Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [2008] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Our decrease in net worth during
- 0:062008 was $11.5 billion, which reduced the per share book value
- 0:12of both our Class A and Class B stock by 9.6%.
- 0:16Over the last 44 years, that is, since present management took
- 0:20over, book value has grown from $19.00 to $70,530, a rate of
- 0:2620.3% compounded annually. The table on the preceding page
- 0:31recording both the 44 year performance of Berkshire's book
- 0:35value and the S&P 500 index shows that 2008 was the worst
- 0:40year for each. The period was devastating as
- 0:43well for corporate and municipal bonds, real estate and
- 0:47commodities. By year end investors of all
- 0:50stripes were bloodied and confused, much as if they were
- 0:53small birds that had strayed into a badminton game.
- 0:57As the year progressed a series of life threatening problems
- 1:00within many of the world's great financial institutions was
- 1:04unveiled. This led to a dysfunctional
- 1:06credit market that an important respect soon turned non
- 1:10functional. The watchword throughout the
- 1:12country became the creed I saw on restaurant walls when I was
- 1:16young. In God we trust all others pay
- 1:19cash. By the fourth quarter, the
- 1:21credit crisis, coupled with tumbling home and stock prices,
- 1:24had produced a paralyzing fear that engulfed the country.
- 1:28A free fall and business activity ensued, accelerating at
- 1:32a pace that I have never before witnessed.
- 1:35The US and much of the world became trapped in a vicious
- 1:39negative feedback cycle. Fear led to business contraction
- 1:44and that in turn led to even greater fear.
- 1:46This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take
- 1:50massive action. In poker terms, the Treasury and
- 1:53the Fed have gone all in. Economic medicine that was
- 1:56previously meted out by the cupful has recently been
- 1:59dispensed by the barrel. These once unthinkable dosages
- 2:03will almost certainly bring on unwelcome after effects.
- 2:07Their precise nature is anyone's guess.
- 2:10The one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation.
- 2:13Moreover, major industries have become dependent on federal
- 2:17assistance and they will be followed by cities and states
- 2:20bearing mind boggling requests. Weaning these entities from the
- 2:24public teet will be a political challenge.
- 2:27They want leave willingly. Whatever the downsides may be,
- 2:30strong and immediate action by government was essential last
- 2:33year if the financial system was to avoid a total breakdown.
- 2:37Had one occurred, the consequences for every area of
- 2:40our economy would have been cataclysmic.
- 2:43Like it or not, the inhabitants of Wall Street, Main Street and
- 2:47the various side streets of America were all in the same
- 2:50boat. Amid this bad news, however,
- 2:54never forget that our country has faced far worse travails in
- 2:57the past. In the 20 TH century alone, we
- 3:01dealt with two great wars, one of which we initially appeared
- 3:04to be losing a dozen or so panics and recessions, virulent
- 3:09inflation that led to a 211 two percent prime rate in 1980, and
- 3:14the Great Depression of the 1930.
- 3:16Yes, when unemployment range between 15% and 25%.
- 3:21For many years, America has had no shortage of challenges.
- 3:25Without fail, however, we've overcome them.
- 3:28In the face of those obstacles and many others, the real
- 3:32standard of living for Americans improved nearly sevenfold during
- 3:35the 1900 S, while the Dow Jones industrials rose from 66
- 3:41TO11497. Compare the record of this
- 3:44period with the dozens of centuries during which humans
- 3:47secured only tiny gains, if any, and how they lived.
- 3:52Though the path has not been smooth, our economic system has
- 3:56worked extraordinarily well over time.
- 3:58It has unleashed human potential as no other system has, and it
- 4:02will continue to do so. America's best days lie ahead.
- 4:06All per share figures used in this report apply to Berkshires
- 4:10A Shares. Figures for the B shares are 130
- 4:13TH of those shown for a three. Take a look again at the 44 year
- 4:18table on page 2. In 75% of those years, the S&P
- 4:22stocks recorded a gain. I would guess that a roughly
- 4:26similar percentage of years will be positive in the next 44.
- 4:30But neither Charlie M Unger, my partner in running Berkshire,
- 4:33nor I can predict the winning and losing years in advance.
- 4:37In our usual opinionated view, we don't think anyone else can
- 4:41either. We're certain, for example, that
- 4:44the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 and for that
- 4:48matter probably well beyond. But that conclusion does not
- 4:52tell us whether the stock market will rise or fall in good years
- 4:56and bad. Charlie and I simply focus on
- 4:59four goals. One, maintaining Berkshires
- 5:01Gibraltar like financial position which features huge
- 5:04amounts of excess liquidity, near term obligations that are
- 5:08modest and dozens of sources of earnings and cash. 2 Widening
- 5:13the moats around our operating businesses that give them
- 5:16durable competitive advantages. 3 Acquiring and developing new
- 5:21and varied streams of earnings for expanding and nurturing the
- 5:24cadre of outstanding operating managers who over the years have
- 5:29delivered Berkshire exceptional results.
- 5:32Berkshire in 2008. Most of the Berkshire businesses
- 5:35whose results are significantly affected by the economy earned
- 5:38below their potential last year, and that will be true in 2009 as
- 5:43well. Our retailers were hit
- 5:45particularly hard, as were our operations tied to residential
- 5:49construction. In aggregate, however, are
- 5:52manufacturing, service and retail businesses earn
- 5:55substantial sums and most of them, particularly the larger
- 5:59ones, continue to strengthen their competitive positions.
- 6:02Moreover, we are fortunate that Berkshire's two most important
- 6:06businesses, our insurance and utility groups, produce earnings
- 6:10that are not correlated to those of the general economy.
- 6:13Both businesses delivered outstanding results in 2008 and
- 6:17have excellent prospects. As predicted in last year's
- 6:20report, the exceptional underwriting profits that are
- 6:23insurance businesses realized in 2007 were not repeated in 2008.
- 6:29Nevertheless, the insurance group delivered an underwriting
- 6:32gain for the 6th consecutive year.
- 6:35This means that our $58.5 billion of insurance float,
- 6:38money that doesn't belong to us but that we hold and invest for
- 6:42our own benefit, cost us less than 0.
- 6:45In fact, we were paid $2.8 billion to hold our float during
- 6:502008. Charlie and I find this
- 6:52enjoyable. Over time, most insurers
- 6:55experience a substantial underwriting loss, which makes
- 6:58their economics far different from ours.
- 7:01Of course, we too will experience underwriting losses
- 7:04in some years, but we have the best group of managers in the
- 7:08insurance business and in most cases they oversee entrenched
- 7:12and valuable franchises. Considering these strengths, I
- 7:15believe that we will earn an underwriting profit over the
- 7:18years and that our float will therefore cost us nothing.
- 7:22Our insurance operation, the core business of Berkshire, is
- 7:25an economic powerhouse. Charlie and I are equally
- 7:29enthusiastic about our utility business, which had record
- 7:32earnings last year and is poised for future gains.
- 7:35Dave Socal and Greg Able, the managers of this operation, have
- 7:39achieved results unmatched elsewhere in the utility
- 7:42industry. I love it when they come up with
- 7:44new projects because in this capital intensive business these
- 7:48ventures are often large. Such projects offer Berkshire
- 7:52the opportunity to put out substantial sums at decent
- 7:55returns. 4 Things also went well on the capital allocation front
- 7:59last year. Berkshire is always a buyer of
- 8:02both businesses and securities and the disarray in markets gave
- 8:06us a tailwind in our purchases. When investing, pessimism is
- 8:10your friend, euphoria the enemy. In our insurance portfolios, we
- 8:14made three large investments on terms that would be unavailable
- 8:18in normal markets. These should add about $11.00
- 8:21two billion pre tax to Berkshire's annual earnings and
- 8:25offer possibilities for capital gains as well.
- 8:28We also closed on our Marm on acquisition.
- 8:31We own 64% of the company now and will purchase its remaining
- 8:35stock over the next six years. Additionally, certain of our
- 8:39subsidiaries made tuck in acquisitions that will
- 8:42strengthen their competitive positions and earnings.
- 8:45That's the good news. But there's another less
- 8:47pleasant reality. During 2008, I did some dumb
- 8:51things in investments. I made at least one major
- 8:54mistake of Commission and several lesser ones that also
- 8:57hurt. I will tell you more about these
- 8:59later. Furthermore, I made some errors
- 9:02of omission, sucking my thumb when new facts came in that
- 9:05should have caused met or examine my thinking and promptly
- 9:08take action. Additionally, the market value
- 9:11of the bonds and stocks that we continue to hold suffered a
- 9:14significant decline along with the general market.
- 9:17This does not bother Charlie and me.
- 9:19Indeed, we enjoy such price declines if we have funds
- 9:23available to increase our positions.
- 9:25Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that price is what you pay,
- 9:29value is what you get. Whether we're talking about
- 9:31stocks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is
- 9:35marked down yardsticks. Berkshire has two major areas of
- 9:39value. The 1st is our investments,
- 9:41stocks, bonds and cash equivalents.
- 9:45At year end those totaled $122 billion, not counting the
- 9:49investments held by our finance and utility operations, which we
- 9:53assigned to our second bucket of value.
- 9:56About $58.5 billion of that total is funded by our insurance
- 10:01float. Berkshire's second component of
- 10:03value is earnings that come from sources other than investments
- 10:06and insurance. These earnings are delivered by
- 10:09our 67 non insurance companies itemized on page 96.
- 10:14We exclude our insurance earnings from this calculation
- 10:18because the value of our insurance operation comes from
- 10:21the invest able funds it generates and we have already
- 10:24included this factor in our first bucket.
