Latest / Net Assessment / Apocalypse Soon? The US and NATO at a Crossroads

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Apocalypse Soon? The US and NATO at a Crossroads · Net Assessment

• 0:08
  Melanie Marlowe: Hello, and welcome to Net Assessment, where we debate the hard choices facing America's national security and foreign policy communities. Today, we're going to talk about NATO 3.0. A year and a half in, how is the U.S. strategy towards Europe shaking out? Does the U.S. shifting the burden of conventional defense to Europe alter our commitment on the nuclear front? And what does this mean for our other allies and partners around the globe? I'm Melanie Marlowe of CSIS, here with Emma Ashford of the Stimson Center and Zack Cooper of the American Enterprise Institute. Yep, I said Emma Ashford. Chris is gone. He's in an undisclosed location, but we did get a picture of it this morning, making us very jealous. But I'll let him talk about that when he's here next time. But we are very lucky to have his colleague and our friend with us today. Many of our listeners probably already know a lot about Emma. But Emma, tell us a little bit more.
• 0:57
  Emma Ashford: Hey, well, thanks so much for having me today. Yeah, and I was voluntold by Chris to be here, so I'm happy to be here. Yeah, I work with Chris over at the Stimson Center on the grand strategy team, where I do a lot of work on Russia, the Middle East, and the future of U.S. foreign policy more generally. So, I'm excited to get a little bit out of my comfort zone with nukes today.
• 1:19
  Melanie Marlowe: And some energy policy in there, too, I have to say.
• 1:22
  Emma Ashford: It's been a pretty... I keep trying to move away from energy policy in the Middle East, but as you might have noticed, U.S. foreign policy is not very conducive to that.
• 1:31
  Melanie Marlowe: Okay. Well, let's ask how we're doing and then maybe say a few things about the MoU now that we know what it is and how it's been going or not. Zack, what have you been up to?
• 1:40
  Zack Cooper: Feel like I should say.
• 1:41
  Melanie Marlowe: You look tan, ready, and rested.
• 1:43
  Zack Cooper: Hello again. Yeah, you know, just got back from Europe yesterday. So, it's nice that we're talking about Europe today. But boy, we've had a lot of news since we recorded last time. I believe last time we recorded, the rumors that we were going to have a U.S.-Iran MoU were out there, but we hadn't actually seen any of the details. I think I felt better before I saw the details. I don't know about both of you. But now, we're recording on Monday, the 29th of June, so now we have an MoU, but the two sides are still launching strikes against each other. So, I don't know if we're in a better position or in a worse position than we were two weeks ago.
• 2:22
  Melanie Marlowe: Somebody said it was more fire than cease, which is a good way to describe it. Emma, what are your thoughts?
• 2:30
  Emma Ashford: Yeah, I mean, look, I feel like two weeks ago, or so, we decided that we were, kind of, done with war with Iran, and now we're in the negotiation phase. And so, yeah, as you say, we've got this memorandum of understanding, which is surprisingly generous to Iran, or perhaps not surprisingly considering how badly we've, sort of, lost this conflict at this point. But as Zack says, we're still trading shots with them. We had another flare-up. We conducted strikes near Tehran, like, two days ago. So, I am just not entirely clear that we have actually succeeded in ending this thing. And I probably won't be sure of that until I see, like, demining happening in the Strait of Hormuz.
• 3:08
  Melanie Marlowe: Yeah, this is going to be interesting to watch. I'm pretty sure that Donald Trump does not want to have to go back in there, but I think, again, as in the past, came to a point where he just really felt like he had to launch some retaliatory strikes the way that Iran was behaving. But it's not clear to me they're going to stop this or how long this is going to go on. And with the statements he's making, like that, you know, Iran can't be the only country in the Middle East that doesn't have a ballistic missile program, and we don't care about the HEU anyway because it's only worth a half million dollars, or the statements that he makes and, you know, not being maybe focused on what the national security team would hope he would be focused on. I do worry that there's not going to be some consistency there. But it is going to be interesting to see how Vance and Rubio come out of this. I thought it was really interesting watching the G7 press conference with Donald Trump up there laughing and telling stories and Howard Lutnick behind him, of course, just yukking it up and smiling behind the president, and Marco Rubio basically looking at his shoes the entire time. And I feel like I've seen that face quite a bit in the last week. Zack, you look like you were going to jump in.
• 4:11
  Zack Cooper: Well, I just think there's this fundamental problem on Iran that President Trump hasn't really addressed, which is it is so clear that he desperately doesn't want to escalate into a high-level conflict again with Iran. So, what we're seeing is this low-level escalation, and both sides are perfectly willing to do that. But the administration sometimes now talks about walking softly and carrying a big stick. But first, they never walk softly because that's just not President Trump's way. But now the question in my mind is, are they actually carrying a big stick when it's become so clear that President Trump is just done with this war? Yeah, he might be willing to do strikes here and there in a pretty limited way, but I think it's very obvious that he doesn't want to really escalate into a big conflict. And I mean, it's, sort of, related to what we're going to talk about today in the Europe context, but I think without that threat of a serious willingness to escalate on Trump's part, it means that the Iranians are going to get a lot of what they want in the negotiations, and I don't see that changing anytime soon.
• 5:18
  Emma Ashford: I mean, I think part of it is this is the failure of at least 10 years of Iran policy, that we have just backed ourselves into a corner. If the theory of pulling out of the JCPOA from Donald Trump's first term, if the theory was sanctions pressure, economic pressure, that will make Iran negotiate, it didn't. And then if the theory was, well, these airstrikes and, you know, maximum pressure in a military sense, that will make Iran negotiate and give up on some of these goals, that didn't do it either. And so, Trump is now, sort of, sitting, I think, inevitably, where any president would have at this point, which is, as Zack says, escalate to something that's really quite a high-level conflict, probably with ground troops, probably very high cost, or concede to the Iranians. And I think, I mean, we've been on this train for 10 years. Trump shouldn't have started this war, but the policies that brought us here have been going a lot longer, and now he has to figure out, right? Either he gives away a bunch of stuff to Iran, or we escalate, and I think those are really the only two choices available at this point.
