Latest / Stage Talks with Bellingcat / "Studying Russia's Digital Grasp" with Dr Mariëlle Wijermars
Transcript
- 0:04You're listening to a stage talk titled Studying
- 0:08Russia's Digital Grasp with Dr. Mariel Weimas.
- 0:12Our conversation this week focused on Russia's
- 0:14digital strategies or lack thereof and their
- 0:18internet governance. We explored how actors within
- 0:21and outside Russia have acted to try to circumvent
- 0:24or combat those controls, and what we can do
- 0:27as researchers to continue to study RussiaNet.
- 0:31You can find all of the links mentioned in the
- 0:33talk in the description of this podcast. The
- 0:36talk was hosted by me, Charlotte Ma, on Thursday
- 0:38the 8th of November 2024 in the Bentley Cat Discord
- 0:42server. And welcome to this week's stage talk
- 0:59with speaker Dr. Mariel Vymaz. Mariel is an assistant
- 1:05professor in internet governance at Maastricht
- 1:07University. She conducts research on internet
- 1:10freedom and the human rights implications of
- 1:12internet policy and platform governance. Much
- 1:15of her work focuses on the acts of authoritarian
- 1:18regions like Russia with internet censorship.
- 1:22She's currently working in a Horizon Europe consortium
- 1:25studying strategies for information control beyond
- 1:27borders, with an emphasis on information suppression.
- 1:30But today she is here to discuss Russia's grasp
- 1:33on digital spaces. We'll be talking about everything
- 1:36from recent developments on Telegram to Russian
- 1:38bots. As we talk, please put your questions in
- 1:41the chat and I'll make sure to ask them as we
- 1:43move into the Q &A section. As I just mentioned,
- 1:46if you do not want me to include your name, in
- 1:49your question, please write that within your
- 1:52question. Okay. Mario, go ahead and take the
- 1:56stage. Great. Thank you so much. So first of
- 2:01all, I very much want to thank the organizers
- 2:03for the invitation. It's really a pleasure to
- 2:06be here and to be able to talk to you today about
- 2:09how version tries to control all digital flows.
- 2:14So in this opening talk, 20 minutes or so. I'll
- 2:18be focusing mostly on the domestic dimension
- 2:21of that. So how Russia has been trying to control
- 2:24the internet within Russia. But of course, there
- 2:27are many transnational dimensions to that as
- 2:29well, as was already mentioned. And that's something
- 2:31that in much more recent research, we're also
- 2:34moving towards. They were looking into more.
- 2:37So very happy in the Q &A to also broaden the
- 2:40scope and to look beyond what has been happening
- 2:42in Russia domestically. But let's get started,
- 2:46I would say. I'm very much looking forward to
- 2:48the discussion later on. So I wanted to start
- 2:51off with something much more recent. So over
- 2:54the past summer, there was a further escalation
- 2:57of Russian internet censorship, one which we
- 3:00have been waiting for for almost two years. So
- 3:03finally, after much waiting indeed, YouTube has
- 3:08become so -called pretty much limited in usage
- 3:13that to the point where it's very difficult to
- 3:15actually use. Of course, as I think many in this
- 3:18audience will know, as soon as you limit the
- 3:20bandwidth, something like a video sharing platform
- 3:22will basically become very useless. But the reason
- 3:25why I say something we've been waiting for for
- 3:27two years is that over the past two years, or
- 3:30ever since Russia's full -scale invasion of Ukraine,
- 3:33they've really accelerated internet censorship
- 3:35and started blocking several of these large Western
- 3:38social media platforms. But surprisingly not
- 3:41YouTube, and this is surprising since it is such
- 3:44an important platform, especially for Russian
- 3:46independent journalism from abroad, Russian opposition,
- 3:50to be able to reach Russian audiences. It's one
- 3:53of those few bridges that still existed between
- 3:56the Russian audiences and those abroad. So now
- 3:59indeed they have moved forward with this, but
- 4:01at the same time what continues to be quite strange
- 4:03is that officially they deny that this is actually
- 4:06Russian government doing it. They tried to put
- 4:09the blame on... Google servers are no longer
- 4:11being serviced and that this is the actual reason.
- 4:14So the jury is still out, but I think all experts
- 4:17agree that it actually is the Russian government
- 4:19that is now restricting YouTube. So again, this
- 4:22is the latest development in more than 10 years
- 4:28of increasing restrictions on the Russian internet.
- 4:34And Russia also is not unique. So throughout
- 4:37the world, we see that the trend in terms of
- 4:40Internet freedom is very negative. Russia is
- 4:45one example where Internet has become more and
- 4:47more restricted. That is actually the global
- 4:49trend where Internet freedom is declining. For
- 4:52example, if you would look at the rankings by
- 4:53freedom on the net, you can see various examples
- 4:56of what different shapes that this takes, but
- 4:58the overall trend is very negative. So we see
- 5:00various repressive regulations. We see a lot
- 5:03of examples, increasingly of blockages of social
- 5:06media or even for internet shutdowns. Russia
- 5:09is one of those examples that I think is very
- 5:11interesting from a research perspective as well,
- 5:14because it has really shifted from one opposite
- 5:16to the other opposite. So Russia's internet has
- 5:19developed really integrated into the global internet.
- 5:23It is quite distinct because it had a very thriving
- 5:26domestic internet sector as well. So Russian
- 5:29tech companies, Russian platforms and so on.
- 5:31But now, of course, it has gone all the way to
- 5:33the other opposite. So it's become quite highly
- 5:37censored and also more and more isolated from
- 5:40the global internet. So how has this actually
- 5:43come about? That is what I've been doing research
- 5:46on for the past years. How has Russia shifted
- 5:50from this, well, the internet using it as this
- 5:54also a tool for economic development, for education?
- 5:59and so on, really coming to a highly digitized
- 6:02society, to now undermining that more and more
- 6:05and more. How have you went from this open internet
- 6:07to a censored, isolated internet? But where I
- 6:11appreciate a little bit against some of the more
- 6:13common narrative is that, yes, it is about what
- 6:16the Russian government does. It is about Russian
- 6:18policy, for example, Russian legislation. But
- 6:21of course, there's much more to that because
- 6:23the internet infrastructure is so complicated.
- 6:26It exists with so many components. and so many
- 6:28different owners, for example, of those different
- 6:30components. That actually, it's quite difficult
- 6:33for alternative states to censor. You often need
- 6:37to pressure some of these, for example, infrastructure
- 6:40owners to actually implement your censorship.
- 6:43So the question then obviously becomes, what
- 6:47role do platform companies, for example, have
- 6:50in this switch towards more and more censorship?
- 6:53So how should we understand the role of platform
- 6:56companies? in Internet censorship in Brazil.
- 7:01So zooming out, I also want to give you just
- 7:04a way of thinking about Internet censorship.
- 7:07If we can actually imagine it as a spectrum,
- 7:10where on the one hand, we have an Internet with
- 7:11no restrictions, this actually is not necessarily
- 7:14beneficial. So if we approach this from a human
- 7:18rights perspective, for example, then this would
- 7:20not be a beneficial situation. We need some forms
- 7:23of regulation, need some forms of control. On
- 7:26the internal opposite, we have complete internet
- 7:29shutdowns, so no internet whatsoever. But these
- 7:31are the two extremes within which we are, and
- 7:35within which we try to find these three spots
- 7:38where indeed the internet is functional, where
- 7:40it is secure, we are able to protect human rights,
- 7:42but at the same time, we're not transgressing
- 7:45into restrictions that actually we do not want.
