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011 - Lessons of the Battle · Canadas Hundred Days The Battle of Amiens

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Speaker 1: Part one, Chapter eleven of Canada's Hundred Days with the
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Speaker 1: Canadian Corps from Amien to Monde August eighth through November eleventh,
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Speaker 1: nineteen eighteen. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings
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Speaker 1: are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer,
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Speaker 1: please visit LibriVox dot org. Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesay,
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Speaker 1: Part one, Chapter eleven, Lessons of the battle. War is
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Speaker 1: the last thing to go. According to program, said Thucidides,
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Speaker 1: and the maxim never had a more striking application than
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Speaker 1: in this Battle of Amien. The enemy were preparing to
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Speaker 1: attack when upon them fell the avalanche. It was all
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Speaker 1: very disconcerting. For the moment they were overwhelmed, those of
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Speaker 1: their front line troops who escaped capture had their wind
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Speaker 1: up and spread consternation behind. Besides, they had lost all
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Speaker 1: their guns except stout machine gunners. In strictly localized defenses.
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Speaker 1: We met very little organized opposition the first day, and
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Speaker 1: our great store of prisoners, guns and material of all
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Speaker 1: kinds was precisely due to the enemy having been massed
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Speaker 1: forward for the assault set for a couple of days later.
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Speaker 1: But as we went forward conditions began to change in
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Speaker 1: their favor. It is another maxim of war that an
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Speaker 1: attack weakens in its thrust as it progresses. So at
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Speaker 1: the end of the third day, our blow having lost
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Speaker 1: some of its first impetus, being restricted in its full
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Speaker 1: swing by the course of the battle on either flank,
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Speaker 1: and meeting more and more determined resistance from the enemy,
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Speaker 1: who had thrown in a number of fresh divisions, and
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Speaker 1: again gathered together a respectable body of artillery, our advance
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Speaker 1: perceptibly slowed down. We were coming too into a bad country. Hitherto,
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Speaker 1: as we have seen, the enemy's organized defense had been
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Speaker 1: in rudimentary. He had paid little attention to his trench system,
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Speaker 1: and there was a minimum of wire. But now we
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Speaker 1: were to advance into the old Somme battlefield, traversed by
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Speaker 1: ancient trench lines bestooned by rusted wire, and passing off
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Speaker 1: solid ground to marshlands, while in our immediate front lay
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Speaker 1: the strong defense line linking up Roy and Chalnez. It
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Speaker 1: was with these considerations before him that Sir Arthur Curry
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Speaker 1: made very strong representations to the High Command to the
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Speaker 1: effect that the Canadian Corps, having successfully accomplished its allotted
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Speaker 1: task as storm troops should be pulled out of that
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Speaker 1: area before its bright temper became dulled, to be used
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Speaker 1: in a similar operation on another front, for which he
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Speaker 1: suggested the Bapaum sector as most suitable. However, it was
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Speaker 1: decided that the corpse should do more spade work until
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Speaker 1: at least the French offensive had developed further. In the
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Speaker 1: direction of Roy, there was a prospect two that the
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Speaker 1: offensive on our left flank reduced north of the somb
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Speaker 1: to a static condition before Bray, and thus in turn
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Speaker 1: holding back our immediate neighbors. The Australians might develop more
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Speaker 1: favorably when the attacking front would broaden and the Canadian
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Speaker 1: Corps be relieved from its salient, offering new opportunities for
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Speaker 1: further successful exploitation towards the psalm. The desultory writing that
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Speaker 1: followed dysultory not that it was easy, but because it
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Speaker 1: led nowhere. In particular, proved very expensive for the Canadian Corps,
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Speaker 1: whose task, subjected as it was, to a galling enfallad fire,
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Speaker 1: resolved itself into the storming of individual villages. In fact,
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Speaker 1: there was the prospect that we were going to run
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Speaker 1: into another blind alley after the fashion of the offensive
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Speaker 1: of nineteen sixteen onto the Somme was the talk in
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Speaker 1: the ranks, but without a true appreciation of the difficulties.
