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Israel and Iran at War (Webinar Recording) · Israel Policy Pod

• 1:21
  Speaker 1: Thank you the Hello everyone, and thank you for joining us today.
• 1:30
  Speaker 1: My name is Rachel Brandenburg, israel Policy Forum's Washington Managing Director and Senior Fellow.
• 1:35
  Speaker 1: I want to welcome those of you who are joining Israel Policy Forum for the first time today, as well as our returning viewers and those listening to our podcast, israel Policy Pod.
• 1:45
  Speaker 1: Before we begin, a big thank you to Israel Policy Forum supporters.
• 1:49
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• 1:53
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• 2:04
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• 2:18
  Speaker 1: Okay, let's get started.
• 2:19
  Speaker 1: Over the next hour, I will ask our guests a few questions, but we also welcome audience participation.
• 2:22
  Speaker 1: Please put any questions you have for our guests in the chat and I will incorporate as many as I am able into the conversation.
• 2:28
  Speaker 1: We are so fortunate today to have with us two very knowledgeable and experienced analysts who have long been watching and working on issues related to Iran, both within and outside their respective governments.
• 2:41
  Speaker 1: I am personally humbled to be on screen with both of them, in particular Ken, for whom I worked as an intern nearly 20 years ago, and I'm really looking forward to our conversation.
• 2:52
  Speaker 1: Dr Raz Zimet joins us from Israel, where he is the director of Iran and the Shiite Axis Research Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, which many of you watching probably know as INSS.
• 3:05
  Speaker 1: Raz holds a master's degree and PhD in Middle Eastern history from Tel Aviv University, where his PhD focused on Iranian policy toward Nasserism and Arab radicalism between 1954 and 1967.
• 3:19
  Speaker 1: He has authored the book Iran from Within State and Society in the Islamic Republic.
• 3:21
  Speaker 1: He has authored the book Iran from Within State and Society in the Islamic Republic, published in 2022 in Hebrew, and has written and commented extensively on Iranian politics, society and foreign policy.
• 3:31
  Speaker 1: Rand Raz is a longtime Iran watcher, including during his service in the Israeli Defense Forces, where he was for more than two decades.
• 3:42
  Speaker 1: Dr Ken Pollock is vice president for policy at the Middle East Institute, a DC-based think tank focused on the Middle East.
• 3:48
  Speaker 1: Previously, he was senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and, prior to that, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, where he was also, for a time, the center's director and director of research.
• 4:02
  Speaker 1: Ken has served twice on the US National Security Council, first as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs and then as Director for Persian Gulf Affairs.
• 4:10
  Speaker 1: He began his career as a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA.
• 4:15
  Speaker 1: During his time in government, ken also worked on Middle Eastern political and military affairs for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
• 4:22
  Speaker 1: Ken has authored 10 books.
• 4:23
  Speaker 1: I will not name them all, but I can say each of them could be related to the topics we hope to cover in today's conversation.
• 4:30
  Speaker 1: Raz Ken, thank you so much for joining us this afternoon.
• 4:35
  Speaker 1: As we've all been watching, israel and Iran have been at war now for about six days.
• 4:41
  Speaker 1: Since Israel's initial operations last Thursday night, friday morning, israel has severely damaged a number of sites related to Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missile program and launch sites, as well as much of Iranian military leadership and a number of nuclear scientists.
• 4:56
  Speaker 1: Israeli strikes.
• 5:05
  Speaker 1: They have responded with a number of waves of missile and drone strikes aimed at Israel that have unfortunately led to a number of casualties, far more injuries and quite a bit of physical destruction.
• 5:11
  Speaker 1: Over the past 24 hours in particular, there's been much conversation in the United States, in Israel and presumably around the world about whether the United States will join the fight militarily and how, following the movement of significant amounts of US military platforms toward the Middle East?
• 5:28
  Speaker 1: Nobody still knows to include President Trump himself, as he said this morning what our US president is thinking, raz, I want to turn to you first.
• 5:39
  Speaker 1: Can you shed some light for us on Israeli thinking amidst this war?
• 5:44
  Speaker 1: In your view, how successful have the operations been thus far?
• 5:48
  Speaker 1: How much has Israel been able to degrade Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities, and where are they within sort of the spectrum of the military objectives they set out to achieve?
• 6:02
  Speaker 2: Yeah, thank you Rachel, thank you the IPF for hosting me tonight.
• 6:05
  Speaker 2: It's a pleasure.
• 6:06
  Speaker 2: Hopefully we won't have any alerts coming in the next hour.
• 6:10
  Speaker 2: You know, I think that from the Israeli point of view, until now it's doing quite well and I would like to point out perhaps three main Israeli achievements, military achievements, to point out perhaps three main Israeli achievements, military achievements, over the last few days.
• 6:29
  Speaker 2: The first one, of course, was the first few hours of the operation the decapitation of senior Iranian military commanders, including the chief of staff, bakheri Salami, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, the Air Force commander Haji Zayed Salami, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, the Air Force commander Haji Zayed.
• 6:47
  Speaker 2: And yes, everyone realized, also in Israel that in a state of 90 million people it's not that difficult to find successors to those commanders.
• 6:54
  Speaker 2: But it was a strategic surprise for the Iranians.
• 6:59
  Speaker 2: It certainly increased the sense of, I would say, israeli intelligence and operational infiltration into Iran, into the top echelon of Iran, high-ranking officials, and it seems to be that Khamenei really feels in a way alone when some of the high-ranking commanders surrounding him suddenly disappeared.
• 7:24
  Speaker 2: So that's one aspect of the Israeli successes.
• 7:29
  Speaker 2: Then the second one is, of course, the main objective of this war, israeli attempt to degrade Iran's nuclear facilities.
• 7:38
  Speaker 2: And here I would like to say that perhaps there are three main elements for this success, or partial success, at this point.
• 7:46
  Speaker 2: One is Natanz.
• 7:48
  Speaker 2: Natanz, one of the two main enrichment sites in Iran, was not totally destroyed, that's for sure.
• 7:56
  Speaker 2: But even if you look at the statements of Mr Grossi, the director general of the IEA, two days ago, saying that more than 15,000 centrifuges were destroyed due to Israeli operation, that's a big success.
• 8:11
  Speaker 2: Then there were other sites being targeted by Iran.
• 8:16
  Speaker 2: Tonight there were several reports about Israeli targeting Karaj, another site which is related to the production of advanced centrifuges near Tehran.
• 8:27
  Speaker 2: The site in Isfahan, another site affiliated with Iran's enrichment infrastructure.
• 8:34
  Speaker 2: And then another element which in my view is very important, was the assassination of more beginning of more than 10 nuclear scientists, and that has always been quite a bottleneck of Iran's scientific community working not just on nuclear issues in general but also on weaponization part of the nuclear program, and that by itself could certainly have an impact not just on Iran's nuclear program today but on Iran's ability to reconstitute its nuclear program the day after the war.
