Latest / ACLED Audio / WEBINAR: Inside Yemen’s south: Governance, regional competition, and al-Qaeda

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WEBINAR: Inside Yemen’s south: Governance, regional competition, and al-Qaeda · ACLED Audio

• 0:06
  SPEAKER_01: Warm welcome to everyone joining us this afternoon for this uh Ackled hosted webinar um on uh Yemen's uh South.
• 0:17
  SPEAKER_01: My name is uh Thanos Peturis.
• 0:19
  SPEAKER_01: I'm a senior advisor on Yemen with the European Institute of Peace, and um Accled has kindly asked me to moderate uh this afternoon's uh discussion.
• 0:31
  SPEAKER_01: I'm joined uh by three uh well-known experts on uh Yemeni affairs.
• 0:39
  SPEAKER_01: Uh we are together today with uh Hind Omeiran, uh who's uh I think joining us from uh Sweden, if I'm if I'm correct.
• 0:51
  SPEAKER_01: Um Hind uh is a politics and human rights uh researcher.
• 0:56
  SPEAKER_01: Uh she's from uh Aden and uh an expert on uh Yemen's southern question.
• 1:05
  SPEAKER_01: Uh with us also is uh Munder Basalma.
• 1:09
  SPEAKER_01: Uh he's joining us actually from Aden.
• 1:12
  SPEAKER_01: Uh Mundher has worked as an advisor to the former Prime Minister of Yemen.
• 1:18
  SPEAKER_01: Uh he's been uh advising senior members of the Yemeni government and uh international partners, and his expertise lies mostly with governance and uh political economy uh of Yemen.
• 1:33
  SPEAKER_01: And last but not least, uh Accled's uh own uh Luca Nevola, uh senior analyst for Yemen and the Gulf.
• 1:42
  SPEAKER_01: Uh Luca also uh works as the regional advisor at the European Institute of Peace, and uh he's done his uh doctorate on social and cultural anthropology in Yemen, uh he where he lived uh in uh northern uh in the northern part of Yemen uh before uh the war.
• 2:04
  SPEAKER_01: Um before uh giving the floor to our panelists, uh the um reason for for today's uh uh webinar is uh the publication today of uh enacted report uh on um al-Qaeda's uh new normal in Yemen, uh strategic continuity despite a leadership change, uh, on which uh Luca as the author uh will present uh later on.
• 2:37
  SPEAKER_01: Um I've been asked to provide a very quick overview of the recent uh latest political developments uh in the country.
• 2:47
  SPEAKER_01: Uh those of you who follow uh events in Yemen, you will know that uh since uh December we've seen a very uh huge political change uh in uh the political structure, if you like, and environment in the country, uh which could also be thought as unprecedented based on the fact that the political status quo had uh continued almost uninterrupted since uh 2022 uh with the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council.
• 3:27
  SPEAKER_01: So at the beginning of December in 2025, uh the country found itself in this de facto division uh with the Ansarala authorities uh in Sanaa continuing uh with their campaign of uh arrests and intimidation of foreign people working with international organizations, but without much change with regards to the border skirmishes between uh north and south.
• 4:07
  SPEAKER_01: In the southern parts, under the control of the internationally recognized government and partly under the control of forces affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council, we saw this major political upset when forces affiliated to the STC and backed by the United Arab Emirates made the move towards the eastern governorates of the country, Shabuwa, Hadramud, and Al-Mahra, gaining control in a relatively quick succession and with uh relative ease of strategic posts in the three governorates, including uh military camps and installations that had previously come under the control of the internationally recognized government, reaching Mukalla and Al Geida, the capital of the Mahra governorate.
• 5:15
  SPEAKER_01: At the time it was felt that the STC had made its move and achieved uh nominal control over the whole of the southern Yemeni governorates.
• 5:29
  SPEAKER_01: Um, of course, the STC politically always arguing that it was the sole representative of Southern Yemeni political of the Southern Yemeni political voice in the country.
• 5:46
  SPEAKER_01: A voice that, according to the STC, was one in favor of secession and the re-establishment of the southern Yemeni uh state.
• 6:00
  SPEAKER_01: This move, although at the time seemed surprising to a lot of us, and raised questions over both the efficiency of the government to continue to operate under these circumstances.
• 6:18
  SPEAKER_01: Um this move was quickly within weeks counteracted by a concerted response by the internationally recognized government supported by Saudi Arabia.
• 6:38
  SPEAKER_01: The Saudis attacked reinforcements that were sent for the STC forces in the port of Mukalla, bringing them very close to a kind of open confrontation on Yemeni soil with the Emiratis and the Emirati-backed forces on the ground.
• 7:01
  SPEAKER_01: The Yemeni government swiftly broke the agreements it had with the Emirati side, issuing an ultimatum for the Emirati forces to evacuate Yemeni soil within 24 hours.
• 7:22
  SPEAKER_01: Government-backed forces were able to regain control of the three governorates, but furthermore were able to push uh STC affiliated forces out also of the rest of the southern governorates, especially the interim capital Aden.
• 7:40
  SPEAKER_01: The bulk of the STC leadership was requested to uh come to uh Riyadh in Saudi Arabia.
• 7:50
  SPEAKER_01: Uh the core of the leadership uh with uh President Aiderus Zubaidi found its way back to Abu Dhabi, but uh the vast majority of STC operatives uh are now uh situated in Riyadh.
• 8:08
  SPEAKER_01: Politically, the Saudi side and the internationally recognized government have organized um a Southern dialogue conference to take place at the moment it's planned for after Ramadan, bringing together the Southern political forces in an attempt to find a solution to uh the Yemen Southern question.
• 8:35
  SPEAKER_01: And in the meantime, the Yemeni government and cabinet have been reshuffled.