• 6:18
  Melanie Marlowe: Yeah. Well, Zack did bring up that this is related to what we're going to be talking about today, and it will be interesting, as things continue and maybe as things die down, to see what our European allies do. They're continuing to be berated by the administration for not joining this, of course, they feel like they have their reasons. But Zack, why don't you talk to us about NATO 3.0?
• 6:40
  Zack Cooper: Today we are talking about a piece from Celeste Wallander, which came out in Foreign Affairs on May 28th. It's called The Coming Crisis of NATO Deterrence. The argument is in the subtitle, it says, "Nuclear guarantees cannot replace U.S. forces in Europe." Keep in mind, this came right around the time when the Trump administration signaled that it was going to pull out troops from Germany before signaling that it was not pulling troops out from Europe and then signaling again that it was. I'm not even 100% sure where we have landed on this. I think some troop withdrawal from Germany is highly likely, but what happens in Poland, whether we see a troop increase or decrease overall, is a little bit harder to understand. But that was the context for this piece from Celeste. I happened to be with her the day that this piece came out at a conference, and I will say I think there was a good debate and a lot of agreement with what she wrote in this piece. And I think a lot of listeners will know this, but Celeste is now the executive director of Penn Washington, which is the University of Pennsylvania's office in Washington, D.C. She has a couple of other roles, but previously, folks may know her because she was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, which includes both Europe and a range of related issues and areas under the Biden administration. So, she's worked on this at the Pentagon and elsewhere. So, before we really jump in to the meat of this piece, I want to start with, sort of, a bigger question for both of you about NATO 3.0, which is the framing that some in the Trump administration and in NATO have been using. Bridge Colby, who had a fun Washington Post story about him, which maybe we'll get into later on the show, described NATO 3.0 as requiring NATO to assume primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe. Meanwhile, he said that the U.S. will continue to provide the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent and that the U.S. would continue in a more limited and focused fashion to provide conventional capabilities that contribute to NATO's defense. So, this is a pretty big shift, if it were to actually happen. And of course, words don't equal actions. But you know, I don't think as a result it's entirely shocking that we've seen these comments about withdrawals of U.S. troops from Germany. We've also seen threats against Spain and Italy most recently, and just last week, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte was in the Oval Office, and he argued that, generally speaking, European allies have been there for the United States and for Donald Trump. But the president responded that, "I just want their loyalty." Sounded a little bit less like an alliance to me than maybe an empire or a mob boss. But I want to get your big picture take on where you think U.S. strategy towards Europe stands now before we jump in in much more detail into the argument that Celeste is making. So, Emma, since you're our guest, maybe we'll start with you.
• 9:48
  Emma Ashford: Yeah, I don't think we have a Europe strategy. I think we have two Europe strategies, or one strategy and one person. That is to say, there is this strategy that is coming out of the Pentagon that's, you know, NATO 3.0, that I tend to think is fairly well thought out. I don't agree with all of it. I'm not entirely sure exactly what it means in terms of troop deployments, troop withdrawals, what specific capabilities we're talking about, but I do think it's being well thought out. It is an attempt, I think, to look at ways in which you could draw down the U.S. commitment to Europe in a responsible way over time, coordinating with allies. And so, I think that's one side of this, and then we have Donald Trump. And as Zack says, you know, the "I just want Europe's loyalty" part, he got in an argument with Italy's Giorgia Meloni at the meetings recently. And you know, what Trump wants is people to affirm all of his decisions and perhaps help with Iran in ways that, you know, might get him out of the mess that he's painted himself into over there. And that's not necessarily going to actually help this NATO 3.0 thing. So, I interpret some of these policies that have come out recently where we're pulling some troops out of Germany, we're not sending rotations to Romania, but as you said, Zack, you know, then we're maybe going to send more to Poland because they're nicer to the president. That to me, that's all about Donald Trump himself. And it's not helpful if you're actually trying to do this well-thought-out version. So, that's, sort of, my problem. I don't think we have one strategy, and that's why I think it's going really poorly.
• 11:20
  Melanie Marlowe: Yeah, I agree with that. This is how I felt when we were talking about the strategy of consolidation. That's nice. You can have whatever you want on paper, and you can have whatever theory you want. We should be doing this and that around the world, we should be pulling back. But at the end of the day, Donald Trump is the President of the United States. And I want to add, you know, with these deployments and cancellations and with aid not getting to Ukraine, we've had this $400 million, a tiny little aid package that has been appropriated for a long time, that has been in limbo for months and months. And every time there's a hearing and a Pentagon official is sitting in Congress, and Roger Wicker or Mike Rogers says, "What is going on with this?" And somebody from the policy office or somebody from the State Department says, "You know, we'll look into it," or, you know, the comptroller or somebody. Someone is making that decision, and I keep seeing people say, "Donald Trump just has such bad advisors. He's getting bad advice." You know what? He's the President of the United States. This stuff has been dragging out for more than a year, all of this confusion. If Donald Trump wanted some answers on this at this point, he could be getting some answers on this at this point. And so, you know, I do applaud Congress for stepping up to have some direction on this. Dan Sullivan has been livid with Bridge Colby for a year about, you know, what is our relationship with Europe, and then also, as I mentioned before, the heads of the Armed Services Committees. But Mike Turner, they want to know what's going on, and so they are starting to put things in appropriations bills, in the NDAA, and so forth to have some more direction. But they would be willing to do what NATO 3.0 is, I think, in the majority of that, if that were going to happen. The one thing I am concerned about with it is how we're doing it rhetorically and on the timeline. And so, just turning this over and saying we're going to yank some of these really critical assets, especially in a crisis, you know, this is just not going to happen. I'm for a transfer, an orderly transfer, and I'm just not sure that this Pentagon has it in them to do that.