• 9:13
  Speaker 2: Last but not least, there have been dozens of Israeli attacks against different kinds of Iranian assets missiles production, missiles launchers.
• 9:25
  Speaker 2: You ask about missiles capabilities.
• 9:27
  Speaker 2: Well, yesterday the spokesman of the IDF mentioned that about a third of the launchers in Iran were destroyed.
• 9:36
  Speaker 2: Israel has attacked command and control posts, headquarters of the IRGC, today, law enforcement forces.
• 9:45
  Speaker 2: So, despite the fact and we can speak about it later despite the fact that there is no objective for Israel for a regime change in Iran, but certainly some of the actions carried out by Israel in recent days certainly managed in a way to weaken the regime Bottom line, very significant operational capabilities.
• 10:09
  Speaker 2: One missing point is still Fordow.
• 10:12
  Speaker 2: Fordow is perhaps the last main nuclear facility which has not been yet targeted.
• 10:18
  Speaker 2: That's why there are more and more voices in Israel calling for US intervention.
• 10:22
  Speaker 2: There are more and more voices in Israel calling for US intervention.
• 10:24
  Speaker 2: But other than that, I think that after five days of war, israel can certainly be quite satisfied.
• 10:31
  Speaker 2: Main concern again we might talk about it later is the risk of being dragged into a kind of war of attrition if we don't know where to put an end to that.
• 10:46
  Speaker 1: Thank you.
• 10:47
  Speaker 1: Yes, I will come back to that and where we go from here.
• 10:50
  Speaker 1: I want to turn first to Ken Ken from Iran.
• 10:54
  Speaker 1: You've had a lot of experience looking at Iran's military program, other actors in the region.
• 11:05
  Speaker 1: What are you seeing in Iran right now?
• 11:05
  Speaker 1: What do you view as their reaction?
• 11:06
  Speaker 1: What capabilities do they have to keep responding to Israeli attacks?
• 11:09
  Speaker 1: They've said they want to come to the table.
• 11:10
  Speaker 1: What are you thinking about?
• 11:28
  Speaker 3: with Raz, delighted to be in it with IPF, which I think is a terrific organization.
• 11:31
  Speaker 3: We should recognize, of course, that one of the.
• 11:34
  Speaker 3: It seems.
• 11:34
  Speaker 3: Again, none of us knows exactly what Prime Minister Netanyahu was thinking, but it seems quite obvious that one of the rationales for launching this attack when he did is that Iran is at a moment in time when its capacity to retaliate is quite low.
• 11:45
  Speaker 3: Hezbollah has been eliminated as a potential source of retaliation.
• 11:50
  Speaker 3: Hamas has also been degraded to the extent that they were likely the Houthis as well.
• 11:57
  Speaker 3: Iran's own ballistic missile force had been revealed to be a very limited capacity in terms of penetrating Israeli ballistic missile defenses, so it was always clear that Iran was going to have a very limited ability to respond to it.
• 12:11
  Speaker 3: I will simply say, rachel, that I think that what I've seen from the Iranians so far is exactly what I expected, and in fact, I wrote about this for Foreign Affairs about six months.
• 12:20
  Speaker 3: They asked me what would an Israel-Iran war look like, and I think I did pretty well in laying out what was going to happen.
• 12:27
  Speaker 3: The Iranians have responded, I think, both in terms of anger, but also in an effort to try to restore some deterrent by simply firing off what they're able to at the Israelis Drones when and where they're able, ballistic missiles when and where they're able, as missiles when and where they're able.
• 12:45
  Speaker 3: As I said, I think this is both because they are angry and they're frightened, but I do think that there is an aspect of trying to impose some damage on Israel to try to get the Israelis to stop, because, at the end of the day, that is Iran's problem.
• 13:03
  Speaker 3: They have very little capacity to fight back against Israel and really what they want right now is they want this thing to end.
• 13:12
  Speaker 3: And that's what I'm mostly seeing from the Iranians.
• 13:15
  Speaker 3: And you know Raz made a number of really important points and I do hope we'll come back to them.
• 13:20
  Speaker 3: You know I'll just pull out one that I think is particularly important that both on the Israeli side and the Iranian side, we've actually seen a tremendous amount of care taken with the kinds of targets that are being struck.
• 13:35
  Speaker 3: Yes, iran is salvoing missiles and drones at Israel, trying to do damage to Israel, but it's not doing a lot of other things that it might.
• 13:45
  Speaker 3: It's not attacking Americans, it's not going after the Gulf states or after the oil exports in the Gulf right.
• 13:52
  Speaker 3: There are things that Iran could do, which it is deliberately choosing not to.
• 13:56
  Speaker 3: And the same thing for Israel.
• 13:58
  Speaker 3: Again, I completely agree with Raz.
• 13:59
  Speaker 3: I think he was spot on and I think it's an important point.
• 14:02
  Speaker 3: You've had people out there saying oh, the Israelis are clearly going after regime change.
• 14:06
  Speaker 3: Absolutely not Right.
• 14:08
  Speaker 3: Again, I don't know what's in Prime Minister Netanyahu's head and maybe you'll get around to that, but just as a military analyst looking at what Israel is striking, this is not an air campaign right now that is designed to bring about regime change.
• 14:22
  Speaker 3: The Israelis would be striking a whole range of other targets if they were trying to do so.
• 14:27
  Speaker 3: I think that is very deliberate.
• 14:29
  Speaker 3: I think that there is a strategic rationale behind it, which I actually think is quite smart, and I think that the Iranians also do recognize that to a certain extent, to the extent that they are able to do so.
• 14:40
  Speaker 3: And again, it's why this war you know it looks terrible.
• 14:44
  Speaker 3: It's obviously horrible for the people who are suffering in various different ways, but the truth of the matter is, right now, this conflict is actually quite well contained because the Iranians are looking to get out of it as quickly as they can and the Israelis are being very deliberate about what they're trying to achieve.
• 15:04
  Speaker 3: Thanks, ken.
• 15:04
  Speaker 1: So I want to pull on that thread for a moment and where we are being very deliberate about what they're trying to achieve.
• 15:08
  Speaker 1: Thanks, ken.
• 15:09
  Speaker 1: So I want to pull on that thread for a moment and where we are now versus where we could go.
• 15:12
  Speaker 1: Two things that have been on my mind and, I think, on the mind of many folks who are watching, is will the US get involved?
• 15:16
  Speaker 1: What is the US considering?
• 15:17
  Speaker 1: And then I'll turn back to you, raz, on what if the US doesn't get involved.
• 15:23
  Speaker 1: What are Israel's options?