• 8:41
  SPEAKER_01: Aiderus Zubaidi and uh Faraj Al-Bakhsani have uh been removed as members of the Presidential Leadership Council and replaced, and uh a new prime minister and a new cabinet has been announced.
• 8:58
  SPEAKER_01: Uh a few of the ministers have already arrived in Aden.
• 9:03
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, the Prime Minister whom I had the chance to meet today, um I'm speaking to you from Riyadh, um, has told us that he's about also to move to Aden next week with his office to coordinate uh the work of the new government.
• 9:19
  SPEAKER_01: Um in terms of uh the members of the new cabinet, I think it's widely accepted that we now have a new technocratic government in place.
• 9:31
  SPEAKER_01: It's a good uh development that uh three women uh have become ministers.
• 9:40
  SPEAKER_01: It's the first three women to join the Yemeni cabinet for more than a decade.
• 9:45
  SPEAKER_01: Um there is younger members also that have uh been appointed ministers, and there is renewed hope that the new cabinet will be able to provide the much-needed services uh that uh the Yemeni people are expecting of their government.
• 10:05
  SPEAKER_01: Um without further ado, I I would like to move on to our panelists.
• 10:12
  SPEAKER_01: Um those of us uh that have joined in the meantime, uh please be advised that you can pose your questions to the panelists in the QA box at the bottom of your Zoom application.
• 10:27
  SPEAKER_01: And uh I will be picking questions uh from that uh during our QA session after uh our speakers.
• 10:36
  SPEAKER_01: Um I would first like to uh ask Hind to give us a sense of uh where does the Southern uh street stand, just as uh the STC has announced from Riyadh its uh self-dissolution?
• 10:55
  SPEAKER_01: Has the STC indeed dissolved itself?
• 10:59
  SPEAKER_01: And if it has, what is uh the future of uh the political um ideology that it represents?
• 11:07
  SPEAKER_01: The STC represents secessionism in the South, uh, which I'm sure even without the STC's presence is uh uh is there to remain.
• 11:17
  SPEAKER_01: We've seen huge demonstrations take place uh in Aden in recent weeks uh around this issue.
• 11:25
  SPEAKER_00: Okay, thank you.
• 11:26
  SPEAKER_00: Thank you, Thanos, for this uh great uh presentation about the recent history about what happened in uh in southern Yemen.
• 11:35
  SPEAKER_00: Um thank you for inviting me for this interesting session about the the South and what happened.
• 11:42
  SPEAKER_00: Um, actually, um that's a good question because it takes us to see is the people now in the Riyadh representing the southern people as they go out in huge demonstrations and in a different places in the southern governates calling for um this is not what we are aiming for.
• 12:05
  SPEAKER_00: Yes, southern, southern negotiation in the Riyadh, it's something that we all the southerners aim, but why should be placed in Riyadh?
• 12:13
  SPEAKER_00: Um, is the STC dissolve itself from Riyadh after two days?
• 12:19
  SPEAKER_00: Uh they arrived to Riyadh, which is the STC from the beginning.
• 12:22
  SPEAKER_00: They send their people, like I think more than 60 people, they've been um uh calculated to be in Riyadh, to to be part of this southern-southern negotiation, which is also take us to another place.
• 12:38
  SPEAKER_00: This is being invited by the the BLC president, um Rashad al-Alimi, and it's sponsored by Saudi Arabia.
• 12:48
  SPEAKER_00: This is all questions like being translated on the ground that people they went out holding Aidarus al-Zubayri photos, that if there is any uh restructuring from the STC, it should be from Aidan, from Aiden, from the ground.
• 13:05
  SPEAKER_00: People who they give their voices to STC as a political component, holding their aim to self-determination or um restoring their states for many, many years.
• 13:19
  SPEAKER_00: Um, it should be from there.
• 13:21
  SPEAKER_00: It's not from Riyadh, as we from the beginning of the crisis, all the government, they've been governing these states from Riyadh, which is, I mean, who who they are um governing, who they are really taking responsible for.
• 13:40
  SPEAKER_00: Um, if we can see that um Saudi Arabia or how the the change of the dynamics or the power on the ground, yes, UAE they've been left, but Saudi Arabia came with their forces.
• 13:55
  SPEAKER_00: So what is it like um I mean the vacuum of the STC or how we can see now southerners on the ground, they see it's a kind of the force of um reconfiguration um of the southern political um um you know um uh group.
• 14:20
  SPEAKER_00: Uh they're trying to reframe the southern political positions, but also from reality.
• 14:30
  SPEAKER_00: Um is this exactly what the southerners want?
• 14:34
  SPEAKER_00: Um, we saw last week there is a huge demonstrations going, um, as I said, Adam, Radfan, Hadramut, say like Hadramut and Seyun, and also in Mukallah with the peaceful um um you know movements.
• 14:51
  SPEAKER_00: But what happened also yesterday in Shabwa, it takes us to another place.
• 14:57
  SPEAKER_00: Why now they are facing within these new forces that Saudi Arabia um uh or the governmental forces, I don't know, the national uh shields forces, um, and the other forces that are they're loyal to Saudi Arabia, um, starting killing innocent people who they are peacefully demonstrate.
• 15:21
  SPEAKER_00: This is all what's happening right now.
• 15:23
  SPEAKER_00: What we can see are the solution will be from Saudi Arabia.
• 15:27
  SPEAKER_00: We don't know.
• 15:28
  SPEAKER_00: Do the people on the ground trusting these people who they are in Riyadh right now, it's the ground is empty.
• 15:37
  SPEAKER_00: They took the political people, people from the STC, all the southern people, even people who they work in a security build, the the um military, they all know Riyadh.
• 15:50
  SPEAKER_00: I mean, it's it's it's a I I think it's a chaos, it's a huge mess.
• 15:55
  SPEAKER_00: Who's gonna protect these people?
• 15:57
  SPEAKER_00: Um, if there is anything happening on the ground?
