Latest / KAJ Business & Money LIVE / Iran-US Update, Mecca Pact, Venezuela Oil Deal | Irina Tsukerman | Global Politics for Leaders 75
Transcript
- 0:19Speaker 1: Welcome to this episode of The World According to Irina Shukerman,
- 0:23Speaker 1: our very special series on global politics on the KAJ
- 0:27Speaker 1: Masterclass Live. Irina Shukerman is a US-based national security and
- 0:32Speaker 1: human rights lawyer, as well as renowned geopolitical analyst. Her
- 0:37Speaker 1: writings and commentary have appeared in diverse U.S. and international
- 0:40Speaker 1: media and have been translated to over a dozen languages.
- 0:45Speaker 1: Every fortnight in the world, according to Irina Shukerman, we
- 0:48Speaker 1: traverse the geopolitical landscape and delve into pressing international issues
- 0:53Speaker 1: and gain insights from Irina's expert perspective.
- 0:58Speaker 2: Welcome to the show once again, Irina.
- 1:02Speaker 3: As always, very glad to be here.
- 1:06Speaker 2: Welcome, welcome.
- 1:07Speaker 1: And Irina, just to mention you, then I'm sure you
- 1:11Speaker 1: know also this is not just any other episode. This
- 1:15Speaker 1: is the 75th episode of the world, according to Irina
- 1:19Speaker 1: Shukerman on the KJ Masterclass Live. So not a small feat.
- 1:24Speaker 1: Thank you very much for the viewers who have shown
- 1:28Speaker 1: us so much of love and affection to this particular
- 1:32Speaker 1: special series. and actually been supporting all throughout. It's almost
- 1:38Speaker 1: three years and it looks like yesterday, Irina. Thank you
- 1:41Speaker 1: again to you also to be the expert, the super
- 1:46Speaker 1: expert on this one and bringing, you know, decoding the
- 1:49Speaker 1: world events and all those things for everyone in the audience.
- 1:54Speaker 2: So thank you once again very much.
- 1:57Speaker 3: It's my pleasure.
- 2:00Speaker 2: Thank you.
- 2:00Speaker 1: So now moving on to the Big topics that we
- 2:04Speaker 1: will be covering. We'll talk about the Iran-U.S. war that
- 2:08Speaker 1: is escalating. Makeup act, Venezuela oil deal and Ukraine and
- 2:12Speaker 1: much more. But before that, Irina, let's touch a bit
- 2:15Speaker 1: on Nepal. Nepal disaster. How does it, what is your
- 2:19Speaker 1: view from that part of the world? How does it
- 2:22Speaker 1: look like? And especially, will it impact anyway the regional
- 2:28Speaker 1: setup here? Because The prime minister there, he had a
- 2:33Speaker 1: different voice altogether, some sort of damages and all those
- 2:37Speaker 1: things from neighboring countries and all of that. Help us understand,
- 2:41Speaker 1: how do you see it all from that part of
- 2:43Speaker 1: the world?
- 2:45Speaker 3: Well, it's certainly been a tragic event. It's been a
- 2:49Speaker 3: combination of human failures, extreme traumatic conditions and also infrastructural weaknesses. So, So, essentially,
- 3:01Speaker 3: once this... It was a combination of terrible flooding and
- 3:08Speaker 3: debris falling down, entering the flooding zone and actually causing
- 3:15Speaker 3: even more damage as the water with the debris and
- 3:19Speaker 3: mud and rocks and everything was slid downwards and and
- 3:26Speaker 3: created even greater momentum to spread laterally and to destroy
- 3:32Speaker 3: infrastructure along the way and sweep that infrastructure along with it.
- 3:36Speaker 3: And essentially, because of the geography, because of the intersection
- 3:41Speaker 3: of several rivers, it created a situation where multiple areas
- 3:46Speaker 3: were affected almost simultaneously. There was a very significant surge
- 3:52Speaker 3: within basically half an hour. Impossible to really evacuate and
- 3:56Speaker 3: give notice to this critical emergency situation. And it created
- 4:05Speaker 3: an isolation of certain areas and isolation of entire groups
- 4:09Speaker 3: of people who were not within the normal zone of evacuation.
- 4:13Speaker 3: These were areas that would not be.
