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From Makin to Bougainville Marine Raiders in the Pacific War - Jon T. Hoffman · With Frederick The Great: A Story of the Seven Years' War

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Speaker 1: Chapter one of From Macon to Bougainville Marine Raiders in
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Speaker 1: the Pacific War. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox
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Speaker 1: recordings are in the public domain. For more information or
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Speaker 1: to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. From Macon to
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Speaker 1: Bougainville Marine Raiders in the Pacific War by John T.
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Speaker 2: Hoffman.
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Speaker 1: In February nineteen forty two, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcombe, the
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Speaker 1: commandant of the Marine Corps, ordered the creation of a
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Speaker 1: new unit, designated the First Marine Raider Battalion. This elite
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Speaker 1: force and its three sister battalions went on to gain
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Speaker 1: considerable fame for fighting prowess in World War II. There
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Speaker 1: is more to the story of these units, however, than
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Speaker 1: a simple tale of combat heroics. The inception, growth, and
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Speaker 1: sudden end of the Raiders reveals a great deal about
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Speaker 1: the development and conduct of amphibious operations during the war,
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Speaker 1: and about the challenges the Corps faced In expanding from
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Speaker 1: nineteen thousand men to nearly a half million. The Raiders
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Speaker 1: also attracted more than their share of strong leaders. The
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Speaker 1: resulting combination of courage, doctrine, organization, and personalities makes this
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Speaker 1: one of the most interesting chapters in Marine Corps history.
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Speaker 2: Creating the Raiders.
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Speaker 1: Two completely independent forces were responsible for the appearance of
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Speaker 1: the Raiders in early nineteen forty two. Several historians have
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Speaker 1: fully traced one of these sets of circumstances, which began
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Speaker 1: with the friendship developed between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Evans F. Carlson.
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Speaker 1: As a result of his experiences in China, Carlson was
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Speaker 1: convinced that guerrilla warfare was the wave of the future.
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Speaker 1: One of his adherents in nineteen forty one was Captain
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Speaker 1: James Roosevelt, the President's son. At the same time, another
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Speaker 1: presidential confidant, William J. Donovan, was pushing a similar theme.
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Speaker 1: Donovan had been an army hero in World War One
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Speaker 1: and was now a senior advisor on intelligence matters. He
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Speaker 1: wanted to create a guerrilla force that would infiltrate occupied
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Speaker 1: territory and assist resistance groups. He made a formal proposal
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Speaker 1: along these lines to President Roosevelt in December nineteen forty one.
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Speaker 1: In January, the younger Roosevelt wrote to the Major General
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Speaker 1: Commandant of the Marine Corps and recommended creation of a
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Speaker 1: unit for purposes similar to the British commandos and the
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Speaker 1: Chinese guerrillas. These ideas were appealing at the time because
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Speaker 1: the war was going badly for the Allies. The Germans
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Speaker 1: had forced the British off the continent of Europe, and
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Speaker 1: the Japanese were sweeping the United States in Britain from
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Speaker 1: much of the Pacific. The military forces of the Allies
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Speaker 1: were too weak to slug it out in conventional battles
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Speaker 1: with the Axis powers, so guerrilla warfare and quick raids
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Speaker 1: appeared to be viable alternatives. The British commandos had already
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Speaker 1: conducted numerous forays against the European coastline, and Prime Minister
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Speaker 1: Winston S. Churchill enthusiastically endorsed the concept to President Roosevelt.
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Speaker 1: The Marine Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcombe allegedly succumbed to
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Speaker 1: this high level pressure and organized the Raider battalions, though
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Speaker 1: he himself thought that any properly trained marine unit could
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Speaker 1: perform amphibious raids. That scenario was mostly accurate, but it
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Speaker 1: tells only half of the story. Two other men were
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Speaker 1: also responsible for the genesis of the raiders. One was
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Speaker 1: General Holland M.
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Speaker 2: Smith.
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Speaker 1: Although the Marine Corps schools had created the first manual
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Speaker 1: on amphibious operations in nineteen thirty five. During the early
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Speaker 1: days of World War II, Smith faced the unenviable task
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Speaker 1: of trying to convert that paper doctrine into reality. As
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Speaker 1: a brigadier general, he commanded the first Marine Brigade in
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Speaker 1: Fleet Landing Exercise six, which took place in the Caribbean
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Speaker 1: in early nineteen forty. There he discovered that several factors,
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Speaker 1: to include the lack of adequate lefe craft, made it
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Speaker 1: impossible to rapidly build up combat power on a hostile shore.
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Speaker 1: The initial assault elements would thus be vulnerable to counterattack
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Speaker 1: and defeat while most of the amphibious force remained on
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Speaker 1: board its transports. As a partial response to this problem,
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Speaker 1: Smith seized upon the newly developed destroyer transport during FLEX six.
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Speaker 1: His plan called for the manly APD one to land
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Speaker 1: a company of the fifth Marines via rubber boats at
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Speaker 1: h minus three hours prior to dawn, at a point
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Speaker 1: away from the primary assault beach. This force would advance inland,
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Speaker 1: seize key terrain, dominating the proposed beachhead, and thus protect
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Speaker 1: the main landing from counter attack. A year later, during
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Speaker 1: Flex seven, Smith had three destroyer transports. He designated the
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Speaker 1: three companies of the seventh Marines embarked on these ships
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Speaker 1: as the Mobile Landing Group. During the exercise, these units
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Speaker 1: again made night landings to protect the main assault or
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Speaker 1: conducted diversionary attacks. Smith eventually crystallized his new ideas about
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Speaker 1: amphibious operations. He envisioned making future assaults with three distinct echelons.
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Speaker 1: The first wave would be composed of fast moving forces
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Speaker 1: that could seize key terrain prior to the main assault.
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Speaker 1: The first element would consist of a parachute regiment, an
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Speaker 1: infantry regiment, gliderborn troops, a light tank battalion, and at
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Speaker 1: least one APD high speed destroyer transport battalion. With a
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Speaker 1: relatively secure beachhead, the more ponderous combat units of the
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Speaker 1: assault force would come ashore. The third echelon would consist
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Speaker 1: of the reserve force and service units. In the summer
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Speaker 1: of nineteen forty one, Smith was nearly in a position
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Speaker 1: to put these ideas into effect. He now commanded the
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Speaker 1: Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet AFAF, which consisted of the first
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Speaker 1: Marine Division and the Armies First Infantry Division. During maneuvers
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Speaker 1: at the recently acquired marine base at New River, North Carolina.
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Speaker 1: Smith embarked the first Battalion, fifth Marines in six APDs
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Speaker 1: and made it an independent command reporting directly to his headquarters.
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Speaker 1: The operations plan further attached the Marine Division's sole company
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Speaker 1: of tanks and its single company of parachutists to the
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Speaker 1: APD battalion. The general did not use his task force
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Speaker 1: to lead the assault, but instead landed it on d
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Speaker 1: plus two of the exercise on a beach well in
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Speaker 1: the rear of the enemy's lines. With all aviation assets
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Speaker 1: working in direct support. The mobile force quickly moved inland,
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Speaker 1: surprised and destroyed the enemy reserves, and took control of
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Speaker 1: key lines of communication. Smith called it a spearhead thrust
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Speaker 1: around the hostile flank. The AFAF commander had not randomly
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Speaker 1: selected the first Battalion, fifth Marines.
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Speaker 2: For this role.
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Speaker 1: In June nineteen forty one one, He personally had picked
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Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel merit A Red Mike Edson to command that
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Speaker 1: battalion and had designated it to serve permanently with the
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Speaker 1: Navy's APD Squadron. Smith began to refer to Edson's outfit
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Speaker 1: as the Light Battalion or the APD Battalion. When the
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Speaker 1: fifth Marines and other elements of the first Marine Division
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Speaker 1: moved down to New River that fall, the first Battalion
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Speaker 1: remained behind in Quantico with Force Headquarters. Reports going to
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Speaker 1: and from AFAF placed the battalion in a category separate
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Speaker 1: from the rest of the division, of which it was
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Speaker 1: still technically a part. Lieutenant Colonel Gerald C. Thomas, the
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Speaker 1: division operations officer, ruefully referred to the battalion as the
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Speaker 1: plaything of headquarters. Edson's unit was unique in other ways.
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Speaker 1: In a lengthy August nineteen forty one report, the lieutenant
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Speaker 1: colonel evaluated the organization and missions of his unit. He
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Speaker 1: believed that the APD Battalion would focus is primarily on
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Speaker 1: reconnaissance raids and other special operations. In his mind, it
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Speaker 1: was a waterborne version.
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Speaker 2: Of the Parachutists.
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Speaker 1: In a similar fashion, the battalion would rely on speed
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Speaker 1: and mobility, not firepower, as its tactical mainstay. Since the
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Speaker 1: APDs could neither embark nor offload vehicles, that meant the
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Speaker 1: battalion had to be entirely foot mobile once ashore, again
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Speaker 1: like the parachutists, to achieve rapid movement. Edson recommended a
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Speaker 1: new table of organization that made his force much lighter
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Speaker 1: than other infantry battalions. He wanted to trade in his
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Speaker 1: eighty one millimeter mortars and heavy machine guns for lighter models.
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Speaker 1: There also would be fewer of these weapons, but they
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Speaker 1: would have larger crews to carry the ammunition. Given the
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Speaker 1: limitations of the APDs, Each company would be smaller than
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Speaker 1: its standard counterpart. There would be four rifle companies, a
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Speaker 1: weapons company, and a headquarters company with a large demolition's
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Speaker 1: plats tune. The main assault craft would be ten man
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Speaker 1: rubber boats. The only thing that kept Smith from formerly
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Speaker 1: removing the first Battalion, Fifth Marines from the First Marine
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Speaker 1: Division was the lack of troops to make the regiment
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Speaker 1: whole again. As it was, many units of the division
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Speaker 1: still existed only on paper in the fall of nineteen
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Speaker 1: forty one. At the very beginning of nineteen forty two,
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Speaker 1: with the United States now at war and recruits pouring
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Speaker 1: into the corps, Smith wrote the Major General Commandant and
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Speaker 1: asked him to redesignate the battalion. On seven January, Edson
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Speaker 1: received word that he now headed the first separate Battalion.
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Speaker 1: A week later, James Roosevelt wrote his letter to the
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Speaker 1: Commandant about raid forces. On fourteen January. General Hocomb sought
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Speaker 1: the reaction of his senior generals to the President's plan
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Speaker 1: to place Donovan in charge of a Marine Corps version
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Speaker 1: of the commandos. In his twenty January reply to the
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Speaker 1: younger Roosevelt, the Major General Commandant pointed out that the
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Speaker 1: APD Battalion is organized, equipped, and trained for this duty,
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Speaker 1: including in particular the use of rubber boats in night landings.
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Speaker 1: He expressed hope that the Navy would make destroyer transports
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Speaker 1: available on the West coast in the near future to
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Speaker 1: support organization of a second APD Battalion there. Holcomb obviously
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Speaker 1: intended to use Smith's new force as a convenient means
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Speaker 1: to channel outside interference toward a useful end. His plan
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Speaker 1: did not entirely work. On twenty three January, the Navy leadership,
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Speaker 1: undoubtedly in response to political pressure, directed the Pacific Fleet
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Speaker 1: to put together a commando type unit. The second separate
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Speaker 1: Battalion officially came to life on four February. To ensure
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Speaker 1: that this new organization developed along proper lines, the Commandant
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Speaker 1: ordered Edson to transfer a one third slice of his
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Speaker 1: unit to California as a cadre for the second Separate Battalion,
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Speaker 1: which initially existed only on paper. Headquarters also adopted Red
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Speaker 1: Mike's recommended tables of organization and promulgated them to both battalions.
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Speaker 1: The only change was the addition of an eighty one
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Speaker 1: millimeter mortar platoon, though there was no room on the
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Speaker 1: ships of the APD Squadron to accommodate the increase. Holcombe
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Speaker 1: even offered to transfer Edson to the Second Separate but
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Speaker 1: in the end the Commandant allowed the commanding General of
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Speaker 1: the Second Marine Division, Major General Charles F. B. Price,
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Speaker 1: to place Major Carlson in charge. James Roosevelt became the
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Speaker 1: executive officer of the unit. In mid February, at Price's suggestion,
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Speaker 1: the Major General Commandant redesignated his new organizations as Marine
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Speaker 1: Raider battalions. Edson's group became the First Raiders on sixteen February.
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Speaker 1: Carlson's outfit was redesignated to the Second Raiders three days later.
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Speaker 1: End of chapter one, Chapter two of From Macon to
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Speaker 1: Bogainville Marine Raiders in the Pacific War by John T.
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Speaker 2: Hoffman.
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Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Sidebars Major
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Speaker 1: General merit A Edson USMC.
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Speaker 2: Merit A.
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Speaker 1: Edson's military career began in the fall of nineteen fifteen,
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Speaker 1: when he enlisted in the first Vermont Infantry, a National
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Speaker 1: Guard outfit. In the summer of nineteen sixteen, he served
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Speaker 1: in the Mexican Border Campaign. When the United States entered
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Speaker 1: World War One in April nineteen seventeen, he earned a
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Speaker 1: commission as a Marine officer, but he did not arrive
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Speaker 1: in France until just.
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Speaker 2: Before the armistice.
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Speaker 1: He ultimately more than made up for missing out on
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Speaker 1: the War to End All Wars. In nineteen twenty one,
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Speaker 1: he began his long career in competitive shooting, as part
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Speaker 1: of the ten man team that won the National Rifle
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Speaker 1: Team Trophy for the Marine Corps. He earned his pilot's
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Speaker 1: wings in nineteen twenty two and flew for five years
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Speaker 1: before poor depth perception forced him back into the infantry.
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Speaker 1: In nineteen twenty seven, he received command of the Marine
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Speaker 1: detachment on board the Denver CL sixteen. He and his
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Speaker 1: men soon became involved in the effort to rid Nicaragua
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Speaker 1: of Augusto Sandino Edson spent fourteen months ashore, most of
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Speaker 1: it deep in the interior of the country. In the process,
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Speaker 1: he won a reputation as an aggressive, savvy small unit leader.
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Speaker 1: He bested Sandino's forces in more than a dozen skirmishes,
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Speaker 1: earned his first Navy Cross for valor, and came away
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Speaker 1: with the nickname Red Mike in honor of the colorful
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Speaker 1: beard he sported in the field. Edson spent the first
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Speaker 1: half of the nineteen thirties as a tactics instructor at
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Speaker 1: the Basic School for New Lieutenants and then as ordnance
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Speaker 1: officer at the Philadelphia Depot of Supplies. During the summer seat,
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Speaker 1: he continued to shoot. Ultimately, he captained the rifle team
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Speaker 1: to consecutive national championships in nineteen thirty five and nineteen
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Speaker 1: thirty six. In the summer of nineteen thirty seven, he
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Speaker 1: transferred to Shanghai to become the operations officer for the
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Speaker 1: fourth Marines. He arrived just in time for a ringside
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Speaker 1: seat when the Sino Japanese War engulfed that city. That
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Speaker 1: gave him ample opportunity to observe Japanese combat techniques at
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Speaker 1: close range. In June nineteen forty one Red Mike assumed
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Speaker 1: command of the first Battalion, Fifth Marines at Quantico. After
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Speaker 1: his stint with the First Raiders and the fifth Marines
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Speaker 1: on Guadalcanal, Edson remained in the Pacific. He served as
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Speaker 1: Chief of Staff of the second Marine Division at Tarawa
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Speaker 1: and as assistant Division commander on Saipan and Tinian. During
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Speaker 1: each of these campaigns, he again distinguished himself under fire. Ultimately,
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Speaker 1: the Marine Corps discovered that Edson's courage was matt by
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Speaker 1: his skill as a staff officer. He spent nine months
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Speaker 1: as chief of Staff for the Fleet Marine Force Pacific
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Speaker 1: and closed out the war in charge of the Service Command.
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Speaker 1: Following the war, Edson headed the effort to preserve the
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Speaker 1: Marine Corps in the face of President Truman's drive to
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Speaker 1: unify the services. He waged a fierce campaign in the
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Speaker 1: halls of Congress, in the media, and in public appearances
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Speaker 1: across the nation. Finally, he resigned his commission in order
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Speaker 1: to testify publicly before committees of both Houses of Congress.
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Speaker 1: His efforts played a key role in preserving the Marine Corps.
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Speaker 1: After stints as the Commissioner of Public Safety in Vermont
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Speaker 1: and as Executive Director of the National Rifle Association. Edson
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Speaker 1: died in August nineteen fifty five. Brigadier General Evans F.
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Speaker 1: Carlson USMC.
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Speaker 2: Evans F.
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Speaker 1: Carlson got an early start in his career as a Maverick.
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Speaker 1: He ran away from his home in Vermont at the
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Speaker 1: age of fourteen, and two years later bluffed his way
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Speaker 1: past the recruiters to enlist in the army. When war
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Speaker 1: broke out in nineteen seventeen, he had already had five
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Speaker 1: years of service under his belt. Like merit a Edson,
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Speaker 1: he soon won a commission, but arrived at the front
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Speaker 1: too late to see combat. After the war, he tried
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Speaker 1: to make it as a salesman, but gave that up
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Speaker 1: in nineteen twenty two and enlisted in the Marine Corps.
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Speaker 1: In a few months he earned a commission again. Other
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Speaker 1: than a failed attempt at flight school, his first several
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Speaker 1: years as a Marine lieutenant were unremarkable. In nineteen twenty seven,
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Speaker 1: Carlson deployed to Shanghai with the fourth Marines. There he
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Speaker 1: became regimental intelligence officer and developed a deep interest in
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Speaker 1: China that would shape the remainder of his days. Three
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Speaker 1: years later, commanding an outpost of the Guardian National In Nicaragua,
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Speaker 1: he had his first brush with guerrilla warfare that became
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Speaker 1: the second guiding star.
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Speaker 2: Of his career.
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Speaker 1: In his only battle, he successfully engaged and dispersed an
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Speaker 1: enemy unit in a daring night attack. There followed a
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Speaker 1: tour with the Legation Guard in Pei, King and a
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Speaker 1: stint as an executive officer of the Presidential Guard Detachment
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Speaker 1: at Warm Springs, Georgia. In the latter job, Carlson came
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Speaker 1: to know Franklin D.
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Speaker 2: Roosevelt.
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Speaker 1: Captain Carlson arrived in Shanghai for his third China tour
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Speaker 1: in July nineteen thirty seven. Again like Edson, he watched
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Speaker 1: the Japanese seize control of the city. Detailed to duty
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Speaker 1: as an observer, Carlson sought and received permission to accompany
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Speaker 1: the Chinese Communist Party's Eighth Route Army, which was fighting
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Speaker 1: against the Japanese.
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Speaker 2: For the next year.
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Speaker 1: He divided his time between the front lines and the
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Speaker 1: temporary Chinese capital of Hankow.
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Speaker 2: During that time, he.
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Speaker 1: Developed his ideas on guerrilla warfare and ethical indoctrination. When
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Speaker 1: a naval officer censured him for granting newspaper interviews, Carlson
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Speaker 1: returned to the States and resigned so that he could
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Speaker 1: speak out about the situation in China. He believed passionately
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Speaker 1: that the United States should do more to help the Chinese.
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Speaker 2: In their war with Japan.
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Speaker 1: During the next two years, Carlson spoke and wrote on
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Speaker 1: the subject, to include two books, The Chinese Army and
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Speaker 1: Twin Stars of China, and made another trip to China.
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Speaker 1: With war looming for the United States, he sought to
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Speaker 1: rejoin the Corps. In April nineteen forty one. The commandant
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Speaker 1: granted his request, made him a major in the reserves,
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Speaker 1: and promptly brought him onto active duty ten months later.
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Speaker 1: He created the second Raider Battalion. After his departure from
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Speaker 1: the Raiders in nineteen forty three, Carlson served as operations
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Speaker 1: officer of the fourth Marine Division. He made the Tarawa
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Speaker 1: landing as an observer and participated with his division in
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Speaker 1: the assaults on Quadling and Saipan. In the latter battle,
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Speaker 1: he received severe wounds in the arm and leg while
19:04
Speaker 1: trying to pull his wounded radio operator out of the
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Speaker 1: line of fire of an enemy machine gun. After the war,
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Speaker 1: Carlson retired from the Marine Corps and made a brief
19:13
Speaker 1: run in the nineteen forty six California Senate race before
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Speaker 1: a heart attack forced him out of the campaign. He
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Speaker 1: died in May nineteen forty seven. Destroyer transports. The origins
19:28
Speaker 1: of the destroyer transports are relatively obscure. The first mention
19:33
Speaker 1: of them came in the First Marine Brigades After Action
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Speaker 1: Report on Fleet Landing Exercise three FLEX.
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Speaker 2: Three.
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Speaker 1: Brigadier General James J. Mead suggested in that February nineteen
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Speaker 1: thirty seven document that destroyers might solve the dual problem
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Speaker 1: of a shortage of amphibious transports and fire support. With
19:52
Speaker 1: such ships, troops could move quickly close into shore and
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Speaker 1: disembark under protection of the ship's guns. Viv He apparently
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Speaker 1: agreed and decided to experiment with one of its flush
20:03
Speaker 1: deck four stack destroyers. It had built a large number
20:07
Speaker 1: of these during World War One, and most were now
20:10
Speaker 1: in mothballs. In November nineteen thirty eight, the Navy reclassified
20:15
Speaker 1: manly DD seventy four as a Miscellaneous Auxiliary AG twenty
20:20
Speaker 1: eight after a few weeks of hasty work in the
20:23
Speaker 1: New York Navy Yard. The ship served as a transport
20:26
Speaker 1: for marine units in the Caribbean. In the fall of
20:30
Speaker 1: nineteen thirty nine, Manly went back into the yards for
20:33
Speaker 1: a more extensive conversion. Workers removed all torpedo tubes, one gun,
20:38
Speaker 1: two boilers, and their stacks that created a hold amidships
20:43
Speaker 1: for cargo and troops. The Chief of Naval Operations made
20:47
Speaker 1: it a rush job so the ship would be available
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Speaker 1: for FLEX six and early nineteen forty. Company A, First Battalion,
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Speaker 1: fifth Marines was the first unit to use the revamped Manly.
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Speaker 1: It used rubber votes to execute its twenty three February
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Speaker 1: nineteen forty assault landing against Culebra in the Caribbean. Satisfied
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Speaker 1: by the utility of the destroyer transport, the Navy redesignated
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Speaker 1: Manly yet again, this time as the leadship of a
21:14
Speaker 1: new class APD one. The APD designation denoted a high
21:20
Speaker 1: speed transport. By the end of nineteen forty, the Navy
21:24
Speaker 1: yards had reactivated five of Manly's sister ships and converted
21:28
Speaker 1: them in the same fashion. In its haste, the Navy
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Speaker 1: had left out any semblance of amenities for MBARK Marines.
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Speaker 1: When Lieutenant Colonel Edson took his battalion on board the
21:39
Speaker 1: APD squadron in the summer of nineteen forty one. Each
21:43
Speaker 1: troop compartment was nothing more than an empty space, no ventilation,
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Speaker 1: no bunks, and just four wash basins for one hundred
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Speaker 1: and thirty men. It took a high level investigation launched
21:54
Speaker 1: by one marine's letter to his congressmen to get the
21:57
Speaker 1: billeting spaces upgraded. These original six APDs would be the
22:02
Speaker 1: only ones available until the Navy rushed to complete more
22:05
Speaker 1: in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. As the two Raider
22:09
Speaker 1: battalions moved out into the Pacific, so did the APDs.
22:14
Speaker 1: All six ships saw service in the Solomon's campaign, but
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Speaker 1: only Manly and Stringham ap D six survived. Japanese bomber
22:23
Speaker 1: Sank Colhoun ap D two on thirty August nineteen forty two,
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Speaker 1: just after it had transferred a company of the First
22:31
Speaker 1: Raiders from Tulagi to Guadalcanal, Enemy destroyer sank Gregory ap
22:37
Speaker 1: D three and Little APD four in the early morning
22:41
Speaker 1: hours of five September nineteen forty two, after the two
22:44
Speaker 1: transports had participated with the First Raiders in a reconnaissance
22:48
Speaker 1: of Tsavo Island, a torpedo bomber ended the existence of
22:53
Speaker 1: McKean ap D five on seventeen November nineteen forty three,
22:57
Speaker 1: as she ferried troops to Bogainville. Before the war was over,
23:02
Speaker 1: the Navy would convert another one hundred and thirty three
23:05
Speaker 1: destroyers and destroyer escorts to the transport role. End of
23:10
Speaker 1: chapter two, chapter three of From Macon to Bogainville Marine
23:20
Speaker 1: Raiders in the Pacific War by John T.
