a monumentally stupid
- 1:17:55decision. Berkshire was then a northern
- 1:17:57textile manufacturer mired in a terrible business.
- 1:18:01The industry in which it operated was heading South, both
- 1:18:04metaphorically and physically, and Berkshire, for a variety of
- 1:18:08reasons, was unable to change course.
- 1:18:11That was true even though the industry's problems had long
- 1:18:14been widely understood. Berkshire's own board minutes of
- 1:18:18July 29th 1954 laid out the grim facts.
- 1:18:22The textile industry in New England started going out of
- 1:18:25business 40 years ago. During the war years this trend
- 1:18:29was stopped. The trend must continue until
- 1:18:31supply and demand have been balanced.
- 1:18:34About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire find Spinning
- 1:18:37Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing, both with roots
- 1:18:41in the 19 TH century joint forces, taking the name we bear
- 1:18:45today. With its 14 plants and 1000
- 1:18:48employees, the merged company became the giant of New England
- 1:18:51textiles. What the two management asks
- 1:18:54viewed as a merger agreement, however, soon morphed into a
- 1:18:58suicide pact. During the seven years following
- 1:19:01the consolidation, Berkshire operated at an overall loss and
- 1:19:05its net worth shrunk by 37%. Meanwhile, the company closed 9
- 1:19:10plants, sometimes using the liquidation proceeds to
- 1:19:13repurchase shares, and that pattern caught my attention.
- 1:19:17I purchased BPLS first shares of Berkshire in December 1962,
- 1:19:22anticipating more Closings and more repurchase S.
- 1:19:26The stock was then selling for 7.50 dollars, a wide discount
- 1:19:31from per share working capital of 10.25 dollars and book value
- 1:19:35of 20.20 dollars. Buying the stock at that price
- 1:19:39was like picking up a discarded cigar, but that had one puff
- 1:19:42remaining in it. Though the stub might be ugly
- 1:19:45and soggy, the puff would be free.
- 1:19:47Once that momentary pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could
- 1:19:51be expected. Berkshire thereafter stuck to
- 1:19:54the script. It soon closed another two
- 1:19:56plants and in that May 1964 move set out to repurchase shares.
- 1:20:01With the shutdown proceeds, the price that Stanton offered was
- 1:20:0550% above the cost of our original purchases.
- 1:20:09There was my free puff just waiting for me, after which I
- 1:20:12could look elsewhere for other discarded butts instead,
- 1:20:16irritated by Stanton's chiseling.
- 1:20:18I ignored his offer and began to aggressively buy more Berkshire
- 1:20:22shares. 24 By April 1965, BPL owned 392,633 shares out of
- 1:20:311017547 then outstanding and at a nearly May board meeting, we
- 1:20:36formally took control of the company through C Berry's and my
- 1:20:40childish behavior. After all, what was an eighth of
- 1:20:43a point to either of us, he lost his job and I found myself with
- 1:20:47more than 25% of capital invested in a terrible business
- 1:20:51about which I knew very little. I became the dog who caught the
- 1:20:54car. Because of Berkshire's operating
- 1:20:57losses and share repurchase S, its net worth at the end of
- 1:21:01fiscal 1964 had fallen to $22 million from $55 million at the
- 1:21:07time of the 1955 merger. The full $22 million was
- 1:21:11required by the textile operation.
- 1:21:14The company had no excess cash and owed its bank 2.5 dollars
- 1:21:18million. dot. Berkshire's 1964 annual report
- 1:21:22is reproduced on pages 130 to 142.
- 1:21:26For a time, I got lucky. Berkshire immediately enjoyed
- 1:21:29two years of good operating conditions.
- 1:21:31Better yet, its earnings in those years were free of income
- 1:21:35tax because it possessed a large loss carryforward that had
- 1:21:38arisen from the disastrous results in earlier years.
- 1:21:42Then the honeymoon ended. During the 18 years following
- 1:21:451966, we struggled unremitting LY with the textile business,
- 1:21:51all to no avail But stubbornness, stupidity has its
- 1:21:54limits. In 1985, I finally threw in the
- 1:21:57towel and closed the operation. Undeterred by my first mistake
- 1:22:01of committing much of BPL's resources to a dying business, I
- 1:22:05quickly compounded the error. Indeed, my second blunder was
- 1:22:09far more serious than the first, eventually becoming the most
- 1:22:13costly in my career. Early in 1967 I had Berkshire
- 1:22:18pay $8.6 million to buy national indemnity company Nikko, a small
- 1:22:22but promising Omaha based insurer.
- 1:22:25A tiny sister company was also included in the deal.
- 1:22:28Insurance was in my suite spot. I understood and liked the
- 1:22:32industry. Jack Ringwald, the owner of
- 1:22:35Nikko, was a long time friend who wanted to sell to Mimi
- 1:22:38personally. In no way was his offer intended
- 1:22:42for Berkshire. So why did I purchase Nikko for
- 1:22:44Berkshire rather than for BPL? I've had 48 years to think about
- 1:22:48that question and I've yet to come up with a good answer.
- 1:22:51I simply made a colossal mistake.
- 1:22:54If BPL had been the purchaser, my partners and I would have
- 1:22:57owned 100% of a fine business destined to from the base for
- 1:23:02building the company Berkshire has become.
- 1:23:04Moreover, our growth would not have been impeded for nearly two
- 1:23:08decades by the unproductive funds imprisoned in the textile
- 1:23:11operation. Finally, our subsequent
- 1:23:14acquisitions would have been owned in their entirety by my
- 1:23:17partners and me, rather than being 39% owned by the legacy
- 1:23:22shareholders of Berkshire, to whom we had no obligation.
- 1:23:25Despite these facts staring me in the face, I opted to marry
- 1:23:29100% of an excellent business in Isoto.
- 1:23:32A 61% owned terrible business Berkshire Hathaway, a decision
- 1:23:37that eventually diverted $100 billion or so from BPL partners
- 1:23:42to a collection of strangers. One more confession and then
- 1:23:46he'll go on to more pleasant topics.
- 1:23:48Can you believe that in 1975 I bought while MBEC Mills, another
- 1:23:53New England textile company. Of course, the purchase price
- 1:23:56was a bargain based on that assets we received and the
- 1:23:59projected sign are geese with Berkshire's existing textile
- 1:24:03business. Nevertheless, surprise surprise,
- 1:24:06while MBEC was a disaster with the mill having to be closed
- 1:24:10down not many years later. And now some good news.
- 1:24:13The northern textile industry is finally extinct.
- 1:24:16You need no longer panic if you hear that I've been spotted
- 1:24:19wandering around New England. 25C straightens me out.
- 1:24:23My cigar butt strategy worked very well while I was managing
- 1:24:27small sums. Indeed, the many dozens of free
- 1:24:30puffs I obtained in the 1950 S made that decade by far the best
- 1:24:34of my life for both relative and absolute investment performance.
- 1:24:39Even then, however, I made a few exceptions to cigar butts, the
- 1:24:43most important being GEICO. Thanks to a 1951 conversation I
- 1:24:48had with Laurie Mayer Davidson, a wonderful man who later became
- 1:24:51CEO of the company, I learned that GEICO was a terrific
- 1:24:55business and promptly put 65% of my $9800 net worth into its
- 1:25:01shares. Most of my gains in those early
- 1:25:04years, though, came from investments in mediocre
- 1:25:07companies that traded at bargain prices.
- 1:25:10Ben Graham had taught me that technique, and it worked.
- 1:25:13But a major weakness in this approach gradually became
- 1:25:16apparent. Cigar butt investing was
- 1:25:18scalable only to a point With large sums, it would never work
- 1:25:22well. In addition, though marginal
- 1:25:25businesses purchased at cheap prices may be attractive as
- 1:25:28short term investments, they are the wrong foundation on which to
- 1:25:32build a large and enduring enterprise.
- 1:25:34Selecting a marriage partner clearly requires more demanding
- 1:25:38criteria than does dating. Berkshire, it should be noted,
- 1:25:42would have been a highly satisfactory date if we had
- 1:25:45taken C Barry Standen's 11.375 dollars offer for our shares.
- 1:25:50BPL's weighted annual return on its Berkshire investment would
- 1:25:54have been about 40%. It took Charlie M Unger to break
- 1:25:58my cigar butt habits and set the course for building a business
- 1:26:01that could combine huge size with satisfactory profits.
- 1:26:05Charlie had grown up a few 100 feet from where I now live, and
- 1:26:08as a youth had worked as Deedee in my grandfather's grocery
- 1:26:13store. Nevertheless, it was 1959 before
- 1:26:16I met Charlie, long after he had left Omaha to make Los Angeles
- 1:26:20his home. I was then 28 and he was 35.
- 1:26:24The Omaha Doctor Who introduced us predicted that we would hit
- 1:26:27it off, and we did. If you've attended our annual
- 1:26:30meetings, you know Charlie has a wide-ranging brilliance, a
- 1:26:33prodigious memory and some firm opinions.
