Latest / Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign / 014 - Chapter 7 Part 1 - Advance To The Chosin Reservoir

Transcript

014 - Chapter 7 Part 1 - Advance To The Chosin Reservoir · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

• 0:01
  Speaker 1: Chapter seven, Part one of US Marine Operations in Korea
• 0:05
  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
• 0:10
  Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
• 0:15
  Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Advanced to the Chosen Reservoir.
• 0:22
  Speaker 1: On four November, while RCT seven was at the height
• 0:25
  Speaker 1: of its fight with the Chinese.
• 0:27
  Speaker 2: The Division CP displaced from WANs On to hung Nam.
• 0:31
  Speaker 1: General Craig the ADC, who inspected the area on the second,
• 0:36
  Speaker 1: recommended the abandoned engineering college on the western outskirts as
• 0:40
  Speaker 1: the best location. During his visit, he was shown a
• 0:44
  Speaker 1: knoll outside the city where the bodies of some two
• 0:46
  Speaker 1: hundred Korean civilians were laid out in a perfect row.
• 0:50
  Speaker 1: All had been victims of the retreating NKPA forces. A
• 0:55
  Speaker 1: location in hamhung would have been preferred, but available sites
• 0:58
  Speaker 1: were already taken by ten General Smith flew to Hung
• 1:02
  Speaker 1: Nam by helicopter and opened the new CP at eleven
• 1:05
  Speaker 1: hundred on the morning of the fourth. That evening, a
• 1:08
  Speaker 1: train carrying one hundred and sixty officers and men of
• 1:11
  Speaker 1: Headquarters Battalion and the division staff arrived at twenty one
• 1:15
  Speaker 1: thirty from Juan San en route. It had been fired
• 1:18
  Speaker 1: on by guerrillas, but no casualties resulted. A perimeter defense
• 1:24
  Speaker 1: consisting of two outposts and eight machine gun positions was
• 1:28
  Speaker 1: set up to command all likely approaches to the new CP.
• 1:32
  Speaker 1: Defensive wiring and trip flares were installed, with the gun
• 1:35
  Speaker 1: positions and outposts being connected by telephone. During these proceedings,
• 1:40
  Speaker 1: everyone was blissfully unaware of the existence of two hundred
• 1:43
  Speaker 1: and fifty tons of nkpa high explosive stored only six
• 1:47
  Speaker 1: hundred yards from the CP in three connecting caves. Undiscovered
• 1:52
  Speaker 1: for a week. This enemy cachet was believed capable of
• 1:55
  Speaker 1: demolishing the command post. A sixteen man security detect was
• 2:00
  Speaker 1: placed on guard until the explosive could be removed and
• 2:03
  Speaker 1: detonated attacks on Wansan hung Nam MSR. Protection of the
• 2:11
  Speaker 1: Wanson Hung Nam MSR took on added importance as the
• 2:14
  Speaker 1: First Marine Division speeded up its move to the north.
• 2:18
  Speaker 1: This responsibility, it may be recalled, was shared by Division
• 2:22
  Speaker 1: and Corps. On three November, in accordance with the decision
• 2:25
  Speaker 1: by General Almond, the First Marines and elements of the
• 2:29
  Speaker 1: first Tank Battalion maintained security from Wanson fifteen miles northward
• 2:33
  Speaker 1: to Munchon, while the first Battalion of the fifth Marines
• 2:37
  Speaker 1: was responsible from ham Hung southward to Chigyong. This left
• 2:41
  Speaker 1: the fifty four mile stretch between Chigyong and Munschon without
• 2:45
  Speaker 1: any protection except the patrols of the Korean CIC Agents
• 2:49
  Speaker 1: and the Special Operations Company US Army, both under CORP control.
• 2:54
  Speaker 1: On four November, this company reported that large numbers of
• 2:57
  Speaker 1: North Koreans were moving into the area to the west.
• 3:01
  Speaker 1: That same afternoon, KORP notified Division that a group of
• 3:05
  Speaker 1: mounted guerrillas had fired on railway police in the yards
• 3:08
  Speaker 1: of Kowan, fifteen miles north of Munschon. On six November,
• 3:13
  Speaker 1: immediately after landing at wan San, the sixty fifth RCT
• 3:18
  Speaker 1: of the third Infantry Division less one Battalion, placed temporarily
• 3:22
  Speaker 1: under First Marine Division control for the Majan Knee operation,
• 3:26
  Speaker 1: was ordered by CORPS to relieve elements of the ninety
• 3:28
  Speaker 1: six Field Artillery Battalion U S Army, which had been
• 3:32
  Speaker 1: recently sent to Yonghung. The Army RCT was assigned a
• 3:36
  Speaker 1: mission of protecting the Yonghung Kowan area and patrolling to
• 3:40
  Speaker 1: the west the Wan San hamhung rail line took on
• 3:44
  Speaker 1: special importance after the announcement that water transportation would be
• 3:48
  Speaker 1: delayed until enemy mines were cleared from the harbor at
• 3:52
  Speaker 1: hung Nam. This made it necessary for the first Marine
• 3:55
  Speaker 1: Division to send daily supply trains from Wan San. The
• 3:59
  Speaker 1: first t who completed the run without incident, but after
• 4:02
  Speaker 1: departing wants On at dusk on the sixth, the third
• 4:05
  Speaker 1: train was halted at Kowan by the destruction of rails ahead.