- 10:27In 2008 our investments fell from $90,343 per share of
- 10:33Berkshire after minority interest O $77,793, a decrease
- 10:39that was caused by a decline in market prices, not by net sales
- 10:43of stocks or bonds. Our second segment of value fell
- 10:47from pre tax earnings of $4093 per Berkshire share to dollars
- 10:523921, again after minority interest.
- 10:55Both of these performances are unsatisfactory.
- 10:58Over time. We need to make decent gains in
- 11:00each area if we are to increase Berkshire's intrinsic value at
- 11:05an acceptable rate. Going forward, however, our
- 11:08focus will be on the earnings segment, just as it has been for
- 11:12several decades. We like buying underpriced
- 11:14securities, but we like buying fairly priced operating
- 11:18businesses even more. Now let's take a look at the
- 11:21four major operating sectors of Berkshire.
- 11:24Each of these has vastly different balance sheet and
- 11:27income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together
- 11:31as is done in standard financial statements, impedes analysis.
- 11:35So we'll present them as four separate businesses, which is
- 11:38how Charlie and I view them. Five regulated utility business,
- 11:43Berkshire has an 87.4% diluted interest in Mid American Energy
- 11:48Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations.
- 11:52The largest of these are One Yorkshire Electricity and
- 11:55Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the UK
- 12:00dot S 3rd largest distributor of electricity to Mid American
- 12:04Energy, which serves 723,000 electric customers primarily in
- 12:10Iowa. 3 Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power serving about 1.7
- 12:15million electric customers in six western States and four Kern
- 12:19River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 9%
- 12:23of the natural gas consumed in the US.
- 12:26Our partners and ownership of Mid American are its two
- 12:29terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, and my longtime
- 12:33friend Walter Scott. It's unimportant how many votes
- 12:37each party has. We make major moves only when we
- 12:40are unanimous in thinking them wise.
- 12:43Nine years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter half reinforced
- 12:47my original belief. Berkshire couldn't have better
- 12:49partners. Somewhat incongruously, Mid
- 12:52American also owns the second largest real estate brokerage
- 12:55firm in the US, Home Services of America.
- 12:59This company operates through 21 locally branded firms that have
- 13:0316,000 agents. Last year was a terrible year
- 13:07for home sales and 2009 looks no better.
- 13:10We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage
- 13:14operations when they are available at sensible prices.
- 13:17Here are some key figures on Mid Americans operations.
- 13:20Consists of a breakup fee of $175,000,000 and a profit on our
- 13:25investment of $917 million. Includes interest earned by
- 13:30Berkshire net of related income tax off $72 in 2008 and $70 in
- 13:362007. Mid Americans record in
- 13:39operating its regulated electric utilities and natural gas
- 13:42pipelines is truly outstanding. Hey, raise some backup for that
- 13:47claim. Our two pipelines, Kern River
- 13:49and Northern Natural were both acquired in 2002.
- 13:53A firm called Mast IO regularly ranks pipelines for customer
- 13:57satisfaction among the 44 rated. Kern River came in nine TH when
- 14:02we purchased it and Northern Natural ranked 39 TH.
- 14:06There was work to do in masked iOS 2009 report Kern River
- 14:10ranked one stand Northern Natural 3 Rd.
- 14:13Charlie and I couldn't be more proud of this performance.
- 14:17It came about because hundreds of people at each operation
- 14:20committed themselves to a new culture and then delivered on
- 14:23their commitment. Achievements at Tour Electric
- 14:26Utilities have been equally impressive.
- 14:28In 1995, Mid American became the major provider of electricity in
- 14:33Iowa by judicious planning and a zeal for efficiency.
- 14:37The company has kept electric prices unchanged since our
- 14:41purchase and has promised to hold them steady through 2013.
- 14:45Six Mid American has maintained this extraordinary price
- 14:48stability while making Iowa number one among all states in
- 14:52the percentage of its generation capacity that comes from wind.
- 14:56Since our purchase. Mid Americans wind based
- 14:59facilities have grown from zero to almost 20% of total capacity.
- 15:03Similarly, when we purchased Pacific or PE in 2006, we moved
- 15:08aggressively to expand wind generation.
- 15:11Wind capacity was then 33 megawatts, it's now 794 with
- 15:16more coming. Arriving at Pacific or P, we
- 15:19found wind of a different sort. The company had 98 committees
- 15:23that met frequently, now there are 28.
- 15:26Meanwhile, we generate and deliver considerably more
- 15:29electricity, doing so with 2% fewer employees.
- 15:33In 2008 alone Mid American spent $1.8 billion on wind generation
- 15:39at two or two operations and today the company is number one
- 15:43in the nation among regulated utilities in ownership of wind
- 15:47capacity. By the way, compare that $1.8
- 15:50billion to the $1.1 billion of pre tax earnings of Pacific or P
- 15:55shown in the table as Western and Iowa.
- 15:58In our utility business, we spend all we earn and then some
- 16:02in order to fulfill the needs of our service areas.
- 16:06Indeed, Mid American has not paid a dividend since Berkshire
- 16:09bought into the company in early 2000.
- 16:12Its earnings have instead been reinvested to develop the
- 16:16utility systems our customers require and deserve.
- 16:19In exchange, we have been allowed to earn a fair return on
- 16:23the huge sums we have invested. It's a great partnership for all
- 16:27concerned. Our long avowed goal is to be
- 16:29the buyer of choice for businesses, particularly those
- 16:32built and owned by families. The way to achieve this goal is
- 16:36to deserve it. That means we must keep our
- 16:39promises, avoid leveraging up acquired businesses, grant
- 16:43unusual autonomy to our managers, and hold the purchase
- 16:46companies through thick and thin.
- 16:48Though we prefer thick and thicker, our record matches our
- 16:52rhetoric. Most buyers competing against
- 16:54us, however, follow a different path.
- 16:57For them, acquisitions are merchandise.
- 17:00Before the ink dries on their purchase contracts, these
- 17:03operators are contemplating exit strategies.
- 17:06We have a decided advantage, therefore, when we encounter
- 17:09sellers who truly care about the future of their businesses.
- 17:13Some years back, our competitors were known as leveraged buyout
- 17:16operators. But LBO became a bad name.
- 17:20So in Orwellian fashion, the buyout firms decided to change
- 17:24their moniker. What they did not change,
- 17:26though, were the essential ingredients of their previous
- 17:29operations, including their cherished fee structures and
- 17:33love of leverage. Their new label became private
- 17:36equity, a name that turns the facts upside down.
- 17:39A purchase of a business by these firms almost invariably
- 17:43results in dramatic reductions in the equity portion of the
- 17:46acquire ES capital structure compared to that previously
- 17:50existing. A number of these acquire ES
- 17:53purchased only two to three years ago are now in mortal
- 17:57danger because of the debt piled on them by their private equity
- 18:00buyers. Much of the bank debt is selling
- 18:03below 70 on the dollar and the public debt has taken a far
- 18:06greater beating. The private equity firms, it
- 18:09should be noted, are not rushing in to inject the equity their
- 18:13wards now desperately need. Instead, they're keeping their
- 18:16remaining funds very private. In the regulated utility field,
- 18:20there are no large family owned businesses here.
- 18:23Berkshire hopes to be the buyer of choice of regulators.
- 18:27It is they, rather than selling shareholders, who judge the
- 18:30fitness of purchasers when transactions are proposed.
- 18:34There is no hiding your history when you stand before these
- 18:37regulators, they can and dock all their counterparts in other
- 18:40states where you operate and ask how you have behaved in respect
- 18:44to all aspects of the business, including a willingness to
- 18:47commit adequate equity capital. 7 When Mid American proposed its
- 18:52purchase of Pacific or P in 2005, regulators in the six new
- 18:57states we would be serving immediately checked our record
- 19:00in Iowa. They also carefully evaluated
- 19:03our financing plans and capabilities.
- 19:06We passed this examination just as we expect to pass future
- 19:09once. There are two reasons for our
- 19:11confidence. First, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel
- 19:14are going to run any businesses with which they are associated
- 19:17in a first class manner. They don't know of any other way
- 19:20to operate. Beyond that is the fact that we
- 19:23hope to buy more regulated utilities in the future and we
- 19:26know that our business behavior in jurisdictions where we are
- 19:30operating today will determine how we are welcomed by new
- 19:33jurisdictions tomorrow. Insurance, our insurance group
- 19:37has propelled Berkshire's growth since we first entered the
- 19:40business in 1967. This happy result has not been
- 19:44due to general prosperity in the industry.
- 19:47During the 25 years ending in 2007, return on net worth for
- 19:52insurers averaged 8.5% versus 14% for the Fortune 500.
- 19:58Clearly, our insurance CEOs have not had the wind at their back.
- 20:02Yet these managers have excelled to a degree.
- 20:04Charlie and an ever dream possible in the early days.
- 20:09Why do I love them? Let me count the ways at GEICO.
- 20:12Tony Nicely now in his 48 TH year at the company after
- 20:16joining it when he was 18, continues to gobble up market
- 20:19share while maintaining disciplined underwriting.
- 20:22When Tony became CEO in 1993, GEICO had 2% of the auto
- 20:27insurance market, a level at which the company had long been
- 20:30stuck. Now we have a 7.7% share, up
- 20:34from 7.2% in 2007. The combination of new business
- 20:39gains and an improvement in the renewal rate on existing
- 20:42business has moved GEICO into the number three position among
- 20:46auto insurers. In 1995, when Berkshire
- 20:50purchased Control, GEICO was #7 Now we trail only State Farm and
- 20:55Allstate. GEICO grows because it saves
- 20:58money from motorists. No one likes to buy auto
- 21:00insurance, but virtually everyone likes to drive, so
- 21:04sensibly drivers look for the lowest cost insurance consistent
- 21:08with first class service. Efficiency is the key to low
- 21:12cost, and efficiency is Tony's specialty.
- 21:15Five years ago, the number of policies per employee was 299.