- 7:49The reason why I want to present it as a spectrum
- 7:51is also because the ways in which we can censor
- 7:53the internet is very, very diverse. There's all
- 7:56these different forms that go from the more benign
- 7:59or potentially benign, like governments requesting
- 8:02a platform to remove illegal content. It can
- 8:05be totally permissible, right? Just a normal
- 8:08way to enforce legislation. It can also be, of
- 8:12course, repressive. This also happens. And towards
- 8:15more the extreme end, we see examples such as
- 8:18blocking social media. And this we would already
- 8:20see as being very problematic because it rarely
- 8:23is proportional. So the kind of strength that
- 8:28a state might want to prevent, it most often
- 8:31doesn't justify really blocking an entire social
- 8:34media platform, which affects a lot of users,
- 8:37a lot of different kinds of communications. So
- 8:39the one is more on the good end and the other
- 8:41is more on the bad end. But it's especially this
- 8:44middle part that I'm always very interested in.
- 8:46So all of the individual actions, but also the
- 8:50less visible actions that actually really influence
- 8:53how users and especially users in off -the -terrain
- 8:57states are able to use the internet. So another
- 9:03more abstract visualization of how indeed the
- 9:08Russian internet has developed. So as I'm sure
- 9:11you know, on the one hand, we have officially
- 9:14a global open internet. At the same time, within
- 9:16that, there's a lot of different communities
- 9:18and a lot of different different bubbles almost
- 9:21you can say. Even if you just imagine the different
- 9:24language spaces that we inhibit, different communities
- 9:27that we are part of. At the same time, most of
- 9:30that you are technically able to access. And
- 9:33this of course is what the major shift is that
- 9:35has now been happening in Russia. Where they've
- 9:38been moving from this integration between on
- 9:41the one hand the global open internet, and also
- 9:44the Russian and Russian language internet, which
- 9:46of course transcended Russian borders. do more
- 9:50and more trying to isolate Russian users from
- 9:53this global internet. They're trying to pull
- 9:55them onto Russian platforms, off from foreign
- 9:58platforms, and to really try to keep them, as
- 10:01well as their traffic, as well as their data,
- 10:03within the boundaries of the Russian state. On
- 10:06the one hand, this is justified as security as
- 10:09well. They're defending national security, maybe
- 10:11even defending the security of Russian citizens
- 10:14when it comes to data privacy. But of course,
- 10:17what it also does is that it censors. So what
- 10:20do they try to deprive Russian citizens from
- 10:22is access to information. So for example, access
- 10:26to information about war crimes committed by
- 10:28the Russian army. But more and more, there's
- 10:31this isolation. But at the same time, it's important
- 10:34to always stress that this is not complete yet.
- 10:37And of course, YouTube was one of those bridges
- 10:38in between, but we still have, for example, also
- 10:41Telegram that is somewhere there. But the bridge
- 10:45is becoming more narrow. But for example, with
- 10:48increasing restrictions even on VPNs, that's
- 10:51becoming more and more difficult for those on
- 10:53the outside to get information into Russia as
- 10:56well as vice versa. So if you think in, again,
- 11:04an abstract form about how Russia tries to control
- 11:06the information, there's actually two kinds of
- 11:10activities or two objectives at the same time.
- 11:13So on the one hand, they try to increase the
- 11:16production and the reach of the narratives and
- 11:19the sources that they are promoting. So think,
- 11:22for example, about RT or about Russian perspectives
- 11:26on political affairs that is trying to promote
- 11:30the reach of these. This is also why Russians
- 11:33may be annoyed by the fact that Russian state
- 11:35media is banned on YouTube worldwide. And the
- 11:39opposite is to suppress the narratives and the
- 11:41sources that they do not want. So this would
- 11:43be, for example, a Russian independent media
- 11:46like Medusa. They're trying to restrict as much
- 11:49as possible the reach of that information. There's
- 11:54always a combination of both of them. We tend
- 11:57to look either or, but of course the propaganda
- 12:00and the censorship, they are mutually reinforcing.
- 12:03So they try to recreate the information landscape
- 12:06in such a way that it helps promote the propaganda
- 12:09and suppress the independent information. And
- 12:13to, of course, also suppress citizens expressing
- 12:15themselves, citizens organizing, citizens resisting.
- 12:23And how do they do this? There are actually different
- 12:26ways in which you can go about it, different
- 12:28ways of targeting the information ever started.
- 12:32So when you think about it, the more traditional
- 12:35way is to go after the production of information.
- 12:39So to repress journalists, for example. to intimidate
- 12:43them, to intimidate citizens, to reinforce self
- 12:46-censorship. These are really traditional forms
- 12:49of repression to try to prevent information from
- 12:52being produced in the first place. So if you,
- 12:55for example, shut down a media organization,
- 12:59then this would be here. We also have things
- 13:01like organizations labeled as foreign agents
- 13:04or being declared undesirable organization. Both
- 13:08would all be on this end. So today we'll be talking
- 13:11a bit less about this and more on the other two.
- 13:14And these are about dissemination and visibility.
- 13:19So the information dissemination is, okay, it
- 13:21has been produced, but you can then still try
- 13:23and limit how far it can actually go. So to limit
- 13:26it from being spread elsewhere. And visibility
- 13:30is, okay, it's out there, it has been disseminated,
- 13:33but it can be more visible or less visible. So
- 13:36more recommended to users or less recommended
- 13:38to users. So I want to just go through two examples
- 13:42of both of those. That's what my research has
- 13:45been focusing on mostly. So let's start with
- 13:49this dissemination of information. This is particularly
- 13:56the dimension where we see the role of platforms
- 13:58become very, very prominent. And what has been
- 14:01fascinating for me to follow over the past years
- 14:03is this continuous conflict between the Russian
- 14:06government and these various platform companies.
- 14:09They're both Russian companies like Yandex, like
- 14:12VK, as well as international companies like X,
- 14:16Facebook, YouTube, and so on. So increasingly
- 14:20they've been trying to pressure these platforms
- 14:22to implement censorship. More and more expressive
- 14:25legislation has been adopted, but then you need
- 14:27to get the platforms to actually enforce it.
- 14:29So if you say a certain type of content is not
- 14:32legal, then how do you get them to actually remove
- 14:34it? And it turns out that this has been much
- 14:37more difficult with the foreign platforms, especially
- 14:39Western platforms, than with the Russian platforms
- 14:42like VK. One of the things that they've also
- 14:47been doing is to then try and promote the domestic
- 14:49ones. So promote the platforms where they're
- 14:51able to influence this much more strongly. So
- 14:55to promote using the reference search engine,
- 14:57the unlocks. to promote using Russian social
- 15:00media like VK and no longer use the international
- 15:04ones. For example, by requiring when a phone
- 15:09is sold in Russia that these apps should be pre
- 15:12-installed on it. So it should already get here
- 15:15as soon as you have a new phone. It should already
- 15:17guide you towards the search engine that they're
- 15:19able to influence most. But especially the social
- 15:23media has been very important over the past decade
- 15:26or so. for Russian opposition and Russian independent
- 15:29journalism. Everything, for example, like Alexei
- 15:32Navalny, who's been killed. His organization
- 15:35has been really instrumental in organizing large
- 15:38scale protests and investigating corruption and
- 15:40so on. They really relied on these Western social
- 15:44media platforms to disseminate their investigations.
