Latest / Beyond The Horizon / Mega Edition: Virginia Robert's Motion To Compel Documents From Improper Objections (Part 3-5) (7/4/26)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
- 0:04In this episode, we're going to dive right back into
- 0:06the court documents and we're going to continue taking a
- 0:09look at Colaine Maxwell's attempt to gain access to attorney
- 0:14work client privilege between Virginia Roberts and Virginia's lawyers federal law.
- 0:21Rather than discuss Florida privilege law, defendant exclusively cites federal
- 0:26case law see emotion to Compel two to three. Yet,
- 0:30as this Court has previously held in ruling on an
- 0:33earlier privilege motion made by the defendant, state law generally
- 0:37provides the rule of decision in this diversity case. See
- 0:41Maxwell versus Roberts D. One thirty five at six, two
- 0:45sixteen w L one seven five nine one eight at
- 0:49six applying New York privilege law citing Allied Irish Banks
- 0:53versus Bank of America North America to forty FRD ninety
- 0:57six one oh two SDN y two the thousand and seven.
- 1:01Because this court subject matter jurisdiction is based upon diversity,
- 1:05state law provides the rule of decision concerning the claim
- 1:08of attorney client privilege. Accordingly, an argument can be made
- 1:13that New York state law applies in this case, but
- 1:16defendant does not explain why she jumps to federal law.
- 1:19As explained above. In the particular context of a waiver argument,
- 1:23federal rule of evidence five h two applies the more
- 1:27protective of state law or a federal law in determining
- 1:30whether a waiver of privilege has occurred. In this case,
- 1:34the controlling federal law is at least as protective as
- 1:38Florida law. The controlling federal law here it comes from
- 1:41the Second Circuit, including the County of Erie five point
- 1:46six f three d two twenty two, Second Circuit two
- 1:49thousand and eight, a case not even cited, much less
- 1:52discussed by the defendant. In view of the importance of
- 1:56the attorney client privilege. The Second Circuit in that case
- 2:00held that any finding of waiver should be made with
- 2:03caution rather than cite this controlling Second Circuit precedent. Defendant
- 2:07relies on a two thousand and two case from this
- 2:10court applying the herne at issue doctrine. See motion to
- 2:14compel at eight, citing Bank Brussels Lambert versus Credit Lionai's
- 2:18Ssay two ten frd five oh six, five oh nine,
- 2:22and five ten sdn Y, two thousand and two. Ellis
- 2:25Magistrate Judge, quoting Hearne versus Ray, sixty eight Frd five
- 2:30seventy four five eighty one ED. Washington, nineteen seventy five.
- 2:34Defendant goes on to argue that the courts have generally
- 2:37applied the Herne at issue doctrine liberally, finding a broad
- 2:41waiver of attorney client privilege where a party asserts the position,
- 2:45the truth of which can only be assessed by examination
- 2:48of the privileged communication. Motion to compel at eight. Defendant
- 2:53fails to recognize that the Second Circuit has explicitly disavowed
- 2:57the Herne doctrine. In County of five forty six ft
- 3:01three d two twenty two, Second Circuit, two thousand and eight.
- 3:05The Second Circuit explained that courts in our circuit and
- 3:09others have criticized Herne and have applied its tests unevenly
- 3:13at two twenty seven and twenty eight. The Second Circuit
- 3:17also noted that the Hearn test has been subject to
- 3:20academic criticism. See Richard Marcus, The Perils of Privilege Waiver
- 3:24and the Litigator, eighty four. Michigan Revised Copies, sixteen oh
- 3:28five sixteen twenty eight and twenty nine, nineteen eighty six,
- 3:33identifying the faults in the Hearn approach. In light of
- 3:36these strong criticisms of Hearne, the Second Circuit decided that
- 3:40we agree with its critics that the Hearn test cuts
- 3:44too broadly, and therefore conclude that the District Court aired
- 3:48in applying it here Nowhere in the Hearn test, has
- 3:51found the essential element of reliance on privileged advice in
- 3:55the assertion of the claim or defense in order to
- 3:57affect a waiver Dot three d at two twenty nine.
