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Was the Moon Landing Fake? The Truth Behind the Conspiracy · The Infographics Show Podcast

• 0:10
  Speaker 1: Welcome to beyond infographics. Hey there, This is where we
• 0:14
  Speaker 1: take a whole stack of information, reports, papers, all that
• 0:19
  Speaker 1: dense stuff and really dig in.
• 0:21
  Speaker 2: We try to find the most important bits, the surprising
• 0:24
  Speaker 2: things you might miss just looking at a summary.
• 0:26
  Speaker 1: Exactly, we go beyond the headlines, and today we're tackling
• 0:30
  Speaker 1: something truly monumental, the Apollo eleven mission.
• 0:35
  Speaker 2: But not just the famous pictures. We've got our hands
• 0:37
  Speaker 2: on the official post mission report.
• 0:39
  Speaker 1: Right this incredibly detailed document that lays out what actually
• 0:44
  Speaker 1: happened technically operationally.
• 0:46
  Speaker 2: Yeah, this thing was put together back in November sixty nine,
• 0:48
  Speaker 2: and it covers well everything the flight path, what the
• 0:52
  Speaker 2: crew did minute by minute, their health, how the spacecraft.
• 0:55
  Speaker 1: Performed, and crucially all the little things that went wrong,
• 0:57
  Speaker 1: the anomalies.
• 0:58
  Speaker 2: It's the raw engineering and science story behind the history
• 1:01
  Speaker 2: we think we know.
• 1:02
  Speaker 1: The main goal stated right there in the report was
• 1:04
  Speaker 1: pretty straightforward, wasn't it.
• 1:06
  Speaker 2: Land two men on the Moon, get them back safe
• 1:08
  Speaker 2: before the decade?
• 1:09
  Speaker 1: Was out simple as that, which they did. Obviously, So
• 1:12
  Speaker 1: our mission for you listening is to go deeper than
• 1:16
  Speaker 1: just they did it.
• 1:17
  Speaker 2: We want to unpack the how the successes, sure, but
• 1:20
  Speaker 2: also the challenges, the workarounds, the stuff you only see
• 1:24
  Speaker 2: when you look at the operational nitty gritty.
• 1:26
  Speaker 1: Okay, let's get into it.
• 1:27
  Speaker 2: Let's do it.
• 1:27
  Speaker 1: So mission accomplished, landing, safe return. But what does the
• 1:32
  Speaker 1: report specifically highlight as the key achievements on the surface itself? Yeah,
• 1:37
  Speaker 1: beyond just you know, planting the flag.
• 1:39
  Speaker 2: Well, it calls out a few critical things. First, getting
• 1:42
  Speaker 2: those three basic experiment packages set up. That was huge. Second,
• 1:47
  Speaker 2: collecting the leanar samples, rocks, soil, the core. Tub's incredibly important.
• 1:51
  Speaker 1: Science, right the moon rocks.
• 1:53
  Speaker 2: And third taking all those photos not just snapshots, but
• 1:57
  Speaker 2: like systematic documentation of the landing site, the geology. What
• 2:00
  Speaker 2: they were doing these.
• 2:01
  Speaker 1: Experiments, they were part of something called ESP Early Apollo
• 2:05
  Speaker 1: Scientific Experiment Package.
• 2:07
  Speaker 2: That's it designed specifically for this first landing. The report
• 2:10
  Speaker 2: lists them out.
• 2:11
  Speaker 1: What were they tim Yeah, let's.
• 2:13
  Speaker 2: See, there's the passive seismic experiment at zero three to one,
• 2:17
  Speaker 2: lunar field geology that was a zero five to nine geology. Okay,
• 2:21
  Speaker 2: the laser ranging retro reflector S zero seven eight, the
• 2:24
  Speaker 2: mirror they left, ah yes, solar wind composition S zero
• 2:28
  Speaker 2: eighty and cosmic rate detection s one fifty one.
• 2:30
  Speaker 1: That's quite a lot of science for the very first
• 2:33
  Speaker 1: trip out. Did it all go perfectly smoothly?
• 2:35
  Speaker 2: The report says the main objective landing in return totally met,
• 2:40
  Speaker 2: and then it says secondary objectives and experiments were quote
• 2:44
  Speaker 2: largely satisfied.
• 2:45
  Speaker 1: Largely satisfied. Okay, so not perfectly right.
• 2:48
  Speaker 2: It mentions specific exceptions, like they didn't get all the
• 2:51
  Speaker 2: plan documented geology samples, mostly because they were running short
• 2:55
  Speaker 2: on time, makes sense, and they didn't pinpoint the LM's
• 2:58
  Speaker 2: exact location from orbit quite as accurately as they had hoped.
• 3:01
  Speaker 2: But fundamentally the experiments got deployed, samples came back success
• 3:05
  Speaker 2: largely satisfied.
• 3:07
  Speaker 1: That phrase really captures the reality of complex operations, doesn't
• 3:10
  Speaker 1: It Plans meet reality?
• 3:12
  Speaker 2: It really does. And that precision that need to adapt
• 3:15
  Speaker 2: started way before landing, right from the trip there. The
• 3:18
  Speaker 2: trajectory analysis getting to the Moon that was intense. How
• 3:22
  Speaker 2: did they track that well up until the command module
• 3:26
  Speaker 2: separated from the big SIVB rocket stage. It was based
• 3:30
  Speaker 2: on data from Marshall Space Flight Center and the manned
• 3:33
  Speaker 2: space flight network, you know, the tracking stations all over
• 3:36
  Speaker 2: the world, So.
• 3:37
  Speaker 1: Ground control was watching like hawks from the start constantly.
• 3:41
  Speaker 2: Then once they were coasting towards the Moon, the analysis
• 3:44
  Speaker 2: used what the report calls the best estimated trajectory that
• 3:48
  Speaker 2: was figured out after the mission using all the tracking
• 3:51
  Speaker 2: data they'd gathered, a sort of reconstruction.
• 3:53
  Speaker 1: And the report gets super technical describing the path latitude, longitude,
• 3:58
  Speaker 1: altitude relative to the landing site, velocity vectors, the whole
• 4:02
  Speaker 1: nine yards.
• 4:02
  Speaker 2: Oh yeah, it's pure orbital mechanics. And within that journey
• 4:06
  Speaker 2: they had these specific mid course navigation periods times set
• 4:10
  Speaker 2: aside for the crew to use the onboard systems to
• 4:12
  Speaker 2: check and correct their path.