- 15:48Because when it was taken down on one platform,
- 15:50it would still be available on the other platform.
- 15:53And for a very long time, these Western platforms
- 15:55also really resisted. So for example, YouTube
- 15:58was one of the platforms that was really essential
- 16:00for keeping these investigations visible. So
- 16:03for allowing audiences worldwide, like really
- 16:06million, million audiences to access these investigations.
- 16:10If they would have been more susceptible to Russian
- 16:12pressure, then of course the opposition would
- 16:15have had less opportunities for reaching this
- 16:17mass audience that they need. But as I mentioned
- 16:21at the beginning, this has now shifted. So for
- 16:24a very long time Russia was... trying to put
- 16:26more and more pressure on these Western platform
- 16:28companies, placing more and more fines on them,
- 16:31threatening to block them, and so on. But only
- 16:34in 2022, so after the full -scale invasion, when,
- 16:37of course, this control over information became
- 16:39even more prominent for the Russian state, we
- 16:42suddenly saw that they went forward and actually
- 16:44started blocking these platforms. Also because
- 16:47now they became more sophisticated in terms of
- 16:50how to actually do it. They also are more capable
- 16:53of doing it. So they blocked Instagram, they
- 16:57blocked Facebook, and they also blocked X. But
- 17:01now, of course, in 2024, they went one step further.
- 17:04So now we also see that indeed YouTube has been
- 17:07largely restricted. And more recently, also the
- 17:10platform where we are now, Discord, has also
- 17:13been added to the list. This means that the bridges
- 17:17between and the spaces that Russian users in
- 17:21Russia and the outside world can co -inhabit
- 17:23have become more limited. So of course, we would
- 17:26always say, well, you can just use the VPN. But
- 17:29as I mentioned before, also there, Russia is
- 17:31doing much more in trying to limit what kind
- 17:34of VPN services are actually available. So it's
- 17:37officially illegal for VPNs to allow you to access
- 17:40and search websites, for example. But of course,
- 17:43that's the beauty of VPNs that they would do
- 17:45that. But they've become more and more sophisticated
- 17:48in even being able to detect and also block.
- 17:50of very prominent VPN services. So it's becoming
- 17:53more and more difficult there as well. So social
- 17:57media platform is very important, but at the
- 17:59same time, we might even go one level down because
- 18:01when we look at, for example, app stores, we
- 18:04have even smaller number of suppliers. So when
- 18:08you think of internet infrastructure as having
- 18:10all kinds of bottlenecks, choke points, then
- 18:13often app stores are very, very important. So
- 18:15they determine what kind of apps you can use.
- 18:19which apps can have a large reach. So when, for
- 18:21example, Apple decides to remove something from
- 18:24their app store, this has a very big implication.
- 18:27Of course, they've also become a target of pressure.
- 18:30For some time, these companies resisted. But
- 18:33the first time we saw that they caved was in
- 18:352021, when there were Russian parliamentary elections,
- 18:39when there was a strategic voting app that was
- 18:41launched. So the idea was that opposition votes,
- 18:44when they get spread out across multiple candidates,
- 18:47even in fraudulent elections. That's not good
- 18:50because we want to undermine the position of
- 18:52the party in power. If we can coordinate, if
- 18:55everyone votes for the same candidate that is
- 18:59not connected to United Russia, then we can undermine
- 19:03the position of this party of power. There was
- 19:06an app that you could then say, this is where
- 19:07I will vote, and then it would recommend which
- 19:10candidate you should then vote for. It was very
- 19:13easy for Russia to block the website in Russia
- 19:15and so on. But then they also wanted to get it
- 19:17removed from these app stores. And in this case,
- 19:21they actually succeeded. And what appears to
- 19:23have been most influential is the fact that Russia
- 19:26also requires you to have a legal representation
- 19:29in the country itself. And they were able to
- 19:32then say, okay, we will prosecute your local
- 19:34employees, for example. So this is what we often
- 19:37dub as hostage -taking laws, but that there are
- 19:41actual people there that you might prosecute,
- 19:44that you might hold hostage. and that it's one
- 19:47of those things to really exercise pressure on
- 19:49these companies. This is an example of dissemination,
- 19:54how they can target it. But then there's another
- 19:57level where it becomes even more murky, even
- 20:00more difficult also for us to really perceive,
- 20:03and that's about the visibility. And even when
- 20:06you look at platform moderation, there's also
- 20:09been a shift. The platforms more and more, they
- 20:11don't remove content, but they're just downranking.
- 20:14They make it less visible. And that's quite difficult,
- 20:17also, for internet censorship scholars to actually
- 20:20detect. But here I have a case that we were able
- 20:24to really show what was going on. Because search
- 20:27engines was also one of those things that really,
- 20:29really influenced visibility, because we all
- 20:32just use the top search results. And many people
- 20:35really rely on search engines for accessing the
- 20:39internet itself. It's very rarely people still
- 20:43remember where they would actually want to go.
- 20:46And if you have only a few suppliers again, then
- 20:48they become very, very important. So what kind
- 20:50of decisions do in this case, Google as the Western
- 20:54search engine available in Russia and Yandex
- 20:56as the more popular Russian alternative, what
- 20:58kind of decisions do they take? The Russian government
- 21:03has tried to influence this as well. So trying
- 21:05to influence what actually comes up when you
- 21:08search for certain terms. trying to pressure
- 21:11them, trying to manually interfere even. And
- 21:14of course, here we again had the difference between
- 21:17Google as the Western platform, which by no means
- 21:20perfect, and then Yandex, that is the company
- 21:24that has been more susceptible to pressure. So
- 21:30let's look at a particular example, and it was
- 21:32again also connected to the same election, so
- 21:36the same smart voting app. Because one very silly
- 21:39thing happened there as well, and that was that
- 21:42there was a company trading in wool that registered
- 21:46the trademark of smart voting, which of course
- 21:48is a very silly thing. And then there was a court
- 21:51decision where they forbade search engines to
- 21:54give any results for the query. So there was
- 21:57a court order that said, if you Google smart
- 22:00voting, the search engine should basically say,
- 22:03I don't know. I have no results for you. So our
- 22:06question was, how did they actually implement
- 22:08it? So we looked at this during the election.