- 4:02The Second Circuit held that for an issue waiver to occur,
- 4:07a party must rely on privileged device from his council
- 4:10to make his claim or his defense. In light of
- 4:13the Second Circuit, courts holding recent cases from this Court
- 4:16have explained that reliance on privileged device in the assertion
- 4:20of the claim or defense is an essential element of
- 4:23a claim waiver. Aristocrat Leisure Limited versus Deutsche Bank Trust
- 4:28Company of Americas four sieves zero one one one four
- 4:33PK L two zero zero nine, w L three one
- 4:37one one seven sixty six at sixteen SDN y September
- 4:41twenty eight, two thousand and nine, for the sake of completeness,
- 4:46it may be relevant to note that New York state
- 4:49privilege applies the same specific protective standard see Bank of
- 4:53New York Mellon forty two, Miscellaneous, three D one seventy one,
- 4:57one seventy seven, nine seventy seven and y two D
- 5:00five sixty five sixty five, Supreme Court, twenty thirteen. At
- 5:05issue waiver occurs when the party has asserted a claim
- 5:08or defense that he intends to prove by use of
- 5:11the privileged materials. An example of an affirmative act that
- 5:15does not constitute at issue waiver of privilege is a
- 5:19party asserting, as an affirmative defense its reliance upon the
- 5:23advice of council. The discussion miss Roberts did not waive
- 5:27her attorney client privilege when Edwards and Cassel filed and
- 5:30pursued their own defamation action against Alan Dershowitz. Defendant's lead
- 5:36argument is that Cassel and Edwards waive Missed Roberts attorney
- 5:39client privilege when they filed and pursued a defamation action
- 5:43against Alan Dershowitz see Motion to compel at ten. This
- 5:47claim is meritless for numerous reasons, including the fact not
- 5:50disclosed by the defendant that this very argument has been
- 5:54fully litigated before the Florida court handling that defamation action,
- 5:58which specifically rejected any finding of waiver A. The Florida
- 6:03Court presiding over the defamation action has already rejected the
- 6:07same waiver claim that defendant is advancing here. The claim
- 6:11that Cassell and Edwards somehow waive miss Robert's attorney client
- 6:15by pursuing their own personal defamation action against Dershowitz has
- 6:19already been the subject of extensive briefing and ultimately a
- 6:23Florida Court ruling. Defendant has scoured the docket in the
- 6:28Dershowitz defamation case to collect every fly spect of information
- 6:32that she believes support or argument that a waiver has
- 6:35taken place see Motion to Compel at ten through twelve,
- 6:38and numerous associated exhibits. But remarkably, she is not revealed
- 6:43to this court the most relevant information from the docket
- 6:47that the Florida Court considered the same waiver issues and
- 6:50rejecting the same arguments that the defendant now advances. This
- 6:54Florida Court ruling applying Florida law, is controlling here. As
- 6:58discussed above in the fact section of this response. In
- 7:01the Florida case, Dershowitz filed a motion to compel, advancing
- 7:05legal and factual arguments identical to those the defendant is
- 7:09advancing here. See McCauley declaration example six at three. Dershowitz's
- 7:15motion to compel arguing that Gussell and Edwards have waighed
- 7:18any privilege or protection that would otherwise attach the response
- 7:22of documents and information by bringing this defamation action, placing
- 7:26at issue the truthfulness of Jane do three's allegations against Dershowitz.
- 7:31Citing Hern versus Ray, sixty eight frd five seventy four,
- 7:35five eighty one E. Ed. Washington, nineteen seventy five, Dershowitz
- 7:40claimed that information Miss Roberts had confidentially provided to Kessell
- 7:44and Edwards as their attorneys, had become at issue in
- 7:48the defamation action McAuley declaration example six, at four and five.
- 7:53Dershowitz argued broadly that a whole host of alleged attorney
- 7:56client communications were at issue in this case, including one
- 8:00Jane Doe number three's allegations against Dershowitz asserted in the
- 8:05action caption Jane Doe number one versus the United States
- 8:08of America case number zero eight CV eight zero seven
- 8:12three six South District of Florida, the Federal action two
- 8:17Cassell and Edwards investigation into Jane Doe three's allegations against Dershowitz.
- 8:22Three Cassel and Edwards assertion in the complaint that Dershowitz
- 8:26was an alleged participant in the criminal conduct committed by
- 8:30Jeffrey Epstein and four Jane Doe number three's whereabouts and
- 8:34activities during the time when she claims to have been
- 8:37sex slave for Epstein example six, at three. As the
- 8:41briefing on the issue continued. In in October twenty six,
- 8:44twenty fifteen response filing, Dershowitz argued that Miss Robert's public
- 8:48statements waive the privilege, along with her actions by her attorneys,
- 8:52Cassell and Edwards example eight at five to eight. After
- 8:56all these arguments were fully briefed, the Florida Court lynched
- 8:59Ji rejected dershowitz arguments that any waiver of the attorney
- 9:03client privilege had taken place. McAuley declaration example ten at one.
- 9:09Defendant counterclaim Plaintiff's motion to compel production of documents and
- 9:13complete responses to interrogatories is hereby denied. In a December eighth,
- 9:18twenty fifteen order, Judge Lynch provided a short explanation of
- 9:22his reasoning and entered and ordered denying dershowitz waiver motion.
- 9:27In her pending motion to compel, Defendant recycles the same
- 9:30arguments that Dershowitz made, such as the claim that Cassell
- 9:33and Edwards wave privilege by filing suit motion to compel
- 9:37at ten, that her March twenty eleven interview with Scrolla
- 9:41and Edwards was a waiver ida at ten, and other
- 9:44similar claims idea at eleven through thirteen. But Dershowitz already
- 9:48litigated these issues a few months ago in the Dershowitz case,
- 9:52and his claims were rejected by the Florida Court. Defendant
- 9:55is now collaterally he stopped from relitigating these ideas entical
- 10:00issues here because Dershowitz at a full and fair opportunity
- 10:04to litigate those issues, and Defendant was in common interest
- 10:07agreement with Dershowitz at the time. The doctrine of collateral
- 10:11estoppel protects litigants and the courts from relitigating identical issues
- 10:16and promotes efficiency by barring unnecessary litigation. See Park Lane
- 10:21Hosiery Company Incorporated versus Shore four thirty nine US three
- 10:25twenty two three twenty six, nineteen seventy nine. As this
- 10:30Court explained, for collateral estoppel to apply, there must be
- 10:34a full and fair decision and fair opportunity to litigate.
- 10:38The decision that now controls the issue in the prior
- 10:41action must be identical to and decisive of the issue
- 10:45in the instant action. Zeice vus Cooper, two sixty eight
- 10:49br eight ninety eight ninety three SDNY two thousand and one.
- 10:54A non party can be bound by a decision so
- 10:57long as her interests were effectively represented Zweiss to sixty
- 11:01eight br At eight ninety three. As this Court can
- 11:04readily determine from reviewing the pleadings Dershowitz filed in the
- 11:08Florida case CE McCaulay declaration at six to eight. Dershowitz
- 11:12fully briefed identical issues to those presented here, and he
- 11:16was effectively representing Maxwell at the time. The elements of
- 11:20collateral estoppel apply moreover entirely apart from collateral estoppel doctrine.