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Speaker 1: When therefore the word reached us that we were to
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Speaker 1: be relieved by French divisions, there was a general satisfaction.
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Speaker 1: We understood, of course, that it meant we were to
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Speaker 1: have a go in elsewhere. It is worth noting here
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Speaker 1: that Field Marshal Haig, in his victory dispatch, indorses the
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Speaker 1: opinion submitted by the Canadian Corps commander. By the evening
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Speaker 1: of August twelve, he writes, our infantry had reached the
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Speaker 1: old German som defenses of nineteen sixteen on the general
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Speaker 1: line west of Damrie, east of Lyon, east of Proyar,
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Speaker 1: having repulsed with severe loss, determined counter attacks in the
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Speaker 1: neighborhood of Lyon, north of the Somme, we were on
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Speaker 1: the western outskirts of Bracer Somme, The derelict battle area
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Speaker 1: which now lay before our troops, seared by old trench lines,
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Speaker 1: pitted with shell holes, and crossed in all directions with
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Speaker 1: tangled belts of wire, the whole covered by the wild
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Speaker 1: vegetation of two years presented unrivaled opportunities for stubborn machine
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Speaker 1: gun defenses. Attacks carried out on August thirteen proved the
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Speaker 1: strength of these positions and showed that the enemy, heavily reinforced,
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Speaker 1: was ready to give battle for them. I therefore determined
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Speaker 1: to break off the battle on this front, and transferred
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Speaker 1: the front of attack from the Fourth Army to the
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Speaker 1: sector north of the Somme, where an attack seemed unexpected
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Speaker 1: by the enemy. My intention was for the Third Army
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Speaker 1: to operate in the direction of Baupalm, so as to
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Speaker 1: turn the lines of the old somb defenses from the north.
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Speaker 1: The French First Army now ceased to be under my command. Meanwhile,
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Speaker 1: south of the Somme, our pressure was to be maintained
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Speaker 1: so as to take advantage of any weakening on the
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Speaker 1: part of the enemy and encourage in him the belief
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Speaker 1: that we intended to persist in our operations on that front.
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Speaker 1: During the succeeding days, local attacks gave us possession of Dammarie,
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Speaker 1: Parvillers and Fransar, and made progress also at other points.
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Speaker 1: In fact, our whole conduct of the war had changed
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Speaker 1: under the masterly direction of Folk. Our attacks henceforth were
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Speaker 1: to be restricted in their objectives, and only to be
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Speaker 1: developed as their successful progress opened out without too great cost,
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Speaker 1: further fields for exploitation. In effect, the Battle of Amien
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Speaker 1: was now broken off so far as the British forces went,
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Speaker 1: and there immediately opened the less ambitious but locally successful
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Speaker 1: attack in the direction of Bapam. Then, in turn came
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Speaker 1: the Battle of Aras and the beginning of the Hindenburg
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Speaker 1: Line by the Canadian Corps. Thereafter the whole fabric of
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Speaker 1: the enemy defense began to give way, and it was
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Speaker 1: the beginning of the end. Before leaving the battle field,
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Speaker 1: some tactical considerations are worthy of note. It cannot be
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Speaker 1: said that in its broad aspects the battle presented any
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Speaker 1: new tactical features. It merely applied successfully the plan Sir
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Speaker 1: Julie and Bing had originated for his Third Army in
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Speaker 1: the first Battle of Cambray of the preceding November. He
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Speaker 1: failed relatively at least to his hopes, because he had
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Speaker 1: not at his disposal sufficient forces to exploit his initial success,
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Speaker 1: nor even to properly defend the ground one. But that
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Speaker 1: did not invalidate his plan, which consisted of a surprise
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Speaker 1: attack unaccompanied by artillery preparation, the free use of tanks
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Speaker 1: being counted on to break the road for the infantry,
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Speaker 1: combined with an intensive barrage laid down on the enemy front,
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Speaker 1: and support lines and battery positions. That plan changed the
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Speaker 1: nature of the combat on the Western Front, converting it
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Speaker 1: from trench fighting to open warfare. The enemy was quick
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Speaker 1: to adopt it in his march offensive and with perfect success,
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Speaker 1: his means being adequate to his purpose, it was now
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Speaker 1: for the first time successfully employed by the British arms.