- 1:26:36And not exactly wish why was Hi myself.
- 1:26:39And we sometimes don't agree. In 56 years, however, we've
- 1:26:43never had an argument. When we differ, Charlie usually
- 1:26:46ends the conversation by saying, Warren, think it over and you'll
- 1:26:50agree with me because you're smart and am right.
- 1:26:53What most of you do not know about Charlie is that
- 1:26:55architecture is among his passions.
- 1:26:57Though he began his career as a practicing lawyer with his time
- 1:27:01billed at $15 per hour, Charlie made his first real money in his
- 1:27:0530s by designing and building 5 apartment projects near Los
- 1:27:09Angeles. Concurrently, he designed the
- 1:27:12house that he lives in today, some 55 years later.
- 1:27:15Like me, Charlie can't be budged if he is happy in his
- 1:27:18surroundings that I. In recent years, Charlie has
- 1:27:22designed large dorm complexes at Stanford and the University of
- 1:27:25Michigan, and today, at age 91, is working on another major
- 1:27:29project. From my perspective, though,
- 1:27:32Charlie's most important architectural feat was the
- 1:27:35design of today's Berkshire. The blueprint he gave me was
- 1:27:39simple. Forget what you know about
- 1:27:40buying fair businesses at wonderful prices.
- 1:27:44Instead, buy wonderful businesses at fair prices. 26
- 1:27:48Altering my behavior is not an easy task.
- 1:27:51Ask my family. I had enjoyed reasonable success
- 1:27:54without Charlie's input, so why should I listen to a lawyer who
- 1:27:58had never spent a day in Business School when am I had
- 1:28:01attended? 3 But Charlie never tired of
- 1:28:03repeating his maxims about business and investing to me,
- 1:28:07and his logic was irrefutable. Consequently, Berkshire has been
- 1:28:11built to Charlie's blueprint. My role has been that of general
- 1:28:15contractor, with the CEOs of Berkshire subsidiaries doing the
- 1:28:19real work as subcontractors. The year 1972 was a turning
- 1:28:23point for Berkshire, though not without occasional backsliding
- 1:28:26on my part. Remember my 1975 purchase of WOW
- 1:28:30MBEC? We had the opportunity then to
- 1:28:32buy See's Candy for Blue Chip Stamps, a company in which
- 1:28:36Charlie and Berkshire had major stakes and which was later
- 1:28:39merged into Berkshire. SEES was a legendary West Coast
- 1:28:43manufacturer and retailer of boxed chocolates, then annually
- 1:28:47earning about $4 million pre tax while utilizing only $8 million
- 1:28:52of net tangible assets. Moreover, the company had a huge
- 1:28:56asset that did not appear on its balance sheet, a broad and
- 1:29:00durable competitive advantage that gave it significant pricing
- 1:29:03power. That strength was virtually
- 1:29:05certain to give CS major gains in earnings over time.
- 1:29:09Better yet, these would materialize with only minor
- 1:29:13amounts of incremental investment.
- 1:29:15In other words, CS could be expected to gush cash for
- 1:29:18decades to come. The family controlling CS wanted
- 1:29:21$30 million for the business, and Charlie rightly said it was
- 1:29:25worth that much. But I didn't want to pay more
- 1:29:27than $25 million and wasn't all that enthusiastic.
- 1:29:31Even at that figure, a price that was three times net
- 1:29:34tangible assets made me gulp. My misguided caution could have
- 1:29:38scuttled the terrific purchase but luckily the sellers decided
- 1:29:43to take our $25 million bid. To date SEES has earned $1.9
- 1:29:48billion pre tax, with its growth having required added investment
- 1:29:52of only $40 million. SEES has thus been able to
- 1:29:56distribute huge sums that have helped Berkshire buy other
- 1:29:59businesses that in turn have themselves produced large D is
- 1:30:03Tri but able profits. Envision rabbits breeding.
- 1:30:07Additionally, through watching SEES in action, I gained a
- 1:30:10business education about the value of powerful brands that
- 1:30:13open my eyes to many other profitable investments.
- 1:30:17Even with Charlie's blueprint, I have made plenty of mistakes
- 1:30:20since. Wow, MBEC.
- 1:30:22The most gruesome was Dexter Shoe.
- 1:30:24When we purchased the company in 1993, it had a terrific record
- 1:30:29and in no way looked to me like a cigar butt.
- 1:30:32Its competitive strengths, however, were soon to evaporate
- 1:30:36because of foreign competition, and I simply didn't see that
- 1:30:39coming. Consequently, Berkshire paid
- 1:30:42$433 million for Dexter, and rather promptly, its value went
- 1:30:47to zero. Gap accounting, however, doesn't
- 1:30:51come close to recording the magnitude of my error.
- 1:30:54The fact is that I gave Berkshire stock to the sellers
- 1:30:57of Dexter rather than cash, and the shares I used for the
- 1:31:00purchase are now worth about 5.7 dollars billion.
- 1:31:04As a financial disaster, this one deserves a spot in the
- 1:31:07Guinness Book of World Records. Several of my subsequent errors
- 1:31:11also involve the use of Berkshire shares to purchase
- 1:31:14businesses whose earnings were destined to simply limp along.
- 1:31:18Mistakes of that kind are deadly.
- 1:31:20Trading shares of a wonderful business, which Berkshire most
- 1:31:23certainly is for ownership of a SOSO business irreparably
- 1:31:27destroys value. We've also suffered financially
- 1:31:30when this mistake has been committed by companies whose
- 1:31:33shares Berkshire has owned, with the errors sometimes occurring
- 1:31:36while I was serving as a director.
- 1:31:38Too often CE OS seem blind to an elementary reality.
- 1:31:42The intrinsic value of the shares you give in an
- 1:31:45acquisition must not be greater than the intrinsic value of the
- 1:31:49business you receive. 27 I've yet to see an investment banker
- 1:31:53quantify this all important math when he is presenting a stock
- 1:31:56for stock deal to the board of a potential acquirer.
- 1:32:00Instead, the bankers focus will be on describing customary
- 1:32:04premiums to market price that are currently being paid for
- 1:32:07acquisitions. An absolutely asinine way to
- 1:32:10evaluate the attractiveness of an acquisition or whether the
- 1:32:14deal will increase the acquire Rs earnings per share, which in
- 1:32:17itself should be far from determinative and striving to
- 1:32:21achieve the desired per share number.
- 1:32:23A panting CEO and hiss helpers will often conjure up fanciful
- 1:32:28sign our geest a essay director of 19 companies over the years,
- 1:32:32I've never heard D is sign our geest mentioned, though I've
- 1:32:35witnessed plenty of these once deals have closed post mortem S
- 1:32:39of acquisitions in which reality is honestly compared to the
- 1:32:43original. Projections are rare in American
- 1:32:46boardrooms. They should instead be standard
- 1:32:48practice. I can promise you that long
- 1:32:51after IMG won, Berkshire CEO and board will carefully make
- 1:32:55intrinsic value calculations before issuing shares in any
- 1:32:59acquisitions. You can't get rich trading $100
- 1:33:02bill for eight tenths even if your advisor has handed you an
- 1:33:06expensive fairness opinion endorsing that swap.
- 1:33:09Overall, Berkshire's acquisitions have worked out
- 1:33:11well, and very well in the case of a few large ones.
- 1:33:14So 2 have our investments in marketable securities.
- 1:33:19The latter are always valued on our balance sheet at their
- 1:33:21market prices. So any gains, including those
- 1:33:24unrealized, are immediately reflected in our net worth.
- 1:33:28But the businesses we buy outright are never revalued
- 1:33:32upward on our balance sheet, even when we could sell them for
- 1:33:35many billions of dollars more than they're carrying value.
- 1:33:38The unrecorded gains in the value of Berkshire subsidiaries
- 1:33:42have become huge, with these growing at a particularly fast
- 1:33:46pace in the last decade. Listening to Charlie has paid
- 1:33:49off. 28 Berkshire Today Berkshire is now a sprawling
- 1:33:53conglomerate constantly trying to sprawl further.
- 1:33:56Conglomerates, it should be acknowledged, have a terrible
- 1:33:59reputation with investors and they richly deserve it.
- 1:34:03Let me first explain why they are in the doghouse, and then I
- 1:34:06will go on to describe why the conglomerate form brings huge
- 1:34:10and enduring advantages to Berkshire.
- 1:34:12Since I entered the business world, conglomerates have
- 1:34:15enjoyed several periods of extreme popularity, the silliest
- 1:34:19of which occurred in the late 1960's.
- 1:34:22The drill for conglomerate CEO's, then was simple.
- 1:34:25By personality promotion or dubious accounting, and often by
- 1:34:29all three, these managers drove a fledgling conglomerate stock
- 1:34:33to, say, 20 times earnings and then issued shares as fast as
- 1:34:38possible to acquire another business selling at 10 or so
- 1:34:41times earnings. They immediately applied pooling
- 1:34:44accounting to the acquisition, which with not a dime's worth of
- 1:34:48change in the underlying businesses, automatically
- 1:34:51increased per share earnings and used the rise as proof of
- 1:34:54managerial genius. They next explained to investors
- 1:34:58that this sort of talent justified the maintenance or
- 1:35:01even the enhancement of the acquire RSP multiple.