- 11:26Judge Lynch's decision is highly persuasive. Judge Lynch was the
- 11:30presiding judge over the Dershowitz matter, so he was intimately
- 11:34familiar with, for example, what matters were at issue in
- 11:37that particular case. Moreover, Judge Lynch is, of course a
- 11:41Florida judge skilled on applying Florida legal principles. His ruling
- 11:46on whether a waiver of attorney client privilege existed under
- 11:49Florida law should be given heavyweight here see Elliott Associates LP.
- 11:54Versus Banco de la Nacion one ninety four f Dot
- 11:58three D three sixty three three seventy Second Circuit, nineteen
- 12:02ninety nine. Finally, defendants briefing entirely ignores even the existence
- 12:07of Judge Lynch's ruling. In such circumstances where the defendant
- 12:11has failed to offer any reason for questioning Judge Lynch's holding,
- 12:15this court should follow Judge Lynch's lead and hold that
- 12:18no waiver of the attorney client privilege exists under Florida law,
- 12:22and because Florida law controlled when the disclosure took place
- 12:26under fed our evidence five OHO two C, no waiver
- 12:29exists in this proceeding. All right, folks, We're going to
- 12:33wrap up right there, and in the next episode, we'll
- 12:35pick up where we left off. All of the information
- 12:38that goes with this episode can be found in the
- 12:40description box. What's up everyone, and welcome back to the
- 12:43Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're diving right back into
- 12:47those court documents and we're going to pick up where
- 12:50we left off with Glenn Maxwell attempting to get access
- 12:55to privileged lawyer client information. Actions by Cassell and Edwards
- 13:00do not waive Miss Roberts attorney client privilege. Not only
- 13:04has Judge Lynch already ruled on the attorney client privilege issue,
- 13:08but his ruling was entirely correct. Defendants arguments rests on
- 13:12the proposition that Cassell and Edwards had authority to waive
- 13:15Miss roberts privilege while they pursued their Florida defamation action,
- 13:20but in filing their own personal defamation claims against Dershowitz
- 13:24in a lawsuit where Miss Roberts was not a party,
- 13:26Cassell and Edwards were not acting on Miss Roberts's behalf.
- 13:30Defendant never attempts to even explain, much less prove, how
- 13:35that defamation action could have benefited Miss Roberts, and Florida
- 13:39law is clear that when attorneys are not acting on
- 13:42the client's behalf, they cannot waive their client privilege. See
- 13:46Charles Erhart Florida Practice Evidence, Section five H two Dot six,
- 13:52twenty fifteen, Shedder versus Scheddar, two thirty nine, second edition,
- 13:57fifty one and fifty two, Florida Fourth DC, nineteen seventy.
- 14:02To find an attorney waived as client's privilege, a clear
- 14:05record must exist concerning the attorney attorney to wave privilege.
- 14:10See Integration Services Incorporated versus At and T zero six
- 14:15CIV eighteen sixty three, JGK two thousand and eight, w
- 14:21L three one eight three four to three AT two SDNY,
- 14:25February fourth, two thousand and eight. Here to the contrary,
- 14:29the record is clear that Miss Roberts did not authorize
- 14:32any waiver of her attorney client privilege. C. McCauley declaration
- 14:36Example thirteen. The affidavit of Miss Roberts, Accordingly, under Florida law,
- 14:42Casel and Edwards actions did not waive Miss roberts privilege.
- 14:46The main examples defendant offers in support of her waiver
- 14:50argument come from a summary judgment motion that Gasell and
- 14:53Edwards filed see motion to compel at sixteen. Of course,
- 14:57that motion was filed on their behalf, not Miss Roberts.
- 15:01To be sure that motion contained, among other supporting information,
- 15:05a sworn affid david from Miss Roberts. But the routine's
- 15:08step of submitting an affidavid is not a waiver of
- 15:11attorney client protections, as discussed at greater length in Part two. End.
- 15:17In any event, defendant does not include that affid david
- 15:20among her supporting materials to her motion. Much less explained
- 15:24how the recitation of factual information in that affidavid constitutes
- 15:29a waiver by Miss Roberts with respect to communications with
- 15:32her attorneys see Coon versus State four sixty three Southern
- 15:36District to one two three and O four, Florida, nineteen
- 15:40eighty five. No waiver. When the client merely discloses facts
- 15:44which were a part of the communication with the client's attorney,
- 15:48Miss Roberts has not waived her privilege. See Miss Roberts's
- 15:54confidential communication with her attorneys were never at issue in
- 15:57the Florida Dershowitz litigation. Defendant's argument that Miss Robert's attorney's
- 16:02client privilege has been waived under the at issue doctrine
- 16:06also fails under Florida law because her confidential communications were
- 16:11never at issue in the Dershowitz litigation. Florida law on
- 16:15when confidential attorney client communications are at issue comes from
- 16:20the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Savino versus Luciano ninety
- 16:25two Southern Second District, eight seventeen, Florida, nineteen fifty seven.
- 16:30There the Florida Supreme Court announced the test for determining
- 16:34whether confidential communications were at issue as whether acclaim or
- 16:39defense would necessarily require the privilege matter be offered in
- 16:43evidence id at eight nineteen. See also Diaz Verson versus
- 16:48Wilbridge Aldinger Company fifty four Southern Third District, one thousand seven,
- 16:55one thy eleven, Florida Second District, d CAA twenty ten.