- 4:19Speaker 3: Would not be affected by rock slides or mud slides
- 4:23Speaker 3: or flooding. So the people who were trapped there or
- 4:29Speaker 3: who were affected and impacted and killed or injured or missing,
- 4:34Speaker 3: many of them were not from areas that would normally
- 4:37Speaker 3: be prepared for such conditions because this was a once-in-a-lifetime
- 4:43Speaker 3: event combining several unusual circumstances. On top of that, natural element.
- 4:50Speaker 3: There was also the human element of not having a
- 4:53Speaker 3: rapid response team or management system because while the disaster
- 5:00Speaker 3: was ongoing the local authorities were trying to figure out
- 5:03Speaker 3: what was happening and they were simply not passing on
- 5:06Speaker 3: information quickly enough to make a difference and frankly even
- 5:10Speaker 3: if they did in some places it still wouldn't have
- 5:12Speaker 3: been fast enough. Another issue was that a lot of
- 5:17Speaker 3: the local authorities and the Nepalese government relied on Chinese
- 5:22Speaker 3: warning system, Chinese alert system, and that also was not
- 5:25Speaker 3: functioning as well as might be expected under circumstances. So
- 5:31Speaker 3: it was a combination of, you know, a unique urgency,
- 5:35Speaker 3: a uniquely critical situation, plus failed responses that would have
- 5:42Speaker 3: been subpar even for a normal natural disaster, much less
- 5:46Speaker 3: for something highly unusual.
- 5:51Speaker 2: Absolutely, absolutely, Irina.
- 5:54Speaker 1: Moving on from that story to the big story also again.
- 5:59Speaker 2: Now, Iran-U.S. update.
- 6:02Speaker 1: What's happening there? We thought, you know, the solution is coming,
- 6:07Speaker 1: solution is coming. Solution did not come. War has escalated.
- 6:11Speaker 1: Midterms are almost over. Was it the plan that is
- 6:15Speaker 1: where we are at the moment?
- 6:19Speaker 3: Frankly, I'm not all that surprised because I never expected
- 6:23Speaker 3: the Iranian leadership to simply react to intermittent campaigns because
- 6:31Speaker 3: they are not effective. They have breathing room in between
- 6:35Speaker 3: and they have time to regroup and come up with
- 6:39Speaker 3: new strategies and to respond. So all of that is
- 6:50Speaker 3: not surprising, but there's a couple of things going on
- 6:53Speaker 3: right now. First, Trump described the war as less of
- 6:58Speaker 3: a war than a conflict with intermittent escalations. I'm not
- 7:04Speaker 3: saying he's wrong to describe it that way because you know,
- 7:08Speaker 3: that's pretty accurate in terms of what was going on,
- 7:11Speaker 3: but he's also not explaining what the actual strategy is.
- 7:15Speaker 3: And at various points, he claims that we are, that,
- 7:19Speaker 3: that the street of Hormuz is free or that it's
- 7:22Speaker 3: almost free. And we are very close to having it
- 7:25Speaker 3: fully free or that, you know, that we will keep
- 7:29Speaker 3: going like this until Iran gives it up. So that's
- 7:32Speaker 3: in terms of his actual comments in terms of the strategy.
- 7:36Speaker 3: he decided to shift away from longer campaigns towards more
- 7:42Speaker 3: economic strangulation of Iran's economy through a combination of reimposed
- 7:47Speaker 3: sanctions and a naval blockade. So a number of critics
- 7:51Speaker 3: of his previous strategies said that the blockade is actually working,
- 7:56Speaker 3: that Iran is not able to sell oil through these channels,
- 8:01Speaker 3: and that it only has about two months of oil supply,
- 8:05Speaker 3: and if it If there's no solution by that point,
- 8:09Speaker 3: the economy could collapse. There could be major internal upheaval.
- 8:17Speaker 3: And some are even thinking that the regime might collapse
- 8:21Speaker 3: if the economic situation reaches that level. At the same time,
- 8:27Speaker 3: Iran continues to attack ships from other countries, and the
- 8:32Speaker 3: Kurds have also joined in that campaign. They're attacking Saudi.
