Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / The fake ransomware 'rescuer' that's really the same gang calling back
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Saturday, the twenty-second of August.
- 0:07The fake ransomware 'rescuer' that's really the same gang calling back.
- 0:12When a ransomware victim's phone rings a few days after the attack, the caller is meant to be an incident re
- 0:19sponder. This week, researchers at GuidePoint Security documented a group that's worked out how to make that c
- 0:27all first. And get paid for it, without lifting a finger to fix anything.
- 0:32It calls itself "Ransom Busters".
- 0:35It contacts victims of established ransomware gangs before the attack is even public.
- 0:41It claims to have hacked the criminals' own infrastructure, and offers to delete the stolen data and hand bac
- 0:48k the keys. The price is $20,000 to $60,000, a fraction of the original demand.
- 0:55There is no rescue on offer.
- 0:58GuidePoint's forensics show the same intrusion signatures, the same backdoor account password, "Numlock!
- 1:06123", and the same attacker hostname turning up across incidents attributed to three separate ransomware-as-a-
- 1:14service operations: DragonForce, Settra and Anubis.
- 1:18The conclusion? One affiliate, working several gangs at once, running a second extortion racket on the side.
- 1:26Next. The tell in the timing.
- 1:30The giveaway isn't the pitch.
- 1:33It's the clock. Legitimate recovery firms and law enforcement get involved once a breach is public, or once a
- 1:41victim has called them in.
- 1:42Ransom Busters reaches out beforehand.
- 1:45It can only do that because it, or someone it works with, was inside the network.
- 1:51It's the equivalent of a burglar knocking the next morning dressed as a locksmith, offering a discount on fi
- 1:57xing the door they kicked in themselves.
- 1:59The tooling matches too. SoftPerfect Network Scanner for reconnaissance.
- 2:05s5cmd to move data to attacker-controlled A W S storage.
- 2:10A remote monitoring tool dropped in through PowerShell.
- 2:13None of that belongs to a genuine recovery service.
- 2:17All of it belongs to the intrusion.
- 2:19And finally. The Secure by Design lesson.
- 2:23The design failure here isn't technical.
- 2:26It's organisational. Too many boards still don't have a pre-agreed answer to one question: who do we trust wh
- 2:34en someone contacts us claiming to help?
- 2:36That answer needs to exist before an attack.
- 2:39It shouldn't be improvised under pressure, with a countdown timer and a chief executive's inbox.
- 2:45The N C S C maintains an assured Cyber Incident Response scheme precisely so organisations aren't choosing a
- 2:53responder for the first time mid-crisis.
- 2:56So any unsolicited offer of "recovery", especially one that arrives suspiciously early, should go straight to
- 3:04that pre-agreed responder and to law enforcement.
- 3:07Not into a private negotiation.
- 3:09Paying a second extortionist doesn't undo the first extortion.
- 3:14And nothing here guarantees data is actually deleted, rather than quietly kept for a third round.
- 3:20That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:26Thanks for listening.