- 17:00More recent decisions from Florida have emphasized that Savino does
- 17:04not mean that a party waives attorney client privilege merely
- 17:07by bringing or defending a lawsuit Coats versus Akerman Centerfit
- 17:12versus Edison, Pa nine forty Southern Second District, five oh four,
- 17:17Florida Second District, DCA two thousand and six. Instead, waiver
- 17:21occurs only when a party must necessarily use the privileged
- 17:25information to establish its claim or defense idea five, ten
- 17:30and eleven, most recently in Genevies versus Provident Life, an
- 17:34Accident Insurance Company, seventy four Southern Third District, ten sixty four,
- 17:39ten sixty nine, Florida, twenty eleven, as revised on denial
- 17:45of regulation November ten, twenty eleven, The Florida Supreme Court
- 17:49cited both Coats and Savino to hold that the issue
- 17:52doctrine always discovery of privilege material only when the holder
- 17:57of the privilege the client raises the advice of count
- 18:00as a claim or defense in the action, and the
- 18:03communication is essential to the claim or defense. Under these
- 18:07restrictive standards, Miss Roberts communications were never at issue in
- 18:11her attorney's personal defamation case against Dershowitz. Consider, for example,
- 18:17a typical allegation Cassell and Edward's complaint. Immediately following the
- 18:21filing of what defendant Dershowitz knew to be an entirely
- 18:25proper and well founded pleading, Dershowitz initiated a massive public
- 18:30media assault on the reputation and character of Bradley J.
- 18:33Edwards and Paul G. Cassel, accusing them of intentionally lying
- 18:37in their filing or having leveled knowingly false accusations against
- 18:41the defendant Dershowitz, without ever conducting any investigation of the
- 18:45credibility of the accusations, and of having acted unethically to
- 18:50the extent that their wilful misconduct warranted and required disbarment.
- 18:56McAuley declaration example five, at four. This is immediately apparent.
- 19:01This allegation does not require an examination of Miss Roberts's
- 19:05confidential communication with her attorneys. Instead, it requires an assessment
- 19:10of dershowitz state of mind with regard to his knowledge
- 19:13of the information that Cassell and Edwards had to support
- 19:16the filing of the allegation, and as supporting exhibits to
- 19:20the pleadings Cassell and Edwards filed made clear the adequacy
- 19:24of their investigation could be readily established from many sources
- 19:28that did not have any connection to what Miss Roberts
- 19:31may or may not have told them in confidence. See
- 19:35e g. McAuley declaration Example three, twenty six through thirty eight,
- 19:40recounting information supporting allegations against Dershowitz, such as sworn testimony
- 19:46from household employees and invocations of the Fifth Amendment by
- 19:50Apstein and his co conspirators to be sure. Dershowitz tried
- 19:54to make an argument that Miss roberts communications with her
- 19:58attorneys might have had some argum relevance to the case,
- 20:01but Judge Lynch rejected that very argument, and quite properly so.
- 20:06Relevance is insufficient to waive privilege. Under Florida law Guarantee
- 20:11Insurance three hundred frd At five ninety four, citing Coin
- 20:15versus Schwartz, gold Cohen, Zacarin, and Kotler PA. Seven fifteen,
- 20:21Southern Second District, ten twenty one, ten twenty two, Florida
- 20:24Fourth District, DCA nineteen ninety eight. Client does not waive
- 20:30the attorney client privilege simply because their credibility could be
- 20:33impeached by communications with her former attorney see Jenny versus
- 20:38Air Data Wyman Incorporated. Eight forty six Southern Second District,
- 20:43six sixty four, six sixty eight, Florida Second District, DCA,
- 20:47two thousand and three. Accordingly, under Florida law, Miss Roberts
- 20:51confidential communications with her attorneys were never at issue in
- 20:55the Florida litigation. D defendant has not met the other
- 21:00requirements for showing waiver of attorney client privilege for the
- 21:04foregoing reasons Defendant has failed to make the required showing
- 21:08for an at issue waiver of attorney client privilege, but
- 21:11even more fundamentally, defendant has failed to establish other elements
- 21:15necessary to find a waiver of attorney client privilege. Defendant
- 21:19repeatedly refers to routine litigation actions, such as the filing
- 21:24of in court affidavits, as a basis for finding some
- 21:27kind of waiver privilege see emotion to compel at sixteen.
- 21:31But it's obvious that such actions do not waive attorney
- 21:35client protection. Litigation requires some limited communication two third parties,
- 21:40including the Court and opposing council, of information learned in
- 21:44the course of the attorney client relationship. Therefore, Florida law
- 21:48recognizes an absolute privilege to protect attorney statements made in
- 21:53communications that are preliminary or proposed judicial proceeding, or in
- 21:59the institution, or during the course and as part of
- 22:02a judicial proceeding. Florida State ninety dot five oh two,
- 22:08Section two. See also McCullough versus Kubiak one fifty eight
- 22:12Southern Third District seven thirty nine seven forty Florida Fourth DCA.