- 8:36Speaker 3: The Houthis are mostly focused on Saudi ships. And after
- 8:41Speaker 3: recent escalation, Iran attacked several US allies, including Jordan, Kuwait,
- 8:47Speaker 3: and Bahrain, also Iraq. So we are seeing, and UAE
- 8:54Speaker 3: as well, so we are seeing this continued action-reaction scenario Today, U.S.
- 9:02Speaker 3: forces attacked an Iranian tanker near the strategically known Harg Island.
- 9:08Speaker 3: Trump is not saying whether he will ultimately go back
- 9:12Speaker 3: to a fully militarized strategy and try to take over
- 9:15Speaker 3: Harg Island or any other territory. I think the plan
- 9:20Speaker 3: is now mostly a long-term strategy using substantial economic pressure
- 9:26Speaker 3: and also a combination of short-term strategies deterrence-focused military operations
- 9:32Speaker 3: that are not really there to collapse the government in
- 9:35Speaker 3: and of themselves, but are there to add to the
- 9:38Speaker 3: pressure to degrade some of Iranian capabilities and basically to
- 9:43Speaker 3: signal with some level of force that Iran cannot attack
- 9:48Speaker 3: ships or take over Hormuz. U.S. also claimed that it
- 9:57Speaker 3: has freed the Hormuz from the war. naval mines that
- 10:02Speaker 3: Iran has planted. No one is sure whether it's true
- 10:06Speaker 3: or not, or whether it's true 100% or not. So
- 10:09Speaker 3: it's still a high-risk area because U.S. did not corroborate
- 10:18Speaker 3: that claim. And it's unclear whether that's accurate. Another issue
- 10:24Speaker 3: that complicates the assessment of the situation is that at
- 10:27Speaker 3: one point Iran claimed that it had come to an
- 10:31Speaker 3: agreement with Oman about a plan that would include revenue sharing,
- 10:36Speaker 3: but then eventually Oman claimed that they were merely negotiating
- 10:41Speaker 3: this position, but that Oman had not agreed to anything.
- 10:45Speaker 3: So that too makes it difficult to figure out exactly
- 10:48Speaker 3: what's going on.
- 10:51Speaker 2: Absolutely, Irina. Yeah. You wanted to add something, Irina?
- 10:56Speaker 3: Yeah, I was just going to add that on the
- 10:58Speaker 3: domestic front, There is concern about the strategy. Nobody knows
- 11:02Speaker 3: where it's going. The Iran hawks, of course, want the
- 11:06Speaker 3: Iranian economy to be weakened as much as possible. But
- 11:10Speaker 3: the goals have shifted. We are no longer talking about
- 11:14Speaker 3: a direct removal of the regime, certainly not. We are
- 11:18Speaker 3: not even talking about the nuclear or the ballistic programs,
- 11:22Speaker 3: although they are The Trump administration is claiming that they
- 11:26Speaker 3: are preparing a strategy for a post-war Iran, whatever that means,
- 11:30Speaker 3: and for the expansion of Abraham Accords, something that, in
- 11:34Speaker 3: my opinion, is only realistic with respect to some African
- 11:39Speaker 3: and maybe one or two South Asian countries, but certainly
- 11:43Speaker 3: not in the Arab world. But we will see what happens.
- 11:47Speaker 2: Absolutely. Absolutely, Irina.
- 11:50Speaker 1: So help us understand, why would President Trump called this
- 11:55Speaker 1: conflict as small potatoes at this stage of the war.
- 12:03Speaker 1: Started since February, billions of dollars spent, threat of wiping
- 12:09Speaker 1: out civilization, 17, 18 U.S. personnel dead, lots of personnel
- 12:16Speaker 1: out there. You know, so much of damage done to
- 12:20Speaker 1: its assets there in the Middle East. Help us understand
- 12:24Speaker 1: why would he at this point in time call it
- 12:27Speaker 1: small potatoes. It's almost like a political hot potato for him.
- 12:35Speaker 3: Well, I would say that Trump is definitely trying to
- 12:39Speaker 3: minimize the impact of the conflict and his message is
- 12:43Speaker 3: aimed at average Americans who for the most part are
- 12:46Speaker 3: impacted by the gas prices and inflation rather than by
- 12:50Speaker 3: the military action directly unless they're families of the military.
- 12:55Speaker 3: Several hundred, about 800 at this point, American members of
- 13:01Speaker 3: the American military have been injured, aside from those who
- 13:06Speaker 3: were killed. Compared to some of the major conflicts the U.S.