• 4:10
  Speaker 1: North Korean guerrillas attacked the train, guarded by a lieutenant
• 4:13
  Speaker 1: and thirty eight men from Company SEE of the first
• 4:15
  Speaker 1: Amphibian Tractor Battalion. The detachment was taken by surprise in
• 4:20
  Speaker 1: the darkness by foes firing from both sides of the track.
• 4:25
  Speaker 1: When the Marines attempted to reverse the train, the enemy
• 4:28
  Speaker 1: wounded the engineer and put a hole in the boiler
• 4:30
  Speaker 1: with grenades. In the darkness, the guard became separated into
• 4:35
  Speaker 1: two groups, the smaller of which was surrounded in a car.
• 4:39
  Speaker 1: The guerrillas fired through the wooden sides, forcing the Marines
• 4:42
  Speaker 1: to the floor and through grenades through the windows, until
• 4:45
  Speaker 1: all ten were killed or wounded, only two of them surviving.
• 4:50
  Speaker 1: The remaining twenty nine men of the guard made a
• 4:52
  Speaker 1: stand on an embankment about two hundred yards from the track.
• 4:56
  Speaker 1: Six Marines were wounded in the ensuing firefight. The train
• 5:01
  Speaker 1: guard broke off the action, in which drew to the
• 5:03
  Speaker 1: area of the Army Artillery Battalion. An empty train from
• 5:07
  Speaker 1: ham Hung, guarded by a platoon from Company A of
• 5:10
  Speaker 1: the Amtraks, was halted at seventeen hundred on the afternoon
• 5:14
  Speaker 1: of six November by railway officials at Yonghung. Reports of
• 5:18
  Speaker 1: guerrilla activity in the area had proved to be only
• 5:21
  Speaker 1: too well founded when elements of the ninety six Field
• 5:24
  Speaker 1: Artillery Battalion were attacked early that morning. Their perimeter south
• 5:29
  Speaker 1: of the town was breached, with losses to the army unit.
• 5:32
  Speaker 2: Of equipment and ammunition.
• 5:34
  Speaker 1: The second Battalion of the sixty fifth RCT, which arrived
• 5:38
  Speaker 1: at yong Hung late that afternoon, had its baptism of
• 5:42
  Speaker 1: fire within a few hours. Gorilla is an estimated strength
• 5:46
  Speaker 1: of five hundred to eight hundred attacked at zero three
• 5:49
  Speaker 1: hundred on the seventh, inflicting casualties of six killed and
• 5:52
  Speaker 1: fourteen wounded. Troops of the ninety six Field Artillery Battalion
• 5:57
  Speaker 1: also came under attack, as did elements of the SIGNA
• 6:00
  Speaker 1: Battalion U S Army Company D of the first Tank
• 6:04
  Speaker 1: Battalion sent a marine tank and Weasel twenty nine to
• 6:08
  Speaker 1: evacuate the wounded, with the assistance of the Amtrak platoon
• 6:12
  Speaker 1: guarding the empty train at Yonghong. At fourteen hundred that afternoon,
• 6:16
  Speaker 1: the empty train resumed its run to wants On. Only
• 6:20
  Speaker 1: two miles had been covered when the locomotive and six
• 6:23
  Speaker 1: cars were derailed by a split rail and wrecked just
• 6:25
  Speaker 1: south of Yonghong. Personnel loss as a mona to one
• 6:29
  Speaker 1: man killed and fourteen injured. At almost exactly the same hour,
• 6:33
  Speaker 1: the force supply train was stopped south of Kowan by
• 6:36
  Speaker 1: a blown section of track. The Guard proceeded on foot
• 6:40
  Speaker 1: to investigate and encountered the depressing spectacle of the third
• 6:44
  Speaker 1: supply train abandoned by the enemy after being plundered. One
• 6:49
  Speaker 1: ammunition car was still burning and in another riddled car
• 6:52
  Speaker 1: the bodies of the trap.
• 6:54
  Speaker 2: Marines were found.
• 6:56
  Speaker 1: So extensive was the damage to tracks and switches that
• 6:59
  Speaker 1: rail service could not be resumed until nine November. The
• 7:03
  Speaker 1: Core Commander summoned General Smith to Wance on that morning
• 7:06
  Speaker 1: for a Conference on Measures for the Security of the
• 7:08
  Speaker 1: rail line, it was decided that only daytime runs would
• 7:12
  Speaker 1: be made thereafter. With the train guard increased from thirty
• 7:15
  Speaker 1: eight to fifty men, the sixty fifth RCT, the twenty
• 7:20
  Speaker 1: sixth Rock Regiment, and a battery of the ninety six
• 7:23
  Speaker 1: Field Artillery Battalion were placed under the temporary control of
• 7:26
  Speaker 1: the first Marine Division, with a mission of guarding bridges
• 7:30
  Speaker 1: and other key points. General Smith worked out a plan
• 7:34
  Speaker 1: for the Rock Regiment to drive the guerrilla southward from
• 7:37
  Speaker 1: the Chigyong area towards the sixty fifth RCT at Yonghung.
• 7:41
  Speaker 1: As it proved, elements of both units were given core
• 7:44
  Speaker 1: commitments which prevented this maneuver from being put into effect.