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Speaker 1: The plan was developed to its highest extent by the
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Speaker 1: employment of a tremendous barrage designed to carry the infantry
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Speaker 1: deep into enemy territory, by the presence of an unprecedented
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Speaker 1: number of tanks, including the newly perfected Whippets, by the
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Speaker 1: bringing up of the Cavalry Corps, and last but not least,
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Speaker 1: by the co operation of the Independent Force under General
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Speaker 1: Brutannel of Canadian motor machine gun brigades and cyclists. Brutennell's
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Speaker 1: Independent Force, as we have seen, did valuable and particularly
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Speaker 1: gallant work along the roy Road, where in the early
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Speaker 1: stage of the battle it acted as the liaison between
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Speaker 1: the French and our own Third Division. But it too
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Speaker 1: was denied the chance of breaking through, and because its
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Speaker 1: operations were necessarily confined to mettled roads held everywhere in
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Speaker 1: great strength by the enemy, its offensive role was limited.
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Speaker 1: Its first brigade was fighting over the same ground where
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Speaker 1: it had won imperishable fame in the March retreat. Over
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Speaker 1: one hundred heavy tanks were assigned to the attack, and
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Speaker 1: of these two thirds had become casualties from one cause
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Speaker 1: and another by the end of the third day. Some
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Speaker 1: were walking wounded cases only, but many were destroyed by
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Speaker 1: direct his Without question, the tanks played a great and
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Speaker 1: formidable part in this battle, and if the war had
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Speaker 1: continued another year, no doubt they would have become a
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Speaker 1: still more effective arm. But that they were not vital
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Speaker 1: to success was proved by the Canadian Corps later on,
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Speaker 1: when its supply of tanks, at first scanty, rapidly was
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Speaker 1: reduced to the vanishing point. The tank, indeed, and its
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Speaker 1: tactical management, was still in process of evolution even up
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Speaker 1: to the close of hostilities. It was perhaps Britain's greatest
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Speaker 1: material contribution to the war. Early tanks failed or achieved
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Speaker 1: but a moiety of success because they were too slow
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Speaker 1: and too vulnerable the enemy after his first shock of surprise,
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Speaker 1: affected to take them lightly, but nevertheless captured documents proved
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Speaker 1: that he was anxious. Commanders being warned to be prepared,
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Speaker 1: to pay special attention to anti tank defense and to
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Speaker 1: train men with the anti tank guns. A magnified rifle
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Speaker 1: weighing thirty five pounds, of which several fell into our
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Speaker 1: hands in the Amiend show. The great width and depth
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Speaker 1: of the Hindenburg Ditch was designed to stop tanks. After
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Speaker 1: the considerable French success with tanks southwest of Sison in
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Speaker 1: July and our own in the present battle, his alarms increased.
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Speaker 1: His own tanks were a failure because of poor design,
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Speaker 1: the flat underbody preventing the climbing of obstacles, and he
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Speaker 1: never had enough to make them really formidable. In the
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Speaker 1: Amiens show, the tanks were masked and the waistage was
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Speaker 1: so great that replacements on the same scale were difficult,
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Speaker 1: especially as the widening of the battle line made an
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Speaker 1: effective tank concentration more and more out of the question.
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Speaker 1: In the Ara defensive very few tanks were in our line,
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Speaker 1: and in the Battle of Cambrai because of the impassable
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Speaker 1: nature of canals and rivers encountered, they were almost entirely absent.
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Speaker 1: Very few, in fact, were left at all in the
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Speaker 1: closing stages of the Great Offensive, and a localized concentration
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Speaker 1: to overcome machine gun resistance became impossible. Had it been otherwise,
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Speaker 1: our casualties would have been lighter. For the tank is
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Speaker 1: the ideal weapon for destroying machine gun nests. Time after time.