- 13:11Speaker 3: has participated in, in terms of human costs on the U.S. side,
- 13:15Speaker 3: it certainly hasn't been the biggest conflict. but the financial
- 13:21Speaker 3: and infrastructural and credibility costs have been very, very high.
- 13:25Speaker 3: US bases all over the Middle East have become unusable,
- 13:29Speaker 3: whether because they've suffered so much damage or because of
- 13:32Speaker 3: the constant barrage of attacks. So essentially, this is why
- 13:36Speaker 3: those carriers were stuck without being able to land for
- 13:41Speaker 3: such a long time, because the bases where these soldiers
- 13:45Speaker 3: and officers would normally land be manning, those bases were
- 13:51Speaker 3: no longer available and they had to do whatever they
- 13:54Speaker 3: were doing from the ships. Now one of those ships
- 13:58Speaker 3: is finally gone, it has stopped by Thailand for some
- 14:05Speaker 3: break before going back home for maintenance. There is supposed
- 14:12Speaker 3: to be a replacement for the carrier that was taken
- 14:15Speaker 3: out of the Indo-Pacific in the near future as well,
- 14:19Speaker 3: trying to manage multiple potential threat theaters at the same time.
- 14:24Speaker 3: But the small potato conflict, while it may seem relatively
- 14:28Speaker 3: minor compared to the war in Ukraine, where hundreds of
- 14:33Speaker 3: thousands of people have been killed, on Russia's side, maybe
- 14:37Speaker 3: over a million soldiers have been killed. Obviously, we're not
- 14:41Speaker 3: talking about that scale, but in terms of economic impact,
- 14:46Speaker 3: in terms of geopolitical impact, it's anything but small potatoes.
- 14:52Speaker 3: It has forced the entire Gulf to reconsider their logistics
- 14:57Speaker 3: and supply chains, to consider land routes and completely alternative
- 15:02Speaker 3: maritime routes as well. It has forced some European countries
- 15:07Speaker 3: to re-examine their reliance on fossil fuels and actually push
- 15:11Speaker 3: them towards alternative sources of energy, which Trump, with the
- 15:15Speaker 3: exception of nuclear, despises. So it has had the kind
- 15:20Speaker 3: of impact Trump probably would not wish it to have.
- 15:23Speaker 3: And yet Trump is trying to send a message to
- 15:26Speaker 3: his audience as well. It's not such a big deal.
- 15:28Speaker 3: We're not all that involved. We don't have a huge
- 15:31Speaker 3: number of people out there. It's 50,000 people and their
- 15:36Speaker 3: stake has been extended to next year. But, you know,
- 15:41Speaker 3: at the end of the day, the hostilities are not constant.
- 15:44Speaker 3: It's not like we're battling every day and so forth.
- 15:48Speaker 3: It's mostly now an economic conflict. That is how he's
- 15:53Speaker 3: trying to position the situation. I'm not sure anyone except
- 15:58Speaker 3: the hardest of his supporters will actually buy it.
- 16:03Speaker 2: Absolutely.
- 16:04Speaker 1: So do you think, you know, Iran is also reconciled
- 16:08Speaker 1: to the fact that let a couple of years pass
- 16:11Speaker 1: by and then perhaps a better solution will come? Difficult
- 16:15Speaker 1: to deal with Trump, even President Trump is reconciled to this, perhaps?
- 16:21Speaker 2: Or do you think, you know, it will get solved
- 16:23Speaker 2: after the midterms?
- 16:26Speaker 3: It's hard to say because Hex has extended the stay
- 16:30Speaker 3: of the American troops in the region until next year.
- 16:34Speaker 3: So he thinks— he at least clearly thinks that at least
- 16:38Speaker 3: the danger of renewed military operations will be there for
- 16:44Speaker 3: long after the midterms. Whether Congress starting January will authorize
- 16:50Speaker 3: or will try to intervene with the expectation that more
- 16:55Speaker 3: Democrats will join the House remains to be seen. I
- 17:00Speaker 3: think there will be a lot more tension with the U.S.
