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02 - The Republic - Plato · Logic Library

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Book one, Part two. But let us consider this further point. Is
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not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match, or in
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any kind of fighting, best able to ward off a blow? Certainly?
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And he who is most skillful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best
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able to create one true And he is the best guard of a camp,
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who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy, certainly. Then
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he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief. That
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I suppose is to be inferred. Then if the just man is good at
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keeping money, he is good at stealing it, that is implied in the
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argument. Then, after all the just man has turned out to be a
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thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out
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of Homer, for he, speaking of a Ptolocus, the maternal grandfather of
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Odysseus, who is a favorite of his, affirms that he was excellent above
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all men in theft and perjury. And so you and Homer and Simonides are
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agreed that justice is an art of theft to be practiced. However, for
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the good of friends and for the harm of enemies. That was what you
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were saying. No, certainly, not that, though I do not know
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what I did say, but I still stand by the latter words. Well,
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there is another question. By friends and enemies, do we mean those
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who are so really or only in seeming? Surely, he said, a
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man who may be expected to love those whom he thinks good and to hate
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those whom he thinks evil. Yes, but do not. Persons often err
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about good and evil. Many who are not good seem to be so.
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And conversely that is true. Then to them the good will be enemies and
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the evil will be their friends. True, and in that case they will
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be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good. Clearly,
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But the good are just and would not do an injustice. True,
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then, according to your argument, it is just to injure those who do
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no wrong. Nay, Socrates, the doctrine is immoral. Then I suppose
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that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust.
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I like that better. But see the consequence. Many a man who is
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ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case
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he ought to do harm to them, And he has good enemies whom he
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ought to benefit but if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of
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what we have affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides. Very true, he
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said, And I think that we had better correct an error into which we
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seem to have fallen in the use of the words friend and enemy. What
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was the error, Polomarchus I asked, We assumed that he is a friend
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who seems to be or who is thought good. And how is the error
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to be corrected? We should rather say that he is a friend who is
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as well as seems good, and that he who seems only and is not
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good, only seems to be and is not a friend and of an enemy.
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The same may be said. You would argue that the good are our
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friends, and the bad our enemies. Yes, And instead of saying simply,
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as we did at first, that it is just to do good to
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our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say it is just
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to do good to our friends when they are good, and harm to our
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enemies when they are evil. Yes, that appears to me to be the
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truth. But ought the just to injure any one at all? Undoubtedly he
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ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies. When horses are
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injured, are they improved or deteriorated? The latter deteriorated, that is to
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say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs. Yes,
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of horses, and dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and
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not of horses, of course, And will not men who are injured be
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deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man, certainly, and that
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human virtue is justice. To be sure, then men who are injured are,
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out of necessity, made unjust, that is the result. But can
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the musician by his art make men unmusical? Certainly not, or the horsemen
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by his art make them bad horsemen? Impossible? And can the just by
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justice make men unjust? Or, speaking generally, can the good by virtue
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make them bad? Assuredly not? Any more than heat can produce cold it
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cannot, or drought moisture clearly not. Nor can the good harm from any
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one impossible? And the just is the good? Certainly. Then to injure
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a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man,
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but of the opposite, who is the unjust. I think what you say
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is quite true, Socrates. Then if a man says that justice consists in
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the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man
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owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies.
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To say this is not wise, for it is not true if,
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as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case
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just. I agree with you, said Polamarchus. Then you and I are
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prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simon
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Iidy or Bias or Piticus, or any other wise man or seer. I
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am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said, Shall I
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tell you whose I believe the saying to be? Whose I believe that Periander
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or Perdicus, or Xerxes or Ismenius, the Theban or some other rich and
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mighty man who had a great opinion of his own power was the first to
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say that justice is doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.
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Most true? He said, yes, I said, but if this definition
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of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered? Several times in
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the course of the discussion, Thrasimachus had made an attempt to get the argument
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into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the
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company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polamarchus and I had
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done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace,
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and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast,
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seeking to devour us. We were quite panic stricken at the sight of
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him. He roared out to the whole company, what folly Socrates has taken
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possession of you all? And why, silly billies do you knock under to
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one another. I say that if you really want to know what justice is,
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you should not only ask, but answer. And you should not seek
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honor to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer,
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For there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And
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now I will not have you say that justice is a duty or advantage,
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or profit or gain or interest, For this sort of nonsense will not do
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for me. I must have clearness and accuracy. I was panic stricken at
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his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed, I
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believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have
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been struck dumb. But when I saw his fury rising. I looked at
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him first, and was therefore able to reply to him. Thrasimachus I said,
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with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polomarchus and I may
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have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure
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you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece
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of gold, you would not imagine that we were knocking under to one another
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and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are
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seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do
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you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost
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to get at the truth. Nay, my good friend, we are most
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willing and anxious to do so, But the fact is that we cannot.