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Speaker 1: In the Amiensho, tanks were driven right over these emplacements,
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Speaker 1: either killing or capturing their garrisons. If war comes again
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Speaker 1: in our time, the tank has a great future. The
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Speaker 1: whippets have a special mission of their own the up
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Speaker 1: to date cavalry. But the heavy tank must also have
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Speaker 1: sufficient speed to keep well ahead of infantry on necessity,
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Speaker 1: strong enough armor plating to resist all but direct hits
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Speaker 1: by field guns, powerful offensive armament to overcome strong fortified posts,
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Speaker 1: and such bulk and engine power as can traverse not
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Speaker 1: only natural obstacles except canals and rivers, but the protective
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Speaker 1: ditches dug by the enemy. Above all, they must have
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Speaker 1: wider range of vision and be in direct communication not
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Speaker 1: only with their own units but with other arms, especially infantry.
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Speaker 1: For at present, the tank, once started is a law
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Speaker 1: unto itself, and too often becomes detached. In the darkness
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Speaker 1: and fog of the early morning of August eight, they
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Speaker 1: often lost their way, overrunning their objectives or missing them altogether.
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Speaker 1: Compasses were useless because of the mass of metal and
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Speaker 1: shut in that fiery box, a general survey is impossible.
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Speaker 1: One tank was observed coming back from the front line
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Speaker 1: when its commander supposed he was working forward. Even in
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Speaker 1: the last days of the war, there appeared to be
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Speaker 1: two schools of thought in regard to tank tactics. One,
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Speaker 1: as exemplified in the Amiensho, was that long lines of
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Speaker 1: tanks should go in ahead of the infantry and overrun
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Speaker 1: the enemy. In many cases they sailed right over dugouts
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Speaker 1: and pasted machine gun posts they could not see in
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Speaker 1: the murk, so that our infantry following up had a
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Speaker 1: hard time of it. And the trouble was that when
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Speaker 1: a tank was wanted to reduce such a fortified point,
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Speaker 1: the infantry had no means of making their need known.
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Speaker 1: The other was that tanks should be held in leash,
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Speaker 1: close up behind the infantry, to be employed on individual
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Speaker 1: work as required. A quite possible development might be that
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Speaker 1: each brigade or even each battalion would have its own
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Speaker 1: tank section to work in tactical conjunction. Extraordinary gallant men,
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Speaker 1: these tank crews the suicide club, our boys called them.
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Speaker 1: One of our officers, a very brave man, went forward
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Speaker 1: in one of them to reconnoiter. When finally he was
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Speaker 1: let out, he shook his fist at his hosts. Never again,
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Speaker 1: demon while I enter your scalding bowels. Tank crews, indeed,
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Speaker 1: were under a terrible strain, both physical and mental, greater
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Speaker 1: even than that of the stokers of a battleship. In
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Speaker 1: action in that confined space filled with poisonous gases, the
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Speaker 1: atmosphere was all but insupportable. Taint crews have been known
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Speaker 1: to come out of their fortress and thrown themselves on
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Speaker 1: the ground in utter exhaustion amid the full fury of
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Speaker 1: an enemy barrage. A full day's battle such as August
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Speaker 1: eight played them out, and there was great difficulty in
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Speaker 1: getting the tank crews back into shape for the battle
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Speaker 1: of the following day. That indeed, was to some extent
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Speaker 1: the cause of our delay in continuing the offensive on
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Speaker 1: August nine. In such a case, the strategist laying out
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Speaker 1: his battle for the morrow is apt to overlook the
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Speaker 1: purely physical elaslement of his problem. Where the fighting is
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Speaker 1: to be continuous over a period of days, it is
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Speaker 1: necessary to furnish relief crews for the tanks. A good
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Speaker 1: number of Canadians were scattered through the tank crews, but
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Speaker 1: it was an Imperial service, the great majority of officers
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Speaker 1: and men being old country. If the war had gone on,
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Speaker 1: a Canadian tank division would have been created. As it
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Speaker 1: was complete mutual confidence existed between our infantry and the tanks.