- 17:02Speaker 3: Congress over continued U.S. stay there. But on the other hand,
- 17:08Speaker 3: even if Democrats see that the blockade is working, that
- 17:11Speaker 3: the Iranian regime really is on the verge of collapse
- 17:14Speaker 3: several months from now, they may actually become more supportive
- 17:18Speaker 3: of retaining U.S. presence if there is no military action
- 17:22Speaker 3: per se and if they're achieving some sort of economic
- 17:28Speaker 3: results in weakening Iran and its proxies. The issue is
- 17:31Speaker 3: it's very hard to measure. For now, Iran is not
- 17:34Speaker 3: only talking, but preparing for a significant escalation. And while
- 17:38Speaker 3: its economy may be very well close to being in shatters,
- 17:42Speaker 3: on the military front, it has actually improved its capability
- 17:45Speaker 3: to target American and other sites and targets thanks to
- 17:53Speaker 3: Russian and Chinese assistance and thanks to its development of
- 17:57Speaker 3: more advanced weapons as a result of multiple conflicts that
- 18:01Speaker 3: are going on in the world simultaneously. So from a
- 18:04Speaker 3: military perspective, it's not at its weakest moment, I hate
- 18:08Speaker 3: to say it. And if it manages to find some
- 18:11Speaker 3: sort of economic solution, for instance, some of Iranian ships
- 18:15Speaker 3: are already traversing into other waters, closer and more into
- 18:19Speaker 3: Asia and away from the Middle East and Mediterranean, you know,
- 18:23Speaker 3: connections and further into Asia, then Iran may find an
- 18:30Speaker 3: economic solution to the U.S. blockade and simply go around.
- 18:33Speaker 3: It may take longer, but it will find at least
- 18:36Speaker 3: a partial solution to sell its oil, and that will
- 18:45Speaker 3: render the U.S. blockade completely irrelevant.
- 18:49Speaker 2: Absolutely, absolutely.
- 18:51Speaker 1: We'll come to President Trump and all those things about
- 18:54Speaker 1: Venezuela oil and all. But before that, let's touch one
- 18:57Speaker 1: important topic. That's the MECA pact. What's happening on the
- 19:04Speaker 1: MECA pact? What is the latest on that? It was
- 19:06Speaker 1: signed earlier on. Now, I guess it has got formalized now.
- 19:11Speaker 1: How should we understand what this pact is all about
- 19:15Speaker 1: right now?
- 19:17Speaker 2: What is this? And it looks like it is expanding.
- 19:19Speaker 1: Even Bangladesh seems to have shown interest into joining this.
- 19:23Speaker 1: Where does India, you know, how does it impact India
- 19:27Speaker 1: and the region as a whole?
- 19:29Speaker 3: So it started out with a collective defense arrangement that
- 19:33Speaker 3: essentially extended Pakistan's nuclear umbrella to the other two countries.
- 19:37Speaker 3: And that's something that's been in negotiation for at least
- 19:41Speaker 3: a year that I know of. Some describe it as
- 19:46Speaker 3: an Arab NATO because of an article 5-like provision which
- 19:52Speaker 3: would claim that an external attack against one member would
- 19:55Speaker 3: be treated as an attack against all three. What that
- 19:57Speaker 3: actually translates to in action remains to be seen because
- 20:02Speaker 3: all of it, despite the fact that there has been
- 20:05Speaker 3: multiple attacks on various Saudi agreements, they haven't called on
- 20:09Speaker 3: the other two countries to intervene in any significant way.
- 20:13Speaker 3: And those attacks were serious attacks on ships, on economic targets.
- 20:18Speaker 3: They were not like small drone incursions or, you know,
- 20:22Speaker 3: minor signaling. They were serious military attacks by Houthis and
- 20:27Speaker 3: by Iran. So far, we don't know whether those countries
- 20:32Speaker 3: would actually.
- 20:35Speaker 3: Whether they would actually come in when needed. And that's
- 20:38Speaker 3: what makes this pact so questionable in nature. Is it
- 20:42Speaker 3: really about a serious defense restructuring? And are Pakistan and
- 20:49Speaker 3: Turkey really going to regard Saudi as a country that
- 20:54Speaker 3: they're willing to protect? Or will it only be a
- 20:58Speaker 3: partial solution at a high price for Saudi Arabia in
- 21:01Speaker 3: exchange for some level of protection protection from the Pakistani
- 21:06Speaker 3: already serving in the Saudi military and maybe some logistical
- 21:11Speaker 3: and intelligence assistance from Turkey, will Erdogan actually send his
- 21:16Speaker 3: own troops on behalf of Saudi Arabia or Pakistan in
- 21:20Speaker 3: the event of a conflict between Pakistan and India, for instance?