- 22:11And what we found was that there indeed was a
- 22:13big difference, where on one hand, Yandex was
- 22:16complying, so they were not linking to the official
- 22:19resources. Well, Google was not complying, so
- 22:22they were linking to the official resources where
- 22:24voters could get the information about the strategic
- 22:26voting. But of course, you then also have to
- 22:29give something else. If you remove certain links,
- 22:32you also have to offer something else. But what
- 22:34did they recommend instead? And what we found
- 22:36interesting was that in Yandex, it was largely
- 22:39replaced also by more conspiracy -leading. So
- 22:42negative about this campaign and more conspiracies
- 22:45about what the actual objectives were. So this
- 22:49is one example where we were really able to look
- 22:51into a case where we see on the one hand, the
- 22:54Russian government trying to influence search
- 22:55results. And then we were able to detect. how
- 22:58these two different search engines implemented
- 23:01it and what it would mean for users. So if half
- 23:05of the users use the one search engine, what
- 23:07kind of information would they get? What would
- 23:09they think that this smart voting strategy is
- 23:12about? Or if they use the other search engine,
- 23:15what is their image of politics then? So just
- 23:21to conclude for now, and then looking forward
- 23:24to hopping into the Q &A. The unfortunate trend
- 23:28that we have today, and that I'm very happy that
- 23:30we're able to talk about today, is that throughout
- 23:33the world, internet censorship is increasing.
- 23:36And here, of course, we also have debates, even
- 23:38within the European Union, that lean more and
- 23:42more towards more intervention, more state intervention.
- 23:46So if we stop it, then of course, the concerns
- 23:48about Russian interference in European politics
- 23:51or in American politics is also one of those
- 23:53examples where we see quite a strong push. towards
- 23:56more and more restrictions, for example, on social
- 23:58media. And Rich has one of those examples where
- 24:01we see that Philip, all the way from totally
- 24:03integrated, totally open global internet to censored,
- 24:10increasingly isolated. I should note here that
- 24:13globally and globally integrated and uncensored,
- 24:17there was already surveillance from the late
- 24:191990s onwards. So on the back end of it, it was
- 24:22not all good. What I also hope to show you and
- 24:26to give you some ways of thinking about is that
- 24:29Internet censorship is very, very complex. It
- 24:31is not just about repressive legislation, but
- 24:34it's also about all of those questions about
- 24:36implementation of censorship, implementation
- 24:39of repressive laws, and those relationship between
- 24:43repressive governments and companies. Do they
- 24:46have leverage? Why is one state able to really
- 24:49push platforms to collaborate to censor for them
- 24:52or not? But also of course, platforms can over
- 24:56-sensor. They can do it themselves as well. But
- 24:59they have a very important role to play both
- 25:00in facilitating as well as encountering internet
- 25:04censorship and a role that we really should take
- 25:06serious, even though it is becoming more and
- 25:08more difficult for us to do. It's more and more
- 25:11they're operating in really this gray area where
- 25:13it's not so much really removing content, but
- 25:16much more about downranking all of these subtle
- 25:19differences in visibility. that are very difficult
- 25:22for us to detect and prove. Thank you so much
- 25:26for now, and I look forward to continuing into
- 25:29the discussion. Thank you so much, Marielle.
- 25:32How fascinating to learn a little bit more about
- 25:35the background to internet censorship and how
- 25:39complicated it is to just navigate the Russian
- 25:43internet as well. Just a little plug here if
- 25:46you are interested in doing open source research
- 25:49on Russian internet. We actually do have trainings
- 25:53on that at Bellingcat. We have fantastic open
- 25:57source researchers who train on just that. And
- 26:00we actually do have a workshop coming up in December.
- 26:03So I'll pop it in the chat in case you're interested
- 26:06in joining that. But first and foremost, if you
- 26:11want to put your questions in the chat now, please
- 26:13go ahead as well. It's just to the right -hand
- 26:16side of, sorry, left -hand side of the top of
- 26:18your screen. Please pop any questions in there
- 26:23from this point onwards. Maria, I wanted to ask
- 26:26you, because Russia's often considered a pioneer,
- 26:31let's say, in internet governance and censorship.
- 26:35Could you explain how Russia's approach differs
- 26:37from other authoritarian regimes? And are there
- 26:42any particular strategies or technologies that
- 26:44Russia has pioneered or are they simply following
- 26:48a well thought out? plan, game plan that's already
- 26:52been instrumented by other ratings. Russia is
- 26:58indeed often seen as being quite unique. The
- 27:01funny thing is that what was traditionally seen
- 27:05as so -called the Russian model or the internet
- 27:08governance, the internet censorship, they actually
- 27:10no longer do. But that's something I'll come
- 27:12to. So it's often contrasted where the Russian
- 27:15model, so to say, and the Chinese model. And
- 27:18the Chinese model originally was, okay, firewall
- 27:21on the outside, really restricting what can be
- 27:25accessed, so re -isolating Chinese users and
- 27:28building an entire ecosystem within it. And then
- 27:30having very strict restrictions from outside
- 27:33companies. If you want to operate in a Chinese
- 27:35market, you have to follow our legislation and
- 27:38so on implemented on a very, very early stage,
- 27:41the early stage of the development of the internet.
- 27:44Russia was the opposite. So again, developed
- 27:47from very open. And the idea initially was that
- 27:51we saw that they were already from the 2010s
- 27:56and onwards, they were trying to influence online
- 28:00discussions, but that this was not done initially
- 28:03by restricting. So not centering website, for
- 28:07example, that's only possible legally since 2012
- 28:10started doing in 2013. And they did not do that.
- 28:15It was much more about paying bloggers when blogging
- 28:18was still very prominent. Those kinds of manipulations,
- 28:22both is something that really emerged already
- 28:25then. Of course, not just in Russia, but also
- 28:27in terms of trying to interfere in Ukraine already
- 28:30early on. So these kinds of manipulation, participating
- 28:34in online discourses, trying to manipulate them,
- 28:37trying to change the balance of conversations.
- 28:40That was really seen as the Russian model initially.
- 28:43So a more sophisticated, in a sense, way of trying
- 28:46to influence online debates in a way that is
- 28:49more difficult for users to actually detect.
- 28:51That they don't notice, okay, I'm running into
- 28:54this restriction. They just think that other
- 28:57people think this way, or maybe I am the only
- 29:00one who thinks like this and so on. But that
- 29:02was originally seen as the Russian model. Of
- 29:05course, over the past years, they've shifted
- 29:07away. And especially now, of course, they've
- 29:09went all the way into the blocking model. But
- 29:13the difficulty that they now encounter is that
- 29:17they did not do this early on. So they actually
- 29:19have to disentangle this very, very complicated
- 29:23amalgamation of all these different technologies.