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Speaker 1: As explained, these were limited in their scope, but that
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Speaker 1: was the inherent defect of the machine, and not the crew.
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Speaker 1: So important was the part of the tank in the
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Speaker 1: battle that this rather lengthy digression may be permitted. We
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Speaker 1: have seen that there was nothing particularly novel about the
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Speaker 1: tactics of the Amnie Show, but the whole plan was
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Speaker 1: brought to the highest perfection, and the employment of a
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Speaker 1: fresh and thoroughly trained body of troops such as the
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Speaker 1: Canadian Corps, assured success in advance. As it turned out,
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Speaker 1: the weight of the battle fell on the Canadian Corps,
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Speaker 1: but that was not the original design. The Fourth Army
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Speaker 1: was to advance on its entire front with British troops
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Speaker 1: on the left and Australians in the center, and Canadians
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Speaker 1: on the right, the most difficult ground perhaps being assigned
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Speaker 1: to the latter. When this movement had well developed, the
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Speaker 1: French First Army was to take up the battle on
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Speaker 1: our right, but this program was diverted by reason of
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Speaker 1: the situation north of the Somme. Here the enemy had
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Speaker 1: attacked the Third British Corps in great strength two days before,
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Speaker 1: and was bringing up reserves for a further thrust in
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Speaker 1: the development of his intended general offensive against Amiens. It
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Speaker 1: turned out, therefore, that instead of making much progress, troops
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Speaker 1: in this sector had all they could do to hold
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Speaker 1: their own. The hope of recovering the strong point of Bray,
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Speaker 1: needlessly given up in March, fell to the ground. As
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Speaker 1: a consequence, the left of the Canadian Corps was obliged
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Speaker 1: to conform, and though its center pushed well forward and
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Speaker 1: its right kept pace with ourselves, it was unable to
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Speaker 1: attain tactical freedom of maneuver. On the other hand, our right.
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Speaker 1: The French battle went so well after it had gained
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Speaker 1: momentum that it spread far to the south, eventually including Montidier.
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Speaker 1: And the effect of this was to make the Canadian
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Speaker 1: area the pivotal center of the entire battle front at
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Speaker 1: all stages, and until we gave over to the French,
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Speaker 1: our line was, in greater or less degree a marked salient,
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Speaker 1: and this, of course exposed our men to Enfolad artillery fire,
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Speaker 1: now from one flank, now from the other, and sometimes
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Speaker 1: from boul It is necessary to have a clear picture
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Speaker 1: of this in order to appreciate the sterling character of
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Speaker 1: their work, especially in such tactical adventures as the capture
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Speaker 1: of Chile Halleu, Carviller, Dammery, Fransart and La Chavette. Their
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Speaker 1: success was not brought about by accident. Skilled and patient
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Speaker 1: staff work, perfect organization by both A and Q branches,
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Speaker 1: the devoted efforts of the Canadian engineers and Army Service Corps,
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Speaker 1: fine qualities of leadership from divisional commanders right down to
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Speaker 1: the veteran NCOs. All these contributed. But the greatest factor
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Speaker 1: of all were the men themselves, highly disciplined, fresh from
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Speaker 1: a period of intensive training, and conspicuous in the qualities
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Speaker 1: of initiative and resource that had stood the Canadian soldier
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Speaker 1: in such goods stead on many a hard fought field.
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Speaker 1: One need not speak of their courage the common heritage
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Speaker 1: of the nations, but they possessed in a peculiar degree
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Speaker 1: the quality of the race that declines to envisaged defeat
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Speaker 1: and will not be denied victory. The moral effect of
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Speaker 1: this great victory was far reaching. For the first time
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Speaker 1: in many a long day, troops of the British Armies
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Speaker 1: had taken the offensive on the grand scale, and had
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Speaker 1: demons strated that man for man, in leadership and technical equipment,
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Speaker 1: they were the superior of the enemy. That was the
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Speaker 1: great contribution that the Canadian Corps and with them the Australians,
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Speaker 1: made to the cause of the Allies on August eighth.