23:23
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
23:24
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Shaping the Raiders,
23:31
Speaker 1: the Raider Battalion soon received first priority in the Marine
23:35
Speaker 1: Corps on men in equipment. Edson and Carlson combed the
23:38
Speaker 1: ranks of their respective divisions and also siphoned off many
23:42
Speaker 1: of the best men pouring forth from the recruit depots.
23:46
Speaker 1: They had no difficulty attracting volunteers with the promise that
23:49
Speaker 1: they would be the first to fight the Japanese. Carlson's
23:53
Speaker 1: exactions were much greater than those required to fill out
23:56
Speaker 1: Edson's battalion, but both generated resentment from fellow officers struggling
24:01
Speaker 1: to flesh out the rapidly expanding divisions on a meager
24:04
Speaker 1: skeleton of experienced men. The Raiders also had Carte blanche
24:09
Speaker 1: to obtain any equipment they deemed necessary, whether or not
24:12
Speaker 1: it was standard issue anywhere.
24:14
Speaker 2: Else in the corps.
24:15
Speaker 1: Carlson and Roosevelt soon broke the shackles that Holkom had
24:18
Speaker 1: attempted to impose on them. They rejected most of the
24:22
Speaker 1: men whom Edson sent them, and they adjusted the organization
24:26
Speaker 1: of their battalion to suit their purposes. They also inculcated
24:30
Speaker 1: the unit with an unconventional military philosophy that was an
24:34
Speaker 1: admixture of Chinese culture, communist egalitarianism, and New England town
24:39
Speaker 1: hall democracy. Every man would have the right to say
24:43
Speaker 1: what he thought, and their battle cry would be Gung
24:46
Speaker 1: Ho Chinese for work together. Officers would have no greater
24:51
Speaker 1: privileges than the men, and would lead by consensus rather
24:54
Speaker 1: than rank. There also would be ethical indoctrination, which Carlson
24:59
Speaker 1: disc described as giving conviction through persuasion. That process supposedly
25:05
Speaker 1: ensured that each man knew what he was fighting for
25:08
Speaker 1: and why. The Second Raiders set up their pup tents
25:11
Speaker 1: at Jacques's farm in the hills of Camp Elliot, where
25:14
Speaker 1: they remained largely segregated from civilization. Carlson rarely granted liberty
25:21
Speaker 1: and sometimes held musters in the middle of the night
25:23
Speaker 1: to catch anyone who had slipped away for an evening
25:26
Speaker 1: on the town. He even tried to convince men to
25:29
Speaker 1: forego leave for family emergencies, though he did not altogether
25:33
Speaker 1: prohibit it. Training focused heavily on weapons practice, hand to
25:37
Speaker 1: hand fighting, demolitions, and physical conditioning to include an emphasis
25:42
Speaker 1: on long hikes. As the men grew tougher and acquired
25:46
Speaker 1: field skills, the focus shifted to more night work. Carlson
25:50
Speaker 1: also implemented an important change to the raider organization promulgated
25:54
Speaker 1: from Washington. Instead of a unitary eight man squad, he
25:59
Speaker 1: created we had a ten man unit composed of a
26:01
Speaker 1: squad leader and three fire teams of three men each.
26:05
Speaker 1: Each fire team boasted a Thompson submachine gun, a Browning
26:09
Speaker 1: automatic rifle bar, and one of the new Garrin M
26:13
Speaker 1: one semi automatic rifles. To keep manpar within the constraints
26:17
Speaker 1: of the carrying capacity of an APD, each rifle company
26:21
Speaker 1: had just two rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. Carlson's
26:25
Speaker 1: system of organization and training was designed to create a
26:29
Speaker 1: four suited for infiltration and the attainment of objectives by
26:33
Speaker 1: unorthodox and unexpected methods. He and Roosevelt were developing the
26:38
Speaker 1: guerrilla unit they had envisioned. Edson's battalion retained the table
26:43
Speaker 1: of organization he had designed. It was based on an
26:47
Speaker 1: eight man squad with a leader, two barmen, four riflemen
26:51
Speaker 1: armed with the M nineteen oh three Springfield bolt operated rifle,
26:55
Speaker 1: and a sniper carrying a springfield mounting a telescopic site.
26:59
Speaker 1: Later in the world, where he would champion the four
27:01
Speaker 1: man fire team that became the standard for all marine infantry.
27:05
Speaker 1: With smaller squads, his companies contained three rifle platoons and
27:09
Speaker 1: a weapons platoon. His weapons company provided additional light machine
27:14
Speaker 1: guns and sixty millimeter mortars. The eighty one millimeter mortar platoon,
27:19
Speaker 1: added to the headquarters company by the commandant, would not
27:22
Speaker 1: deploy overseas with the battalion. Training was similar to that
27:27
Speaker 1: in the Second Raiders, except for more rubber boatwork due
27:30
Speaker 1: to the convenient location of Quantico on the Potomac River.
27:34
Speaker 1: The First Raiders also strove to reach a pace of
27:37
Speaker 1: seven miles per hour on hikes, more than twice the
27:40
Speaker 1: normal speed of infantry. They did so by alternating periods
27:44
Speaker 1: of double timing with fast walking. Although Red Mike emphasized
27:49
Speaker 1: light infantry tactics, his men were not guerrillas. Instead, they
27:54
Speaker 1: formed a highly trained battalion prepared for special operations as
27:58
Speaker 1: well as more conventional employement. Edson's style of leadership contrasted
28:03
Speaker 1: starkly with that of his counterpart. He encouraged initiative in
28:07
Speaker 1: his subordinates, but rank carried both responsibility and authority for
28:12
Speaker 1: decision making. He was a quiet man who impressed his
28:15
Speaker 1: troops with his ability on the march and on the
28:18
Speaker 1: firing ranges, not with speeches. His raiders received regular liberty,
28:24
Speaker 1: and he even organized battalion dances attended by bus loads
28:27
Speaker 1: of secretaries from nearby Washington. The two Raider battalions bore
28:32
Speaker 1: the same name, but they could hardly have been more dissimilar.
28:36
Speaker 1: What they did have in common was excellent training and
28:39
Speaker 1: a desire to excel in battle. Getting to the fight,
28:45
Speaker 1: it did not take long for the Raiders to move
28:47
Speaker 1: toward the sound.
28:48
Speaker 2: Of the guns.
28:50
Speaker 1: In early April nineteen forty two, the majority of the
28:53
Speaker 1: first Raiders boarded trains and headed for the West coast,
28:56
Speaker 1: where they embarked in the Zalin. They arrived in Samoa
29:00
Speaker 1: near the end of the month and joined the Marine
29:02
Speaker 1: Brigades Garrison. That outpost Company D, the eighty one millimeter
29:07
Speaker 1: Mortar Platoon, and a representative slice of the headquarters and
29:10
Speaker 1: weapons companies remained behind in Quantico. This rear echelon was
29:15
Speaker 1: under the command of Major Samuel B. Griffith, the Second,
29:19
Speaker 1: the battalion executive officer. He had recently joined the Raiders
29:22
Speaker 1: after spending several months in England observing the British commandos.
29:27
Speaker 1: This small force maintained some raider capability on the East
29:31
Speaker 1: Coast and also constituted a nucleus for a projected third
29:34
Speaker 1: Raider Battalion. The Second Raiders spent the month of April
29:38
Speaker 1: on board ship learning rubber boat techniques. The Navy had
29:42
Speaker 1: transferred three of its APDs to the West Coast, and
29:46
Speaker 1: Carlson's men used them to conduct practice landings on San
29:49
Speaker 1: Clemente Island. In May, the Second Raiders embarked and sailed
29:53
Speaker 1: for Hawaii, arriving at Pearl Harbor on seventeen May. Carlson's
29:58
Speaker 1: outfit hardly had a arrived in Hawaii when Admiral Chester W.
30:02
Speaker 1: Nimitz Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the
30:05
Speaker 1: Pacific Ocean Areas Sink Pack Sink POA ordered two companies
30:09
Speaker 1: of raiders to Midway to reinforce the garrison in preparation
30:13
Speaker 1: for an expected Japanese attack. They arrived on twenty five May.
30:18
Speaker 1: Company C took up defensive positions on Sand Island, while
30:22
Speaker 1: Company D moved to Eastern Island. Trained to fight a
30:26
Speaker 1: guerrilla campaign of stealth and infiltration, these raiders had to
30:29
Speaker 1: conduct a static defense of a small area. In the end,
30:34
Speaker 1: navy and marine aircraft turned back the invading force in
30:37
Speaker 1: one of the great naval victories of the war. Combat
30:41
Speaker 1: for the Marines on the ground consisted of a single
30:43
Speaker 1: large enemy air attack on the morning Offo June. Although
30:47
Speaker 1: the Japanese inflicted considerable damage on various installations, the raiders
30:52
Speaker 1: suffered no casualties. Not long after the battle, the two
30:56
Speaker 1: companies joined the rest of the battalion back in Hawaii.
31:01
Speaker 1: End of chapter three Chapter four of From Macon to
31:10
Speaker 1: Bogainville Marine Raiders in the Pacific War by John T.
31:14
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
31:15
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Macon during
31:22
Speaker 1: the summer of nineteen forty two, Admiral Nimitz decided to
31:25
Speaker 1: employ Carlson's battalion for its designated purpose. Planners selected Macon
31:31
Speaker 1: Atoll and the Gilbert Islands as the target. They made
31:35
Speaker 1: available two large mine lane submarines, the Nautilus and the Argonaut.
31:40
Speaker 1: Each one could carry a company of raiders. The force
31:44
Speaker 1: would make a pre dawn landing on Butari Tari Island,
31:47
Speaker 1: destroy the garrison estimated at forty five men, withdraw that evening,
31:52
Speaker 1: and land the next day on Little Macon Island. The
31:55
Speaker 1: scheduled d day was seventeen August, ten days after the
31:59
Speaker 1: first marine division in the first raiders assaulted the Lower Solomons.
32:03
Speaker 1: The objectives of the operation were diverse, to destroy installations,
32:08
Speaker 1: take prisoners, gain intelligence on the area, and divert Japanese
32:12
Speaker 1: attention and reinforcements from Guadalcanal into Logi. Companies A and
32:18
Speaker 1: B drew the mission and boarded the submarines on eight August.
32:22
Speaker 1: Once in the objective area, things began to go badly.
32:26
Speaker 1: The subsurfaced in heavy rain and high seas. Due to
32:30
Speaker 1: the poor conditions, Carlson altered his plan at the last minute.
32:35
Speaker 1: Instead of each company landing on widely separated beaches, they
32:39
Speaker 1: would go ashore together. Lieutenant Oscar F. Pete Ross, a
32:43
Speaker 1: platoon commander, did not get the word. He and the
32:47
Speaker 1: squad in his boat ended up landing alone in what
32:50
Speaker 1: became the enemy rear. The main body reached shore in
32:54
Speaker 1: some confusion due to engine malfunctions and weather. Then the
32:57
Speaker 1: accidental discharge of a weapon ruined any hope of surprise.
33:02
Speaker 1: First Lieutenant Merwin C. Plumley's Company A quickly crossed the
33:06
Speaker 1: narrow island and turned southwest toward the known enemy positions.
33:10
Speaker 1: Company B, commanded by Captain Ralph H. Koit, followed in
33:14
Speaker 1: trace as the reserve. Soon thereafter, the raiders were engaged
33:19
Speaker 1: in a firefight with the Japanese. Sergeant Clyde Thomasin died
33:23
Speaker 1: in this initial action while courageously exposing himself in order
33:27
Speaker 1: to direct the fire of his platoon. He later was
33:31
Speaker 1: awarded the Medal of Honor, the first enlisted Marines so
33:34
Speaker 1: decorated in World War II. The raiders made little headway
33:38
Speaker 1: against Japanese machine guns and snipers. Then the enemy launched
33:42
Speaker 1: two Bonzai attacks, each announced with a bugle call. Marine
33:47
Speaker 1: fire easily dispatched both groups of charging enemy soldiers. Unbeknownst
33:52
Speaker 1: to the Americans, they had nearly wiped out the Japanese
33:55
Speaker 1: garrison at that point in the battle. At eleven thirty two,
33:59
Speaker 1: enemy ears aircraft appeared over the island and scouted the
34:02
Speaker 1: scene of action. Carlson had trained his men to remain
34:06
Speaker 1: motionless and not fire at planes. With no troops in
34:10
Speaker 1: sight and no contact from their own ground force, the
34:13
Speaker 1: planes finally dropped their bombs, though none landed within marine lines.
34:18
Speaker 1: Two hours later, twelve planes arrived on the scene, several
34:21
Speaker 1: of them seaplanes. Two of the larger flying boats landed
34:26
Speaker 1: in the lagoon. Raider machine guns and boys anti tank
34:30
Speaker 1: rifles fired at them. One burst into flame and the
34:34
Speaker 1: other crashed on takeoff after receiving numerous hits. The remaining
34:38
Speaker 1: aircraft bombed and straighted the island for an hour, again
34:42
Speaker 1: with most of the ordinates hitting enemy occupied territory. Another
34:46
Speaker 1: air attack came late in the afternoon. The natives on
34:50
Speaker 1: the island willingly assisted the Americans throughout the day. They
34:54
Speaker 1: carried ammunition and provided intelligence. The latter reports suggested that
35:00
Speaker 1: that enemy reinforcements had come ashore from the seaplanes and
35:03
Speaker 1: from two small ships in the lagoon. The submarines later
35:06
Speaker 1: took the boats under indirect fire with their deck guns
35:09
Speaker 1: and miraculously sunk both. Based on this information, Carlson was
35:14
Speaker 1: certain there was still a sizeable force on the island.
35:18
Speaker 1: At seventeen hundred, he called several individuals together and contemplated
35:21
Speaker 1: his options. Roosevelt and the battalion operations officer argued for
35:26
Speaker 1: a withdrawal, as planned in preparation for the next day's
35:29
Speaker 1: landing on Little Macon. Concerned that he might become too
35:33
Speaker 1: heavily engaged if he tried to advance, Carlson decided to
35:37
Speaker 1: follow their recommendation. This part of the operation went smoothly
35:41
Speaker 1: for a time.
35:43
Speaker 2: The force broke.
35:44
Speaker 1: Contact and good order, and a group of twenty men
35:46
Speaker 1: covered the rest of the raiders as they readied their
35:49
Speaker 1: rubber boats and shoved off. Carlson, however, forgot about the
35:53
Speaker 1: covering force and thought his craft contained the last men
35:56
Speaker 1: on the island when it entered the water at nineteen thirty.
36:00
Speaker 1: Disaster then struck in the form of heavy surf. The
36:04
Speaker 1: outboard engines did not work, and the men soon grew
36:07
Speaker 1: exhausted trying to paddle against the breakers boats capsized and
36:12
Speaker 1: equipment disappeared. After a repeated attempts, several boat loads made
36:16
Speaker 1: it to the rendezvous with the submarines, but Carlson and
36:19
Speaker 1: one hundred twenty men ended up stranded on the shore.
36:23
Speaker 1: Only the covering force and a handful of others had weapons.
36:27
Speaker 1: In the middle of the night, a small Japanese patrol
36:30
Speaker 1: approached the perimeter. They wounded a century, but not before
36:34
Speaker 1: he killed three of them. With the enemy apparently still
36:38
Speaker 1: full of fight and his raiders disorganized and weakened, Carlson
36:41
Speaker 1: called another council of war. Without much input from the others,
36:46
Speaker 1: he decided to surrender. His stated reasons were concerned for
36:50
Speaker 1: the wounded and for the possible fate of the president's son,
36:53
Speaker 1: who was not present at the meeting. At zero three thirty,
36:57
Speaker 1: Carlson sent his operations officer and another marine out to
37:01
Speaker 1: contact the enemy. They found one Japanese soldier and eventually
37:05
Speaker 1: succeeded in giving him a note offering surrender. Carlson also
37:10
Speaker 1: authorized every man to fend for himself. Those who wished
37:13
Speaker 1: could make another attempt to reach the submarines. By the
37:17
Speaker 1: next morning, several more boatloads made it through the surf,
37:20
Speaker 1: including one with Major Roosevelt.
37:23
Speaker 2: In the meantime, a.
37:24
Speaker 1: Few exploring raiders killed several Japanese, one of them probably
37:28
Speaker 1: the man with the surrender note. With dawn, the situation
37:32
Speaker 1: appeared dramatically better. The two man surrender party reported that
37:36
Speaker 1: there appeared to be no organized enemy force left on
37:39
Speaker 1: the island. There were about seventy raiders still ashore, and
37:43
Speaker 1: the able bodied armed themselves with weapons lying about the battlefield.
37:48
Speaker 1: Carlson organized patrols to search for food in the enemy.
37:52
Speaker 1: They killed two more Japanese soldiers and confirmed the lack
37:55
Speaker 1: of opposition. The raider commander himself led a patrol to
37:59
Speaker 1: survey the scene and carry out the demolition of military
38:02
Speaker 1: stores and installations. He counted eighty three dead Japanese and
38:07
Speaker 1: fourteen of his own killed in action. Based on native reports,
38:11
Speaker 1: Carlson thought his force had accounted for more than one
38:14
Speaker 1: hundred and sixty Japanese. Enemy aircraft made four separate attacks
38:19
Speaker 1: during the day, but they inflicted no losses on the
38:21
Speaker 1: raider force ashore. The Marines contacted the submarines during the
38:26
Speaker 1: day and arranged an evening rendezvous off the entrance to
38:29
Speaker 1: the lagoon, where there was no serf to hinder an evacuation.
38:34
Speaker 1: The men hauled four rubber boats across the island and
38:37
Speaker 1: arranged for the use of a native outrigger. By twenty
38:41
Speaker 1: three hundred, the remainder of the landing force was back
38:44
Speaker 1: on board the Nautilus and Argonaut. Since the entire withdrawal
38:48
Speaker 1: had been so disorganized, the two companies were intermingled on
38:51
Speaker 1: the submarines, and it was not until they returned to
38:54
Speaker 1: Pearl Harbor that they could make an accurate accounting of
38:56
Speaker 1: their losses. The official tally was eighteen dead and twelve missing.
39:02
Speaker 1: Only after the war would the Marine Corps discover that
39:05
Speaker 1: nine of the missing raiders had been left alive on
39:07
Speaker 1: the island. These men had become separated from the main
39:11
Speaker 1: body at one point or another during the operation. With
39:15
Speaker 1: the assistance of the natives, the group evaded capture for
39:18
Speaker 1: a time, but finally surrendered on thirty August. A few
39:23
Speaker 1: weeks later, the Japanese beheaded them on the island of Quadulin.
39:27
Speaker 1: The raid itself had mixed results. Reports painted it as
39:31
Speaker 1: a great victory and a boosted morale on the home front.
39:35
Speaker 1: Many believed it achieved its original goal of diverting forces
39:38
Speaker 1: from Guadalcanal, but the Japanese had immediately guessed the size
39:43
Speaker 1: and purpose of the operation and had not let it
39:45
Speaker 1: alter their plans for the Solomons. However, it did cause
39:50
Speaker 1: the enemy to worry about the potential for other such
39:52
Speaker 1: raids on rear area installations. On the negative side, that
39:57
Speaker 1: threat may have played a part in the subsequent Japanese
40:00
Speaker 1: decision to fortify heavily places like Tarawa Atoll, the scene
40:05
Speaker 1: of a costly, amphibious assault later in the war. At
40:08
Speaker 1: the tactical level, the second Raiders had proven themselves in
40:12
Speaker 1: direct combat with the enemy. Their greatest difficulties had involved
40:16
Speaker 1: rough season, poor equipment. Bravery could not fix those limitations.
40:22
Speaker 1: Despite the trumpeted success of the operation, the Navy never
40:25
Speaker 1: again attempted to use submarines to conduct raids behind enemy lines.
40:30
Speaker 1: Carlson received the Navy Cross for his efforts on making
40:34
Speaker 1: and the public accorded him hero status. A few of
40:37
Speaker 1: those who served with him were not equally pleased with
40:40
Speaker 1: his performance. No one questioned his demonstrated bravery under fire,
40:45
Speaker 1: but some junior officers were critical of his leadership, especially
40:49
Speaker 1: the attempt to surrender to a non existent enemy. Carlson
40:53
Speaker 1: himself later noted that he had reached a spiritual low
40:57
Speaker 1: on the night of the seventeenth. Again, on the evening
41:00
Speaker 1: of the eighteenth, the battalion commander contemplated remaining on the
41:04
Speaker 1: island to organize the natives for resistance, while others supervised
41:09
Speaker 1: the withdrawal of his unit. Those who criticized him thought
41:13
Speaker 1: he had lost his aggressiveness and ability to think clearly
41:16
Speaker 1: when the chips were down, but he and his raiders
41:19
Speaker 1: would have another crack at the enemy in the not
41:21
Speaker 1: too distant future. End of chapter four chapter five of
41:33
Speaker 1: From Macon to Bogainville Marine Raiders in the Pacific War
41:37
Speaker 1: by John T.
41:38
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
41:39
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. To Lagi,
41:46
Speaker 1: the making operation had not been Nimitz's first choice for
41:49
Speaker 1: an amphibious raid. In late May, he had proposed an
41:53
Speaker 1: attack by the first Raiders against the Japanese seaplane base
41:56
Speaker 1: on Tulagi in the Lower Solomon Islands. The target was
42:01
Speaker 1: in the Southwest Pacific area, however, and General Douglas MacArthur
42:05
Speaker 1: opposed the plan, but Tulagi remained a significant threat to
42:09
Speaker 1: the maritime lifeline to Australia after the Midway victory opened
42:14
Speaker 1: the door for a more offensive Allied posture. The Japanese
42:17
Speaker 1: advanced positions in the Solomons became a priority objective. In
42:22
Speaker 1: late June, the Joint chiefs of Staff shifted that region
42:25
Speaker 1: from MacArthur's command to Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Area's Command and
42:29
Speaker 1: ordered the seizure of Tulagi. The Americans soon discovered that
42:34
Speaker 1: the Japanese were building an airfield on nearby Guadalcanal, and
42:37
Speaker 1: that became the primary target for Operation watch Tower. The
42:42
Speaker 1: first Marine Division, with the first Raider Battalion attached, received
42:46
Speaker 1: the assignment in answer to Edson's repeated requests. The rear
42:51
Speaker 1: echelons of his battalion, lest the eighty one millimeter mortar Platoon,
42:55
Speaker 1: finally joined up with him on three July and Samoa.
42:59
Speaker 1: The entire unit then moved on to New Caledonia. The
43:03
Speaker 1: first Raiders received definitive word on Watchtower on twenty July.
43:08
Speaker 1: They would seize Tulagi with the second Battalion, Fifth Marines
43:12
Speaker 1: in support. The first Parachute Battalion would take the conjoined
43:16
Speaker 1: islets of Gavutu Tanambogo. The first Marine division less one
43:21
Speaker 1: regiment in reserve would capture the incomplete airfield on Guadalcanal.
43:26
Speaker 1: Edson offered to make amphibious reconnaissance patrols of the objective,
43:30
Speaker 1: but the naval commander rejected that idea. Most of the
43:34
Speaker 1: information on Tulagi would come from three Australians, all former
43:38
Speaker 1: colonial officials familiar with the area. Tulagi was four thousand
43:43
Speaker 1: yards long and no more than one thousand yards wide,
43:46
Speaker 1: and a high ridge ran along its length except for
43:49
Speaker 1: a low, open saddle near the southeast end. The only
43:53
Speaker 1: suitable landing beaches from a hydrographic standpoint were those on
43:57
Speaker 1: either side of this low ground, since corals fringe the
44:01
Speaker 1: rest of the island. Intelligence officers estimated that the island
44:05
Speaker 1: held several hundred men of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Force.