- 21:20In 2008, the number was 439, a huge increase in productivity as
- 21:26we view Geico's current opportunities.
- 21:28Tony and I feel like 2 hungry mosquitoes in a nudist camp.
- 21:32Juicy targets are everywhere. 1st and most important, our new
- 21:36business and auto insurance is now exploding.
- 21:40Americans are focused on saving money as never before and they
- 21:43are flocking to GEICO. In January 2009, we set a
- 21:48monthly record by a wide margin for growth and policyholders.
- 21:52That record will last exactly 28 days.
- 21:55As we go to press, it's clear February's gain will be even
- 21:59better. Beyond this, we are gaining
- 22:01ground in allied lines. Last year, our motorcycle
- 22:05policies increased by 23.4%, which raised our market share
- 22:09from about 6% to more than 7%. Our RV and ATV businesses are
- 22:15also growing rapidly, albeit from a small base.
- 22:18And finally, we recently began insuring commercial autos a big
- 22:23market that offers real promise. GEICO is now saving money for
- 22:27millions of Americans. Go to geico.com or call
- 22:311-800-847-7536 and see if we can save you money as well.
- 22:37General Rhee, our large international reinsurer, also
- 22:41had an outstanding year in 2008. Some time back, the company had
- 22:46serious problems which I totally failed to detect when we
- 22:49purchased it in late 1998. By 2001, when Joe Brandon took
- 22:54over as CEO, assisted by his partner Tadmont Ross, general
- 22:58residential culture had further deteriorated, exhibiting a loss
- 23:02of discipline and underwriting, reserving and expenses.
- 23:06After Joe and Tad took charge, these problems were decisively
- 23:11and successfully addressed. Today, General Rhee has regained
- 23:14its luster. Last spring, Joe stepped down
- 23:17and Tad became CEO. Charlie and I are grateful to
- 23:20Joe for riding the ship and are certain that with TAD, General
- 23:25residential future is in the best of hands. 8 Reinsurance is
- 23:29a business of long term promises, sometimes extending
- 23:33for 50 years or more. This past year has retaught
- 23:36clients a crucial principle. A promise is no better than the
- 23:40person or institution making it. That's where General Re excels.
- 23:44It is the only reinsurer that is backed by in AAA Corporation.
- 23:49Ben Franklin once said it's difficult for an empty sack to
- 23:52stand upright. That's no worry for General Re
- 23:55clients. Our third major insurance
- 23:57operation is AJ at Giants Reinsurance Division.
- 24:01Headquartered in Stanford and staffed by only 31 employees,
- 24:05this may be one of the most remarkable businesses in the
- 24:08world. Hard to characterize, but easy
- 24:11to admire from year to year. AJ It's business is never the
- 24:15same. It features very large
- 24:17transactions, incredible speed of execution, and a willingness
- 24:21to quote on policies that leave others scratching their heads
- 24:25when there is a huge and unusual risk to be insured.
- 24:29AJ It is almost certain to be called AJ.
- 24:31It came to Berkshire in 1986. Very quickly I realized that we
- 24:36had acquired an extraordinary talent.
- 24:38So I did the logical thing. I wrote his parents in New Delhi
- 24:42and asked if they had another one like him at home.
- 24:44Of course, I knew the answer before writing.
- 24:47There isn't anyone like a Jayet. Our smaller insurers are just as
- 24:50outstanding in their own way as the Big Three, regularly
- 24:54delivering valuable float to us at a negative cost.
- 24:57We aggregate their results below under other primary.
- 25:01For space reasons, we don't discuss these insurers
- 25:04individually, but be assured that Charlie and I appreciate
- 25:07the contribution of each. Here is the record for the four
- 25:11legs to our insurance stool. The underwriting profits signify
- 25:14that all four provided funds to Berkshire last year without
- 25:18cost, just as they did in 2007. And in both years our
- 25:22underwriting profitability was considerably better than that
- 25:25achieved by the industry. Of course, we ourselves will
- 25:28periodically have a terrible year in insurance, but overall I
- 25:33expect us to average an underwriting profit.
- 25:36If so, we will be using free funds of large size for the
- 25:39indefinite future. Underwriting profit year and
- 25:42float does not include purchase accounting adjustments.
- 25:46This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops
- 25:50to motor homes, earn an impressive 17.9% on average
- 25:55tangible net worth last year. It's also noteworthy that these
- 25:58operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving
- 26:02that return. Clearly, we own some terrific
- 26:04businesses. We purchased many of them,
- 26:07however at large premiums to net worth, a point reflected in the
- 26:11goodwill item shown on our balance sheet.
- 26:14And that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying
- 26:17value to 8.1%. Though the full year result was
- 26:21satisfactory, earnings of many of the businesses in this group
- 26:24hit the skids in last year's fourth quarter.
- 26:27Prospects for 2009 look worse. Nevertheless, the group retains
- 26:32strong earning power even under today's conditions and will
- 26:35continue to deliver significant cash to the parent company.
- 26:39Overall, these companies improved their competitive
- 26:42positions last year partly because our financial strength
- 26:46let us make advantageous tuck in acquisitions.
- 26:49In contrast, many competitors were treading waterer sinking.
- 26:53The most noteworthy of these acquisitions was his car slate
- 26:56November purchase of Tongue Aloe YA, leading Japanese producer of
- 27:00small tools. Charlie and I continue to look
- 27:03with astonishment and appreciation at the
- 27:06accomplishments of his car's management.
- 27:08To secure one manager like E it and Wertheimer, Jacob Harp, AZ
- 27:12or Danny Goldman when we acquire a company is a blessing.
- 27:16Getting 3 is like winning the Triple Crown is cars growth
- 27:20since our purchase has exceeded our expectations which were high
- 27:23in the addition of tongue aloe, why well move performance to the
- 27:27next level. ME Tech, Benjamin Moore, Acme,
- 27:31Brick, Forest River, Marmont and CTB also made one or more
- 27:36acquisitions during the year. CTB, which operates worldwide in
- 27:40the agriculture equipment field, has now picked up six small
- 27:44firms since we purchased it in 2002.
- 27:47At that time we paid $140 million for the company.
- 27:51Last year its pre tax earnings were $89,000,000.
- 27:55Vic Mancine Lee, its CEO, followed Berkshire like
- 27:59operating principles long before our arrival.
- 28:02He focuses on blocking and tackling day by day, doing the
- 28:05little things right and never getting.
- 28:08Of course, 10 years from now, Vick will be running a much
- 28:11larger operation and more important will be earning
- 28:15excellent returns on invested capital, finance and financial
- 28:19products. I will write here at some length
- 28:21about the mortgage operation of Clayton Homes and skip any
- 28:24financial commentary, which is summarized in the table at the
- 28:28end of this section. I do this because Clayton's
- 28:30recent experience may be useful in the public policy debate
- 28:34about housing and mortgages. But first, a little background.
- 28:38Clayton is the largest company in the manufactured home
- 28:41industry, delivering 27,499 units last year.
- 28:46This came to about 34% of the industry's 81,889 total.
- 28:52Our share will likely grow in 2009, partly because much of the
- 28:57rest of the industry is in acute distress.
- 29:00Industry wide units sold have steadily declined since they hit
- 29:03a peak of 372,843 in 1998. At that time much of the
- 29:11industry employed sales practices that were atrocious.
- 29:14Writing about that period somewhat later, I described it
- 29:17as involving borrowers who shouldn't have borrowed being
- 29:19financed by lenders who shouldn't have lent to begin
- 29:23with. The need for meaningful down
- 29:25payments was frequently ignored, sometimes fake rewas involved.
- 29:29That certainly looks like a $2000 cat to me, says the
- 29:32salesman, who will receive a $3000 Commission if the loan
- 29:37goes through. Moreover, impossible to meet
- 29:39monthly payments were being agreed to buy borrowers who
- 29:43signed up because they had nothing to lose.
- 29:45The resulting mortgages were usually packaged SE curate ized
- 29:49and sold by Wall Street firms to unsuspecting investors.
- 29:53This chain of folly had to end badly, and it did.
- 29:57Clayton, it should be emphasized, followed far more
- 30:00sensible practices in its own lending.
- 30:02Throughout that time. Indeed, no purchaser of the
- 30:06mortgages that originated and then SE curate ized has ever
- 30:09lost a dime of principal or interest.
- 30:12But Clayton was the exception. Industry losses were staggering,
- 30:16and the hangover continues to this day.
- 30:19This 1997 to 2000 fiasco should have served as a Canary in the
- 30:24coal mine warning for the far larger conventional housing
- 30:27market, but investors, government, and rating agencies
- 30:31learned exactly nothing from the manufactured home debacle.
- 30:35Instead, in an eerie rerun of that disaster, the same mistakes
- 30:39were repeated with conventional homes in the 2004 to 2007
- 30:44period. Lenders happily made loans that
- 30:46borrowers couldn't repay out of their incomes, and borrowers
- 30:50just as happily signed up to meet those payments.
- 30:53Both parties counted on house price appreciation to make this
- 30:57otherwise impossible arrangement work.
- 30:59It was Scarlett O'Hara all over again.
- 31:02I'll think about it tomorrow. The consequences of this
- 31:05behavior are now reverberating through every corner of our
- 31:09economy. Clayton's 198888 borrowers,
- 31:13however, have continued to pay normally throughout the housing
- 31:16crash, handing us no unexpected losses.
- 31:19This is not because these borrowers are unusually credit
- 31:22worthy, a point proved by FICO scores, a standard measure of
- 31:26credit risk. Their median FICO score is 644,
- 31:30compared to a national median of 723, and about 35% are below
- 31:36620. The segment usually designated
- 31:39subprime. Many disastrous pools of
- 31:42mortgages on conventional homes are populated by borrowers with
- 31:45far better credit as measured by FICO scores.