• 7:49
  Speaker 1: They remained only a few days under nominal division control,
• 7:53
  Speaker 1: being used for a variety of security missions along the
• 7:56
  Speaker 1: wants On Hamhung MSR. By nine November, when the division
• 8:01
  Speaker 1: supply trains resumed their runs, ninety five loaded cars had
• 8:04
  Speaker 1: been accumulated at wants On. The first Combat Service Group
• 8:08
  Speaker 1: continued to route supplies northward from the railhead at the
• 8:11
  Speaker 1: wants On Airfield. Corps orders required troops to ride in
• 8:15
  Speaker 1: open gondola cars appraisals of the new enemy. It is
• 8:22
  Speaker 1: understandable that an atmosphere of uncertainty should have enveloped military
• 8:26
  Speaker 1: decisions of this period. With the Joint Chiefs of Staff
• 8:30
  Speaker 1: and the UN Command groping their way through a fog
• 8:33
  Speaker 1: of war, division commanders in Korea could not be expected
• 8:37
  Speaker 1: to see very far ahead. Disconcerting as it had been
• 8:41
  Speaker 1: to have the Chinese appear in the first place, it
• 8:44
  Speaker 1: was even more disturbing to have them break off contact
• 8:46
  Speaker 1: and vanish so inexplicably. Nevertheless, General MacArthur and his staff
• 8:52
  Speaker 1: had a fairly accurate idea of CCF numbers.
• 8:54
  Speaker 2: At this time.
• 8:56
  Speaker 1: On to November, the UN Command estimated that sixteen and
• 9:00
  Speaker 1: five hundred Chinese communist soldiers had crossed the Yalu and
• 9:03
  Speaker 1: four hundred fifty thousand CCF regulars were in Manchuria. Three
• 9:08
  Speaker 1: days later, Major General Charles A. Willoughby's intelligence summary warned
• 9:13
  Speaker 1: that the Chinese had the potential to start a large
• 9:15
  Speaker 1: scale counter offensive. General MacArthur, reporting to the United Nations
• 9:20
  Speaker 1: for the first half of November, stated that twelve CCF
• 9:24
  Speaker 1: divisions had been identified in Korea, indicating a total of
• 9:28
  Speaker 1: perhaps one hundred thousand troops. Nine of these units had
• 9:32
  Speaker 1: appeared on the Eighth Army Front and three in the
• 9:35
  Speaker 1: ten Corp zone north of Hamhung. At the same time,
• 9:39
  Speaker 1: the report continued, United Nations aerial reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop
• 9:43
  Speaker 1: movements near the border in Manchuria and into Korea. Quite
• 9:48
  Speaker 1: as important as the new enemy's numbers was the question
• 9:51
  Speaker 1: of his intentions. Did the CCF divisions consist merely of
• 9:56
  Speaker 1: so called volunteers making a demonstration to encourage the beaten
• 9:59
  Speaker 1: in remnants, or were the Chinese contemplating an all out
• 10:04
  Speaker 1: military intervention. President Truman asked the JCS on four November
• 10:09
  Speaker 1: to obtain from General MacArthur an estimate of the situation.
• 10:13
  Speaker 1: The general's reply stated that it was impossible to authoritatively
• 10:18
  Speaker 1: appraise the actualities of Chinese communist intervention in North Korea.
• 10:23
  Speaker 1: He recommended that a final appraisement should await a more
• 10:26
  Speaker 1: complete accumulation of military facts during the next three days.
• 10:31
  Speaker 1: The issue of bombing bridges across the Yalu posed a
• 10:34
  Speaker 1: question that has remained a controversial subject ever since. General
• 10:39
  Speaker 1: MacArthur was granted permission after being at first refused, but
• 10:44
  Speaker 1: cautioned that extreme care be taken to avoid violation of
• 10:48
  Speaker 1: Manchurian territory and airspace. In two messages of seven November,
• 10:54
  Speaker 1: the UN Commander confirmed his original appraisal to the effect
• 10:57
  Speaker 1: that the Chinese were not making a full scale into
• 11:01
  Speaker 1: but he conceded that reinforcements might enable the new enemy
• 11:04
  Speaker 1: to stop the UN advance or even throw it into reverse.
• 11:08
  Speaker 1: He planned a resumption of the initiative, he said, in
• 11:12
  Speaker 1: order to take accurate measure of enemy strength, and he
• 11:17
  Speaker 1: repeated that the restriction of his bombing operations provided a
• 11:21
  Speaker 1: complete sanctuary for hostile air immediately upon their crossing of
• 11:25
  Speaker 1: the Manchuria and North Korea border. This factor, he warned,
• 11:30
  Speaker 1: could assume decisive proportions. On this same date, with the
• 11:35
  Speaker 1: weary phase of UN strategy at its height, General Alman
• 11:39
  Speaker 1: flew to Hung Nam to confer with General Smith. The
• 11:43
  Speaker 1: ten core commanders still wore another hat as General MacArthur's
• 11:46
  Speaker 1: chief of staff, and though he could not function actively
• 11:49
  Speaker 1: in this position, he kept in close touch with strategic
• 11:52
  Speaker 1: games at Tokyo. Thus, the cautious spirit of the UN
• 11:57
  Speaker 1: Commander's messages of seven November was reflected at Almand's changed viewpoint,
• 12:02
  Speaker 1: where he had previously urged haste in the ten Corps
• 12:05
  Speaker 1: drive to the border, he was now disposed to put
• 12:08
  Speaker 1: on the brakes and carry out that mission with less
• 12:10
  Speaker 1: scattering of forces. The prospect of a winter campaign was discussed,
• 12:15
  Speaker 1: and the Marine General recommended that only enough territory be
• 12:19
  Speaker 1: held for the security of Hamhung, Hung Nam, and Juan
• 12:22
  Speaker 1: San Alman believed that Haggaroo should also be included, but
• 12:26
  Speaker 1: he agreed that a greater degree of concentration was advisable.