- 1:35:05And finally, they promised to endlessly repeat this procedure
- 1:35:09and thereby create ever increasing per share earnings.
- 1:35:12Wall Street's love affair with this hocus pocus intensified as
- 1:35:16the 1960 S rolled by the streets.
- 1:35:19Denizens are always ready to suspend disbelief when dubious
- 1:35:23maneuvers are used to manufacture rising per share
- 1:35:26earnings, particularly if these acrobatics produce mergers that
- 1:35:30generate huge fees for investment bankers.
- 1:35:33Auditors willingly sprinkled their holy water on the
- 1:35:36conglomerates accounting and sometimes even made suggestions
- 1:35:40as to how to further juice the numbers.
- 1:35:42For many, gushers of easy money washed away ethical
- 1:35:46sensitivities. Since the per share earnings
- 1:35:48gains of an expanding conglomerate came from
- 1:35:51exploiting PE differences, it's the CEO had to search for
- 1:35:55businesses selling at low multiples of earnings.
- 1:35:58These of course, were characteristically mediocre
- 1:36:01businesses with poor long term prospects.
- 1:36:04This incentive to bottom fish usually led to a conglomerates
- 1:36:08collection of underlying businesses becoming more and
- 1:36:11more junky. That mattered little to
- 1:36:13investors. It was deal velocity and pooling
- 1:36:16accounting they looked to for increased earnings.
- 1:36:19The resulting firestorm of merger activity was fanned by an
- 1:36:22adoring press. Companies such as ITT lit on
- 1:36:26industries, Gulf and Western and LTV were lionized, and their
- 1:36:31CEO's became celebrities. These once famous conglomerates
- 1:36:35are now long gone. As Yogi BRR has said, every
- 1:36:38Napoleon meets his Watergate. Back then, accounting
- 1:36:42shenanigans of all sorts, many of them ridiculously
- 1:36:45transparent, were excused or overlooked.
- 1:36:48Indeed, having an accounting wizard at the helm of an
- 1:36:51expanding conglomerate was viewed as a huge plus.
- 1:36:54Shareholders in those instances could be sure that reported
- 1:36:57earnings would never disappoint, no matter how bad the operating
- 1:37:01realities of the business might become.
- 1:37:04In the late 1960s, I attended a meeting at which an acquisitive
- 1:37:08CEO bragged of his bold, imaginative accounting.
- 1:37:12Most of the analysts listening responded with approving nods,
- 1:37:15seeing themselves as having found a manager whose forecasts
- 1:37:19were certain to be met, whatever the business results might be.
- 1:37:2229 Eventually, however, the clock struck 12 and everything
- 1:37:27turned to pumpkins and mice. Once again it became evident
- 1:37:31that business models based on the serial issuance as of
- 1:37:34overpriced shares just like chain letter models most
- 1:37:38assuredly redistribute wealth but in no way created both
- 1:37:42phenomena nevertheless periodically blossom in our
- 1:37:45country. They are every promoters dream
- 1:37:47though often they appear in a carefully crafted disguise.
- 1:37:51The ending is always the same. Money flows from the gullible to
- 1:37:55the fraudster and with stocks unlike chain letters, the sums
- 1:37:59hijacked can be staggering. At both BP Land Berkshire, we
- 1:38:02have never invested in companies that are hell bent in issuing
- 1:38:05shares. That behavior is one of the
- 1:38:08surest indicators of a promotion minded management, weak
- 1:38:11accounting, a stock that is overpriced and all too often
- 1:38:15outright dishonesty. So what do Charlie and I find so
- 1:38:19attractive about Berkshire's conglomerate structure?
- 1:38:21To put the case simply, if the conglomerate form is used
- 1:38:25judiciously, it is an ideal structure for maximizing long
- 1:38:29term capital growth. One of the heralded virtues of
- 1:38:32capitalism is that it efficiently allocates funds.
- 1:38:36The argument is that markets will direct investment to
- 1:38:39promising businesses and deny it to those destined to wither.
- 1:38:42That is true with all its excesses, market driven
- 1:38:46allocation of capital is usually far superior to any alternative.
- 1:38:50Nevertheless, there are often obstacles to the rational
- 1:38:54movement of capital, as those 1954 Berkshire Minutes made
- 1:38:58clear. Capital withdrawals within the
- 1:39:00textile industry that should have been obvious were delayed
- 1:39:03for decades because of the vain hopes and self-interest of
- 1:39:07management's. Indeed, I myself delayed
- 1:39:10abandoning hour obsolete textile mills for far too long.
- 1:39:14A CEO with capital employed in a declining operation seldom
- 1:39:18elects to massively redeploy that capital into unrelated
- 1:39:22activities. A move of that kind would
- 1:39:24usually require that long time associates be fired and mistakes
- 1:39:28be admitted. Moreover, it's unlikely that CEO
- 1:39:31would be the manager you would wish to handle the redeployment
- 1:39:34job, even if he or she was inclined to undertake it at the
- 1:39:38shareholder level. Taxes and frictional costs weigh
- 1:39:41heavily on individual investors when they attempt to reallocate
- 1:39:45capital among businesses and industries.
- 1:39:48Even tax free institutional investors face major costs as
- 1:39:52they move capital because they usually need intermediaries to
- 1:39:55do this job. A lot of mouths with expensive
- 1:39:58taste then clamor to be fed, among them investment bankers,
- 1:40:02accountants, consultants, lawyers and such capital real
- 1:40:06locator ass as leveraged buyout operators.
- 1:40:09Money shufflers don't come cheap.
- 1:40:11In contrast, a conglomerate such as Berkshire is perfectly
- 1:40:14positioned to allocate capital rationally and at minimal cost.
- 1:40:19Of course, form itself is no guarantee of success.
- 1:40:23We have made plenty of mistakes and we will make more.
- 1:40:26Our structural advantages, however, are formidable.
- 1:40:30At Berkshire we can, without incurring taxes or much in the
- 1:40:34way of other costs, move huge sums from businesses that have
- 1:40:37limited opportunities for incremental investment to other
- 1:40:40sectors with greater promise. Moreover, we are free of
- 1:40:44historical biases created by lifelong association with a
- 1:40:47given industry and are not subject to pressures from
- 1:40:51colleagues having a vested interest in maintaining the
- 1:40:53status quo. That's important.
- 1:40:55If horses had controlled investment decisions it would
- 1:40:59have been no auto industry 30. Another major advantage we
- 1:41:03possess is the ability to buy pieces of wonderful businesses
- 1:41:06AK common stocks. That's not a course of action
- 1:41:10open to most management as over our history this strategic
- 1:41:13alternative has proved to be very helpful.
- 1:41:17A broad range of options always sharpens decision making.
- 1:41:20The businesses we are offered by the stock market every day, in
- 1:41:24small pieces to be sure, are often far more attractive than
- 1:41:27the businesses we are concurrently being offered in
- 1:41:30their entirety. Additionally, the gains we've
- 1:41:33realized from marketable securities have helped us make
- 1:41:36certain large acquisitions that would otherwise have been beyond
- 1:41:39our financial capabilities. In effect, the world is
- 1:41:43Berkshires oyster, a world offering us a range of
- 1:41:46opportunities far beyond those realistically open to most
- 1:41:49companies. We are limited, of course, to
- 1:41:52businesses whose economic prospects we can evaluate, and
- 1:41:56that's a serious limitation. Charlie and I have no idea what
- 1:42:00a great many companies will look like 10 years from now, but that
- 1:42:04limitation is much smaller than that borne by an executive whose
- 1:42:08experience has been confined to a single industry.
- 1:42:11On top of that, we can profitably scale to a far larger
- 1:42:14size than the many businesses that are constrained by the
- 1:42:18limited potential of the single industry in which they operate.
- 1:42:21I mentioned earlier that See's candy had produced huge earnings
- 1:42:25compared to its modest capital requirements.
- 1:42:28We would have loved of course to intelligently use those funds to
- 1:42:32expand our candy operation, but our many attempts to do so we're
- 1:42:36largely futile. So without incurring tax
- 1:42:39inefficiencies or frictional costs, we have use the excess
- 1:42:43funds generated by CS to help purchase other businesses.
- 1:42:47If CS had remained a stand alone company, its earnings would have
- 1:42:50had to be distributed to investors to redeploy, sometimes
- 1:42:54after being heavily depleted by large taxes and almost always by
- 1:42:59significant frictional and agency costs.
- 1:43:02Berkshire has one further advantage that has become
- 1:43:05increasingly important over the years.
- 1:43:07We are now the home of choice for the owners and managers of
- 1:43:11many outstanding businesses. Families that own successful
- 1:43:14businesses have multiple options when they contemplate sale.
