Latest / Logic Library / 01 - Prejudices of Philosophers - Beyond Good and Evil - Friedrich Nietzsche
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- 0:03This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
- 0:08For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Beyond Good
- 0:13and Evil by Frederic Nietzsche, Chapter one, Prejudices of Philosophers, read by
- 0:21Hugh Maguire one. The will to truth, which is to tempt us to
- 0:26many a hazardous enterprise, the famous truthfulness of which all philosophers have hitherto spoken
- 0:33with respect. What questions has this will to truth not laid before us?
- 0:38What strange, perplexing, questionable questions? It is already a long story,
- 0:45yet it seems as if it were hardly commenced. Is it any wonder if
- 0:51we at last grow distrustful, lose patience, and turn impatiently away, that
- 0:58the Sphinx teaches us at last to ask questions ourselves. Who is it really
- 1:03that puts questions to us here? What really is this will to truth?
- 1:07In us? In fact, we made a long halt at the questions as
- 1:11to the origin of this will, until at last we came to an absolute
- 1:17standstill before a yet more fundamental question. We inquired about the value of this
- 1:23will. Granted that we want the truth, why not rather untruth and uncertainty,
- 1:32even ignorance. The problem of the value of truth presented itself before us?
- 1:40Or was it we who presented ourselves before the problem? Which of us
- 1:46is the Oedipus? Here which the sphinx? It would seem to be a
- 1:52rendezvous of questions and notes of interrogation. And could it be believed that it
- 1:57at last seems to us as if the problem had never been propounded before,
- 2:01as if we were the first to discern it, Get a sight of it,
- 2:06and risk raising it, For there is risk in raising it, perhaps
- 2:09there is no greater risk. Two, How could anything originate out of its
- 2:16opposite? For example, truth out of error, or the will to truth
- 2:22out of the will to deception, or the generous deed out of selfishness,
- 2:27or the pure sun bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness. Such
- 2:32genesis is impossible. Whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay worse than
- 2:38a fool. Things of the highest value must have a different origin, an
- 2:43origin of their own. In this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world,
- 2:49in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source,
- 2:54but rather in the lap of being, in the intransitory, in the concealed
- 3:00God, in the thing in itself, there must be their source, and
- 3:06nowhere else. This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of
- 3:13all times can be recognized. This mode of valuation is at the back of
- 3:17all their logical procedure. Through this belief of theirs, they exert themselves for
- 3:23their knowledge for something that is, in the end solemnly christened the truth.
- 3:30The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the belief in antithesis of values. It never
- 3:37occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here, on the very threshold
- 3:40where doubt, however, was most necessary, though they had made a solemn
- 3:45vow de omnibus dubitundum. For it may be doubted firstly whether antithesis exists at
- 3:53all, and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antithesis of value upon which
- 4:00metaphysicians have set their seal are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives,
- 4:08besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below frog perspectives,
- 4:14as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of
- 4:18all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the
- 4:23unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life
- 4:28generally should be assigned to pretense, to the will, to delusion, to
- 4:31selfishness and cupidity. It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of
- 4:39those good and respected things consists precisely in their being insidiously related, natted,
- 4:46and crotcheted to these evil and apparently opposed things, perhaps even in being essentially
- 4:51identical with them. Perhaps, But who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous
- 4:58perhapses that investigation One must await the advent of a new order of philosophers,
- 5:04such as will have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent
- 5:10philosophers of the dangerous, perhaps in every sense of the term, and to
- 5:15speak, in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear.
- 5:21Three. Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read between their
- 5:27lines long enough, I now say to myself that the greater part of conscious
- 5:30thinking must be counted among the instinctive functions, and it is so even in
- 5:36the case of philosophical thinking, one has here to learn anew as one learned
- 5:42new about heredity and innateness. As little as the act of birth comes into
- 5:46consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, just as little is being
- 5:54conscious opposed the instinctive in any decisive sense. The greater part of the conscious
- 6:00thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts and forced into definite channels.