- 31:49Yet at year end, our delinquency rate on loans we have originated
- 31:52was 3.6%, up only modestly from 2.9% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2004.
- 32:01The eye In addition to our originated loans, we've also
- 32:04bought both portfolios of various types from other
- 32:08financial institutions. Clayton's foreclosures during
- 32:112008 were 3% of originated loans compared to 3.8% in 2006 and
- 32:175.3% in 2004. Why are our borrowers
- 32:21characteristically people with modest incomes and far from
- 32:25great credit scores performing so well?
- 32:27The answer is elementary. Going right back to lending one
- 32:31O 1, our borrowers simply looked at how full bore mortgage
- 32:34payments would compare with their actual, not hoped for
- 32:37income and then decided whether they could live with that
- 32:40commitment. Simply put, they took out a
- 32:42mortgage with the intention of paying it off whatever the
- 32:45course of home prices. Just as important is what our
- 32:48borrowers did not do. They did not count on making
- 32:51their loan payments by means of refinancing.
- 32:54They did not sign up for teaser rates that upon reset were
- 32:57outsized relative to their income.
- 32:59And they did not assume that they could always sell their
- 33:02home at a profit if their mortgage payments became
- 33:05onerous. Jimmy Stewart would have loved
- 33:07these folks. Of course, a number of our
- 33:09borrowers will run into trouble. They generally have no more than
- 33:13minor savings to tide them over if adversity hits.
- 33:16The major cause of delinquency or foreclosure is the loss of a
- 33:20job, but death, divorce, and medical expenses all cause
- 33:24problems. If unemployment rates rise, as
- 33:27they surely will in 2009, more of Clayton's borrowers will have
- 33:31troubles and we will have larger, though still manageable,
- 33:34losses. But our problems will not be
- 33:37driven to any extent by the trend of home prices. 11
- 33:41Commentary about the current housing crisis often ignores the
- 33:44crucial fact that most foreclosures do not occur
- 33:48because a house is worth less than its mortgage, so-called
- 33:50upside down loans. Rather, foreclosures take place
- 33:54because borrowers can't pay the monthly payment that they agreed
- 33:57to pay. Homeowners who have made a
- 34:00meaningful down payment derived from savings and not from other
- 34:03borrowings seldom walk away from a primary residence simply
- 34:07because it's value today is less than the mortgage.
- 34:10Instead, they walk when they can't make the monthly payments.
- 34:14Home ownership is a wonderful thing.
- 34:16My family and I have enjoyed my present home for 50 years, with
- 34:20more to come. But enjoyment and utility should
- 34:23be the primary motives for purchase, not profit or refi
- 34:27possibilities. And the home purchased ought to
- 34:30fit the income of the purchaser. The present housing debacle
- 34:33should teach home buyers, lenders, brokers and government
- 34:37some simple lessons that will ensure stability in the future.
- 34:40Home purchases should involve an honest to God down payment of at
- 34:44least 10% and monthly payments that can be comfortably handled
- 34:48by the borrower's income. That income should be carefully
- 34:51verified. Putting people into homes,
- 34:54though a desirable goal, shouldn't be our country's
- 34:57primary objective. Keeping them in their homes
- 34:59should be the ambition. Clayton's lending operation,
- 35:02though not damaged by the performance of its borrowers, is
- 35:06nevertheless threatened by an element of the credit crisis.
- 35:10F under S that have access to any sort of government
- 35:13guarantee, Banks with FDIC insured deposits, large entities
- 35:17with commercial paper now backed by the Federal Reserve and
- 35:21others who are using imaginative methods or lobbying skills to
- 35:24come under the government's umbrella.
- 35:26Half money costs that are minimal.
- 35:29Conversely, highly rated companies such as Berkshire are
- 35:32experiencing borrowing costs that, in relation to Treasury
- 35:36rates, are at record levels. Moreover, funds are abundant for
- 35:40the government guaranteed borrower, but often scarce for
- 35:43others, no matter how credit worthy they may be.
- 35:46This unprecedented spread in the cost of money makes it
- 35:50unprofitable for any lender who doesn't enjoy government
- 35:53guaranteed funds Togo up against those with a favored status.
- 35:57Government is determining the have asked and have not asked.
- 36:01That is why companies are rushing to convert to bank
- 36:03holding companies. Not a course feasible for
- 36:06Berkshire though. Berkshire's credit is pristi new
- 36:09are one of only 7 AAA corporations in the country are
- 36:13cost of borrowing is now far higher than competitors with
- 36:16shaky balance sheets but government backing.
- 36:19At the moment it is much better to be a financial cripple with a
- 36:23government guarantee than a Gibraltar without one.
- 36:26Today's extreme conditions may soon end.
- 36:28At worst, we believe we will find at least a partial solution
- 36:32that will allow us to continue much of Clayton's lending.
- 36:35Clayton's earnings, however, will surely suffer if we are
- 36:39forced to compete for long against government favored
- 36:42lenders. Income before investment and
- 36:44derivatives gains or losses. 787 dollars 1006 dollars includes
- 36:51$92 million in 2008 and $85 million in 2007 of fees that
- 36:58Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire's credit.
- 37:0212th Tax Exempt bond insurance Early in 2008, we activated
- 37:07Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Company, BHAC as an insurer of
- 37:11the tax exempt bonds issued by states, cities and other local
- 37:15entities. BHAC insures these securities
- 37:18for issuers both at the time their bonds are sold to the
- 37:22public, primary transactions, and later, when the bonds are
- 37:25already owned by investors, secondary transactions.
- 37:29By year end 2007, the half dozen or so companies that had been
- 37:33the major players in this business had all fallen into big
- 37:36trouble. The cause of their problems was
- 37:38captured long ago by Mae. WI was Snow White, but I drifted
- 37:43the mono lines as the bond insurers are called, initially
- 37:46insured only tax exempt bonds that were low risk.
- 37:50But over the years, competition for this business intensified
- 37:53and rates fell. Faced with the prospect of
- 37:56stagnating or declining earnings, the mono line managers
- 37:59turn to ever riskier propositions.
- 38:02Some of these involve the insuring of residential mortgage
- 38:05obligations. When housing prices plummeted,
- 38:08the mono line industry quickly became a basket case.
- 38:12Early in the year, Berkshire offered to assume all of the
- 38:15insurance issued on tax exempt that was on the books of the
- 38:19three largest mono lines. These companies were all in life
- 38:23threatening trouble, though they said otherwise we would have
- 38:26charged a 11/2 percent rate to take over the guarantees on
- 38:30about $822 billion of bonds. If our offer had been accepted,
- 38:35we would have been required to pay any losses suffered by
- 38:38investors who owned these bonds. Are guarantees stretching for 40
- 38:42years in some cases. Ours was not a frivolous
- 38:45proposal for reasons we will come to later.
- 38:48It involves substantial risk for Berkshire.
- 38:51The Mono line summarily rejected our offer, in some cases a
- 38:54pending an insult or two. In the end though, the turn
- 38:58downs proved to be very good news for us because it became
- 39:01apparent that I had severely underpriced our offer.
- 39:05Thereafter, we wrote about $15.6 billion of insurance in the
- 39:09secondary market and hey race the punch line.
- 39:13About 77% of this business was on bonds that were already
- 39:16insured, largely by the three aforementioned mono lines.
- 39:20In these agreements, we have to pay for defaults only if the
- 39:24original insurer is financially unable to do so.
- 39:27We wrote this 2nd to pay insurance for rates averaging
- 39:303.3%. That's right, we have been paid
- 39:34far more for becoming the 2nd to pay than the 1.5% we would have
- 39:38earlier charged to be the 1st to pay.
- 39:41In one extreme case, we actually agreed to be 4th to pay
- 39:45nonetheless receiving about three times the 1% premium
- 39:49charged by the mono line that remains 1st to pay.
- 39:52In other words, three other mono lines have to 1st go broke
- 39:56before we need to write a check. Two of the three mono lines to
- 39:59which we made our initial bulk offer later raised.
- 40:02Substantial capital. This of course directly helps us
- 40:06since it makes it less likely that we will have to pay, at
- 40:09least in the near term, any claims on our 2nd to pay
- 40:12insurance because these two mono lines fail.
- 40:15In addition to our book of secondary business, we have also
- 40:19written $3.7 billion of primary business for a premium of
- 40:23$96,000,000. In primary business, of course,
- 40:28we are 1st to pay if the issuer gets in trouble.
- 40:31We have a great many more multiples of capital behind the
- 40:34insurance we write than does any other monoline.
- 40:37Consequently, our guarantee is far more valuable than there, as
- 40:42this explains why many sophisticated investors have
- 40:45bought 2nd to pay insurance from us even though they were already
- 40:48insured by another monoline. BHH has become not only the
- 40:53insurer of preference but in many cases the sole insurer
- 40:56acceptable too bondholders. Nevertheless, we remain very
- 41:01cautious about the business we write and regard it as far from
- 41:04assure thing that this insurance will ultimately be profitable
- 41:08for us. The reason is simple, though I
- 41:10have never seen even a passing reference to it by any financial
- 41:14analyst, rating agency, or monoline CEO. 13 The rationale
- 41:19behind very low premium rates for insuring tax exempts has
- 41:23been that default half historically been few, But that
- 41:26record largely reflects the experience of entities that
- 41:29issued uninsured bonds. Insurance of tax exempt bonds
- 41:33didn't exist before 1971, and even after that most bonds
- 41:37remained uninsured. A universe of tax exempt, fully
- 41:41covered by insurance would be certain to have a somewhat
- 41:44different lost experience from a group of uninsured but otherwise
- 41:48similar bonds, the only question being how different.