- 29:27So you see, even now, even though they for various,
- 29:30for quite a number of years have a lot of legislation
- 29:32on trying to get everyone to move from Western
- 29:35technologies and Chinese technology to Russian
- 29:38-produced technologies, that in reality, this
- 29:41is very, very hard to do. And oftentimes, they
- 29:43don't even have the domestic production capacity,
- 29:46for example. There's something like having the
- 29:50type of service that's a company we need. They
- 29:53force them to use the Russian ones, but then
- 29:55the companies say, well, they're just not good
- 29:58enough. We cannot actually do that. So it's proven
- 30:01to be very difficult. So in that sense, the original
- 30:04Russian model no longer is what Russia actually
- 30:07does today, but they are still very innovative
- 30:10in the sense that the way that they now are able
- 30:12to censor, this is something that they've been
- 30:15implementing since 2019 under what they call
- 30:18the Russian internet sovereignty legislation,
- 30:21that it is actually very sophisticated. So they
- 30:24have a more sophisticated form of DPI, so deep
- 30:27packet inspection, but the way it is organized
- 30:30is that they installed the special devices with
- 30:34all of the internet service providers and all
- 30:36the big telecom providers. And they are able
- 30:39to access those directly. Previously they had
- 30:42a list of ISPs have to block these and these
- 30:47websites and they had to update the list twice
- 30:49a day and then indeed block access for their
- 30:53clients. But now they can do it directly, but
- 30:56they're no longer reliant on is Internet service
- 30:59providers no longer reliant on the telecommunication
- 31:01operators. They can do it centrally. So it allows
- 31:05them to filter traffic in a more advanced fashion,
- 31:09but also to do it in a way that the telecommunication
- 31:13operators, they don't even have access to these
- 31:15rooms where these devices are. They cannot do
- 31:19that. And another advantage, as we see it in
- 31:23terms of Internet censorship, is that it allows
- 31:26them to do this on a quite local level, so to
- 31:29really target particular areas. And that, of
- 31:32course, is another sophistication that then can
- 31:35be exported to other countries. So that, unfortunately,
- 31:40is an area where it looks like they are innovating,
- 31:43where it looks like this is actually very effective
- 31:45and relatively cheap as well. And that is, of
- 31:48course, also another factor that might ease this.
- 31:51other countries adopting this similar kind of
- 31:54model as well, which is concerning. At the same
- 31:57time, I think you also mentioned the idea of
- 31:59like, are they very strategic? Are they following
- 32:00our plan? And this is the thing where, just because
- 32:03I've been following this for some 10 years now,
- 32:06where I always want to push back because it is
- 32:08so damn messy. If you just look at even how this
- 32:12legislation is being made and then how it's implemented.
- 32:16They say one thing, but in practice it actually
- 32:19doesn't work. It actually is very messy. But
- 32:23of course the end result still is the same. So
- 32:26the end result still is that the Russian internet
- 32:28today is very highly censored. There's a lot
- 32:31of repression for online activity and it's becoming
- 32:34more and more difficult for those outside, like
- 32:37who have been forced to live outside of Russia
- 32:40to still engage with Russian audiences. So even
- 32:44though, no, it is not really thought through.
- 32:47Yes, they make a lot of mistakes. They have a
- 32:50lot of ideas that actually are not possible.
- 32:55The end result, unfortunately, still is a highly
- 32:57sensitive internet. Super interesting to hear
- 33:04how messy it is behind the scenes. And I want
- 33:06to return back to the discussion about what lessons
- 33:11we can learn from this. for future censorship
- 33:15in other countries, for example, as you touched
- 33:17on. But first, you mentioned, I know you said
- 33:20that blocking is now the new place they're concentrating
- 33:24on, but you did mention the bot farms and Batman
- 33:28had asked a question, great name, by the way,
- 33:31on Discord. They asked, on top of directly censoring
- 33:35information, Russian government is notorious
- 33:38for its troll activity, seeing how effective
- 33:40Russian trolls are at disturbing and diverting
- 33:43any constructive discussion, both in Russian
- 33:45and English language segments and across platforms.
- 33:49Is there any visibility on initiatives that could
- 33:51be coming up to counter that? And how could the
- 33:54open source community help here? That's a very
- 33:58good question. This is another one of those areas
- 34:03where we often think of Russia as being quite
- 34:06innovative and quite effective. So already for
- 34:10quite some years, of course, initially starting
- 34:12with the original troll factories, so to say,
- 34:15so the research agency, first operating mostly
- 34:20domestically. We've seen also a lot of very early
- 34:23on activity, of course, in, in Ukraine. And now
- 34:26we're switching to some new organizations, because
- 34:30of course, after the head Prigozhan was killed,
- 34:35the Inter -Research Agency is no more, but of
- 34:36course, there are other partners or other parties
- 34:39who are very willing to take over those government
- 34:42tenders. So we see that this is indeed one of
- 34:46the areas where there's a lot of activity. And
- 34:49for quite some years, Russia has also been quite
- 34:53apt in the sense that it is quite tailored to
- 34:57the particular audiences that they try to influence.
- 35:01This actually requires skill. Like it or not,
- 35:06it does. So to be able to analyze what is going
- 35:11on in a certain society, to analyze how you might
- 35:14influence that, what you would want to amplify,
- 35:18how you can destabilize a society by picking
- 35:21on certain topics. This is something that, for
- 35:25example, for many years, China has been left
- 35:27out at actually doing. So this has been, because
- 35:31of that, of course, quite a big concern. A personal
- 35:36concern I have right now is that we might often
- 35:39be overestimating the effectiveness of a lot
- 35:41of these activities. So it's relatively easy
- 35:46for us to detect inauthentic behaviors. So to
- 35:50try and figure out how active are these networks,
- 35:54I think that by now there's a lot of capacity
- 35:56in doing this. There's a lot of organizations
- 35:58that work on this. At the same time, what worries
- 36:01me is that oftentimes we then very quickly make
- 36:04the step from activity to saying, okay, that
- 36:07there has been engagement, which oftentimes there's
- 36:10very little engagement or a lot of engagement
- 36:13with others, but only within the same forms,
- 36:16though, to say. So very little engagement actually
- 36:19beyond that. And then the point that is often
- 36:22left out entirely, of course, is what is the
- 36:24actual effect of this? So does it influence anyone's
- 36:28perceptions and so on? At the same time, of course,
- 36:31the fact that we see so much activity and that
- 36:33we're talking about this activity, that might
- 36:35in itself already have effects, right? The idea
- 36:39that we think that we are being threatened, that
- 36:40there's an outside actor that's interfering in
- 36:43our debates, that our communications and our...
- 36:45public debates are not safe or that they're not
- 36:48secure from this outside interference. So even
- 36:52that already can be very powerful. This was something
- 36:57that I think is quite challenging about the moment
- 37:00where we are now. So of course we went all the
- 37:03way from an underestimation of the threat. It
- 37:07took quite a long time. from 2016 onwards for
- 37:11this to be really recognized, even though within
- 37:14our research community, we've seen these activities
- 37:16for much longer, especially Ukraine has been
- 37:19fighting them for much, much longer. It took
- 37:22quite a long time for it to be taken seriously,
- 37:25but now we are at the point where it is taken
- 37:27seriously and where sometimes we're lacking really
- 37:31the connection to, is it really effective or
- 37:35are we just granting them? effectiveness and
- 37:38just assuming that actually it is effective.
- 37:42And this also doesn't really do justice to the
- 37:44fact that a lot of our average citizens, they
- 37:47actually are able to tell what is going on. They
- 37:50actually have their own opinions and they might
- 37:52not be influenced that easily. It might take
- 37:55a lot more, a lot more about the social interactions
- 37:58that they have, but that is much more important
- 38:00for us to understand how public opinion is made
- 38:02today. And what can we do against it? Of course,
- 38:07the most important thing is indeed awareness,
- 38:09but just in general awareness about how do these
- 38:12online spaces work. So digital literacy is of
- 38:16course the common thing that's always being proposed,
- 38:18but I do think that in a general sense that is
- 38:20just important. So not just about knowing how
- 38:23the internet works, but also in general, how
- 38:25do media work? So if you want to support that
- 38:29also younger generations that they trust certain
- 38:31sources of information. It can be very beneficial
- 38:34if they understand how does journalism work?