- 6:09And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are valuations,
- 6:14or, to speak more plainly, physiological demands for the maintenance of a
- 6:18definite mode of life, for example, that the certain is worth more than
- 6:25the uncertain, that the illusion is less valuable than the truth. Such valuations,
- 6:30in spite of their regulative importance for us, might notwithstanding, be only
- 6:36superficial valuations, special kinds of mayiseri, such as may be necessary for the
- 6:45maintenance of beings such as ourselves. Supposing in effect, that man is not
- 6:49just the measure of things. Four, the falseness of an opinion is not
- 6:57for us any objection to it. It is here, perhaps that our new
- 7:01language sounds most strangely, the question is how far an opinion is life furthering,
- 7:09life, persevering, species persevering, perhaps species rearing. And we are
- 7:15fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions to which the synthetic judgments a priority
- 7:20belong, are the most indispensable to us. That without a recognition of logical
- 7:27fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely imagined world of the absolute
- 7:32and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers,
- 7:38man could not live. That the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation
- 7:43of life, a negation of life. To recognize untruth as a condition of
- 7:47life, that is certainly to impunge the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous
- 7:55manner. And a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed
- 8:00itself beyond good and evil. Five. That which causes philosophers to be regarded
- 8:05half distrustfully and half mockingly is not the oft repeated discovery, how innocent they
- 8:11are, how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way. In
- 8:16short, how childish and childlike they are. But that there is not enough
- 8:20honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when
- 8:24the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all
- 8:31pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self evolving
- 8:35of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic. In contrast to all sorts
- 8:41of mystics, who fairer and foolisher talk of inspiration, whereas in fact a
- 8:48prejudice, proposition, idea, or suggestion, which is generally their heart's desire,
- 8:54abstracted and refined, is defended by them, with arguments sought out after
- 8:58the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as
- 9:03such, generally astute defenders also of their prejudices, which they dub truths,
- 9:11and very far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very
- 9:16far from having the good taste of the courage, which goes so far as
- 9:20to let this be understood, perhaps to warm friend or foe, or in
- 9:26ch cheerful confidence and self grecule. The spectacle of the tartufery of old Kant,
- 9:35equally stiff and decent with which he entices us into the dialectic byways that
- 9:41lead more correctly mislead to his categorical imperative. Makes us fasidious ones smile,
- 9:50we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists
- 9:54and ethical preachers, or still more so the hocus pocus in mathematical form,
- 10:01by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his philosophy in
- 10:05male and mask in fact the love of his wisdom to translate the term fairly
- 10:11and squarely, in order thereby to strike terror at once into the heart of
- 10:16the assailant, who should dare to cast a glance on the invincible maiden that
- 10:20pallis athene. How much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a
- 10:28sickly recluse betray six It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy
- 10:37up till now has consisted of, namely the confession of its originator and a
- 10:43species of involuntary and unconscious autobiography. And moreover that the moral or immoral purpose
- 10:50in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ, out of which the entire
- 10:54plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusist metaphysical assertions of
- 11:01a philosopher have been arrived at, it is always well and wise to first
- 11:05ask oneself what morality do they or does he aim at? Accordingly, I
- 11:13do not believe that an impulse to knowledge is the father of philosophy, but
- 11:18that another impulse here is elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge, and
- 11:24mistaken knowledge as an instrument. But whoever considers the fundamental impulses of man with
- 11:30a view to determining how far they may have here acted as inspiring Jenny or
- 11:35as demons and Cobald's, will find that they have all practiced philosophy at one
- 11:41time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too
- 11:46glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate lord
- 11:50over all other impulses. For every impulse is imperious, and as such attempts
- 12:00to philosophye. To be sure, in the case of scholars, in the
- 12:03case of really scientific men, it may be otherwise better if you will there
- 12:11there may really be such a thing as an impulse to knowledge, some kind
- 12:15of small, independent clockwork which when well wound up, works away industriously to
- 12:20that end, without the rest of the scholarly impulses taking any material part therein.
- 12:26The actual interests of the scholar, therefore, are generally in quite another
- 12:30direction, in the family, perhaps, or in money making, or in
- 12:33politics. It is in fact almost indifferent at what point of research his little
- 12:39machine is placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist,
- 12:45a mushroom specialist, or a chemist. He is not characterized by becoming this
- 12:50or that. In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing
- 12:54impersonal, and above all his morality furnishes a decide and decisive testimony as to
- 13:01who he is. That is to say, in what order the deepest impulses
- 13:07of his nature stand to each other. Seven How malicious philosophers can be,
- 13:11I know of nothing more stinging than the joke Epicurius took the liberty of making
- 13:16on Plato and Platonists. He called them Dionysio colakes in its original sense,
- 13:22and on the face of it, the word signifies flatterers of Dionysius. Consequently,
- 13:28tyrants, accessories, and lickspittles. Besides this, however, it is
- 13:33as much to say they are all actors. There is nothing genuine about them.
- 13:39For Dionysio Collas was a popular name for an actor, and the latter
- 13:46is really the malignant reproach that Epicurius cast upon Plato. He was annoyed by
- 13:52the grandiose manner the Mesoncene's style, of which Plato and his scholars were masters,
- 13:56of which Epicurius was not a master. He the old school teacher of
- 14:01Samos, who sat concealed in his little garden at Athens and wrote three hundred
- 14:07books, perhaps out of rage and ambitious envy of Plato. Who knows Greece
- 14:11took a hundred years to find out who the garden god Epicurius really was.