44:09
Speaker 1: These were elite troops of proven fighting ability. Aerial reconnaissance
44:14
Speaker 1: indicated they were dug in to defend the obvious landing sites.
44:19
Speaker 1: Planners thus chose to make the assault halfway up the
44:22
Speaker 1: western coast, at a place designated as Beach Blue. They
44:26
Speaker 1: wisely decided to make the first American amphibious assault of
44:29
Speaker 1: the war against natural obstacles.
44:32
Speaker 2: Not enemy gunfire.
44:34
Speaker 1: The Raiders sailed from New Caledonia on twenty three July
44:37
Speaker 1: and joined up with the main task force for rehearsals
44:40
Speaker 1: on kro Island and the Fijis. These went poorly since
44:44
Speaker 1: the navy boat crews and most of the first Marine
44:46
Speaker 1: Division were too green.
44:49
Speaker 2: On the morning of.
44:50
Speaker 1: Seven August, the task force hove to and commenced unloading
44:53
Speaker 1: in what would become known as Iron Bottom Sound. Although
44:58
Speaker 1: Edson's men had trained hard on their rubb boats, they
45:00
Speaker 1: would make this landing from Higgins boats. After a preliminary
45:05
Speaker 1: bombardment by a cruiser and destroyer, the first wave, composed
45:09
Speaker 1: of Companies B and D headed for shore. Coral forced
45:13
Speaker 1: them to debark and weigh the last one hundred yards,
45:16
Speaker 1: but there was no enemy opposition. Companies A and C
45:20
Speaker 1: quickly followed them. The four rifle companies spread out across
45:24
Speaker 1: the waste of the island and then advanced in line
45:27
Speaker 1: to the southeast. They met only occasional sniper fire until
45:31
Speaker 1: they reached Phase Line A at the end of the ridge,
45:34
Speaker 1: where they halted as planned while naval guns fired an
45:37
Speaker 1: additional preparation on the enemy defenses. The attack jumped off
45:42
Speaker 1: again just before noon and promptly ran into heavy Japanese resistance.
45:47
Speaker 1: For the remainder of the day, the raiders fought to
45:49
Speaker 1: gain control of the saddle from the entrenched enemy, who
45:52
Speaker 1: would not surrender under any circumstances. The Marines quickly discovered
45:57
Speaker 1: that their only recourse was to employ explain Josephs to
46:00
Speaker 1: destroy the men occupying the caves and bunkers. As evening approached,
46:05
Speaker 1: the battalions settled into defensive lines that circled the small
46:09
Speaker 1: Ridge Hill two eighty one on the tip of the island.
46:13
Speaker 1: The second Battalion, fifth Marines had already scoured the remainder
46:16
Speaker 1: of the island and now took up positions in the
46:19
Speaker 1: rear of the raiders. The Japanese launched their classic Banzai
46:23
Speaker 1: counter attack at twenty two hundred that night. The initial
46:27
Speaker 1: effort punched a small hole in the raidar lines between
46:30
Speaker 1: Companies A and C. A second assault, which might have
46:34
Speaker 1: exploited this gap, instead struck full against Company a's front.
46:39
Speaker 1: This time, the Raiders held their ground for the remainder
46:42
Speaker 1: of the night. The Japanese relied on infiltration tactics, with
46:46
Speaker 1: individuals and small groups trying to make their way into
46:49
Speaker 1: the American rear by stealth. By this means, they attacked
46:53
Speaker 1: both the Second Battalion's Command Post CP and the aid
46:56
Speaker 1: station set up near Blue Beach. Came within fifty yards
47:01
Speaker 1: of the raider CP. Edson tried to call for reinforcements,
47:05
Speaker 1: but communications were out. In the morning, things looked much better,
47:10
Speaker 1: just as they had on making. At zero nine hundred,
47:14
Speaker 1: two companies of the fifth Marines passed through raider lines
47:16
Speaker 1: and swept over the southern portions of Hill to eighty one.
47:20
Speaker 1: The remaining enemy were now isolated in a ravine in
47:23
Speaker 1: the midst of the small ridge. After a lengthy barrage
47:27
Speaker 1: by the sixty millimeter mortars of Company E and their
47:30
Speaker 1: heavier eighty one millimeter cousins of the Rifle Battalion, infantrymen
47:35
Speaker 1: from both outfits moved through the final enemy. Pocket grenades
47:39
Speaker 1: and dynamite were the weapons of choice against the Japanese
47:42
Speaker 1: still hold up in their caves and dugouts. At fifteen hundred,
47:46
Speaker 1: Edson declared the island secured. That did not mean the
47:50
Speaker 1: fighting was entirely over. For the next few days, Marines
47:54
Speaker 1: scoured the island by day and fended off occasional infiltrators
47:58
Speaker 1: at night until they had killed off the last enemy soldier.
48:02
Speaker 1: In the entire battle, the raiders suffered losses of thirty
48:05
Speaker 1: eight dead and fifty five wounded. There were an additional
48:09
Speaker 1: thirty three casualties among other marine units on the island.
48:13
Speaker 1: All but three of the three hundred and fifty Japanese
48:15
Speaker 1: defenders had died. On the night of eight August, a
48:19
Speaker 1: Japanese surface force arrived from Reball and surprised the Allied
48:23
Speaker 1: naval forces guarding the transports. In a brief engagement, the
48:27
Speaker 1: enemy sank four cruisers and a destroyer, damaged to other ships,
48:31
Speaker 1: and killed twelve hundred sailors, all at minimal cost to themselves.
48:36
Speaker 1: The American naval commander had little choice the next morning
48:39
Speaker 1: but to order the early withdrawal of his force. Most
48:43
Speaker 1: of the transports would depart that afternoon with their cargo
48:46
Speaker 1: holds still half full. The raiders were in a particularly
48:50
Speaker 1: bad way. They had come ashore with little food because
48:53
Speaker 1: the plan called for their immediate withdrawal after.
48:55
Speaker 2: Seizing the island.
48:57
Speaker 1: Moreover, since they had not cleared the enemy from the
49:00
Speaker 1: only usable beaches until d plus one, there had been
49:03
Speaker 1: little time to unload anything. The result would be short
49:07
Speaker 1: rations for some time to come. The First Raiders performed
49:11
Speaker 1: well in their initial exposure to combat. Like their compatriots
49:15
Speaker 1: and the Second Raiders, they were both brave and daring.
49:19
Speaker 1: Major Kenneth D. Bailey demonstrated the type of leadership that
49:23
Speaker 1: was common to both units. When an enemy machine gun
49:26
Speaker 1: held up the advance of his company on d Day,
49:29
Speaker 1: he personally circled around the bunker, crawled on top, and
49:33
Speaker 1: pushed a grenade into the firing port. In the process,
49:36
Speaker 1: he received a gunshot wound in the thigh. Edson established
49:40
Speaker 1: his reputation for fearlessness by spending most of his time
49:43
Speaker 1: in the front lines, where he contemptuously stood up in
49:47
Speaker 1: the face.
49:47
Speaker 2: Of enemy fire.
49:49
Speaker 1: More important, he aggressively employed his force in battle, while
49:53
Speaker 1: many other senior commanders had grown timid after years of
49:56
Speaker 1: peacetime service. Major General Alexander A. Van Ergriff, commander of
50:01
Speaker 1: the first Marine Division, soon wrote Commandant Holcomb that Edson
50:05
Speaker 1: is one of the finest troop leaders I ever saw. Tasimboco.
50:12
Speaker 1: As August progressed, the Japanese moved a steady stream of
50:15
Speaker 1: reinforcements to Guadalcanal in nightly runs by destroyers and barges,
50:19
Speaker 1: a process soon dubbed the Tokyo Express. The Marines repulsed
50:24
Speaker 1: the first enemy attack at the Tenaru River on twenty
50:27
Speaker 1: one August, but vandergriff knew that he would need all
50:30
Speaker 1: the strength he could muster to defend the extended perimeter
50:34
Speaker 1: surrounding the airfield. At the end of the month, he
50:37
Speaker 1: brought the raiders and parachutists across the sound and placed
50:40
Speaker 1: them in reserve near Lunga Point. The latter battalion had
50:44
Speaker 1: suffered heavily in its assault of Gavutu Tanembago, to include
50:48
Speaker 1: the loss of its commander, so vandergriff attached the parachutist
50:52
Speaker 1: to Red Mike's force. Edson quickly established a rapport with
50:56
Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas, the division operations officer, and convinced him
51:01
Speaker 1: to use the raiders offensively. The first product of this
51:04
Speaker 1: effort was a two company patrol on four September to
51:07
Speaker 1: Tsavo Island, where intelligence believed the enemy had an observation post.
51:13
Speaker 1: While Griffith commanded that operation, Red Mike planned a reconnaissance
51:17
Speaker 1: in force against Cape Esperance for the next day when
51:21
Speaker 1: the Tsavo patrol returned in the late afternoon on Little
51:24
Speaker 1: APD four and Gregory APD three. The men began debarking
51:29
Speaker 1: before they received the order to remain on board in
51:32
Speaker 1: preparation for the next mission. Once he became aware of
51:35
Speaker 1: the mix up, Edson let the offload process proceed to completion.
51:40
Speaker 1: That night, Japanese destroyers of the Tokyo Express sank the
51:44
Speaker 1: two APDs. It was the second close escape for the
51:48
Speaker 1: raiders during the shift of Guadalcanal. Enemy planes had sunk
51:53
Speaker 1: the Kolhoun APD two just after it had unloaded a company.
51:58
Speaker 1: Marine attention soon shifted from Cape esperance as it became
52:01
Speaker 1: evident that the primary terminus of the Tokyo Express was
52:05
Speaker 1: the village of Tassimboko. On six September, Edson and Thomas
52:09
Speaker 1: won permission from Vandergrift to raid the area on the
52:12
Speaker 1: eighth after the loss of three of their APDs. Shipping
52:16
Speaker 1: was at a premium, so the raiders boarded the McKean
52:20
Speaker 1: APD five, Manly APD one, and two converted Tuna boats
52:25
Speaker 1: for the operation. The raider rifle companies would comprise the
52:29
Speaker 1: first achelon the ships then would shuttle back to the
52:32
Speaker 1: Lunga for the weapons company and the parachutists. Native scouts
52:37
Speaker 1: reported there were several thousand Japanese in the area, but
52:40
Speaker 1: division planners discounted that figure. However, Edson did rely on
52:45
Speaker 1: their reports that the enemy defenses faced west toward marine lines.
52:50
Speaker 1: He decided to land beyond the village at Tayview Point
52:53
Speaker 1: and then advance overland to take the target from the rear.
52:57
Speaker 1: When the raiders went ashore just prior to on eight September,
53:01
Speaker 1: they quickly realized the scouting reports had been accurate. As
53:05
Speaker 1: they moved along the coast toward Tassimboco, they discovered more
53:09
Speaker 1: than a thousand life preservers placed in neat rows, a
53:12
Speaker 1: large number of fox holes, and even several unattended thirty
53:15
Speaker 1: seven millimeter anti tank guns. In the previous days, Major
53:20
Speaker 1: General Kiyataki Kawaguchi had landed an entire brigade at Tassimboko,
53:25
Speaker 1: but it was then advancing inland. Only a rearguard of
53:29
Speaker 1: about three hundred men secured the village and the Japanese
53:32
Speaker 1: supply dumps located there, though this force was nearly as
53:35
Speaker 1: big as the raider first echelon. The marine soon ran
53:38
Speaker 1: into stubborn resistance, to include seventy five millimeters artillery pieces
53:43
Speaker 1: firing point blank down the coastal road and the orderly
53:46
Speaker 1: rows of a coconut plantation. While Edson fixed the attention
53:51
Speaker 1: of the defenders with two companies, he sent Griffith and
53:54
Speaker 1: company a y to the left flank, concerned that he
53:58
Speaker 1: might be facing the enemy. Main Red Mic radio a
54:01
Speaker 1: plea for a supplemental landing to the west of Tasimboco.
54:05
Speaker 1: The last part of the message indicated there was trouble
54:08
Speaker 1: if not request instructions regarding my embarkation. Forty five minutes later,
54:14
Speaker 1: Edson again asked for fresh troops and for more air support.
54:18
Speaker 1: Division responded the same way each time, the raiders were
54:21
Speaker 1: to break off the action and withdraw. Red Mike ignored
54:25
Speaker 1: that order and continued the attack. Not long afterwards, enemy
54:30
Speaker 1: resistance melted away, and both wings of the raider force
54:33
Speaker 1: entered the village around noon. The area was stockpiled with
54:37
Speaker 1: large quantities of food, ammunition, and weapons ranging up to
54:41
Speaker 1: seventy five millimeters artillery pieces. Vandergriff radioed a well done
54:47
Speaker 1: and repeated his order to withdraw, yet again. The raider
54:51
Speaker 1: commander chose to stay put for the time being, and
54:53
Speaker 1: his men set about destroying as much of the cash
54:56
Speaker 1: as they could. Troops wrecked a powerful radio station, bayoneted
55:01
Speaker 1: cans of food, tore open bags of rice and urinated
55:04
Speaker 1: on the contents or spilled them on the ground, tied
55:07
Speaker 1: guns to landing boats and towed them into deep water,
55:10
Speaker 1: and then finally put the torch to everything that was left.
55:14
Speaker 1: They also gathered all available documents. As the sun went down,
55:19
Speaker 1: the men re embarked and headed for the perimeter, many
55:22
Speaker 1: of them a little bit heavier with liberated chow, cigarettes
55:25
Speaker 1: and alcohol. The raid was a minor tactical victory in
55:29
Speaker 1: terms of actual fighting. The Marines counted twenty seven enemy
55:33
Speaker 1: bodies and estimated they had killed fifty. Their own losses
55:37
Speaker 1: were two dead and six wounded. But the battle had
55:41
Speaker 1: important repercussions. The raiders had put a serious dent in
55:45
Speaker 1: Japanese logistics, fire support, and communications. The intelligence gathered had
55:51
Speaker 1: more far reaching consequences, since it revealed many of the
55:54
Speaker 1: details of the coming Japanese offensive. Finally, the setback hurt
55:59
Speaker 1: the enemy morale and further boosted.
56:01
Speaker 2: That of the raiders.
56:03
Speaker 1: They had defeated the Japanese yet again and were literally
56:06
Speaker 1: feasting on the fruits of their victory.
56:10
Speaker 2: End of chapter five.
56:17
Speaker 1: Chapter six of From Macon to Bogainville Marine Raiders in
56:21
Speaker 1: the Pacific War by John T.
56:23
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
56:23
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Edson's Ridge
56:31
Speaker 1: The next day, Red Mike discussed the situation with division planners.
56:36
Speaker 1: Intelligence officers translating the captured documents confirmed that three thousand
56:40
Speaker 1: Japanese were cutting their way through the jungle southwest of Tassimboko.
56:45
Speaker 1: Edson was convinced that they planned to attack the currently
56:48
Speaker 1: unguarded southern portion of the perimeter. From an aerial photograph,
56:52
Speaker 1: he picked out a grass covered ridge that pointed like
56:55
Speaker 1: a knife at the airfield. His hunch was based on
56:59
Speaker 1: his own experience in jungle fighting and with the Japanese.
57:03
Speaker 1: He knew they liked to attack at night, and that
57:05
Speaker 1: was also the only time they could get fire support
57:08
Speaker 1: from the sea, and a night attack in the jungle
57:11
Speaker 1: only had a chance if it moved along a well
57:14
Speaker 1: defined avenue of approach. The ridge was the obvious choice.
57:18
Speaker 1: Thomas agreed, Vandergriff did not, but they convinced the general
57:23
Speaker 1: to let the raiders and parachutists shift their bivouac to
57:27
Speaker 1: the ridge in order to get out of the pattern
57:29
Speaker 1: of bombs falling around the airfield. The men moved to
57:32
Speaker 1: the new location on ten September. Contrary to their hopes,
57:37
Speaker 1: it was not a rest zone. Japanese planes bombed the
57:41
Speaker 1: ridge on the eleventh and twelfth. Native scouts brought reports
57:45
Speaker 1: of the approaching enemy column, and raider patrol soon made
57:48
Speaker 1: contact with the advanced elements of the force. The Marines
57:52
Speaker 1: worked to improve their position under severe handicaps. There was
57:56
Speaker 1: very little barbed wire and no sandbags or engineering to US.
58:01
Speaker 1: Troops on the ridge itself could not dig far before
58:04
Speaker 1: striking coral. Those on either flank were hampered by thick
58:07
Speaker 1: jungle that would conceal the movement of the enemy. Casualties
58:11
Speaker 1: had thin ranks, while illness and a lack of good
58:14
Speaker 1: food had sapped the strength of those still on the lines.
58:18
Speaker 1: Edson and Thomas did the best they could with the
58:20
Speaker 1: resources available. Red Mike used the spine of the ridge
58:24
Speaker 1: as the dividing point between his two rump battalions. One
58:29
Speaker 1: company of parachutists held the left of his line. With
58:32
Speaker 1: the rest of their comrades echelon to the rear to
58:34
Speaker 1: protect that flank. Two companies of raiders occupied the right,
58:39
Speaker 1: With that flank anchored on the Lunger River. The lagoon
58:43
Speaker 1: separated the two raider units. Edson attached the machine guns
58:47
Speaker 1: to the forward companies and kept the remaining raiders in reserve.
58:51
Speaker 1: Company D was no larger than a platoon now, since
58:54
Speaker 1: Red Mike had used much of its manpower to fill
58:56
Speaker 1: holes in the other three rifle companies. He set up
59:00
Speaker 1: his forward command post on Hill one twenty, just a
59:03
Speaker 1: few hundred yards behind the front lines. Thomas placed the
59:07
Speaker 1: second Battalion, fifth Marines in reserve between the ridge and
59:10
Speaker 1: the airfield Artillery. Forward observers joined Edson and registered the howitzers.
59:16
Speaker 1: The Marines were as ready as they could be, but
59:19
Speaker 1: the selection of the ridge as the heart of the
59:21
Speaker 1: defense was a gamble. To the west of the Lunga
59:24
Speaker 1: there were only a few strong points occupied by the
59:27
Speaker 1: men from the Pioneer and Amphibious Tractor battalions.
59:31
Speaker 2: To the east of.
59:31
Speaker 1: Red Mike's line, there was nothing but a mile of
59:34
Speaker 1: empty jungle. Kawaguchi was having his own problems in addition
59:39
Speaker 1: to the setback at Tassimboco, his troops were having a
59:42
Speaker 1: tough time cutting their way through the heavy jungle and
59:45
Speaker 1: toiling over the many ridges in their path. Some of
59:49
Speaker 1: his difficulties were self inflicted his decision to attack from
59:53
Speaker 1: the south that required him to leave his artillery and
59:56
Speaker 1: most of his supplies behind, since they could not be
59:59
Speaker 1: hauled over them rough jungle trail. Thus he would go
1:00:02
Speaker 1: into battle with little fire support and poor logistics. He
1:00:07
Speaker 1: then detailed one of his four battalions to make a
1:00:09
Speaker 1: diversionary attack along the Tenoru. This left him with just
1:00:13
Speaker 1: twenty five hundred men for the main assault. Finally, he
1:00:18
Speaker 1: had underestimated the time needed.
1:00:19
Speaker 2: To reach his objective.
1:00:22
Speaker 1: On the evening of twelve September, as the appointed hour
1:00:25
Speaker 1: of the attack approached, Kawaguchi realized that only one battalion
1:00:29
Speaker 1: had reached its assigned jump off point and no units
1:00:32
Speaker 1: had been able to reconnoiter the area of the ridge.
1:00:36
Speaker 1: He wanted to delay the attack, but communications failed and
1:00:39
Speaker 1: he could not pass the order behind schedule and without guides.
1:00:43
Speaker 1: The battalions hastily blundered forward, only to break up into
1:00:47
Speaker 1: small groups as the men fought their way through the
1:00:49
Speaker 1: tangled growth in total darkness. At twenty two hundred, a
1:00:53
Speaker 1: Japanese plane dropped a series of green flares over the
1:00:56
Speaker 1: marine perimeter. Then a cruiser and three just destroyers opened
1:01:00
Speaker 1: up on the ridge. For the next twenty minutes, they
1:01:04
Speaker 1: poured shells in that direction, though most rounds sailed over
1:01:07
Speaker 1: the high ground to land in the jungle beyond, some
1:01:10
Speaker 1: to explode among the Japanese infantry. When the bombardment ceased,
1:01:14
Speaker 1: Kawaguchi's units launched their own flares, and the first piecemeal
1:01:18
Speaker 1: attacks began. The initial assault concentrated in the low ground
1:01:22
Speaker 1: around the lagoon. This may have been an attempt to
1:01:25
Speaker 1: find the American flank, or the result of lack of
1:01:28
Speaker 1: familiarity with the terrain. In any case, the thick jungle
1:01:33
Speaker 1: offset the marine advantage in firepower, and the Japanese found
1:01:36
Speaker 1: plenty of room to infiltrate between platoon strong points. They
1:01:41
Speaker 1: soon isolated the three platoons of Company C, each of
1:01:44
Speaker 1: which subsequently made its way to the rear. The Marines
1:01:48
Speaker 1: on the ridge remained comparatively untouched. As daylight approached, the
1:01:53
Speaker 1: Japanese broke off the action, but retained possession of Company
1:01:56
Speaker 1: c's former positions. Kawaguchi's officers began the slow process of
1:02:02
Speaker 1: regrouping their units, now scattered over the jungle and totally disoriented.
1:02:07
Speaker 1: In the morning, Edson ordered a counter attack by his
1:02:10
Speaker 1: reserve companies. They made little headway against the more numerous Japanese,
1:02:14
Speaker 1: and Red Mike recalled them. Since he could not restore
1:02:18
Speaker 1: an unbroken front, he decided to withdraw the entire line
1:02:21
Speaker 1: to the reserve position. This had the added benefit of
1:02:25
Speaker 1: forcing the enemy to cross more open ground on the
1:02:28
Speaker 1: ridge before reaching marine fighting holes. In the late afternoon,
1:02:32
Speaker 1: the b companies of both raiders and parachuters pulled back
1:02:35
Speaker 1: and anchored themselves on the ridge midway between Hills eighty
1:02:38
Speaker 1: and one twenty. Thomas provided an engineer company, which Edson
1:02:43
Speaker 1: inserted on the right of the ridge. Company A of
1:02:46
Speaker 1: the raiders covered the remaining distance between the engineers and
1:02:49
Speaker 1: the LUNGA. The other two parachute companies withdrew slightly and
1:02:54
Speaker 1: bulked up the shoulder of the left flank. The remains
1:02:57
Speaker 1: of Company C and D assumed a new reserve position
1:03:00
Speaker 1: on the west slope of the ridge, just behind Hill
1:03:03
Speaker 1: one twenty redmec's command post stayed in its previous location.
1:03:09
Speaker 1: The Japanese made good use of the daylight hours and
1:03:11
Speaker 1: prepared for a fresh effort. This time, Kawaguchi would not
1:03:15
Speaker 1: make the mistake of getting bogged down in the jungle.
1:03:18
Speaker 1: He would follow the tactics Edson had originally expected and
1:03:21
Speaker 1: concentrate his attack on the open ground of the ridge.
1:03:25
Speaker 1: The new assault kicked off just after darkness fell. The
1:03:29
Speaker 1: initial blowstruck Company b's right flank near the lagoon. A
1:03:33
Speaker 1: mad rush of screaming soldiers drove the right half of
1:03:36
Speaker 1: the raider company out of position, and those men fell
1:03:39
Speaker 1: back to link up with Company C on the ridge. Inexplicably,
1:03:44
Speaker 1: Kawaguchi did not exploit the gap he had created. Possibly
1:03:48
Speaker 1: the maneuver had been a diversion to draw marine reserves
1:03:51
Speaker 1: off the ridge.
1:03:52
Speaker 2: And out of the way of the main effort.