- 22:17Twenty fifteen. A waiver of the attorney client privilege occurs
- 22:21only if the client voluntarily discloses in court the substance
- 22:25of a communication with her attorney. Ce g. Delep versus
- 22:30State four to forty Southern Second District twelve forty two
- 22:33twelve forty seven, Florida, nineteen eighty three. Criminal defendants sought
- 22:37to use in court favorably testimony in his investigator while
- 22:41blocking inquiry into other testimony. No waiver occurs when the
- 22:46client merely discloses facts which were part of the communication
- 22:50with the client's attorney. See Coon versus State four sixty
- 22:53three Southern Second District two one, two oh three and four, Florida,
- 22:58nineteen eighty five. So Taylor versus State eight fifty five
- 23:02Southern Second District twenty six n Dot twenty nine, Florida,
- 23:06two thousand and three. Thus the privilege attaches to the
- 23:09communication with council, not to the underlying facts. Brookings versus
- 23:14State four ninety five Southern Second District one thirty five
- 23:19one thirty nine, Florida, nineteen eighty six. See also Lynch
- 23:22versus State second Southern third District forty seven sixty six, Florida,
- 23:27two thousand and eight. As a result, allegations that Roberts
- 23:31disclosed to third parties the same facts that she may
- 23:34have related to Cassel and Edwards, without any evidence that
- 23:37she disclosed the substance of her confidential consultation with Edwards
- 23:41and Cassel cannot overcome her privilege to whold otherwise would
- 23:46eviscerate the attorney client privilege. Such a ruling would mean
- 23:50that every time an attorney filed a declaration by his
- 23:53client that contained the factual basis for the client's claim,
- 23:57the opposing party would have the right to examine all
- 24:00privileged communications. Defendant has not cited any authority, either in
- 24:05Florida or elsewhere, to support this extreme assertion that Miss
- 24:09Roberts waived her privilege simply by allowing an Avid David
- 24:13to be filed in a court proceeding. Defendant also claims Cassel,
- 24:17at his deposition in the Dershowitz case, waived attorney client
- 24:21privilege by discussing factual information related to his investigation of
- 24:25Miss Roberts' allegations, for example, flight log information. Cassel's deposition
- 24:30testimony did not constitute a waiver of Miss Robert's attorney
- 24:34client privilege. Indeed, Miss Roberts's own separate attorney, undersigned counsel,
- 24:39Miss McCauley from the law firm of Boys, Schiller and Flexner,
- 24:43raised a standing objection to Cassel answering any questions that
- 24:46would require divulging any attorney client communication. McAuley declaration Example
- 24:52fourteen deposition excerpt of Paul Cassell, Volume one, dated October sixteenth,
- 24:58twenty fifteen, at thirty fenne four. Virginia Roberts does not
- 25:02waive her attorney client privilege with her lawyers, and they
- 25:06are not entitled to testify as to the information that
- 25:09she intended to be confidential that she communicated to her lawyers.
- 25:14Defendant also argues that because Cassell said at some unspecified
- 25:19point in his deposition that he knew some unidentified information
- 25:22about Miss Roberts, he must have been revealing attorney client communication.
- 25:27Motion to compel at seventeen. Of course, the information Cassell
- 25:31and Edwards knew about Miss Roberts was a direct result
- 25:34of her attorney client communications with him. But Gasell knew
- 25:37a vast amount of information about Miss Roberts from the
- 25:41factual record in the case, such as the flight logs
- 25:44demonstrating flights that she took with Epstein and defendant on
- 25:48Epstein's jet, and Defendant's logic is simply incorrect. All right, folks,
- 25:53We're going to wrap up right there, and in the
- 25:55next episode talking about this topic, we'll pick up where
- 25:58we left off. All of these information that goes with
- 26:01this episode can be found in the description box. What's up, everyone,
- 26:05and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. Yesterday I uploaded
- 26:10the Maxwell motion for thirty seven B and C sanctions,
- 26:14and it seems like there was a bit of an
- 26:17issue on the end of Speaker yesterday with the uploading process,
- 26:22and it looks like some of you didn't receive those updates.
- 26:25So what I'm gonna do is later on today, after
- 26:27we do today's slate, I'll re upload those episodes. That way,
- 26:31those of you who didn't get them can have the
- 26:34access to them. That way, you're all up to date
- 26:37on these core documents. Now, I don't know what the
- 26:39hell was going on yesterday with Spreaker, but in the
- 26:42morning it was all goofy. So either way, I'll get
- 26:45those re uploaded today. And considering it's the weekend, it's
- 26:48not like it's gonna take away from anything more meaningful
- 26:51that we were going to talk about. So, now that
- 26:54we got that little bit of housekeeping out of the way,
- 26:56why don't we dive right back in to the Glen
- 26:59Maxwell uneradacted court documents and her attempt to get access
- 27:04to attorney client work privilege between Virginia and her lawyers. E.