• 16:00
  SPEAKER_00: Um, that's how I can see how we I mean we've been observing the situation, but people, I think they have the knowledge to understand exactly um that whatever it's gonna come or the outcomes from the riyad, yes, some people they are optimistic, but is it gonna represent what the southern people aiming for more than three decades?
• 16:28
  SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
• 16:30
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you.
• 16:30
  SPEAKER_01: So you're describing a period of anticipation among southerners and uncertainty as to what the future will bring.
• 16:42
  SPEAKER_01: So the exit, if we call it like this, of the STC from the political scene in Aden, either because of uh the self-dissolution announcement, dissolution announcement or the leadership uh going to Abu Dhabi, um leaves a political vacuum.
• 17:02
  SPEAKER_01: Do you see any particular forces covering that political vacuum?
• 17:08
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, who is organizing these kind of demonstrations and acts of resistance, if you like, on the ground?
• 17:16
  SPEAKER_01: Do we have an image on this?
• 17:21
  SPEAKER_00: I mean, I can see that with the one tweet from Aiderus Baidi, people they go out or the STC because they believe that STC it's not dissolved itself.
• 17:37
  SPEAKER_00: They believe there is an regional power for the STC member, as now they are not STC members, how they can see it call themselves.
• 17:47
  SPEAKER_00: We respect them as a southerner, they representing the the the southern voices.
• 17:52
  SPEAKER_00: But do the ground, the people on the ground, believe that they represent them?
• 17:56
  SPEAKER_00: That's that's another that's another thing.
• 17:59
  SPEAKER_00: Um I mean, I don't know.
• 18:01
  SPEAKER_00: Honestly, that's why people they took place to demonstrate because they think the balance of the political or the southern political power now is unbalanced.
• 18:11
  SPEAKER_00: So that's the only way uh they can represent the southern voices from the ground.
• 18:17
  SPEAKER_00: Do they gonna take or take us to another place?
• 18:21
  SPEAKER_00: We don't know.
• 18:22
  SPEAKER_00: People they start waiting for the negotiation of the southern, southern, uh, south-south negotiation and real and its outcomes.
• 18:32
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you.
• 18:33
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you very much.
• 18:34
  SPEAKER_01: Um so, Mundar, in in those recent events, Hadramut was catapulted to the to the center of attention uh because of what was happening there, and of course bore the brunt of the um STC uh takeover in December.
• 18:53
  SPEAKER_01: Speaking to Hadramis here in Riyadh, I hear very strong feelings about this not being a north-south problem, but there is a third party, and that's Hadramut, and uh that the Hadramis will not accept anything less than becoming a party to these discussions and negotiations that should not be left in the hands of just between the North and the South.
• 19:21
  SPEAKER_01: How would how are uh rather how are Hadramis feeling right now uh with uh having been able to to push away the STC from Hadramut?
• 19:38
  SPEAKER_01: Um what are their expectations of of this southern dialogue that is being convened in uh in Riyadh?
• 19:46
  SPEAKER_02: Yeah, thank you, Thanos.
• 19:48
  SPEAKER_02: You know, uh I am a realist.
• 19:51
  SPEAKER_02: So sometimes it's not about what the Hadramis want or what the Southerners want.
• 19:55
  SPEAKER_02: It's it's it's a about what's achievable and what's the current dynamics.
• 20:00
  SPEAKER_02: We don't live like in islands, so like we are surrounded by uh by by regional powers, by regional uh interests, and like for the Hadramis, it's like uh what what characterized that characterize the Hadramis is the Hadrami identity, I would say.
• 20:18
  SPEAKER_02: So you have uh identity uh that Hadrimi inside Hadramot and uh in the diaspora that relate to so like for the Hadrimi especially when we are talking about the South, the South was before 67.
• 20:36
  SPEAKER_02: Hadramot was not part of the South at that time.
• 20:39
  SPEAKER_02: Hadramot was part of the uh PDRY, yeah, uh which was established in 76, but the south, literally, Hadramut was not part, it was Sultanate.
• 20:51
  SPEAKER_02: So and also like uh in the South South dialogue, I think it will be eastern, west, east-west of the south.
• 21:02
  SPEAKER_02: So you see divide in the south, you see eastern part, and you see the rest.
• 21:09
  SPEAKER_02: So and and and for the Hadramis their vision about what they want is clear.
• 21:16
  SPEAKER_02: They want uh political, financial independence, whether it is whether this be in the south, be in the north, to be independent state.
• 21:30
  SPEAKER_02: Even if you make also like if you make a survey for for the Hadarmeans, it would be very interesting.
• 21:35
  SPEAKER_02: Whether they want to join Saudi Arabia.
• 21:37
  SPEAKER_02: How many would say yes?
• 21:39
  SPEAKER_02: So the thing is uh they didn't call you know, like they care more about what they achieved uh in in in in in in the current dynamics.
• 21:48
  SPEAKER_02: It's like they want independence, uh yeah.
• 21:51
  SPEAKER_02: And also like sovereignty to some extent.
• 21:57
  SPEAKER_01: So you have quite uh a lot of uh experience working with governments.
• 22:04
  SPEAKER_01: What do you think with relation To the situation in Hadramut would be the challenges for the new government, and there's also a new governor in Hadramut uh to achieve.
• 22:16
  SPEAKER_01: Uh the expectations are very high, of course, and there is not much patience among the population after more than 10 years of conflict.
• 22:25
  SPEAKER_01: What would you single out as the first priorities and obstacles for uh the government to uh to achieve in in Hadramut?
• 22:36
  SPEAKER_02: Uh like to uh to to begin first, you know, like the formation of the of the government.
• 22:41
  SPEAKER_02: So we have 35 ministers, let's say 20 from the south, 15 from the north, I think five from Hadramout.
• 22:49
  SPEAKER_02: So we have the representation of 25 yeah from the south.