• 4:13
  Speaker 1: Using the spacecraft computer. What was it? P twenty three?
• 4:16
  Speaker 2: P twenty three, that's the one, the command module's navigation program.
• 4:20
  Speaker 2: They did two main navigation sessions described in.
• 4:23
  Speaker 1: The report, Right, when were those?
• 4:24
  Speaker 2: First one was about six hours in maybe thirty thousand
• 4:28
  Speaker 2: miles out. The main idea was to calibrate the optics
• 4:32
  Speaker 2: by sighting stars against the Earth's horizon.
• 4:35
  Speaker 1: Wait, like sailors using a sextant seriously.
• 4:38
  Speaker 2: Kind of the space sextant. Yeah, they measured angles, fed
• 4:42
  Speaker 2: them to the computer. But this first session it actually
• 4:46
  Speaker 2: caused some problems used up extra time and fuel.
• 4:49
  Speaker 1: Oh why was that? What happened?
• 4:52
  Speaker 2: They ran into difficulties. They tried using gimbal angles for
• 4:55
  Speaker 2: the navigation platform that were supplied by the ground instead
• 4:58
  Speaker 2: of letting the computer figure out the best orientation.
• 5:00
  Speaker 1: Why do it that way?
• 5:01
  Speaker 2: Well, the computer's preferred angles sometimes pointed the sexton or
• 5:04
  Speaker 2: telescope where the lunar module docked right there might block
• 5:07
  Speaker 2: the view, so the ground angles were meant to avoid that.
• 5:10
  Speaker 1: Okay, makes sense, but these.
• 5:11
  Speaker 2: Ground angles weren't quite precise enough. It made it really
• 5:14
  Speaker 2: hard to get the sexton's alignment marks. The radical pattern
• 5:17
  Speaker 2: lined up perfectly parallel with the horizon.
• 5:20
  Speaker 1: Ah, so they had to wiggle the whole spacecraft around
• 5:22
  Speaker 1: more than planned, burning fuel just to get a good
• 5:25
  Speaker 1: site line.
• 5:25
  Speaker 2: Exactly a practical hiccup. The second NAF period was about
• 5:29
  Speaker 2: twenty four hours out, and that one was more focused
• 5:32
  Speaker 2: on nailing down any tiny errors or biases in the
• 5:36
  Speaker 2: optical system itself.
• 5:37
  Speaker 1: And the report lists the stars They used rager Atria
• 5:40
  Speaker 1: all those it a whole catalog. Men can't Alfeca, Vega, nunkey.
• 5:46
  Speaker 1: These were their fixed points in space, the references for
• 5:49
  Speaker 1: those critical measurements to tell the computer exactly where they
• 5:51
  Speaker 1: were and how the guidance platform was aligned.
• 5:54
  Speaker 2: Amazing, Okay, let's jump ahead the rendezvous after they lifted
• 5:59
  Speaker 2: off the Moon back up with the command module. The
• 6:01
  Speaker 2: report covers that too.
• 6:02
  Speaker 1: Oh yeah, in detail, the LM's rendezvous radar was key there. Yeah,
• 6:06
  Speaker 1: after they got into lunar orbit, that radar predicted their
• 6:09
  Speaker 1: lowest point the Parasynthian would be around fifty thousand feet altitude. Okay,
• 6:13
  Speaker 1: And interestingly, the landing point designator in the command module
• 6:16
  Speaker 1: which Collins was using, gave a very similar figure about
• 6:19
  Speaker 1: fifty two thousand feet.
• 6:20
  Speaker 2: So two different systems cross checking each other. That must
• 6:23
  Speaker 2: have felt good, definitely reassuring. They also did a solar
• 6:27
  Speaker 2: sighting with the telescope once they were in orbit. The
• 6:30
  Speaker 2: report says the alignment was well within the Gono go
• 6:33
  Speaker 2: limit like zero point twenty five degrees off. Showed the
• 6:36
  Speaker 2: platform was performing.
• 6:37
  Speaker 1: Beautifully credible precision.
• 6:39
  Speaker 2: They even noted a tiny correction needed for the telescope's
• 6:42
  Speaker 2: alignment like point zero seven degrees shows the level they
• 6:45
  Speaker 2: were working.
• 6:46
  Speaker 1: At mind boggling. So getting ready for the final burn
• 6:49
  Speaker 1: to actually meet.
• 6:50
  Speaker 2: Up right the terminal phase initiation burn that involved more
• 6:53
  Speaker 2: navigation updates, recycling the computer a few times to get
• 6:57
  Speaker 2: refined calculations. They started the final computation for that burn
• 7:01
  Speaker 2: about twelve minutes beforehand.
• 7:03
  Speaker 1: And did it ignite exactly when calculated.
• 7:05
  Speaker 2: The final calculation actually pushed the ignition times slightly later
• 7:09
  Speaker 2: than the initial plan by about six minutes and thirty
• 7:12
  Speaker 2: nine seconds. It wasn't a delay, just the computer refining
• 7:14
  Speaker 2: the optimal time based on the latest data.
• 7:17
  Speaker 1: Adapting on the fly, and once they came around from
• 7:19
  Speaker 1: the backside of the Moon.
• 7:21
  Speaker 2: When they got signaled back, the report says they were
• 7:23
  Speaker 2: flying information setting up for docking. The crew called the
• 7:26
  Speaker 2: rendezvous nominal went as planned, needed just a couple of
• 7:30
  Speaker 2: small correction burns.
• 7:31
  Speaker 1: How small tiny.
• 7:33
  Speaker 2: Less than one foot per second delta V for the first,
• 7:36
  Speaker 2: about one point five feet per second for the second.
• 7:39
  Speaker 2: Then they used braking thrust to ease into station keeping
• 7:42
  Speaker 2: range before docking.
• 7:43
  Speaker 1: Sounds smooth, but docking in lunar orbit that's still incredibly.
• 7:48
  Speaker 2: Complible, absolutely a delicate dance. The report even has tables
• 7:52
  Speaker 2: showing the exact velocity changes needed. Reading about all this
• 7:56
  Speaker 2: precision the star sites the computer burn it gives you
• 8:01
  Speaker 2: a whole new respect for just getting there and back.
• 8:03
  Speaker 1: It really does. And you know, if you're finding this
• 8:06
  Speaker 1: level of detail as fascinating as we do, maybe take
• 8:08
  Speaker 1: a second to give Beyond Infographics a five stars rating.