• 15:24
  Speaker 1: So, ken, can you talk to us for a moment about US considerations?
• 15:31
  Speaker 1: What has the US been doing thus far?
• 15:32
  Speaker 1: Who knows what our president is thinking, but what would you be thinking about if you were weighing this decision?
• 15:37
  Speaker 3: Sure, and you know, yeah, this is such a strange administration.
• 15:42
  Speaker 3: It just doesn't behave like any other one that we've ever seen not anyone that I've ever worked for.
• 15:49
  Speaker 3: You know, the president makes his decisions.
• 15:52
  Speaker 3: He makes his decisions not based on staff work but, famously, on his gut.
• 15:57
  Speaker 3: It's what his impulses tell him.
• 15:58
  Speaker 3: I do have the impression that he is certainly interested in getting involved.
• 16:26
  Speaker 3: I think that a number of statements he's made, fact that he has been so dismissive and despairing of Tucker Carlson right, the fact that he's been, you know, criticizing Tucker Carlson, who's been, you know, arguing the United States should not get involved in this, I see, is actually quite significant, revealing of where Trump's head is Now.
• 16:44
  Speaker 3: Setting aside the president and getting to the rest of your question, point number one, the United States is moving additional forces to the region.
• 16:52
  Speaker 3: We're sending another surface combatant, we're sending an additional aircraft carrier, you guys all know we're sending refueling aircraft closer to the theater.
• 17:01
  Speaker 3: We're clearly posturing ourselves so that we could intervene militarily if we chose to do so.
• 17:08
  Speaker 3: But don't assume that that's what this is about.
• 17:11
  Speaker 3: This is also completely consistent with the United States simply wanting to do a better job to be able to defend our interests in the region, which, by the way, include protecting Israel from Iranian strikes, right.
• 17:23
  Speaker 3: So this is all very consistent with that, and while it would enable us to enter the war and conduct offensive operations against Iran more effectively, it doesn't mean that we absolutely are doing so.
• 17:36
  Speaker 3: Then the last piece of your question, which I think is the most important one, is why would we intervene?
• 17:42
  Speaker 3: Right?
• 17:42
  Speaker 3: What would we be trying to accomplish if we did so?
• 17:45
  Speaker 3: You know Raz mentioned Firdo.
• 17:48
  Speaker 3: Firdo is very important.
• 17:50
  Speaker 3: Again, I think there's been a lot of kind of people saying things without fully having thought all of it through.
• 17:58
  Speaker 3: Yes, as best we understand, it would be very difficult for Israel to destroy Firdo through airstrikes alone, right, but let's recognize that Israel may have other plans for Firdo.
• 18:10
  Speaker 3: You know, I will say that I was speaking to a very senior IDF officer the other day, and you know he made the statement to me and I asked him and he said yes, you're welcome to repeat this.
• 18:22
  Speaker 3: He said I think that if this campaign ends and Ferdow remains operational, that we will not have achieved all of our objectives.
• 18:31
  Speaker 3: Right, which I took as a sign that you know Israel has thought this through and you know Israel has been thinking about the problem for Ferdow for over a dozen years and typically when the IDF thinks really hard about a problem, they come up with some really creative solutions.
• 18:48
  Speaker 3: They might be thinking about special forces or cyber or some combination of the two, along with airstrikes.
• 18:54
  Speaker 3: Or, let's recognize, the IDF may have come up with a solution to Ferdow that none of us has ever thought of right, none of us at least.
• 19:03
  Speaker 3: Maybe Roz did, but certainly you and I, rachel.
• 19:05
  Speaker 3: We didn't have any inkling of the beeper attack.
• 19:08
  Speaker 3: That was a complete surprise to us.
• 19:10
  Speaker 3: I don't think any of us would have predicted that the Israelis would be able to build a drone base outside of Tehran.
• 19:17
  Speaker 3: So let's recognize that that is all out there.
• 19:20
  Speaker 3: But the real issue for the United States is less about what gets destroyed in this strike.
• 19:26
  Speaker 3: That's certainly part of it and, yes, us intervention could be about taking out Firdo and some other facilities that Israel may be having difficulty with.
• 19:34
  Speaker 3: The bigger issue and again what I hope President Trump is thinking about, but I'm afraid that he isn't is this issue of the long term and preventing Iran from reconstituting its nuclear program down the road.
• 19:48
  Speaker 3: Israel has struck various facilities around the region over the course of time Iraq in 1981, syria 2007, and then, along with us with the Stuxnet attack, iran again in 2002, sorry 2010, with very mixed results in terms of the long-term impact.
• 20:10
  Speaker 3: Right, this war cannot result in Iran getting a nuclear weapon in two or five or 10 years.
• 20:18
  Speaker 3: That would be a terrible outcome.
• 20:20
  Speaker 3: And so, whatever the US does and I'm glad to unpack the different scenarios, but I want to stop talking right now Whatever we do, our intervention has to be designed to make it that much less likely, in fact, impossible, if we can do it, for Iran to reconstitute.
• 20:37
  Speaker 3: That's what we need to be thinking about, and it can go either way.
• 20:40
  Speaker 3: Either way, thanks.
• 20:41
  Speaker 1: Ken, yeah, I want to come back to some of the potential implications for the US in the region and Israel.
• 20:47
  Speaker 1: But first, raz, from the Israeli perspective, let's say the US doesn't strike Fordow.
• 20:53
  Speaker 1: And in your answer, just to respect some of the audience questions, can you say a word about what Fordow is for some of our watchers?
• 21:01
  Speaker 2: Yeah well, Fodor is the second enrichment site in Iran, but it's more difficult to deal with Fodor, in which there is enrichment today to 60%.
• 21:12
  Speaker 2: By the way, the fact that Fodor is under the ground in the mountains is the main reason why, according to the JCPOA sign in 2015, the Iranians were not allowed to enrich uranium in Fordow, but only in the Tansk.
• 21:26
  Speaker 2: It shouldn't come as a surprise that Israel wants the Americans to take direct part in this campaign.
• 21:36
  Speaker 2: It's been discussed for many years that there is a very big difference between the impact of an Israeli unilateral attack on Iran and a joint Israeli-American efforts.
• 21:47
  Speaker 2: It could be much quicker, it could be more efficient, and I certainly agree with Ken concerning that.
• 21:56
  Speaker 2: There are some ways to deal with Fordow other than aerial attack.
• 22:01
  Speaker 2: By the way, it's not just military commanders saying that without dealing with Fordow, Israel is not going to put an end to the war.
• 22:09
  Speaker 2: Just two or three days ago, the national security advisor the Israel national security advisor also said very clearly in a TV interview.
• 22:20
  Speaker 2: He said we are not going to end this war with Fordow still intact, and the meaning of that, as he still doesn't know if the United States is going to play a role in that that probably there are other ways to deal with Fordow, but they are probably much riskier and therefore Israel would certainly love the Americans to do that.