- 14:16Did she ever find out? Eight? There is a point in every philosophy
- 14:22at which the conviction of the philosopher appears on the scene. Or, to
- 14:26put it in the words of the ancient mystery aventavit Asinos pulker A fortissimus.
- 14:35Nine you desire to live according to nature, Oh, you noble stoics,
- 14:41What fraud of words? Imagine to yourselves indifference as a power? How could
- 14:48you live in accordance with such indifference? To live, is not that just
- 14:52endeavoring to be otherwise than this? Nature is not living valuing, preferring being
- 14:58unjust being limited, endeavoring to be different. And granted that your imperative living
- 15:05according to nature means actually the same as living according to life, how could
- 15:11you do differently? Why should you make a principle out of what you yourselves
- 15:16are and must be in reality? However, it is quite otherwise with you.
- 15:20While you pretend to read with rapture the canon of your law and nature,
- 15:26you want something quite contrary. You extraordinary stage players and self deluds in
- 15:33your pride. You wish to dictate your morals and ideals to nature, to
- 15:37nature herself, and to incorporate them therein. You insist that it shall be
- 15:41nature according to the Stoa, and would like everything to be made after your
- 15:46own image, as a vast eternal glorification and generalism of stoicism. With all
- 15:52your love for truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently,
- 15:58and with hypnotic rigidity, to see nature falsely, that is to say,
- 16:04stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise, and to
- 16:08crown all some unfathomable superciliousness gives you the belamite hope that because you are able
- 16:17to tyrannize over yourselves, stoicism is self tyranny. Nature will also allow herself
- 16:23to be tyrannized over. Is not the stoic a part of nature? But
- 16:29this is an old and everlasting story. What happened in old times with the
- 16:33stoic still happens today. As soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in
- 16:38itself, it always creates the world in its own image. It cannot do
- 16:44otherwise. Philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual will to power,
- 16:51the will to creation of the world, the will to cause a prima
- 16:56ten, the eerness and subtle, I should even say, craftiness with which
- 17:02the problem of the real and the apparent world is dealt with. At present,
- 17:06throughout Europe furnishes food for thought and attention, And he who hears only
- 17:11a will to truth in the background and nothing else cannot certainly boast of the
- 17:15sharpest ears. In rare and isolated cases, it may really have happened that
- 17:22such a will to truth a certain extravagant and adventurous pluck, a metaphysician's ambition
- 17:30of the forlorn hope has participated therein that which, in the end always prefers
- 17:36a handful of certainty to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities. There may even
- 17:41be puritanical fanatics of conscience who prefer to put their last trust in assure nothing
- 17:48rather than in an uncertain something. But that is nihilism and the sign of
- 17:52a despairing, morally wearied soul, notwithstanding the courageous bearing such a virtue made
- 17:59as say. It seems, however, to be otherwise with stronger and livelier
- 18:04thinkers, who are still eager for life, in that they side against appearance
- 18:11and speak superciliously of perspective, in that they rank the credibility of their own
- 18:17bodies about as low as the credibility of the ocular evidence that the earth stands
- 18:22still, and thus apparently allowing with complacency their securest possession to escape. For
- 18:29what does one at present believe in more firmly than in one's body. Who
- 18:36knows if they are not really trying to win back something which was formerly an
- 18:40even securer possession, something of the old domain of the faith of former times.
- 18:45Perhaps the immortal soul, perhaps the old God, in short, ideas
- 18:51by which they could live better, that is to say, more vigorously and
- 18:55more joyously than by modern ideas. There is distrust of these modern ideas in
- 19:02this mode of looking at things, a disbelief in all that has been constructed
- 19:06yesterday and today. There is perhaps some slight admixture of satiety and scorn which
- 19:12can no longer endure the BRITA bract of ideas of the most varied origin,
- 19:18such as so called positivism at present throws on the market a disgust at the
- 19:22more refined taste, at the village fair motliness and patchiness of all these reality
- 19:29philosophasters in whom there is nothing either new or true except this motleliness. Therein,
- 19:36it seems to me that we should agree with those skeptical anti realists and
- 19:41knowledge microscopists of the present day. Their instinct which repels them from modern reality
- 19:48is unrefuted. What do their retrograde bypaths concern us? The main thing about
- 19:53them is not that they wish to go back, but that they wish to
- 19:57get away therefrom little more strength, swing, courage, and artistic power,
- 20:03and they would be off and not back eleven. It seems to me that
- 20:10there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert attention from the actual influence which
- 20:15Kant exercised on German philosophy, and especially to ignore prudently the value which he
- 20:21set upon himself. Kant was first and foremost proud of his table of categories.