- 1:43:18Frequently the best decision is to do nothing.
- 1:43:21There are worse things in life than having a prosperous
- 1:43:23business that one understands well.
- 1:43:26But sitting tight is seldom recommended by Wall Street.
- 1:43:29Don't ask the Barber whether you need a haircut.
- 1:43:32When one part of a family wishes to sell while others wish to
- 1:43:35continue, a public offering often makes sense.
- 1:43:39But when owners wish to cash out entirely, they usually consider
- 1:43:43one of two paths. The first to sale to a
- 1:43:45competitor who is salivating at the possibility of ringing sign
- 1:43:49are geese from the combining of the two companies.
- 1:43:52This buyer invariably contemplates getting rid of
- 1:43:55large numbers of the sellers associates, the very people who
- 1:43:58have helped the owner build his business.
- 1:44:01A caring owner, however, in there are plenty of them,
- 1:44:04usually does not want to leave his long time associates.
- 1:44:06Sadly, singing the old country song.
- 1:44:09She got the gold mine, I got the shaft.
- 1:44:12The second choice for sellers is the Wall Street buyer.
- 1:44:15For some years, these purchasers accurately called themselves
- 1:44:19leveraged buyout firms when that term got a bad name in the early
- 1:44:231990s. Remember our junior and
- 1:44:26Barbarians at the gate? These buyers hastily relabeled
- 1:44:29them self Espervate equity. The name may have changed, but
- 1:44:32that was all. Equity is dramatically reduced
- 1:44:35and debt is piled on in virtually all private equity
- 1:44:39purchases. Indeed, the amount that a
- 1:44:41private equity purchaser offers to the seller is in part
- 1:44:45determined by the buyer assessing the maximum amount of
- 1:44:48debt that can be placed on the acquired company. 31 Later, if
- 1:44:52things go well and equity begins to build, leveraged buyout shops
- 1:44:56will often seek to releverage with new borrowing S.
- 1:45:00They then typically use part of the proceeds to pay a huge
- 1:45:03dividend that drives equity sharply downward, sometimes even
- 1:45:07to a negative figure. In truth, equity is a dirty word
- 1:45:11for many private equity buyers. What they love is debt, and
- 1:45:15because debt is currently so inexpensive, these buyers can
- 1:45:19frequently pay top dollar. Later, the business will be
- 1:45:22resold, often to another leveraged buyer.
- 1:45:26In effect, the business becomes a piece of merchandise.
- 1:45:29Berkshire offers a third choice to the business owner who wishes
- 1:45:32to sell a permanent home in which they, the company's people
- 1:45:36and culture will be retained, though occasionally management
- 1:45:39changes will be needed. Beyond that, any business we
- 1:45:43acquired dramatically increases its financial strength and
- 1:45:46ability to grow. It's days of dealing with banks
- 1:45:50and Wall Street analysts are also forever ended.
- 1:45:53Some sellers don't care about these matters, but when sellers
- 1:45:56do, Berkshire does not have a lot of competition.
- 1:46:00Sometimes pundits propose that Berkshire spin off certain of
- 1:46:03its businesses. These suggestions make no sense.
- 1:46:07Our companies are worth more as part of Berkshire than a
- 1:46:09separate entities. One reason is our ability to
- 1:46:13move funds between businesses or into new ventures instantly and
- 1:46:17without tax. In addition, certain costs
- 1:46:20duplicate themselves in full or part if operations are
- 1:46:24separated. Hey Race, the most obvious
- 1:46:26example, Berkshire incurs nominal costs for its single
- 1:46:30board of directors. There are dozens of subsidiaries
- 1:46:33to be split off. The overall cost for directors
- 1:46:36would soar, so two would regulatory and administration
- 1:46:41expenditures. Finally, there are sometimes
- 1:46:43important tax efficiencies for subsidiary A because we own
- 1:46:47subsidiary B4. Example, certain tax credits
- 1:46:51that are available to our utilities are currently
- 1:46:53realizable only because we generate huge amounts of taxable
- 1:46:58income at other Berkshire operations.
- 1:47:00That gives Berkshire Hathaway Energy a major advantage over
- 1:47:04most public utility companies in developing wind and solar
- 1:47:08projects. Investment bankers, being paid
- 1:47:11as they are for action, constantly urge acquire Rs to
- 1:47:14pay 20% to 50% premiums over market price for publicly held
- 1:47:19businesses. The bankers tell the buyer that
- 1:47:21the premium is justified for control value and for the
- 1:47:25wonderful things that are going to happen once the acquirer RSCO
- 1:47:28takes charge. What acquisition hungry manager
- 1:47:32will challenge that assertion? A few years later, bankers
- 1:47:35bearing straight faces again appear and just as earnestly
- 1:47:38urge spinning off the earlier acquisition in order to unlock
- 1:47:42shareholder value. Spin offs, of course, strip the
- 1:47:46owning company of its purported control value without any
- 1:47:49compensating payment. The bankers explain that the
- 1:47:52spun off company will flourish because it's management will be
- 1:47:55more entrepreneurial, having been freed from the smothering
- 1:47:59bureaucracy of the parent company.
- 1:48:01That SO much for that talented CEO we met earlier.
- 1:48:05If the divesting company later wishes to reacquire the spun off
- 1:48:08operation, it presumably would again be urged by its bankers to
- 1:48:12pay a hefty control premium for the privilege.
- 1:48:15Mental flexibility of this sort by the banking fraternity has
- 1:48:19prompted the saying that fees too often lead to transactions
- 1:48:23rather than transactions leading to fees.
- 1:48:26It's possible, of course, that someday a spin off or sale at
- 1:48:30Berkshire would be required by regulators.
- 1:48:32Berkshire carried out such a spin off in 1979 when new
- 1:48:36regulations for bank holding companies forced us to divest a
- 1:48:40bank we owned in Rockford, IL 32 voluntary spin offs though make
- 1:48:46no sense for us. We would lose control, value,
- 1:48:49capital allocation, flexibility and in some cases important tax
- 1:48:53advantages. The CEOs who brilliantly run our
- 1:48:56subsidiaries now would have difficulty in being as effective
- 1:49:00if running a spun off operation given the operating and
- 1:49:04financial advantages derived from Berkshire's ownership.
- 1:49:08Moreover, the parent and the spun off operations once
- 1:49:11separated would likely incur moderately greater costs than
- 1:49:15existed when they were combined. Before I depart the subject of
- 1:49:18spin offs, let's look at a lesson to be learned from a
- 1:49:21conglomerate mentioned earlier, LTV.
- 1:49:24They'll summarize here, but those who enjoy a good financial
- 1:49:27story should read the piece about Jimmy Ling that ran in the
- 1:49:31October 1982 issue of D magazine.
- 1:49:34Look it upon the Internet. Through a lot of corporate
- 1:49:37razzle dazzle, Ling had taken LTV from sales of only $36
- 1:49:41million in 1965 to #14 on the Fortune 500 list just two years
- 1:49:47later. Ling, it should be noted, had
- 1:49:50never displayed any managerial skills.
- 1:49:53What Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who
- 1:49:57overestimates himself, and Ling had no appear in that respect.
- 1:50:01Ling's strategy, which he labeled Project Redeployment,
- 1:50:04was to buy a large company and then partially spin off its
- 1:50:08various divisions. In Lt.
- 1:50:10VS 1966 Annual Report, he explained the magic that would
- 1:50:14follow. Most importantly, acquisitions
- 1:50:17must meet the test of the 2 + 2 = 5 or 6 formula.
- 1:50:21The press, the public and Wall Street love this sort of talk.
- 1:50:25In 1967, Ling bought Wilson and Company, a huge meat Packer that
- 1:50:30also had interest in golf equipment and pharmaceuticals.
- 1:50:33Soon after, he split the parent into three businesses, Wilson
- 1:50:38and Company Meatpacking, Wilson Sporting Goods, and Wilson
- 1:50:41Pharmaceuticals, each of which was to be partially spun off.
- 1:50:45These companies quickly became known on Wall Street as
- 1:50:48meatball, golf Ball, and Go of Ball.
- 1:50:51Soon thereafter, it became clear that, like Icarus, Ling had
- 1:50:55flown too close to the sun. By the early 1970s, Ling's
- 1:50:59empire was melting and he himself had been spun off from
- 1:51:03LTV. That is fired periodically.
- 1:51:06Financial markets will become divorced from reality.
- 1:51:09You can count on that. More Jimmy Ling S will appear.
- 1:51:13They will look and sound authoritative.
- 1:51:15The press will hang on their every word.
- 1:51:17Bankers will fight for their business.
- 1:51:19What they are saying will recently have worked.
- 1:51:22Their early followers will be feeling very clever.
- 1:51:25Our suggestion? Whatever their line, never
- 1:51:28forget that 22 will always equal 4.