• 22:54
  SPEAKER_02: So uh you know, like is it the representatives of the Hadramis?
• 23:00
  SPEAKER_02: As we say in Yemen, Allah knows.
• 23:02
  SPEAKER_02: The thing is the formula, like which formula okay, would satisfy.
• 23:08
  SPEAKER_02: I'm not talking about Hadramout, I'm also like talking about the different governors.
• 23:12
  SPEAKER_02: Okay, there should be kind of a formula that satisfies, and it would be hard to find this formula that satisfies all the governors.
• 23:22
  SPEAKER_02: What are the representations in the government?
• 23:25
  SPEAKER_02: Like in terms of a local authority, now we have a new governor who also uh uh a member of the PLC, he's both so that gives strength to Hadramot to uh to some extent.
• 23:40
  SPEAKER_02: Uh and also like he was I think he's still uh he led the national shield forces during the uh during the takeover of the camps in in Hadramot.
• 23:52
  SPEAKER_02: So he's empowered.
• 23:54
  SPEAKER_02: Uh so for the Hadramis, uh what they want, it's what every citizens in Yemen in the south want basic services, electricity, sanitation, water, supply.
• 24:09
  SPEAKER_02: It's like it's the basics.
• 24:11
  SPEAKER_02: It's and if we really it's like if we uh if we compare uh what the southerners want, what the Hadramis want, what the Yemenese want, they all want the same thing.
• 24:23
  SPEAKER_02: It's like they want stable life and basic services.
• 24:31
  SPEAKER_01: I think um a last question with regards to Hadramut.
• 24:36
  SPEAKER_01: How um what are the basic uh political components from within the governorate that represents uh the views of the Hadramis?
• 24:48
  SPEAKER_01: Uh and uh what is the what would you say is their relative popularity on the ground?
• 24:56
  SPEAKER_02: Yeah, that's that's a good question.
• 24:58
  SPEAKER_02: You know, you know, like the hardest question is who represents Hadramut now, like at this stage.
• 25:06
  SPEAKER_02: So in theory, like we have uh the Hadramout National Council, which which was established in 2023, like it was an umbrella, like combining all the Hadrami uh uh political entities.
• 25:21
  SPEAKER_02: But what has Hadramot National Council done so far?
• 25:25
  SPEAKER_02: It's little like compared to the let's say to the uh Hadramot uh uh Hadramot al-Jama, uh Hadramot uh H I C inclusive, yes, inclusive conference.
• 25:40
  SPEAKER_02: So they have some support on the ground, but this support is let's say like in the in some part of the uh Al Hadama, uh you know, like or in in in in uh rural areas, yeah.
• 25:56
  SPEAKER_02: Uh they have some kind of support, but giving credit to the STC, you know, like STC, I'm not talking about STC, I'm talking about Harak.
• 26:06
  SPEAKER_02: Harak started actually from Hadramot, from Mukallah, faction.
• 26:13
  SPEAKER_02: So like it was like in Mukallah, we could we can't ignore there is a harak uh representation, large harak representation in in in Mukallah.
• 26:23
  SPEAKER_02: So it's very complicated now, like in in in in in Hadramot, who actually who represent Hadramot, but in practice, who represents Hadramot is the governor is uh al Al-Khambashi, who also like is the he's in the PLC.
• 26:43
  SPEAKER_01: Well, the the there is no lack of uh of uh Hadramis, as you said, in government and in the there's the representation in the PLC.
• 26:52
  SPEAKER_01: So it will be interesting to see how this translates into political action.
• 26:57
  SPEAKER_01: Um I would like to move over to Luca, uh, who will present us the basic findings of the Accled report and um throw at him the question that uh in the same way that the STC is leaving behind a political vacuum, uh, as the report uh notes, it also leaves a security vacuum in uh parts of uh of the country, especially in um in Abian and in the western part of southern Yemen.
• 27:27
  SPEAKER_01: So it will be interesting to hear from you um how this might uh might affect uh local power dynamics, especially with relation to the Al-Qaeda presence in in these uh governorates.
• 27:41
  SPEAKER_03: Yes, thank you, Thanos.
• 27:43
  SPEAKER_03: Thank you for the introduction and thank you to the other panelists for the engaging conversation.
• 27:48
  SPEAKER_03: I agree that at this stage, the primary concern when we talk about AQAP is that the weakening of the STC and the emergence of a potential security vacuum may create opportunities for AQAP to expand its activity.
• 28:04
  SPEAKER_03: But I also argue that in order to understand the likelihood of this scenario, we need to have a look at the recent past of AQAP, to understand its strategic direction and the type of operational activity that it carried out since the appointment of its new leader, Sa'ad bin Atib al-Aawagi, in early March 2024.
• 28:25
  SPEAKER_03: So, with my colleague Sherwan Ali, who is the co-author of this report, we have approached these questions empirically, uh, looking at AQAP activity through the lenses of the data and focusing in particular on the period following the appointment of Al-Aulagi.
• 28:42
  SPEAKER_03: Now, you will allow me to share my screen.
• 28:51
  SPEAKER_03: Okay, so Al-Aawagi's appointment initially raised expectations of change because, unlike his predecessor, Khaled Batarfi, Aawagi is a Yemeni tribal leader, he hails from the Awalik tribe in Shabwa.
• 29:04
  SPEAKER_03: He is a field commander rather than a religious ideologue, and who's someone who's deeply embedded in local tribal structures.
• 29:12
  SPEAKER_03: And more importantly, before becoming the leader of AQAP, Aulagi had reportedly opposed the strategic direction pursued under Batarfi.
• 29:23
  SPEAKER_03: This direction is sometimes described by scholars as the Iranian shift, as you can see from this visual.
• 29:30
  SPEAKER_03: The so-called Iranian shift refers to a pragmatic non-aggression arrangement between AQAP and the Houthis.