- 20:27With it in his hand, he said, this is the most difficult
- 20:33thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics. Let us only understand
- 20:38this could be. He was proud of having discovered a new faculty in Man,
- 20:42the faculty of synthetic judgment, a priory granting that he deceived himself in
- 20:48this matter. The development and rapid flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his
- 20:55pride and on the eager rivalry of the younger generation to discover, if possible,
- 21:00something at all events, new faculties of which to be still prouder.
- 21:06But let us reflect for a moment it is high time to do so.
- 21:11How are synthetic judgments a priority possible? Kant asks himself, and what is
- 21:18really his answer by means of a means faculty, But unfortunately not in five
- 21:26words, but so circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of German profundity
- 21:32and verbal flourishes, that one altogether loses sight of the comical niazeri a lamande
- 21:40involved in such an answer. People were beside themselves with delight over this new
- 21:45faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when Kant further discovered a moral faculty
- 21:51in Man, for at that time Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling
- 21:56in the politics of hard fact. Then came the honeymoon of German philosophy.
- 22:02All the young theologians of the Tubigene Institution went immediately into the groves, all
- 22:08seeking for faculties. And what did they not find in that innocent, rich
- 22:14and still youthful period of the German spirit to which Romanticism the malicious fairy piped
- 22:19and sang when one could not yet distinguish between finding and inventing. Above all
- 22:29a faculty for the transcendental shell ichristened it intellectual intuition and thereby gratified the most
- 22:37earnest longings of the naturally pious incline Germans. One can do no greater wrong
- 22:44to the whole of this exuberant and ecstatic movement, which was really youthfulness,
- 22:48notwithstanding that it disguised itself so boldly in hoary and senile conceptions than to take
- 22:55it seriously or even treat it with moral indignation. However, the world grew
- 23:00older and the dream vanished. A time came when people rubbed their foreheads,
- 23:07and they still rubbed today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost
- 23:11old kant by means of a means faculty, he had said, or at
- 23:18least meant to say. But is that an answer, an explanation, or
- 23:25is it not rather merely a repetition of the question, how does opium induce
- 23:30sleep? By means of a faculty? Namely, the virtuous dormitiva, replies
- 23:37the doctor in moliere kia s in eovitrus dormitiva kujus s natura census asuper.
- 23:49But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high time
- 23:53to replace the Kantian question, how are synthetic judgments a priori possible? By
- 24:00another question, why is belief in such judgments necessary? In effect, it
- 24:06is high time that we should understand that such judgments must be believed to be
- 24:10true for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves. Though they still
- 24:15might naturally be false judgments or more plainly spoken and roughly and readily synthetic judgments,
- 24:22a priority should not be possible at all. We have no right to
- 24:26them in our mouths. They are nothing but false judgments. Only, of
- 24:30course, the belief in their truth is necessary, as plausible belief and ocular
- 24:37evidence belonging to the prospective view of life. And finally, to call to
- 24:41mind the enormous influence which German philosophy I hope you understand its right to inverted
- 24:48commas goose feet, has exercised throughout the whole of Europe. There is no
- 24:53doubt that a certain virtuous dormitiva had a share in it thanks to German philosophy.
- 25:00It was a delight to the noble, idlers, the virtuous, the
- 25:03mystics, the artiste, the three fourths Christians, and the political obscurantists of
- 25:10all nations to find an antidote to the still overwhelming sensualism which overflowed from the
- 25:17last centrally into this in short census asupire twelve. As regards materialistic atomism,
- 25:27It is one of the best refuted theories that have been advanced, and in
- 25:32Europe there is now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to
- 25:37attach serious signification to it, except for convenient everyday use as an abbreviation of
- 25:44the means of expression. Thanks chiefly to the pole Boskovich, he and the
- 25:49pole Copernicus have hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of ocular evidence.
- 25:57For while Copernicus has persuaded us to believe, contrary to all the senses,
- 26:03that the Earth does not stand fast, Boskovich has taught us to abjure the
- 26:07belief in the last thing that stood fast of the Earth, the belief in
- 26:12substance in matter, in the earth residum and particle atom. It is the
- 26:19greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on Earth. One must,
- 26:23however, go still further and also declare war, relentless war to the
- 26:29knife against the atomistic requirements, which still lead a dangerous after life in places
- 26:34where no one suspects them, Like the more celebrated metaphysical requirements. One must
- 26:41also, above all give the finishing stroke to that other more portentous atomism,
- 26:48which Christianity has taught best and longest, the soul atomism. Let it be
- 26:53permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something in
- 26:59destruction, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon. This
- 27:06belief ought to be expelled from science between ourselves. It is not at all
- 27:11necessary to get rid of the soul thereby, and thus renounce one of the
- 27:15oldest and most venerated hypotheses. Has happened frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists,
- 27:22who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way
- 27:26is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul hypothesis, and such conceptions
- 27:33as mortal soul and soul of subjective multiplicity, and soul as social structure of
- 27:38the instincts and passions want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. In that
- 27:45new psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions which have hitherto flourished
- 27:52with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul. He is really,
- 27:57as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust,
- 28:03it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of
- 28:08it. Eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he is also condemned
- 28:15to invent, and who knows, perhaps to discover the new thirteen Psychologists should
- 28:23bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self preservation, As the cardinal instinct
- 28:29of an organic being, a living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength.