- 1:51:31And when someone tells you how old fashioned that math is, zip
- 1:51:34up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to
- 1:51:38buy stocks at cheap prices. Today, Berkshire possesses one
- 1:51:42an unmatched collection of businesses, most of them now
- 1:51:45enjoying favorable economic prospects to a cadre of
- 1:51:49outstanding managers who, with few exceptions, are unusually
- 1:51:53devoted to both the subsidiary they operate and to Berkshire.
- 1:51:57Three, an extraordinary diversity of earnings, premier
- 1:52:00financial strength and oceans of liquidity that we will maintain
- 1:52:04under all circumstances for a first choice ranking among many
- 1:52:08owners and managers who are contemplating sale of their
- 1:52:11businesses. And five, in a point related to
- 1:52:14that preceding item. Now culture distinctive in many
- 1:52:17ways from that of most large companies that we have worked 50
- 1:52:21years to develop and that is now rock solid.
- 1:52:24These strengths provide USA wonderful foundation on which to
- 1:52:28build 33 the next 50 years at Berkshire.
- 1:52:31Now let's take a look at the road ahead.
- 1:52:33Bear in mind that if I had attempted 50 years ago to gauge
- 1:52:36what was coming, certain of my predictions would have been far
- 1:52:40off the mark. With that warning, I will tell
- 1:52:43you what I would say to my family today if they asked me
- 1:52:46about Berkshire's future. 1st and definitely foremost, I
- 1:52:49believe that the chance of permanent capital loss for
- 1:52:52patient Berkshire shareholders is as low as can be found among
- 1:52:56single company investments. That's because our per share
- 1:52:59intrinsic business value is almost certain to advance over
- 1:53:03time. This cheery prediction comes,
- 1:53:05however, with an important caution.
- 1:53:08If an investor's entry point into Berkshire stock is
- 1:53:11unusually high at a price, say approaching double book value,
- 1:53:15which Berkshire shares have occasionally reached, it may
- 1:53:18well be many years before the investor can realize a profit.
- 1:53:22In other words, a sound investment can morph into a rash
- 1:53:25speculation if it is bought at an elevated price.
- 1:53:29Berkshire is not exempt from this truth.
- 1:53:31Purchases of Berkshire that investors make at a price
- 1:53:34modestly above the level at which the company would
- 1:53:37repurchase its shares, however, should produce gains within a
- 1:53:41reasonable period of time. Berkshires directors will only
- 1:53:45authorize repurchase S at a price they believe to be well
- 1:53:48below intrinsic value. In our view, that is an
- 1:53:52essential criterion for repurchase S that is often
- 1:53:55ignored by other management S. For those investors who plan to
- 1:53:59sell within a year or two after their purchase, I can offer no
- 1:54:02assurances whatever. The entry price movements of the
- 1:54:06general stock market during such abbreviated periods will likely
- 1:54:10be far more important in determining your results than
- 1:54:13the concomitant change in the intrinsic value of your
- 1:54:16Berkshire shares. As Ben Graham said many decades
- 1:54:19ago, in the short term the market is a voting machine.
- 1:54:23In the long run, it acts as a weighing machine.
- 1:54:25Occasionally, the voting decisions of investors, amateurs
- 1:54:29and professionals alike border on lunacy.
- 1:54:32Since I know of no way to reliably predict market
- 1:54:34movements, I recommend that you purchase Berkshire shares only
- 1:54:38if you expect to hold them for at least five years.
- 1:54:41Those who seek short term profits should look elsewhere.
- 1:54:44Another warning, Berkshire shares should not be purchased
- 1:54:47with borrowed money. There have been three times
- 1:54:50since 1965 when our stock has fallen about 50% from its high
- 1:54:54point. Someday, something close to this
- 1:54:56kind of drop will happen again, and no one knows when.
- 1:55:00Berkshire will almost certainly be a satisfactory holding for
- 1:55:03investors, but it could well be a disastrous choice for
- 1:55:06speculators employing leverage. I believe the chance of any
- 1:55:10event causing Berkshire to experience financial problems is
- 1:55:14essentially 0. We will always be prepared for
- 1:55:17the thousand year flood. In fact, if it occurs we will be
- 1:55:20selling life jackets to the unprepared.
- 1:55:23Berkshire played an important role as a first responder during
- 1:55:26the 2008 to 2009 meltdown and we have since more than doubled the
- 1:55:31strength of our balance sheet and our earnings potential.
- 1:55:35Your company is the Gibraltar of American business and will
- 1:55:38remain so. Financial staying power requires
- 1:55:41a company to maintain 3 strengths under all
- 1:55:44circumstances, 1A large and reliable stream of earnings, 2
- 1:55:48massive liquid assets and three no significant near term cash
- 1:55:53requirements. Ignoring that last necessity is
- 1:55:56what usually leads companies to experience unexpected problems.
- 1:56:00Too often, CEOs of profitable companies feel they will always
- 1:56:04be able to refund maturing obligations, however large these
- 1:56:08are. In 2008 to 2009, many management
- 1:56:12nests learn how perilous that mindset can be.
- 1:56:15Here show we will always stand on the three essentials.
- 1:56:18First, our earnings stream is huge and comes from a vast array
- 1:56:22of businesses. Our shareholders now own many
- 1:56:25large companies that have durable competitive advantages,
- 1:56:29and we will acquire more of those in the future.
- 1:56:31Our diversification assures Berkshires continued
- 1:56:35profitability even if a catastrophe causes insurance
- 1:56:38losses that far exceed any previously experienced 34.
- 1:56:43Next up is cash. At a healthy business, cash is
- 1:56:46sometimes thought of as something to be minimized.
- 1:56:49Dawson unproductive asset that acts as a dragon such markers as
- 1:56:53return on equity. Cash, though, is to a business
- 1:56:56ass. Oxygen is to an individual never
- 1:56:59thought about when it is present, the only thing in mind
- 1:57:02when it is absent. American Business provided a
- 1:57:05case study of that in 2008. In September of that year, many
- 1:57:09long, prosperous companies suddenly wondered whether their
- 1:57:12checks would bounce in the days ahead.
- 1:57:15Overnight, their financial oxygen disappeared.
- 1:57:18At Berkshire, our breathing went uninterrupted.
- 1:57:21Indeed, in a three-week period spanning late September and
- 1:57:25early October, we supplied $15.6 billion of fresh money to
- 1:57:30American businesses. We could do that because we
- 1:57:33always maintain at least $20 billion and usually far more in
- 1:57:37cash equivalents. And by that we mean you S
- 1:57:41Treasury bills, not other substitutes for cash that are
- 1:57:44claimed to deliver liquidity and actually do so except when it is
- 1:57:49truly needed. When bills come due, only cash
- 1:57:52is legal tender. Don't leave home without it.
- 1:57:55Finally, getting to our Third Point, we will never engage in
- 1:57:58operating or investment practices that can result in
- 1:58:01sudden demands for large sums. That means we will not expose
- 1:58:05Berkshire to short term debt maturities of size nor enter
- 1:58:09into derivative contracts or other business arrangements that
- 1:58:12could require large collateral calls.
- 1:58:15Some years ago we became a party to certain derivative contracts
- 1:58:18that we believed were significantly mispriced and that
- 1:58:22had only minor collateral requirements.
- 1:58:24These have proved to be quite profitable.
- 1:58:26Recently, however, newly written derivative contracts have
- 1:58:30required full collateralization, and that ended our interest in
- 1:58:34derivatives, regardless of what profit potential they might
- 1:58:37offer. We have not for some years
- 1:58:40written these contracts, except for a few needed for operational
- 1:58:43purposes at Tory utility businesses.
- 1:58:46Moreover, we will not write insurance contracts that give
- 1:58:49policyholders the right to cash out at their option.
- 1:58:52Many life insurance products contain redemption features that
- 1:58:55make them susceptible to a run in times of extreme panic.
- 1:58:59Contracts of that sort, however, do not exist in the property
- 1:59:03casualty world that we inhabit. If our premium volume should
- 1:59:08shrink, our float would decline, but only at a very slow pace.
- 1:59:12The reason for our conservatism, which may impress some people as
- 1:59:15extreme, is that it is entirely predictable that people will
- 1:59:19occasionally panic, but not at all predictable when this will
- 1:59:22happen. Though practically all days are
- 1:59:25relatively uneventful, tomorrow is always uncertain that I felt
- 1:59:30no special apprehension on December 6th, 1941 or September
- 1:59:3410th, 2001. And if you can't predict what
- 1:59:37tomorrow will bring, you must be prepared for whatever it does.
- 1:59:41Aceo, who is 64 and plans to retire at 65, may have his own
- 1:59:46special calculus in evaluating risks that have only a tiny
- 1:59:50chance of happening in a given year.
- 1:59:52He may, in fact, be right 99% of the time.
- 1:59:56Those odds, however, hold no appeal for us.
- 2:00:00We will never play financial Russian roulette with the funds
- 2:00:02you've entrusted to us, even if the metaphorical gun has 100
- 2:00:07chambers and only one bullet. In our view, it is madness to
- 2:00:11risk losing what you need and pursuing what you simply desire.