1:03:54
Speaker 1: Edson had to decide quickly whether to plug the hole
1:03:57
Speaker 1: with his dwindling reserve or risk having the center of
1:03:59
Speaker 1: his line encircled by the next assault. The enemy soon
1:04:03
Speaker 1: provided the answer. By twenty one hundred Japanese soldiers were
1:04:08
Speaker 1: massing around the southern nose of the ridge, making their
1:04:11
Speaker 1: presence known with the usual barrage of noisy chants, they
1:04:15
Speaker 1: presumably were going to launch a frontal assault on the
1:04:18
Speaker 1: center of the marine line. Red Mike ordered Company C
1:04:22
Speaker 1: of the raiders and Company A of the parachutists to
1:04:25
Speaker 1: form a reserve line around the front and sides.
1:04:27
Speaker 2: Of Hill one twenty.
1:04:29
Speaker 1: Japanese mortar and machine gun fire swept the ridge. The
1:04:33
Speaker 1: Marines responded with artillery fire on suspected assembly areas. The
1:04:38
Speaker 1: assault waves finally searched forward at twenty two hundred. The
1:04:42
Speaker 1: attack on a front all across the ridge immediately unhinged
1:04:46
Speaker 1: the marine center. As Japanese swarmed toward the left flank
1:04:50
Speaker 1: of his Company B, Captain Harry L. Torgersen, the Parachute
1:04:54
Speaker 1: Battalion executive officer, ordered it to withdraw. The parachutists and co.
1:05:00
Speaker 1: Company C soon followed suit. Turguson gathered these two units
1:05:04
Speaker 1: in the rear of Company ACE position on Hill one twenty,
1:05:07
Speaker 1: where he attempted to reorganize them. The remaining Company B
1:05:12
Speaker 1: Raiders were now isolated in the center. The situation looked desperate.
1:05:17
Speaker 1: At this point. The Japanese seemed to take a breather.
1:05:20
Speaker 1: Heavy fire raked the ridge, but the enemy made no
1:05:23
Speaker 1: fresh assaults. Etson arranged for more artillery support and got
1:05:28
Speaker 1: his own force to provide covering fire for the withdrawal
1:05:31
Speaker 1: of the exposed raiders of Company B. For a time,
1:05:35
Speaker 1: it looked like the series of rearward movements would degenerate
1:05:38
Speaker 1: into a route. As a few men around Hill one
1:05:41
Speaker 1: twenty began to filter to the rear. Red Mike took
1:05:44
Speaker 1: immediate steps to avert disaster. From his CP, now just
1:05:49
Speaker 1: a dozen yards behind the front, He made it known
1:05:51
Speaker 1: that this was to be the final stand. The word
1:05:55
Speaker 1: went around nobody moves, just die in your holes or
1:06:00
Speaker 1: Bailey ranged up and down the line, raising his voice
1:06:03
Speaker 1: above the din and breathing fresh nerve into those on
1:06:05
Speaker 1: the verge of giving up. The commander of the Parachute
1:06:09
Speaker 1: Battalion broke down Edson, relieved him on the spot, and
1:06:12
Speaker 1: placed Torguson in charge. The new position was not very strong,
1:06:17
Speaker 1: just a small horseshoe bent around the hill, with men
1:06:20
Speaker 1: from several units intermingled on the bare slopes. Red Mike
1:06:25
Speaker 1: directed the artillery to maintain a continuous barrage close along
1:06:28
Speaker 1: his front. When the Japanese renewed their attack. Each fresh
1:06:33
Speaker 1: wave of Imperial soldiers boiled out of the jungle into
1:06:36
Speaker 1: a torrent of steel and lead. In addition to the
1:06:39
Speaker 1: firepower of artillery and automatic weapons, Men on the lines
1:06:43
Speaker 1: tossed grenade after grenade at whatever shapes or sounds they
1:06:47
Speaker 1: could discern. Supplies of ammunition dwindled rapidly. The division headquarters
1:06:52
Speaker 1: pushed forward cases of belted machine gun ammunition and grenades.
1:06:57
Speaker 1: One of the Japanese assaults, probably of voading. The concentrated
1:07:01
Speaker 1: fire sweeping the crest, pushed along the jungle edge at
1:07:04
Speaker 1: the bottom of the slope and threatened to envelop the
1:07:06
Speaker 1: left flank. Edson ordered Tourguson to launch a counter attack
1:07:11
Speaker 1: with his two reorganized parachute companies. These Marines advanced checked
1:07:16
Speaker 1: the enemy progress, and extended the line to prevent any recurrents.
1:07:21
Speaker 1: Red Mike later cited this effort as a decisive factor
1:07:24
Speaker 1: in our ultimate victory. At zero four hundred, Edson asked
1:07:28
Speaker 1: Thomas to commit the reserve battalion to bolster his depleted
1:07:32
Speaker 1: line a company at a time. The men of the
1:07:35
Speaker 1: second Battalion, fifth Marines filed along the top of the
1:07:38
Speaker 1: ridge and into place beside those who had survived.
1:07:41
Speaker 2: The long night.
1:07:43
Speaker 1: By that point, the Japanese were largely spent. Kawaguchi sent
1:07:47
Speaker 1: in two more attacks, but they were hit by artillery
1:07:50
Speaker 1: fire as the troops assembled and never presented much of
1:07:53
Speaker 1: a threat. A small band actually made it past the
1:07:56
Speaker 1: ridge and reached the vicinity of the airfield. The Marines,
1:07:59
Speaker 1: providing security there, dealt with them. The onset of daylight
1:08:03
Speaker 1: brought an end to any organized effort, though remnants of
1:08:06
Speaker 1: the Japanese assault units were scattered through the fringing jungle
1:08:10
Speaker 1: to the flanks and rear of the marine position. Squads
1:08:14
Speaker 1: began the long process of rooting out these snipers. Hetson
1:08:18
Speaker 1: also ordered up an air attack to strike the enemy
1:08:20
Speaker 1: units clinging to the southern edge of the ridge. A
1:08:24
Speaker 1: flight of the P four hundreds answered the call and
1:08:26
Speaker 1: straighted the exposed enemy groups. Kawaguchi admitted failure that afternoon
1:08:32
Speaker 1: and ordered his tattered brigade to retreat. The raiders and
1:08:36
Speaker 1: parachutists had already turned over the ridge to the other Marines.
1:08:39
Speaker 2: That morning.
1:08:41
Speaker 1: The first Raiders had lost one hundred thirty five men,
1:08:44
Speaker 1: the first parachute Battalion one hundred twenty eight of those
1:08:48
Speaker 1: fifty nine were dead or missing in action. Seven hundred
1:08:52
Speaker 1: Japanese bodies littered the battlefield, and few of Kawaguchi's five
1:08:56
Speaker 1: hundred wounded which survived the terrible trek back to the Cokeost.
1:09:01
Speaker 1: The battle was much more than a tremendous tactical victory
1:09:03
Speaker 1: for the Marines. Edson and his men had turned back
1:09:07
Speaker 1: one of the most serious threats that Japanese were to
1:09:09
Speaker 1: mount against Henderson Field. If the raiders and parachutists had failed,
1:09:14
Speaker 1: the landing strip would have fallen into enemy hands, and
1:09:17
Speaker 1: the lack of air cover probably would have led to
1:09:20
Speaker 1: the defeat of the first Marine Division and the loss
1:09:22
Speaker 1: of Guadalcanal. Such a reversal would have had a grave
1:09:26
Speaker 1: impact on the course of the war and the future
1:09:29
Speaker 1: of the Corps. Vandergriff wasted no time in recommending Edson
1:09:33
Speaker 1: and Bailey for Medals of Honor. Red Mike's citation noted
1:09:37
Speaker 1: his marked degree of cool, leadership and personal courage. At
1:09:42
Speaker 1: the height of the battle, with friendly artillery shells landing
1:09:45
Speaker 1: just seventy five yards to the front and enemy bullets
1:09:48
Speaker 1: and mortars sweeping the knoll, Edson had never taken cover.
1:09:52
Speaker 1: Standing in the shallow hole that passed for a CP
1:09:56
Speaker 1: he had calmly issued orders and served as an inspiration
1:09:59
Speaker 1: to all.
1:09:59
Speaker 2: Who saw him.
1:10:01
Speaker 1: War correspondents visiting the scene the day after the battle
1:10:04
Speaker 1: dubbed it Edson's Ridge.
1:10:08
Speaker 2: End of chapter six.
1:10:15
Speaker 1: Chapter seven of From Macon to Bogainville Marine Raiders in
1:10:19
Speaker 1: the Pacific War by John T.
1:10:21
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
1:10:22
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Motana Kaw,
1:10:29
Speaker 1: the depleted parachutists fifty five percent casualties in the campaign,
1:10:33
Speaker 1: left Guadalcanal on seventeen September on board the convoy that
1:10:38
Speaker 1: brought in the seventh Marines. The first raiders thirty three
1:10:42
Speaker 1: percent casualties, remained and received precious little rest. Just six
1:10:48
Speaker 1: days after the battle, Vandergriff ordered them to make a
1:10:51
Speaker 1: reconnaissance south of Edson's Ridge and destroy any Japanese stragglers.
1:10:56
Speaker 1: The raiders passed through their old position, now strongly defended
1:11:00
Speaker 1: by the seventh Marines, and followed the track of their
1:11:03
Speaker 1: beaten foe, a trail marked by abandoned weapons and bodies.
1:11:08
Speaker 1: Edson made liberal use of artillery and his crew serve
1:11:11
Speaker 1: weapons against the slightest sign of resistance at a cost
1:11:15
Speaker 1: of three wounded. The Raiders captured a single dismantled howitzer
1:11:19
Speaker 1: and killed nineteen enemy soldiers. The greatest point of danger
1:11:24
Speaker 1: in the operation turned out to be the return trip.
1:11:27
Speaker 1: As the battalion neared friendly lines, the jittery new arrivals
1:11:31
Speaker 1: of the seventh Marines opened fire on the Raiders. Luckily
1:11:35
Speaker 1: no one was hit. That same day, vandergriff shipped out
1:11:39
Speaker 1: several excess colonels and reorganized the senior ranks of the division.
1:11:44
Speaker 1: Edson took command of the fifth Marines and Griffith succeeded
1:11:48
Speaker 1: him as head of the First Raiders. Red Mike's departure
1:11:51
Speaker 1: did not take the Raider battalion out of the spotlight.
1:11:55
Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Louis B. Chesty Pohler's first Battalion, seventh Marines
1:12:00
Speaker 1: part of the perimeter on twenty three September with the
1:12:02
Speaker 1: mission of clearing enemy units from the vicinity of the
1:12:05
Speaker 1: Metanakaw River. Once that was accomplished, Division wanted to place
1:12:10
Speaker 1: the Raiders in a patrol base near Cocombona to prevent
1:12:14
Speaker 1: the enemy's return. That would keep Japanese artillery out of
1:12:18
Speaker 1: range of the airfield. On the twenty fourth, Pullar's men
1:12:22
Speaker 1: surprised a Japanese unit and routed it, but lost seven
1:12:25
Speaker 1: killed and twenty five wounded in the process. Division sent
1:12:29
Speaker 1: out the second Battalion, fifth Marines as a relief force,
1:12:33
Speaker 1: since Polar had to use most of his battalion to
1:12:35
Speaker 1: get the casualties safely back into the perimeter. Puller then
1:12:39
Speaker 1: continued on with his one remaining rifle company and the
1:12:42
Speaker 1: second battalion. The combined force reached the Metanaka on twenty
1:12:47
Speaker 1: six September, proceeded down the east bank, then tried to
1:12:51
Speaker 1: cross the sandbar at the river's mouth. A Japanese company
1:12:55
Speaker 1: blocked away and drove the Marines back with heavy fire. Meanwhile,
1:12:59
Speaker 1: another other enemy company moved into defensive positions on the
1:13:03
Speaker 1: eastern end of the single log bridge that served as
1:13:05
Speaker 1: the only crossing upstream. The Marines remained ignorant of that move.
1:13:11
Speaker 1: That afternoon, Vandergriff ordered Edson to take charge of the
1:13:14
Speaker 1: operation and sent the raiders along to assist him. Polar
1:13:19
Speaker 1: and Edson jointly devised a new plan.
1:13:21
Speaker 2: That evening in.
1:13:23
Speaker 1: The morning, the raiders would move up river, cross at
1:13:26
Speaker 1: the bridge and then come back down river on the
1:13:28
Speaker 1: far bank to take the Japanese at the river mouth
1:13:31
Speaker 1: and the flank. To ensure that the enemy force did
1:13:34
Speaker 1: not retreat out of the trap, the second Battalion, fifth
1:13:37
Speaker 1: Marines would pressure them with its own attack across the sandbar. Finally,
1:13:42
Speaker 1: the bulk of the first Battalion, seventh Marines, then in
1:13:45
Speaker 1: the perimeter after the casualty evacuation, would make an amphibious
1:13:49
Speaker 1: landing beyond point Cruise to slam shut any possible escape route.
1:13:54
Speaker 1: The ambitious plan received divisions blessing. After a night of
1:13:58
Speaker 1: heavy rain, the second Battalion and launched its assault at
1:14:01
Speaker 1: the river mouth, but made no progress against continuing strong opposition.
1:14:06
Speaker 1: The raiders, reinforced by Poehler's loan company, advanced up river,
1:14:10
Speaker 1: but soon found themselves wedged into a narrow sheft between
1:14:14
Speaker 1: the water and a steep ridge. The Japanese had placed
1:14:18
Speaker 1: a tight stopper in this bottle with infantry supported by
1:14:21
Speaker 1: machine guns and mortars. Bailey responded in his typical fashion
1:14:26
Speaker 1: and tried to lead the assault. He soon fell mortally wounded.
1:14:30
Speaker 1: Griffith ordered company see up the ridge in an effort
1:14:33
Speaker 1: to outflank the enemy. The Japanese had this approach covered too.
1:14:38
Speaker 1: When the battalion commander appeared on the ridge line to
1:14:41
Speaker 1: observe the action firsthand, a sniper put a bullet in
1:14:44
Speaker 1: his shoulder. With no outside fire support, the raiders could
1:14:48
Speaker 1: make no headway against the dug in Japanese poor communications
1:14:53
Speaker 1: made things worse. Edson misinterpreted a message from the raiders
1:14:58
Speaker 1: and thought they were across the river. He launched the
1:15:01
Speaker 1: second Battalion, fifth Marines and yet another assault, this time
1:15:05
Speaker 1: with help from additional mortars and thirty seven millimeters anti
1:15:08
Speaker 1: tank guns, but it met the same fate as all
1:15:11
Speaker 1: previous attempts. Upon landing in the enemy's rear, the first Battalion,
1:15:16
Speaker 1: seventh Marines was surrounded by a large force enemy bivouacked
1:15:20
Speaker 1: in the vicinity. The unit had brought no radios ashore
1:15:24
Speaker 1: and consequently could not immediately inform division of its plight. Eventually,
1:15:28
Speaker 1: the Marines used air panels to signal supporting aircraft. When
1:15:33
Speaker 1: that word reached Pollar, he wanted the second battalion to
1:15:36
Speaker 1: renew the assault to take pressure off his men, but
1:15:39
Speaker 1: Edson refused to incur further casualties in a hopeless frontal attack.
1:15:44
Speaker 1: Puller eventually extricated his beleaguered force with naval gunfire and
1:15:48
Speaker 1: messages passed by semaphore flags. Red Mike then ordered the
1:15:52
Speaker 1: raiders to pull back to the river mouth to join
1:15:55
Speaker 1: second Battalion, fifth Marines, after which both units withdrew to
1:15:58
Speaker 1: the division perimeter. The units engaged had lost sixty seven
1:16:03
Speaker 1: dead and one hundred twenty five wounded in the course
1:16:05
Speaker 1: of the operation. This aborted action along the Bttanakaw was
1:16:10
Speaker 1: the only defeat the marine suffered during the Guadalcanal campaign.
1:16:14
Speaker 1: Raider casualties during the all day action had been comparatively light,
1:16:18
Speaker 1: two killed and eleven wounded, but that total included both
1:16:22
Speaker 1: senior officers in the battalion. Command now devolved upon Captain
1:16:27
Speaker 1: Ira J.
1:16:28
Speaker 2: Jake Irwin.
1:16:30
Speaker 1: The battalion was worn down by two months of steady
1:16:32
Speaker 1: fighting and by the ravages of the tropics. Large numbers
1:16:37
Speaker 1: of men were ill with malaria and other diseases. The
1:16:41
Speaker 1: battalion had seen more action than any other on the island,
1:16:44
Speaker 1: and rumors persisted that they would soon ship out like
1:16:47
Speaker 1: the parachutists. One raider later recalled that a more sickly bedraggled,
1:16:52
Speaker 1: miserable bunch of Marines would have been hard to find.
1:16:56
Speaker 1: The First Raiders had one more battle to go on Guadalcanal.
1:17:00
Speaker 1: In early October, intelligence indicated that the Japanese were building
1:17:04
Speaker 1: up their forces west of the Metanakaw in preparation for
1:17:07
Speaker 1: another offensive against the perimeter. Division headquarters decided to strike
1:17:12
Speaker 1: first to secure the crossing over the river. In a
1:17:15
Speaker 1: plan reminiscent of the beginnings of the previous operation, two
1:17:19
Speaker 1: battalions of the Fifth Marines would move down the coast road,
1:17:23
Speaker 1: seize the near bank of the motana Kaw, and fix
1:17:25
Speaker 1: the attention of the Japanese forces on the far side.
1:17:29
Speaker 1: Three other battalions would cross the Motanaka at the single
1:17:33
Speaker 1: log bridge and attack north toward the sea. Once they
1:17:36
Speaker 1: cleared the far side of the river, a force would
1:17:39
Speaker 1: garrison Cocombona and prevent further enemy operations in the vicinity.
1:17:44
Speaker 1: In addition to strengthening the assault forces, this time, Division
1:17:48
Speaker 1: provided ample fire support. All units were to move into
1:17:52
Speaker 1: position on seven October in preparation for launching that attack
1:17:56
Speaker 1: the next morning. When the Fifth Marines deployed forward on
1:18:00
Speaker 1: seven October, they ran into a Japanese company dug in
1:18:03
Speaker 1: on the near side of the river, just inland from
1:18:05
Speaker 1: the sandbar. Edson's second battalion managed to secure most of
1:18:10
Speaker 1: its assigned frontage farther up river, but his third battalion
1:18:13
Speaker 1: was unable to break the enemy resistance centered on a
1:18:16
Speaker 1: well fortified defensive position. He committed Company L to the
1:18:21
Speaker 1: battle and then Radio Division for reinforcements so he could
1:18:24
Speaker 1: reconstitute a regimental reserve Division. Assigned Company A first raiders
1:18:30
Speaker 1: to the task, and the unit marched off down the
1:18:32
Speaker 1: coast road to bivouac next to Red Mike's CP. That night,
1:18:36
Speaker 1: the Japanese on the near side of the river probed
1:18:39
Speaker 1: the lines of the third Battalion, Fifth Marines and mauled
1:18:42
Speaker 1: the company nearest the sandbar. Early in the morning of
1:18:45
Speaker 1: the eighth Edson decided to commit the raiders of Company
1:18:48
Speaker 1: A to the task of reducing the Japanese pocket. He
1:18:52
Speaker 1: placed Major Lewis W. Walt in charge of the effort.
1:18:56
Speaker 1: Walt had been Company a's commander until Edson had brought
1:18:59
Speaker 1: him over at as operations officer for the Fifth Marines.
1:19:03
Speaker 1: The raiders drove in a few enemy outposts but could
1:19:06
Speaker 1: make little headway against the interlocking fires of the concealed
1:19:09
Speaker 1: Japanese positions. Meanwhile, heavy rains during the night had continued
1:19:14
Speaker 1: into the day, and division delayed the move across the
1:19:17
Speaker 1: river for twenty four hours. Vandergriff also decided to alter
1:19:22
Speaker 1: his original plan to a quick envelopment of the west
1:19:24
Speaker 1: bank and a return to the perimeter. Based on these
1:19:28
Speaker 1: changed circumstances and his own observation at close range of
1:19:32
Speaker 1: Company a's predicament, Edson halted the attack on the strong point.
1:19:37
Speaker 1: His third battalion would continue to encircle most of the
1:19:40
Speaker 1: enemy position, while Company A went into the defense on
1:19:43
Speaker 1: their right flank. The latter's position was shaped like a horseshoe,
1:19:47
Speaker 1: with the left linking up with the third battalion and
1:19:50
Speaker 1: facing south toward the bunker complex, the center facing west
1:19:54
Speaker 1: toward the sand spit, and the right on the beach
1:19:56
Speaker 1: facing north toward the sea. To fill out the thin
1:20:00
Speaker 1: mortarmen and company headquarters personnel occupied the left flank positions.
1:20:05
Speaker 1: The raiders expected a Japanese assault across the river mouth
1:20:09
Speaker 1: to relieve the surrounded bridgehead, so the marine strung barbed
1:20:12
Speaker 1: wire at the friendly end of the sandbar the remainder
1:20:16
Speaker 1: of the Raider battalion came up the coast road and
1:20:18
Speaker 1: went into reserve. Just after dusk, the Japanese and the
1:20:23
Speaker 1: strong point rushed from their positions in an effort to
1:20:26
Speaker 1: break through to their own lines. They quickly overran the
1:20:30
Speaker 1: surprise left flank of Company A and hit the center
1:20:32
Speaker 1: of the raider line from the rear. The enemy, who
1:20:35
Speaker 1: survived the close quarters fighting in both locations, then ran
1:20:39
Speaker 1: headlong into the wire, where fire from the remaining Marines
1:20:42
Speaker 1: cut them down. The lieutenant commanding the raider company tried
1:20:46
Speaker 1: to recover from the confusion and establish a fresh line
1:20:50
Speaker 1: farther back along the coast road. In the morning, there
1:20:53
Speaker 1: was some more fighting with a handful of Japanese who
1:20:56
Speaker 1: had sought refuge in marine foxholes. Company SEE of the
1:21:00
Speaker 1: Raiders moved up to occupy the abandoned enemy position and
1:21:04
Speaker 1: killed three more Japanese still hold up.
1:21:06
Speaker 2: There.
1:21:07
Speaker 1: They found an elaborate complex of trenches and bunkers connected
1:21:11
Speaker 1: by tunnels to an underground command post. The Marines counted
1:21:15
Speaker 1: fifty nine bodies stacked up against the wire or strewn
1:21:18
Speaker 1: about the perimeter. The battalion lost twelve dead and twenty
1:21:22
Speaker 1: two wounded during this stint on the Mattana Call, The
1:21:26
Speaker 1: Raider suffered one additional casualty during the operation. When Red
1:21:31
Speaker 1: Mike had gone over to the fifth Marines, he had
1:21:33
Speaker 1: taken with him his longtime runner, Corporal Walter J.
1:21:37
Speaker 2: Burek.
1:21:38
Speaker 1: While carrying a message along the river. On the afternoon
1:21:41
Speaker 1: of nine October, Japanese machine gun fire killed the former Raider.
1:21:46
Speaker 1: He was the last member of the first Raiders to
1:21:48
Speaker 1: die in action on Guadalcanal. On thirteen October, a convoy
1:21:53
Speaker 1: delivered the army's one hundred and sixty fourth Infantry to
1:21:56
Speaker 1: the island and embarked the Raider Battalion for transport to
1:21:59
Speaker 1: New Caledonia. There were barely two hundred effectives left in
1:22:03
Speaker 1: the unit, just a quarter of the battalion's original strength.
1:22:08
Speaker 1: Sidebar Raider weapons and equipment. Given their special priority early
1:22:16
Speaker 1: in the war, the Raider battalions had ample opportunity to
1:22:19
Speaker 1: experiment with weapons and equipment. The result was an interesting
1:22:24
Speaker 1: collection of items that were often unique to the Raiders.
1:22:28
Speaker 1: The most famous of these were the various models of
1:22:30
Speaker 1: raider knives. One was a heavy Bowie type knife with
1:22:34
Speaker 1: a blade more than nine inches long. These were manufactured
1:22:39
Speaker 1: specifically for the Second Raiders and consequently came to be.
1:22:42
Speaker 2: Known as gung Ho knives.