• 29:38
  SPEAKER_03: As you can see from the beginning of Batarfi's tenure until August 2022, more or less, most AQAP confrontations were with the Houthis in dark blue here.
• 29:50
  SPEAKER_03: But after the death of Ayman Azwahiri, the leader of Al-Qaheda Global, and the emergence of Seif al-Adel as the new acting leader for Al-Qaheda, we see a shift towards targeting the STC under botography.
• 30:05
  SPEAKER_03: Now, Seif al-Adel is reportedly closer to the Iranian regime and to the IRGC.
• 30:12
  SPEAKER_03: And what we see, and what is interesting, is that this shift is continuing under Sahad al-Awlagi up to these days.
• 30:20
  SPEAKER_03: So despite past proclamations and the renewed rhetoric around global jihad and support for Palestine, what we really observe on the ground is that AQAP's activity remains geographically limited to Abiyan and Shabwa and operationally focused on low-level insurgency against mainly the STC forces.
• 30:42
  SPEAKER_03: So we are not recording a substantial change, but rather strategic continuity combined with tactical adaptation.
• 30:49
  SPEAKER_03: And by tactical adaptation, we mean that AQAP's operational patterns have evolved under Al-Hawagi in three main directions.
• 30:59
  SPEAKER_03: The first is the type of confrontations they had with the STC, the second is the concealed cooperation with the Houthis, and the third is the engagement with the local communities and the tribes.
• 31:11
  SPEAKER_03: So let me start from the findings we have about the STC.
• 31:15
  SPEAKER_03: Our main takeaway is that despite counter-terrorism gains by the STC, AQAP remains resilient with increasingly bold attacks and evolving capabilities that have resulted in cyclical flare-ups between the STC and AQAP.
• 31:33
  SPEAKER_03: As you probably will remember, the STC launched Operation Arras of the East in August 2022, expanding into AQAP strongholds in Shabwa and Abian under the banner of counter-terrorism.
• 31:47
  SPEAKER_03: And since then, we have recorded short but intense counter-terrorism campaigns that produced temporary gains.
• 31:55
  SPEAKER_03: You can see it here on the bar graph because we have the territorial gains in red and the overall activity in blue.
• 32:02
  SPEAKER_03: Now, these territorial gains from counter-terrorism forces were followed by periods in which AQAP activity drops and then AQAP regroups and then it resumes its activity in a cyclical pattern.
• 32:16
  SPEAKER_03: Now, of course, in September 2022 and September 2023, the STC forces made significant gains.
• 32:25
  SPEAKER_03: They captured AQAP camps, they progressed towards the Shawa border, getting closer to the stronghold of AQAP around Ghaoura.
• 32:36
  SPEAKER_03: So that by the time Al-Aulagi assumed leadership, AQAP was effectively confined to mountainous areas here around Wadi Awimran, and it faced an entrenched SDC at the mouth of Wadi Awimran, focused on holding ground through patrols rather than advancing into AQAP areas.
• 32:57
  SPEAKER_03: And this produced a shift in AQAP's operational behavior.
• 33:01
  SPEAKER_03: Under Al-Aawagi, armed clashes increased by 55%, while attacks using improvised explosive devices declined by about 70%.
• 33:12
  SPEAKER_03: And this suggests a recalibration of AQAP's battlefield approach.
• 33:17
  SPEAKER_03: The group appears to be moving away from indiscriminate targeting or low-impact violence towards more targeted operations.
• 33:27
  SPEAKER_03: As you can see from this visual, we observe more close-range attacks, including a spike in sniping operations and direct assaults against military sites and the senior leadership.
• 33:56
  SPEAKER_03: Also, we record occasional high-profile behold-borne attacks designed to maximize lethality and have a symbolic impact rather than expanding AQAP's territorial gain.
• 34:07
  SPEAKER_03: So moving to the present, in response to the recent crisis in the south, AQAP is adopting a sort of wait and see approach, maintaining low-level activity, but the security vacuum could lead AQAP to regain territory in Abian, and especially the Wadi Awimbrand bottleneck around here is removed.
• 34:31
  SPEAKER_03: AQAP could quickly spill into surrounding areas.
• 34:35
  SPEAKER_03: And it will probably recalibrate its strategy, focusing more on IRG forces.
• 34:40
  SPEAKER_03: And also it could attempt other high-profile symbolic attacks, for instance, with VBIEDs, getting closer to the areas in Nazinjibar as it already did in the past.
• 34:53
  SPEAKER_03: Now moving to the findings about the Houthis, we see that direct hostilities between AQAP and the Houthis ceased in July 2022 and have not resumed since.
• 35:05
  SPEAKER_03: And we have indicators of cooperation that are steadily increasing, including prisoner exchanges, shared smuggling networks, and drone use.
• 35:16
  SPEAKER_03: For the sake of time, I will only focus on drone usage, as the data can perhaps provide a nuanced picture of these trends.
• 35:25
  SPEAKER_03: As you can see from this visual, when the confrontations between AQAP and the Houthis in red on the bar graph stopped, drone attacks or drone usage by AQAP hadn't yet started.
• 35:40
  SPEAKER_03: The first drone attack happened in May 2023, and since then drone use has increased significantly.
• 35:48
  SPEAKER_03: We see a 300% yearly increase according to Accled data.
• 35:53
  SPEAKER_03: Even after that, um, the senior AQAP drone specialist was killed in 2024.
• 36:00
  SPEAKER_03: And this indicates access to a sustained procurement channel.
• 36:04
  SPEAKER_03: Yet the drones that are being used by Al-Qaeda are overwhelmingly low-tech.
• 36:09
  SPEAKER_03: It seems that there are mostly commercial quadcopters modified to drop grenades.
• 36:14
  SPEAKER_03: And only a very small number of attacks, which is basically two attacks, use the suicide drones.