• 13:25
  Zack Cooper: Yeah, I want to stick on that for a second because I think part of what is so strange about the Trump administration's approach is that sometimes you hear the Trump administration lauding Europe for having stepped up. So, for example, when Pete Hegseth went to the Shangri-La Dialogue a year ago, he said Europe is now demonstrating that they're model allies because the Trump administration forced them to do more and commit to this 3.5% of GDP target on defense spending. And we can talk about how real that is and whether it's going to happen soon enough. But there's a lot of movement in Europe, right? Now, obviously, the movement is in part because there's much less trust in the United States, and having just come back from dealing with a lot of European member states, you know, the view is they've got to be independent and autonomous, largely of the United States, because we're just not that dependable. So, maybe the reasons that Europe is stepping up are not the ones that many transatlanticists would like to see. But at the end of the day, you hear this story that actually, you know, Trump asked Europe to step up, and it did. And then you hear this complete opposite story, which, again, was from Pete Hegseth just a couple weeks ago at this year's Shangri-La, where he says, "Actually, the European allies need to learn from others because they're not doing enough." And you hear Trump being incredibly critical, not just of Spain and Italy, which were angered by the Iran conflict, but of other European allies, whether it's Germany, sometimes Poland. And so, you hear these two different messages from them, which are really confusing. And I guess for me, what's hard is I do think Europe is stepping up and, you know, it's being forced to step up. So, not doing this out of generosity to the United States. But I think we're clearly seeing Europe do more on the defense side. And yet, at the same time, even though Europe is doing what the Trump administration wanted, they're still getting hammered, we're still talking about pulling troops out. So, it, sort of, raises this question of, well, what's the purpose, if you're Europe, of actually doing what the U.S. wants, if when you do what the U.S. says it wanted, the U.S. still pulls forces out?
• 15:41
  Melanie Marlowe: Yeah, I mean and look at Germany. Countries in Europe are starting to get nervous about how strong Germany is actually getting. Merz is, you know, in a lot of political... He is taking a lot of heat because he's doing so much, and yet he says one thing in public, which I acknowledge was very ill-advised. He, just knowing Donald Trump, he shouldn't have said that the United States was getting humiliated by Iran. Okay, I get that. But then, as Emma said and as we've talked about, this ends up being a policy that's just run on emotion and spite and resentment, that is not a long-term project for success. Look, they are procuring in new and interesting ways. Besides, their spending is up, you know, they're doing things with the old companies, and they're doing things with the new companies. You know, I just saw yesterday this big contract with Helsing and Stark, and they're trying to get the right capabilities, and that's going to be a hard mix. And they're going to have to think carefully about how to do it because they want to look at all the lessons of Ukraine and have to think about what the situation's going to be. They're much more involved in NATO's operational command. They're working to make lots of bilateral agreements with other countries. So, they are trying to do, as you said, all the things that we ask. And then I watched Pete Hegseth walk into the Defense Contact Group a couple of weeks ago, right after the MoU came out, where we were humiliated, and he walked in and gave the same lecture that he gives everywhere. And he says, "There's some of you that are doing well," and then belligerent about the rest. And again, I am absolutely on board with telling our allies that they have to do more and things have to change. But even some of our allies that are on the good list have said, "Please stop talking about it like this in public because Putin's watching." Do you think that he believes when you talk to us like this about even conventional capabilities? Do you think that he thinks that you're going to be there for us? No. I wouldn't think that. I wouldn't think that if I were Europe, and I don't think that as Melanie Marlowe, the way that they talk about it. Yeah, I think some people in the administration would be, but it just leaves all sorts of doors open.
• 17:44
  Emma Ashford: I mean, I think for me the devil's advocate question here, which is that I do not like what this administration is doing on Europe. I don't like what you're describing in terms of the, you know, complete erratic nature of this policy. But the question I keep asking myself is, would Europe really be stepping up if not for this erratic nature? Because mostly what I hear from Europeans is not necessarily, "Well, the Trump administration asked us, and so we're doing this." I mean, that's what leaders are saying publicly, but what I hear in private conversations is, you know, "We're absolutely terrified because who can tell where the U.S. goes next?" And again, I don't like that, but I do wonder if perhaps the way to a more coherent European defense that isn't just reliant on the U.S. maybe it does run through this kind of erratic behavior.
• 18:29
  Melanie Marlowe: I mean, I am perfectly happy and will give credit to Donald Trump for moving this along and getting it going because Putin didn't spark the fire under Europe, and he well should have after many years. So, I will. But again, I would rather have him, as I've said before, do it the way that the Prime Minister of Japan is doing things, you know, going or like she's in India now, and she smiles and is nice. And you know, people can go in back rooms and have hard discussions about what they're going to do, and I don't even mind some flogging in public. Look, sometimes you have to say something in a public forum. I'm fine with that. But it's the real berating consistently that bothers me. But yeah, you're absolutely right that I doubt it would have been moved along like that.
• 19:13
  Zack Cooper: So, I think this is a good place to bring back in Celeste's argument because it touches on a lot of these themes. And so, this is, sort of, the backdrop in which Celeste makes her assertion, and I'll just quote her here, about what's important for pushing back against Russia, against Putin. And she says, quote, "The key to deterring Moscow lies not at the top of the escalation ladder where nuclear weapons are in play, but on its lower rungs where conventional weapons are what matters." And I think what the Trump administration is signaling, and we've been talking about this a little bit, is that they are going to focus more on the nuclear escalation level and less on the lower-level conventional layer. And this is a way, you know, as both of you have talked about, to, sort of, force Europe to step up at that conventional level, right? And say, "Look, if the U.S. is less reliably here conventionally, then Europe will have to, sort of, fill that gap." So, Celeste is pretty worried about this approach, and she argues, and I'll quote her again, that, quote, "If Washington retrenches from the continent, Moscow's calculations will shift. The Trump administration has effectively delegated conventional defense to Europe, weakening the elements of deterrence Moscow fears most. Now, Russia could be tempted to seize territory in the Baltics or Poland. The result is a higher risk of nuclear confrontation." End quote. So, I want to get your takes on this. I think there's first a question about, well, is there this disconnect between the signaling from the U.S. on the nuclear side and the conventional side? And if you think there is, is it possible for Europe to, sort of, step up and fill this conventional gap, or does doing that still leave us with a deterrence problem, which as Celeste says, is essentially that if the U.S. is seen as less active in conventional deterrence, then the escalation pathway towards nuclear deterrence is, sort of, weaker because we've taken out some rungs on that ladder, and it may make Putin more confident that he can escalate against Europe, even against NATO countries, than he would have been otherwise. So, what's your take on this? Melanie, why don't we start with you?