- 28:36Life itself is will to power. Self preservation is only one of the
- 28:41indirect and most frequent results thereof. In short, here as everywhere else,
- 28:45let us beware of superfluous teleological principles, one of which is the instinct of
- 28:52self preservation. We owe it to Spinosa's inconsistency. It is thus, in
- 28:57effect that method ordains, which must be essentially economy of principles fourteen. It
- 29:06is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural philosophy is only a
- 29:11world exposition and world arrangement according to us if I may say so, and
- 29:18not a world explanation. But in so far as it is based on belief
- 29:22in the senses, it is regarded as more and for a long time to
- 29:27come must be regarded as more namely, as an explanation. It has eyes
- 29:33and fingers of its own. It has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own.
- 29:38This operates fascinatingly, persuasively, and convincingly upon an age with fundamentally plebeian
- 29:45tastes. In fact, it follows instinctively the canon of truth of eternal popular
- 29:49sensualism. What is clear, what is explained, only that which can be
- 29:56seen and felt. One must peruse a every problem thus far. Aversely,
- 30:03however, the charm of the Platonic mode of thought, which was an aristocratic
- 30:07mode, consisted precisely in resistance to obvious sense evidence, perhaps among men who
- 30:15enjoyed even stronger and more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how
- 30:21to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them, and this by means
- 30:26of pale, cold, gray conceptual networks, which they threw over the motley
- 30:33whirl of the senses, the mob of the senses. As Plato said,
- 30:37in this Overcoming of the World and interpreting of the World. In the manner
- 30:42of Plato, there was an enjoyment different from that which the physicist of today
- 30:48offer us, and likewise the Darwinists and anti teleologists among the physiological workers,
- 30:57with their principle of the smallest possible effort and the greatest possible blunder. Where
- 31:03there is nothing more to see or grasp, there is also nothing more for
- 31:06men to do. That is certainly an imperative different from the platonic one,
- 31:11but it may notwithstanding be the right imperative for a hardy, laborious race of
- 31:15machinists and bridge builders of the future, who have nothing but rough work to
- 31:22perform. Fifteen. To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist
- 31:32on the fact that the sense organs are not phenomena in the sense of the
- 31:36idealistic philosophy. As such, they certainly could not be causes sensualism therefore,
- 31:44at least as regulative hypothesis, if not as euristic principle. What and others
- 31:52say even that the external world is the work of our organs, but then
- 31:57our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work
- 32:02of our organs. But then our organs themselves would be the work of our
- 32:07organs. It seems to me that this is a complete reductio ad absurdum.
- 32:14If the conception causa sui is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world
- 32:22is not the work of our organs. Sixteen. There are still harmless self
- 32:29observers who believe that there are immediate certainties. For instance, I think,
- 32:34or as a superstition of Schopenhauer puts it, I will, as though cognition
- 32:39here got hold of its object purely and simply as the thing in itself,
- 32:45without any falsification taking place, either on the part of the subject or the
- 32:50object. I would repeat it, however a hundred times that immediate certainty,
- 32:57as well as absolute knowledge and the thing in its involve a contradictio in adjecto.
- 33:05We really ought to free ourselves from the misleading significance of words. The
- 33:10people, on their part, may think that cognition is knowing all about things,
- 33:15But the philosopher must say to himself, when I analyze the process that
- 33:22is expressed in the sentence, I think, I find a whole series of
- 33:25daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible.
- 33:31For instance, that it is I who think that there must necessarily be something
- 33:38that thinks that thinking is an activity and an operation on the part of a
- 33:45being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an ego,
- 33:50and finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking?
- 33:55That I know what thinking is. For if I had not already done
- 34:00sided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that
- 34:05which is just happening is not perhaps willing or feeling? In short, the
- 34:08assertion I think assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other
- 34:15states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is.
