Latest / The Philosophy Insights Collection / 12 - Phaedrus - Plato
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- Section twelve. M Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul. And therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls. They are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes. Such and such persons, he will say, are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way, And he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, this is the man, or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion. He who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned. When I say he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then and not till then he is a perfect master of his art. But if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art, he who says I don't believe you has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this fidrous? And Socrates, your account of the so called art of rhetoric? Or am I to look for another? He must take this, Socrates, for there is no possibility of another. And yet the creation of so an art is not easy, very true. And therefore let us consider this matter in every light, and see whether we cannot find a shorter and easier road. There is no use in taking a long, rough roundabout way if there be a shorter and easier one. And I wish that you would try, and remember whether you have heard from Lysias or any one else, anything which might be of service to us. If trying would avail, then I might But at the moment I can think of nothing. Suppose I tell you something which somebody who knows told me certainly may not the wolf, as the proverb says, claimer hearing, do you say what can be said for him? He will argue that there is no use in putting a solemn face on these matters, or in going round and round until you arrive at first principles. For as I said at first, when the question is of justice or good, or is a question in which men are concerned who are just and good, either by nature or habit, he who would be a skillful rhetorician has no need of truth, for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, but only about conviction. And this is based on probability, to which he who would be a skillful orator should therefore give his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts, if they are improbable, ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should be told, either in accusation or defense, and that always in speaking the orator should keep probability in view and say goodbye to the truth. And the observation of this principle throughout a speech vurnishes the whole art. That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually say. Socrates, I have not forgotten that we have quite briefly touched upon this matter already with them. The point is all important. I dare say that you are familiar with Tissias. Does he not define probability to be that which the many think? Certainly he does. I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this sort. He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat, or of something or other. He is brought into court, and then Tissias says that both parties should tell lies. The coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one. The other should prove that they were alone, and should argue, thus, how could a weak man like me have assaulted a strong man like him? The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent some other lie, which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in the system. Am I not right Fidrus, certainly bless me. What a wonderfully mysterious art is this which Tisseias, or some other gentleman in whatever name or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him? Or not? What shall we say to him? Let us tell him that before he appeared you and I were saying that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth. And we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything else to say about the art of speaking, we should like to hear him. But if not, we are satisfied with our own view that unless a man estimates the various characters of his hearers, and is able to divide all things into classes and to comprehend them under single ideas, he will never be a skillful rhetorician, even within the limits of human power. And this skill he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speak, seeking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God, and always to act acceptably to Him, as far as in him lies. For there is a saying of wiser men than ourselves, that a man of sense should not try to please his fellow servants. At least this should not be his first object, but his good and noble masters. And therefore, if the way is long and secuitous, marvel not at this, For where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, tisse Us, that if you do not mind, go so far, rhetoric has a fair beginning here. I think Socrates that this is admirable, if only practicable. But even to fail in an honorable object is honorable true. End of Section twelve.