• 21:36
  Melanie Marlowe: I mean, I, kind of, mentioned before that I do think there's a big disconnect there between what Europe believes and what probably Russia believes about what we would actually be willing to do. But I also think that it leaves doors open for Putin because, for example, the kinds of capabilities that we can contribute to, like really precise targeting and AI capabilities right now that are already integrated, those help us stay lower on the escalation ladder. Because we can more precisely target things and because we can hold things at risk better, there wouldn't have to be the escalation to the top rungs, I think, as quickly. So, I do worry. I mean, obviously, we're going to have all these other capabilities that will help us discern things that are coming towards us or things that we would be able to anticipate and preempt. So, I do worry that not having some of our conventional capabilities, besides just not having the troops there, which I know probably Emma and I are going to differ on how many we should have, I'm absolutely happy to have the posture review in Europe. We should be doing a public global posture review. I spend a lot of time with European embassies, and they all, as we've talked about, acknowledge that there's going to be changes, and they just want to know what those changes are going to be, and they haven't heard, and they feel like they just want to start doing some of that planning. But I do worry that us removing some of those conventional capabilities or enablers will make things escalate more quickly than they might need to.
• 23:05
  Emma Ashford: Let me, I guess, jump in. So, I have, sort of, one point of agreement, which Celeste and I rarely agree, so that's a nice change. Look, I mean, I think she is correct to note that when you uncouple conventional forces from nuclear deterrence, extended nuclear deterrence, to be clear, you are putting yourself in a situation where that nuclear deterrence is inevitably less compelling, that it is not going to be as persuasive to the other side. And there's an entire, I mean, if we go back to the Cold War, there is just an entire school of writing and thinking, and I mean, screeds have been written on this, on what you need to do to make extended deterrence credible. One of the big policy problems the U.S. faces in general these days, and actually I'll mention another great piece in this Foreign Affairs by Jenny Lind and Daryl Press, on why extended deterrence is failing. And so, U.S. extended deterrence is becoming less credible in general. So, I think the White House is making a mistake in its Europe policy when it is saying, "Oh, we can just decouple the nuclear question from the conventional question, and we can all just go along as if the U.S. would inevitably immediately jump in at the nuclear level if, say, the Russians did something in Tallinn." You know, we're moving past all concepts of tripwires and U.S. forces and all of these things that we've discussed for years. So, I understand why they're doing it. They're trying to reassure European allies. I just don't think it's persuasive, frankly. And I don't think it's a very good idea. More disagreement, though, I will say, I think, on some of the specifics here. So, one is I'd love to hear what you guys think on the question of timelines because I read Celeste's piece as effectively saying that Europe can never do any of these things for itself, that there will never be a situation in which, you know, U.S. forces would not be needed on the ground to backstop a U.S. extended nuclear guarantee in Europe. That doesn't seem to me to be entirely reflective of some of the debates that are happening in France and elsewhere about how you might build a European deterrent that would be credible. And then the second point, I think, is there's a lot of, sort of, very hidden assumptions in this piece that have actually never really been tested, right? Assumptions that it is U.S. tripwires that have always deterred Russia from acting in any way in the Baltics or elsewhere, the assumptions that we cannot pull back at all, that the U.S. has been the most important part of European deterrence against Russia, and also that there's not been anything destabilizing about the U.S. presence in Europe. So, for me, there's just a lot in here that, sort of, assumes that everything we've been doing to this point has been correct because nothing has gone badly wrong, and, you know, we need to keep doing that to ensure that nothing goes wrong in the future. That seems to me to be rather oversimplified.
• 25:55
  Zack Cooper: Two thoughts on this, Emma. So, one is, I think it's clear that Europe is stepping up enough that at some point Europe will have conventional capabilities that will be able to deter Russia, maybe not entirely on their own, but with much less U.S. support. I just don't know when that is, right? Like, I think you look at advancements in Poland, for example, pretty substantial, and the fact that the Nordic countries, now all three of them part of NATO, are so capable also means that, you know, NATO itself is more capable than it was a few years ago just because we've added some really advanced allies that have been dealing with the Russians for many years and deterring them effectively even outside of the NATO context. So, I do think Europe is going to be able to step up and fulfill a lot of these roles. I just don't know how long that is going to take, right? And it seems it's definitely longer than the Trump administration is going to want. I don't think this is happening in the Trump administration's next two and a half years. And this is where the second point is, some people are going to say, "Well, look, the next two and a half years shouldn't be a problem because the Ukraine war is still going on. Even if it ended soon, Russia is under huge pressure, and so it's unlikely that Russia is going to test NATO in a serious way." I think one of the questions, and I don't, of course, know the answer, is whether that's right. And I worry a little bit that we are nearing a point at which Putin might think about escalation options that would surprise some of us. The Ukrainian attacks have been highly effective deep into Russia recently, and you're starting to get, I think, a bit of a change in narrative where there are real questions being asked about the Russian economy, the Russian ability to continue the war at this scale. I worry that this is a moment where, actually, Putin might think about some escalation options that have been off the table for a little bit. So, even though I can't imagine that Putin is going to contemplate some sort of major operation into Poland, might we see lower-level escalations even against NATO members, maybe deniably? I think that could be possible. I guess my two points would be, first, I think you're right that European allies in NATO will eventually have the capability to largely deter Russia on their own. We just don't know the timeline, and the fear that I have is that the Trump administration is, sort of, pulling back too fast, too quickly. But as you noted earlier, it's likely that without that pullback, Europe wouldn't have stepped up. So, you're, sort of, in a little bit of a trap here, right? Which is, if you don't increase the risk to European countries, they're not going to step up. But if you do, you increase the danger of a Russian engagement at lower levels. And maybe there's no way to solve that, but that seems to me to be the challenge at the moment.