• 22:47
  Speaker 2: If the United States doesn't play a direct role and, by the way, the United States, we have to say, plays a major role in defending Israel right now but if not, then I think that the main purpose would be to try and deal with FODO in other ways, At least to have a certain impact on FODO.
• 23:11
  Speaker 2: I'm not sure that Israel is capable of destroying FODO entirely, but it would certainly assist Israel to see American involvement, and then I think one implication would be not just that it would be more efficient, but I think that the US involvement could certainly put an end to the war much quicker than perhaps an adjusting Israeli operation.
• 23:42
  Speaker 1: Thanks, raz.
• 23:42
  Speaker 1: I had in mind and we've gotten a number of questions from the audience related to diplomacy.
• 23:47
  Speaker 1: You mentioned the war could end quickly if there's a more decisive strike on Fordow or US involvement.
• 23:52
  Speaker 1: There's also still talk from the US president, from the Iranians, about negotiations.
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: Is there and Ken, I'll turn to you first for this do you envision a scenario in which the US and Iran can come to the table right now to have meaningful conversations that could lead to an Israeli and Iranian ceasefire and achieve Israel's objectives with respect to Iran's nuclear program?
• 24:18
  Speaker 1: And then, raz, I'll ask you from the Israeli perspective is there any scenario in which Israel would stand down, and what would a sufficient agreement look like?
• 24:28
  Speaker 3: Sure, look, rachel.
• 24:29
  Speaker 3: I think in some ways that's exactly what the Iranians would like.
• 24:34
  Speaker 3: I think that, again, they are desperate to stop this war and if they can get into negotiations with the United States as a way to putting an end to the war, that is exactly what they need to have happen Now.
• 24:48
  Speaker 3: Again, if they can do it with some other country, that'd be even better, right, but the United States may be its last preference, but nonetheless it's the only realistic one out there.
• 24:58
  Speaker 3: The Israelis are not going to be terribly interested if the Iranians decide to sit down with the Qataris over talks about their nuclear program.
• 25:07
  Speaker 3: The big question mark, of course, will be what happens in those negotiations.
• 25:12
  Speaker 3: What is Iran actually willing to give on?
• 25:15
  Speaker 3: You know, again, this is the big question mark lying out there.
• 25:19
  Speaker 3: It's not just how much does Israel destroy in these strikes, it's making sure that Iran does not reconstitute down the road right.
• 25:28
  Speaker 3: Nobody wants to repeat this.
• 25:30
  Speaker 3: Nobody wants this war to lead to an Iranian nuclear arsenal, and again, part of Iran's strategy might well be hey, let's get to those negotiations.
• 25:40
  Speaker 3: Let's take up President Trump on his offer in hope that we can end the Israeli airstrikes and just play out the negotiations without having to give up anything meaningful.
• 25:53
  Speaker 3: I think that's actually why the statements that President Trump is making that there can be no enrichment in Iran is a very important one is a very important one, right?
• 26:03
  Speaker 3: I'd actually like to see him go a little bit beyond that and say you know basically nothing other than civilian nuclear uses, and those are going to have to be tightly controlled.
• 26:12
  Speaker 3: And he said things that are close to it, right?
• 26:14
  Speaker 3: But the Iranians have to understand that that's got to be what these talks look like.
• 26:18
  Speaker 3: So can I imagine, absolutely.
• 26:21
  Speaker 3: But point number one, back to Raz's point Israel is going to prosecute this war, and it's going to prosecute this war until it believes that it is taking care of everything that it needs to believe, and I don't think that there's going to be again.
• 26:33
  Speaker 3: I want to be a little careful because it's the Middle East unexpected things happen, but certainly Israel is going to resist any effort to shut down this war before then.
• 26:43
  Speaker 3: Once that happens, I do think that it is a perfectly reasonable off-ramp for the war to say we're now going to shift to negotiations mediated by the United States that will put a permanent end to Iran's nuclear program, but in return again, as President Trump has offered we would lift our sanctions.
• 27:03
  Speaker 3: They would get to rebuild their economy, at least to a certain extent, that way, as something of a carrot for them.
• 27:09
  Speaker 3: But the Iranians are going to have to be willing to accept that, and at the moment it's not entirely clear that they are.
• 27:16
  Speaker 3: It's the kind of thing that I could certainly imagine Ayatollah Khamenei agreeing to, but he's got other constituencies right now.
• 27:26
  Speaker 3: He's got a Revolutionary Guard Corps and other more hardline members of his regime who probably are opposing him rather fiercely.
• 27:33
  Speaker 3: He'll have to get his domestic ducks in order.
• 27:36
  Speaker 3: So, yes, I can definitely see us moving in that direction.
• 27:39
  Speaker 3: But I'll also say I don't think that's the inevitable way that this ends.
• 27:43
  Speaker 3: I don't think it's a foregone conclusion.
• 27:44
  Speaker 3: I don't think we should be Pollyanna-ish about that's the inevitable way that this ends.
• 27:45
  Speaker 3: I don't think it's a foregone conclusion.
• 27:46
  Speaker 3: I don't think we should be Pollyanna-ish about that being the likely end to this.
• 27:51
  Speaker 1: Thanks, ken.
• 27:51
  Speaker 1: Before I turn to Raz, we've gotten a couple of questions, as both of you have been talking about what is happening inside Iran.
• 27:57
  Speaker 1: One in response, ken you said they're desperate to stop the war beyond sort of the degradation of their military capabilities.
• 28:03
  Speaker 1: What are you seeing among reactions in Iran economy, infrastructure, et cetera?
• 28:09
  Speaker 1: Sorry to me or to Raz yeah sorry, Ken you, and then I'll turn back to Raz.
• 28:17
  Speaker 3: So you know, again, I'm paid to look a little deeper than most people, but most of what I'm seeing is what most of other people are seeing too, the Iranian I should.
• 28:27
  Speaker 3: I should caveat this pockets of the Iranian population are deeply frightened.
• 28:31
  Speaker 3: You know, everyone focuses on Tehran and Tehran is a huge, you know, symbol for Iran.
• 28:38
  Speaker 3: A lot of people do live in Tehran, but we should remember, you know, there are 92 million people in Iran.
• 28:44
  Speaker 3: Most of them don't live in Tehran, right, and we're not necessarily seeing everyone evacuate Mash that are big and go boom and burn very bright and very loud, but the Israelis didn't wipe out all of Tehran's infrastructure.
• 29:21
  Speaker 3: They didn't wipe out all of its oil infrastructure.
• 29:24
  Speaker 3: Again, they were very precise in picking out targets that would send a very big message to people without actually destroying civilian life there.
• 29:33
  Speaker 3: Gasoline situation isn't bad.