1:22:45
Speaker 1: An entirely different version, a lighter stiletto type was modeled
1:22:49
Speaker 1: on the Fairbairn Sykes fighting knife used by the British Commandos.
1:22:54
Speaker 1: These Raider stilettos were issued to off four battalions for
1:22:58
Speaker 1: the later campaigns. The emphasis on rapid movement on foot
1:23:02
Speaker 1: drove both Carlson and Edson to emphasize the acquisition of
1:23:05
Speaker 1: light weapons with a lot of fire power. Both men
1:23:09
Speaker 1: rejected the standard heavy machine guns and eighty one millimeter
1:23:12
Speaker 1: mortars carried by regular infantry in adopted lighter models. The
1:23:17
Speaker 1: Second Raider Battalion was one of the first Marine units
1:23:20
Speaker 1: to receive the semi automatic M one gearon thirty caliber
1:23:23
Speaker 1: rifle as standard issue. Most units, including the First Raiders,
1:23:28
Speaker 1: started the Guadalcanal campaign with the old bolt action Springfield
1:23:32
Speaker 1: M nineteen o three. The Browning automatic rifle, the reviled
1:23:37
Speaker 1: Racing submachine gun, and the more dependable Thompson submachine gun
1:23:42
Speaker 1: were favored weapons, particularly in the Second Raiders, where each
1:23:46
Speaker 1: fire team boasted a bar and a Thompson. Perhaps the
1:23:50
Speaker 1: oddest weapon carried by the Raiders was the Boy's Anti
1:23:53
Speaker 1: tank rifle, a thirty five pound behemoth firing a fifty
1:23:57
Speaker 1: five caliber round. Edson ad opted these Canadian weapons to
1:24:01
Speaker 1: provide his men with a light but serviceable capability against
1:24:05
Speaker 1: enemy armor. The rifle eventually saw use with other Raider battalions.
1:24:11
Speaker 1: The heavy round was accurate at more than one thousand yards,
1:24:14
Speaker 1: and the Second Raiders used a boys On macon to
1:24:17
Speaker 1: destroy two Japanese seaplanes. The Raiders experimented with a number
1:24:22
Speaker 1: of odd items of equipment, everything from collapsible bicycles to
1:24:26
Speaker 1: belly bands. Carlson introduced the latter, a cloth rectangle that
1:24:31
Speaker 1: could be wrapped around the midsection, where it supposedly prevented
1:24:35
Speaker 1: intestinal disorders. The Second Raiders also employed a hunting jacket
1:24:40
Speaker 1: that could double as a pack. Inevitably, it was dubbed
1:24:43
Speaker 1: the gung Ho jacket. Edson's men tried out portable individual
1:24:48
Speaker 1: field stoves, toggle ropes.
1:24:49
Speaker 2: And other innovative items.
1:24:52
Speaker 1: The eight foot toaggle ropes had a loop at one
1:24:54
Speaker 1: end and a peg at the other. They were helpful
1:24:57
Speaker 1: when it came time to scale cliffs. The Raiders also
1:25:01
Speaker 1: pioneered the use of camouflage pattern uniforms and of burlap
1:25:04
Speaker 1: strips to break up the distinctive outline of their helmets.
1:25:09
Speaker 1: End of chapter seven, Chapter eight of From Macon to
1:25:19
Speaker 1: Bogainville Marine Raiders in the Pacific War by John T.
1:25:22
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
1:25:23
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
1:25:28
Speaker 2: The Long Patrol.
1:25:31
Speaker 1: Not long after the departure of the First Raiders, it
1:25:33
Speaker 1: was the turn of the Second Raiders to fight on Guadalcanal.
1:25:37
Speaker 1: Carlson's outfit had been refitting in Hawaii after the Midway
1:25:41
Speaker 1: and Macon battles. In early September, the unit boarded a
1:25:45
Speaker 1: transport for Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, the primary
1:25:49
Speaker 1: staging area for most reinforcements going to the Southern Solomons.
1:25:54
Speaker 1: There they continued training until Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner,
1:25:58
Speaker 1: commander Amphibious four SIS South Pacific, decided to land a
1:26:02
Speaker 1: force at Aola Bay on the northeast coast of Guadalcanal
1:26:05
Speaker 1: to build another airfield. He assigned Carlson and two companies
1:26:10
Speaker 1: of Raiders to secure the beachhead for an Army Battalion
1:26:13
Speaker 1: CBS and a Marine Defense battalion, the McKeen and manly
1:26:17
Speaker 1: placed Company C and E ashore on the morning.
1:26:20
Speaker 2: Of four November.
1:26:22
Speaker 1: There was no opposition, though it soon became apparent the
1:26:25
Speaker 1: swampy jungle was no place to put an airfield. On
1:26:28
Speaker 1: five November, Vandergriff sent a message to Carlson.
1:26:31
Speaker 2: By air drop.
1:26:33
Speaker 1: Army and marine elements were moving east from the perimeter
1:26:36
Speaker 1: to mop up a large force of Japanese located near
1:26:40
Speaker 1: the Metapona River. This enemy unit, the two hundred thirtieth
1:26:44
Speaker 1: Infantry Regiment, had cut its way through the jungle from
1:26:47
Speaker 1: the west as part of a late October attack on
1:26:50
Speaker 1: Edson's Ridge by the Sendai Division. For various reasons, the
1:26:54
Speaker 1: two hundred thirtieth had failed to participate in the attack
1:26:58
Speaker 1: and then had completed a circumnavigate gation of the marine
1:27:00
Speaker 1: perimeter to reach its current location in the east. The
1:27:04
Speaker 1: Tokyo Express had recently reinforced it with the battalion of
1:27:08
Speaker 1: the two hundred twenty eighth Infantry. Vandergriff wanted the raiders
1:27:12
Speaker 1: to march from aola and harass the Japanese from the rear.
1:27:16
Speaker 1: Carlson set out with his force on six November with
1:27:19
Speaker 1: a coastwatcher, and several native scouts as guides. Among the
1:27:24
Speaker 1: islanders was Sergeant Major Jacob c. Vuza, already a hero
1:27:28
Speaker 1: in the campaign. The men initially carried four days of
1:27:31
Speaker 1: canned rations. The raiders moved inland before heading west. The
1:27:37
Speaker 1: trails were narrow and overgrown, but the native scouts proved
1:27:40
Speaker 1: invaluable in leading the way. On eight November, the point
1:27:44
Speaker 1: ran into a small Japanese ambush near Rico. The Marines
1:27:48
Speaker 1: killed two Japanese. One native suffered wounds. The next day,
1:27:53
Speaker 1: the column reached Binu, a village on the Belsuna River,
1:27:56
Speaker 1: eight miles from the coast. There Carlson halted while his
1:28:00
Speaker 1: patrols made contact with marine and army units closing in
1:28:04
Speaker 1: on the main Japanese force. On ten November, Companies B
1:28:08
Speaker 1: DNF of the Second Raiders landed at Tassimboco and moved
1:28:12
Speaker 1: overland to join up with their commander. Company D was
1:28:15
Speaker 1: only a platoon at this point, since Carlson had used
1:28:18
Speaker 1: most of its manpower to fill out the remaining companies
1:28:21
Speaker 1: prior to departing Espiritu Santo. From that point, the raiders
1:28:25
Speaker 1: also received periodic resupplies, usually via native porters dropped on
1:28:30
Speaker 1: the coast by Higgins boats. Rations were generally t rice,
1:28:35
Speaker 1: raisins and bacon, the type of portable guerrilla food Carlson
1:28:39
Speaker 1: thrived on, reinforced by an occasional d ration and chocolate bar.
1:28:44
Speaker 1: On the nights of nine and ten November, about three
1:28:46
Speaker 1: thousand Japanese escaped from the American ring encircling them on
1:28:49
Speaker 1: the Metapona They were hungry and tired, and probably dispirited
1:28:54
Speaker 1: now that they had orders to retrace their steps back
1:28:57
Speaker 1: to the western side of the perimeter, but they were
1:29:00
Speaker 1: still a formidable force. On the eleventh, the second Raiders
1:29:04
Speaker 1: had four companies out on independent patrols, while the fifth
1:29:07
Speaker 1: Guard of the base camp at Binu. Each unit had
1:29:10
Speaker 1: a TBX radio. At mid morning, one outfit made contact
1:29:15
Speaker 1: with a patrol from first Battalion, seventh Marines and learned
1:29:18
Speaker 1: of the enemy breakout. A few minutes later, company c
1:29:22
Speaker 1: ran into a large force of Japanese near Asumama on
1:29:25
Speaker 1: the Metapona River. The Marines had been crossing a wide
1:29:29
Speaker 1: grassy area when the advance guard entered a wooded area
1:29:33
Speaker 1: on the opposite side. It surprised the enemy in their bivouac.
1:29:37
Speaker 1: In the initial action, the advance guard inflicted significant casualties
1:29:42
Speaker 1: on the Japanese but lost five men killed in three wounded.
1:29:46
Speaker 1: In short order, the enemy had the remainder of the
1:29:48
Speaker 1: company pinned down in the open with rifle, machine gun
1:29:51
Speaker 1: and mortar fire. Carlson vector two of his patrols in
1:29:55
Speaker 1: that direction to assist and dispatch one platoon from the
1:29:59
Speaker 1: base camp. As it crossed the Metapona to reach the
1:30:02
Speaker 1: main battle, Company E tangled with another enemy group coming
1:30:06
Speaker 1: in the opposite direction. The more numerous Japanese initially forced
1:30:10
Speaker 1: the Marines to withdraw, but Major Richard T. Washburn reorganized
1:30:14
Speaker 1: his company and counterattacked the enemy as they attempted to
1:30:18
Speaker 1: cross the river. The raiders inflicted significant casualties on their opponent,
1:30:23
Speaker 1: but could not push through to link up with Charlie Company.
1:30:27
Speaker 1: In mid afternoon, Carlson himself led Company F toward Asamama.
1:30:32
Speaker 1: By the time he arrived, Company C had extricated itself
1:30:35
Speaker 1: under covering fire from its own sixty millimeter mortars. Carlson
1:30:39
Speaker 1: called in two dive bombers on the enemy, ordered Company
1:30:42
Speaker 1: E to break off its independent action, and launched Company
1:30:46
Speaker 1: F in a flanking attack against the main Japanese force.
1:30:50
Speaker 1: The raiders completed the maneuver by dusk, only to find
1:30:53
Speaker 1: the enemy position abandoned. The battalion assembled back at Binu
1:30:57
Speaker 1: that night. There d reported that it had run into
1:31:01
Speaker 1: yet another group of enemy and been pinned down for
1:31:04
Speaker 1: most of the afternoon. The under strength unit had lost
1:31:08
Speaker 1: two killed and one wounded. On twelve November, Carlson led
1:31:12
Speaker 1: Companies B and E back to the woods of Asamama.
1:31:16
Speaker 1: Throughout the day, enemy messengers attempted to enter the bivouac
1:31:19
Speaker 1: site under the mistaken notion that it still belonged to
1:31:22
Speaker 1: their side. The raiders killed twenty five of them in
1:31:26
Speaker 1: the afternoon. Carlson ordered Company C to join him there.
1:31:30
Speaker 1: The next day, he observed enemy units moving in the vicinity,
1:31:33
Speaker 1: and he placed artillery and mortar fire on five separate groups.
1:31:38
Speaker 1: After each such mission, the raiders dealt with Japanese survivors
1:31:41
Speaker 1: trying to make their way into the woods. On fourteen November,
1:31:45
Speaker 1: Carlson decided to pull back to Binu. That same day,
1:31:49
Speaker 1: a Company F patrol wiped out a fifteen man enemy
1:31:52
Speaker 1: outpost that had been reported by native scouts. After a
1:31:56
Speaker 1: brief period of rest and replenish at Binu. The Second
1:31:59
Speaker 1: Raiders moved their base camp to Assimama on fifteen November.
1:32:04
Speaker 1: During two days of patrolling from that site, Carlson determined
1:32:07
Speaker 1: that the main enemy force had departed the area. At
1:32:11
Speaker 1: Vandergriff's request, the Raider commander entered the perimeter on seventeen November.
1:32:16
Speaker 1: Vandergriff directed Carlson to search for a pistol pete, an
1:32:20
Speaker 1: enemy artillery piece that regularly shelled the airfield. The battalion
1:32:25
Speaker 1: also was to seek out trail circling the perimeter and
1:32:28
Speaker 1: any Japanese units operating to the south. The Raiders moved
1:32:32
Speaker 1: forward to the Tenaru River over the next few days.
1:32:36
Speaker 1: On twenty five November, Company A arrived from Espiritu Santo
1:32:40
Speaker 1: and joined the battalion. For the next few days, the
1:32:43
Speaker 1: Second Raiders divided into three combat teams of two companies
1:32:47
Speaker 1: a piece, with each operating from its own patrol base.
1:32:51
Speaker 1: Each day, they moved farther into the interior of the island,
1:32:54
Speaker 1: in the area between the headwaters of the Tenaru and
1:32:57
Speaker 1: Lunga rivers. Carlson remained with the center team, from which
1:33:01
Speaker 1: point he could quickly reinforce either of the flank detachments.
1:33:06
Speaker 1: On thirty November, the battalion crossed over the steep ridge
1:33:09
Speaker 1: line that divided the valleys of the Tenneru and LUNGA
1:33:13
Speaker 1: discovery of a telephone wire led the raiders to a
1:33:15
Speaker 1: large bivouac site which held an unattended seventy five millimeter
1:33:19
Speaker 1: mountain gun and a thirty seven millimeter anti tank gun.
1:33:23
Speaker 1: Marines removed key parts of the weapons and scattered them
1:33:26
Speaker 1: down the hillside. Farther on, the advance guard entered yet
1:33:30
Speaker 1: another bivouac site, this one occupied by one hundred Japanese.
1:33:35
Speaker 1: Both sides were equally surprised, but Corporal John Yancey charged
1:33:39
Speaker 1: into the group, firing his automatic weapon and calling for
1:33:42
Speaker 1: his squad to follow. The more numerous enemy were at
1:33:46
Speaker 1: a disadvantage since their arms were stacked out of reach.
1:33:50
Speaker 1: The handful of raiders routed the Japanese and killed seventy five.
1:33:55
Speaker 1: Carlson called it the most spectacular of any of our engagements.
1:34:00
Speaker 1: For this feat, Yancey earned the first of his two
1:34:02
Speaker 1: Navy crosses. The second came years later in Korea. The
1:34:06
Speaker 1: next day, one December, a Douglas R four d sky
1:34:10
Speaker 1: train transport air drop badly needed rations as well as
1:34:14
Speaker 1: orders for the battalion to enter the perimeter. Carlson asked
1:34:17
Speaker 1: for a.
1:34:17
Speaker 2: Few more days in the fielding got it.
1:34:20
Speaker 1: On three December. He held a gung home meeting to
1:34:23
Speaker 1: motivate his exhausted men for one more effort. Then he
1:34:27
Speaker 1: divided the second Raiders in half, sending the companies with
1:34:30
Speaker 1: the most field.
1:34:31
Speaker 2: Time down to marine lines.
1:34:33
Speaker 1: The rest he led up to the top of Mount Austin,
1:34:36
Speaker 1: where a raider patrol had discovered a strong but abandoned
1:34:39
Speaker 1: Japanese position. The force had barely reached their objective when
1:34:44
Speaker 1: they encountered an enemy platoon approaching from a different direction.
1:34:48
Speaker 1: After a two hour firefight and two attempts at a
1:34:51
Speaker 1: double envelopment, the Marines finally wiped out their opponents. The
1:34:56
Speaker 1: result was twenty five enemy dead at a cost of
1:34:59
Speaker 1: four wounded Marine, one of whom died soon after. The
1:35:03
Speaker 1: raiders spent a tough night on the mountain since there
1:35:05
Speaker 1: was no water available and their canteens were empty. The
1:35:09
Speaker 1: next day, Carlson led the force down into the marine perimeter,
1:35:13
Speaker 1: but not without one last skirmish. Seven Japanese ambushed the
1:35:17
Speaker 1: point and succeeded in killing four men before the Raiders
1:35:20
Speaker 1: wiped them out. The long patrol of the Second Raiders
1:35:24
Speaker 1: was extremely successful from a tactical point of view. The
1:35:27
Speaker 1: battalion had killed four hundred eighty eight enemy soldiers at
1:35:30
Speaker 1: a cost of sixteen dead and eighteen wounded. Carlson's subsequent
1:35:35
Speaker 1: report praised his guerrilla tactics, which undoubtedly played an important
1:35:39
Speaker 1: role in the favorable exchange ratio. Far away from the
1:35:43
Speaker 1: marine perimeter, the Japanese became careless and allowed themselves to
1:35:47
Speaker 1: be surprised on a regular basis, a phenomenon other marine
1:35:51
Speaker 1: units had exploited earlier in the campaign. Since the Second
1:35:55
Speaker 1: Raiders operated exclusively in the enemy rear, they reaped the
1:35:59
Speaker 1: benefit of their own stealthiness and this Japanese weakness. The
1:36:03
Speaker 1: stated casualty figures, however, did not reflect the true costs
1:36:07
Speaker 1: to the Marines. During the course of the operation, the
1:36:11
Speaker 1: Second Raiders had evacuated two hundred and twenty five men
1:36:14
Speaker 1: to the rear due to severe illness, primarily malaria, dysentery,
1:36:18
Speaker 1: and ringworm. Although sickness was common on Guadalcanal, Carlson's men
1:36:24
Speaker 1: became disabled at an astonishing rate due to inadequate rations
1:36:28
Speaker 1: and the rough conditions, factors that had diminished significantly by
1:36:32
Speaker 1: that point in the campaign for other American units. Since
1:36:36
Speaker 1: only two Raider companies had spent the entire month in combat,
1:36:39
Speaker 1: the effect was actually worse than those numbers indicated. Company
1:36:43
Speaker 1: C and F had landed at Aola Bay with one
1:36:46
Speaker 1: hundred and thirty officers and men each. They entered the
1:36:50
Speaker 1: perimeter on four December with a combined total of fifty
1:36:53
Speaker 1: seven marines, barely one fifth their original strength. This would
1:36:58
Speaker 1: have been worse except for the f of native carriers
1:37:01
Speaker 1: to keep the raiders supplied. Guerrilla tactics inflicted heavy casualties
1:37:06
Speaker 1: on the enemy, but at an equally high cost and
1:37:08
Speaker 1: friendly manpower. Nevertheless, the Raiders could hold their heads high.
1:37:14
Speaker 1: Vandergriff cited them for the consummate skill displayed in the
1:37:18
Speaker 1: conduct of operations, for the training stamina and fortitude displayed
1:37:22
Speaker 1: by all members of the battalion, and for its commendable
1:37:25
Speaker 1: aggressive spirit.
1:37:27
Speaker 2: And high morale.
1:37:29
Speaker 1: Sidebar the Raider Training Center. The Raider Training Center got
1:37:37
Speaker 1: its start in late nineteen forty two when the Major
1:37:40
Speaker 1: General Commandant authorized a slight increase in the table of
1:37:43
Speaker 1: organization of the newly formed fourth Raider Battalion. These additional
1:37:48
Speaker 1: two officers and twenty six enlisted men became the cadre
1:37:51
Speaker 1: for the Center, which formerly came into being at Camp Pendleton, California,
1:37:55
Speaker 1: on five February nineteen forty three. The purpose of the
1:37:59
Speaker 1: center was to train men up to Raiders standards and
1:38:02
Speaker 1: thus create a pool of qualified replacements for the battalions overseas.
1:38:07
Speaker 1: Prior to this, each Raider unit had solicited fresh volunteers
1:38:11
Speaker 1: from other organizations in rear areas and then incorporated them
1:38:14
Speaker 1: directly into their ranks. Since most of these young marines
1:38:18
Speaker 1: had only rudimentary training in weapons and tactics, the Raiders
1:38:22
Speaker 1: had to expend considerable effort on individual instruction. Worse still,
1:38:27
Speaker 1: that old system provided no means to replace casualties during
1:38:31
Speaker 1: prolonged combat operations. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Griffithcond had been
1:38:36
Speaker 1: a prime proponent of the improved set up. The course
1:38:40
Speaker 1: was eight weeks long. Carlson's vision of the Raiders initially
1:38:44
Speaker 1: influenced the training program, probably via Lieutenant Colonel James Roosevelt's
1:38:49
Speaker 1: part in setting up the center. Their hands were obvious
1:38:53
Speaker 1: in the selection of classes on guerrilla warfare and individual cookery.
1:38:58
Speaker 1: The latter was a fetish of Carlson. He thought regular
1:39:01
Speaker 1: infantry relied to heavily.
1:39:02
Speaker 2: On bulky field kitchens.
1:39:05
Speaker 1: There also was a week long field problem in which
1:39:08
Speaker 1: the students divided into a main body and two gorilla
1:39:11
Speaker 1: bands acting as aggressors. Rubber boat operations occupied a significant
1:39:16
Speaker 1: block of the schedule. Otherwise, the course focused heavily on
1:39:20
Speaker 1: traditional individual skills and small unit tactics marksmanship, scouting, patrolling,
1:39:26
Speaker 1: physical conditioning, individual.
1:39:28
Speaker 2: Combat, and so forth.
1:39:32
Speaker 1: End of chapter eight, chapter nine of From Making to
1:39:41
Speaker 1: Bogainville Marine Raiders in the Pacific War by John T.
1:39:44
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
1:39:45
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Reshaping the Raiders.
1:39:53
Speaker 1: The second Raiders boarded a transport on fifteen December and
1:39:57
Speaker 1: returned to campgung Ho on Espiritu Se. There they recuperated
1:40:02
Speaker 1: in pyramidal tents and a coconut grove along the banks
1:40:05
Speaker 1: of a river. The camp and the chow were spartan,
1:40:09
Speaker 1: and the only relief came when a ship took the
1:40:11
Speaker 1: battalion to New Zealand in February nineteen forty three.
1:40:14
Speaker 2: For two weeks of liberty.
1:40:17
Speaker 1: The First Raiders had returned to Camp Bailey in New
1:40:19
Speaker 1: Caledonia in October nineteen forty two. Their living conditions were similar,
1:40:25
Speaker 1: except for a slightly better hillside site overlooking a river.
1:40:29
Speaker 1: They spent a month in New Zealand over the Christmas holidays.
1:40:33
Speaker 1: These were no longer the only raider battalions in the
1:40:36
Speaker 1: Marine Corps. Admiral Turner had tried to force each Marine
1:40:39
Speaker 1: regiment to convert one battalion to a raider organization, but
1:40:43
Speaker 1: General Holcombe, with an assist from Nimitz, put a stop
1:40:47
Speaker 1: to that interference in the corps internal affairs. However, the
1:40:51
Speaker 1: Commandant did authorize the creation of two additional battalions of Raiders.
1:40:57
Speaker 1: The Third Raiders came into being on Samoa on twenty
1:40:59
Speaker 1: six September nineteen forty two. Their commander was Lieutenant Colonel
1:41:04
Speaker 1: Harry B. Harry the Horse livers Edge, a former enlisted
1:41:08
Speaker 1: Marine and a shot putter in the nineteen twenty and
1:41:10
Speaker 1: nineteen twenty four Olympics. The battalion drew on volunteers from
1:41:15
Speaker 1: the many Marine units in Samoa, and also received small
1:41:18
Speaker 1: contingents from the First and Second Raiders. The Corps activated
1:41:23
Speaker 1: the Fourth Raider Battalion in southern California on twenty three
1:41:26
Speaker 1: October nineteen forty two. Major Roosevelt commanded this new unit.