- 34:20On account of this retrospective connection with further knowledge, it has at any rate
- 34:24no immediate certainty for me, in place of the immediate certainty in which the
- 34:32people may believe in the special case. The philosopher thus finds a series of
- 34:37metaphysical questions presented to him, veritable conscience questions of the intellect, to wit,
- 34:45whence did I get this notion of thinking? Why do I believe in
- 34:50cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an ego and
- 34:54even of an ego as cause, and finally of an ego as cause of
- 35:00thought? He who ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an appeal
- 35:06to a sort of intuitive perception, like the person who says, I think
- 35:09and I know that this at least is true, actual, and certain,
- 35:15will encounter a smile and two notes of interrogation in a philosopher. Nowadays,
- 35:20sir, the philosopher will perhaps given to understand, it is improbable that you
- 35:24are not mistaken, But why should it be the truth? Seventeen With regard
- 35:32to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small,
- 35:38terse fact which is unwillingly recognized by these credulous minds, namely, that a
- 35:45thought comes when it wishes, and not when I wish. So that it
- 35:51is a perversion of the facts of the case to say that the subject I
- 35:55is the condition of the predicate think one thinks, but that this one is
- 36:05precisely the famous old ego is to put it, mildly, only a supposition,
- 36:09an assertion, and assuredly not an immediate certainty. After all, one
- 36:15has even gone too far with this, one thinks, even the one contains
- 36:21an interpretation of the process and does not belong to the process itself. One
- 36:27infers here, according to the usual grammatical formula to think is an activity.
- 36:32Every activity requires an agency that is active. Consequently, it was pretty much
- 36:38the same lines that the older atomists sought. Besides the operating power the material
- 36:46particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates the atom. More rigorous
- 36:52minds, however, learned it last to get along without this earth residium.
- 36:58And perhaps someday we shall accusts to ourselves, even from the logician's point of
- 37:01view, to get along without the little one to which the worthy old ego
- 37:07has refined itself. Eighteen. It is certainly not the least charm of a
- 37:13theory that it is refutable. It is precisely thereby that it attracts the more
- 37:19subtle minds. It seems that the hundred times refuted theory of the free will
- 37:25owes its persistence to this charm alone. Someone is always appearing who feels himself
- 37:32strong enough to refute it. Nineteen. Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the
- 37:39will as though it were the best known thing in the world. Indeed,
- 37:44Schopenhauer has given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us,
- 37:49absolutely and completely known, without deduction or addition. But it again and
- 37:54again seems to me that in this case Schopenhauer also only did what philosophers are
- 38:00in the habit of doing. He seems to have adopted a popular prejudice and
- 38:06exaggerated it. Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, something
- 38:12that is a unity only in name. And it is precisely in a name
- 38:17that popular prejudice lurks, which has got the mastery over the inadequate precautions of
- 38:23philosophers in all ages. So let us for once be more cautious. Let
- 38:29us be unphilosophical. Let us say that in all willing there is firstly a
- 38:34plurality of sensations, namely the sensation of the condition away from which we go,
- 38:42the sensation of the condition towards which we go, the sensation of this
- 38:47from and towards itself. And then besides an accompanying muscular sensation, which,
- 38:55even without our putting in motion arms and legs, commences its action by force
- 39:01of habit. Directly we will anything therefore, just as sensations, and indeed
- 39:09many kinds of sensations are to be recognized as ingredients of the will. So
- 39:15in the second place, thinking is also to be recognized in every act of
- 39:22the will, there is a ruling thought. And let us not imagine it
- 39:27possible to sever this thought from the willing, as if the will would then
- 39:32remain over. In the third place, the will is not only a complex
- 39:39of sensation and thinking, but it is above all an emotion, and in
- 39:44fact the emotion of the command, that which is termed freedom of the will
- 39:49is essentially the emotion of supremacy and respect. To him who must obey,
- 39:54I am free, he must obey. This consciousness is inherent in every will
- 40:00will, and equally so the straining of the attention, the straight look,
- 40:04which fixes itself exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that this and nothing
- 40:10else is necessary now, the inward certainty that obedience will be rendered, and
- 40:16whatever else pertains to the position of the commander. A man who wills commands
- 40:22something within himself which renders obedience, or which he believes renders obedience. But
- 40:29now let us notice what is the strangest thing about the will, this affair
- 40:32so extremely complex, for which the people have only one name. Inasmuch as,
- 40:39in the given circumstances, we are, at the same time the commanding
- 40:45and the obeying parties, and as the obeying party, we know the sensations
- 40:51of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually commence
- 40:57immediately after the act of wills. Much as on the other hand, we
- 41:00are accustomed to disregard this duality and to deceive ourselves about it by means of
- 41:06the synthetic term I. A whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of
- 41:14false judgments about the will itself, has become attached to the act of willing,
- 41:19to such a degree that he who wills believes firmly that willing suffices for
- 41:23action. Since in the majority of cases there has only been exercise of will
- 41:30when the effect of the command consequently obedience and therefore action was to be expected,
- 41:37the appearance has translated itself into sentiment, as if there were a necessity
- 41:44of effect. In a word, he who wills believes with a fair amount
- 41:50of certainty that will and action are somehow won. He ascribes the success the
- 41:57carrying out of the willing to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase
- 42:01of the sensation of power which accompanies all success freedom of will, that is
- 42:10the expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who
- 42:16commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order,
- 42:22who as such enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that
- 42:28it was really his own will that overcame them. In this way, the
- 42:31person exercising volition adds feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the useful
- 42:38under wills or under souls. Indeed, our body is but a social structure
- 42:44composed of many souls. To his feelings of delight, as Commander le fessemis,
- 42:51what happens here is what happens in every well constructed and happy commonwealth,
- 42:55namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth.