• 8:11
  Speaker 1: It really helps other people find the show.
• 8:13
  Speaker 2: Yeah, we'd appreciate that.
• 8:14
  Speaker 1: Okay. The main event landing on the Moon. The report
• 8:18
  Speaker 1: breaks down that final descent moment by moment.
• 8:21
  Speaker 2: Step by step, landing radar on altitude cow outs fifty
• 8:26
  Speaker 2: thousand feet descent, engine ignition, hitting that fixed throttle point,
• 8:31
  Speaker 2: getting confirmation the radar data was good for the computer
• 8:34
  Speaker 2: and the.
• 8:35
  Speaker 1: Alarms, the famous twelve ozho to twelve oh one alarms.
• 8:38
  Speaker 2: Yep, they're in the timeline. When they started popping up
• 8:41
  Speaker 2: signaling the computer was getting overloaded, and it notes the
• 8:44
  Speaker 2: crew had to manually enable the radar updates, basically tell
• 8:47
  Speaker 2: the computer, hey, ignore the overload, focus on this landing
• 8:49
  Speaker 2: data while.
• 8:50
  Speaker 1: Trying to fly the thing that sequences legendary but Armstrong
• 8:54
  Speaker 1: took over manually, right, it wasn't all automated.
• 8:56
  Speaker 2: Correct. The report pinpoints it around six hundred feet up.
• 8:59
  Speaker 2: He's switched from automatic guidance to attitude hold that gave
• 9:02
  Speaker 2: him direct control over pitch roll.
• 9:04
  Speaker 1: Yaw, why what did he do with that control?
• 9:07
  Speaker 2: He manually pitched the LM more upright, increased the flightpath angle.
• 9:11
  Speaker 2: This wasn't just for show. The report calls it range extension.
• 9:14
  Speaker 2: He was slowing their forward speed to fly over a
• 9:17
  Speaker 2: field of boulders the automatic system was aiming for.
• 9:19
  Speaker 1: He was actively dodging rocks, selecting a better spot in
• 9:23
  Speaker 1: real time. Incredible skill.
• 9:25
  Speaker 2: Absolutely highlights the pilot in the loop. Then around four
• 9:29
  Speaker 2: hundred feet he went into rate of descent mode for
• 9:32
  Speaker 2: finer control of the vertical speed. The report confirms his
• 9:36
  Speaker 2: manual inputs guided them about eleven hundred feet further downrange
• 9:39
  Speaker 2: than the original computer target.
• 9:41
  Speaker 1: Eleven hundred feet. That's a significant etour all crew controlled.
• 9:45
  Speaker 1: The report also compares altitude readings from different systems during descent.
• 9:49
  Speaker 2: Yeah, it shows the primary guidance which used the landing
• 9:52
  Speaker 2: radar versus the backup abort guidance system, and also the
• 9:56
  Speaker 2: tracking data from Earth. You can see the abort systems
• 9:59
  Speaker 2: out altitude drifting away from the primary because it wasn't
• 10:02
  Speaker 2: getting those radar updates. It was just using its inertial platform.
• 10:05
  Speaker 1: Until they manually fed it the primary system's altitude, the
• 10:08
  Speaker 1: report says, shows why you have backups and need the
• 10:11
  Speaker 1: crew monitoring everything totally.
• 10:12
  Speaker 2: And for the real tech heads listening, the report has
• 10:14
  Speaker 2: this cool graph showing the communications signal quality during landing oh.
• 10:18
  Speaker 1: Right, bit error rate, word rate, sink issues.
• 10:21
  Speaker 2: It's basically a live feed of how well the signal
• 10:24
  Speaker 2: was getting back to Earth during those critical moments. You
• 10:26
  Speaker 2: see tiny fluctuations, but overall rock solid, concrete data showing
• 10:31
  Speaker 2: that vital link held up.
• 10:32
  Speaker 1: Wow. From computers calculating trajectories, to alarms flashing, manual piloting
• 10:39
  Speaker 1: and the signal holding the landing was this amazing mix
• 10:43
  Speaker 1: of tech and human skill.
• 10:45
  Speaker 2: And this report captures the technical reality behind that iconic
• 10:49
  Speaker 2: eagle has landed moment.
• 10:50
  Speaker 1: So they're down safe. Next up the moonwalk the EVA.
• 10:55
  Speaker 1: The report notes they actually went out earlier than planned.
• 10:58
  Speaker 2: It does the original schedule had a period right after landing,
• 11:01
  Speaker 2: but the crew, well, they felt pretty good adjusted to
• 11:04
  Speaker 2: the sixteenth gravity, quickly, felt rested from the trip, and
• 11:07
  Speaker 2: the post landing checklist inside the LM went smoothly, so.
• 11:10
  Speaker 1: They basically said we're good to go.
• 11:12
  Speaker 2: Pretty much the decision to start the EVA prep early
• 11:15
  Speaker 2: came about one hundred and four hours forty minutes into
• 11:18
  Speaker 2: the mission. Shows the flexibility they had and the crew's
• 11:21
  Speaker 2: confidence in their condition.
• 11:22
  Speaker 1: That's a neat insight. What about challenges once they were
• 11:25
  Speaker 1: on the surface, The report mentioned some.
• 11:27
  Speaker 2: Yeah, like collecting the bulk sample. It took way longer
• 11:30
  Speaker 2: than they expected, partly because the mesa table the work
• 11:33
  Speaker 2: bench outside the LM was in deep shadow, hard to
• 11:37
  Speaker 2: see right.
• 11:38
  Speaker 1: Working in the dark is never easy.
• 11:39
  Speaker 2: Plus, they were trying to grab samples away from the
• 11:42
  Speaker 2: LM's engine exhaust to avoid contamination. And they wanted to
• 11:46
  Speaker 2: get a decent sized rock in each bag, which wasn't
• 11:48
  Speaker 2: always easy to find or scoop, and just scooping the
• 11:51
  Speaker 2: loose stuff it kept wanting to fly out of the scoop.
• 11:55
  Speaker 2: Reports says it took about twenty tries just to fill
• 11:57
  Speaker 2: the one bulk sample box.
• 11:59
  Speaker 1: Twenty scoops. Wow. Definitely not like digging at the beach.
• 12:03
  Speaker 2: Not at all. The report also has great observations about
• 12:06
  Speaker 2: just moving around. Crew felt cool, comfortable in the suits,
• 12:09
  Speaker 2: led mission plannets to think maybe more strenuous tasks were possible.