• 29:34
  Speaker 3: You can get gas.
• 29:34
  Speaker 3: It's just that people are so frightened and they are leaving.
• 29:47
  Speaker 3: But we've not yet seen any degradation of the regime's control over Iranian society.
• 29:52
  Speaker 3: We've not seen any particular shutdown of the Iranian economy.
• 29:56
  Speaker 3: The Iranian economy was in really bad shape before this started.
• 29:59
  Speaker 3: It's not like we've seen any kind of an economic collapse.
• 30:03
  Speaker 3: The big thing is that a lot of people are afraid, particularly in places like Tehran.
• 30:10
  Speaker 1: Thanks, ken Raz.
• 30:11
  Speaker 1: I'll turn back to you on the topic of negotiation, sort of what might it take for Israel to stand down absent achievement of all military objectives?
• 30:21
  Speaker 1: And as an addition to that, is there a point at which there's too much pain for Israelis or interceptors run out?
• 30:28
  Speaker 1: Is there a limit to Israel's ability to prosecute this war?
• 30:34
  Speaker 2: First of all, israel is not going to oppose diplomacy.
• 30:37
  Speaker 2: I think it's very clear in Israel, and it's been very clear from the beginning, that there is no way to totally destroy Iran's nuclear program, even through an American joint and American-Israeli efforts.
• 30:50
  Speaker 2: And at the end of the day we'll have to make sure that Iran doesn't reconstitute its program, doesn't use what is remains of its nuclear program, whether it's just a few hundreds of kilograms of fissile material and a few thousands of hundreds of centrifuges, and those will have to be sorted out through diplomacy.
• 31:11
  Speaker 2: I'm not sure that Israel is going to be thrilled with a possible agreement between Iran and the United States because even if that's going to be the best deal ever signed in human history, it's very clear that at least one thing will be included in this deal as Ken said, sanctions are going to be removed and we all know that probably the money is not going to be invested just to improve the electricity and water infrastructures in Iran.
• 31:43
  Speaker 2: They will go to missiles and drones and perhaps even although it's much more difficult today to support Iran's proxies in the region.
• 31:52
  Speaker 2: But basically, israel's story is not going to impose diplomacy.
• 31:58
  Speaker 2: The Israeli position before the war was very clear and that was basically the same as the official US position.
• 32:06
  Speaker 2: We want to get a deal in which there is no enrichment inside Iran, no right for Iran to enrichment inside Iran.
• 32:15
  Speaker 2: If Iran wants to use some fuel for its civilian uses, then it can import fuel from other places.
• 32:28
  Speaker 2: So that has been the Israeli position and it's not going to change.
• 32:32
  Speaker 2: On the contrary, perhaps we will see some other demands coming from Israel, exploiting the Israeli successes over the last few days.
• 32:41
  Speaker 2: I have to say that one of my concerns and we discussed that in recent days at INSS is the possibility that there might be some disagreements between the United States and Israel when it comes not to the issue of enrichment but perhaps to other issues, for example the missiles.
• 33:05
  Speaker 2: Here I can definitely see an Israeli demand saying OK, we took care of the main threat, which is the nuclear program, but we have to also discuss the issue of long range missiles and I'm not sure that the US administration is going to insist on this issue, for example, concerning the second part of your question, look, the problem is, I'm not sure that the problem, at least at this point, is the interception capabilities.
• 33:36
  Speaker 2: Of course there is a limit, not just to interception capabilities, also to the ability of the Israeli pilots and the Israeli Air Force to continue working in Iran so far away.
• 33:52
  Speaker 2: Iran is not Gaza, it's not even Lebanon.
• 33:54
  Speaker 2: It's very difficult to work there for a relatively long period of time, but Israel can do that.
• 34:01
  Speaker 2: There is a kind of I don't like the use of this term competition, but there is a competition between the production capabilities inside Iran of new missiles and the Israeli capabilities to intercept them.
• 34:16
  Speaker 2: But I think that the main issue actually refers to Israeli resilience when it comes to its economic.
• 34:24
  Speaker 2: From the economic point of view, israeli way is disconnected.
• 34:30
  Speaker 2: Those days, no flight.
• 34:32
  Speaker 2: Or today there was the renewal of the flights to Israel to get all those hundreds of thousands of Israelis who were stuck abroad, to get them back to Israel.
• 34:43
  Speaker 2: It's still at the beginning of this process abroad to get them back to Israel.
• 34:47
  Speaker 2: It's still at the beginning of this process.
• 34:50
  Speaker 2: Until today, no working places working in Israel.
• 34:52
  Speaker 2: The economy is actually in a halt.
• 34:55
  Speaker 2: No schools.
• 34:57
  Speaker 2: So, yes, the school year is going to be ending anyway in a matter of days, ending anyway in a matter of days, but still it's a major problem to persist with this situation for much longer.
• 35:12
  Speaker 2: We don't have a lot of sleep because of the continued alerts and there is concern in Israel.
• 35:19
  Speaker 2: What will happen if, at some point and we've already seen a decline in the number of missiles being launched from Iran?
• 35:26
  Speaker 2: But what will happen if the Iranians continue to launch not 20 or 30 or 50 missiles per day, just two or three missiles per day?
• 35:35
  Speaker 2: This by itself is a major problem.
• 35:38
  Speaker 2: So we are trying to, and there is already some changes in the regulations concerning the Israeli home front, and some of the places are going to be reopened beginning of tomorrow, because there is a recognition in Israel that it's not going to be as easy to keep this emergency status quo much longer.
• 36:03
  Speaker 2: But again, I think that Israel can still manage that and I think and that would be my last remark here there is almost a consensus in Israel.
• 36:17
  Speaker 2: We with the INSF, just conducted a survey two days ago.
• 36:20
  Speaker 2: 90% of the Israeli population supports this war, despite the damage and despite the casualties, and the reason for that, I think, is very clear.
• 36:30
  Speaker 2: For many years we've been discussing in Israel the number one threat, the number one potentially existential threat to the state of Israel, which is Iran and therefore most Israelis.
• 36:42
  Speaker 2: I'm not talking just of the political system and the security establishment in Israel.
• 36:48
  Speaker 2: Ordinary Iranians realize that even if they have to deal with the Iranian threat, nuclear threat and at the end of the day the question will be whether Israel managed, if not to destroy the nuclear threat, at least to delay it in many years.
• 37:46
  Speaker 1: Thanks, raz.
• 37:46
  Speaker 1: You mentioned window of opportunity and some of that window is born out of Israel's ability to degrade Iranian proxies around its borders capability.
• 37:50
  Speaker 1: We haven't seen much from Iraq.
• 37:51
  Speaker 1: The Houthi reaction has been very muted.
• 37:52
  Speaker 1: Hezbollah said you know we're not going to get involved.