- 41:51To understand why, let's go back to 1975, when New York City was
- 41:56on the edge of bankruptcy. At the time it's bonds,
- 41:59virtually all uninsured, were heavily held by the city's
- 42:02wealthier residents, as well as by New York banks and other
- 42:06institutions. These local bondholders deeply
- 42:09desire to solve the city's fiscal problems, so before long,
- 42:13concessions and cooperation from a host of involved
- 42:16constituencies produced a solution.
- 42:19Without one, it was apparent to all that New York citizens and
- 42:22businesses would have experienced widespread and
- 42:25severe financial losses from their bond holdings.
- 42:28Now imagine that all of the city's bonds had instead been
- 42:32insured by Berkshire with similar belt tightening tax
- 42:35increases, labor concessions, etcetera have been forthcoming.
- 42:39Of course not. At a minimum Berkshire would
- 42:42have been asked to share in the required sacrifices and
- 42:46considering our deep pockets, the required contribution would
- 42:49most certainly have been substantial.
- 42:52Local governments are going to face far tougher fiscal problems
- 42:55in the future than they have to date.
- 42:57The pension liabilities I talked about in last year's report will
- 43:01be a huge contributor to these woes.
- 43:03Many cities and states were surely horrified when they
- 43:06inspected the status of their funding at year in 2008.
- 43:10The gap between assets and a realistic actuarial valuation of
- 43:15present liabilities is simply staggering.
- 43:17When faced with large revenue shortfalls, communities that
- 43:21have all of their bonds insured will be more prone to develop
- 43:24solutions less favorable to bondholders than those
- 43:27communities that have uninsured bonds held by local banks and
- 43:31residents. Losses in the tax exempt arena,
- 43:34when they come, are also likely to be highly correlated among
- 43:38issuers. If a few communities stiff their
- 43:40creditors and get away with it, the chance that others will
- 43:44follow in their footsteps will grow.
- 43:46What mayor or City Council is going to choose paying to local
- 43:49citizens in the form of major tax increases?
- 43:52Overpaying to a faraway bond insurer?
- 43:55Insuring tax exempts, therefore has the look today of a
- 43:59dangerous business, one with similarities in fact to the
- 44:03insuring of natural catastrophes.
- 44:05In both cases, a string of loss free years can be followed by a
- 44:09devastating experience that more than wipes out all earlier
- 44:13profits. We will try therefore, to
- 44:16proceed carefully in this business, eschewing many classes
- 44:20of bonds that other mono lines regularly embrace.
- 44:23The type of fallacy involved in projecting loss experience from
- 44:27a universe of non insured bonds onto a deceptively similar
- 44:31universe in which many bonds are insured pops up in other areas
- 44:35of finance. Back tested models of many kinds
- 44:38are susceptible to this sort of error.
- 44:40Nevertheless, they are frequently touted in financial
- 44:44markets as guides to future action that if merely looking up
- 44:47past financial data, would tell you what the future holds, the
- 44:50Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.
- 44:53Indeed, the stupefying losses in mortgage related securities came
- 44:57in large part because of flawed history based models used by
- 45:01salesman rating agencies and investors.
- 45:04These parties looked at loss experience over periods when
- 45:07home prices rose only moderately and speculation in houses was
- 45:11negligible. They then made this experience a
- 45:14yardstick for evaluating future losses.
- 45:17They blissfully ignored the fact that house prices had recently
- 45:21skyrocketed, loan practices had deteriorated, and many buyers
- 45:25had opted for houses they couldn't afford.
- 45:28In short, universe past and universe current had very
- 45:31different characteristics, but lenders, government and media
- 45:35largely failed to recognize this all important fact. 14 Investors
- 45:41should be skeptical of history based models constructed by a
- 45:44nerdy sounding priesthood using esoteric terms such as beta,
- 45:48gamma, Sigma and the like. These models tend to look
- 45:51impressive. Too often, though, investors
- 45:54forget to examine the assumptions behind the symbols.
- 45:58Our advice? Beware of geeks bearing
- 46:00formulas. A final postscript on BHAC.
- 46:04Who, you may wonder, runs this operation While I help set
- 46:08policy? All of the heavy lifting is done
- 46:10by a Jayet and his crew. Sure, they were already
- 46:14generating $24 billion of float along with hundreds of millions
- 46:18of underwriting profit annually, but how busy can that keep a 31
- 46:22person group? Charlie and I decided it was
- 46:25high time for them to start doing a full day's work.
- 46:27Investments. Because of accounting rules, we
- 46:30divide our large holdings of common stocks this year into two
- 46:34categories. The table below presenting the
- 46:37first category itemizes investments that are carried on
- 46:40our balance she'd at market value and that had a year in
- 46:44value of more than $500 million. One 123,108 percentage of
- 46:50company shares, company owned cost, market write ups or write
- 46:54downs that have been required. In addition, we have holdings in
- 46:58Moody's and Burlington Northern Santa Fe that we now carry at
- 47:01equity value. Our cost plus retained earnings
- 47:04since our purchase minus the tax that would be paid if those
- 47:08earnings were paid to us as dividends.
- 47:11This accounting treatment is usually required when ownership
- 47:14of an invest EE company reaches 20%.
- 47:17We purchased 15% of Moody's some years ago and have not since
- 47:21bought a share. Moody's though has repurchased
- 47:24its own shares and by late 2008, those repurchase S reduced its
- 47:30outstanding shares to the point that our holdings rose above
- 47:3320%. Burlington Northern has also
- 47:36repurchased shares, but our increase to 20% primarily
- 47:40occurred because we continued to buy this stock 15 Unless facts
- 47:45or rules change, you will see these holdings reflected in our
- 47:48balance sheet at equity accounting values, whatever
- 47:51their market prices. You will also see our share of
- 47:54their earnings less applicable taxes regularly included in our
- 47:58quarterly and annual earnings. I told you in an earlier part of
- 48:02this report that last year I made a major mistake of
- 48:05Commission and maybe more. This one sticks out.
- 48:08Without urging from Charlie or anyone else, I bought a large
- 48:12amount of Konoco Phillips stock when oil and gas prices were
- 48:15near their peak. I in no way anticipated the
- 48:18dramatic fall in energy prices that occurred in the last half
- 48:22of the year. I still believe the odds are
- 48:24good that oil sells far higher in the future than the current
- 48:28$40 to $50 price. But so far I have been dead
- 48:31wrong, even if prices should rise.
- 48:34Moreover, the terrible timing of my purchase has cost Berkshire
- 48:37several billion dollars. I made some other already
- 48:40recognizable errors as well. They were smaller, but
- 48:43unfortunately not that small. During 2008, I spent $244
- 48:49million for shares of two Irish banks that appeared cheap tone.
- 48:53At year end we wrote these holdings down to market $27
- 48:57million for an 89% loss. Since then, the two stocks have
- 49:02declined even further. The tennis crowd would call my
- 49:05mistakes on forced errors. On the plus side, last year we
- 49:08made purchases totaling $14.5 billion in fixed income
- 49:13securities issued by Wrigley, Goldman Sachs and General
- 49:16Electric. We very much like these
- 49:18commitments, which carry high current yields that in
- 49:22themselves make the investments more than satisfactory.
- 49:25But in each of these three purchases, we also acquired A
- 49:29substantial equity participation.
- 49:31As a bonus to fund these large purchases, I had to sell
- 49:35portions of some holdings that I would have preferred to keep,
- 49:37primarily Johnson and Johnson, Proctor and Gamble, and Konoco
- 49:42Phillips. However, I have plajeto you, the
- 49:45rating agencies and myself to always run Berkshire with more
- 49:49than ample cash. We never want to count on the
- 49:51kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow's obligations.
- 49:55When forced to choose, I will not trade even a night's sleep
- 49:59for the chance of extra profits. The investment world has gone
- 50:03from under pricing risk to overpricing it.
- 50:05This change has not been minor. The pendulum has covered an
- 50:09extraordinary arc. A few years ago it would have
- 50:12seemed unthinkable that yields like today's could have been
- 50:15obtained on good grade municipal or corporate bonds, even while
- 50:19risk free governments offered near 0 returns on short term
- 50:23bonds and no better than a pittance on long terms.
- 50:26When the financial history of this decade is written, it will
- 50:30surely speak of the Internet bubble of the late 1990s in the
- 50:34housing bubble of the early 2000 S.
- 50:37But the US Treasury bond bubble of late 2008 may be regarded as
- 50:42almost equally extraordinary. Clinging to cash equivalents or
- 50:47long term government bonds at present yields is almost
- 50:50certainly a terrible policy if continued for long.
- 50:54Holders of these instruments, of course, have felt increasingly
- 50:57comfortable, in fact almost smug, in following this policy
- 51:01as financial turmoil has mounted.
- 51:03They regard their judgement confirmed when they hear
- 51:06commentators proclaim cash is king, even though that wonderful
- 51:10cash is earning close to nothing and will surely find its
- 51:13purchasing power eroded over time.
- 51:16Approval, though, is not the goal of investing.
- 51:19In fact, approval is often counterproductive because it
- 51:23sedates the brain and makes it less receptive to new facts or a
- 51:27re examination of conclusions formed earlier.
- 51:29Beware the investment activity that produces applause.
- 51:33The great moves are usually greeted by yawns.
- 51:35Derivatives. Derivatives are dangerous.
- 51:38They have dramatically increased the leverage and risks in our
- 51:42financial system. They have made it almost
- 51:44impossible for investors to understand and analyze our
- 51:48largest commercial banks and investment banks.
- 51:51They allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in massive
- 51:54misstatements of earnings for years.
- 51:57So indecipherable were Freddie and Fannie that their federal
- 52:00regulator of HEO, who's more than 100 employees had no job
- 52:05except the oversight of these two institutions totally missed
- 52:08their cooking of the books. 16 Indeed, recent events
- 52:13demonstrate that certain big name CEOs or former CEOs at
- 52:17major financial institutions were simply incapable of
- 52:21managing a business with a huge, complex book of derivatives
- 52:25include Charlie and Maine, this hapless group.