• 12:31
  Speaker 1: As day after day passed without further CCF contacts of importance, however,
• 12:36
  Speaker 1: operations again took on the character of an occupation rather
• 12:39
  Speaker 1: than a drive which might end in a collision with
• 12:42
  Speaker 1: a powerful new enemy. Ten Corps Operation Orders six, issued
• 12:46
  Speaker 1: at twenty four hundred on eleven November, called for an
• 12:50
  Speaker 1: advance to the border by one Rock Corps on the right,
• 12:54
  Speaker 1: the seventh Infantry Division in the center, and the first
• 12:56
  Speaker 1: Marine Division on the left. The third Infantry with the
• 13:00
  Speaker 1: twenty six Rock Regiment attached, was to have the responsibility
• 13:05
  Speaker 1: for the Wan San Yeonghung area. After relieving elements of
• 13:08
  Speaker 1: the first Marine Division, the Marines were directed to take
• 13:12
  Speaker 1: blocking positions in Huksui and yudam Nie. In the core rear,
• 13:17
  Speaker 1: the first k MC Regiment minus had a zone to
• 13:21
  Speaker 1: the south and west of Kojo. The marine zone on
• 13:24
  Speaker 1: the Yalu, about forty miles in width, was approached and
• 13:28
  Speaker 1: bounded by two roads branching off from the Changjin area.
• 13:33
  Speaker 1: One of them ended at Hutchangangu and the other at
• 13:36
  Speaker 1: single Padjin. From that point, the zone of the seventh
• 13:40
  Speaker 1: Infantry Division extended east to Heisjin, where the border turns
• 13:44
  Speaker 1: north at a right angle, and thence again eastward to
• 13:47
  Speaker 1: the Hapsu area. One rock Corp was to operate from
• 13:51
  Speaker 1: the line Hapsu Chuchung Hujang and drive northward along the
• 13:56
  Speaker 1: coast with Chungjin as an objective. Such a dispersion of
• 14:01
  Speaker 1: forces depending for supplies on poor secondary roads through wild
• 14:05
  Speaker 1: mountainous regions could hardly have been contemplated if large scale
• 14:09
  Speaker 1: CCF opposition were expected. As a further indication of renewed confidence,
• 14:15
  Speaker 1: General MacArthur asked informally and indirectly that ten corps do
• 14:19
  Speaker 1: everything possible to assist the Eighth Army in its drive
• 14:22
  Speaker 1: to the Yalu. This request was conveyed in a personal
• 14:26
  Speaker 1: letter of eleven November from General Wright G three of
• 14:30
  Speaker 1: FECOM to the Core Commander. The turning point of fifteen November,
• 14:38
  Speaker 1: the date of General Almon's reply. The fifteenth is worthy
• 14:41
  Speaker 1: of recognition as a turning point, for it was also
• 14:45
  Speaker 1: the occasion of messages from the un Commander in Chief
• 14:48
  Speaker 1: and the commanding General of the first Marine Division, which
• 14:51
  Speaker 1: had an effect on strategy. Indeed, the entire course of
• 14:55
  Speaker 1: the Chosen Reservoir campaign was channeled into new directions as
• 14:58
  Speaker 1: a result of the cont advanced in these three communications
• 15:02
  Speaker 1: of fifteen November nineteen fifty. Obviously, the gap of eighty
• 15:06
  Speaker 1: miles separating the Eighth Army from ten Core would have
• 15:09
  Speaker 1: to be reduced before much help could be.
• 15:11
  Speaker 2: Given by the latter.