• 12:12
  Speaker 1: Later on testing the limits.
• 12:14
  Speaker 2: Yeah, Armstrong reported feeling some exertion carrying the sample box back.
• 12:18
  Speaker 2: It was heavy, but he definitely wasn't maxed out physically, and.
• 12:21
  Speaker 1: Getting back in the LM that ladder always looked awkward.
• 12:25
  Speaker 2: Report says ingress was problem free. They actually used the
• 12:29
  Speaker 2: low gravity. Armstrong did a deep knee bend and sort
• 12:33
  Speaker 2: of jumped, guiding his feet to land on the third.
• 12:35
  Speaker 1: Rung up he jumped onto the ladder. That's amazing.
• 12:38
  Speaker 2: Report says their movements were slow enough that they could
• 12:41
  Speaker 2: place their feet carefully after the jump. It does mention
• 12:44
  Speaker 2: the ladder was a bit slippery from moondust on their boots,
• 12:47
  Speaker 2: but not dangerously so.
• 12:49
  Speaker 1: How did the backpacks the life support systems hold up?
• 12:52
  Speaker 2: The PLSS backpack and the OPS backup system were worn comfortably.
• 12:57
  Speaker 2: Data showed performance matched the ground simulation pretty well. One
• 13:01
  Speaker 2: interesting tidbit the cooling system feed water pressure was slightly
• 13:05
  Speaker 2: higher on the Moon. Why the report thinks it was
• 13:08
  Speaker 2: the lower gravity affecting the water head. Basically, how the
• 13:11
  Speaker 2: weight of the water column behaved in the system a
• 13:14
  Speaker 2: subtle sixteen gem effect.
• 13:15
  Speaker 1: Even the cooling felt the difference exactly.
• 13:17
  Speaker 2: Cooling overall was actually better than expected. And fascinatingly, the
• 13:21
  Speaker 2: temperature differences between Armstrong and Aldron matched their personal preferences
• 13:25
  Speaker 2: seen in simulations. They could tweak a diverter valve for comfort.
• 13:29
  Speaker 1: Custom cooling and mobility balance. Could they move okay?
• 13:35
  Speaker 2: Reports as mobility and balance were good enough for stable movement.
• 13:38
  Speaker 2: Algin demonstrated walking, running, turning, stopping easily. He did note
• 13:42
  Speaker 2: a tendency to tip backward a bit in soft spots,
• 13:45
  Speaker 2: had to compensate for the backpack center of mass shift.
• 13:48
  Speaker 1: Could they bend down work near the ground.
• 13:50
  Speaker 2: Yep, they could kneel to pick things up. Kneeling was
• 13:53
  Speaker 2: considered a normal way to work. They did suggest more
• 13:56
  Speaker 2: waste flexibility in future suits would help them get closer
• 13:58
  Speaker 2: to the ground and seed downward better.
• 14:00
  Speaker 1: So a bit stiff around the middle. What about just
• 14:03
  Speaker 1: seeing things? Any visibility issues?
• 14:05
  Speaker 2: Visor reflections were a problem, especially when the sun was
• 14:09
  Speaker 2: off to the side about ninety degrees made it hard
• 14:12
  Speaker 2: to see into shadows. Moving between bright sun and deep
• 14:15
  Speaker 2: shadow constantly required eye adaptation. Time reports suggests maybe little
• 14:19
  Speaker 2: blinders on the visor could have helped.
• 14:21
  Speaker 1: Simple fix Maybe and they documented everything constantly, Oh.
• 14:25
  Speaker 2: Yeah, detailed descriptions, tons of photos with those Hasselblood cameras
• 14:29
  Speaker 2: and of course the TV camera sending back those fuzzy
• 14:31
  Speaker 2: but live images.
• 14:33
  Speaker 1: The world was watching. How did the report sum up
• 14:36
  Speaker 1: the success of the.
• 14:36
  Speaker 2: EVA called the surface activities totally successful. Objectives accomplished except
• 14:42
  Speaker 2: for getting every single planned, documented sample. As we said,
• 14:46
  Speaker 2: the core bulk contingency samples were collected, but time ran
• 14:50
  Speaker 2: out for some specialized containers that needed more careful.
• 14:53
  Speaker 1: Handling pragmatic choice given the clock yeh, and the TV
• 14:57
  Speaker 1: camera deployment that was rushed too.
• 14:59
  Speaker 2: Report notes the timeline gave minimal time for unpacking it,
• 15:02
  Speaker 2: changing the lens, setting up the tripod, moving it away
• 15:05
  Speaker 2: from the lm aiming it. Plus they squeezed in unplanned
• 15:08
  Speaker 2: stuff too. It was an incredibly packed EDA.
• 15:10
  Speaker 1: Busy guys, and if you're finding this level of detail fascinating,
• 15:14
  Speaker 1: please do you think about giving beyond infographics that five
• 15:17
  Speaker 1: stars rating. It really does help us keep digging into
• 15:19
  Speaker 1: this stuff for you.
• 15:20
  Speaker 2: Yeah, definitely appreciated.
• 15:22
  Speaker 1: Okay. Moving from the cruise actions to the moon itself,
• 15:25
  Speaker 1: the report has observations about the surface, the samples, geological stuff.
• 15:30
  Speaker 1: What did they see right where they landed the footpads?
• 15:33
  Speaker 2: Yeah, the footpads gave immediate clues. The only sank in
• 15:35
  Speaker 2: about two to five centimeters less than two inches.
• 15:38
  Speaker 1: Not very deep.
• 15:38
  Speaker 2: No, they saw what the contact probes underneath had dragged
• 15:42
  Speaker 2: a bit, and the front pad had pushed some material
• 15:44
  Speaker 2: aside bulldozing. As they settled, you.
• 15:46
  Speaker 1: Could see the landing marks yep.
• 15:48
  Speaker 2: But importantly no big spray of material thrown out from
• 15:52
  Speaker 2: under the pads. The pressure was low, maybe one or
• 15:55
  Speaker 2: two psi per pad spread the weight well.
• 15:58
  Speaker 1: What was the surface material like right there?
• 16:00
  Speaker 2: Report describes the top few centimeters as brownish gray, slightly cohesive,
• 16:05
  Speaker 2: granular like silt to find sand, and scattered around were
• 16:10
  Speaker 2: rocks angular to subranded up to a meter across, some
• 16:14
  Speaker 2: just sitting there, some partly buried.