- 52:28When Berkshire purchased General Rhee in 1998, we knew we could
- 52:32not get our minds around its book of 23,218 derivatives
- 52:37contracts made with 884 counterparties, many of which we
- 52:41had never heard of. So we decided to close up shop.
- 52:45Though we were under no pressure and we're operating in benign
- 52:48markets as we exited, it took us five years and more than $400
- 52:53million in losses to largely complete the task.
- 52:56Upon leaving, our feelings about the business mirrored a line in
- 53:00a country song. I like you better before I got
- 53:03to know you so well. Improve transparency.
- 53:06A favorite remedy of politicians, commentators, and
- 53:10financial regulators for averting future train wrecks
- 53:13won't cure the problems that derivatives pose.
- 53:16I know of no reporting mechanism that would come close to
- 53:19describing and measuring the risks in a huge and complex
- 53:23portfolio of derivatives. Auditors can't audit these
- 53:26contracts and regulators can't regulate them.
- 53:29When I read the pages off disclosure in 10 KS of companies
- 53:33that are entangled with these instruments, all I end up
- 53:35knowing is that I don't know what is going on in their
- 53:38portfolios. And then I reach for some
- 53:40aspirin. For a case study on regulatory
- 53:43effectiveness, let's look harder at the Freddie and Fannie
- 53:46example. These giant institutions were
- 53:48created by Congress, which retained control over them,
- 53:52dictating what they could and could not do.
- 53:54To aid its oversight, Congress created of HEO in 1992,
- 53:59admonishing it to make sure the two behemoths were behaving
- 54:02themselves. With that move, Fannie and
- 54:05Freddie became the most intensely regulated companies of
- 54:08which I am aware, as measured by manpower assigned to the task.
- 54:12On June 152003 of HE OS annual reports are available on the
- 54:18Internet sent its 2002 report to Congress, specifically to its
- 54:23four bosses in the Senate and House, among them none other
- 54:27than Mess, Rs Sarbanes and Oxley.
- 54:30The report's 127 pages included a self congratulatory cover line
- 54:35celebrating 10 years off excellence.
- 54:38The transmittal letter and report were delivered nine days
- 54:41after the CEO and CFO of Freddie Hat resigned in disgrace and the
- 54:46CEO had been fired. No mention of their departures
- 54:49was made in the letter, even while the report concluded, as
- 54:53it always did, that both enterprises were financially
- 54:56sound and well managed. In truth, both enterprises had
- 55:00engaged in massive accounting shenanigans for some time.
- 55:03Finally, in 2006, of HEO issued A340 page scathing chronicle of
- 55:09the sins of Fanny that more or less blamed the fiasco on every
- 55:14party but, you guessed it, Congress, And of HEO, the Bear
- 55:17Stearns collapse highlights the counterparty problem embedded in
- 55:21derivatives transactions. A time bomb I first discussed in
- 55:25Berkshire's 2002 report on April 32008, Tim Gieffner, then the
- 55:32able president of the New York Fed, explained the need for a
- 55:35rescue. The sudden discovery by Bears
- 55:38derivative counterparties that important financial positions
- 55:42they had put in place to protect themselves from financial risk
- 55:45were no longer operative would have triggered substantial
- 55:48further dislocation in markets. This would have precipitated a
- 55:51rush by Bears counterparties to liquidate the collateral they
- 55:55held against those positions and to attempt to replicate those
- 55:59positions in already very fragile markets.
- 56:02This is Fed speak for we stepped in to avoid a financial chain
- 56:06reaction of unpredictable magnitude.
- 56:08In my opinion, the Fed was right to do so.
- 56:11A normal stock or bond trade is completed in a few days, with
- 56:15one party getting its cash the other it's securities.
- 56:19Counterparty risk therefore quickly disappears, which means
- 56:22credit problems can't accumulate.
- 56:24This rapid settlement process is key to maintaining the integrity
- 56:28of markets. That, in fact, is a reason for
- 56:32NYSE and NASDAQ shortening the settlement period from 5 days to
- 56:36three days in 1995. Derivatives contracts, in
- 56:40contrast, often go unsettled for years or even decades, with
- 56:45counterparties building up huge claims against each other.
- 56:49Paper assets and liabilities, often hard to quantify, become
- 56:53important parts of financial statements, though these items
- 56:56will not be validated for many years.
- 56:59Additionally, A frightening web of mutual dependence develops
- 57:02among huge financial institutions.
- 57:05Receivable S and payable S by the billions become concentrated
- 57:09in the hands of a few large dealers who are apartment to be
- 57:12highly leveraged in other ways as well.
- 57:15Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem
- 57:18as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease.
- 57:22It's not just whom you sleep with, but also whom they are
- 57:24sleeping with. 17 Sleeping around, to continue our
- 57:28metaphor, can actually be useful for large derivatives dealers
- 57:32because it assures them government aid if trouble hits.
- 57:36In other words, only companies having problems that can infect
- 57:39the entire neighborhood, I won't mention names are certain to
- 57:42become a concern of the stadium outcome.
- 57:45Am sad to say that is proper. From this irritating reality
- 57:49comes the first law of corporate survival for ambitious CEO's who
- 57:54pile on leverage and run large and unfathomable derivatives
- 57:57books. Modest incompetence simply won't
- 58:00do. It's mind boggling screw ups
- 58:03that are required considering the ruin I've pictured.
- 58:06You may wonder why Berkshire is a party to 251 derivatives
- 58:10contracts other than those used for operational purposes at Mid
- 58:13American and the few leftover at Genre.
- 58:16The answer is simple. I believe each contract we own
- 58:20was mispriced at inception, sometimes dramatically so.
- 58:23I both initiated these positions and monitor them, a set of
- 58:28responsibilities consistent with my belief that the CEO of any
- 58:31large financial organization must be the Chief Risk Officer
- 58:35as well. If we lose money on our
- 58:37derivatives, it will be my fault.
- 58:39Our derivatives dealings require our counterparties to make
- 58:42payments to us when contracts are initiated.
- 58:46Berkshire therefore always holds the money, which leaves us
- 58:49assuming no meaningful counterparty risk.
- 58:52As of year end, the payments made to us less losses we have
- 58:55paid. Our derivatives float, so to
- 58:57speak, totaled $8.1 billion. This float is similar to
- 59:02insurance float. If we break even on an
- 59:05underlying transaction, we will have enjoyed the use of free
- 59:09money for a long time. Our expectation, though it is
- 59:12far from a sure thing, is that we will do better than break
- 59:16even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the
- 59:19funds will be frosting on the cake.
- 59:21Only a small percentage of our contracts call for any posting
- 59:25of collateral when the market moves against us.
- 59:28Even under the chaotic conditions existing in last
- 59:31year's fourth quarter, we had to post less than 1% of our
- 59:35securities portfolio. When we post collateral, we
- 59:38deposit it with third parties, meanwhile retaining the
- 59:42investment earnings on the deposited securities.
- 59:45In our 2002 annual report, we warned of the lethal threat that
- 59:49posting requirements create, real life illustrations of which
- 59:53we witnessed last year at a variety of financial
- 59:56institutions and for that matter at Constellation Energy, which
- 1:00:00was within hours of bankruptcy when Mid American arrived to
- 1:00:04effect a rescue. Our contracts fall into four
- 1:00:07major categories. With apologies to those who are
- 1:00:10not fascinated by financial instruments, I will explain them
- 1:00:14in excruciating detail. We have added modestly to the
- 1:00:17equity put portfolio I described in last year's report.
- 1:00:21Some of our contracts come due in 15 years, others in 20.
- 1:00:25We must make a payment to our counterparty ad maturity if the
- 1:00:29reference index to which the put is tied is then below what it
- 1:00:32was at the inception of contract.
- 1:00:35Neither party can elect to settle early.
- 1:00:37It's only the price on the final day that counts.
- 1:00:40To illustrate, we might sell a 1 billion dollars 15 year put
- 1:00:44contract on the S&P 500 when that index is at say 1300.
- 1:00:50If the index is at 1170, down 10% on the day of maturity, we
- 1:00:54would pay $100 million. If it is above 1300, we owe
- 1:00:59nothing. For us to lose $1 billion, the
- 1:01:02index would have Togo to zero. In the meantime, the sale of the
- 1:01:06put would have delivered us a premium, perhaps $100 million to
- 1:01:10$150.00 million that we would be free to invest as we wish.
- 1:01:15Our put contracts total $37.1 billion at current exchange
- 1:01:20rates and are spread among for major indices, the S&P 500 in
- 1:01:25the US, the FTSE 100 in the UK, the Euro S to 2050 in Europe and
- 1:01:31the Nikkei 225 in Japan. Our first contract comes due on
- 1:01:36September 92019 and our last on January 24th, 2028.
- 1:01:42We have received premiums of $4.9 billion, money we have
- 1:01:46invested. We meanwhile have paid nothing
- 1:01:49since all expiration dates are far in the future.
- 1:01:52Nonetheless, we have used Black Scholl's valuation methods to
- 1:01:56record a year in liability of $10 billion, an amount that will
- 1:02:01change one very reporting date the two financial items.
- 1:02:04This estimated loss of $10 billion minus the 4.9 dollars
- 1:02:09billion in premiums we have received means that we have so
- 1:02:13far reported a mark to market loss of $5.1 billion from these
- 1:02:17contracts. 18 we endorse mark to market accounting.
- 1:02:21I will explain later however why I believe the Black Scholl's
- 1:02:25formula, even though it is the standard for establishing the
- 1:02:29dollar liability for options produces strange results when
- 1:02:32the long term variety are being valued.