- 2:00:15Despite our conservatism, I think we will be able every year
- 2:00:19to build the underlying per share earning power of
- 2:00:21Berkshire. That does not mean operating
- 2:00:23earnings will increase each year.
- 2:00:25Far from it. The US economy will ebb and
- 2:00:29flow, though mostly flow in. When it weakens, so will our
- 2:00:32current earnings. But we will continue to achieve
- 2:00:35organic gains, make bolt on acquisitions and enter new
- 2:00:39fields. I believe therefore that
- 2:00:42Berkshire will annually add to its underlying earning power.
- 2:00:45In some years the gains will be substantial and at other times
- 2:00:49they will be minor markets. Competition and chance will
- 2:00:52determine when opportunities come our way.
- 2:00:55Through it all, Berkshire will keep moving forward, powered by
- 2:00:58the array of solid businesses we now possess and the new
- 2:01:02companies we will purchase in most years.
- 2:01:05Moreover, our country's economy will provide a strong tailwind
- 2:01:09for business. We are blessed to have the
- 2:01:11United States as our home field. 35 The bad news is that
- 2:01:16Berkshires long term gains, measured by percentages, not by
- 2:01:19dollars, cannot be dramatic and will not come close to those
- 2:01:23achieved in the past 50 years. The numbers have become too big.
- 2:01:27I think Berkshire will outperform the average American
- 2:01:29company, but our advantage, if any, won't be great.
- 2:01:34Eventually, probably between 10 and 20 years from now,
- 2:01:37Berkshire's earnings and capital resources will reach a level
- 2:01:40that will not allow management to intelligently reinvest all of
- 2:01:44the company's earnings. At that time, our directors will
- 2:01:47need to determine whether the best method to distribute the
- 2:01:50excess earnings is through dividends, share repurchase S,
- 2:01:55or both. If Berkshire shares are selling
- 2:01:57below intrinsic business value, massive repurchase S will almost
- 2:02:01certainly be the best choice. You can be comfortable that your
- 2:02:05directors will make the right decision.
- 2:02:07No company will be more shareholder minded than
- 2:02:09Berkshire. For more than 30 years, we have
- 2:02:12annually reaffirmed our shareholder principles.
- 2:02:15See page 117. Always leading off with although
- 2:02:19our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.
- 2:02:23This covenant with you is etched in stone.
- 2:02:26We have an extraordinarily knowledgeable and business
- 2:02:29oriented board of directors ready to carry out that promise
- 2:02:32of partnership. None took the job for the money.
- 2:02:35In an arrangement almost non existent elsewhere, our
- 2:02:38directors are paid only token fees.
- 2:02:41They receive their rewards instead through ownership of
- 2:02:44Berkshire Shares and the satisfaction that comes from
- 2:02:47being good stewards of an important enterprise.
- 2:02:50The shares that they and their families own, which in many
- 2:02:53cases are worth very substantial sums worth purchased in the
- 2:02:57market rather than their materializing through options or
- 2:03:00grants. In addition, unlike almost all
- 2:03:04other sizable public companies, we carry no directors and
- 2:03:07officers liability insurance at Berkshire Directors.
- 2:03:11Walk in your shoes. To further ensure continuation
- 2:03:14of our culture, I have suggested that my son Howard succeed me as
- 2:03:19an on Executive Chairman. My only reason for this wish is
- 2:03:22to make change easier. If the wrong CEO should ever be
- 2:03:26employed and there occurs a need for the Chairman to move
- 2:03:29forcefully, I can assure you that this problem has a very low
- 2:03:33probability of arising at Berkshire, likely as slow as at
- 2:03:36any public company. In my service on the boards of
- 2:03:4019 public companies, however, I've seen how hard it is to
- 2:03:43replace a mediocre CEO. If that person is also chairman,
- 2:03:48the deed usually gets done, but almost always very late.
- 2:03:51If elected, Howard will receive no pay and will spend no time at
- 2:03:55the job other than that required of all directors.
- 2:03:59He will simply be a safety valve to whom many director can go if
- 2:04:02he or she has concerns about the CEO and wishes to learn if other
- 2:04:06directors are expressing doubts as well.
- 2:04:08Should multiple directors be apprehensive, Howard's
- 2:04:12chairmanship will allow the matter to be promptly and
- 2:04:15properly addressed. Choosing the right CEO is all
- 2:04:18important and is a subject that commands much time at Berkshire
- 2:04:21board meetings. Managing Berkshire is primarily
- 2:04:25a job of capital allocation coupled with the selection and
- 2:04:29retention of outstanding managers to captain our
- 2:04:32operating subsidiaries. Obviously, the job also requires
- 2:04:36the replacement of a subsidiary CEO when that is called for.
- 2:04:40These duties require Berkshire CEO to BA rational a Tom and
- 2:04:45decisive individual who has a broad understanding of business
- 2:04:48and good insights into human behavior.
- 2:04:51It's important as well that he knows his limits to AS Tom
- 2:04:54Watson, senior of IBM, said. I am no genius, but IMS Martin
- 2:04:59spots and I stay around those spots.
- 2:05:02Character is crucial. A Berkshire CEO must be all in
- 2:05:05for the company, not for himself.
- 2:05:08Amusing mail pronouns to avoid awkward wording, but gender
- 2:05:12should never decide who becomes CEO.
- 2:05:14He can't help but earn money far in excess of any possible need
- 2:05:18for it, but it's important that neither ego nor avarice motivate
- 2:05:22him to reach for pay matching his most lavishly compensated
- 2:05:26peers, even if his achievements far exceed there.
- 2:05:29As a CEO's behavior has a huge impact on managers down the
- 2:05:33line. If it's clear to them that
- 2:05:36shareholders interests are paramount to him, they will,
- 2:05:39with few exceptions, also embrace that way of thinking. 36
- 2:05:44My successor will need one other particular strength, the ability
- 2:05:48to fight off the Abcs of business decay, which are
- 2:05:52arrogance, bureaucracy and complacency.
- 2:05:55When these corporate cancers metastasize, even they strongest
- 2:05:59of companies can falter. The examples available to prove
- 2:06:02the point are legion. But to maintain friendships, I
- 2:06:05will exhume only cases from the distant past in their glory
- 2:06:09days. General Motors, IBM, Sears,
- 2:06:12Roebuck and US Steel S at a top huge industries.
- 2:06:17Their strengths seemed unassailable, but the
- 2:06:20destructive behavior I deplored above eventually LED each of
- 2:06:23them to fall to depths that their CE OS and directors had
- 2:06:27not long before thought impossible.
- 2:06:29Their one time financial strength and their historical
- 2:06:32earning power proved no defense. Only a vigilant and determined
- 2:06:36CEO can ward off such debilitating forces as Berkshire
- 2:06:40Gross ever larger. He must never forget Charlie's
- 2:06:44plea. Tell me where I'm going to die.
- 2:06:46So we'll never go there. If our non economic values were
- 2:06:49to be lost, much of Berkshire's economic value would collapse as
- 2:06:53well. Tone at the top will be key to
- 2:06:56maintaining Berkshire's special culture.
- 2:06:58Fortunately, the structure our future CE OS will need to be
- 2:07:01successful is firmly in place. The extraordinary delegation of
- 2:07:06authority now existing at Berkshire is the ideal antidote
- 2:07:10to bureaucracy. In an operating sense, Berkshire
- 2:07:13is not a giant company but rather a collection of large
- 2:07:16companies at headquarters. We have never had a committee,
- 2:07:20nor have we ever required our subsidiaries to submit budgets,
- 2:07:23though many use them as an important internal tool.
- 2:07:27We don't have a legal office, nor departments that other
- 2:07:29companies take for granted. Human Relations, public
- 2:07:33relations, investor relations, strategy, acquisitions, you name
- 2:07:38it. We do, of course, have an active
- 2:07:40audit function. No sense being a damned fool.
- 2:07:43To an unusual degree, however, we trust our managers to run
- 2:07:47their operations with a keen sense of stewardship.
- 2:07:50After all, they were doing exactly that before we acquired
- 2:07:53their businesses, with only occasional exceptions.
- 2:07:56Furthermore, our trust produces better results than would be
- 2:08:00achieved by streams of directives, endless reviews and
- 2:08:04layers of bureaucracy. Charlie and I try to interact
- 2:08:07with our managers in a manner consistent with what we would
- 2:08:10wish for if the positions were reversed.
- 2:08:13Our directors believe that our future CEOs should come from
- 2:08:16internal candidates whom the Berkshire board has grown to
- 2:08:19know well. Our directors also believe that
- 2:08:22an incoming CEO should be relatively young so that he or
- 2:08:26she can have a long run in the job.
- 2:08:28Berkshire will operate best if its CEOs average well over 10
- 2:08:32years at the helm. It's hard to teach a new dog old
- 2:08:34tricks, and they are not likely to retire at 65 either.