• 36:20
  SPEAKER_03: So there is no evidence of long-range systems, and there is no clear Iranian technological footprint up to now.
• 36:28
  SPEAKER_03: So in practice, AQAP drone attacks function as a sort of low-intensity harassment operation against the STC targets.
• 36:37
  SPEAKER_03: These attacks often cease when counter-terrorism pressure increases, and they are very linked to seasonal dynamics happening mainly during the dry season in Yemen.
• 36:49
  SPEAKER_03: Now, again, the weakening of the STC is likely to facilitate two things.
• 36:53
  SPEAKER_03: Firstly, an expansion of smuggling activities along the southern coast, because we know that we have this link between Ashabab, AQAP, and the Houthis.
• 37:03
  SPEAKER_03: And there are this is documented by the UN and many other reports, and perhaps an expansion of the geographical scope of drone attacks.
• 37:12
  SPEAKER_03: Instead, what is really unlikely and so far is still unverified, is the presence of military coordination between AQAP and the Houthis.
• 37:24
  SPEAKER_03: Now, moving to the last takeaway, I'd like to have a look at the relationship between AQAP and the local communities.
• 37:32
  SPEAKER_03: And the key takeaway here is that the new AQAP leadership appears more attuned to local communities and actively encourages tensions between local tribes and counter-terrorism forces.
• 37:45
  SPEAKER_03: Here you see a very sketchy map of the main tribes that we have around Abian and Shabwa.
• 37:53
  SPEAKER_03: And you have to keep in mind that in these two areas, the contest between AQAP and the STC is also a contest for local legitimacy.
• 38:02
  SPEAKER_03: Since September 2022, the expansion of the STC forces has been accompanied in some areas of Abian, especially by repression of local communities and dissenting tribes.
• 38:15
  SPEAKER_03: The data shows a recurring pattern where following AQAP attacks, counter-terrorism operations have often expanded into broader repression, including arbitrary arrests or raids, or even confrontations with the local tribes conducted under the banner of security operations.
• 38:35
  SPEAKER_03: This has periodically triggered tribal backlash.
• 38:38
  SPEAKER_03: For example, it happened with the Al-Fathan tribe in early 2023.
• 38:44
  SPEAKER_03: Other confrontations erupted in Mudiyya in 2024 with the Al-Walid.
• 38:50
  SPEAKER_03: And these dynamics can ultimately serve AQAP's strategies in at least two ways.
• 38:56
  SPEAKER_03: Firstly, AQAP is actively seeking to exploit and fuel these tensions, attempting to deter cooperation with the counter-terrorism forces.
• 39:05
  SPEAKER_03: And secondly, repression increases the risk of tribal polarization.
• 39:10
  SPEAKER_03: So, in other words, pre-existing local disputes and feuds can evolve into broader alignments with some factions siding with Al-Qaeda and other factions siding more with the counter-terrorism forces, like we've seen happening between the Al-Hathan and Arubesi tribes again in Abian in Mudiyya.
• 39:30
  SPEAKER_03: And these can heighten the tensions in the governorate.
• 39:34
  SPEAKER_03: And again, against the backdrop of a weakened STC, the risk is really that local communities may cease to actively marginalize or expel AQAP members, thus heightening uh the risk of recruitment or social embedment.
• 39:51
  SPEAKER_03: So I'm conscious of time, so I guess uh I will stop it here and leave the floor to you, Thanos.
• 39:58
  SPEAKER_01: Well, thank you.
• 39:59
  SPEAKER_01: Thanks to all three of you for sticking to our to our time.
• 40:03
  SPEAKER_01: And this gives us enough time to address some of the questions that we have been receiving.
• 40:09
  SPEAKER_01: Uh please do uh write more um if anything has come up that that you feel uh needs uh elaborating from what you've had so far.
• 40:20
  SPEAKER_01: I would like to go to Mundar.
• 40:22
  SPEAKER_01: We have two relating questions on Hadramut.
• 40:27
  SPEAKER_01: Uh one is um over the question of uh increased tribal influence over the Hadrami politics.
• 40:37
  SPEAKER_01: Uh how can we ensure that uh the rest of the population, uh, women, youth, non-tribal um citizens are adequately represented?
• 40:50
  SPEAKER_01: Do you see any risks in this over tribalization, it is argued, of Hadrami politics?
• 40:58
  SPEAKER_01: And uh relating to this, are there any political differences between the coast and the Wadi?
• 41:07
  SPEAKER_01: What do you see as the political division between the two uh parts within the governorate?
• 41:14
  SPEAKER_02: Well, like so, Thanos, you know, regarding the uh the tribal question, uh the question is has the latest events strengthened or weakened the Hadramut Inclusive Conference?
• 41:30
  SPEAKER_02: And I think to some extent they have weakened because now it's like yeah, it's like the CC took over Hadramut and uh Hadramut Inclusive Conference could not actually maintain power.
• 41:48
  SPEAKER_02: It's a reality, and their power uh yeah, you can see it's like even the in the representation of the government.
• 41:55
  SPEAKER_02: Now they have a minister without a you know, like without a ministry.
• 42:00
  SPEAKER_02: So their representation, you know, like it's it's it's it's does not reach the cities, which is a problem actually for the Hadramud Inclusive Conference.
• 42:11
  SPEAKER_02: It's the population is in the cities, it's in Mukallah and in Seyun.
• 42:17
  SPEAKER_02: It's like yeah, it's like 70-30 percent, 70 in the cities, and their messages so far they haven't been adjusted to urban, uh, you know, like urban population.
• 42:30
  SPEAKER_02: So they will have issues not the other way around.
• 42:34
  SPEAKER_02: So and and the uh the question is like yeah, it's like uh Wadi and Sahel.