- 1:02:35One point about our contracts that is sometimes not
- 1:02:38understood. For us to lose the full $37.1
- 1:02:41billion we have at risk, all stocks in all four indices would
- 1:02:46have to go to 0 on their various termination dates.
- 1:02:49If, however, as an example, all indices fell 25% from their
- 1:02:54value at the inception of each contract and foreign exchange
- 1:02:58rates remained as they are today, we would owe about $9
- 1:03:00billion payable between 2019 and 2028.
- 1:03:05Between the inception of the contract and those dates, we
- 1:03:08would have held the $4.9 billion premium and earned investment
- 1:03:13income on it. The second category we described
- 1:03:16in last year's report concerns derivatives requiring us to pay
- 1:03:20when credit losses occur at companies that are included in
- 1:03:23various high yield indices. Our standard contract covers A5
- 1:03:27year period and involves 100 companies.
- 1:03:30We modestly expanded our position last year in this
- 1:03:33category, but of course the contracts on the books at the
- 1:03:37end of 2007 moved one you're closer to their maturity.
- 1:03:41Overall, our contracts now have an average life of 21 three
- 1:03:45years with the first expiration due to occur on September 202009
- 1:03:51and the last on December 202013. By year and we had received
- 1:03:56premiums of $3.4 billion on these contracts and paid losses
- 1:04:00of $542 million. Using mark to market principles,
- 1:04:05we also set up a liability for future losses that at year end
- 1:04:09totaled $3.0 billion. Thus we had to that point
- 1:04:13recorded a loss of about $100 million derived from our $3.5
- 1:04:19billion total in paid and estimated future losses minus
- 1:04:23the $3.4 billion of premiums we received in our quarterly
- 1:04:27reports. However, the amount of gain or
- 1:04:30loss has swung wildly from a profit of $327 million in the
- 1:04:35second quarter of 2008 to a loss of $693,000,000 in the fourth
- 1:04:41quarter of 2008. Surprisingly, we made payments
- 1:04:45on these contracts of only $97 million last year, far below the
- 1:04:50estimate I used when I decided to enter into them.
- 1:04:53This year, however, losses have accelerated sharply with the
- 1:04:57mushrooming of large bankruptcies.
- 1:04:59In last year's letter, it old you I expected these contracts
- 1:05:03to show a profit at expiration. Now, with the recession
- 1:05:07deepening at a rapid rate, the possibility of an eventual loss
- 1:05:11has increased. Whatever the result, I will keep
- 1:05:14you posted. In 2008, we began to write
- 1:05:16credit default swaps on individual companies.
- 1:05:19This is simply credit insurance, similar to what we write in
- 1:05:23BHAC, except that here we bear the credit risk of corporations
- 1:05:28rather than of tax exempt issuers.
- 1:05:30If, say, the XYZ company goes bankrupt and we have written a
- 1:05:34$100 million contract, we are obligated to pay an amount that
- 1:05:39reflects the shrinkage in value of a comparable amount of XYZ's
- 1:05:43debt. If, for example, the company's
- 1:05:46bonds are selling for 30 after default, we would owe $70
- 1:05:50million For the typical contract.
- 1:05:53We receive quarterly payments for five years after which hour
- 1:05:56insurance expires. At year end, we had written $4
- 1:06:00billion of contracts covering 42 corporations for which we
- 1:06:04receive annual premiums of $93 million.
- 1:06:08This is the only derivatives business we write that has any
- 1:06:12counterparty risk. The party that buys the contract
- 1:06:15from us must be good for the quarterly premiums it will owe
- 1:06:18us over the five years. We are unlikely to expand this
- 1:06:22business to any extent because most buyers of this protection
- 1:06:26now insist that the seller post collateral and we will not enter
- 1:06:29into such an arrangement. At the request of our customers,
- 1:06:33we write a few tax exempt bond insurance contracts that are
- 1:06:37similar to those written at BHAC but that are structured as
- 1:06:40derivatives. The only meaningful difference
- 1:06:43between the two contracts is that Mark to market accounting
- 1:06:47is required for derivatives, whereas standard accrual
- 1:06:50accounting is required at BHAC 19.
- 1:06:53But this difference can produce some strange results.
- 1:06:56The bonds covered in effect insured by these derivatives are
- 1:07:00largely general obligations of states, and we feel good about
- 1:07:04them at your end. However, Mark to market
- 1:07:07accounting required us to record a loss of $631 million on these
- 1:07:12derivatives contracts. Had we instead insured the same
- 1:07:15bonds at the same price in BHAC and used the accrual accounting
- 1:07:20required at insurance companies, we would have recorded a small
- 1:07:23profit for the year. The two methods by which we
- 1:07:27insure the bonds will eventually produce the same accounting
- 1:07:30result. In the short term, however, the
- 1:07:33variance in reported profits can be substantial.
- 1:07:36We have told you before that our derivative contracts, subject as
- 1:07:40they are to mark to market accounting, will produce wild
- 1:07:43swings in the earnings we report.
- 1:07:45The UPS and downs neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me.
- 1:07:49Indeed, the downs can be helpful in that they give us an
- 1:07:52opportunity to expand a position on favorable terms.
- 1:07:56I hope this explanation of our dealings will lead you to think
- 1:07:58similarly. The Black Shoals formula has
- 1:08:01approached the status of wholly ridden finance and we use it
- 1:08:05when valuing our equity put options for financial statement
- 1:08:08purposes. Key inputs to the calculation
- 1:08:11include a contracts maturity and strike price as well as the
- 1:08:15analysts expectations for volatility, interest rates and
- 1:08:19dividends. If the formula is applied to
- 1:08:21extended time periods, however, it can produce absurd results.
- 1:08:26In fairness, Black and Scholes almost certainly understood this
- 1:08:29point well, But they're devoted followers may be ignoring
- 1:08:32whatever caveats the two men attached when they first
- 1:08:35unveiled the formula. It's often useful in testing a
- 1:08:39theory to push it to extremes, so let's postulate that.
- 1:08:42Vasel Law 100 year $1.00 billion Put option on the S&P 500 at a
- 1:08:48strike price of 903. The indexes level on 123108.
- 1:08:53Using the implied volatility assumption for long dated
- 1:08:56contracts that we do and combining that with appropriate
- 1:09:00interest and dividend assumptions, we would find the
- 1:09:03proper Black Shoals premium for this contract to be $2.5
- 1:09:07million. To judge the rationality of that
- 1:09:09premium, we need to assess whether the S&P will be valued a
- 1:09:13century from now at less than today.
- 1:09:16Certainly the dollar will then be worth a small fraction of its
- 1:09:19present value. We had only 2% inflation, it
- 1:09:22will be worth roughly 14, so that will be a factor pushing
- 1:09:26the stated value of the index higher.
- 1:09:28Far more important, however, is that 100 years of retained
- 1:09:32earnings will hugely increase the value of most of the
- 1:09:35companies in the index. In the 20 TH century, the Dow
- 1:09:39Jones Industrial Average increased by about 175 fold,
- 1:09:44mainly because of this retained earnings factor.
- 1:09:47Considering everything, I believe the probability of a
- 1:09:50decline in the index over a 100 year period to be far less than
- 1:09:541%. But let's use that figure and
- 1:09:57also assume that the most likely decline, should one occur, is
- 1:10:0050%. Under these assumptions, the
- 1:10:03mathematical expectation of loss on our contract would be $5
- 1:10:07million, $1 billion X 1% X 50%. But if we had received our
- 1:10:12theoretical premium of $2.5 million upfront, we would have
- 1:10:17only had to invest it at 0.7% compounded annually to cover
- 1:10:22this loss expectancy. Everything earned above that
- 1:10:25would have been profit. Would you like to borrow money
- 1:10:28for 100 years at a 0.7% rate? Let's look at my example from a
- 1:10:32worst case standpoint. Remember that 99% of the time we
- 1:10:36would pay nothing if my assumptions are correct.
- 1:10:39But even in the worst case, among the remaining 1% of
- 1:10:42possibilities, that is 1 Assuming a total loss of $1
- 1:10:46billion, our borrowing cost would come to only 6.2%.
- 1:10:50Clearly, either my assumptions are crazy or the formula is
- 1:10:54inappropriate. 20 The ridiculous premium that Black Scholes
- 1:10:58dictates in my extreme example is caused by the inclusion of
- 1:11:02volatility in the formula and by the fact that volatility is
- 1:11:06determined by how much stocks have moved around in some past
- 1:11:09period of days, months, or years.
- 1:11:12This metric is simply irrelevant in estimating the probability
- 1:11:17weighted range of values of American business 100 years from
- 1:11:20now. Imagine, if you will, getting a
- 1:11:23quote every day on a farm from a manic depressive neighbor, and
- 1:11:27then using the volatility calculated from these changing
- 1:11:30quotes as an important ingredient in an equation that
- 1:11:33predicts A probability weighted range of values for the farm a
- 1:11:37century from now. Though historical volatility is
- 1:11:39a useful but far from foolproof concept in valuing short term
- 1:11:43options, its utility diminishes rapidly as the duration of the
- 1:11:47option lengthens. In my opinion, the evaluations
- 1:11:51that the Black Scholes formula now place on our long term put
- 1:11:55options overstate our liability, though the overstatement will
- 1:11:59diminish as the contracts approach maturity.
- 1:12:01Even so, we will continue to use Black Shoals when we are
- 1:12:05estimating our financial statement liability.
- 1:12:08For long term equity puts. The formula represents
- 1:12:11conventional wisdom, and any substitute that I might offer
- 1:12:15would engender extreme skepticism.
- 1:12:17That would be perfectly understandable.