1:41:32
Speaker 1: The third and fourth Raiders both arrived in Espiritu Santo
1:41:35
Speaker 1: in February nineteen forty three. There as yet existed no
1:41:40
Speaker 1: common Raider table of organization. Carlson retained his six companies
1:41:45
Speaker 1: of two rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. Griffith adopted
1:41:49
Speaker 1: the fireteam concept but added a fourth man to each team,
1:41:52
Speaker 1: and retained the four rifle companies and a weapons company
1:41:55
Speaker 1: established by Adson. Roosevelt's battalion had four rifles companies plus
1:42:00
Speaker 1: a demolition and engineer company. On the anniversary of the
1:42:05
Speaker 1: creation of the Second Raiders, Carlson addressed his men in
1:42:08
Speaker 1: a gung Ho meeting. He issued a press release later
1:42:12
Speaker 1: to publicize his words. In addition to announcing his decision
1:42:16
Speaker 1: to establish Marine Raider organization day, he reviewed the battalion's
1:42:20
Speaker 1: first year of existence. He noted that his morale had
1:42:24
Speaker 1: been low at times as the officers and men struggled
1:42:28
Speaker 1: to learn and implement the philosophy of gung Ho. In
1:42:31
Speaker 1: his mind, the tactical successes of the outfit were less
1:42:35
Speaker 1: significant than the way in which he had molded it.
1:42:39
Speaker 1: Macon brought the story of our methods of living and
1:42:41
Speaker 1: training to the world. Perhaps this fact was of even
1:42:44
Speaker 1: greater importance than the material gains of the raid. However,
1:42:48
Speaker 1: the days of Carlson's influence on the Raiders were numbered.
1:42:52
Speaker 1: On fifteen March nineteen forty three, the Marine Corps created
1:42:56
Speaker 1: the First Raider Regiment and gave it control of all
1:42:58
Speaker 1: four battalions. Livers Edge, now a colonel, took charge of
1:43:03
Speaker 1: the new organization. A week later, Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley
1:43:08
Speaker 1: took over command of the Second Raiders. He was an
1:43:12
Speaker 1: orthodox line officer who had earned a Navy Cross on
1:43:14
Speaker 1: board the Arizona BB thirty nine on seven December nineteen
1:43:19
Speaker 1: forty one. He thought the Macon rate had been a
1:43:22
Speaker 1: fiasco and he had no interest in gung Ho. Shapley
1:43:26
Speaker 1: wasted no time in turning the unit into a regular battalion.
1:43:31
Speaker 1: Carlson temporarily became the regimental executive officer, but served there
1:43:36
Speaker 1: only briefly before entering the hospital a week from malaria
1:43:39
Speaker 1: and jundice. Soon thereafter, he was on his way Stateside.
1:43:44
Speaker 1: A month later, Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Currn, another officer
1:43:48
Speaker 1: with more orthodox views, took command of the fourth Raiders
1:43:51
Speaker 1: from Roosevelt. The regiment enforced a common organization among the battalions.
1:43:57
Speaker 1: The result was a mixture of Edson and Carl Wilson's ideas.
1:44:02
Speaker 1: Carlson bequeathed his fire team and squad to the Raiders
1:44:06
Speaker 1: and later to the Corps as a whole, but each
1:44:09
Speaker 1: battalion now had a weapons company and four rifle companies
1:44:12
Speaker 1: composed of a weapons platoon in three rifle platoons. Edson's
1:44:17
Speaker 1: other imprint was the concept of a highly trained, lightly
1:44:20
Speaker 1: equipped force using conventional tactics to accomplish special missions or
1:44:24
Speaker 1: to fill in for a line battalion. The First Raider
1:44:28
Speaker 1: Regiment was no gorilla outfit. Given the changing thrust of
1:44:32
Speaker 1: the Pacific War, the choice was a wise one. In
1:44:36
Speaker 1: the future of the Marines would be attacking Japanese forces
1:44:39
Speaker 1: holed up in tight perimeters or on small islands. Gorilla
1:44:44
Speaker 1: tactics provided no answer to the problem of overcoming these
1:44:47
Speaker 1: strong defensive positions.
1:44:51
Speaker 2: Sidebar the raider patch, the.
1:44:57
Speaker 1: Use of Marine Corps shoulder patches in World War II
1:44:59
Speaker 1: original with the creation of the First Marine Division insignia
1:45:03
Speaker 1: following the Guadalcanal Campaign. This was not a new practice
1:45:07
Speaker 1: for Marines, since members of the fourth Marine Brigade were
1:45:10
Speaker 1: the star and Indian head patch of the Army second
1:45:13
Speaker 1: Infantry Division in France during World War One. The First
1:45:17
Speaker 1: Marine Division emblem consisted of the word Guadalcanal lettered in
1:45:21
Speaker 1: white on a red numeral one placed on a sky
1:45:24
Speaker 1: blue diamond. The white stars of the Southern Cross surrounded
1:45:29
Speaker 1: the number. By July nineteen forty three, the one Marine
1:45:33
Speaker 1: Amphibious Corps had adopted a variation for its own patch,
1:45:37
Speaker 1: a white bordered red diamond encircled by the white stars
1:45:40
Speaker 1: of the Southern Cross on a five sided blue background.
1:45:44
Speaker 1: Non divisional Corps units each had a specific symbol inside
1:45:48
Speaker 1: the red diamond. The emblem for the iMac Raider Battalions
1:45:52
Speaker 1: was a skull. While the Raider insignia may not have
1:45:55
Speaker 1: been the most artistic of Marine Corps shoulder patches in
1:45:58
Speaker 1: the war, it was certainly the most striking. The skull
1:46:02
Speaker 1: device originated with the second Raider Battalion, which began using
1:46:06
Speaker 1: it not long after that unit came into existence. Carlson
1:46:10
Speaker 1: issued paper emblems consisting of a skull like face superimposed
1:46:15
Speaker 1: on cross scimitars to his raiders prior to the make
1:46:18
Speaker 1: and raid. Each piece of paper was backed with glue,
1:46:21
Speaker 1: and allegedly the raiders were to use them to mark
1:46:24
Speaker 1: enemy dead for psychological effect, but they stuck together in
1:46:27
Speaker 1: the humid tropics and proved impractical. By the time Carlson's
1:46:32
Speaker 1: battalion reached Guaddal Canal, the emblem had evolved into a
1:46:35
Speaker 1: skull backed by a crossed gung ho knife and lightning
1:46:39
Speaker 1: bowlt It is not clear who selected the skull for
1:46:42
Speaker 1: the official raider patch, but that device readily conveyed the image.
1:46:46
Speaker 1: The raiders effectively cultivated that of an elite force train
1:46:50
Speaker 1: to close with and destroy the enemy in commando style operations.
1:46:56
Speaker 1: End of chapter nine, Chapter ten of From Macon to
1:47:05
Speaker 1: Bogainville Marine Raiders in the Pacific War by John T.
1:47:08
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
1:47:09
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
1:47:14
Speaker 2: New Georgia.
1:47:16
Speaker 1: As the fighting on Guadalcanal drew to a close in
1:47:19
Speaker 1: early nineteen forty three, American commanders intensified their planning for
1:47:24
Speaker 1: the eventual seizure of Reball. The primary Japanese stronghold in
1:47:28
Speaker 1: the Southwest Pacific. This major air and naval base on
1:47:32
Speaker 1: the eastern end of New Britain was centrally located between
1:47:35
Speaker 1: New Guinea and the northwestern terminus of the Solomons. That
1:47:40
Speaker 1: allowed the Japanese to shift their air in naval support
1:47:43
Speaker 1: from one front to the other on short notice. Conversely,
1:47:47
Speaker 1: simultaneous American advances through New Guinea and the Solomons would
1:47:51
Speaker 1: threaten Reball from two directions. With that in mind, Admiral
1:47:56
Speaker 1: William F. Halsey's South Pacific Command prepared to drive farther
1:47:59
Speaker 1: up to Solomon's Chain while MacArthur continued his operations along
1:48:04
Speaker 1: the New Guinea coast. Halsey's planners initially focused on New Georgia,
1:48:09
Speaker 1: a large island located on the southern flank of the
1:48:12
Speaker 1: slot about halfway up to Solomon's chain. By December nineteen
1:48:16
Speaker 1: forty two, the Japanese had managed to complete an airstrip
1:48:20
Speaker 1: on New Georgia's munda point. Seizure of the island would
1:48:23
Speaker 1: thus remove that enemy threat and advance Allied aircraft.
1:48:27
Speaker 2: One third of the way to Reball.
1:48:30
Speaker 1: However, the South Pacific Command also was worried about enemy
1:48:34
Speaker 1: activity in the Russell Islands, located thirty miles northwest of
1:48:38
Speaker 1: Guadalcanal's Cape Esperance. The Russells had been a staging point
1:48:42
Speaker 1: for the enemy's reinforcement and subsequent evacuation of Guadalcanal strong
1:48:48
Speaker 1: Japanese forces. There would be a thorn in the side
1:48:50
Speaker 1: of an operation against New Georgia and possibly a threat
1:48:54
Speaker 1: to Guadalcanal itself. Halsey thus decided to seize the Russells
1:48:59
Speaker 1: prior to action l elsewhere in the Solomons. As an
1:49:02
Speaker 1: additional benefit, American fighter planes stationed in the Russells would
1:49:06
Speaker 1: be able to provide more effective support to the eventual
1:49:09
Speaker 1: assault on New Georgia. The landing force for Operation Clean Slate,
1:49:14
Speaker 1: the code name for the Russells assault, consisted of the
1:49:17
Speaker 1: forty third Infantry Division and the third Raider Battalion. The
1:49:21
Speaker 1: Army division would seize Banka Island while the Marines took
1:49:24
Speaker 1: nearby Pavuvu. The APDs of TRANSDV twelve carried the raiders
1:49:30
Speaker 1: from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal in mid February, four days
1:49:35
Speaker 1: prior to the twenty one February D Day a lieutenant
1:49:38
Speaker 1: and a sergeant from the Raiders scouted both objectives. They
1:49:42
Speaker 1: found them empty of the enemy. The third Raiders thus
1:49:45
Speaker 1: made an unopposed landing in their first offensive action. The
1:49:49
Speaker 1: one to fifty ninth Infantry followed them ashore and assisted
1:49:52
Speaker 1: in the occupation of the island. The greatest challenges the
1:49:56
Speaker 1: Marines faced on Pavuvu were logistical and medical. Due to
1:50:01
Speaker 1: the Navy's legitimate concern about an enemy air in naval response,
1:50:04
Speaker 1: the landing plan relied on a rapid offload and quick
1:50:07
Speaker 1: withdrawal of the transports. The Higgins boats of the APDs
1:50:12
Speaker 1: were preloaded with raider supplies while the men went ashore
1:50:15
Speaker 1: in their rubber boats. A rash of outboard motor failures
1:50:19
Speaker 1: played havoc with the landing formations and livers edges. After
1:50:23
Speaker 1: action report noted that this could have resulted in serious consequences.
1:50:28
Speaker 1: Once ashore, the Light Raiders suffered from their lack of
1:50:31
Speaker 1: organic transport as they struggled to manhandle supplies from the
1:50:35
Speaker 1: beach to inland dumps. During the battalions subsequent four weeks
1:50:39
Speaker 1: stay on Pavuvu, the diet of field chow and the
1:50:42
Speaker 1: tough tropic conditions combined to debilitate the troops. Fully one
1:50:47
Speaker 1: third developed skin problems, all men lost weight, and several
1:50:51
Speaker 1: dozen eventually fell ill with malaria and other diseases. Although
1:50:56
Speaker 1: it was not entirely the fault of planners, the hard
1:50:59
Speaker 1: hitting case capabilities of the Marine Battalion were wasted on
1:51:02
Speaker 1: Clean Slate. Only the two man scouting team had performed
1:51:06
Speaker 1: a mission in accordance with the original purpose of the raiders.
1:51:10
Speaker 1: In the midst of the execution of Clean Slate, Halsey
1:51:13
Speaker 1: continued preparations for subsequent operations in the Central Solomons. This
1:51:19
Speaker 1: included repeated use of the scouting capability demonstrated in the Russells.
1:51:24
Speaker 2: At the end of.
1:51:24
Speaker 1: February, a Navy lieutenant and six raiders landed at New
1:51:27
Speaker 1: Georgia's Roviano Lagoon. With the aid of coast watchers and natives.
1:51:33
Speaker 1: They spent the next three weeks collecting information on the terrain,
1:51:36
Speaker 1: hydrographic conditions, and Japanese defenses.
1:51:40
Speaker 2: On twenty one.
1:51:41
Speaker 1: March, Consolidated Catalina PBIS landed four raider patrols at New
1:51:46
Speaker 1: Georgia's Segi Point. From there, they fanned out with native
1:51:50
Speaker 1: guides and canoes to scout Colombangara, Vangunu, and New Georgia.
1:51:55
Speaker 1: Other groups visited these areas and Rendova over the course
1:51:59
Speaker 1: of the next three months. The patrols provided valuable information
1:52:03
Speaker 1: that helped shape landing plans, and the final groups in
1:52:06
Speaker 1: place small detachments near designated beaches to act as guides
1:52:10
Speaker 1: for the assault forces. During May and June, the Japanese
1:52:14
Speaker 1: reinforced their garrisons in the Central Solomons to eleven thousand men,
1:52:19
Speaker 1: but this number was grossly insufficient to cover all potential
1:52:22
Speaker 1: landing sites on the numerous large islands in the region
1:52:26
Speaker 1: that gave Halsey's force great flexibility. The final plan called
1:52:30
Speaker 1: for several assaults, all against lightly defended or undefended targets.
1:52:36
Speaker 1: On d Day, the Eastern Landing Force, consisting of the
1:52:39
Speaker 1: one hundred third Infantry, an Army Regiment, and the fourth
1:52:42
Speaker 1: Raider Battalion, would occupy Wickham Anchorage, Segi Point, and Vairu Harbor.
1:52:48
Speaker 1: Naval construction units would immediately build a fighter strip at
1:52:52
Speaker 1: segi In a base for torpedo boats at Vairu. The
1:52:56
Speaker 1: Northern Landing Group, the First Raider Regiment headquarters the First
1:53:00
Speaker 1: Raider battalion and two Army battalions would simultaneously go ashore
1:53:04
Speaker 1: at Rice Anchorage, then attack overland to take Enogay Inlet
1:53:08
Speaker 1: in Byroco Harbor. This would cut off the Japanese barge
1:53:12
Speaker 1: traffic that supplied reinforcements and logistics. The last D day
1:53:17
Speaker 1: operation would be the Southern Landing Group seizure of the
1:53:20
Speaker 1: northern end of Rendova and its outlying islands. On D
1:53:24
Speaker 1: plus four, many of these same units from the forty
1:53:27
Speaker 1: third Infantry Division would conduct a short ashore assault against
1:53:31
Speaker 1: the undefended beaches at Zenana and Pyrika on New Georgia.
1:53:36
Speaker 1: Planes from Segi Point and artillery from the Rendova beachhead
1:53:39
Speaker 1: would render support as the army regiments advanced overland to
1:53:43
Speaker 1: capture Munda Airfield. D Day was thirty June. Things did
1:53:49
Speaker 1: not go entirely according to plan. During June, the Japanese
1:53:53
Speaker 1: used some of their reinforcements to extend their coverage of
1:53:56
Speaker 1: New Georgia. They ordered a battalion to Vairru with instructions
1:54:00
Speaker 1: to clean out native forces operating in the vicinity of
1:54:03
Speaker 1: Sege the Solomon Islanders under command of coast watcher Donald G.
1:54:09
Speaker 1: Kennedy had repeatedly attacked enemy outposts and patrols in the area.
1:54:14
Speaker 1: As the Japanese Battalion advanced units closer to Segi Point,
1:54:18
Speaker 1: Kennedy requested support. On twenty June, Admiral Turner ordered Lieutenant
1:54:23
Speaker 1: Colonel Kerran and half of his fourth Raiders to move
1:54:26
Speaker 1: immediately from Guadalcanal to Segi. Companies O and P loaded
1:54:31
Speaker 1: on board APDs that day and made an unopposed landing
1:54:34
Speaker 1: the next morning. On twenty two June, two Army infantry
1:54:38
Speaker 1: companies in the advanced party of the Airfield Construction Unit
1:54:41
Speaker 1: arrived to strengthen the position. VAIRU presented a tougher problem.
1:54:47
Speaker 1: The narrow entrance to the harbor was flanked by high
1:54:50
Speaker 1: cliffs and covered by a three inch coast defense gun.
1:54:53
Speaker 1: Numerous enemy machine guns, including fifty caliber models, occupied supporting positions.
1:55:00
Speaker 1: Most of the defenses were oriented toward an attack from
1:55:03
Speaker 1: the sea, so American leaders quickly decided to conduct an
1:55:06
Speaker 1: overland approach, but that was not easy either, given the
1:55:10
Speaker 1: difficulty of the trails. After reconnaissance and consultation with higher headquarters,
1:55:17
Speaker 1: Kerr decided to take his raiders by rubber boat to Reggie,
1:55:20
Speaker 1: where he would begin their trek. The assault on Vayru
1:55:24
Speaker 1: would be a double envelopment. Lieutenant de Villo W. Brown's
1:55:28
Speaker 1: third platoon, designated Task Force B, would take the lightly
1:55:32
Speaker 1: defended village of Tome on the eastern side of the harbor.
1:55:37
Speaker 1: The remainder of the force would attack the main enemy
1:55:39
Speaker 1: defenses at Tetemera on the opposite shore. The simultaneous assaults
1:55:44
Speaker 1: were to take place on the originally scheduled D day.
1:55:48
Speaker 1: Once the approaches were secured, ap ds would land two
1:55:51
Speaker 1: Army infantry companies. The Marines departed Seggi the evening of
1:55:55
Speaker 1: twenty seven June and landed at Reggi just after midnight.
1:56:00
Speaker 1: They rested a few hours and then moved out single
1:56:03
Speaker 1: file on the narrow trail. Company O took the lead,
1:56:06
Speaker 1: with Company P bringing up the rear. Native scouts served
1:56:10
Speaker 1: as guides and the point. The small force had not
1:56:14
Speaker 1: gone very far when the path disappeared into a swamp.
1:56:18
Speaker 1: After three hours of tough movement, firing erupted at the
1:56:21
Speaker 1: end of the column. One of the Japanese patrols known
1:56:25
Speaker 1: to be in the area had stumbled upon the rear guard.
1:56:28
Speaker 1: The raiders killed four of the enemy and suffered no casualties.
1:56:32
Speaker 1: About an hour later, a Japanese force of about twenty men,
1:56:36
Speaker 1: possibly the same force, came up from a side trail
1:56:39
Speaker 1: and hit the rear guard in the flank. After an
1:56:42
Speaker 1: hour of firing, the enemy broke off the action.
1:56:46
Speaker 2: There were no known.
1:56:47
Speaker 1: Casualties on either side, but the five man rear point
1:56:50
Speaker 1: failed to rejoin the Marine column. They later turned up
1:56:53
Speaker 1: back at Segi. The Raiders crossed the Mohi River late
1:56:57
Speaker 1: in the afternoon and set up a perimeter defense for
1:56:59
Speaker 1: the night. The wicked terrain and the two forced halts
1:57:03
Speaker 1: convinced Kern that he would not make it to Vairru
1:57:06
Speaker 1: in time for D Day. Since he no longer had
1:57:09
Speaker 1: any working radios. He sent two native runners to Kennedy,
1:57:12
Speaker 1: asking him to relay a message to higher command that
1:57:15
Speaker 1: the fourth Raiders would be a daylight in making its attack.
1:57:19
Speaker 1: After a miserable rainy night, the Marines moved out. They
1:57:23
Speaker 1: reached the Choi.
1:57:24
Speaker 2: River late in the morning.
1:57:26
Speaker 1: As the rear elements crossed, an enemy force on a
1:57:29
Speaker 1: hill three hundred yards to the battalion's flank opened up
1:57:32
Speaker 1: with heavy fire from machine guns and rifles. The battalion
1:57:36
Speaker 1: halted again as Kerrn tried to determine what was transpiring.
1:57:41
Speaker 1: After about three hours, he knew that his rear had
1:57:43
Speaker 1: successfully engaged a small unit, probably another enemy patrol, so
1:57:48
Speaker 1: the remainder of the force proceeded on its way. The
1:57:51
Speaker 1: raiders crossed the snakelike Choi River twice before halting for
1:57:55
Speaker 1: the night at eighteen hundred. The third platoon reached the
1:57:58
Speaker 1: perimeter at twenty one. They had lost five killed and
1:58:02
Speaker 1: another man was wounded, but they had counted eighteen enemy dead.
1:58:07
Speaker 1: It seemed likely that the enemy at Vairu was now
1:58:09
Speaker 1: aware of the marine presence. Since the native scouts indicated
1:58:14
Speaker 1: that the area north of the harbor was considered impassable,
1:58:17
Speaker 1: Kern suspected that the Japanese would reinforce Tome against an
1:58:21
Speaker 1: attack from the east. In view of that and the
1:58:24
Speaker 1: losses to Brown's unit, the colonel decided to strengthen that
1:58:28
Speaker 1: wing of his assault. Captain Anthony Cold Steel Walker would
1:58:33
Speaker 1: now lead two platoons of his company p against Tome.
1:58:37
Speaker 1: Given the difficulties with the terrain and communications, there would
1:58:40
Speaker 1: be no attempt to coordinate the two arms of the envelopment.
1:58:43
Speaker 1: Walker was free to attack whenever he chose. After dawn
1:58:46
Speaker 1: on one July, with the plans finalized, the raiders settled
1:58:51
Speaker 1: in for another night of rain. The battalion resumed the
1:58:55
Speaker 1: march early the next morning, but Walker's unit soon branched
1:58:58
Speaker 1: off on the shorter route to Tome. During the course
1:59:01
Speaker 1: of the day, the main force crossed several ridges and
1:59:04
Speaker 1: the Vairu and Teta rivers. Everyone to include the native
1:59:09
Speaker 1: bearers carrying the heavy weapons ammunition, felt exhausted, but the
1:59:13
Speaker 1: worst was yet to come. In twilight, the marines had
1:59:17
Speaker 1: to forge the Mango, a wide, swift river that was
1:59:20
Speaker 1: at least six feet deep. They formed a human chain
1:59:24
Speaker 1: and somehow managed to get everyone across without incident. The
1:59:28
Speaker 1: tough hills now disappeared, but in their place was a
1:59:31
Speaker 1: mangrove swamp waist deep in the pitch darkness, The men
1:59:35
Speaker 1: stumbled forward through the mess of water, roots, and mud. Finally,
1:59:39
Speaker 1: the natives brought forward bits of rotting jungle vegetation from
1:59:43
Speaker 1: the banks of the Mango. With this luminescent material on
1:59:47
Speaker 1: their backs, each raider could at least follow.
1:59:50
Speaker 2: The man in front.
1:59:51
Speaker 1: At the end of the swamp was a half mile
1:59:54
Speaker 1: climbed to the top of a ridge where the unit
1:59:56
Speaker 1: could rest and prepare for the attack. The nightly rain
2:00:00
Speaker 1: and the struggles of hundreds of men soon made the
2:00:02
Speaker 1: steep slope nearly impassable. Several hours after nightfall, the battalion
2:00:07
Speaker 1: finally reached level ground, and the Marines huddled on the
2:00:10
Speaker 1: sides of the trail until dawn. Unbeknownst to the raiders,
2:00:14
Speaker 1: the amphibious portion of the assault against Vau had taken
2:00:17
Speaker 1: place as previously scheduled. Although the Navy commander in charge
2:00:22
Speaker 1: was aware of Kern's message altering the date of the
2:00:24
Speaker 1: land attack, he chose to order his APDs to approach
2:00:27
Speaker 1: the harbor on thirty June. The Japanese three inch gun
2:00:31
Speaker 1: quickly drove them off. Unable to contact Kerran, higher headquarters
2:00:36
Speaker 1: then decided to land.
2:00:37
Speaker 2: The army force.
2:00:38
Speaker 1: Embarked in the APDs near the same spot where the
2:00:41
Speaker 1: raiders had begun their trek. The new mission was to
2:00:44
Speaker 1: move overland and support the Marines, who were apparently experiencing difficulties.
2:00:50
Speaker 1: The Japanese commander at VAU reported that he had repulsed
2:00:53
Speaker 1: in American landing. Both wings of the Raider assault force
2:00:57
Speaker 1: moved out early on the morning of one July. By
2:01:01
Speaker 1: zero eight forty five, Walker's detachment reached the outskirts of
2:01:04
Speaker 1: Tome without being discovered. The men deployed opened fire on
2:01:09
Speaker 1: the tiny village and then rushed forward. Most of the
2:01:13
Speaker 1: defenders apparently died in the initial burst of fire. The
2:01:17
Speaker 1: two marine platoons secured the village without a single casualty
2:01:20
Speaker 1: and counted thirteen enemy bodies. Just as that engagement came
2:01:24
Speaker 1: to a close, six American aircraft appeared over the harbor.