• 28:57
  Melanie Marlowe: Yeah. So, going back to what Europe is doing, Sweden and Finland will allow the transport of nuclear weapons through their territory during wartime. That's a big change for them. And then there's all the other changes that we're making. There's the ELSA long-range strike program, the European Sky Shield Initiative, IAMD. But they aren't going to have those things for a while, and they're not going to have new destroyers, and they're not going to have tankers and enough maritime surveillance patrol planes. So, there's a lot of things that they aren't going to have. And what I wish is that the administration would put some public heat on our partners on, "You guys have to start doing this," and no, France and Germany can't start any programs together, they're like in time-out, separate from each other, so that these things will get done. I, sort of, feel like that after the timelines we see on tanks and the disasters of fighter jets. But that timeline is going to be a while, and I wish that the administration would acknowledge that we could do a transfer, but we have to see those commitments in the right capabilities. We could do that instead of just screaming at them. The other thing that I worry about is in this new Foreign Affairs, both Michael Kofman, and Samuel Charap, and Hiski Haukkala, have articles about the ability of Russia to reconstitute its military power much more rapidly than people probably think. And the Charap-Haukkala article says, “It would be foolish to rule out a deliberate, premeditated Russian attack against NATO. Militaries can and should prepare even for low-probability events when the stakes are high, as they are here.” But then what Kofman says is, "Current trends suggest that Russia will reconstitute its military enough to pose a major threat faster than analysts expected back in 2022. It will likely take five to seven years, with Russia able to use force to threaten NATO members or Ukraine in more limited ways shortly after the current war comes to a close. Even a full reconstitution takes a few years longer. Such a timeframe is still short by defense planning standards. Russia will field a larger force with more drones, deep strike capabilities, and personnel than before the war. It will continue to prioritize defense spending and maintain higher levels of defense industrial production. But the path to reconstitution will not be easy." And so, I agree. They might have five years, maybe they'll have seven, but you would be lucky to have some of your air programs done by then. You'd be very lucky, or ships. So, I do think that there are serious reasons for us to be more cautious about this.
• 31:29
  Emma Ashford: I mean, I do think, again, this is back to this disconnect in the administration's foreign policy, right? I interpret a lot of what we're seeing from particularly the Pentagon, this NATO 3.0, as they are talking privately, quietly to European governments about some of these questions like which specific capabilities take longer to replace, where are troops needed for this period of time and that period of time. And then, of course, you know, the wrecking ball in the White House just comes in and smashes straight through most of it. And literally because we've blocked some tankers. But, I mean, again, I think we are in this period of transition. It is certainly not ideal, but I don't think it's ever going to be ideal. There is never going to be an ideal time to actually do this. And while I'm conscious of, as you were talking about the speed of Russia's ability to reconstitute, I mean, as long as the war in Ukraine goes on, I sort of disagree with you, Zack. I do not think the Russians are looking for additional escalation right now, or at least not additional escalation that would bring in parties on the opposing side more strongly than they have been. Because from the Russian point of view, I think from Moscow's point of view, both the U.S. and Europe really are starting to tire of spending on Ukraine, of dealing with the war in Ukraine, and are looking for ways out. And, you know, escalating horizontally into NATO would be a very quick way to ruin that. Now, that's not to say the Kremlin might not consider it, because they have done things in the past that seem very irrational to us. But it just doesn't seem to me to be their most obvious option.
• 32:58
  Melanie Marlowe: And I suspect Beijing would not be very happy about much escalation either.
• 33:03
  Zack Cooper: Yeah. I think I agree with that. And it was part of why we wanted to have Emma on the show, because, I think, Emma, you and I agree on a lot of issues. But one of the things that we discovered, I think when we were talking about your... So, Emma had a book last year called First Among Equals, and we had a couple of chances to talk about the book. And one of the areas where I think we disagree is sort of how to approach Europe, right? And the degree of engagement that would be wise from the United States. And this touches a little bit on one of the things that Celeste talks about at the end of the piece, which is how much the U.S. should really try and, as she says, strengthen credibility all along the escalation ladder. And Celeste worries that if Washington signals an unwillingness to engage in conventional military action to defend Europe, then Putin will conclude that Russia has escalation dominance, and that he therefore may think about pushing at those lower levels of escalation. So, I think this leads to a question of, do we think Putin might do that in the short term, or is this more of a long-term threat to the alliance? And I guess my two cents on this would be, I think you're right, Emma, that in the near term, I'm sure Putin is not looking for a fight with NATO, right? I do wonder whether he might worry at the moment, though, that Ukraine is making some pretty significant gains in terms of deep strikes from Ukraine into Russia, and that one way to try and get Ukraine to pull back would be to put some pressure on Kyiv via Brussels or Washington. And so, some of the saber-rattling that we heard from Putin a few years ago, I wonder if that might come back. Now, I'm not saying that we should be responsive to that saber-rattling, but I am guessing that President Trump might be. Now, part of what's hard is that Trump's instincts on this seem so confused. So, if you look just last week, Trump talked a little bit about the Ukraine conflict, and he starts off his comments by saying "Ukraine is winning," which is a little surprise to hear this from President Trump. And then he sort of backs off. He's like, "Well, they're not losing. Well, they're doing some damage to Russia." But, you know, it's hard to figure out, like, where the U.S. is going to come out here. So, I guess the question is, if this is a moment where actually Europe is stepping up, and the risks of a Russian attack against NATO are low, then maybe, Emma, as you've suggested, this is not a moment for the U.S. to step in and make Europe feel more confident about U.S. support at lower levels of conventional escalation. But, I guess this is sort of an issue of how much risk do you want to inject into the transatlantic alliance to force the Europeans to step up at this moment? So, Emma, why don't we turn back to you first, and then I’m interested in Melanie's views on that?
• 36:04
  Emma Ashford: Yeah. I mean, look, I have a lot of thoughts here. As Zack knows, I've sort of just bent his ear for hours on most of this stuff. Look, I mean, if you're going to have some kind of strategy of whatever you want to call it, prioritization, consolidation, there's like 1,000 different words at this point. But if you were going to have some sort of strategy where the U.S. retrenches in some places in order to bolster itself in others because we are currently overstretched, which I believe, I think that's true, then at some point you need to make those choices, and there's never going to be an ideal time to do it. And I think particularly with Europe, my feeling at least is just that we have waited far too long, right? And that this should've been something we were pushing a long time ago. While I'm somewhat sympathetic logically to the arguments in this piece about the escalation ladder and about seeing that, you know, Moscow does not see specific opportunities for escalation that the U.S. can't match, I'm also kind of conscious of many of the debates that we've had over the last 10, 15 years, where there's always some hole that needs to be patched, right? Maybe we need tactical nuclear weapons because the Russians are talking about battlefield use, or maybe it's because there's this RAND war game in 2014, and "Oh, no, the Baltics are vulnerable, so we need a specific tripwire on the ground in the Baltics to close up that loophole." And so, I mean, I feel like for many folks, there's always a risk. The U.S. always has to do somewhat more, and at some point, if we are overstretched, then we need to say "Enough is enough," and figure out how we're going to dial that back in the safest possible way. And so, again, I don't think this is a risk-free endeavor. But I also don't see a better opportunity on the horizon in the next 10 or 15 years, and I'm confident that if we let this go 20, 25 years and we're still trapped in Europe with 100,000 troops the way that we are today, then we will have failed to focus where we actually need to focus.