• 16:17
  Speaker 1: So not smooth sand, but rocky, dusty ground pretty much.
• 16:21
  Speaker 2: The top layer, maybe five to twenty centimeters deep, was
• 16:24
  Speaker 2: relatively soft, easy to scoop, didn't offer much resistance or
• 16:28
  Speaker 2: support for tools stuck in.
• 16:29
  Speaker 1: It soft on top, but below that.
• 16:31
  Speaker 2: Resistance increased significantly right probably because the material got denser
• 16:35
  Speaker 2: deeper down, not necessarily hitting solid rock everywhere.
• 16:38
  Speaker 1: Just how their tools went in told them something about
• 16:40
  Speaker 1: the layering the samples they brought back. The report details
• 16:43
  Speaker 1: those it.
• 16:44
  Speaker 2: Does the contingency sample, the quick grab just in case,
• 16:47
  Speaker 2: was taken right near the LM in view of the camera.
• 16:50
  Speaker 2: Two scoops about a kilogram had little rock bits they
• 16:54
  Speaker 2: could see from the.
• 16:54
  Speaker 1: Wind Van insurance policy sample exactly.
• 16:57
  Speaker 2: Then the bulk sample where Armstrong pushed the scoop handle
• 17:00
  Speaker 2: maybe fifteen twenty centimeters down, took those seventeen or eighteen scoops,
• 17:05
  Speaker 2: many seen on.
• 17:06
  Speaker 1: TV documenting the collection.
• 17:07
  Speaker 2: Crucial and two core tubes were hammered in near the
• 17:11
  Speaker 2: solar wind experiment. The first one's location was well documented
• 17:14
  Speaker 2: with photos and TV, second one nearby.
• 17:17
  Speaker 1: Crew reported those cores showed the layers the history right there.
• 17:20
  Speaker 2: Absolutely vital and an interesting observation. During liftoff from the Moon,
• 17:26
  Speaker 2: no visible signs of the ground eroding from the ascent
• 17:29
  Speaker 2: engine blast.
• 17:30
  Speaker 1: Really i'd expect a crater.
• 17:31
  Speaker 2: Apparently not, but insulation that ripped off the descent stage
• 17:35
  Speaker 2: was seen getting blown outwards on long paths, sort of
• 17:38
  Speaker 2: like dust. Wood crew saw it flying for miles.
• 17:41
  Speaker 1: So not enough forced to dig a hole, but enough
• 17:43
  Speaker 1: to send light debris flying.
• 17:44
  Speaker 2: Huh. A subtle but specific observation about the engine's interaction
• 17:48
  Speaker 2: with the surface.
• 17:49
  Speaker 1: The report also covers the science experiments. They deployed the seismometer.
• 17:54
  Speaker 2: Right the passive seismic experiment as zero three one. It
• 17:57
  Speaker 2: includes a graph of the background's ismc noise it picked up.
• 18:01
  Speaker 1: What did it hear was the moon shaking?
• 18:04
  Speaker 2: Well? Initially it heard the astronauts moving around the LM
• 18:07
  Speaker 2: venting gas lots of noise, but that died down completely
• 18:11
  Speaker 2: after about eight days. After that, the background rumble was
• 18:14
  Speaker 2: incredibly low, near one hurtz. It was less than point
• 18:18
  Speaker 2: three milimicrons, basically just the instrument's own noise, So.
• 18:21
  Speaker 1: The moon at least there was super quiet seismically.
• 18:25
  Speaker 2: Extremely although during the EVA when they were walking and working,
• 18:28
  Speaker 2: it picked up signals up to one point two microns
• 18:31
  Speaker 2: at seven eighthurtz. It could literally feel their footsteps.
• 18:34
  Speaker 1: Wow. Could it tell the difference between footsteps and moonquakes? Yeah.
• 18:37
  Speaker 2: The report mentions different types of signals actual seismic events,
• 18:41
  Speaker 2: tidal forces tugging on the Moon, and signals hitting different
• 18:44
  Speaker 2: sensors at the same time indicating local disturbances like.
• 18:47
  Speaker 1: The crew amazing sensitivity. What about the other experiments The
• 18:49
  Speaker 1: laser reflector.
• 18:51
  Speaker 2: S zero seven eight The laser ranging retro Reflector YEP
• 18:55
  Speaker 2: successfully deployed. That's the mirror array. Earth based lasers still
• 18:59
  Speaker 2: bounce signals off today for incredibly precise.
• 19:02
  Speaker 1: Distance measurements, simple but brilliant.
• 19:04
  Speaker 2: And the Solar Wind Composition Experiment AS zero eighty. That
• 19:08
  Speaker 2: was the sheet of foil they unrolled to catch particles
• 19:10
  Speaker 2: from the solar wind, rolled it back up, brought it
• 19:13
  Speaker 2: home for analysis. Report notes The core samples were taken
• 19:16
  Speaker 2: near where it was set.
• 19:17
  Speaker 1: Up, catching space weathers samples essentially.
• 19:20
  Speaker 2: And finally lunar field geology S zero five nine. That
• 19:23
  Speaker 2: was mainly about collecting the samples using the tools scoop, tongs, hammer,
• 19:28
  Speaker 2: the gnomen for scale and photos. As mentioned, they got
• 19:30
  Speaker 2: great samples, but didn't complete every single planned documented collection
• 19:34
  Speaker 2: task due to time.
• 19:35
  Speaker 1: Right science goals met, but practicalities adjusted the specific exactly.
• 19:39
  Speaker 2: They learned a ton about doing field science and suits
• 19:42
  Speaker 2: on the.
• 19:42
  Speaker 1: Moon okay, shifting gears beyond the hardware and rocks, the
• 19:46
  Speaker 1: human side, the biomedical aspect, and that intense quarantine afterward.
• 19:51
  Speaker 1: The report covers this extensively.
• 19:53
  Speaker 2: One really interesting point was about sleep. The crew felt
• 19:57
  Speaker 2: like they slept less than the biomedical data actually.
• 20:00
  Speaker 1: Showed, so the sensors said they got more rest than
• 20:02
  Speaker 1: they perceived.
• 20:03
  Speaker 2: That's what the report suggests. It does say they slept
• 20:07
  Speaker 2: well in the command module during the trip there and
• 20:09
  Speaker 2: arrived on the moon well rested, which backs up their
• 20:12
  Speaker 2: decision to do the EVA early.