- 38:37How does OSINT work? How do we actually come
- 38:39to knowledge? How can you investigate things
- 38:42yourself? Who can you really trust? Who are the
- 38:45sources that you might return to and why? That
- 38:48can be actually very, very supportive. Of course,
- 38:51we still need the platforms to do to be very
- 38:53active because we do not need these very big
- 38:57campaigns. We do not need all of these. inauthentic
- 39:01behavior on those platforms that are trying to
- 39:03manipulate online discussions. So very active
- 39:07responses from those platforms. They will be
- 39:11essential moving forward. And this is also where,
- 39:14of course, European regulations like the DSA,
- 39:17they really push platforms to take the next step.
- 39:20Also in terms of becoming more transparent about
- 39:24the decisions that they make. And also hopefully
- 39:27at some point that we get better access for researchers
- 39:30to data so that we're able to investigate what
- 39:33really happens there. And maybe we're able to
- 39:36then say more about, indeed, there's engagement,
- 39:38for example, and how the activities that we see
- 39:42there, how they might influence how people actually
- 39:44communicate. Yeah, exactly. I couldn't agree
- 39:50more with what you're talking about. I mean,
- 39:53there's actually an example of this kind of bot
- 39:56network that's been attacking media houses in
- 40:00that tweet that I shared in the chat from Elliot
- 40:03Higgins, our founder. If you've been following
- 40:07Bellingcat's social media accounts recently,
- 40:09you'll have seen that there's been a fake news
- 40:12campaign against us and many other media organizations.
- 40:16What we did was we sat back and tried to monitor
- 40:20the engagement level and how quick they were
- 40:24being responded to and it was very obvious that
- 40:28they were just echoing themselves. And when we
- 40:30didn't echo them, they didn't get as much visibility
- 40:33as they did when we were raising awareness of
- 40:37the fact that these were out there. It's quite
- 40:39interesting as well as how they're often targeting
- 40:43fact checkers and news journalists as well, sending
- 40:46them in DMs to try and again, get them verified
- 40:50or fact -checked so that there's amplification
- 40:53of those original claims as well. So just be
- 40:55careful. If you see disinformation campaigns
- 40:58like that, often kind of giving them space and
- 41:02giving them amplification can be more problematic
- 41:05than sitting back and kind of monitoring their
- 41:09networks and which bots are interacting with
- 41:11which. So please do have a look at that. Thank
- 41:14you so much for making that point. I think that's
- 41:17really, really crucial because of course we often
- 41:19think about the responsibility of citizens or
- 41:22how we might help citizens. But it's much more
- 41:24important or at least that there are just certain
- 41:28individuals and organizations in a society are
- 41:30more influential. So the way that media and also
- 41:34the way that politicians handle these activities.
- 41:39is much more important because they determine
- 41:42whether something gets amplified more or less.
- 41:45But they're able to really still play this gatekeeper
- 41:47function, but in a positive sense in trying to
- 41:50prevent that these activities are actually successful.
- 41:54Um, but what I think it's also interesting why
- 41:55you mentioned, uh, this particular example. It's
- 41:58because this is it's rich that we have seen in
- 42:00the way that Russia engages, um, in that because,
- 42:05um, it's quite difficult to establish an audience
- 42:08for yourself, right? So if you now create, I
- 42:11don't know, thousands of bots, right? They don't
- 42:14mean anything. So you need an entry point, you
- 42:18need a certain person, you need a certain media
- 42:21that has already established audience or that
- 42:24has some sense of authenticity that then helps
- 42:27you to be amplified or that readers or users
- 42:31got that information from you. So we do see this
- 42:34in the more recently exposed cases, much more
- 42:37examples of this. For example, the US case that
- 42:41was recently disclosed, payments to these very
- 42:45large influencers, that of course is much smarter.
- 42:50So it already is established, they already have
- 42:52a large following, they already have a certain
- 42:55credibility with their audience, and you just
- 42:57paid them some money to say certain things. This
- 43:01can be very effective. The same thing also for
- 43:03the doppelganger, where they've been really spoofing.
- 43:07They're pretending to be established media outlets,
- 43:10which of course does two things. On the one hand,
- 43:12might get their information out there and users
- 43:15might trust it. But at the same time, it might
- 43:18also harm the reputation of those established
- 43:20media that can actually have both of those. So
- 43:23that is a more recent trend that we see that
- 43:26really plays with how we trust certain information
- 43:30sources online. And that of course is also another
- 43:34thing to really be aware of. Absolutely. We've
- 43:39got about 15 minutes left, so please put your
- 43:43questions in the chat. Tony Barrett shared Hugo
- 43:48Mercier's book, Not Born Yesterday might be relevant.
- 43:51Interviews include this one and his link to a
- 43:55YouTube video called 80 ,000 Hours. Might be
- 43:57worth a check and have a look at that. I wanted
- 44:01to move to Benji123's question now. They've asked,
- 44:05do you have information on how Ukraine is trying
- 44:07to separate itself from the Russian internet,
- 44:10e .g. use of VK in Ukraine, since the countries
- 44:12are so linked culturally and linguistically?
- 44:18Yeah, absolutely. So I do have seen a bracket
- 44:21that my focus is mostly on Russia, but I follow
- 44:24Ukraine very thoroughly as well. And especially
- 44:27also the situation now for occupied territories,
- 44:30because they're oftentimes censorship is even
- 44:33more harshly applied than in Russia. So Ukraine
- 44:37has been babbling with Russian interference for
- 44:40many, many years. This goes back even way before
- 44:442014. And one of the things that they decided
- 44:48to do after the extension of Crimea is to block
- 44:52those Russian online resources. Ukrainian citizens.
- 44:56from this Russian information environment in
- 44:58a way that it was playing on themes. So already
- 45:03then they blocked Russian search engine, Yandex,
- 45:07as well as the most popular Russian social media,
- 45:10VK. At the same time, of course, there has been
- 45:13other forms of Russian influencing that can tear
- 45:15beyond that. So they've been actively trying
- 45:18to counter that as well, but that, of course,
- 45:19has been very difficult. So there are also a
- 45:22lot of concerns about some Ukrainian media. with
- 45:25special link ties and then of course it becomes
- 45:29much more messy. So there's all kinds of very
- 45:32important legislation about media pluralism that
- 45:36we need to have pluralism within our media systems
- 45:39and then diversity of viewpoints and so on. So
- 45:42actually determining when you can prove that
- 45:45a media is actually so much linked to an outside
- 45:49power that is trying to undermine the state and
- 45:52it justifies restricting them. That was actually
- 45:56very, very high bar. This has been really a challenge
- 46:01for Ukraine, but also something where they've
- 46:03actually by now accumulated a lot of knowledge
- 46:05and a lot of other capacity. And of course, after
- 46:09the full scale invasion, there's also been so
- 46:11much mobilization within Ukrainian society, which
- 46:14also really helps in shielding against this.