• 15:13
  Speaker 1: General Alman replied to General Wright in a letter proposing
• 15:17
  Speaker 1: that Tencres attack to the west of the Chosen Reservoir
• 15:20
  Speaker 1: while also continuing to advance northward in zone to complete
• 15:24
  Speaker 1: its original mission. That same day, while the letter was
• 15:28
  Speaker 1: en route to Tokyo, General MacArthur came to a far
• 15:31
  Speaker 1: reaching decision in a radio message. He directed the ten
• 15:35
  Speaker 1: Core commander to develop, as an alternative to Operation Order six,
• 15:40
  Speaker 1: a plan for reorienting his attack to the west on
• 15:43
  Speaker 1: reaching chang Jin in order to cut the Chinese MSR
• 15:47
  Speaker 1: as represented by the Manpo Jen Kangye Hoichan Road and
• 15:51
  Speaker 1: rail line. This was the first indicated change in mission
• 15:56
  Speaker 1: according to the Tencore Command report since Sinkfi's directive late
• 16:00
  Speaker 1: in October calling for a drive to the border. The
• 16:03
  Speaker 1: amendment was made necessary, the report continued by the enemy
• 16:07
  Speaker 1: build up in front of the Eighth Army and the
• 16:10
  Speaker 1: fact that the enemy action had halted the first attempt
• 16:12
  Speaker 1: to advance Eighth Army to the border. An estimate of
• 16:16
  Speaker 1: the Eighth Army situation fixed the relative combat power as
• 16:20
  Speaker 1: one hundred thousand UN to one hundred thousand enemy, with
• 16:23
  Speaker 1: UN forces having air superiority and superior artillery support. The
• 16:29
  Speaker 1: enemy was given an offensive capacity which he could implement
• 16:32
  Speaker 1: with an estimated reserve of one hundred forty thousand CCF
• 16:35
  Speaker 1: troops north of the Yalu River. In view of the
• 16:39
  Speaker 1: enemy's offensive capacity, Eighth Army adopted a conservative plan to
• 16:43
  Speaker 1: make a general advance with the main effort in the center,
• 16:46
  Speaker 1: generally parallel to the enemy MSR houchon Kanye. This course
• 16:52
  Speaker 1: of action was designed to meet any course of action
• 16:54
  Speaker 1: which might be adapted by the enemy to assist the
• 16:58
  Speaker 1: Eighth Army advance. Ten Corps was to initiate a main
• 17:01
  Speaker 1: attack to the west from the chosen reservoir area, cutting
• 17:05
  Speaker 1: the enemy MSR at Mupiong Knee, and advance in a
• 17:09
  Speaker 1: northwesterly direction to the Yalu river line at Manpojin. By
• 17:14
  Speaker 1: a coincidence, it was also on Wednesday, fifteen November that
• 17:18
  Speaker 1: General Smith wrote a letter which foreshadowed future military events,
• 17:22
  Speaker 1: addressed to General Clifton B. Ktes, comman down of the
• 17:26
  Speaker 1: Marine Corps. This communication made it plain that the first
• 17:29
  Speaker 1: Marine Division commander and his staff did not share in
• 17:32
  Speaker 1: the renewed optimism as to the course of the un
• 17:35
  Speaker 1: war effort. Not only did the Marines accept the possibility
• 17:39
  Speaker 1: of imminent and formidable CCF intervention, but they were making
• 17:43
  Speaker 1: preparations to meet it. So far, our MSR north of
• 17:47
  Speaker 1: hamhung has not been molested, but there is evidence that
• 17:50
  Speaker 1: this situation will not continue. Someone in high authority will
• 17:55
  Speaker 1: have to make up his mind as to what is
• 17:57
  Speaker 1: our goal.
• 17:58
  Speaker 2: My mission is still to advance to the border.
• 18:02
  Speaker 1: The Eighth Army eighty miles to the southwest, will not
• 18:05
  Speaker 1: attack until the twentieth Manifestly we should not push on
• 18:10
  Speaker 1: without regard to the Eighth Army. We would simply get
• 18:14
  Speaker 1: further out on a limb. If the Eighth Army push
• 18:17
  Speaker 1: does not go, then the decision will have to be
• 18:20
  Speaker 1: made as to what to do next. I believe a
• 18:23
  Speaker 1: winter campaign in the mountains of North Korea has too
• 18:25
  Speaker 1: much to ask of the American soldier or marine, and
• 18:29
  Speaker 1: I doubt the feasibility of supplying troops in this area
• 18:32
  Speaker 1: during the winter, or providing for the evacuation of sick
• 18:35
  Speaker 1: and wounded. This letter mentioned such preparations as the work
• 18:39
  Speaker 1: done by marine engineers to strengthen the Hamhung Hagaroo Road
• 18:43
  Speaker 1: for tanks and heavy vehicles. Plans had been approved, added
• 18:47
  Speaker 1: General Smith, for an airstrip at Hagaroo capable of landing
• 18:51
  Speaker 1: cargo planes for resupply and casualty evacuation. He emphasized that
• 18:56
  Speaker 1: he did not mean to be Pessimistice pep are doing
• 19:00
  Speaker 1: a creditable job. He said, their spirit is fine and
• 19:04
  Speaker 1: they will continue to do a fine job. But in
• 19:07
  Speaker 1: conclusion he reiterated his doubts about his wide open left
• 19:11
  Speaker 1: flank and his concern over the prospect of stringing out
• 19:15
  Speaker 1: a marine division along a single mountain road for one
• 19:18
  Speaker 1: hundred twenty air miles from ham Hung to the border.
• 19:22
  Speaker 1: General Smith had no more than finished dictating his letter
• 19:25
  Speaker 1: when two Navy officers called at the cp rear Admiral
• 19:29
  Speaker 1: Albert K. Moorhouse, chief of staff to Admiral Joy, and
• 19:33
  Speaker 1: Captain Norman W. Sears, chief of staff to Admiral Doyle.
• 19:37
  Speaker 1: Both were old acquaintances of the marine general who had
• 19:40
  Speaker 1: led the assault landing force on Peleliu in nineteen forty four.
• 19:44
  Speaker 1: While Sears commanded an Lst.
• 19:46
  Speaker 2: Grew.
• 19:47
  Speaker 1: Smith felt that he could speak frankly therefore and express
• 19:51
  Speaker 1: his concern over the aspects of the strategic situation he
• 19:54
  Speaker 1: had discussed in the letter. Sinkfi had requested in his
• 19:58
  Speaker 1: message of the first that the plan for reorienting the
• 20:01
  Speaker 1: ten Cores attack be submitted to him as an alternative
• 20:04
  Speaker 1: to Operation Order six. General Alman put his staff to
• 20:08
  Speaker 1: work on the sixteenth, and that same day draft number
• 20:12
  Speaker 1: one of Operation Order Plan eight was completed. This was
• 20:16
  Speaker 1: a concept of attack on Kanye by means of a
• 20:19
  Speaker 1: drive westward from chang Jin changes in ten Core mission.