• 42:40
  SPEAKER_02: Yeah, there are huge differences because you have two sultanates, uh, you have al-Khwaiti Sultanate in the in the Sahel and uh Katiri uh Sultanate in the Wadi, and also like different political affiliation to some extent.
• 42:56
  SPEAKER_02: In the Sahel, you will see more is or harak, I would say harak uh representation in the wadi, you will have more yeah, islah.
• 43:05
  SPEAKER_02: And what's what's worrying now in the sahel or in the wadi, it's the politicization of tribes.
• 43:13
  SPEAKER_02: It means I would say, like in the in the wadi and the sahels, also we have sheikhs in in Hadram society, you have uh what do you call sayed, sheikhs, tribal, and then the others.
• 43:26
  SPEAKER_02: So now they politicize sheikhs, both like in the shaykhs of tribes in the sahel and the wadi.
• 43:33
  SPEAKER_02: And it's and that's worse what's worrying because if you politicize the sheikhs, you can politicize the whole tribe.
• 43:42
  SPEAKER_02: So in the Wadi, it's yeah, it's like more Isla affiliated than the in the in the Sahel.
• 43:50
  SPEAKER_02: And yeah, what one important thing is even in the Wadi, they feel marginalized as as a Hadramis, by the way, because all the power is in the in Mukkallah.
• 44:05
  SPEAKER_02: So So even if we are talking about Hadramote as an entity, there should be, let's say, uh arrangements or talks about how to split power and how to split revenues across yeah across the the districts.
• 44:23
  SPEAKER_02: We have 20 23 districts in Hadramut.
• 44:26
  SPEAKER_02: It's it's large.
• 44:31
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you.
• 44:32
  SPEAKER_01: Um and for uh backgrounds, of course, the the Hadramut Inclusive Conference was a signatory to the Riyadh uh agreements and part of the discussions in Riyadh back in 2019 and participated in the previous cabinet with a number of uh ministers as you mentioned.
• 44:53
  SPEAKER_01: Um questions to hint.
• 44:57
  SPEAKER_01: Uh people are mainly asking how likely is it uh the achievement is the achievement of Southern secession or independence, and whether the current uh fragmentation of the Southern political field uh helps or hinders uh this kind of scenario.
• 45:19
  SPEAKER_01: Um, and also as a Southerner, how why do you think that uh the Southern question is being discussed outside of the country and there isn't a meaningful kind of uh dialogue over it inside Yemen?
• 45:39
  SPEAKER_00: Okay, that's uh that's a very important question because um to see the southerners um on the ground, like the fragmentation, how we can uh say it, uh do we need a new fragmentation?
• 45:56
  SPEAKER_00: Do we need um a new form of political representation for the southern coast?
• 46:05
  SPEAKER_00: Um and that's how we can see it.
• 46:08
  SPEAKER_00: Do we need to start from the even before the zero?
• 46:13
  SPEAKER_00: Um now when uh Luca started presenting exactly Al-Qaeda, and it's all in the southerner uh places in the south.
• 46:23
  SPEAKER_00: Um the STC was a tool to fight the terrorism, um, even if it was backed from the UAE.
• 46:33
  SPEAKER_00: And from me, I would see it, it was from both Saudi Arabia and UAE.
• 46:38
  SPEAKER_00: But there was like a different uh, I would say, scoop or power of like UAE, they are with the STC to fight terrorism, which is people they start feeling that yeah, we we are now we are free things, especially after the Al-Qaeda took over Hadramut for one year controlling, and that's what the a very big achievement of the Southerners um in this way.
• 47:07
  SPEAKER_00: The other thing, um do like if we can go to reality, do Saudi Arabia or the new government, they're gonna form a new um group of people representing the southern cause just because they want them to follow what is uh the new form of Yemen, uh, or are they gonna have their demands of depending states?
• 47:36
  SPEAKER_00: Actually, I don't know because who's not me or the people in Saudi Arabia or representing South?
• 47:43
  SPEAKER_00: It's the people on the ground who are gonna decide do they want to stay in this new form, or they want STC to represent them and take their demand of I would they they how they people say uh on the ground, dignity, identity, and depending state.
• 48:06
  SPEAKER_00: Um, the other question of why do the negotiation happening outside of Yemen?
• 48:15
  SPEAKER_00: That's also another great question.
• 48:17
  SPEAKER_00: Like, why don't they go to the south and then start having this negotiation of South South?
• 48:25
  SPEAKER_00: We saw the southern cohesion what um on uh to 20 uh 2023 when the STC um um gathered the the differences between the Herak when it comes to Bahum and the other groups.
• 48:43
  SPEAKER_00: Why they can they don't continue of this negotiation of a South South because yes, we need it.
• 48:49
  SPEAKER_00: There is some kind of leader, they are not accepting the STC, they criticizing STC.
• 48:55
  SPEAKER_00: I was also myself criticizing STC uh when it comes to women and their work on the ground because we saw there is a hope that they're gonna um solve this problem, but it doesn't mean that we have to remove it all and then start from the beginning.
• 49:14
  SPEAKER_00: And that's also like um take us to see people on the ground demonstrating, going on like a huge numbers, it's a marches everywhere because they don't want to start from the beginning.
• 49:29
  SPEAKER_00: Yeah.
• 49:30
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you.
• 49:32
  SPEAKER_01: Um, so Luca, what are the remaining, if there are any remaining pro-Emirati forces on the ground, and if they're active, um to your knowledge.
• 49:48
  SPEAKER_01: And um what is the positioning of the Giants brigades and Tarex Alex forces uh who were known to have been aligned uh to the United Arab Emirates before this crisis uh unfolded?
• 50:07
  SPEAKER_03: Thank you, Thanos, for the very difficult question.
• 50:10
  SPEAKER_03: Um it's difficult to state whether or not forces are aligned with the UAE or backed by the UAE at this stage, but we can definitely provide an overview of how the former SEC forces have evolved uh following the crisis in early January.