• 37:56
  Zack Cooper: Can I just say something on this, Melanie, before we bring you in? So, the area that Emma and I have agreed on for a long time, I think, is the Middle East. And I used to teach this piece, Emma, that you wrote called Unbalanced, in Strategic Studies Quarterly, Rethinking America's Commitment to the Middle East, which I think was maybe 2018, or something like that it came out, in which you argued that essentially the U.S. needed to think about prioritizing other regions, and that U.S. strategy in the Middle East had been ineffective for a long time. And as we talked about at the beginning of the show, broadly agree with that.
• 38:31
  Emma Ashford: And since then, everything's gone great, and we're out of the Middle East.
• 38:34
  Zack Cooper: Everything has been wonderful. Yeah. We have solved all the problems. I think where we may diverge is I do think that the U.S. has struggled in the Middle East and should probably pull back significantly the level of attention that it gives to the Middle East as a region. But for me, I don't think that we should also pull back significantly from Europe. I mean, I think we should modify our approach a little bit, but not significantly. And I think my sense from you, Emma, is that you'd like to see the U.S. retrench to some degree from both the Middle East and Europe. Is that fair?
• 39:11
  Emma Ashford: Yeah, that's broadly accurate, yes.
• 39:13
  Zack Cooper: Okay. So, I think that may be where we're coming at things from slightly different approaches. But Melanie, why don't we turn to you on this? Because I know you have thoughts.
• 39:21
  Melanie Marlowe: I largely agree with you, Zack, on that. I think that we should be doing quite a bit less in the Middle East, and if we followed our schizophrenic National Security Strategy, that's what we would be doing. Although our National Security Strategy is pretty hard on Europe. But you know, within that framework, we could be rebalancing what each side of the Atlantic is doing on that. Like I said, I would be willing to move some forces around and maybe bring some home, give me an explanation about what they're doing. But I think that inevitably we would get dragged into a conflict should one start, whether we're there or not. It's just too important of a region for us, and maybe it's because there's some cultural stuff, and the traditional ties and that kind of thing. But it's such a big trading partner. It's such an important security partner to us. We do use those bases, we do need so many parts of it, and I just think that it's probably worth it, in my view, to keep a lot of what we have there. That said, you know, when I saw Trump, he did mention two or three times, and Pete Hegseth has said a couple of times, I'm sure, he wants to put needles in his eyeballs, would prefer to do that than compliment Ukraine. But they have acknowledged that Ukraine is doing better, and I think that Trump would love to take credit for that and say, "This is because they had American weapons," or whatever. I think he'd also really like to get it off his plate, and he would like to say that he ended that war and Biden didn't, and all of those usual things like that. That said, I could see Russia sending a couple of armed drones over the Baltics, maybe letting one or two crash, just kind of testing, seeing what the response of NATO would be to that. I don't think Russia would be looking to actually start a war with NATO.
• 41:06
  Zack Cooper: Sure.
• 41:06
  Melanie Marlowe: But I can see him probing around a little and seeing, like, how seriously are we taking this stuff? How willing are we to respond? What would our responses be?
• 41:16
  Emma Ashford: They actually already are a little bit.
• 41:17
  Zack Cooper: Yeah.
• 41:18
  Melanie Marlowe: Yes. And they've said so far they would tolerate it, and they would tolerate Ukrainian drones flying over their territory, too, if necessary, whether on purpose or by accident, just because, you know, things get jammed and moved around, so forth. But it would be interesting to see if there were more. I will say Russia is carrying out quite a successful sabotage campaign all over Europe, so they are doing things. They are actually doing damage and putting a lot of countries... Like, you know, major airports where a lot of our equipment and NATO equipment goes through. Plotting to kidnap defense industry leaders and things like this. So, it's not that they're not even at all a threat to NATO right now. They are. They're undertaking certain kinds of campaigns. Question is, like, what is the response, you know, if things escalated further?
• 42:06
  Zack Cooper: So, I want to get your final thoughts on this piece because I know there's a lot we could have talked about that we didn't because, you know, this is a pretty rich topic, and there's some other very good pieces on this related subject recently. Rose Gottemoeller had one, and as you mentioned, Jenny Lind and Daryl Press had another. So, there's a lot more to discuss. I guess my final thought before turning back to both of you for yours is if we were going to prioritize other regions and lower the amount of resources we spent on Europe, and we were pulling back U.S. forces for that reason, I think I could see a stronger argument for some of what the Trump administration is doing. The problem I have is that essentially what they've announced is that we're going to withdraw some Army units. But let's be honest, those army units are almost useless in an Asia contingency outside of Korea, which the Trump administration also doesn't really care about very much. That's not a priority for them. And so, what I don't understand is if you are focused on prioritization, then you should shrink the Army. That is not what we're seeing from the Trump administration. And in fact, there's been some good research done by RAND and others that suggests that the cost of keeping U.S. forces in Europe, those Army forces, is actually lower than bringing them back to the United States. So, I think if you were going to make the strong case for the Trump administration's actions in Europe, what you'd have to see is them either shrinking Army force structure, which they haven't done, or moving those forces that they're pulling out to someplace else where they're more relevant. But they're not going to do that because these Army units are less relevant, actually, in a Taiwan contingency than just about anything else on Earth. And so, I think part of the problem with this approach is, it may succeed, as Emma was suggesting, in getting Europe to step up. And there's a logic there itself. But for me, I guess my point would be, I think in the near term, the risk that we're creating in the transatlantic alliance, but also the incentives we're creating for Russia, are not worth the very meager gains that we might be getting by decreasing army force structure in Europe. And I think this is what you're hearing from some members of Congress, Republicans in particular, about why they're so frustrated with the Trump administration approach. So, that's my two cents. But why don't I turn back to both of you? Maybe, Emma, we'll go to you first and then Melanie for your last thoughts.