- 2:08:39Have you noticed in both Berkshires business acquisitions
- 2:08:42and large tailored investment moves, it is important that our
- 2:08:46counterparties be both familiar with and feel comfortable with
- 2:08:49Berkshire CEO. Developing confidence of that
- 2:08:53sort and cementing relationships takes time.
- 2:08:56The payoff though can be huge. Both the board and I believe we
- 2:08:59now have the right person to succeed me as CEO, a successor
- 2:09:03ready to assume the job the day after I die or step down.
- 2:09:07In certain important respects, this person will do a better job
- 2:09:11than I am doing. Investments will always be of
- 2:09:14great importance to Berkshire and will be handled by several
- 2:09:17specialists. They will report to the CEO
- 2:09:19because their investment decisions in a Broadway will
- 2:09:23need to be coordinated with Berkshire's operating and
- 2:09:26acquisition programs. Overall, though, our investment
- 2:09:30managers will enjoy great autonomy in this area too.
- 2:09:34We are in fine shape for decades to come, Taught Combs and Ted We
- 2:09:39S Siehler, each of whom has spent several years on
- 2:09:42Berkshire's investment team, are first rate in all respects and
- 2:09:46can be a particular help to the CEO in evaluating acquisitions.
- 2:09:50All told, Berkshire is ideally positioned for life after
- 2:09:53Charlie and I leave the scene. We have the right people in
- 2:09:57place, the right directors, managers and prospective
- 2:10:00successors to those managers. Our culture furthermore is
- 2:10:04embedded throughout their ranks. Our system is also regenerative
- 2:10:08to a large degree. Both good and bad cultures self
- 2:10:12select to perpetuate themselves for very good reasons.
- 2:10:15Business owners and operating managers with values similar to
- 2:10:19ours will continue to be attracted to Berkshire as a
- 2:10:22one-of-a-kind and permanent home. 37 I would be remiss if I
- 2:10:26didn't salute another key constituency that makes
- 2:10:29Berkshire special, our shareholders.
- 2:10:32Berkshire truly has an owner base unlike that of any other
- 2:10:35giant corporation. That fact was demonstrated in
- 2:10:39spades at last year's annual meeting where the shareholders
- 2:10:42were offered a proxy resolution resolve.
- 2:10:45Whereas the corporation has more money than it needs.
- 2:10:48And since the owners, unlike Warren, are not multi
- 2:10:51billionaires, the board's hall consider paying a meaningful
- 2:10:55annual dividend on the shares. The sponsoring shareholder of
- 2:10:59that resolution never showed up at the meeting, so his motion
- 2:11:02was not officially proposed. Nevertheless, the proxy votes
- 2:11:06had been tallied, and they were enlightening.
- 2:11:09Not surprisingly, the A shares owned by relatively few
- 2:11:12shareholders, each with a large economic interest, voted no on
- 2:11:16the dividend question by a margin of 89 to 1.
- 2:11:20The remarkable vote was that of RB shareholders.
- 2:11:23They number in the hundreds of thousands, perhaps even
- 2:11:26totalling 1,000,000, and they voted 660759855 no and 13927026
- 2:11:35yes, a ratio of about 47 to one. Our directors recommended a no
- 2:11:40vote, but the company did not otherwise attempt to influence
- 2:11:44shareholders. Nevertheless, 98% of the shares
- 2:11:47voting said in effect, don't send USA dividend, but instead
- 2:11:52reinvest all of the earnings. To have our fellow owners, large
- 2:11:56and small, be so In Sync with our managerial philosophy is
- 2:12:00both remarkable and rewarding. I am a lucky fellow to have you
- 2:12:04as partners. Warren E Buffett, 38, Vice
- 2:12:08Chairman's Thoughts, Past and future to the shareholders of
- 2:12:11Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated. I closely watched the 50 year
- 2:12:15history of Berkshire's uncommon success under Warren Buffett,
- 2:12:19and it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement
- 2:12:23whatever celebratory comment comes from him.
- 2:12:25I will try to do 5 things. One described the management
- 2:12:28system and policies that caused a small and unfixed ably doomed
- 2:12:33commodity textile business to Morphin to the mighty Berkshire
- 2:12:36that now exists. To explain how the management
- 2:12:39system and policies came into being.
- 2:12:42Three, explain to some extent why Berkshire did so well for
- 2:12:46predict whether abnormally good results would continue if
- 2:12:49Buffett were soon to depart. And five, consider whether
- 2:12:52Berkshire's great results over the last 50 years have
- 2:12:55implications that may prove useful elsewhere.
- 2:12:58The management system and policies of Berkshire under
- 2:13:01Buffett here in together called the Berkshire system, were fixed
- 2:13:05early and are described below. 1 Berkshire would be a diffuse
- 2:13:08conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could
- 2:13:12not make useful predictions to. Its top company would do almost
- 2:13:16all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries, whose
- 2:13:20CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy. 3 There would
- 2:13:24be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except
- 2:13:27a tiny office suite containing a chairman, a CFO and a few
- 2:13:32assistants who mostly help the CFO with auditing, internal
- 2:13:35control, etcetera. 4 Berkshire subsidiaries would always
- 2:13:39prominently include casualty insurers.
- 2:13:42Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce in due
- 2:13:46course dependable underwriting gains while also producing
- 2:13:50substantial flow from unpaid insurance liabilities for
- 2:13:53investment. 5 There would be no significant system wide
- 2:13:56personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system,
- 2:14:00retirement system or the like because the subsidiaries would
- 2:14:04have their own systems, often different. 6 Berkshires chairman
- 2:14:08would reserve only a few activities for himself I.
- 2:14:11He would manage almost all security investments with these
- 2:14:15normally residing in Berkshires casualty insurers. 2 He would
- 2:14:19choose all CE OS of important subsidiaries and he would fix
- 2:14:23their compensation and obtain from each a private
- 2:14:26recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.
- 2:14:30Three, he would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after
- 2:14:34they had increased their competitive advantage, with the
- 2:14:37ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new
- 2:14:40subsidiaries. For he would make himself
- 2:14:42promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any
- 2:14:46subsidiaries CEO, and he would require almost no additional
- 2:14:50contact. V He would write a long, logical
- 2:14:54and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed
- 2:14:57as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder,
- 2:15:01and he would be available for hours of answering questions at
- 2:15:05annual shareholders meetings. Six, he would try to be an
- 2:15:08exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers,
- 2:15:11shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time both
- 2:15:15before and after his departure. 7 His first priority would be
- 2:15:19reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking,
- 2:15:22particularly that which might advance his determined learning,
- 2:15:26no matter how old he became, and 39 eight He would also spend
- 2:15:31much time and enthusiastically admiring what others were
- 2:15:34accomplishing. 7 New subsidiaries would usually be
- 2:15:37bought with cash, not newly issued stock. 8 Berkshire would
- 2:15:41not pay dividends so long as more than $1.00 of market value
- 2:15:45for shareholders was being created by each dollar of
- 2:15:48retained earnings. 9 In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would
- 2:15:52seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the chairman
- 2:15:56could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good
- 2:15:59CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to
- 2:16:03manage well without need for help from headquarters. 10 In
- 2:16:07choosing CEO's of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure
- 2:16:11trustworthiness, skill, energy and love for the business and
- 2:16:15circumstances the CEO was in. 11 As an important matter of
- 2:16:19preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a
- 2:16:22subsidiary. 12 Berkshire would almost never transfer a
- 2:16:26subsidiary CEO to another unrelated subsidiary. 13
- 2:16:30Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on
- 2:16:34account of mere age. 14 Berkshire would have little debt
- 2:16:37outstanding as it tried to maintain a virtually perfect
- 2:16:41creditworthiness under all conditions and easy availability
- 2:16:45of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting
- 2:16:48unusual opportunities. 15 Berkshire would always be user
- 2:16:52friendly to a prospective seller of a large business.
- 2:16:56An offer of such a business would get prompt attention.
- 2:16:59No one but the chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would
- 2:17:02ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction
- 2:17:06and they would never tell outsiders about it.
- 2:17:08Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their
- 2:17:11collected size are quite unusual.
- 2:17:12Unusual. No other large corporation I
- 2:17:15know of has half of such elements in place.
- 2:17:17How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so
- 2:17:20different from the norm? Well, Buffett, even when only 34
- 2:17:25years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire's shares and was
- 2:17:29completely trusted by all the other big shareholders.
- 2:17:32He could install whatever system he wanted, and he did so,
- 2:17:36creating the Berkshire system. Almost every element was chosen
- 2:17:40because Buffett believed that under him it would help maximize
- 2:17:43Berkshire's achievement. He was not trying to create a
- 2:17:46one type fits all system for other corporations.