• 37:55
  Speaker 1: What are you thinking about as you watch this?
• 37:59
  Speaker 2: You know, rachel, I spent almost 25 years in the Israeli military intelligence and then about a decade at the NSS.
• 38:05
  Speaker 2: I participated in dozens of simulations and war games and discussions.
• 38:11
  Speaker 2: What will happen if and when Israel decides to strike the nuclear facilities in Iran?
• 38:18
  Speaker 2: And, with all due respect to Iran missiles capabilities, which, of course, upgraded during the recent years the number one concern was always Hezbollah and the arsenal of hundreds of thousands of rockets and missiles, and I think that there is no doubt that this was not the trigger for what Israel did six days ago.
• 38:41
  Speaker 2: But we can't understand Israeli decision to do that without understanding that, for the first time since the summer of 2024, when Israel was discussing the possibility of striking Iran, it didn't have to take into consideration the possibility of Hezbollah retaliation.
• 38:59
  Speaker 2: Syria is out of the game.
• 39:02
  Speaker 2: I think I would guess that many in Damascus today are actually quite happy with what Israel is doing in Iran.
• 39:10
  Speaker 2: Hezbollah is under major pressure.
• 39:12
  Speaker 2: By the way, we still have this concern that at some point, if the situation in Iran becomes almost an existential threat to the stability of the regime, we might see some intervention by Hezbollah, but it's not going to be easy and it's certainly not going to be as significant as before.
• 39:31
  Speaker 2: The Afghans, the Shabi, the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, are not in the business right now.
• 39:36
  Speaker 2: We've seen some clues of perhaps activity against the US forces there.
• 39:43
  Speaker 2: The Falis are already doing whatever they do to support the Palestinians in Gaza.
• 39:47
  Speaker 2: That's not significant.
• 39:48
  Speaker 2: So the bottom line is that this comes as perhaps the first real indication for the dire position of Iran, which has lost in recent months a very vital component of its deterrence strategy against Israel.
• 40:10
  Speaker 2: And of course, we all hope that the voices inside Iran which called in recent months to try and compensate for the loss of proxies and Iran's inability to force a new equation of deterrence against Israel through its missiles, both in April and then in October, in the two Iranian attacks against Israel, and they called for trying to change the nuclear doctrine of Iran in order to come up with the nuclear solution I hope that this nuclear option is going to get out of the table up the table and I think this will certainly have a major impact not just on Iran and on the Iranian-Israeli confrontation, but on the Middle East as well.
• 40:58
  Speaker 1: Thanks, Raz.
• 40:58
  Speaker 1: I want to come back to Gaza in a moment, which we've also gotten a number of questions on as well, as sort of that new Middle East architecture you're talking about.
• 41:07
  Speaker 1: But first, Ken, sticking with other regional players, how do you think about where golf partners are in this scenario?
• 41:16
  Speaker 3: Sure.
• 41:16
  Speaker 3: So I think this is an important question because it's a little bit complicated.
• 41:20
  Speaker 3: Gulf publics seem I'll put it this way angry at Israel, unhappy with Israel.
• 41:29
  Speaker 3: There seems to be a lot of negative public opinion toward Israel within the Gulf and a big chunk of that is a reflection of their sympathies for the Palestinians.
• 41:39
  Speaker 3: A big chunk of that is about Gaza and what's going on in Gaza, and they don't like to see the Israelis act with impunity and throw around their unique military weight.
• 41:51
  Speaker 3: Their governments have a very different perspective on these things.
• 41:54
  Speaker 3: First, their governments absolutely like to see, or want to see, iran defanged.
• 41:59
  Speaker 3: Iran has been their number one threat for decades, arguably since the 1979 revolution.
• 42:06
  Speaker 3: Decades, arguably since the 1979 revolution.
• 42:12
  Speaker 3: Cutting down Iran to size is very, very helpful and very positive for them.
• 42:13
  Speaker 3: There seems to be some concern.
• 42:14
  Speaker 3: My own conversations with Gulf officials.
• 42:16
  Speaker 3: They certainly are somewhat concerned about the potential for horizontal escalation, that is, escalation beyond Israel and Iran to encompass other countries.
• 42:27
  Speaker 3: There is some degree of a sense of you know this could get out of hand.
• 42:34
  Speaker 3: You know the Israelis might do this, that might cause the Iranians to do that.
• 42:37
  Speaker 3: That's certainly out there, that's certainly on the table.
• 42:40
  Speaker 3: But, as I said earlier, we've actually we have not seen that and we've seen both sides trying very hard not to move in that direction so far.
• 42:47
  Speaker 3: But that's a consideration for them as well, I think for the gulf states.
• 42:51
  Speaker 3: Um, if this war ends with the uh destruction, I'll put it that way.
• 42:57
  Speaker 3: But we really mean raz made this point earlier, he's absolutely right setting back the iranian program very severely right, and then add on to it the point that I keep making, which is that the outcome of the war results in this Iranian regime never acquiring nuclear weapons.
• 43:16
  Speaker 3: However that happens, whether it's all military or diplomatic or some combination of the two, that would be a very good outcome for the Gulf states.
• 43:24
  Speaker 3: That said, I do want to add a wrinkle to it which I think is important to understand.
• 43:30
  Speaker 3: We saw this already after the dismantling of Hezbollah by Israel, which is we need to recognize that the major driver behind the Abraham Accords, with the exception of the Emirates.
• 43:44
  Speaker 3: The Emirates are in a somewhat different area because they're looking for genuine economic cooperation with Israel for their own reasons.
• 43:52
  Speaker 3: It's just a different kind of country.
• 43:54
  Speaker 3: For the majority of the Arab states, even Saudi Arabia as it was considering it, the major driver for normalization with Israel was the Iranian threats right and before October 7, 2023,.
• 44:07
  Speaker 3: The Gulf States were very concerned about that, in particular, because the United States, under three successive administrations Obama, trump, won, and Biden had been progressively disengaging from the Middle East.
• 44:22
  Speaker 3: All of that created fears on their part, which drove them into the arms of the Israelis.
• 44:26
  Speaker 3: With the destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah began to see the Gulf states pulling back a little bit, no longer feeling the need.
• 44:36
  Speaker 3: It wasn't essential to have Israel as an ally, as they once did, and, of course, it wasn't just Hezbollah and Hamas.
• 44:43
  Speaker 3: It was also the damage that Israel had inflicted directly on Iran right, demonstrating Israel's military superiority over Iran.
• 44:52
  Speaker 3: This war because it is, I think, going to result in an even far worse diminution of Iranian military power, of Iran's military capability, not just within Iran but around the region, and, of course, in massive diminution of Iran's reputation to be able to wield influence in the region.
• 45:12
  Speaker 3: I suspect, and I think we're already starting to see it again many of these Gulf states are going to be less desirous of normalization with Israel.