• 20:26
  Speaker 1: Almand disapproved the first draft on the grounds that the
• 20:29
  Speaker 1: MSR of the core element making the effort would be
• 20:32
  Speaker 1: too far extended. He requested the preparation of a new
• 20:36
  Speaker 1: plan based on the concept of an advance farther south
• 20:39
  Speaker 1: of the Hagaroo Muppyong Knee axis and west of the
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: zone of the first Marine Division. The ten Core Commander
• 20:47
  Speaker 1: also directed one that the ham Hung Hagaroo Road be
• 20:51
  Speaker 1: developed as a core MSR with intensive effort on the
• 20:54
  Speaker 1: part of core troops, including Core engineers. Two let an
• 21:00
  Speaker 1: RCT of the seventh Division be assigned the mission of
• 21:02
  Speaker 1: seizing Changjin in order to protect the right flank of
• 21:05
  Speaker 1: the first Marine Division. The Core Commander considered that chang
• 21:10
  Speaker 1: Jin and Mumpyong Knee were too widely separated as objectives
• 21:13
  Speaker 1: to be assigned to a single division. Not to mention
• 21:16
  Speaker 1: the difficult terrain, his staff worked for four days on
• 21:20
  Speaker 1: draft number two of Operation Order Plan eight before submitting
• 21:24
  Speaker 1: it to him. He accepted it with several modifications and
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: directed that the third draft be taken to Tokyo by
• 21:30
  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel John H.
• 21:32
  Speaker 2: Chiles the Corps.
• 21:33
  Speaker 1: G three for presentation to GHQ Marine Preparations for Trouble.
• 21:42
  Speaker 1: General Smith for his part lost no time in putting
• 21:45
  Speaker 1: into effect his preparations for trouble in the shape of
• 21:48
  Speaker 1: a formidable CCF attack. The completion of mind clearance at
• 21:53
  Speaker 1: hung Nam had opened that port on fifteen November, thus
• 21:56
  Speaker 1: easing the transportation situation. The same day, the seventh Marines
• 22:01
  Speaker 1: occupied Hagaru, being greeted by a temperature of four degrees
• 22:05
  Speaker 1: below zero, which threatened an early and bleak winter. Only
• 22:09
  Speaker 1: four days previously, ten Core Operation Order number six had
• 22:13
  Speaker 1: directed the First Marine Division to take up blocking positions
• 22:16
  Speaker 1: to the west at Huksui and udam Nie while continuing
• 22:20
  Speaker 1: the northward advance to the Yalu. This meant a further
• 22:24
  Speaker 1: dispersion at a time when Smith hoped to reduce the
• 22:27
  Speaker 1: one hundred and sixty three road miles separating his infantry battalions.
• 22:32
  Speaker 1: In order to carry out the core directives, Division Operation
• 22:35
  Speaker 1: Order twenty one Dash fifty of thirteen November assigned the
• 22:38
  Speaker 1: following tasks RCT IE to seize Huksuri, RCT seven to
• 22:46
  Speaker 1: seize Hagarou and on order seize udum Nie RCT five
• 22:53
  Speaker 1: to protect the MSR from positions at Majan, Dong Chinhung
• 22:57
  Speaker 1: Knee and Codo ree while preparing to pass through RCT
• 23:01
  Speaker 1: seven in the Hagaru area and advance to Changjin, approximately
• 23:05
  Speaker 1: forty miles northward. Division Reconnaissance Company to screen the division
• 23:11
  Speaker 1: right flank by operating in the Soyang Knee Sinhung Valley
• 23:15
  Speaker 1: to the east Division boundary in connection with the mission
• 23:19
  Speaker 1: of RCT seven. The words on order deserve special notice
• 23:24
  Speaker 1: for the commanding officer was directed by Smith's oral instructions
• 23:28
  Speaker 1: to take up blocking positions at Tuktung Pass, about halfway
• 23:32
  Speaker 1: between Hagarou and Yudam Knee, until additional units of the
• 23:36
  Speaker 1: Division could be moved up to.
• 23:37
  Speaker 2: The Hagarou area.