• 20:14
  Speaker 1: Okay, so data and feeling aligned on being ready yep.
• 20:18
  Speaker 1: But sleep on the LM itself was minimal.
• 20:21
  Speaker 2: Yeah, reports as minimal. Sleep in the LM probably cramped, noisy,
• 20:25
  Speaker 2: maybe just the excitement makes sense.
• 20:27
  Speaker 1: And coming home, yeah, the quarantine procedures were intense, right,
• 20:31
  Speaker 1: fear of moon germs totally.
• 20:33
  Speaker 2: They had no idea what they might bring back. So
• 20:35
  Speaker 2: right after splashdown, swimmers passed biological isolation garments big suits
• 20:40
  Speaker 2: into the capsule for the crew to put on before
• 20:41
  Speaker 2: coming out.
• 20:42
  Speaker 1: Sealed up immediately yep.
• 20:43
  Speaker 2: Then a helicopter to the USS Hornet and straight into
• 20:47
  Speaker 2: the Mobile Quarantine Facility the MQF. That trailer parked on
• 20:50
  Speaker 2: the ship. Crew and the rock boxes went in there.
• 20:53
  Speaker 1: That converted airstream, that's the.
• 20:54
  Speaker 2: One, a rolling isolation ward kept them sealed until they
• 20:58
  Speaker 2: got to the Lunar Receiving Lab to LURL in Houston.
• 21:01
  Speaker 2: The command module itself was brought aboard the Hornet about
• 21:04
  Speaker 2: three hours later, also handled carefully.
• 21:06
  Speaker 1: The report tracks that whole isolation journey step.
• 21:09
  Speaker 2: By step, helicopter to MQF on the ship MQF flown
• 21:12
  Speaker 2: by cargo plane to Houston, MQF hooked up to the LURL.
• 21:17
  Speaker 2: Report stresses the transfer of crew samples and the capsule
• 21:20
  Speaker 2: into the LURL happened exactly as planned quote without any
• 21:23
  Speaker 2: question of a quarantine violation.
• 21:25
  Speaker 1: Zero tolerance for contamination. Did they find anything any space bugs?
• 21:29
  Speaker 2: The report is definitive. No. Twenty people were exposed one
• 21:33
  Speaker 2: way or another inside the quarantine zone for five to
• 21:35
  Speaker 2: eighteen days, daily medical checks, lab tests. Absolutely no signs
• 21:40
  Speaker 2: or symptoms of any infectious disease related to lunar exposure
• 21:43
  Speaker 2: were found in anyone.
• 21:44
  Speaker 1: Huge relief globally, no Andromeda strain exactly.
• 21:47
  Speaker 2: The report even includes a timeline of the key quarantine
• 21:50
  Speaker 2: events MQF offloaded capsule, safe and complete arrival dates and
• 21:54
  Speaker 2: times at the LRL. It just underscores how incredibly methodical
• 21:57
  Speaker 2: they were about that potential biohazard.
• 21:59
  Speaker 1: Which thankful wasn't there. And again, if you find this
• 22:02
  Speaker 1: meticulous detail and the real story compelling. Please do take
• 22:06
  Speaker 1: a second to rate Beyond Infographics five stars. It really
• 22:09
  Speaker 1: helps others discover these deep dives.
• 22:11
  Speaker 2: We appreciate it.
• 22:12
  Speaker 1: Okay, now for maybe the most revealing part for understanding
• 22:15
  Speaker 1: the mission's reality, the spacecraft system's performance, and specifically the anomalies,
• 22:23
  Speaker 1: the glitches, the unexpected stuff.
• 22:25
  Speaker 2: Right, because no complex machine is perfect, especially not the
• 22:28
  Speaker 2: first time out. The report lists quite a few interesting
• 22:31
  Speaker 2: ones like water management, gas bubbles and the drinking water
• 22:35
  Speaker 2: were annoying on earlier flights.
• 22:37
  Speaker 1: Like drinking flat, bubbly water in space. Yeah, not great.
• 22:40
  Speaker 2: So Apollo eleven had these new dual membrane separators on
• 22:44
  Speaker 2: the water gun and food prep outlets. Report says they
• 22:47
  Speaker 2: worked well. Water was nearly gas free.
• 22:49
  Speaker 1: Success, but there were usability issues.
• 22:51
  Speaker 2: Yeah, interface problems. The water pistol didn't lock securely onto
• 22:55
  Speaker 2: the separator inlets, the separator sometimes popped off, and the
• 22:58
  Speaker 2: crew said it would be really helpful if the food
• 23:00
  Speaker 2: bags could lock positively onto the separator outlet. Too.
• 23:03
  Speaker 1: Little things now frustrating when you're trying to rehydrate a
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: meal and xerog exactly.
• 23:08
  Speaker 2: Report notes redesigns were planned for later missions to fix
• 23:10
  Speaker 2: those physical connections. Shows how crew feedback directly improved things.
• 23:15
  Speaker 1: What about the control panels that displays? Any issues there
• 23:19
  Speaker 1: generally okay?
• 23:20
  Speaker 2: But the mission clock in the command module's lower bay
• 23:22
  Speaker 2: ran slow by less than ten seconds a day. Why
• 23:26
  Speaker 2: report blames electromagnetic interference. EMI said that clock design was
• 23:30
  Speaker 2: known to be susceptible. Also, the glass face of that
• 23:34
  Speaker 2: same clock was found cracked after the flight, apparently a
• 23:36
  Speaker 2: known stress issue from assembly. The identical LM clock also
• 23:40
  Speaker 2: had problems a different kind, though and improved timer design
• 23:44
  Speaker 2: was already on the way.
• 23:45
  Speaker 1: Okay, annoying clock issues. What about actual failures? Yeah? Like
• 23:48
  Speaker 1: the cryogenic heaters.
• 23:49
  Speaker 2: Yeah, one of the two heaters in oxygen tank two
• 23:52
  Speaker 2: failed during flight. It worked before launch, failed sometime after.
• 23:55
  Speaker 2: Probable cause was listed as an intermint in contact on
• 23:58
  Speaker 2: a specific type of terminal inside, and interestingly, the report
• 24:02
  Speaker 2: mentions this same type of terminal board was also suspected
• 24:06
  Speaker 2: and a reaction control thruster problem on this flight.
• 24:09
  Speaker 1: One dodgy component type causing multiple.