- 46:17The reinforcement of Ukrainian language and increasingly
- 46:22also those who maybe grew up more with Russian
- 46:26language dominant. Most Ukrainians are bilingual,
- 46:30but those who maybe at home spoke more Russian,
- 46:33you see more and more switching to Ukrainian
- 46:34entirely. But it of course also disentangles
- 46:38that space much and much more. So the challenge
- 46:41I think for Ukraine right now is that how do
- 46:45you reach The audiences, that's the Ukrainians
- 46:48that are in occupied territories. Because as
- 46:50I mentioned, as soon as Russia occupies territory,
- 46:54we see, of course, repression of the population.
- 46:56This also involves a lot of violence, a lot of
- 46:59torture and all of that. But it also involves
- 47:02taking over of all the communication infrastructures.
- 47:06So it means that now Russian propaganda is brought
- 47:08in and censorship is brought in as well. There
- 47:11were complete rerouting of internet traffic via
- 47:14Russian networks and so on. sort of deprives
- 47:17citizens there from outside information. This
- 47:20of course is tactical, right? Is to deprive them
- 47:23from connections to Ukraine and from information
- 47:25from there, and to expose them to Russian propaganda.
- 47:29This is really a big challenge for Ukraine. If
- 47:34we're pushing towards liberation of these territories,
- 47:37then it's important to try and keep engaging
- 47:40with the citizens there and to provide them with
- 47:43independent information of what is going on.
- 47:45And that is particularly hard today. I had a
- 47:51very interesting conversation with a Ukrainian
- 47:53journalist a couple of weeks ago about Ukrainian
- 47:56print newspaper that's being distributed on the
- 47:58front lines because of internet restrictions
- 48:02and the value of having kind of Ukrainian language
- 48:07on the front line there and news and updates
- 48:11from back home. It's fascinating. And also, of
- 48:17course, there's so much damage to infrastructure
- 48:19to begin with. So just the reliability of having
- 48:25internet access is absolutely not a given. There's
- 48:28so much destruction of energy infrastructure,
- 48:32of communications infrastructure, and of course,
- 48:34a lot of repair work is being done. But still,
- 48:38there are just so many outages, even just with
- 48:40electricity outages. So there's not necessarily
- 48:44very reliable communication possible everywhere
- 48:48in Ukraine at all times, which of course makes
- 48:51it difficult. And then even more so indeed in
- 48:53occupied territories, where some of them are
- 48:56deprived of this entirely. These kinds of local
- 48:59newspapers, they are able to really provide for
- 49:03those things. So we're talking about occupied
- 49:05territories, but Geiss has asked, have there
- 49:07been any efforts to measure slash understand
- 49:09reach? over citizens outside of their borders
- 49:13of scale. So Russian citizens abroad. Yeah. So
- 49:21there actually is quite some research on that,
- 49:24but at the same time, it's really difficult to
- 49:26talk about it because there are so many diverse
- 49:29groups when we talk about this topic. Because
- 49:32of course Russia tries to influence across its
- 49:35borders in general. This is why, for example,
- 49:39RT has been one of the primary instruments for
- 49:42many, many years. So RT broadcasting in all the
- 49:45different languages. Within Europe, this is restricted,
- 49:49but again, in many countries in the world, actually,
- 49:51this is null. So even today, RT is still very
- 49:54important. And all kinds of associated other
- 49:57communication forms that came with it. So this
- 50:01is just in general trying to promote Russian
- 50:04perspectives, which of course often include a
- 50:07lot of disinformation. But Russian citizens abroad,
- 50:11of course, is a particular category where they
- 50:13target them for different reasons. One is indeed
- 50:16to provide certain information to try and keep
- 50:20them positive towards the Russian state that
- 50:23might even then also influence domestic public
- 50:27opinion there. But of course, there's also a
- 50:29repressive side to this. This is something that's
- 50:32within the new project that you mentioned earlier.
- 50:36What we'll be doing over the next few years or
- 50:38so is to really focus on also the repressive
- 50:40side of it. So how does REC try to repress information
- 50:43across its borders, which it actively does. So
- 50:47let me again think about the role of those platforms.
- 50:50And then what we've often seen and also for Ukrainian
- 50:54journalists, for example, it's a false flagging
- 50:57on platforms. So it's saying this account is
- 51:01violating the platform rules or this account
- 51:03is doing this and this. And if there's enough
- 51:06of these complaints, then oftentimes an account
- 51:08at least gets suspended for a bit and it might
- 51:10even get blocked. So these kinds of manipulation
- 51:13of reporting mechanisms is again, one of those
- 51:16ways in which they might be able to influence
- 51:18that as well. But the reason why I mentioned
- 51:21it's complicated is because of course a lot of
- 51:23this is done in Russian language as well. And
- 51:27there it becomes very messy of who these target
- 51:29audiences actually are because they can be very
- 51:31diverse. This can be former Soviet citizens who've
- 51:34been in Germany for 20, 25 years. This can be
- 51:38recent emigrates in the Baltics. It is a very,
- 51:42very diverse group that they might want to target
- 51:46or that might be affected by this. And so partly,
- 51:50this isn't just Russian domestic propaganda influencing
- 51:52across its borders. Partly, this is actually
- 51:55tailored to reach particular audiences at certain
- 51:58times. Yeah, Timur just asked as well in the
- 52:04chat about sensitive and strategic territories
- 52:08if they also have the same kind of censorship,
- 52:12for example, in the Russian Arctic. But I think
- 52:15you kind of referred to that a little bit. and
- 52:17your last answer. I also linked to your project
- 52:20in the chat as well if you want to check that
- 52:23out. It's in the chat now, the Horizon project.
- 52:27We've only got about six minutes left and I wanted
- 52:30to ask you, because you're talking about how
- 52:32Russia's strategy at the moment is blocking and
- 52:35banning, particularly of social media apps, but
- 52:38I wanted to ask you about the Russian government's
- 52:41response to France's arrest of telegram CEO.
- 52:48And what you found from that kind of government
- 52:52response and what Telegram as an app, what role
- 52:58that plays within Russia and in regards to censorship.
- 53:05Thank you so much for that question. The Telegram
- 53:08is such a fascinating case where I think that
- 53:12there's so much that we actually do not know.
- 53:14uh, both about, uh, the platform as well as its
- 53:17founder, as well as what it actually does and
- 53:19the links that it has with various governments.
- 53:21Uh, it's one of the platforms that is increasingly
- 53:23very, very influential, uh, but also very, very,
- 53:26uh, intransparent. Uh, so after the arrest, they
- 53:30are suddenly becoming a little bit more proactive,
- 53:32a little bit more transparent, but, uh, we still
- 53:35know very, very little. So the interesting thing
- 53:37about Russia and Telegram is, of course, that
- 53:39for some people they think, okay, this is a Russian
- 53:41app because the founder is Russian. So there,
- 53:46the idea for a very long time, it's been like,
- 53:48no, it actually might be against the Russian
- 53:50state because it was indeed the founders, the
- 53:53two brothers, the Dudov brothers, who initially
- 53:56founded the social media platform VK. Then were
- 54:00forced out of VK and then they created Telegram
- 54:03as a messenger to stand able to resist pressure
- 54:06from governments. So able to shield you from
- 54:08a repressive government that wants you to have
- 54:11access to your data and so on. because it actually
- 54:14protects you. This was also why it became so
- 54:17popular, both in Russia itself as well as elsewhere,
- 54:20especially because they were actually very good
- 54:22at circumventing censorship. So if, for example,
- 54:26some years ago when they released a very large
- 54:28protest in Belarus. The internet was being shut
- 54:31down. It's very difficult to access all kinds
- 54:33of resources. The telegram was the most resistant.