- 27:10Miss Roberts will not seek to use confidential attorney client
- 27:13communications interaction here. For all the reasons just explained, Miss
- 27:18Roberts has not waived her attorney client privilege through events
- 27:21that occurred in the Dershowitz case, but one additional point
- 27:25Bear's emphasis. Defendant attempts to argue that the trial in
- 27:29this case will somehow be unfair if she does not
- 27:32receive access to confidential attorney client communications that Miss Roberts
- 27:37had with her lawyers earlier motion to compel at twenty
- 27:40and twenty one. But regardless of what may or may
- 27:43not have been at issue in the Dershowitz case, confidential
- 27:46communications will not be at issue here. For example, defendant
- 27:51rights that it would be prejudicial for Miss Roberts to
- 27:54be able to support her claim in this case that
- 27:57she is not a liar using her attorney's testimony to
- 28:01be clear, Miss Roberts has no intention of calling, for example,
- 28:04Cassell and Edwards to testify at trial in an attempt
- 28:07to support her claims. Thus, this will not be a
- 28:10case where it will be misleading to the court or
- 28:13any jury to hear testimony from Miss Roberts Council about
- 28:17the factual basis, work product, and thought process on which
- 28:21they relied on in making the allegations in the joinder
- 28:24motion Motion to compel at twenty two for the simple
- 28:28reason that Miss Roberts Council will not be witnesses in
- 28:31this case, nor will Miss Roberts be presenting a state
- 28:35of mind defense that might require a more extensive inquiry
- 28:38into attorney client communications. See City IVERI five forty six
- 28:44ft three d two twenty two to twenty nine, Second Circuit,
- 28:47two thousand and eight percents of good faith or state
- 28:50of mind issues as a reason for not finding at
- 28:52issue waiver of privilege No Mara Asset Capital Corporation versus Cadwallader,
- 28:58Wickersham and Taft sixty two AD three D five eighty one,
- 29:04five eighty two eight eighty Nys two D six seventeen
- 29:08six eighteen through six twenty New York Appeals Division two
- 29:11thousand and nine, finding no waiver where plaintiff disavowed any
- 29:15intention to use confidential attorney client communications. Relevance alone insufficient
- 29:21to put privileged materials at issue, because if that were
- 29:24the case, a privilege would have had little effect. To
- 29:27be sure at trial, Miss Roberts will present factual testimony
- 29:31supporting her version of events, just as no doubt defendant
- 29:35will try to present testimony supporting her version. But such
- 29:39testimony from both sides does not create any waiver of
- 29:43attorney client privilege. Instead, such testimony is simply the presentation
- 29:48of competing facts, from which the jury can decide who
- 29:51is telling the truth. None of this creates any need
- 29:54for defendant to force Miss Roberts to reveal confidential communications.
- 29:59Miss robert Ertz did not waive her attorney client privilege
- 30:02by denying fabricated evidence during her deposition. Defendants spends significant
- 30:07time arguing that Miss Robert's answers to several deposition questions
- 30:11about the absence of any communications from Cassel and Edwards
- 30:14that she provide false information constituted a waiver of attorney
- 30:18client privilege. Motion to compel at eleven arguing that never
- 30:23answered to the question, has Brad Edwards ever pressured you
- 30:27or encouraged you in any way, or under any circumstances
- 30:31at any time to provide false information about Jeffrey Epstein
- 30:35constituted a waiver of attorney client privilege. While the arguments
- 30:38above are sufficient to dispose of this claim, it is
- 30:42worth emphasizing several additional points about this specific testimony. First,
- 30:47disclosing the absence of communication is not the same as
- 30:50exposing any communication. It is a fundamental requirement of a
- 30:55waiver argument that a communication be exposed. See Florida State
- 31:00and nine dot five two extending privilege to a communication
- 31:05between lawyer and client, not the absence of such communication.
- 31:09See Montanes versus Public Supermarket Incorporated. One thirty five SO
- 31:14Dot three D five ten, five twelve through thirteen. Florida
- 31:18District Court of Appeals twenty fourteen, rejecting argument that client
- 31:22waived her attorney client privilege by stating that an interrogatory
- 31:26answer was not her answer because this did not disclose
- 31:29the substance of her communications with her attorney. C. F.
- 31:33Mitchell versus Superior Court, thirty seven California, three D five
- 31:37ninety one six O two six ninety one p Dot
- 31:40two D six forty two, six forty seven California nineteen
- 31:44eighty four. Relevant case law makes it clear that mere
- 31:48disclosure of the fact that a communication between client and
- 31:52attorney had occurred does not amount to the disclosure of
- 31:55the specific content of that communication, and as such does
- 32:00not necessarily constitute a waiver of the privilege. Second, the
- 32:04questions highlighted by the defendant asked Miss Roberts whether she
- 32:08had ever communicated with her attorneys Cassell and Edwards for
- 32:12purposes of committing a crime or fraud see Motion to
- 32:15compel out eleven. If such a communication involving perjury had existed,
- 32:20it would not have been covered by the attorney client
- 32:22privilege in the first instance, because it would have involved
- 32:25an ongoing crime or fraud see Florida State Laws at
- 32:29ninety five two four. There is no lawyer client privilege
- 32:33under this section when the services of the lawyer were
- 32:36sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit
- 32:39or a plan to commit what the client knew was
- 32:42a crime or a fraud. Answering those questions by denying
- 32:46the existence of a crimeer fraud accordingly did not constitute
- 32:49waiver of confidentiality over any otherwise protected communication. Indeed, any
- 32:56other conclusion would essentially abolish the attorney client privilege. A
- 33:00party could simply accuse the opposing side of fabricating evidence, and,
- 33:04when the accusation was denied, argue that attorney client privilege
- 33:08had been waived. This is not the law. Finally, it's
- 33:12important to note that throughout her deposition, Miss Roberts attorney
- 33:15strenuously objected to any effort by Dershowitz to obtain attorney
- 33:20client information. CE McCaulay declaration Exhibit eleven can posite exhibit
- 33:25of deposition excerpts from the deposition of Virginia Roberts. Clearly,
- 33:30at her deposition, Miss Roberts did not voluntarily waive any
- 33:34attorney client privilege that she held. Section three. Edwards and
- 33:39Cassell have not waived work product protection and Maxwell has
- 33:42not demonstrated need to penetrate the protection. A work product
- 33:47protection has not been waived for many of the same
- 33:50reasons that Miss Roberts has not waived her attorney client privilege.
- 33:54The work product protection has not been waived. Fed our
- 33:57evidence five h two's protection again waiver applies not only
- 34:01to the attorney client privilege, but also to the work
- 34:04product doctrine on the facts of this case. Rule five
- 34:07oh two thus extends all work product protections that exist
- 34:11under the law of the state where the disclosure occurred
- 34:14fed Dot r Evidence five O two c ie Florida law,
- 34:19as well as the protection that exists under federal law.