• 50:29
  SPEAKER_03: So we have basically two models that have been followed by Saudi Arabia in reforming the security and military camps.
• 50:36
  SPEAKER_03: We have some governorates like Hadramot, where basically all the former SEC commanders have been replaced by new commanders.
• 50:44
  SPEAKER_03: And so, for instance, the Hadramilit forces have been brought under the control of the IRG by replacing the commanders, not all of them, of course, but the apex of those forces.
• 50:55
  SPEAKER_03: And we have other governorates, for instance, I'm thinking about Shawwa, where the Shawani Defense Forces have decided to start coordinating with the governor and with Saudi Arabia.
• 51:07
  SPEAKER_03: And so we had eight divisions of the Shabwani Defense Forces, the same commanders remained in place, and we still have more or less the same structure.
• 51:17
  SPEAKER_03: So those forces are now uh on the payroll of Saudi Arabia, both in Hadramut and Shabwa, as elsewhere.
• 51:25
  SPEAKER_03: Uh, what is really interesting is that uh other forces, like for instance the security belt forces, opposed more resistance to this kind of integration into uh Saudi-led uh state structures, and eventually they have been brought under the umbrella of the so-called um national security forces of um uh Abu Zaral Al-Muharrami.
• 51:51
  SPEAKER_03: Now, at that level, it's it remains unclear if those forces are still loyal to the SDC, for instance, or if they will be loyal to Saudi Arabia.
• 52:03
  SPEAKER_03: Uh what is sure is that right now they are included in a very specific chain of command that reports to the newly established Supreme Military Committee.
• 52:14
  SPEAKER_03: And the direction that the IRG and the PLC are taking is to try to unify as much as possible the security and military sectors under the uh guide of the coalition and of the PLC.
• 52:30
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you.
• 52:31
  SPEAKER_01: I knew you could answer difficult questions.
• 52:34
  SPEAKER_01: Um so uh a question to all of you.
• 52:38
  SPEAKER_01: Uh has the uh have the Saudis made a strategic mistake by um forcing, if you will, uh the dissolution of the STC as an organized political organization without having um a replacement, uh without having identified the political and military leadership to to cover the the vacuums that's we've already discussed.
• 53:09
  SPEAKER_01: How would you assess uh that kind of move?
• 53:15
  SPEAKER_01: Who would like to go first?
• 53:25
  SPEAKER_00: Yeah, I mean it's a hard uh I would not say hard question, but I mean why do the southern land or territory should be a proxy for Saudi Arabia or UAE if they have a problem, um they should solve it with themselves, you know.
• 53:49
  SPEAKER_00: They are uh like uh GCC members, uh um if there is any problem, why the southerners they have to be the Udhiya, how they call it, like you know, to give them the the opportunity to to fight.
• 54:05
  SPEAKER_00: Um I mean, two days and I would say to force the STC members to dissolve themselves, I mean, it's it's a it's a big mistake because I don't think Southerners um and how they really see how on how we can see it on the ground, really accepting this.
• 54:30
  SPEAKER_00: It is a mistake, yes, it is a mistake, and I hope this is not gonna lead to um civil war um and um you know um on the ground because of uh not accepting um either Rus or other STC members doesn't mean that it's gonna uh uh take the image or uh change the scenario of um the southern coast, it's not there.
• 55:02
  SPEAKER_00: Yeah, I would say, yeah.
• 55:04
  SPEAKER_02: And and Antanos, adding adding to that, uh you know, like from interests perception, we are talking about interests.
• 55:11
  SPEAKER_02: What's the interest for Saudi Arabia?
• 55:13
  SPEAKER_02: It would be yeah, good to dissolve uh the ACC if it serves its interests, interests.
• 55:21
  SPEAKER_02: But the thing is I see uh a political and security vacuum right now, and the longer the South-South dialogue starts, I don't know, like in one month, two months, this political vacuum security vacuum could be replaced with I don't know what.
• 55:41
  SPEAKER_02: So yeah, it that's that's very hard to tell, you know, like only time will tell, like in three months format, whether whether that was a good policy or not.
• 55:54
  SPEAKER_01: And what you're saying is connected to perhaps our last question for today, uh, for Luca, relating also to the report.
• 56:03
  SPEAKER_01: Um, what do you see?
• 56:05
  SPEAKER_01: Do you see likely uh more open cooperation between Ansarallah and uh AQAP helping uh either side to expand their territorial control and influence in in the coming uh months?
• 56:24
  SPEAKER_03: Well, as I said, the cooperation between Ansarallah and Al-Qaeda is a cooperation that remains at the level of pragmatic coordination.
• 56:33
  SPEAKER_03: We don't have evidence of military coordination on the ground.
• 56:37
  SPEAKER_03: I don't think that somehow the Houthis and AQAP could coordinate to favor territorial advances of any of the two forces, but they will for sure exploit the security vacuum to expand their smuggling networks, to expand the connection that is now linking the Horn of Africa with the Houthis, and to expand the transfer of technology and expertise that is now connecting the two sides of the Red Sea.
• 57:09
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you.
• 57:10
  SPEAKER_01: Um we're hitting the hour on on sharply, and um I should say to those listening to us that the report is live on uh Accled's website.
• 57:22
  SPEAKER_01: I think you can also find the relevant link uh shared uh on our uh chat.
• 57:29
  SPEAKER_01: Uh I would like to thank uh Hint, Munder, and uh Luca for uh providing us with their analysis of uh the current state in the south.
• 57:40
  SPEAKER_01: Clearly, we all know that the politics of Southern Yemen is very complicated, it remains very complex for uh historical and geographic and political uh reasons, and uh I think we will continue with this kind of discussion.
• 57:57
  SPEAKER_01: Uh, and uh we hope that uh you found it uh interesting uh listening to us tonight.
• 58:04
  SPEAKER_01: Thank you all.