- 1:12:19CEOs who have concocted their own valuations for esoteric
- 1:12:23financial instruments have seldom aired on the side of
- 1:12:26conservatism. That club of optimists is one
- 1:12:29that Charlie and I have no desire to join.
- 1:12:32The annual meeting. Our meeting this year will be
- 1:12:34held on Saturday, May 2nd in D. As always, the doors will open
- 1:12:38at the Quest center at 7:00 AM and a new Berkshire movie will
- 1:12:42be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to
- 1:12:46the question and answer period, which, with a break for lunch at
- 1:12:49the quest stands, will last until 3:00.
- 1:12:53Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the
- 1:12:57Annual Meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during
- 1:13:00the days question periods, please do so while Charlie is
- 1:13:04talking. The best reason to exit, of
- 1:13:06course, is to shop. We will help you do that by
- 1:13:09filling the 194300 square foothold that adjoins the
- 1:13:14meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries.
- 1:13:17Last year, the 31,000 people who came to the meeting did their
- 1:13:21part and almost every location racked up record sales.
- 1:13:25But you can do better. A friendly warning, if I find
- 1:13:28sales are lagging, I lock the exits.
- 1:13:31This year Clayton will showcase its new I house that includes
- 1:13:34Shaw flooring, John's Manville insulation and ME Tech
- 1:13:38fasteners. This innovative green home
- 1:13:40featuring solar panels and numerous other energy saving
- 1:13:44products is truly a home of the future.
- 1:13:47Estimated cost for electricity and heating total only about
- 1:13:51$1.00 per day when the home is sighted in an area like Omaha.
- 1:13:55After purchasing the I house, you should next consider the
- 1:13:58Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby.
- 1:14:02Make your neighbors jealous. GEICO will have a booth staffed
- 1:14:05by a number of its top counselors from around the
- 1:14:07country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance
- 1:14:11quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be
- 1:14:14able to give you a shareholder discount, usually 8%.
- 1:14:17This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 50 jurisdictions in
- 1:14:21which we operate. 1 Supplemental point the discount is not
- 1:14:26additive if you qualify for another such as that given
- 1:14:29certain groups. Bring the details of your
- 1:14:31existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money
- 1:14:35for at least 50% of you. I believe we can.
- 1:14:38On Saturday at the Omaha Airport, we will have the usual
- 1:14:42array of Net Jets aircraft available for your inspection.
- 1:14:46Stop by the Net Jets booth at the Quest to learn about viewing
- 1:14:49these planes. Come to Omaha by bus, leaving
- 1:14:52your new plane, and take, along with No Fear of a strip search,
- 1:14:56the gins you knives that you've purchased at the exhibit of our
- 1:14:59Cut Cut subsidiary. Next, if you have any money
- 1:15:02left, visit the Bookworm, which will be selling about 30 books
- 1:15:06and DVDs. A shipping service will be
- 1:15:08available for those whose thirst for knowledge exceeds their
- 1:15:11carrying capacity. 21 Finally, we will have 3 fascinating cars
- 1:15:17in the exhibition floor, including one from the past and
- 1:15:20one of the future. Paul Andrews, CEO of our
- 1:15:24subsidiary TTI will bring his 1935 Dwessenberg, a car that
- 1:15:29wants belonged to Missus Forrest Mars, senior parent and
- 1:15:33grandparent of our new partners in the Wrigley purchase.
- 1:15:37The future will be represented by a new plug in electric car
- 1:15:40developed by by D, an amazing Chinese company in which we have
- 1:15:44a 10% interest. An attachment to the proxy
- 1:15:47material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can
- 1:15:50obtain the credential you will need for admission to the
- 1:15:53meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car
- 1:15:57reservations, we have again signed up American Express
- 1:16:00800-799-6634 to give you special help.
- 1:16:05Carol Peterson, who handles these matters does a terrific
- 1:16:09job for us each year and it Hank her for it.
- 1:16:12Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will
- 1:16:16get one at Nebraska Furniture Mart located on a 77 acre site
- 1:16:20on 72 in D Street between Dodge and Pacific.
- 1:16:24We will again behaving Berkshire weekend discount pricing.
- 1:16:28We initiated this special event at NFM 12 years ago and sales
- 1:16:33during the weekend grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to a record
- 1:16:38$33.3 million in 2008. On Saturday of that weekend we
- 1:16:45also set a single day record of $7.2 million.
- 1:16:49Ask any retailer what he thinks of such volume.
- 1:16:52To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your
- 1:16:54purchases between Thursday, April 30th TH and Monday, May
- 1:16:594th TH, inclusive, and also present your meeting credential.
- 1:17:03The period's special pricing will even apply to the products
- 1:17:06of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have
- 1:17:09ironclad rules against discounting, but which, in the
- 1:17:13spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception
- 1:17:16for you. We appreciate their cooperation.
- 1:17:19NFM is open from 10:00 AM to 9:00 PM, Monday through Saturday
- 1:17:23and 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM on Sunday.
- 1:17:26On Saturday this year from 5:30 PM to 8:00 PM, NFM is having a
- 1:17:31Western cookout to which you are all invited.
- 1:17:34At Borschi IMS we will again have two shareholder only
- 1:17:37events. The first will be a cocktail
- 1:17:40reception from 6:00 PM to 10:00 PM on Friday, May 1st St.
- 1:17:45The second, the main gala will be held on Sunday, May 3rd Rd.
- 1:17:49from 9A dot m.to 4:00 PM. On Saturday we will be open
- 1:17:54until 6:00 PM. We will have huge crowds at
- 1:17:57Borschi IMS throughout the weekend for your convenience.
- 1:18:00Therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday,
- 1:18:04April 27th TH through Saturday May 9th TH.
- 1:18:08During that period, please identify yourself as a
- 1:18:11shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a
- 1:18:14brokerage statement that shows you area.
- 1:18:16Berkshire holder on Sunday in them all outside of Borschi,
- 1:18:20IMSA blindfolded Patrick Wolf twice You dot chess champion
- 1:18:25will take on all comers who will have their eyes wide open in
- 1:18:29groups of 6. Nearby Norman Beck, a remarkable
- 1:18:33magician from Dallas, will be Wilder onlookers.
- 1:18:36Additionally, we will have Bob Ham and and Sharon OS Berg, two
- 1:18:40of the world's top bridge experts, available to play
- 1:18:43bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
- 1:18:47Gore Otts will again be open exclusively for Berkshire
- 1:18:50shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd Rd. and will be serving from
- 1:18:541:00 PM until 10:00 PM. Last year, Gore Otts, which
- 1:18:58seats 240, served 975 dinners on shareholder Sunday.
- 1:19:03The three day total was 2448, including 702 T-bone steaks, the
- 1:19:09entree preferred by the cognos seni.
- 1:19:12Please don't T embarrass me by ordering FOI egra.
- 1:19:15Remember to come Togo rats on that day.
- 1:19:18You must have a reservation to make one.
- 1:19:21Call 402-551-3733 on April 1st but not before.
- 1:19:28We will again have a reception at 4:00 PM on Saturday afternoon
- 1:19:32for shareholders who have come from outside North America.
- 1:19:35Every year our meeting draws many people from around the
- 1:19:38globe and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet
- 1:19:42those who have comes of AR. Last year, we enjoyed meeting
- 1:19:45more than 700 of you from many dozens of countries.
- 1:19:49Any shareholder who comes from outside the USDOT or Canada will
- 1:19:53be given a special credential and instructions for attending
- 1:19:56this function. This year we will be making
- 1:19:59important changes in how we handle the meetings question
- 1:20:01periods. In recent years, we have
- 1:20:04received only a handful of questions directly related to
- 1:20:07Berkshire and its operations. Last year there were practically
- 1:20:11none, so we need to steer the discussion back to Berkshire's
- 1:20:15businesses. In a related problem, there has
- 1:20:17been a mad rush when the doors open at 7:00 AM, led by people
- 1:20:21who wish to be first in line at the 12 microphones available for
- 1:20:25questioners. This is not desirable from a
- 1:20:28safety standpoint. Nordo believed that sprinting
- 1:20:30ability should be the determinant of who gets to pose
- 1:20:33questions that Ath. 78. I've concluded that speed of
- 1:20:38foot is a ridiculously overrated talent.
- 1:20:40Again, a new procedure is desirable.
- 1:20:43In our first change, several financial journalists from
- 1:20:46organizations representing newspapers, magazines and
- 1:20:50television will participate in the question and answer period,
- 1:20:53asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted
- 1:20:57by mail. The journalists and their e-mail
- 1:20:59addresses are Carol Loomis of Fortune, who may be emailed at
- 1:21:03See Loomis fortunemail.com, becky.quickofcnbc@berkshirequestioncnbc.com
- 1:21:10and and Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times at AR
- 1:21:14sorkinetimes.com. From the questions submitted,
- 1:21:17each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides
- 1:21:21are the most interesting and important.
- 1:21:24In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would
- 1:21:26like your name mentioned. If your question is selected,
- 1:21:29neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the
- 1:21:32questions to be asked. We know the journalists will
- 1:21:35pick some tough ones, and that's the way we like it.
- 1:21:38In our second change, we will have a drawing at 8:15 at each
- 1:21:42microphone for those shareholders hoping to ask
- 1:21:45questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate
- 1:21:48the questions asked by the journalists with those from the
- 1:21:51winning shareholders. At least half the questions,
- 1:21:54those selected by the panel from your submissions are therefore
- 1:21:57certain to be Berkshire related. We will meanwhile continue to
- 1:22:00get some good and perhaps entertaining questions from the
- 1:22:03audience as well. So join USA Tour Woodstock for
- 1:22:07Capitalists and let us know how you like the new format.
- 1:22:10Charlie and I look forward to seeing you.
- 1:22:12February 27th, 2009 Warren E Buffett, Chairman of the Board.