- 43:01In all willing. It is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying on the
- 43:07basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of many souls,
- 43:13on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing as such within
- 43:19the sphere of morals regarded as the doctrine of the relations of supremacy, under
- 43:24which the phenomenon of life manifests itself. Twenty that the separate philosophical ideas are
- 43:32not anything optional or autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and relationship with
- 43:38each other that, however suddenly and arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history
- 43:45of thought, they nevertheless belong just as much to a system as the collective
- 43:50members of the fauna of a continent. Is betrayed in the end by the
- 43:54circumstance. How unfailingly, the most diverse philosopher always fill in again a definite
- 44:01fundamental scheme of possible philosophies under an invisible spell. They always revolve once more
- 44:09in the same orbit. However, independent of each other they may feel themselves
- 44:15with their critical or systematic wills, something within them leads them, something impels
- 44:22them, in definite order, the one after the other, to wit the
- 44:28innate methodology and relationship of their ideas. Their thinking is in fact, far
- 44:35less a discovery than a re recognizing, a remembering, a return and a
- 44:42homecoming to far off ancient common household of the soul out of which those ideas
- 44:49formerly grew. Philosophizing is so far a kind of activism of the highest order.
- 44:54The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek and German philosophizing is easily
- 45:00enough explained. In fact, where there is affinity of language owing to the
- 45:06common philosophy of grammar, I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance
- 45:10of similar grammatical functions, it cannot but be that everything is prepared at the
- 45:16outset for a similar development and succession of philosophical systems. Just as the way
- 45:23seems barred against certain other possibilities of world interpretation, it is highly probable that
- 45:30philosophers within the domain of the ural altaic languages, where the conception of the
- 45:37subject is least developed, look otherwise into the world, and will be found
- 45:43on paths of thought different from those of the Indo Germans and Mussulmans. The
- 45:47spell of certain grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of physiological valuations and racial
- 45:55conditions. So much by way of daring Locke superficiality with regard to the origin
- 46:02of ideas twenty one, the causa sui is the best self contradiction that has
- 46:09yet been conceived. It is a sort of logical violation and unnaturalness. But
- 46:15the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with this
- 46:21very folly. The desire for freedom of will in the superlative metaphysical sense,
- 46:28such as still holds sway unfortunately in the minds of the half educated, the
- 46:34desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to
- 46:39absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society. Therefrom involves
- 46:45nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui, and with more than Munchausen
- 46:52daring to pull oneself up into existence by the hair out of the slough of
- 46:58nothingness. Very one should find out in this manner the crass stupidity of the
- 47:04celebrated conception of free will, and put it out of his head altogether.
- 47:08I beg of him to carry his enlightenment a step further, and also put
- 47:14out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of free will, I
- 47:19mean non free will, which is tantamount to a misuse of cause and effect.
- 47:23One should not wrongly materialize cause and effect, as the natural philosophers do,
- 47:30and whoever like them naturalize in thinking at present according to the prevailing mechanical
- 47:37doultishness, which makes the cause press and push until it affects its end.
- 47:43One should use cause and effect only as pure conceptions, that is to say,
- 47:46as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and mutual understanding, not for
- 47:53explanation. In being in itself there is nothing of causal connection, of nonses
- 48:00necessity, or of psychological non freedom. There the effect does not follow the
- 48:06cause, their law does not obtain. It is we alone who have devised
- 48:10cause, sequence, reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom,
- 48:19motive, and purpose. And when we interpret and intermix this symbol world
- 48:24as being in itself with things, we act once more as we have always
- 48:30acted. Mythologically, the non free will is mythology. In real life,
- 48:36it is only a question of strong and weak wills. It is almost always
- 48:40a symptom of what is lacking in himself. When a thinker, in every
- 48:45causal connection and psychological necessity, manifests something of compulsion, indigence, obsequiousness,
- 48:54oppression, and non freedom, it is suspicious to have somes the person betrays
- 49:01himself. And in general, if I have observed correctly, the non freedom
- 49:07of the will is regarded as a problem from two entirely opposite standpoints, but
- 49:14always in a profoundly personal manner. Some will not give up their responsibility,
- 49:21their belief in themselves the personal right to their merits at any price. The
- 49:27vain races belong to this class. Others, on the contrary, do not
- 49:32wish to be answerable for anything or blamed for anything, and, owing to
- 49:37an inward self contempt, seek to get out of the business no matter how
- 49:44The latter, when they write books, are in the habit at present of
- 49:47taking the side of criminals. A sort of socialistic sympathy is their favorite disguise,
- 49:54and as a matter of fact, the fatalism of the weak willed embellishes
- 49:59itself surprise when it compose as la religion de las sufranc umene, that is
- 50:06its good taste. Twenty two. Let me be pardoned as an old philologist
- 50:13who cannot desist from the mischief of putting his finger on bad modes of interpretation.