• 24:12
  Speaker 2: Issues potentially, But for the two heater it was redundant.
• 24:16
  Speaker 2: There were two, so losing one wasn't a mission ender
• 24:19
  Speaker 2: just meant more crewwork balancing the tank quantities. Report says
• 24:22
  Speaker 2: no immediate fix needed for a pall at twelve as
• 24:25
  Speaker 2: they knew where those older boards were and none were
• 24:27
  Speaker 2: in critical safety circuits.
• 24:28
  Speaker 1: On that next mission, redundancy worked okay andrew monitor system display.
• 24:32
  Speaker 2: The EMS yeah, a backup display for re entry velocity
• 24:35
  Speaker 2: and stuff. One segment on the numeric display failed like
• 24:39
  Speaker 2: a pixel burning out. Reports said it was likely just
• 24:41
  Speaker 2: a random component failure in that segment circuit, no design flaw,
• 24:45
  Speaker 2: no fix needed.
• 24:46
  Speaker 1: Minor glitch. What about master alarms for flow sensors sounds
• 24:50
  Speaker 1: more serious.
• 24:50
  Speaker 2: This one's tricky involved two relays K one and K
• 24:54
  Speaker 2: two linked to flow sensors. Maybe in the cooling or
• 24:56
  Speaker 2: suit lube. K two switched off slower than K one.
• 25:00
  Speaker 2: If K one chattered flickered on off rapidly, K two
• 25:03
  Speaker 2: wouldn't react fast enough to reset a sixteen second timer
• 25:06
  Speaker 2: tied to it, so the timer would eventually run out
• 25:08
  Speaker 2: trigger master alarms, even though the actual flow might be
• 25:11
  Speaker 2: okay momentarily.
• 25:12
  Speaker 1: A timing quirk leading to false.
• 25:14
  Speaker 2: Alarm exactly postflight. They found an open capacitor could cause
• 25:17
  Speaker 2: this with low floor rates no history of that capacitor
• 25:20
  Speaker 2: failing before, so no immediate action taken.
• 25:23
  Speaker 1: Weird electrical gremlin. Now this next one forward heat shield
• 25:27
  Speaker 1: mortar lanyard untied knots.
• 25:30
  Speaker 2: This is wild. Postflight inspection found almost all the knots
• 25:33
  Speaker 2: securing tire raps on this lanyard were untied. Procedure called
• 25:36
  Speaker 2: for two half hitches, but on Apollo eleven, like Apollo ten,
• 25:40
  Speaker 2: someone had used clove hitches instead. A cloth hitch can
• 25:43
  Speaker 2: work itself loose if the tire rap tail pulls out
• 25:46
  Speaker 2: a bit, making the lanyard effectively longer.
• 25:48
  Speaker 1: Okay, different not Why does a slightly longer lanyard matter?
• 25:51
  Speaker 2: Big potential consequence? A longer lanyard could snag or put
• 25:55
  Speaker 2: tension on the main umbilical disconnects during separation. If that
• 25:59
  Speaker 2: tension broke the sheer pins holding the umbilical prematurely before
• 26:03
  Speaker 2: the mortar fire to push the heat shield away, it
• 26:05
  Speaker 2: could disconnect the firing signal carried and the umbilical. Result
• 26:09
  Speaker 2: the mortar might not fire and the crucial forward heat
• 26:12
  Speaker 2: shield parachute might not deploy.
• 26:14
  Speaker 1: WHOA A simple nodding error could have potentially led to
• 26:18
  Speaker 1: a re entry disaster.
• 26:19
  Speaker 2: That's the failure mode. The report lays out, stunning a
• 26:23
  Speaker 2: tiny assembly detail with huge implications. Luckily, the sheer pins
• 26:27
  Speaker 2: held the system worked, so the anomaly was closed with
• 26:30
  Speaker 2: no specific action for Apollo twelve, relying on the hardware's
• 26:33
  Speaker 2: margin incredible.
• 26:34
  Speaker 1: A real hidden complexity glyclled temperature control valve.
• 26:38
  Speaker 2: That one was listed as open, meaning unresolved when the
• 26:41
  Speaker 2: report was written. The valve, part of the cooling system
• 26:44
  Speaker 2: that mixes hot and cold GLYCLL, was showing some kind
• 26:46
  Speaker 2: of instability. Analysis was still ongoing to figure out why.
• 26:50
  Speaker 1: So a slight wobble in the cooling they were still investigating. Yep.
• 26:53
  Speaker 2: Now over in the lunar module, its mission timer just
• 26:55
  Speaker 2: stopped shortly after landing.
• 26:57
  Speaker 1: Oh great, timing not ideal.
• 26:59
  Speaker 2: Crew couldn't restart it right away, so they powered it
• 27:01
  Speaker 2: down to cool off, turned it back on eleven hours later,
• 27:04
  Speaker 2: and it worked fine for the rest of the time.
• 27:06
  Speaker 1: Cooling fixed it.
• 27:07
  Speaker 2: Report suspects a cracked solder joint, likely due to the
• 27:11
  Speaker 2: cordwood construction components packed tightly between boards with potting compound
• 27:15
  Speaker 2: poured in. Thermal stress can crack joints. Cooling let it
• 27:20
  Speaker 2: make contact again temporarily.
• 27:22
  Speaker 1: Another manufacturing gremlin. Physical damage inside the LM two.
• 27:26
  Speaker 2: Yeah, some circuit breakers were found damaged post flight, most
• 27:29
  Speaker 2: likely cause getting bumped by the edge of the OPS
• 27:33
  Speaker 2: backpack while the crew were moving around getting suited up
• 27:36
  Speaker 2: for the EVA in that tiny cabin. Simulations confirmed it could.
• 27:39
  Speaker 1: Happen out just bump the controls.
• 27:42
  Speaker 2: YEP report says break reguards were planned for Apollo twelve to.
• 27:45
  Speaker 1: Prevent that, and engine pressure switches thruster issues.
• 27:49
  Speaker 2: A pressure switch for one of the reaction control thrusters
• 27:52
  Speaker 2: A too A was sluggish near rendezvous. It failed to
• 27:55
  Speaker 2: respond seven times in a row to tiny pulses, triggered
• 27:58
  Speaker 2: alarms warning flags. Crew just reset them.
• 28:01
  Speaker 1: Did the thruster actually fail?