• 44:39
  Emma Ashford: Yeah. I mean, look, I think this is actually just a bigger point. It's not Europe policy as much as it is the Trump administration's foreign policy, particularly defense policy, is this strange mishmash of different viewpoints about what the U.S. should do in the world, and I think much of that is personnel, right? We're in this period of flux in U.S. foreign policy. The administration has people inside it who are, as everybody knows by this point, notable hawks, primacists who want to do way more, who want a $1.5 trillion defense budget, and then they're sort of in the same administration as the people who want to be more restrained or to do some retrenchment or some prioritization. And at any given time, one of those factions is up, and one is down. It's like the pivot between administrations, but it's inside this administration, and Donald Trump himself is not, I think, cognizant enough of even what this debate is, not certain enough in what should be happening for him to actually mediate between these factions. And so, for me, this is a very difficult and almost unworkable situation in which we have U.S. policy that just sort of flips back and forth and contains these huge inconsistencies because I very much agree with you, Zack, on the fact that, like, pulling down from Europe, that's not the end goal. The end goal is force restructuring so that you end up with a much larger navy, a more capable air force, and a smaller army, much more suitable for the Indo-Pacific. But the notion of this administration managing to put that out there as a coherent policy and then work with Congress to actually make the changes in the NDAA and other things that would be necessary, building support in the Pentagon, I just don't see it happening. So, it's sort of we're in a very problematic halfway house where we're not getting good things for either side.
• 46:26
  Melanie Marlowe: Yeah, I don't have a lot to disagree on that. I largely feel the same way, and it's a huge missed opportunity, and I felt this way at the end of the first Trump administration. What a bunch of wasted time. And right now, they have unified government, and they could be doing a lot. And I think that, as you said, this is a lot of the frustration of Congress. Like Mike Rogers can't believe what is going on right now. And I'm sure that you would have vast disagreements with Mike Rogers. But just the haphazard nature of everything, or do they even understand what the administration wants? Or the administration comes in at the last minute, or they testify to things that are completely off the radar of Congress. And so, I'm sure our allies are more frustrated than I am about all of this, but it really is a disappointment, and things may change significantly, and we won't get this time back. And I will also say, I like a lot about the relationship. I liked being able to, in moments that I thought were critical, have a heavy hand on certain countries when we thought they were going to go down a road. Like, I don't want the Dutch selling their chips to China and their, you know, lithography machines and things like this. I want us to be able to put the brakes on that kind of thing. And we've just lost the actual capability and the moral capability to do that, or we're in the process of just frittering all of that away.
• 47:46
  Zack Cooper: Well, on that pleasant note, Melanie.
• 47:49
  Melanie Marlowe: Okay, how about some grievances?
• 47:54
  Frank Costanza: "The tradition of Festivus begins with the airing of grievances. I got a lot of problems with you, people. And now, you're going to hear about it!"
• 48:04
  Melanie Marlowe: Zack.
• 48:05
  Zack Cooper: So, my grievance is with Bill Pulte, who at the moment is the acting director of National Intelligence. What he's done so far is try and undermine, as best as I can tell, the expertise of the Director of National Intelligence, by firing a couple of dozen of the experts there. And let's be clear, these are not political appointees, right? These are civil servants just doing their jobs. And look, there's a big debate about whether DNI should still exist. And actually, I would be open to having that debate, but that's not what we're doing here. We're just getting rid of people who, I think, are non-partisan, careful analysts of the world. This comes at a moment where, for example, the President of the United States says that no one told him that when we killed most of the Iranian leadership, that they might respond by closing the Strait of Hormuz. And I'm guessing that's not what people in the U.S. intelligence community actually thought was going to happen. So, if we're actually worried about politicization of intelligence, well, we should be worried about why it was that no one told Donald Trump the truth. And I am sure if it didn't happen, it's not the fault of the people who just got fired. It was the fault of the political leadership between them and the president. So, if there's any problem at DNI, it's not with the people who've just been let go, it's with the political leaders. And Bill Pulte seems to be making these problems worse. And if the suggestions are right, as he and the president have noted, that he's going to be pretty focused on election issues, that's even more problematic given the sort of disinformation about what happened in the 2020 election. So, Bill Pulte, unfortunately, gets my grievance. Hopefully, he'll be gone by the time we do our next show, but I'm not holding my breath.
• 50:03
  Melanie Marlowe: Me neither. Okay, Emma.
• 50:05
  Emma Ashford: Yeah, my grievance is with the America 250th celebrations, and I want to be very clear here. My grievance is with what they are and not with what they could have been. The notion that we have taken the country's 250th birthday celebration, a quarter millennium of existence, that is so cool, and it has become instead of being a celebration of the entire country and all the amazing things here happening at the same time as the World Cup, welcoming all these people, instead it's become this truly bizarre sort of Trump show where we're debating algae in the Reflecting Pool and the National Guard are shooing people off the Mall because they might be agitators. And I just honestly, as an immigrant, I became an American later in life, but the idea that we could have had this birthday celebration, there's this fair downtown on the National Mall. They're meant to have pavilions from all 50 states, showcasing the variety of America. That could have been absolutely amazing, and instead, what we're left with is, you know, multiple states that won't even send delegations because they're worried about how much of a political nightmare this is going to become. And fireworks that are being shown too late at night for anyone under the age of 18. It's an absolute disaster, and I just wish that somebody could have organized something better.