2:01:29
Speaker 1: These were not part of the original plan, but headquarters
2:01:32
Speaker 1: had sent them to soften up the objective when it
2:01:34
Speaker 1: realized that the raidar attack would be delayed. Although this
2:01:38
Speaker 1: uncoordinated air support could have resulted in disaster, it worked
2:01:42
Speaker 1: out well in practice. The planes ignored Tome and concentrated
2:01:47
Speaker 1: their efforts on Tetemea. The Japanese abandoned some of their
2:01:51
Speaker 1: fixed defenses and moved inland, directly into the path of
2:01:54
Speaker 1: the oncoming raiders. Current's point made contact with the enemy
2:01:58
Speaker 1: shortly after the bombing ceased. Company O, leading the battalion column,
2:02:04
Speaker 1: quickly deployed two platoons online astride the trail. The raiders
2:02:08
Speaker 1: continued forward and destroyed Japanese outposts, but then ran into
2:02:12
Speaker 1: the enemy main body, which was bolstered by several machine guns.
2:02:17
Speaker 1: Progress then was painfully slow as intermittent heavy rain swept
2:02:20
Speaker 1: the battlefield. Company oh's reserved platoon went into line to
2:02:25
Speaker 1: the left as noise indicated that the enemy might be
2:02:27
Speaker 1: gathering there for a counter attack. As the day wore on,
2:02:32
Speaker 1: the raiders pushed the Japanese back until the Marine right
2:02:35
Speaker 1: flank rested on high ground overlooking the harbor. Kern fed
2:02:39
Speaker 1: some of Company p's machine guns into the line, then
2:02:42
Speaker 1: put his remaining platoon, also from Company P, on his
2:02:46
Speaker 1: right flank. Demolition's men moved forward to deal with the
2:02:50
Speaker 1: enemy machine guns, and mid afternoon, a handful of Japanese
2:02:54
Speaker 1: launched a brief Bonzai attack against the Marine left. Not
2:02:59
Speaker 1: long after this out effort dissolved, Kern launched Lieutenant Malcolm
2:03:02
Speaker 1: and McCarthy's Company P platoon against the enemy's left flank
2:03:06
Speaker 1: while Company zero provided a base of fire. McCarthy's men
2:03:10
Speaker 1: quickly overran the three inch gun and soon rolled up
2:03:13
Speaker 1: the enemy line as the remainder of the Japanese defenders
2:03:16
Speaker 1: withdrew toward the northwest. The Raiders had suffered eight dead
2:03:21
Speaker 1: and fifteen wounded, while killing forty eight of the enemy
2:03:24
Speaker 1: and capturing sixteen machine guns and a handful of heavier weapons.
2:03:29
Speaker 1: The Fourth Raiders consolidated its hold on Vru and conducted
2:03:32
Speaker 1: numerous patrols over the next several days. The two army
2:03:36
Speaker 1: companies landed near Reggie finally reached home on four July.
2:03:41
Speaker 1: The Navy brought in more army units on nine July,
2:03:44
Speaker 1: and the Marines boarded the LCIs for Guadalcanal. The other
2:03:48
Speaker 1: half of the Fourth Raider Battalion, Companies N and Q,
2:03:52
Speaker 1: received its baptism of fire during this same period. This
2:03:56
Speaker 1: unit was under command of the battalion executive Officer, Major J.
2:04:00
Speaker 2: Clark.
2:04:01
Speaker 1: It was assigned to assist the Army's second Battalion, one
2:04:04
Speaker 1: hundred third Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Lester E. Brown and seizing
2:04:08
Speaker 1: Vangunu and the approaches to Wickham Anchorage. On thirty June,
2:04:13
Speaker 1: intelligence from the coast watchers indicated that there were about
2:04:16
Speaker 1: one hundred Japanese occupying the island. The plan called for
2:04:20
Speaker 1: the Raiders to make a pre dawn landing at undefended
2:04:23
Speaker 1: Olowana Bay. The army would follow them ashore after daylight,
2:04:28
Speaker 1: establish a beachhead, and then deal with the enemy, thought
2:04:31
Speaker 1: to be located in a village along the coast several
2:04:33
Speaker 1: miles to the east. The night landing, under conditions of
2:04:37
Speaker 1: low visibility and heavy seas turned into a fiasco. The
2:04:41
Speaker 1: APDs began debarkation in the wrong spot, their Higgins boats
2:04:45
Speaker 1: lost formation when they attempted to pass through the LCIs
2:04:49
Speaker 1: loaded with soldiers, and the two raider companies ended up
2:04:52
Speaker 1: being scattered along seven miles of coastline. When the army
2:04:56
Speaker 1: units began to land after daylight, they found just seventy
2:04:59
Speaker 1: five marine holding the designated beachhead. A two man patrol,
2:05:04
Speaker 1: one lieutenant each from the raiders and the army battalion
2:05:07
Speaker 1: had been ashore since mid June to reconnoiter. With the
2:05:10
Speaker 1: aid of native scouts. They provided the exact location of
2:05:14
Speaker 1: the Japanese garrison, and the joint force soon headed to
2:05:17
Speaker 1: the northeast toward its objective. Native scouts and the handful
2:05:21
Speaker 1: of marines led the way, with two Army companies F
2:05:24
Speaker 1: and G in trace. The remaining raiders were to join
2:05:28
Speaker 1: up with their unit as soon as they could, All
2:05:32
Speaker 1: but one platoon did catch up by the time the
2:05:34
Speaker 1: Americans reached their line of departure, a few hundred yards
2:05:37
Speaker 1: north of the village. The plan of attack was simple.
2:05:41
Speaker 1: The army units passed through the raiders on the east
2:05:44
Speaker 1: west trail to assume the easternmost position. The entire column
2:05:49
Speaker 1: of files then merely faced to the right, which placed
2:05:51
Speaker 1: the composite battalion online and pointing toward the enemy to
2:05:55
Speaker 1: the south. Company Q held the right flank on the
2:05:58
Speaker 1: bank of the Kayruka. Company N in the center, and
2:06:03
Speaker 1: Company F on the left flank would guide on the
2:06:05
Speaker 1: movements of Q. Company G held back and acted as
2:06:09
Speaker 1: the reserve. Within minutes of beginning the advance, the attack
2:06:13
Speaker 1: ran into resistance. Japanese fire from the west bank of
2:06:18
Speaker 1: the river was particularly heavy, and Company Q crossed over
2:06:21
Speaker 1: to deal with this threat. At the same time, Company
2:06:25
Speaker 1: F moved to its left to skirt around strong defenses.
2:06:28
Speaker 1: Company G soon moved in to fill the gap. By
2:06:32
Speaker 1: late afternoon, the Americans were able to clear the east
2:06:35
Speaker 1: bank of the river. Lieutenant Colonel Brown ordered Company Q
2:06:39
Speaker 1: to disengage from the west bank and join in the
2:06:41
Speaker 1: battalion's perimeter defense at the mouth of the river. The
2:06:45
Speaker 1: Marines had lost ten dead and twenty one wounded, while
2:06:48
Speaker 1: the army had suffered similarly. The enemy made no ground
2:06:52
Speaker 1: attack that night, but periodically fired mortars and machine guns
2:06:56
Speaker 1: at American lines.
2:06:58
Speaker 2: During a lull.
2:06:59
Speaker 1: At zero two hundred three Japanese barges approached the beach,
2:07:02
Speaker 1: apparently unaware that ownership of the real estate was under dispute.
2:07:07
Speaker 1: As they neared shore, the Marines guarding the seaward position
2:07:10
Speaker 1: of the perimeter opened up. One craft sank and the
2:07:14
Speaker 1: other two broached in the surf. Two Marines and one
2:07:18
Speaker 1: soldier died in the firefight, but the entire enemy force,
2:07:21
Speaker 1: estimated at one hundred twenty men, was destroyed in the
2:07:24
Speaker 1: water or on the beach. The next morning, Brown decided
2:07:28
Speaker 1: to disengage and moved to Vairu village, where he could
2:07:31
Speaker 1: reorganize and direct fire support on the remaining enemy at Kairuka.
2:07:35
Speaker 1: Prior to launching another attack. The Americans received only harassing
2:07:40
Speaker 1: fire as they withdrew. After a day of preparatory fire
2:07:44
Speaker 1: by air, artillery and naval guns, the Composite Battalion returned
2:07:48
Speaker 1: to Kaiyruka on three July. They seized the village against
2:07:53
Speaker 1: minimal resistance, killed seven more Japanese and captured one. The
2:07:58
Speaker 1: raiders returned to Olowana Bay by LCI later the next day.
2:08:03
Speaker 1: On nine July, they made a pre dawn landing from
2:08:05
Speaker 1: an LCT on Gadukai Island to investigate reports of a
2:08:09
Speaker 1: fifty man Japanese unit. The Marines found evidence of the
2:08:13
Speaker 1: enemy but made no contact. They returned to Olowana Bay
2:08:17
Speaker 1: on ten July and departed for Guadalcanal the day after.
2:08:22
Speaker 1: There they joined up with Lieutenant Colonel Kern and the
2:08:24
Speaker 1: rest of the fourth Raider Battalion end of chapter ten,
2:08:35
Speaker 1: Chapter eleven of From Macon to Bogainville Marine Raiders in
2:08:39
Speaker 1: the Pacific War by John T.
2:08:41
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
2:08:42
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
2:08:46
Speaker 2: N O.
2:08:46
Speaker 1: Guy, the first Raider Battalion in the Raider Regimental Headquarters,
2:08:52
Speaker 1: joined in on the New Georgia operation in the early
2:08:54
Speaker 1: hours of five July. They spearheaded the night landing of
2:08:59
Speaker 1: the Northern Group. Rice Anchorage, a spot selected because previous
2:09:03
Speaker 1: reconnaissance showed it to be undefended. Coastal guns from Enegui
2:09:07
Speaker 1: and the island of Kolam Bengara fired on the APDs
2:09:11
Speaker 1: during the landing, but their accuracy was poor. In the
2:09:14
Speaker 1: driving rain, the only serious interference came from enemy destroyers.
2:09:19
Speaker 1: A long range torpedo sunk one of the American transports. Nevertheless,
2:09:25
Speaker 1: the troops and most of their equipment and supplies made
2:09:28
Speaker 1: it ashore, and the amphibious group was able to withdraw
2:09:31
Speaker 1: before daylight left them vulnerable to further enemy counteraction. From
2:09:36
Speaker 1: Rice Anchorage, the first Raider Battalion was to advance overland
2:09:40
Speaker 1: to seize Dragon's Peninsula and the enemy's barge bases at Enogui.
2:09:44
Speaker 2: And by Roco.
2:09:46
Speaker 1: The army's third Battalion, one hundred forty eighth Infantry would
2:09:49
Speaker 1: head deeper into the interior and establish a blocking position
2:09:53
Speaker 1: on the trail connecting Enegui by Roko with Munda. Another
2:09:57
Speaker 1: army unit, third Battalion, one hundred four fifth Infantry, would
2:10:01
Speaker 1: divide itself, with half securing the beachhead and the remainder
2:10:05
Speaker 1: serving as the reserve force. Intelligence reports indicated five hundred
2:10:10
Speaker 1: Japanese troops were in place on Dragon's Peninsula. Liver's Edge
2:10:14
Speaker 1: in the regimental headquarters accompanied the First Raiders. A reconnaissance patrol,
2:10:19
Speaker 1: headed by Raider Captain Clay A.
2:10:21
Speaker 2: Boyd, had already been.
2:10:22
Speaker 1: On the island for some time when the American force
2:10:25
Speaker 1: landed on five July. His small detachment, a coastwatcher and
2:10:30
Speaker 1: the ever present native scouts helped guide the initial waves
2:10:33
Speaker 1: of marines to shore. The natives had also cut fresh
2:10:37
Speaker 1: trails leading to the Giza Giza River at the head
2:10:40
Speaker 1: of Enogai Inlet. With this advanced preparation, the units covered
2:10:44
Speaker 1: the seven miles of rough terrain to the Giza Giza
2:10:47
Speaker 1: before nightfall. With darkness came heavy rain. There were no
2:10:53
Speaker 1: trails through the swamp on the far side of the
2:10:55
Speaker 1: Giza Giza, and the rain rendered the Tomoco River unfordable,
2:10:59
Speaker 1: so it took all all the next day for the
2:11:01
Speaker 1: force to move less than a mile and cross the Tomoko.
2:11:04
Speaker 1: There they halted and endured another night of rain. Late
2:11:08
Speaker 1: in the morning on seven July, the raider advance guard
2:11:11
Speaker 1: met up with the enemy for the first time. In
2:11:14
Speaker 1: a brief fight, It killed two men and captured the
2:11:17
Speaker 1: remaining five members of a small Japanese patrol near the
2:11:20
Speaker 1: village of Marinusa. From there, the trail followed the steep
2:11:24
Speaker 1: sides of a coral ridge for a mile and the
2:11:27
Speaker 1: village of Trey at the western end of the ridge.
2:11:30
Speaker 2: The advance guard.
2:11:31
Speaker 1: Encountered a second patrol. The raiders killed eleven Japanese here,
2:11:36
Speaker 1: but lost three dead and four wounded. The attackers set
2:11:40
Speaker 1: up around Treery for the night and arranged ambushes along
2:11:43
Speaker 1: the trails. Entering the village at dawn on a July,
2:11:47
Speaker 1: a strong enemy force bumped into the platoon of raiders
2:11:50
Speaker 1: from Company D, blocking the trail to Bairoko. The fight
2:11:54
Speaker 1: lasted all morning, and the Japanese did not break off
2:11:57
Speaker 1: till Company C arrived on the scene. The enemy left
2:12:00
Speaker 1: behind fifty dead while the army companies held Trere. The
2:12:05
Speaker 1: raider battalion moved out in the afternoon for Enegui. That
2:12:09
Speaker 1: trail entered yet another swamp along the southern edge of
2:12:12
Speaker 1: the inlet. This one was so bad that Griffith decided
2:12:16
Speaker 1: to return to Treri and try a new route the
2:12:18
Speaker 1: next day. It was just as well, for the Japanese
2:12:22
Speaker 1: had renewed their counter attack on the Bairoko trail and
2:12:25
Speaker 1: were pressing hard on the soldiers. A raider platoon from
2:12:28
Speaker 1: Company B slipped around the enemy flank and soon caused
2:12:31
Speaker 1: the Japanese to withdraw again. On the morning of nine July,
2:12:35
Speaker 1: the first Raider Battalion headed down a different trail toward Enegei.
2:12:40
Speaker 1: It crossed the swamp by an easier route and led
2:12:42
Speaker 1: onto the high ground that dominated the objective. At fifteen hundred,
2:12:47
Speaker 1: Company C made contact with the Japanese defenses. Company A
2:12:52
Speaker 1: went into line on the left of Company C, anchoring
2:12:55
Speaker 1: its left flank on Leland lagoon. Company B took the
2:12:58
Speaker 1: right flank. Thick jungle canopy prevented the use of mortars,
2:13:03
Speaker 1: but the lack of light also kept undergrowth to a minimum,
2:13:06
Speaker 1: leaving good fields of fire for small arms. Companies A
2:13:11
Speaker 1: and C were soon pinned down, though Company B reported
2:13:14
Speaker 1: no contact to its front As night fell, the firing
2:13:18
Speaker 1: slacked off. Early the next morning, Company B patrols moved
2:13:22
Speaker 1: forward and discovered their portion of the front unoccupied. Griffith
2:13:26
Speaker 1: then ordered his right flank to attack through the open
2:13:29
Speaker 1: terrain near the inlet. Mortars provided valuable support, and Company
2:13:34
Speaker 1: B advanced quickly. With their flank turned. The Japanese began
2:13:38
Speaker 1: to pull out and cross to the spit of land
2:13:40
Speaker 1: on the north side of Leland Lagoon. Company a's machine
2:13:44
Speaker 1: guns turned that into a bloody retreat, but its infantry
2:13:47
Speaker 1: platoons still could not crack the tight resistance in their
2:13:50
Speaker 1: immediate front. By evening, however, the raiders had surrounded these
2:13:55
Speaker 1: final holdouts. At first light. The following day, eleven Company
2:14:01
Speaker 1: deattacked with hand grenades and cleaned out the area. American
2:14:05
Speaker 1: losses in the campaign against Enegui were fifty four dead
2:14:08
Speaker 1: and ninety one wounded, but the Marines and soldiers had
2:14:11
Speaker 1: killed three hundred and fifty Japanese and seized twenty three
2:14:14
Speaker 1: machine guns and four one hundred forty millimeters coastal defense guns.
2:14:19
Speaker 1: These results were remarkable given the handicaps which the American
2:14:23
Speaker 1: forces faced. The rough terrain had made it impossible for
2:14:27
Speaker 1: the troops to carry all the rations and ammunition they needed.
2:14:31
Speaker 1: The first raiders had gone without food for more than
2:14:33
Speaker 1: a day when supplies air dropped to Tree refinally reached
2:14:36
Speaker 1: them on the front lines at Enegae the evening of
2:14:39
Speaker 1: ten July. With the exception of one air strike, fire
2:14:43
Speaker 1: support had come entirely from the raiders handful of sixty
2:14:46
Speaker 1: millimeter mortars. There was also no way to quickly evacuate
2:14:50
Speaker 1: wounded to adequate hospitals until the Marines had taken Anoguy.
2:14:54
Speaker 1: Then on July eleven, three PBYs flew in to carry
2:14:58
Speaker 1: the casualties to the rear. That mission almost had an
2:15:02
Speaker 1: unhappy ending when two Japanese planes appeared and straighted the
2:15:06
Speaker 1: pbwise as they sat on the water boarding the wounded. Luckily,
2:15:10
Speaker 1: damage was slight and the Amphibian planes were able to
2:15:13
Speaker 1: take off after the attack. When the Pbwise departed, they
2:15:18
Speaker 1: carried two of Liver's Edge's staff officers with a plea
2:15:21
Speaker 1: for better aerial resupply. And for the fourth Raider Battalion
2:15:26
Speaker 1: by Roko, things were worse for the third Battalion, one
2:15:31
Speaker 1: hundred forty eighth Infantry. After breaking off from the line
2:15:34
Speaker 1: of march of the first Raiders on six July, the
2:15:37
Speaker 1: soldiers had moved over equally difficult terrain to assume their
2:15:41
Speaker 1: blocking position on the Munda by Roko trail. On eight July,
2:15:45
Speaker 1: after initial success against surprise Japanese patrols, the Army battalion
2:15:50
Speaker 1: fought a bloody action against an enemy force of similar
2:15:53
Speaker 1: strength that pushed the American soldiers off high ground and
2:15:56
Speaker 1: away from the important trail. Heavy jungle, and poor maps
2:16:00
Speaker 1: prevented aerial resupply of their position, while illness and casualties
2:16:05
Speaker 1: sapped manpower. Liver's Edge led a reinforcing company from the
2:16:09
Speaker 1: third Battalion, one hundred forty fifth Infantry to the scene
2:16:12
Speaker 1: on thirteen July. Disappointed at the results of this portion
2:16:17
Speaker 1: of the operation and unable to reinforce or resupply this
2:16:20
Speaker 1: outpost adequately, the Raider colonel decided to withdraw the force
2:16:24
Speaker 1: to Treery. There the soldiers would recuperate for the upcoming
2:16:28
Speaker 1: move on by Roco and disrupt enemy movement on the
2:16:31
Speaker 1: Munda Bairoco trail with occasional patrols. Prior to dawn on
2:16:36
Speaker 1: eighteen July, four APDs brought the fourth Raider Battalion and
2:16:40
Speaker 1: fresh supplies to Enogui. Most of the Rice Anchorage garrison
2:16:45
Speaker 1: had also moved up to join the main force. This
2:16:48
Speaker 1: gave Liver's Edge four battalions, but all of them were
2:16:51
Speaker 1: significantly under strength due to losses already suffered in the
2:16:55
Speaker 1: New Georgia campaign. The fourth Raider Battalion was short more
2:16:59
Speaker 1: than two hundred men. The first Raiders reorganized into two
2:17:03
Speaker 1: full companies B and D, with A and C becoming
2:17:06
Speaker 1: skeleton units. A detachment of the third Battalion, one hundred
2:17:10
Speaker 1: forty fifth.
2:17:11
Speaker 2: Infantry remained at Rice Anchorage.
2:17:14
Speaker 1: More important, the enemy at Bairoko was now aware of
2:17:17
Speaker 1: the threat to its position.
2:17:19
Speaker 2: Marine patrols in.
2:17:20
Speaker 1: Mid July noted that the Japanese were busily fortifying the
2:17:23
Speaker 1: landward approaches to their last harbor on the north coast
2:17:27
Speaker 1: of the island. Liver's Edge issued his order for the attack.
2:17:32
Speaker 1: It would commence the morning of twenty July, with two
2:17:34
Speaker 1: companies of the first Raider Battalion and all of the
2:17:37
Speaker 1: fourth advancing from Enegai, while the third Battalion, one hundred
2:17:40
Speaker 1: forty eighth Infantry moved out along the Truri by Roko trail.
2:17:45
Speaker 1: The American forces would converge on the Japanese from two directions.
2:17:50
Speaker 1: The remaining Army battalion guarded Truri Companies A and C
2:17:53
Speaker 1: of the Raiders defended Enogui. These units also served as
2:17:58
Speaker 1: the reserve. Requested an airstrike on by Roco time to
2:18:03
Speaker 1: coincide with the attack.
2:18:04
Speaker 2: But it never materialized.
2:18:07
Speaker 1: The movement toward by Roco kicked off at zero eight
2:18:10
Speaker 1: hundred and the first Raider battalion made contact with enemy outposts.
2:18:13
Speaker 1: Two hours later, Companies B and D deployed into line
2:18:17
Speaker 1: and pushed through a series of Japanese outguards. By noon,
2:18:21
Speaker 1: Griffith's men had reached the main defenses, which consisted of
2:18:25
Speaker 1: four fortified lines on parallel coral ridges just a few
2:18:29
Speaker 1: hundred yards from the harbor. The bunkers were mutually supporting
2:18:33
Speaker 1: and well protected by coconut logs and coral. Each held
2:18:37
Speaker 1: a machine gun or automatic weapon. Here, the first battalions
2:18:41
Speaker 1: attacked ground to a halt. Liver's edge accompanying the northern
2:18:46
Speaker 1: prong of his offensive committed the fourth battalion in an
2:18:49
Speaker 1: attempt to turn the enemy flank, but it met the
2:18:52
Speaker 1: same heavy resistance. The raider companies slowly worked their way forward,
2:18:57
Speaker 1: and by late afternoon they had seized the first two
2:18:59
Speaker 1: enemy However, throughout this advance, enemy ninety millimeter mortar fire
2:19:05
Speaker 1: swept the marine units and inflicted numerous casualties. The southern
2:19:10
Speaker 1: prong of the attack was faring less well. The Army
2:19:14
Speaker 1: battalion made its first contact with the enemy just one
2:19:17
Speaker 1: thousand yards from Biroko, but the Japanese held a vital
2:19:20
Speaker 1: piece of high ground that blocked the trail. With the
2:19:24
Speaker 1: lagoon on one side and a deep swamp on the other,
2:19:27
Speaker 1: there was no room for the soldiers to maneuver to
2:19:29
Speaker 1: the flanks of the enemy position. With the approval of
2:19:33
Speaker 1: the executive officer of the Raider Regiment, the commander of
2:19:36
Speaker 1: the Army battalion pulled back his lead units and used
2:19:39
Speaker 1: his two eighty one millimeter mortars to soften the defenses.