- 21:26Speaker 3: Will Pakistan even need that kind of assistance or ask
- 21:30Speaker 3: for it? There are too many unknowns and For now,
- 21:33Speaker 3: this arrangement is extremely speculative and very hard to evaluate
- 21:37Speaker 3: in practice. The three governments are now trying to institutionalize
- 21:42Speaker 3: the pact through additional meetings, through training exercises and discussions
- 21:46Speaker 3: about integration, interoperability, essentially doing the practical part beyond the optics.
- 21:54Speaker 3: For instance, they have agreed to establish a permanent secretariat
- 21:57Speaker 3: in Saudi Arabia which will be initially headed by a
- 22:01Speaker 3: Pakistani secretary-general, while expanding joint military activities, defense, industrial cooperation, tech,
- 22:10Speaker 3: R & D, and coordination among the armed forces. Again,
- 22:14Speaker 3: what that actually means in practice will remain to be seen.
- 22:16Speaker 3: I can't imagine it being easy due to three different
- 22:20Speaker 3: languages being spoken. But Pakistan and Turkey are already training
- 22:26Speaker 3: together and have been for quite a while. There's also
- 22:30Speaker 3: been Egyptian-Pakistani joint trainings. While Egypt is not a formal
- 22:34Speaker 3: part of this pact, there is another quadrilateral, which does
- 22:38Speaker 3: include Egypt. There is no mutual defense arrangement, but there
- 22:43Speaker 3: is kind of a dedication to more improved mutual kind
- 22:48Speaker 3: of defense cooperation. And there's, as I mentioned, a lot
- 22:53Speaker 3: of the Pakistanis serving in Saudi Arabia, some of them
- 22:56Speaker 3: do speak Arabic, some of them grew up in Saudi Arabia,
- 22:59Speaker 3: while others, there is also potentially an English language component
- 23:06Speaker 3: to their communications. The membership discussions, however, are indeed trying
- 23:12Speaker 3: to bring in more and more members. And in my opinion,
- 23:17Speaker 3: this element of it is far less about defense and
- 23:20Speaker 3: far more about politics sending the Sunni political arrangement signal
- 23:26Speaker 3: to both the U.S. and certainly to Iran. Egypt has
- 23:30Speaker 3: been publicly mentioned as a possible participant, but so far
- 23:35Speaker 3: there hasn't been a meeting of the minds on what
- 23:39Speaker 3: each side would get from the other. Other countries, such
- 23:43Speaker 3: as Bangladesh, mostly Muslim majorities, are considering how closely they
- 23:47Speaker 3: actually want to associate themselves with the emerging structure. After all,
- 23:52Speaker 3: Bangladesh and Pakistan have not always had the easiest of
- 23:55Speaker 3: relationships either. So this could get awkward on a political level,
- 24:01Speaker 3: even if on a defense level people get along, on
- 24:04Speaker 3: a political level there could be obstacles. So potentially the
- 24:11Speaker 3: pact could extend across several strategic regions and not remain
- 24:17Speaker 3: a Gulf-focused arrangement. Pakistan connects the Pact to South Asia,
- 24:24Speaker 3: Turkey connects it to NATO, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Saudi
- 24:28Speaker 3: Arabia provides the Gulf element, but also connects it to
- 24:33Speaker 3: the entire Arab world, and possible Egyptian participation could bring
- 24:38Speaker 3: this security infrastructure into North Africa, the Red Sea, and
- 24:42Speaker 3: also the East Med. So far from being a regional
- 24:46Speaker 3: security strategy, it could end up being a multilateral strategy arrangement.