• 45:22
  Speaker 3: They won't feel the need the way that they once did, and the fact that they all have publics who are antagonistic toward Israel, not sympathetic toward Israel, that will weigh more heavily for them, right, and so this is kind of a perverse outcome for the Israelis.
• 45:41
  Speaker 3: Potentially I don't think that it's you know should change their minds about this, but I do think that it's worth thinking about that.
• 45:49
  Speaker 3: Whereas before this war and before October 7, 2023, we saw this convergence of the moderate Arab states and Israel in a new alliance against Iran, messes since October 7, 2023, are causing many of the Gulf states, many of the moderate Arab states, to say you know what?
• 46:12
  Speaker 3: We don't need that alliance with Israel as much as we once did, and therefore our public's unhappiness with the situation in Gaza, with Israel's treatment of the Palestinians more broadly, that will weigh more heavily in their calculations.
• 46:26
  Speaker 1: Thanks.
• 46:26
  Speaker 1: I want to push on that for a moment and wonder if you think the same logic applies or it's just a totally different scenario for Lebanon and Syria.
• 46:35
  Speaker 3: Yeah.
• 46:35
  Speaker 3: So I do think that it's very different for both Lebanon and Syria, because the stakes are much more immediate, right?
• 46:43
  Speaker 3: In fact, it's kind of the reverse of the incentives for the Gulf States and, to some extent, jordan as well, although, again, jordan is literally the middle ground in all of this.
• 46:52
  Speaker 3: Lebanon wants Hezbollah defanged and it wants peace with Israel.
• 46:58
  Speaker 3: Right?
• 46:58
  Speaker 3: The vast majority of Lebanese, as we can tell, seem absolutely sick of the constant conflict with Israel.
• 47:06
  Speaker 3: I think they've been sick of it for decades.
• 47:08
  Speaker 3: They see this now as an opportunity to end that.
• 47:13
  Speaker 3: Obviously, the Shia population of Lebanon is the big unknown out there.
• 47:17
  Speaker 3: Just how supportive will they be of Hezbollah?
• 47:20
  Speaker 3: How much does Hezbollah have a protection racket over them?
• 47:24
  Speaker 3: But yes, I think in the case of Lebanon, it's pretty clear.
• 47:27
  Speaker 3: The new government and many of its constituents absolutely want a normalization with Israel, defanging Hezbollah and end to this conflict which has just been so ruinous for them for decades.
• 47:41
  Speaker 3: And Syria, the same thing, at least insofar as what many Syrians seem to want.
• 47:47
  Speaker 3: Same thing, at least insofar as what many Syrians seem to want and what Ahmed al-Shara wants, the now leader of Syria.
• 47:56
  Speaker 3: Now, again, there are big question marks surrounding other members of his government, and particularly his military leaders, who seem to be much more kind of radical jihadi in their orientation, don't really know how they think about Israel.
• 48:08
  Speaker 3: But you know, shara has gone out of his way to indicate that he too wants normalization and peace with Israel.
• 48:16
  Speaker 3: And again, that puts them in a very different set of circumstances, and I will say that in both of those cases, israel's further destruction of Iranian military power, I think, makes that even easier.
• 48:30
  Speaker 3: Right, it's going to make it even harder for Hezbollah to fight back.
• 48:33
  Speaker 3: It is going to make it even easier for Shara to convince his people hey, we want to make peace with Israel.
• 48:39
  Speaker 3: We don't want to get in another fight with these guys.
• 48:42
  Speaker 3: We want a better, peaceful, more prosperous future, and that means making peace.
• 48:49
  Speaker 1: Thanks, ken Raz.
• 48:50
  Speaker 1: I welcome any of your reaction to what Ken just put on the table and sort of what this could all mean for the region.
• 48:55
  Speaker 1: And then I would ask that you touch on any implications that this war has on Israel's war in Gaza.
• 49:20
  Speaker 2: Yeah, so I get the sense in Israel that the war against Iran is the last phase of the Israeli efforts to create a new environment in the Middle East, after dealing with Gaza, hezbollah, then of course, syria was not our operation, but that was clearly a result of what Israel did in Lebanon.
• 49:27
  Speaker 2: And I think that until the war in Iran erupted there was a sense of some kind of okay, we still missed something.
• 49:36
  Speaker 2: We managed to deal with Gaza, with Hamas of course not entirely, we still remember that we have more than 50 hostages in Gaza.
• 49:44
  Speaker 2: We managed to deal with Hezbollah.
• 49:49
  Speaker 2: That was a major Israeli success, which actually surprised even the Israelis the level of success against Hezbollah.
• 49:55
  Speaker 2: A Syrian regime collapsed.
• 49:59
  Speaker 2: But there was this bitterness, knowing that the number one threat on the security of the state of Israel has always been Iran.
• 50:08
  Speaker 2: That was the head of the snake, as some Israeli politicians refer to.
• 50:14
  Speaker 2: And I think that if and when and I want to be very cautious about that because we still don't know how this war is going to end we certainly hope that it won't turn into some kind of war of attrition with many casualties and damage caused, but, if this war is over, dealing very successfully with Iran's nuclear and other military threats.
• 50:42
  Speaker 2: I think it can certainly increase not just the opportunities to move forward with Syria and perhaps to complete trying to get this new architecture with Hezbollah and with Lebanon as well, but it also can convince even the more hardliners in Israel of course not Smotrich and Ben-Gur, but perhaps the more self-right in Israel.
• 51:09
  Speaker 2: Okay, we managed to do that, and the meaning of that is that we have to put an end to the war in Gaza as quickly as possible and then move forward, perhaps to create better conditions for Israel.
• 51:22
  Speaker 2: I still think that, despite all the problems and I certainly agree with Ken that it's much more problematic to resume talks with Saudi Arabia on normalization of progress not towards Palestinian states, but towards a kind of settlement with the Palestinians this by itself will be enough to reignite the possibility of normalization with the Saudis, and that would certainly be an historical turnout.
• 52:06
  Speaker 1: Thanks, Raz.
• 52:08
  Speaker 1: I want to remind the audience we have about five minutes left, so please continue putting any questions into the chat.
• 52:14
  Speaker 1: I've been trying to incorporate a number of them into our discussion, but I'm going to ask a couple very discreet ones now before I turn to another closing question.
• 52:23
  Speaker 1: One for Raz Do you have any sense of why Israel allegedly targeted Shamkhani?
• 52:32
  Speaker 2: That's a difficult question.
• 52:34
  Speaker 2: I have a thesis, but it's without being exposed to any kind of intelligence.
• 52:41
  Speaker 2: That might have something to do with the position held by Shomkhani concerning the so-called nuclear file in Iran and not just responsibility for some of the talks.