• 51:28
  Melanie Marlowe: You got that right. Ugh, it is such a disappointment. I can't even believe it, so ugh. Okay. Well, my grievance, and I had so many to choose from this time, but I'm going to go back to Congress and its inability to have a regular appropriations process. So, this last week, we got the $88 billion supplemental that is supposed to cover a lot of the cost of the Iran war, but maybe not all of it. And there's $67 billion for the Pentagon, $21 billion for munitions to rebuild the stockpiles, $17 billion for operations, $2.4 billion for drones, $12 billion for classified programs, and then there's a bunch of other stuff in it. And this is in addition to the reconciliation package that has stalled because Donald Trump has stalled it. That is $350 billion where we've put our most important capabilities because reconciliation is like it's holding the hostage. And they're going to kill the hostage. And I'm really worried about that going forward. And then we have the $1.1 trillion official budget. But this is a mess, and we need to stop doing this. Rick Scott, the senator from Florida, has already circulated a CR that goes to the end of the year that, don't worry, it'll pay essential federal workers, so there's not the political hit there this time. But the idea that we just don't even have a budget anymore and that we do all the other gimmicks because we're so closely tied in terms of partisanship, it's just really disappointing. And by the way, all the fault is not with the Republicans. There's Democrats that are more recalcitrant than they would be, I think Patty Murray, because it is so close, and they are interested in holding things hostage until there might be a change of government. So, it's just a real disappointment that, you know, there's real needs. There's people that depend on this. When you don't have regular appropriations, you don't have a baseline budget to build things or have an understanding of things for the next time around, and it's just another failure of government here. So, let's try to do better. Okay. Zack, an atta.
• 53:29
  Zack Cooper: So, I wasn't going to do this, but I got to say, I think my atta is for the World Cup. And I'd been worried about the challenges just with people getting into the U.S. to watch the World Cup, and there'd been questions about whether some of the teams like Iran would even be able to come, and admittedly, the Iranian team has complained a lot about how they were treated. But I think if you step back and look at this World Cup so far, it's been great. And, you know, for all the questioning about expanding the World Cup size, all but one of the African teams have made it through the group game rounds. So, anyways, it's been fun. I got to watch Japan play a game in Japan. I got to watch Portugal play a game in Portugal. You know, the world's having fun. It's kind of nice to actually see. So, that's a lighthearted atta.
• 54:18
  Melanie Marlowe: That is. That's a good one. Okay, Emma.
• 54:21
  Emma Ashford: Mine is also a World Cup one, and I wanted to give an atta people to my other fellow countrymen, which is to say the Tartan Army. Scotland has not qualified for the World Cup in 28 years, and true to form, the team almost immediately got knocked out and we're done with the competition, but the fans have been living it up. We were in Boston for the first two matches, and the city of Boston welcomed them with open arms. Apparently, the Tartan Army drank so much beer that they drank Boston out of beer, which I think should be an achievement of some kind, before moving on to Miami. And it has just been wonderful to see not just, you know, Americans opening their arms and welcoming the Tartan Army, but also Scottish people coming here and getting to experience the U.S., and if you have never seen a bunch of Scottish football fans experience a Walmart Supercenter for the first time, you have never lived. It's quite an experience.
• 55:15
  Melanie Marlowe: That's awesome, Emma. I bet you were there at the same time as my sister and her family. My brother-in-law is deployed, and she decided to take the kids on a quick pre-holiday 4th of July trip, and so they went to Boston and then spent a few days in Maine, and they were there, and they loved seeing all of your fellow countrymen, or former countrymen, that were there. And even the drunk ones were super fun and super nice to the kids. They thought it was great. They loved seeing the traffic cones everywhere. Okay. Well, my atta goes to America for the 250th, and I have to give it to the Founders who made the break with England, who did their best, they risked so much, put their names on the Declaration of Independence. And yes, I'm going to read the first paragraph: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." So, I love that, and I used to love teaching that and, you know, having students stand up and read a paragraph at a time. It was great. If you were in the middle section, it didn't sound so exciting. But pretty good overall. I give it an A. But I also have to say I give it to the framers who wrote the Constitution and to the people who debated it in the Federalists and Anti-Federalists Papers, as everybody knows that I love, in their states, and the people who continue to discuss and debate what the documents mean and what it means to be an American today. And on that note, my friend Tony Williams, who's a senior fellow at the Bill of Rights Institute, and David Bobb, who is the CEO of the Bill of Rights Institute, they have a new book out called Divided Over the Declaration: How an Enduring Debate Sustains the Vision of America, which is sitting right over there. They sent me copy of that, and it looks over the debates that the Founders had and how those have continued today. So, like, for equality using Frederick Douglass' speech, what to the Slave is the 4th of July? It looks at Lincoln's understanding of the relationship between the Declaration and the Constitution and lot more, and I highly recommend that. And listeners know that I cannot tolerate people who use the 4th of July to bring up all the faults of the country and use it as their day for grievances about America. It's like bringing up, like, all your family problems at Thanksgiving dinner. So, everybody have a really great holiday. And if you need something to follow, follow Freddie's Twitter feed, looking at all the great parts of America, small-town America. My favorite part of that, as I've said, is looking at people that are so proud of the little towns where they're from. This is a great country. Okay, what do you have coming up, Zack?
• 57:57
  Zack Cooper: You know, I'm just enjoying the 4th of July, not the fireworks, because, as Emma noted, they start way too late, especially for my children, but even for me. But, looking forward to a nice little break of time back at home.
• 58:11
  Melanie Marlowe: That's great. Emma.
• 58:14
  Emma Ashford: So, two things. One is, I'm under orders from Chris to mention that Stimson is opening applications for our Foreign Policy Futures Fellows. This is for students or people who are newly in the workplace, less than five years experience. And we take essay applications, and they get to sort of join some of our strategy team meetings. They get to work on a paper with us over the course of the year. It's a great opportunity to get to work with the team a little bit. You can find the application at stimson.org. And for myself, I'm going to Aspen twice in the next two weeks. I have never been to Aspen, so I'm excited about that, and I'm also really interested to see the difference between the Ideas Festival and then the Strategy Forum, and I'm guessing it's going to be very different groups of people, so that should be quite fun to watch.
• 59:00
  Melanie Marlowe: Are you like the bridge between them?
• 59:02
  Emma Ashford: I don't think so, no. I think I'm going to be a fish out of water in both, but it'll be, you know, sociologically interesting to observe.
• 59:10
  Zack Cooper: You got to watch out for the bears. I opened my door last year, and there was like a bear right outside my door. That is a jarring experience.
• 59:20
  Emma Ashford: Okay.