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Speaker 1: They restored confidence in the British arms, weakened in morale
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Speaker 1: and repute in the sight of both our allies and
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Speaker 1: the enemy since the sad days of March, not only
19:26
Speaker 1: to the rank and file of the armies themselves, but
19:28
Speaker 1: to the world at large looking back over but a
19:33
Speaker 1: few months. Yet this nevertheless a gulf fast obliterating memory
19:37
Speaker 1: and almost impassable to the imagination. From the sure vantage
19:41
Speaker 1: ground of British victories in every theater of the war.
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Speaker 1: It seems all but incredible that in those days immediately
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Speaker 1: preceding Amen, and notwithstanding the demonstration of the French on
19:51
Speaker 1: the Marn, doubts actually existed in the ability of the
19:55
Speaker 1: British armies to carry out a successful offensive. Yet was
20:01
Speaker 1: these doubts totally without justification, as the event proved, were
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Speaker 1: finally dispelled on August eight, thus ended l C Operation,
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Speaker 1: as it was named by the Canadian Corps staff for
20:14
Speaker 1: the battle cry on the morning of August eight was
20:17
Speaker 1: remember the Landavari Castle, the hospital ship sunk in the
20:21
Speaker 1: Irish Sea just before, with Canadian medical officers and nurses
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Speaker 1: on board, and what did the enemy think of it?
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Speaker 1: Von Hutier, who commanded in this front, was brother in
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Speaker 1: law of Ludendorf, and the best face must be put
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Speaker 1: on it. We were up against the elite of the
20:40
Speaker 1: French army and the celebrated Canadian Corps, said the German
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Speaker 1: higher staff. It is not generally known that this great
20:48
Speaker 1: Battle of Amnien was intended to be the last British
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Speaker 1: offensive on the West Front in nineteen eighteen, and it
20:54
Speaker 1: was only because of the unexpected success attained that our
20:58
Speaker 1: offensives were everywhere. Can continued the original program granted a
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Speaker 1: reasonable measure of success, such as should free the Amien
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Speaker 1: Paris railway, was that thereafter the troops should settle down
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Speaker 1: into winter quarters and await the coming of the American
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Speaker 1: armies to renew the offensive in the spring of nineteen nineteen.
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Speaker 1: This bold stroke in which the Canadian corps had so
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Speaker 1: striking a part, not only opened the floodgates of victory,
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Speaker 1: but saved for us the long, weary months of trench
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Speaker 1: warfare and the heavy casualties they entail. With Ludendorf, August
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Speaker 1: eighth is obviously an obsession. We have seen above something
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Speaker 1: of his opinion. The eighth of August, he says in
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Speaker 1: another place, marked the downfall of our writing strength and
21:46
Speaker 1: destroyed our hopes of strategic amelioration. To continue the war
21:50
Speaker 1: was to start a gambol. The war had to be
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Speaker 1: ended end quote. He returns again and again to the
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Speaker 1: fatal day. Quote. The eighth of August nineteen eighteen is
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Speaker 1: the black day of the German army. In the history
22:05
Speaker 1: of the war, I have experienced none worse except during
22:09
Speaker 1: the events beginning with September fifteenth, which took place on
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Speaker 1: the Bulgarian front, and sealed the fate of the Central powers.
22:17
Speaker 1: The English colonials and the French broke deep into our
22:21
Speaker 1: line between the Sum and the Louse, where our divisions
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Speaker 1: were completely overrun. Six or seven German divisions, which could
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Speaker 1: be described as thoroughly fit for battle had been defeated
22:33
Speaker 1: two or three divisions, and the remnants of the defeated
22:36
Speaker 1: forces were ready to close the wide gap between Bray
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Speaker 1: and Roy and quote, and he concludes by speaking of
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Speaker 1: the contemplated retirement in this section of the line. Quote.
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Speaker 1: This movement, he says, was decided upon the night of
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Speaker 1: August nine to ten. If it did not succeed, a
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Speaker 1: great Allied victory was possible. End quote end of Part one,
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Speaker 1: Chapter eleven.