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And if so, you, people who know all things, should pity us
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and not be angry with us. How characteristic of Socrates, he replied with
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a bitter laugh, that's your ironical style. Have I not already told you
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that whatever he was asked, he would refuse to answer and try irony or
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any other shuffle in order that he might avoid answering. You are a philosopher,
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Thrasamachus I replied, And well know that if you ask a person what
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numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering
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twice six or three times four, or six times two or four times three,
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for this sort of nonsense will not do for me. Then, obviously,
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if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer
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you. But suppose that he were to retort the thracamacus, what do you
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mean if one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the
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question? Am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right
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one? Is that your meaning? How would you answer him? Just as
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if the two cases were at all alike? He said, why should they
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not be? I replied, And even if they are not, but only
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appear to be so to the person who has asked, ought not he to
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say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not. I
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presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers. I
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dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection, I
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approve of any of them. But what if I give you an answer about
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justice other and better he said, than any of these What do you deserve
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to have done to you? Done to me? As becomes the ignorant,
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I must learn from the wise. That is what I do deserve to have
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done to me? What? And no payment? A pleasant notion. I
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will pay when I have the money, I replied, But you have,
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Socrates, said Glaucon, and you, Thrasimachus, need be under no anxiety
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about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates. Yes,
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he replied, immense. Socrates will do as he always does, refuse to
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answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else.
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Why, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer
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who knows and says that he knows just nothing, and who, even if
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he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of
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authority not to utter them. The natural thing is that the speaker should be
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some one like yourself, who professes to know and can tell what he knows.
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Will you then kindly answer for the edification of the company and of myself.
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Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request. And Thrasimachus,
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as any one might see, was in reality eager to speak, for
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he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But
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at first he affected to insist on my answering. At length he consented to
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begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates. He refuses to
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teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even
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says, thank you. That I learn of others, I replied, is
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quite true, But that I am ungrateful. I wholly deny money. I
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have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have.
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And how ready I am to praise any one who appears to me to
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speak. Well, you will very soon find out when you answer, for
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I expect that you will answer well. Listen, then, he said,
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I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And
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why now do you not praise me? But of course you won't let me
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understand you, I replied, Justice, as you say, is the interest
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of the stronger. What, Thrasimachus, is the meaning of this? You
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cannot mean to say that, because Polydamus, the pancratiast, is stronger than
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we are and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that
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to eat beef is therefore equally for our good, who are weaker than he
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is, and right and just for us. That's abominable of you, Socrates.
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You take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.
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No, not at all, my good sir, I said, I
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am trying to understand them, and I wish that you would be a little
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clearer. Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government
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differ. There are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies.
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Yes, I know. And the government is the ruling power in each
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state, certainly. And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical,
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tyrannical, with a view to their several interests. And these laws,
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which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they
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deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker
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of the law and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say
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that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the
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interest of the government. And as the government must be supposed to have power,
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the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice,
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which is the interest of the stronger. Now I understand you, I said,
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and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But
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let me remark that in defining justice you have yourself used the word interest,
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which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in
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your definition the words of the Stronger are added a small edition. You must
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allow, he said, great or small. Never mind about that. We
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must first inquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are
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both agreed that justice is interest of some sort. But you go on to
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say of the Stronger about this edition, I am not so sure, and
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must therefore consider further proceed I will, and first tell me. Do you
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admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers? I do.
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But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible or are they sometimes liable to err?
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To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err. Then,
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in making their laws, they may sometimes make them rightly and sometimes not
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true. When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest,
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when they are mistaken contrary to their interests. You admit that, yes,
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and the laws that they make must be obeyed by their subjects, And
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that is what you call justice. Doubtless, then justice, according to your
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argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger, but the
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reverse. What is that you are saying, he asked, I am only
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repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider. Have
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we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what
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they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has that not
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been admitted? Yes, then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be
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for the interest of the stronger when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done
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which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice
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is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case,
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O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker
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are commanded to do not what is for the interest, but what is for
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the injury of the stronger. Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polamarchus.
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Yes, said Clytophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his
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witness. But there is no need of any witness, said Polmarchus, for
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Thrasimachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest,
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and that for subjects to obey them is justice, yes, Polmarchus.
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Thrasimachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just,
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yes, Clytophon. But he also said that justice is the interest of
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the stronger. And while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the
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stronger may command the weaker, who are his subjects, to do what is
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not for his own interest, whence follows that justice is the injury quite as
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much as the interest of the stronger. But said Clytophon, he meant by
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the interest of the stronger that the stronger thought to be his interest. This
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was what the weaker had to do, and this was affirmed by him to
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be justice. Those were not his words, rejoined Polmarchus. Never mind,
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I replied, If he now says that they are, let us accept his
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statement. Tell me, Thrasimachus, I said, did you mean by justice
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what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?
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Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is
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mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken? Yes, I said,
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My impression was that you did so when you admitted that the ruler was
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not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken, And of Book one, Part two,