- 34:22Fed Are Evidence five O two c. One. Florida law
- 34:26provides that work product protections extend to the documents and
- 34:30tangible things otherwise discoverable if a party prepared those items
- 34:34in anticipation of litigation or for trial Florida r Dot
- 34:39civp one dot two eight zero b and three. The
- 34:42rationale supporting the work product doctrine is that one party
- 34:46is not entitled to prepare his case through the investigative
- 34:49work product of his adversary where the same or similar
- 34:53information is available through ordinary investigative techniques and discovery procedures.
- 34:58Universal City Developed Men Partners Ltd. Versus Papeal. Fifty four
- 35:04SOO Dot three D six twelve six fourteen Florida Fifth DCA.
- 35:08Twenty eleven. The work product of the litigant, his attorney
- 35:12or agent cannot be examined absent rare and exceptional circumstances.
- 35:16Surf Drugs Incorporated versus Vermet two thirty six, Southern Second District,
- 35:21one O eight one twelve, Florida, nineteen seventy. In Florida,
- 35:25as elsewhere, a party can make a limited waiver of
- 35:28its work product privilege. Paradise Divers Incorporated versus up mL
- 35:34nine forty three, Southern Second District A twelve eight fourteen,
- 35:38Florida District Court of Appeals, two thousand and six. A
- 35:41waiver by disclosure only includes other unrevealed communications to the
- 35:46extent that they are relevant to the communication already disclosed,
- 35:50citing Eastern Airlines Incorporated versus Gellert four thirty one, Southern
- 35:54Second District three twenty nine, three thirty two, Florida, Third DCA.
- 35:59Nineteen eighty three. Waiver by disclosure does not mean that
- 36:03the voluntary disclosure of confidential information effectively waives the privilege
- 36:08as to all conversations or the whole breadth of discussion
- 36:11which may have taken place. Procacci versus Seiteland four ninety seven,
- 36:16Southern Second District nine sixty nine nine sixty nine seventy, Florida,
- 36:20District Court of Appeals nineteen eighty six, citing Goldman Sachs
- 36:24Company versus Blondis four twelve f Dot su Pp. Two
- 36:28eighty six, two eighty eight and D three, nineteen seventy six. Instead,
- 36:33waiver by disclosure is confined to that specific subject during
- 36:37that particular conversation Pracacci four ninety seven, Southern Second District,
- 36:43at nine seventy, quoting Paranon versus Bergen Brunswick Corporation, seventy
- 36:47seven fr D four fifty five four sixty one n
- 36:51D Cal. Nineteen seventy eight. As with her attorney client
- 36:55privilege argument, Defendant has not even cited Florida law on
- 36:59waiver ord work product protection, much less explained how she
- 37:03meets its demanding requirements. Moreover, the illustration she provides do
- 37:08not prove any general waiver of work product protection. For example,
- 37:12defendant relies on the claim that Cassell and Edwards have
- 37:16waived work product protection by disclosing a transcript of a
- 37:19portion of a twenty eleven telephone interview with Miss Roberts
- 37:24by attorneys Jack Scrolla and Brad Edwards. But that recorded
- 37:28interview was never confidential communication between Miss Roberts and the lawyers,
- 37:33but rather, as the transcript of the call itself makes
- 37:36clear a communication that could be presented to any jury
- 37:40that might ultimately have to hear these facts. McAuley declaration
- 37:44example fifteen at one transcript of SCROLLA Edwards interview on
- 37:49April seventh, twenty eleven. In other words, the recorded call
- 37:53was simply the functional equivalent of an Avid David and
- 37:56Avid David's are routinely disclosed with waving work product protections
- 38:01under the law of Florida and elsewhere. Defendant also argues
- 38:05that Cassel and Edwards waived work product protection by filing
- 38:08a summary judgment motion in the Dershowitz case, which contains
- 38:12supporting exhibits e g. Flight logs, sworn testimony by third
- 38:17party witnesses, and other evidence motion to compel at sixteen,
- 38:21but providing information in support of a summary judgment motion
- 38:25in a routine step that attorneys take every day. While
- 38:28the materials produced are obviously not subject to work product protection,
- 38:32other materials in communications do somehow become subject to discovery.
- 38:37Paradise Divers Incorporated, nine forty three Southern Second District, at
- 38:41eight fourteen B. Defendant has not proven need to penetrate
- 38:46work product protections. Defendant statement on work product protection also
- 38:51simply assumes that it is the same as attorney client
- 38:54privilege and can be waived under an at issue theory.
- 38:58But the at issue legal theory defendant relies on to
- 39:01argue incorrectly that attorney client privilege has been waived applies
- 39:05only to that privilege. The work product doctrine is quite
- 39:09distinct from attorney client privilege. An application of the privileges
- 39:13and exceptions to them differ. See West Bend Mutual Insurance
- 39:17Company versus Higgins, nine Southern Third District, six fifty five,
- 39:22six fifty six, Florida, fifth DCA two thousand and nine.
- 39:26Genevies versus Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, seventy four
- 39:30Southern Third District, ten sixty four, ten sixty eight, Florida,
- 39:34twenty eleven, as revised on denial of regulation twenty eleven.
- 39:39The function of the work product doctrine is to protect
- 39:42council's mental impressions. West Bend Mutual, ninth Southern Third District
- 39:47at six fifty six. To pierce the privilege, defendant must
- 39:50show that the substantial equivalent of the material cannot be
- 39:54obtained by other means. Southern Bell Telephone and Telephone Company
- 39:59versus Decent six thirty two Southern Second District, thirteen seventy
- 40:03seven thirteen eighty five, Florida, nineteen ninety four. Defendant has
- 40:07not even identified any specific work product she claims to need,
- 40:12much less shown why she cannot get the underlying information
- 40:15from other sources. Under the law of Florida and elsewhere,
- 40:19to establish need, a party must present testimony or evidence
- 40:23demonstrating the material requested is critical to the theory of
- 40:27the requestor's case or to some significant aspect of the case.