- 2:17:50Indeed, Berkshire's subsidiaries were not required to use the
- 2:17:54Berkshire system in their own operations and some flourished
- 2:17:57while using different systems. What was Buffett aiming at as he
- 2:18:01designed the Berkshire system? Well, over the years I diagnosed
- 2:18:05several important themes. One, he particularly wanted
- 2:18:08continuous maximization of the rationality, skills and devotion
- 2:18:12of the most important people in the system, starting with
- 2:18:15himself. Two, he wanted win win results
- 2:18:18everywhere in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance. 3 He
- 2:18:22wanted decisions that maximized long term results, seeking these
- 2:18:26from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to
- 2:18:30bear the consequences of decisions, for he wanted to
- 2:18:33minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come
- 2:18:36from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.
- 2:18:39Five He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben
- 2:18:42Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained when Buffett developed
- 2:18:46the Berkshire system. Did he foresee all the benefits
- 2:18:49that followed? No Buffett stumbled into some
- 2:18:52benefits through practice evolution, but when he saw
- 2:18:55useful consequences, he strengthened their causes. 40
- 2:19:00Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well?
- 2:19:02Only four large factors occur Tone 1 The constructive
- 2:19:05peculiarities of Buffett 2 The constructive peculiarities of
- 2:19:09the Berkshire system 3 Good luck.
- 2:19:11And for the weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some
- 2:19:15shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press, I
- 2:19:20believe all four factors were present and helpful.
- 2:19:23But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive
- 2:19:26peculiarities, the weird devotion and their interactions.
- 2:19:30In particular, Buffett's decision to limit his activities
- 2:19:33to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to
- 2:19:37keep doing so for 50 years, was a Lollapalooza.
- 2:19:40Buffett succeeded for the same reason Rodger Federer became
- 2:19:43good at tennis. Buffett was, in effect, using
- 2:19:47the winning method of the famous basketball coach John Wooden,
- 2:19:51who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually
- 2:19:55all playing time to his seven best players.
- 2:19:58That way, opponents always faced his best players instead of his
- 2:20:02second best, and with the extra playing time, the best players
- 2:20:06improved more than was normal. And Buffett much out wouldn't.
- 2:20:09Ed wouldn't, because in his case the exercise of skill was
- 2:20:13concentrated in one person, not 7.
- 2:20:15And his skill improved and improved as he got older and
- 2:20:19older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill
- 2:20:22of a basketball player does. Moreover, by concentrating so
- 2:20:26much power and authority in the often long serving CE OS of
- 2:20:30important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong wooden
- 2:20:34type effects there, and such effects enhance the skills of
- 2:20:37the CE OS and the achievements of the subsidiaries.
- 2:20:40Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much desired autonomy
- 2:20:44on many subsidiaries and their CE OS and Berkshire became
- 2:20:48successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and
- 2:20:52better subsidiaries into Berkshire and better CE OS as
- 2:20:56well. And the better subsidiaries and
- 2:20:58CE OS then required less attention from headquarters,
- 2:21:01creating what is often called a virtuous circle.
- 2:21:05How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include
- 2:21:07casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?
- 2:21:11Marvelously well. Berkshire's ambitions were
- 2:21:13unreasonably extreme, and Even so, it got what it wanted.
- 2:21:18Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value
- 2:21:21amounting roughly to their shareholders equity, as did
- 2:21:25Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries.
- 2:21:28And the S&P 500 index produced about 10% per annum pre tax
- 2:21:33during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.
- 2:21:37And in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks
- 2:21:40within Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries greatly
- 2:21:43outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected.
- 2:21:47And later, when both the large size of Berkshire's stock
- 2:21:51holdings and income tax considerations caused the index
- 2:21:54beating part of returns to fade to insignificance, perhaps not
- 2:21:59forever. Other and better advantage came
- 2:22:02AJ and Jane, created out of nothing an immense reinsurance,
- 2:22:06a business that produced both a huge float and a large
- 2:22:09underwriting game. And all of GEICO came into
- 2:22:11Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of Geico's market
- 2:22:14share and the rest of Berkshire's insurance operations
- 2:22:17hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage,
- 2:22:22underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches,
- 2:22:26and recruiting and holding outstanding people. 41 Then
- 2:22:30later, as Berkshire's nearly unique and quite dependable
- 2:22:34corporate personality and large size became well known, it's
- 2:22:38insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive
- 2:22:41opportunities not available to others to buy privately issued
- 2:22:46securities. Most of these securities had
- 2:22:48fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.
- 2:22:52Berkshire's marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural
- 2:22:55result. Ordinarily, A casualty insurance
- 2:22:58business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very
- 2:23:02well managed, and such results are of little use.
- 2:23:05Berkshire's better outcome was so astoundingly large that I
- 2:23:09believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he
- 2:23:12returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and
- 2:23:15regaining his youth. Did Berkshire suffer from being
- 2:23:18a diffuse conglomerate? No.
- 2:23:21Its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for
- 2:23:25operation, and bad effects common elsewhere were prevented
- 2:23:29by Buffett's skills. Why did Berkshire prefer to buy
- 2:23:31companies with cash instead of its own stock?
- 2:23:34Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for
- 2:23:37Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.
- 2:23:41Why did Berkshire's acquisition of companies outside the
- 2:23:43insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders
- 2:23:47when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for
- 2:23:51shareholders of the acquirer? Well, Berkshire by design had
- 2:23:55methodological advantages to supplement it's better
- 2:23:58opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a
- 2:24:01department of acquisitions under pressure to buy, and it never
- 2:24:04relied on advice from helpers sure to be prejudice in favor of
- 2:24:08transactions. And Buffett held self delusion
- 2:24:11at Bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better
- 2:24:15than most corporate executives what worked and what didn't in
- 2:24:17business, aided by his long experience as a passive
- 2:24:21investor. And finally, even when Berkshire
- 2:24:24was getting much better opportunities than most others,
- 2:24:28Buffett often displayed almost in human patients and seldom
- 2:24:31bought. For instance, during his first
- 2:24:34ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one
- 2:24:37business, Dextals, move close to death and two new businesses
- 2:24:41come in for a net gain of one. What were the big mistakes made
- 2:24:44by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of
- 2:24:47Commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not
- 2:24:51making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock.
- 2:24:54When that was sure to work out enormously well.
- 2:24:57The errors of omission were of much importance.
- 2:25:00Berkshire's net worth would now beat least $50 billion higher if
- 2:25:04it had seized several opportunities it was not quite
- 2:25:07smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.
- 2:25:11The next to last task on my list was to predict whether
- 2:25:14abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett
- 2:25:17we're soon to depart. The answer is yes.
- 2:25:20Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business
- 2:25:23momentum grounded and much durable competitive advantage.
- 2:25:27Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide
- 2:25:31much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed
- 2:25:35assets, and many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise
- 2:25:39bolt on acquisitions provided that most of the Berkshire
- 2:25:42system remains in place. The combined momentum and
- 2:25:46opportunity now present is so great that Berkshire would
- 2:25:49almost surely remain a better than normal company for a very
- 2:25:52long time, even if one, Buffett left tomorrow to his successors
- 2:25:57were persons of only moderate ability and three, Berkshire
- 2:26:00never again purchased a large business.
- 2:26:03But under this Buffett soon leaves assumption his successors
- 2:26:07would not be of only moderate ability.
- 2:26:09For instance, AJ and Jane and Greg Abel are proven performers
- 2:26:14who would probably be under described as world class.
- 2:26:17World leading would be the description I would choose.
- 2:26:20In some important ways, each is a Better Business executive than
- 2:26:24Buffett, and I believe neither Jane nor Abel would one leave
- 2:26:27Berkshire, no matter what someone else offered, or to
- 2:26:30desire much change in the Berkshire system. 42 Nor would
- 2:26:35Oy think that desirable purchases of new businesses
- 2:26:38would end with Buffett's departure.
- 2:26:40With Berkshire now so large in the age of activism upon us, I
- 2:26:44think some desirable acquisition opportunities will come in that
- 2:26:48Berkshire's $60 billion in cash will constructively decrease.
- 2:26:53My final task was to consider whether Berkshire's great
- 2:26:55results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove
- 2:27:00useful elsewhere. The answer is plainly yes.
- 2:27:02In its early Buffett years, Berkshire had a big task ahead,
- 2:27:06turning a tiny stash into a large and useful company.
- 2:27:10And it solved that problem by avoiding bureaucracy and relying
- 2:27:14much on one thoughtful leader for a long, long time, as he
- 2:27:18kept improving and brought in more people like himself.
- 2:27:21Compare this to a typical big corporation system with much
- 2:27:25bureaucracy at headquarters and a long succession of CEO's who
- 2:27:29come in at about age 59, pause little thereafter for quiet
- 2:27:33thought, and are soon forced out by a fixed retirement age.
- 2:27:37I believe that versions of the Berkshire system should be tried
- 2:27:40more often elsewhere, and at the worst, attributes of bureaucracy
- 2:27:44should much more often be treated like the cancers they so
- 2:27:47much resemble. A good example of bureaucracy
- 2:27:50fixing was created by George Marshall when he helped win
- 2:27:53World War 2 by getting from Congress the right to ignore
- 2:27:57seniority and choosing generals. Sincerely, Charles T and Munger.