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: In other words, the division commander believed that the possibilities
• 23:43
  Speaker 1: of large scale CCF intervention were such as to justify
• 23:46
  Speaker 1: caution in the drive to Yudam Knee. Not only would
• 23:50
  Speaker 1: the concentration of the marine units east General Smith's concern
• 23:53
  Speaker 1: over the tactical situation, it would also greatly simplify the
• 23:57
  Speaker 1: administrative load. Colonel Bowser had commented, division was faced with
• 24:03
  Speaker 1: the problem of handling a division scattered from Wan San
• 24:06
  Speaker 1: to Madjan Knee in the south. To the heavy engagement
• 24:09
  Speaker 1: of the seventh Marines in the north. Add to this
• 24:13
  Speaker 1: the problem of guerrilla bandits between Wan San and hung
• 24:16
  Speaker 1: Nam Hamhung, as well as a completely unknown situation to
• 24:20
  Speaker 1: the west, and you have a task of considerable magnitude
• 24:24
  Speaker 1: for any division staff. RCT one was delayed several days
• 24:28
  Speaker 1: by lack of railway facilities, and its moved seventy miles
• 24:31
  Speaker 1: northward to Chigyong after being relieved in the Wansan area
• 24:35
  Speaker 1: by the third Infantry Division, but most of the other
• 24:39
  Speaker 1: marine units had been pulled up a battalion or even
• 24:42
  Speaker 1: a company at a time as far as the hung
• 24:44
  Speaker 1: Nam area along the new MSR north of Hamhung. The
• 24:49
  Speaker 1: column of advance on fifteen November consisted of these units
• 24:54
  Speaker 1: Hagarou RCT seven Codo Ree, Second Battalion RCTIE, chig Hung Knee,
• 25:02
  Speaker 1: Third Battalion, RCT five Battery k fourth Battalion, Eleventh Marines Detachment,
• 25:10
  Speaker 1: First Ordnance Battalion Detachment, First Service Battalion, First and second Platoons,
• 25:16
  Speaker 1: Company A, First Engineer Battalion, Company B less, third Platoon,
• 25:21
  Speaker 1: First Engineer Battalion, Magon Dong, First Battalion, RCT five Company D,
• 25:28
  Speaker 1: First Tank Battalion. The division command and staff took a
• 25:32
  Speaker 1: dim view of the possibility of completing the race to
• 25:35
  Speaker 1: the Yalu before winter. It was already too late if
• 25:40
  Speaker 1: sub zero temperatures were any indication, and preparations must now
• 25:44
  Speaker 1: be made for tactical and logistical support of a midwinter
• 25:47
  Speaker 1: campaign in the mountains. Among the most essential provisions were
• 25:51
  Speaker 1: the selection of a forward base, the construction of airstrips
• 25:55
  Speaker 1: along the MSR, and the strengthening of the road to
• 25:58
  Speaker 1: make it fit for tanks and heavy vehicles. Hagaroo, at
• 26:03
  Speaker 1: the foot of the chosen reservoir, had been recommended by
• 26:06
  Speaker 1: General Craig as the best location for a forward base
• 26:09
  Speaker 1: when he visited here on the fifteenth. The commanding generals
• 26:13
  Speaker 1: of the Division and Wing arrived for a tour of inspection.
• 26:16
  Speaker 2: The next day.
• 26:18
  Speaker 1: General Harris made the trip at the express request of
• 26:21
  Speaker 1: General Allman, who believed that a strip long enough to
• 26:24
  Speaker 1: land R four D's was necessary to ensure resupply and
• 26:27
  Speaker 1: casualty evacuation.
• 26:28
  Speaker 2: In a midwinter emergency.
• 26:31
  Speaker 1: One of the few comparatively flat pieces of real estate
• 26:34
  Speaker 1: in Northeast Korea was found just south of the town.
• 26:38
  Speaker 1: The black loam promised to make a hard surface in
• 26:41
  Speaker 1: freezing weather, so that the prevailing Arctic temperatures offered. At
• 26:44
  Speaker 1: least one consolation and oy strip had been completed on
• 26:49
  Speaker 1: thirteen November at Kotoree, but heavier engineer equipment was needed
• 26:53
  Speaker 1: at Hagaroo before it could be brought forward. The road
• 26:57
  Speaker 1: from Chinghung Knee to Kotoree required strengthening and widening. This
• 27:02
  Speaker 1: task had already been assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Partridge, commanding
• 27:06
  Speaker 1: the First Engineer Battalion. After a survey by jeep, he
• 27:10
  Speaker 1: decided to begin operations at the highest point of the
• 27:13
  Speaker 1: one way dirt road. By working down, he explained, we
• 27:17
  Speaker 1: could first of all provide for what we considered to
• 27:20
  Speaker 1: be a dangerous accumulation of snow and the problem of landslides.
• 27:25
  Speaker 1: The work on the road involved a good bit of
• 27:27
  Speaker 1: drainage in order to ensure that the melting snows from
• 27:30
  Speaker 1: day to day during the sunlight hours would not filter
• 27:33
  Speaker 1: across and destroy the roadbed. It involved demolitions and drilling,
• 27:38
  Speaker 1: and a good deal of dozer and greater work. Enough
• 27:41
  Speaker 1: progress had been made by eighteen November so that armor
• 27:44
  Speaker 1: could be sent forward to support RCT seven only the
• 27:48
  Speaker 1: day before. The First Tank Battalion had begun functioning with
• 27:52
  Speaker 1: its headquarters and service company at Soyang Knee, eight miles
• 27:55
  Speaker 1: northwest of Hamhung. The road between Chinhung Knee and Codo
• 28:00
  Speaker 1: was still impassable for M twenty six pershing tanks until
• 28:05
  Speaker 1: the engineers could widen some of the turns, but Lieutenant
• 28:09
  Speaker 1: Colonel Harry T. Milne, the battalion commander, organized a provisional
• 28:14
  Speaker 1: tank platoon consisting of two M four A three Sherman
• 28:18
  Speaker 1: tanks from Headquarters Company and four Doser tanks from Company
• 28:21
  Speaker 1: D at Majon Dong. They proceeded without incident on the
• 28:25
  Speaker 1: eighteenth to Hagaroo operating as a gun platoon. Opening the
• 28:30
  Speaker 1: mountain road to heavy traffic made it possible on the
• 28:32
  Speaker 1: eighteenth to begin work on the Hagarou airstrip. Five large
• 28:37
  Speaker 1: dozers with pans of eight qubic yards capacity arrived at
• 28:41
  Speaker 1: the site the next day, and Company D of the
• 28:43
  Speaker 1: First Engineer Battalion tackled the job of hacking out a
• 28:46
  Speaker 1: runway from ground frozen as hard as granite. Plans called
• 28:50
  Speaker 1: for a cut of ninety thousand cubic yards and a
• 28:53
  Speaker 1: fill of sixty thousand for a thirty two hundred foot runway.