2:19:43
Speaker 1: When news of the halt and the Southern attack made
2:19:46
Speaker 1: it to Liver's Edge at sixteen hundred, he asked the
2:19:48
Speaker 1: commanders of the raider battalions for their input. Griffith and
2:19:52
Speaker 1: Kerrn checked their lines. They were running out of water
2:19:56
Speaker 1: and ammunition. Casualties had been heavy, and there was no
2:20:00
Speaker 1: friendly fire support. Neither battalion had any fresh reserves to
2:20:04
Speaker 1: commit to the fight. Moreover, a large number of.
2:20:08
Speaker 2: Men would be needed to hand carry the many wounded
2:20:10
Speaker 2: to the rear.
2:20:12
Speaker 1: The fourth Raiders alone had ninety litter cases. From their
2:20:16
Speaker 1: current positions on high ground, the marine commanders could see
2:20:19
Speaker 1: the harbor just a few hundred yards away, but continued
2:20:22
Speaker 1: attacks against a well entrenched enemy with fire superiority seemed wasteful.
2:20:27
Speaker 1: Not long after seventeen hundred. Livers Age issued orders for
2:20:31
Speaker 1: all battalions to pull back into defensive positions for the
2:20:34
Speaker 1: night in preparation for a withdrawal to Enegai and Trurary
2:20:37
Speaker 1: the next day. He requested air strikes to cover the
2:20:41
Speaker 1: latter movement. The move back across Dragon's Peninsul on twenty
2:20:45
Speaker 1: one July went smoothly from a tactical point of view.
2:20:49
Speaker 1: After failing to provide air support for the attack, Higher
2:20:52
Speaker 1: Echelon sent two hundred and fifty sorties against Bairoko to
2:20:55
Speaker 1: cover the withdrawal. The Japanese did not pursue, but he
2:21:00
Speaker 1: even so, it was tough going on the ground. Water
2:21:03
Speaker 1: was in short supply and everyone had to take turns
2:21:06
Speaker 1: carrying litters. The column moved slowly and halted every few
2:21:10
Speaker 1: hundred yards. In the afternoon, rubber boats picked up most
2:21:14
Speaker 1: of the wounded and ferried them to the rear. By
2:21:17
Speaker 1: that evening, the entire force was back in its enclaves
2:21:20
Speaker 1: at Eneguy and Trary. Pbwise made another trip to evacuate wounded,
2:21:26
Speaker 1: though this time two zero fighters damaged one of the
2:21:28
Speaker 1: Amphibian planes after takeoff and forced it to return to
2:21:32
Speaker 1: Eneguy inlet total American casualties were forty nine killed, two
2:21:36
Speaker 1: hundred wounded, and two missing, the vast majority of them
2:21:40
Speaker 1: suffered by the Raider battalions. The failure to seize the
2:21:44
Speaker 1: objective and the severe American losses were plainly the result
2:21:48
Speaker 1: of poor logistics and a lack of firepower. A Joint
2:21:52
Speaker 1: Chief of Staff post mortem on the operation noted that
2:21:55
Speaker 1: lightly armed troops cannot be expected to attack fixed positions
2:21:59
Speaker 1: to defended by heavy automatic weapons, mortars, and heavy artillery.
2:22:04
Speaker 1: Another factor of significance, however, was the absence of surprise.
2:22:09
Speaker 1: The Raiders had taken Enogai against similar odds because the
2:22:12
Speaker 1: enemy had not expected an attack from anywhere, but the
2:22:15
Speaker 1: sea victory at Enogai provided ample warning to the garrison
2:22:20
Speaker 1: at Biroko, and the Japanese there made themselves ready for
2:22:23
Speaker 1: an overland assault. The Raiders might still have won with
2:22:27
Speaker 1: a suicidal effort, but by Roko was not worth it.
2:22:31
Speaker 1: The first Raider regiment and its assorted battalion settled into
2:22:34
Speaker 1: defensive positions for the rest of July. The sole action
2:22:39
Speaker 1: consisted of patrols towed by Roko and nuisance raids from
2:22:42
Speaker 1: Japanese aircraft. In early August, elements of the force took
2:22:46
Speaker 1: up new blocking positions on the Munda Biroko trail. On
2:22:51
Speaker 1: nine August they made contact with Army troops from the
2:22:54
Speaker 1: Southern Landing Group. Munda Airfield had fallen four days earlier.
2:22:59
Speaker 1: Later in the month to two Army battalions moved cautiously
2:23:01
Speaker 1: against Byroco and found their way barred by only an
2:23:04
Speaker 1: occasional small outpost. The main enemy force had escaped by sea,
2:23:09
Speaker 1: and the soldiers took control of the harbor on twenty
2:23:12
Speaker 1: four August. The raider headquarters in both marine battalions embarked
2:23:16
Speaker 1: in transports on twenty eight August and sailed for Guadalcanal.
2:23:21
Speaker 1: The New Georgia campaign had been a costly one. Each
2:23:24
Speaker 1: Raider battalion had suffered battle casualties of more than twenty
2:23:28
Speaker 1: five percent. In addition, sickness had claimed an even greater number.
2:23:33
Speaker 1: The First Raiders now had just two hundred and forty
2:23:35
Speaker 1: five effectives, the Fourth Raiders only one hundred and fifty four.
2:23:41
Speaker 1: End of chapter eleven Chapter twelve of From Macon to
2:23:50
Speaker 1: Bogainville Marine Raiders in the Pacific War by John T.
2:23:54
Speaker 2: Hoffman.
2:23:55
Speaker 1: This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. In the
2:24:02
Speaker 1: immediate aftermath of the fall of New Georgia, the ally
2:24:05
Speaker 1: seized other islands in the vicinity, to include Arundo, Vella,
2:24:09
Speaker 1: Lavella and Columbangara. Thereafter, the South Pacific Command turned its
2:24:15
Speaker 1: attention to the next major step in the encirclement of Reball.
2:24:20
Speaker 1: There were several options, but the final choice was a
2:24:23
Speaker 1: landing on Bogainville, the largest island in the Solomon's Group.
2:24:27
Speaker 1: A month later, MacArthur's command would assault Cape Gloucester, on
2:24:31
Speaker 1: the western end.
2:24:31
Speaker 2: Of New Britain.
2:24:33
Speaker 1: Reball would then be within range of Allied land based
2:24:36
Speaker 1: fighter aircraft coming from two directions. Airpower thus could neutralize
2:24:41
Speaker 1: the Japanese bastion and allow it to be bypassed. The
2:24:46
Speaker 1: scheduled d day for Bogainville was one November nineteen forty three.
2:24:50
Speaker 1: Several factors dictated Halsey's scheme of maneuver for the offensive. First,
2:24:56
Speaker 1: he had too few transports and marines to make a
2:24:59
Speaker 1: direct assault on the heavily defended enemy airfields located on
2:25:02
Speaker 1: the northern and southern ends of the island. Another consideration
2:25:07
Speaker 1: was the range of land based fighters from bases in
2:25:09
Speaker 1: the central Solomons, they could only effectively cover landing in
2:25:13
Speaker 1: the southern half of Bogainville. The planner settled on the
2:25:17
Speaker 1: Empress Augusta Bay Cape Toroquina region on the western side
2:25:21
Speaker 1: of the island. Defenses were negligible there, and Bougainville's difficult
2:25:25
Speaker 1: terrain would prevent any rapid reaction from enemy ground forces
2:25:29
Speaker 1: located elsewhere on the island. Once ashore, the invasion force
2:25:34
Speaker 1: would seize a defensible perimeter, build an airfield, and eventually
2:25:38
Speaker 1: neutralize the remainder of the island from this enclave. A
2:25:42
Speaker 1: patrol landed by submarine in late September discovered that the
2:25:45
Speaker 1: area's back of the landing beaches were swampy. Aerial reconnaissance
2:25:50
Speaker 1: in October also discovered the construction of new defenses. Neither
2:25:55
Speaker 1: of these facts changed the.
2:25:56
Speaker 2: Plan, however.
2:25:58
Speaker 1: For this operation, the second and third Raider Battalions were
2:26:02
Speaker 1: organized as the second Raider Regiment, with Shapley in command.
2:26:06
Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. McCaffrey took over the Second Raider Battalion.
2:26:12
Speaker 1: Because of insufficient shipping, the initial landing consisted of just
2:26:15
Speaker 1: two regiments of the third Marine Division, reinforced by the
2:26:19
Speaker 1: raiders in the third Defense Battalion. The remainder of the
2:26:23
Speaker 1: Marines and the army's thirty seventh Division would.
2:26:25
Speaker 2: Follow at a later time.
2:26:27
Speaker 1: On one November, the third and ninth Marines, assisted by
2:26:31
Speaker 1: the second Raider Battalion, seized a swath of the coast
2:26:34
Speaker 1: from Cape Toroquina to the northwest. At the same time,
2:26:38
Speaker 1: the third Raider Battalion less company m assaulted purier Oda
2:26:42
Speaker 1: Island off Cape Toroquina. Japanese defenses in the landing area
2:26:47
Speaker 1: consisted of a single company supported by a seventy five
2:26:50
Speaker 1: millimeter gun. One platoon occupied puriro Oda and a squad
2:26:55
Speaker 1: held Toroquina Island, while the rest of the Japanese infantry
2:26:58
Speaker 1: and the gun were dug in a on the cape itself.
2:27:02
Speaker 1: The small Japanese force gave a good account of itself.
2:27:05
Speaker 1: The seventy five millimeter gun infilated the eastern landing beaches,
2:27:09
Speaker 1: while machine guns on the two small islands and the
2:27:12
Speaker 1: cape placed the approaches to this area in a crossfire.
2:27:16
Speaker 1: The result was havoc among the initial right flank assault waves,
2:27:20
Speaker 1: which landed in considerable disorder. The seventy five millimeter gun
2:27:24
Speaker 1: destroyed four landing craft and damaged ten others before Sergeant
2:27:28
Speaker 1: Robert A. Owens of the first Battalion, Third Marine silenced it.
2:27:32
Speaker 1: He received a posthumous Medal of Honor for his single
2:27:35
Speaker 1: handed charge against the key position. The Second Raider Battalion,
2:27:40
Speaker 1: landing just to the left of Owens's battalion, suffered from
2:27:43
Speaker 1: the gun and from mortar and machine gun fire raking
2:27:46
Speaker 1: the beach. McCaffrey succeeded in reorganizing his force on the
2:27:50
Speaker 1: beach and launching an attack that swept away the enemy defenses,
2:27:54
Speaker 1: but he fell mortally wounded in the process. Other battalions
2:27:58
Speaker 1: farther to the west met little or no resistance, except
2:28:02
Speaker 1: from high surf that caused many landing craft. A broach
2:28:06
Speaker 1: company m Third Raiders, temporarily attached to the Second Raider Battalion,
2:28:10
Speaker 1: moved out at noon and occupied a blocking position fifteen
2:28:13
Speaker 1: hundred yards up the Pivot Trail, the main avenue of
2:28:16
Speaker 1: approach into the beachhead. The Third Raiders silenced the machine
2:28:21
Speaker 1: guns on purra Ada on d Day and destroyed the
2:28:24
Speaker 1: last defenders on that island by late afternoon on two November.
2:28:28
Speaker 1: Total Raider casualties to this point were three killed and
2:28:31
Speaker 1: fifteen wounded. Over the next several days, the Marines advanced
2:28:36
Speaker 1: inland to extend their perimeter. There were occasional engagements with
2:28:40
Speaker 1: small enemy patrols, but the greatest resistance during this period
2:28:44
Speaker 1: came from the terrain, which consisted largely of swamp land
2:28:48
Speaker 1: and dense jungle. Once one moved beyond the beach, the
2:28:51
Speaker 1: thing most Marines would remember about Bogainville would be the deep,
2:28:55
Speaker 1: sucking mud that seemed to cover everything not already under water.
2:29:00
Speaker 1: On four November, another unit relieved the second Raider battalion
2:29:03
Speaker 1: on the line, and both battalions of the Raider Regiment
2:29:06
Speaker 1: were attached to the ninth Marines. The Raiders maintained responsibility
2:29:10
Speaker 1: for the roadblock, and companies rotated out to the position
2:29:13
Speaker 1: every couple of days. Two small attacks hit Company E
2:29:17
Speaker 1: at the roadblock the night of five November, and a
2:29:20
Speaker 1: larger one struck Company H there two days later.
2:29:24
Speaker 2: Company G came.
2:29:25
Speaker 1: Forward in support and the enemy withdrew, but the Japanese
2:29:28
Speaker 1: kept up a rain of mortar shells all that night.
2:29:31
Speaker 1: On the morning of eight November, Companies H and M
2:29:34
Speaker 1: occupied the post and received yet another assault, this one
2:29:37
Speaker 1: the heaviest yet In mid afternoon, Company's E and F
2:29:41
Speaker 1: conducted a passage of lines, counter attacked the enemy, and
2:29:44
Speaker 1: withdrew after two hours. The next morning, Companies I and
2:29:48
Speaker 1: M held the roadblock as L and F conducted another counterattack,
2:29:52
Speaker 1: preceded by a half hour artillery preparation. Japanese resistance was stubborn,
2:29:58
Speaker 1: and elements of Company's I and M and the ninth
2:30:00
Speaker 1: Marines eventually moved.
2:30:02
Speaker 2: Forward to assist.
2:30:04
Speaker 1: Shortly after noon, the enemy retired from the scene. Patrol
2:30:08
Speaker 1: soon discovered the abandoned bivouac site of the Japanese twenty
2:30:11
Speaker 1: third Infantry Regiment just a few hundred yards up the trail.
2:30:15
Speaker 1: In the midst of this action, Pfc. Henry Gurky of
2:30:18
Speaker 1: Company M covered an enemy grenade with his body to
2:30:21
Speaker 1: protect another Marine. He received a posthumous Medal of Honor
2:30:25
Speaker 1: for his heroic act of self sacrifice. The Raider Regiment
2:30:30
Speaker 1: celebrated the Marine Corps Birthday on ten November by moving
2:30:33
Speaker 1: off the front lines and into division reserve. Other than
2:30:37
Speaker 1: occasional patrols and short stints on the line, the next
2:30:40
Speaker 1: two weeks were relatively quiet for the Raiders. The Army's
2:30:44
Speaker 1: thirty seventh Division began arriving at this time to reinforce
2:30:47
Speaker 1: the perimeter. On twenty three November, the first parachute Battalion
2:30:52
Speaker 1: came ashore and temporarily joined the raiders, now acting as
2:30:55
Speaker 1: Corps reserve. Two days later, the second Raider Battalion participate
2:31:00
Speaker 1: paid it in an attack extending the perimeter several hundred
2:31:03
Speaker 1: yards to the east, but it met little opposition. On
2:31:07
Speaker 1: twenty nine November, Company M of the third Raider Battalion
2:31:10
Speaker 1: reinforced the parachutists for a pre dawn amphibious landing at Koiari,
2:31:14
Speaker 1: several miles southeast of the perimeter. This operation could have
2:31:19
Speaker 1: been a repeat of the successful Tasimboco raid, since the
2:31:22
Speaker 1: marine force unexpectedly came ashore on the edge of a
2:31:25
Speaker 1: large Japanese supply dump. However, the enemy reacted quickly and
2:31:30
Speaker 1: pinned the Marines to the beach with heavy fire. Landing
2:31:34
Speaker 1: Craft attempting to extract the force were twice driven off.
2:31:38
Speaker 1: It was not until evening that artillery, air and naval
2:31:41
Speaker 1: gunfire support sufficiently silenced opposition that the parachutists and raiders
2:31:46
Speaker 1: could get back out to sea. Army troops continued to
2:31:50
Speaker 1: pour into the enlarging perimeter. On fifteen December, control of
2:31:54
Speaker 1: the landing force passed from the one Marine Amphibious Corps
2:31:57
Speaker 1: to the Army's fourteen Corps. The Americal Division gradually replaced
2:32:02
Speaker 1: the Third Marine Division, which had borne the brunt of
2:32:05
Speaker 1: the fighting for much of the month. The Second Raider
2:32:08
Speaker 1: Regiment served as Corps reserve, but these highly trained assault
2:32:12
Speaker 1: troops spent most of their time on working parties at
2:32:15
Speaker 1: the airfield, their carrying supplies to the front lines. On
2:32:19
Speaker 1: twenty one December, the Raiders, reinforced by the first Parachute
2:32:22
Speaker 1: Battalion and a battalion of the one hundred forty fifth Infantry,
2:32:26
Speaker 1: assumed the position formerly occupied by the third Marines. The
2:32:30
Speaker 1: regiment remained there until eleven January, when an Army outfit
2:32:34
Speaker 1: relieved it. The Raiders boarded transports the next day and
2:32:38
Speaker 1: sailed to Guadalcanal.
2:32:41
Speaker 2: The Raider legacy.
2:32:44
Speaker 1: While the Second Raider Regiment had been fighting on Bogainville,
2:32:47
Speaker 1: the Raiders who had participated in the New Georgia campaign
2:32:50
Speaker 1: had been recuperating and training.
2:32:52
Speaker 2: In the rear.
2:32:54
Speaker 1: Both the first and fourth Battalions enjoyed a month of
2:32:57
Speaker 1: leave in New Zealand after which they returned to their
2:32:59
Speaker 1: base camps in New Caledonia. Just after Christmas nineteen forty three,
2:33:04
Speaker 1: Colonel Liversedge detached and passed command of the First Raider
2:33:08
Speaker 1: Regiment to Lieutenant Colonel Samuel D. Poehler, the youngest brother
2:33:12
Speaker 1: of Cheste Puller. The regiment embarked on twenty one January
2:33:16
Speaker 1: and arrived at Guadalcanal three days later. In short order,
2:33:20
Speaker 1: the Second Raider Regiment disbanded and folded into the first,
2:33:23
Speaker 1: with Shapleigh taking command of the combined unit and Polar
2:33:27
Speaker 1: becoming the executive officer. Bogainville, however, was the last combat
2:33:32
Speaker 1: action for any Raider unit. Events had conspired to sound
2:33:36
Speaker 1: the death knell of the Raiders. The main factor was
2:33:39
Speaker 1: the unprecedented expansion of the Corps. In late nineteen forty three,
2:33:44
Speaker 1: there were four divisions, with another two on the drawing boards.
2:33:48
Speaker 2: Even though there.
2:33:49
Speaker 1: Were now nearly half a million marines, there never seemed
2:33:52
Speaker 1: to be enough men to create the new battalions needed
2:33:54
Speaker 1: for the fifth and sixth Divisions. In addition to the
2:33:58
Speaker 1: usual drains like training in transience, the Corps had committed
2:34:02
Speaker 1: large numbers to specialty units defense battalions, parachute battalions, raider battalions,
2:34:08
Speaker 1: barrage balloon detachments, and many others. Since there was no
2:34:12
Speaker 1: prospect of increasing the core beyond five hundred thousand men,
2:34:16
Speaker 1: the only way to add combat divisions was to delete
2:34:18
Speaker 1: other organizations. Another factor was the changing nature of the
2:34:23
Speaker 1: Pacific War. In the desperate early days of nineteen forty two,
2:34:27
Speaker 1: there was a potential need for commando type units that
2:34:30
Speaker 1: could strike deep in enemy territory and keep the Japanese
2:34:33
Speaker 1: off balance while the United States caught its breath. However,
2:34:38
Speaker 1: there had been only one such operation, and it had
2:34:41
Speaker 1: not been a complete success. The development of the Amphibian
2:34:45
Speaker 1: tractor and improved fire support also had removed the need
2:34:48
Speaker 1: for the light assault units envisioned by Holland Smith at
2:34:51
Speaker 1: the beginning of the war. Since then, the raiders generally
2:34:55
Speaker 1: had performed the same missions as any infantry battalion. Sometimes
2:34:59
Speaker 1: this meant that their training and talent were wasted, as
2:35:02
Speaker 1: happened on Boganville and Pavuvu. In other cases, the quick,
2:35:07
Speaker 1: but lightly armed raiders suffered because they lacked the firepower
2:35:10
Speaker 1: of a line outfit. The failure on Bairoco could be
2:35:14
Speaker 1: partially traced to that fact. With many large scale, amphibious
2:35:18
Speaker 1: assaults to come against well defended islands, there was no
2:35:21
Speaker 1: foreseeable requirement for the particular strengths of the Raiders. Finally,
2:35:26
Speaker 1: there was institutional opposition to the existence of an elite
2:35:30
Speaker 1: force within the already elite Corps. The personnel and equipment
2:35:34
Speaker 1: priorities given to the first two Raider battalions at a
2:35:37
Speaker 1: time of general scarcity had further fueled enmity toward these units.
2:35:42
Speaker 1: Now that the war was progressing toward victory, there was
2:35:45
Speaker 1: less interest on the part of outsiders in meddling in
2:35:48
Speaker 1: the details of Marine Corps organization. Just as important, two
2:35:53
Speaker 1: senior officers who had keenly felt pain at the birth
2:35:56
Speaker 1: of the Raiders, Vandergriff and Thomas, were now coming into
2:35:59
Speaker 1: position where they could do something about it. On one
2:36:03
Speaker 1: January nineteen forty four, Vandergriff became Commandant of the Marine Corps,
2:36:07
Speaker 1: and he made Thomas the Director of Plans and Policies.
2:36:11
Speaker 1: In mid December nineteen forty three, Thomas's predecessor at Headquarters
2:36:15
Speaker 1: Marine Corps had already set the wheels in motion to
2:36:17
Speaker 1: disband the Raiders and the parachutists. Among the reasons cited
2:36:22
Speaker 1: in his study was that such hand picked outfits are
2:36:25
Speaker 1: detrimental to morale of other troops. A week later, a
2:36:30
Speaker 1: Marine officer on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff forwarded
2:36:33
Speaker 1: a memorandum through the Navy chain of Command noting that
2:36:36
Speaker 1: the Corps feels that any operation so far carried out
2:36:40
Speaker 1: by the Raiders could have been performed equally well by
2:36:43
Speaker 1: a standard organization specially trained for that specific mission. The
2:36:48
Speaker 1: c ANDO concurred in the suggestion to disband the special units,
2:36:51
Speaker 1: and Vandergriff gladly promulgated the change on eight January nineteen
2:36:56
Speaker 1: forty four. This gave Thomas everything he wanted freshman power
2:37:00
Speaker 1: from the deleted units and their state side training establishments,
2:37:04
Speaker 1: as well as simplified supply requirements. Due to increased uniformity,
2:37:09
Speaker 1: the Raiders did not entirely disappear. On one February, the
2:37:13
Speaker 1: first Raider Regiment was redesignated the fourth Marines, thus assuming
2:37:17
Speaker 1: the lineage of the regiment that had garrison Shanghai in
2:37:20
Speaker 1: the interwar years and fought so gallantly on Batan and Corrigidor.
2:37:26
Speaker 1: The First, third, and fourth Raider battalions became, respectively, the first, third,
2:37:30
Speaker 1: and second Battalions of the fourth Marines. The second Raider
2:37:34
Speaker 1: Battalion filled out the Regimental Weapons Company personnel, and the
2:37:38
Speaker 1: Raider Training Center transferred to the newly formed fifth Marine Division.
2:37:43
Speaker 1: Levened with new men. The fourth Marines went on to
2:37:46
Speaker 1: earn additional distinctions in the assaults on Guam and Okinawa.
2:37:50
Speaker 1: At the close of the war, the regiment joined the
2:37:53
Speaker 1: occupation forces in Japan and participated in the release from
2:37:56
Speaker 1: pow compounds of the remaining members of the old four
2:38:00
Speaker 1: with Marines. The commanders in the Pacific theater may not
2:38:03
Speaker 1: have properly used the Raiders, but the few thousand men
2:38:07
Speaker 1: of those elite units bequeath the legacy of courage and
2:38:09
Speaker 1: competence not surpassed by any other Marine battalion. The spirit
2:38:14
Speaker 1: of the Raiders lives on today in the Marine Corps
2:38:17
Speaker 1: Special Operations Capable Battalions. These infantry units, specifically trained for
2:38:23
Speaker 1: many of the same missions as the Raiders, routinely deploy
2:38:27
Speaker 1: with amphibious ready groups around the globe. End of Chapter twelve.
2:38:34
Speaker 1: End of From Macon to Bogainville Marine Raiders in the
2:38:37
Speaker 1: Pacific War by John T. Hoffman read by Aaron Bennett,