• 52:55
  Speaker 2: But perhaps he had other assignments from the Supreme Leader Khamenei, dealing not just with this political or diplomatic angle of Iran's nuclear program.
• 53:06
  Speaker 2: Of course he was very close to Khamenei as well, as we know, but unlike the high-ranking generals, this was the exception and I'm not sure that, other than his connection to the nuclear issue or the nuclear file, we could find a better explanation for that.
• 53:26
  Speaker 1: Thank you, and another very discreet question for Ken.
• 53:29
  Speaker 1: We got a question from former board chair and longtime IPF supporter and board member, Susie Gellman, about Congress.
• 53:36
  Speaker 1: What is the mood in Congress these days?
• 53:39
  Speaker 1: There are those primarily on the Democratic side maybe a Republican or two who are very focused on the authorization of use of military force and congressional oversight over the US path to war.
• 53:52
  Speaker 1: There are those who are advocating that the US needs to get involved because Iran's nuclear program is a threat to us too.
• 53:59
  Speaker 1: What are you seeing and what are you hearing?
• 54:01
  Speaker 3: Sure, and I love the fact that Susie is asking me, because I could just as easily ask Susie, but I'll give my answer since I'm the one on the screen.
• 54:08
  Speaker 3: So first, I suspect that you were going to find a great many Democrats voting against any authorization to use force simply because it is President Trump who wants it.
• 54:21
  Speaker 3: Obviously, there will be supporters of Israel there and I think that some of them might defect and vote in favor of it, but you know the partisanship is so rancorous at this moment that you know I do suspect that there will be a very significant Democratic opposition and let's recognize that.
• 54:42
  Speaker 3: You know big chunks of the Democratic Party have turned against Israel and I think that they will enthusiastically oppose any kind of an authorization for the use of military force.
• 54:53
  Speaker 3: In many ways, I think that the issues within the Republican Party are the much more interesting ones.
• 54:59
  Speaker 3: You've got this split now between and in some ways it's not a clean split, it's a three-way break.
• 55:09
  Speaker 3: Most people think of it in terms of a break between the neo-isolationists and the traditional internationalists within the Republican Party, and I think that division is out there and we have seen it on any number of occasions where you do have the kind of Rand Paul Tucker, carlson wing of the Republican Party that JD Vance also in that category, not interested in the world, not interested in what's happening out there, not particularly interested in supporting Israel.
• 55:40
  Speaker 3: And then, of course, you've got more traditional Republicans Lindsey Graham, tom Cotton, marco Rubio would have once fallen into that category I'm not sure he still does, but he once did who I think will be very supportive of the use of military force in Israel's favor.
• 55:56
  Speaker 3: But, as I said, I think there is a third group that we're not really thinking about too much, which is a group of Republicans who will simply do whatever President Trump wants them to do right.
• 56:05
  Speaker 3: These are the true MAGA folks who you know.
• 56:06
  Speaker 3: Whatever President Trump wants them to do right, these are the true MAGA folks who you know.
• 56:08
  Speaker 3: Whatever President Trump tells them to do, they will do it.
• 56:12
  Speaker 3: And so on, one day they may be in favor of a war and the next day they may be opposed to it, depending on what the president's position is.
• 56:19
  Speaker 3: And what that obviously suggests is that if the president does decide one way or the other, whatever it may be, you'll get a split.
• 56:27
  Speaker 3: You know the Republican Party will split, but that MAGA group will be with the president, and then the president will pick up either the traditional conservatives, traditional internationalist Republicans or the neo-isolationist conservatives, depending on what he does Now.
• 56:44
  Speaker 3: Is that enough for an AUMF?
• 56:46
  Speaker 3: No idea.
• 56:47
  Speaker 3: What he does Now, is that enough for an AUMF?
• 56:51
  Speaker 3: No idea.
• 56:51
  Speaker 3: We've also seen the Republicans fall in line behind the president, simply because they are afraid of all the different powers that he has and the grip that he has on the Republican base.
• 56:58
  Speaker 3: That might carry the day, but it's also a reason why we might not see a request for an authorization for the use of military force from this administration.
• 57:07
  Speaker 3: They may choose to avoid the issue altogether.
• 57:13
  Speaker 1: Thanks, ken.
• 57:14
  Speaker 1: We have about two minutes left.
• 57:16
  Speaker 1: In that Uncertainty about what we'll see here at home in the United States is a good segue to the uncertainty in all of this.
• 57:22
  Speaker 1: I think it is still very much an evolving situation.
• 57:24
  Speaker 1: So what are you each watching for in 60 seconds or less, over the coming days?
• 57:31
  Speaker 1: What are the indicators, what are the signs, what are the things that will be on your mind, raz, go ahead.
• 57:37
  Speaker 2: I think that we'll have to see in the next 24 or 48 hours whether the United States is involved in this war.
• 57:45
  Speaker 2: This will have a major impact on the way the war is being conducted.
• 57:50
  Speaker 2: If there is no US involvement, my sense is that in about a week or so, israel will probably reach the conclusion that most of the goals or the objectives could be achieved and then strive to get either a ceasefire even a unilateral ceasefire or some kind of a regime which could put an end to the war.
• 58:18
  Speaker 2: But, as I said before, my main concern today is that you know, if there is too much appetite and if there are too many successes in the next few days, there could be some voices in Israel saying, ok, we've done remarkably well, let's try this as an opportunity to look for other objectives, including perhaps regime change, and this, in my view, could be catastrophic.
• 58:45
  Speaker 2: Thank you, ken.
• 58:48
  Speaker 3: Just very quickly.
• 58:48
  Speaker 3: I completely agree with Raz.
• 58:50
  Speaker 3: What the US decides to do is hugely important.
• 58:52
  Speaker 3: I'll put Raz's second point slightly differently Changes in the Israeli target set.
• 58:57
  Speaker 3: Again, I think that Israel has been very focused and very successful in going after those.
• 59:03
  Speaker 3: There's still more to be done.
• 59:05
  Speaker 3: I am watching for Ferdow but yes, like Raz, my big question mark is does Israel start going after additional target sets, either because it feels like the opportunity is there or, to an earlier point that Raz made, because Israel believes that the only way to bring the war to a close, because the Iranians won't give up, is by going after other targets to inflict greater pain on the Iranians?
• 59:30
  Speaker 1: Thank you.
• 59:30
  Speaker 1: While our time is up, I could continue this conversation for hours, but we will stop.
• 59:35
  Speaker 1: Ken Raz, thank you again for joining us To our audience and participants.
• 59:39
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• 59:41
  Speaker 1: I think this has been a very informative, timely and insightful conversation.
• 59:45
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• 59:58
  Speaker 1: So thank you again and wishing everyone a safe night.
• 1:00:01
  Speaker 1: Bye, thank you.