- 50:19But nature's conformity to law of which you physicists talk so proudly, as
- 50:24though why it exists only owing to your interpretation and bad philology, it is
- 50:30no matter of fact, no text, but rather just naively humanitarian adjustment and
- 50:37perversion of meeting with which you make abundant concessions to the democratic instincts of the
- 50:44modern soul. Everywhere equality before the law. Nature is not different in that
- 50:49respect, nor better than we a fine instance of secret motive in which the
- 50:54vulgar antagonism to everything privileged and autocratic wise a second and more refined atheism,
- 51:01in which a vulgar antagonism to everything privileged and autocratic. Likewise a second and
- 51:08more refined atheism is once more disguised. Ni dieu nimehtre. That also is
- 51:15what you want, and therefore cheers for natural law? Is it not so?
- 51:22But as has been said, that is interpretation, not text. And
- 51:27somebody might come along who, with opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could
- 51:34read out of the same nature and with regard to the same phenomena, just
- 51:38the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of the claims of power. An interpreter who
- 51:45should so place the unexceptionalness and unconditionalness of all will to power before your eyes,
- 51:53that almost every word and the word tyranny itself would eventually seem unsuitable,
- 52:00or like a weakening and softening metaphor, as being too human and who should
- 52:06nevertheless end by asserting the same about this world as you do, namely,
- 52:13that it has a necessary and calculable course, not however, because laws obtain
- 52:19in it, but because they are absolutely lacking, and every power affects its
- 52:23ultimate consequences every moment. Granted that this also is only interpretation, and you
- 52:30will be eager enough to make this objection well, so much the better.
- 52:36Twenty three. All psychology hitherto has run aground on moral prejudices and timidities.
- 52:44It has not dared to launch out into the depths. In so far as
- 52:47it is allowable to recognize in that which has hitherto been written evidence of that
- 52:53which has hitherto been kept silent. It seems as if nobody had yet harbored
- 52:59the notion of psychology as the morphology and development doctrine of the will to power.
- 53:05As I conceive of it, the power of moral prejudices has penetrated deeply
- 53:12into the most intellectual world, the world apparently most indifferent and unprejudiced, and
- 53:19has obviously operated in an injurious, obstructive, blinding, and distorting manner.
- 53:27A proper physiopsychology has to contend with unconscious antagonism in the heart of the investigator,
- 53:34it has the heart against it. Even a doctrine of the reciprocal conditionalness
- 53:38of the good and the bad impulses causes as refined immorality, distress, and
- 53:46aversion in a still strong and manly conscience. Still more so, a doctrine
- 53:53of the derivation of all good impulses from bad ones. If, however,
- 53:59a person should regard even the emotions of hatred, envy, covetousness, and
- 54:04imperiousness as life conditioning emotions, as factors which must be present fundamentally and essentially
- 54:12in the general economy of life, which must therefore be further developed. If
- 54:16life is to be further developed, he will suffer from such a view of
- 54:21things as from sea sickness. And yet this hypothesis is far from being strangest
- 54:28and most painful in this immense and almost new domain of dangerous knowledge. And
- 54:34there are in fact a hundred good reasons why everyone should keep away from it.
- 54:38Who can do so. On the other hand, if one has once
- 54:43drifted hither with one's bark, well, very good. Now, let us
- 54:49set our teeth firmly, let us open our eyes and keep our hands fast
- 54:52on the helm, we sail away right over morality we crush out, We
- 54:59destroy, perhaps the remains of our own mortality by daring to make our voyage
- 55:05thither. But what do we matter? Never yet did a profounder world of
- 55:09insight reveal itself to daring travelers and adventurers. And the psychologist who thus makes
- 55:16a sacrifice it is not the sacrificio del intellecto. On the contrary, will
- 55:24at least be entitled to demand in return that psychology shall once more be recognized
- 55:30as the queen of the sciences, for whose service and equipment the other sciences
- 55:36exist, For psychology is once more the path to the fundamental problems. End
- 55:45of Chapter one,