• 28:03
  Speaker 2: No engine worked fine, it was just the sensor reporting
• 28:06
  Speaker 2: the pressure that glitched. Had no emission impact. Crew didn't
• 28:08
  Speaker 2: even investigate if the engine was okay, just cleared the alarms.
• 28:12
  Speaker 2: Anomaly closed.
• 28:14
  Speaker 1: So many little things went slightly wrong, yet redundancy, cruise,
• 28:18
  Speaker 1: gill ground support pulled it through.
• 28:21
  Speaker 2: The report even lists issues with government furnished equipment GFE
• 28:25
  Speaker 2: stuff NASA provided not the main contractors, like what the
• 28:29
  Speaker 2: TV camera cable on the surface stayed coiled up, creating
• 28:33
  Speaker 2: a trip hazard. Looked into fixes, but they added weight
• 28:37
  Speaker 2: for little benefit, so no change planned, and the sample
• 28:39
  Speaker 2: container retention related to the water food bag issue. No
• 28:43
  Speaker 2: good way to securely hold the bags while filling them.
• 28:45
  Speaker 1: Even basic stuff like cable management and bag holders were challenges.
• 28:49
  Speaker 2: YEP report says better locking mechanisms for containers were being
• 28:52
  Speaker 2: looked at for Apolla thirteen onwards. Constant practical improvements based
• 28:56
  Speaker 2: on experience.
• 28:57
  Speaker 1: The report appandex digs even deeper right into do Radar
• 29:00
  Speaker 1: modifications made before Apollo eleven.
• 29:02
  Speaker 2: Oh Yeah lists tweaks to both landing and rendezvous radars
• 29:06
  Speaker 2: based on earlier tests. Landing rainar was modified to resist
• 29:10
  Speaker 2: computer interference, let the crew manually break lock if needed,
• 29:14
  Speaker 2: updated its assumptions about lunar reflectivity based on surveyor data,
• 29:19
  Speaker 2: improved its velocity outputs, and added logic to reject noise spikes.
• 29:23
  Speaker 1: Fine tuning the critical landing sensor based on everything they knew.
• 29:27
  Speaker 2: And the rendezvous radar got a new self test for
• 29:29
  Speaker 2: low tempts, added heaters for components to handle the cold
• 29:33
  Speaker 2: on the Moon, and a manual override switch for the
• 29:36
  Speaker 2: crew to choose which gyro data to use.
• 29:38
  Speaker 1: More robustness, more crew control options. It's just staggering how
• 29:42
  Speaker 1: many systems they tracked and how every single issue down
• 29:45
  Speaker 1: to knots and sider joints was documented.
• 29:47
  Speaker 2: Everyone was a data point, a potential failure mode to
• 29:49
  Speaker 2: understand and mitigate, even if it didn't bite them on
• 29:52
  Speaker 2: Apollo eleven. That intense scrutiny is why it worked and
• 29:55
  Speaker 2: why these reports are gold mines okay.
• 29:57
  Speaker 1: Final phase Return to Earth recovery.
• 30:00
  Speaker 2: Report covers the support performance, flight control, the tracking network,
• 30:03
  Speaker 2: recovery teams all performed.
• 30:05
  Speaker 1: Well back to splashdown YEP.
• 30:08
  Speaker 2: Command module hoisted onto the USS Hornet about three hours
• 30:12
  Speaker 2: after hitting the water. Report even includes diagrams showing where
• 30:16
  Speaker 2: the swimmers were, the recovery boats, the photo helicopter, the
• 30:19
  Speaker 2: whole operation.
• 30:20
  Speaker 1: A well oiled machine waiting for them.
• 30:23
  Speaker 2: And the report closes simply with Apollo evans completion. The
• 30:27
  Speaker 2: national goal moon landing and safe return before the end
• 30:30
  Speaker 2: of the decade was met.
• 30:32
  Speaker 1: Simple end to an unbelievably complex undertaking detailed in this report.
• 30:36
  Speaker 2: We've really dug in here, gone past the highlights to
• 30:39
  Speaker 2: the nitty gritty of the mission. Report systems science, human factors, glitches.
• 30:44
  Speaker 1: It just shows, doesn't it. Even the most iconic successes
• 30:47
  Speaker 1: are built on intense engineering, problem solving adaptability, both in
• 30:51
  Speaker 1: space and on the ground.
• 30:53
  Speaker 2: Absolutely, it wasn't magic. It was incredibly hard work, rigorously documented.
• 30:57
  Speaker 1: Looking at these details, the complexity of the engine, new,
• 31:00
  Speaker 1: the human side, the anomalies manage. It shows that even
• 31:03
  Speaker 1: missions that seem perfect involved constant adaptation, and.
• 31:06
  Speaker 2: That meticulous post mission analysis learning from every tiny issue
• 31:10
  Speaker 2: was key to the whole program success. That feedback loop
• 31:13
  Speaker 2: was everything.
• 31:14
  Speaker 1: So when you think about this level of detail, tracking
• 31:17
  Speaker 1: system performance, crewe health, how footpads interact with soil, not tying,
• 31:23
  Speaker 1: what does this exhaustive documentation tell us but the discipline
• 31:27
  Speaker 1: required and maybe what hidden complexities might lie behind other
• 31:32
  Speaker 1: historical successes where we don't have this kind of report.
• 31:35
  Speaker 2: It tells us that deep understanding only comes from analyzing everything,
• 31:39
  Speaker 2: the good, the bad, the unexpected. That documentation wasn't just
• 31:43
  Speaker 2: record keeping, it was the engine of improvement. Makes you wonder, Yeah,
• 31:47
  Speaker 2: what other simple successes in history were actually incredibly messy
• 31:50
  Speaker 2: and complex underneath, But we just don't have the report
• 31:53
  Speaker 2: to show us. There's always more below the surface.
• 31:55
  Speaker 1: Definitely food for thought it is.
• 31:57
  Speaker 2: And hey, if this deep dive into Apollo eleven's reality resonated,
• 32:01
  Speaker 2: please do consider giving beyond infographics that five stars rating
• 32:05
  Speaker 2: it genuinely helps us reach more folks who appreciate getting
• 32:07
  Speaker 2: into the details.
• 32:08
  Speaker 1: Thanks so much for joining us for this look inside
• 32:10
  Speaker 1: the Apollo leven mission report.
• 32:12
  Speaker 2: Hope it gave you a new appreciation for just what
• 32:14
  Speaker 2: an incredible and complex achievement it really was.
• 32:18
  Speaker 1: Until the next time we unpack something fascinating