- 40:31The Circle Back Construction Incorporated versus Rajan ninety three Southern
- 40:36third District, eleven twenty four eleven thirty, Florida, two d DCA.
- 40:41Twenty twelve. Well established in Florida is the principle that
- 40:46the unsworn analysis of a party's attorney and or bear
- 40:49assertion of need and undue hardship to obtain the substantial
- 40:53equivalent is insufficient to satisfy this showing Butler versus Harder
- 40:58one fifty two Southern Thirdie District, seven O five seven twelve, Florida,
- 41:02first DCA. Twenty fourteen. See Procter and Gamble Company versus
- 41:07Swilly for sixty two Southern Second District, eleven eighty eight
- 41:11eleven ninety four, Florida First DCA. Nineteen eighty five, State
- 41:16versus Tha five twenty eight Southern Second District nine seventy four,
- 41:20nine seventy five, Florida Second DCA. Nineteen eighty eight. Representations
- 41:25by council not made under oath and not subject across
- 41:28examination absence of stipulation are not evident. Further, Florida courts
- 41:33have held that the showing of need encompasses a showing
- 41:36of diligence by the party seeking discovery of another party's
- 41:40work product. Butler versus Harder, one fifty two Southern Third
- 41:45District seven o five seven twelve, Florida First DCA. Twenty fourteen.
- 41:50See also CSX Transportation Incorporated. Versus Carpenter seven twenty five,
- 41:55Southern Second District four thirty four four to thirty five,
- 41:58Florida Second dcxeteen ninety nine. Quashing order granting motion to
- 42:03compel discovery because the record did not contain Avid David's
- 42:07supporting plaintiff's argument that it was unable to obtain the
- 42:10substantially equivalent information by other means without undue hardship Falco
- 42:16versus North Shore Labs Corporation eight sixty six, Southern Second District,
- 42:20twelve fifty five twelve fifty seven, Florida First DCA. Two
- 42:24thousand and four, holding that need and undue hardship must
- 42:27be demonstrated by affid david or sworn testimony. Broward Hospital
- 42:33District versus Button five ninety two, So Second District, three
- 42:38sixty seven, three sixty eight, Florida Fourth DCA. Nineteen ninety two.
- 42:43The unsworn assertions of Plaintiff's council were insufficient to constitute
- 42:47a showing of need and undue hardship called into doubt
- 42:51on other grounds, as stated in Columbia Hospital Corp. Of
- 42:54South Broward versus Fane sixteen, Southern Third District, two thirty six,
- 42:59Florida Fourth DAS two thousand and nine. Here defendant has
- 43:03ample information from which she can present her case. At
- 43:06the core of this case is whether Miss Roberts lied
- 43:09when she said that the defendant recruited her to be
- 43:11sexually abused by Jeffrey Epstein. Defendant can, of course testify
- 43:16to her interactions with Miss Roberts as well as call
- 43:19witnesses regarding the circumstances of those interactions. Defendant can also
- 43:24get information from her close friend Epstein about the circumstances
- 43:28of the interactions. Defendant in Epstein are not only good friends,
- 43:32but they have a common interest agreement that facilitates transfer
- 43:35of information between the two of them. Finally, to make
- 43:39her showing that she is unable to obtain equivalent information
- 43:42from other sources, Defendant would have to explain in detail
- 43:45what other steps she has taken to secure information from
- 43:49other sources, including not only Epstein, but other witnesses present
- 43:53at Epstein's mansion. Having failed to do any of this,
- 43:56Defendant has not made a sufficient showing to obtain work
- 44:00product information. Po. Fifty four, Southern Third District, at six
- 44:04fourteen four. Communications with Attorney Jack Scarolla are covered by
- 44:09a joint defense agreement and are thus protected by attorney
- 44:12client and work product protections. As a tag along argument,
- 44:16at the end of her motion, Defendant argues that Miss
- 44:19Roberts has not established the existence of a common interest
- 44:23or joint defense agreement that embraces Jack Scarolla, the attorney
- 44:26for Cassel and Edwards in the Dershowitz Litigation Motion to
- 44:30compel at twenty three and twenty four. Disclosure of the
- 44:33agreement involved notice to the parties of the agreement. Now
- 44:37that appropriate notice has been provided, the agreement can be
- 44:41and has been disclosed. See McCauley declaration example sixteen Common
- 44:45Interest Agreement. In view of the existence of the valid agreement,
- 44:49it is clear that the reference communications involving SCROLLA are protected.
- 44:54See Roberts versus Maxwell number fifteen Sieves seven four three
- 44:58three r WS TO two twenty sixteen, w L one
- 45:02seven five six nine one eight at six SDNY May two,
- 45:06twenty nineteen. Noting Common Interest Agreement protection conclusion, Defendant's motion
- 45:13to compel should be denied in its entirety. This was
- 45:17dated June first, twenty sixteen, and it was signed by
- 45:20Sigurd macaulay and the crew over at Boys and Schiller.
- 45:24All Right, folks, that's gonna do it for this one
- 45:26and for this document as a whole. But have no fear,
- 45:30we'll be diving into the next one very shortly. All
- 45:33the information that goes with this episode can be found
- 45:36in the description box.