- 54:36So when they were not able to use WhatsApp, for
- 54:39example, then oftentimes people were able to
- 54:41use telegram. Therefore it became very important.
- 54:44So they also really cultivated this image that
- 54:47they are on the side of the protesters, that
- 54:49they are really reinforcing them. Even in Russia,
- 54:52it was blocked. for a few years or officially
- 54:55blocked from 2018 to 2020, but in practice, not
- 54:59really because they were not able to. And some
- 55:02of the Russian government officials even continue
- 55:04using it, even though officially they were blocking
- 55:06it, which of course is one of those messy things
- 55:09that I always want to stress, that they can do
- 55:12things at the same time so they can block a resource,
- 55:15but at the same time have the spokesperson for
- 55:19the presidential administration to still use
- 55:20it and not be ashamed of that. So the challenging
- 55:26thing right now is, of course, that on the one
- 55:28hand, they've really cultivated this image of
- 55:30being that supporting protest and projecting
- 55:35here against the authoritarian state. At the
- 55:37same time, the type of open communication that
- 55:40they promote, which leans more to like libertarian
- 55:43ideas about information and freedom, it actually
- 55:47doesn't protect you. as well. So it also leaves
- 55:51a lot of room for propaganda, a lot of room for
- 55:54fraud, a lot of room for criminal activities.
- 55:57And this is of course where it becomes problematic.
- 55:59And also the reason why now France indeed decided
- 56:02to then arrest the CEO. If you do not want to
- 56:06communicate with us, which they were apparently
- 56:08not doing. If you do not want to remove, in this
- 56:11case, this was about child sexual abuse materials.
- 56:14If you do not want to remove those fast enough.
- 56:17then we will actually try and prosecute you as
- 56:20the CEO and hold you accountable for this. So
- 56:23we're holding you accountable for facilitating
- 56:25these activities. And what the Russians then
- 56:29did is of course the most surprising and unsurprising
- 56:33is that suddenly they re -adopted Durov. So they
- 56:37said, oh, but look there in the West. They speak
- 56:41about the global open internet, they speak about
- 56:43freedom of expression online and against censorship,
- 56:46but look at what they're actually doing. They
- 56:47are now prosecuting Gudev and they're trying
- 56:50to restrict telegram and trying to force state
- 56:53regulation and execute or exert state power over
- 56:57them. So look at the West that is being hypocritical
- 57:01again. And actually everything's much better
- 57:03in Russia. So Gudev should just come back and
- 57:06then everything will be okay. There's a very
- 57:09complicated case again, where I think right now
- 57:12we also have a lot of open questions also about
- 57:15Dutov himself and about his positionality. So
- 57:19he always claimed that he was not able to go
- 57:21back to Russia, but now Russian investigative
- 57:23journalists have found out that actually he's
- 57:25been flying back and forth quite often. So there's
- 57:28increasingly doubts about how should we review
- 57:32this? Governments, do they actually have connections
- 57:37with? What are those connections? Are they trustworthy
- 57:40or not? But I think in general, it's always important
- 57:43to stress that within the security community,
- 57:47it's very clear that Telegram is not as secure
- 57:49as they often claim to be. And that if you are
- 57:52in a vulnerable position and if this is really
- 57:54important for you or for your own security, that
- 57:57Telegram is not the app to use for you. Yeah,
- 58:04it's a fascinating case. I wanted to ask you
- 58:07last question, and if we could keep this short
- 58:10and sweet, that'd be amazing if it's even possible.
- 58:13What lessons as researchers can we take from
- 58:16those researching within Russia's internet censorship
- 58:19for other regions that may be increasingly facing
- 58:21stricter online restrictions? I'm thinking in
- 58:25regards to election periods in lots of different
- 58:28regions. What lessons can we take from Russia's
- 58:32censorship into those? I think the most important
- 58:37lesson is that things are easily lost. I think
- 58:41that especially for us in democratic countries
- 58:43is one of the important things. And that's the
- 58:47decentralization of the internet is actually
- 58:49the crucial point. So the more that we have an
- 58:53internet infrastructure that has a lot of bottlenecks,
- 58:56that has a limited number of platforms available,
- 58:59that does not allow interoperability, the more
- 59:02vulnerable it becomes to state control. So I
- 59:05think the push for, on the one hand, defending
- 59:08the right to encryption is really, really crucial
- 59:11for everyone. But also in trying to maintain
- 59:16this core idea of what makes the internet resilient.
- 59:19So not just resilient against what was initially
- 59:21the objective, resilient against nuclear attack,
- 59:25but actually resilient to censorship. And this
- 59:28comes through pushing back against monopolization,
- 59:31pushing back against these very big companies
- 59:33occupying the few bottlenecks that really influence
- 59:38the way that the entire internet works. Another
- 59:41thing, maybe the last thing to stress is the
- 59:43importance of communities like this one. So the
- 59:46importance of having digital vice defenders,
- 59:48of having journalists and of having these connections
- 59:51that allow us to then actually draw attention.
- 59:55through cases that signal bad developments and
- 59:59to be able to start organizing and pushing back.
- 1:00:02It's really, really important and it's quicker
- 1:00:04lost than it is regained. Thank you so much,
- 1:00:10Marielle, for your time today. It's been fascinating
- 1:00:12listening to you. I put the auto -archiver link
- 1:00:16in the chat in case you haven't seen it yet.
- 1:00:19Archive, archive, archive, as Marielle just said,
- 1:00:22the links in the chat for you to do just that.
- 1:00:25Thank you so much for your time, Marielle. Our
- 1:00:28Discord stage talk will not be back in two weeks'
- 1:00:31time, and there's going to be a little bit of
- 1:00:33a break. But if you have checked out our social
- 1:00:35media in the last hour or so, you'll know that
- 1:00:38we have a 10 -year anniversary celebration next
- 1:00:41week, which is about 70 stage talks in one. So
- 1:00:45please tune in. It will be live on our YouTube
- 1:00:47on the 13th and 14th of November. full of incredible
- 1:00:51talks just like this one. So do check that out.
- 1:00:55But again, thank you so much, Marielle, and thank
- 1:00:57you to everybody who's joined us today. Thank
- 1:01:01you. It was a pleasure. Thank you so much. Thank
- 1:01:03you, everybody. Thank you for listening to the
- 1:01:09Stage Talk. If you'd like to catch a Stage Talk
- 1:01:12live where you can ask the guest questions, Join
- 1:01:15the Bellingcat Discord server by visiting www
- 1:01:18.discord .gg slash Bellingcat. The music you've
- 1:01:24heard is titled Dawn by Newer Self and is courtesy
- 1:01:28of Artlist.