• 28:57
  Speaker 1: The rub was that Engineering Field Manual US prescribed a
• 29:00
  Speaker 1: runway of thirty six hundred feet for R four d's
• 29:03
  Speaker 1: or CE forty sevens at sea level, plus an additional
• 29:07
  Speaker 1: one thousand feet for each one thousand feet of altitude,
• 29:11
  Speaker 1: and since Hagaroo was about four thousand feet above sea level,
• 29:15
  Speaker 1: it could only be hoped that pilots were right in
• 29:17
  Speaker 1: estimating that a strip of three thousand to forty five
• 29:20
  Speaker 1: hundred feet might do in a pinch. The nineteenth also
• 29:23
  Speaker 1: dated the establishment of the Supply Regulating Station at Hagaroo
• 29:27
  Speaker 1: for the purpose of building up stockpiles. Prior to this time,
• 29:32
  Speaker 1: the First Service and First Ordnance Battalions had been in
• 29:35
  Speaker 1: charge of division dumps at Hamhung Supplies arrived by rail
• 29:39
  Speaker 1: after being unloaded from the ships at Wanson by the
• 29:42
  Speaker 1: First Shot Party Battalion, and the First Combat Service grew.
• 29:46
  Speaker 1: The completion of mind Clearance made it possible to order
• 29:49
  Speaker 1: the latter organization to Hungnam by sea to operate intransit
• 29:54
  Speaker 1: depots for ten Corps. Practically all division supplies were soon
• 29:59
  Speaker 1: being received by i'd see at this port, where the
• 30:02
  Speaker 1: First Combat Service Group separated the incoming cargo into proper classifications.
• 30:07
  Speaker 2: And forwarded it to the dumps at Hamhung Port.
• 30:11
  Speaker 1: Operation was the responsibility of the second Engineer Special Brigade,
• 30:15
  Speaker 1: US Army. After the project got into full swing, from
• 30:19
  Speaker 1: two thousand to twenty five, hundred Korean laborers were employed
• 30:23
  Speaker 1: at hung Nam and as many as six thousand tons
• 30:25
  Speaker 1: of cargo unloaded in twenty four hours. A limited amount
• 30:30
  Speaker 1: of rolling stock was available for the narrow gage railway
• 30:33
  Speaker 1: from hung Nam to Chinhung Nie, but it was up
• 30:36
  Speaker 1: to the Marines to put the line back into action
• 30:39
  Speaker 1: for the ten core railway. Transportation Section already had its
• 30:42
  Speaker 1: hands full with the wants on ham hung route. The
• 30:46
  Speaker 1: First Service Battalion was authorized to make the attempt, and
• 30:49
  Speaker 1: enough Korean crews were rounded up to operate the trains.
• 30:53
  Speaker 1: Chinhung Nie thus became the railhead for supplies track the
• 30:57
  Speaker 1: rest of the way to Hagarouations were also made for
• 31:01
  Speaker 1: large scale casualty evacuation to the Division Hospital at Hungnam.
• 31:06
  Speaker 1: H and S A and B companies of the First
• 31:08
  Speaker 1: Medical Battalion remained there to set up the Division hospital,
• 31:12
  Speaker 1: while DC and E companies were attached to RCTs one,
• 31:16
  Speaker 1: five and seven respectively. As the division center of gravity
• 31:21
  Speaker 1: shifted northward. Medical officers foresaw the need of a hospital
• 31:25
  Speaker 1: type facility at Hagarou in addition to the clearing stations
• 31:28
  Speaker 1: contemplated at Cooto Ree and Chinhungnee. Plans were approved therefore
• 31:35
  Speaker 1: for Companies C and E to pool their resources at
• 31:38
  Speaker 1: Hagaroo and establish a medical supply dump. Additional surgical teams
• 31:43
  Speaker 1: were to be flown to Hagaroo in an emergency by
• 31:46
  Speaker 1: Companies A and B from the hospital at hung Nam. Meanwhile,
• 31:50
  Speaker 1: the Hospital Ship Consolation, commanded by Captain John W. McElroy,
• 31:55
  Speaker 1: US Navy Reserve, prepared to move from Juansan to hung Nam.
• 32:00
  Speaker 1: There the Division hospital had been enlarged to four hundred beds,
• 32:04
  Speaker 1: and an additional one hundred to one hundred fifty were
• 32:07
  Speaker 1: planned for the new annex at Hamhung In order to
• 32:10
  Speaker 1: speed up casualty evacuation, several heated railway cars were equipped
• 32:15
  Speaker 1: for that purpose on the thirty five mile narrow gage
• 32:18
  Speaker 1: line from Chinhung Knee. End of Chapter seven, Part one,
• 32:24
  Speaker 1: red by Aaron Bennett