- 24:51Speaker 3: But again, trying to do too much too quickly with
- 24:54Speaker 3: too many players and too many conflicts of interest could
- 25:00Speaker 3: turn this pact into another military version of the Arab
- 25:03Speaker 3: League or the OAC, mega groupings which have in fact
- 25:09Speaker 3: achieved very little beyond issuing statements and on occasion cooperating
- 25:15Speaker 3: on some fairly anodyne projects. So So far, the political
- 25:22Speaker 3: value and political signal far outweigh the defense. There is
- 25:28Speaker 3: potential for greater defense cooperation, but it will require a
- 25:34Speaker 3: lot of very practical integrity working through an integration. For India,
- 25:40Speaker 3: it may be a political concern more than a security
- 25:44Speaker 3: concern because I don't believe that this group will be
- 25:47Speaker 3: ready for any serious conflict. Action, certainly not for any
- 25:51Speaker 3: offensive action, jointly, anytime in the near future. And those
- 25:55Speaker 3: countries that are already potentially threatening to engage interests are
- 26:00Speaker 3: doing so regardless of the pact. Pakistan hasn't stopped being Pakistan.
- 26:05Speaker 3: Turkey has been doing what it's been doing. And the
- 26:08Speaker 3: two of them have been cooperating in South Asia long
- 26:12Speaker 3: before this pact came into existence. So there's nothing substantially new.
- 26:16Speaker 3: Whether Saudi Arabia... would join them in any military action
- 26:22Speaker 3: against India. That strongly depends. First of all, I don't
- 26:25Speaker 3: think Saudi Arabia will be much of a threat from
- 26:30Speaker 3: a military perspective, even if they did. But I also
- 26:33Speaker 3: don't think they'll be very interested in joining unless Pakistan
- 26:37Speaker 3: really insists on them joining via jet planes or something
- 26:42Speaker 3: like that. I think Any cooperation would mostly be logistical
- 26:46Speaker 3: and intelligence at best. I think any operations in South
- 26:51Speaker 3: Asia would not require Saudi elements all that much because
- 26:56Speaker 3: Pakistan and Turkey have already been quite active and seem
- 27:00Speaker 3: to have managed quite well without the Saudis. I also
- 27:05Speaker 3: think that Saudi Arabia is simply not keen in entering
- 27:09Speaker 3: any additional conflicts with its hands full with the Houthis.
- 27:14Speaker 3: in the Middle East, nor would it want to disrupt
- 27:17Speaker 3: its trade relationships with India. Its relations with India have
- 27:21Speaker 3: not been conflicted lately, and I don't think Riyadh will
- 27:25Speaker 3: do anything to challenge that, because the value from this
- 27:28Speaker 3: defense agreement right now is highly questionable, while the value
- 27:32Speaker 3: of the trade relationship with India is very real and growing,
- 27:36Speaker 3: and there's also a lot of Indian workers all over
- 27:39Speaker 3: the Middle East, all over the Gulf as well. So
- 27:42Speaker 3: disrupting that over Pakistani adventurism or Turkish adventurism, I don't
- 27:48Speaker 3: think that's part of the plan. And hence, interestingly enough,
- 27:52Speaker 3: this NATO-like provision also underscores that it is mostly a
- 27:58Speaker 3: defensive alliance, that starting wars or conflicts will not automatically
- 28:03Speaker 3: bring the other two countries in if one of them
- 28:06Speaker 3: decides to enter a conflict offensively with somebody else.
- 28:13Speaker 2: Absolutely. Absolutely.
- 28:14Speaker 1: So do you think this grouping has come up on
- 28:17Speaker 1: its own or is there any, you know, behind the
- 28:21Speaker 1: scenes role by China or any other country to put
- 28:24Speaker 1: pressure on India in any way?
- 28:27Speaker 3: I think, well, Pakistan, it has essentially become China's proxy regardless.
- 28:32Speaker 3: And by the way, Interestingly enough, Iran is becoming China's
- 28:36Speaker 3: proxy as well. For now, mostly against the United States,
- 28:39Speaker 3: but Iran's caused problems for India as well. Not major
- 28:43Speaker 3: problems that would lead to a war necessarily, but enough
- 28:47Speaker 3: meddling and enough maritime challenges that it cannot be regarded
- 28:54Speaker 3: as really an ally or a serious partner beyond pragmatic
- 28:59Speaker 3: economic exchanges that the two countries have established a long
- 29:04Speaker 3: time ago. China certainly seeks to find a way to
- 29:09Speaker 3: pressure India in any way, but at the same time,
- 29:13Speaker 3: it doesn't want to be involved in a major proxy
- 29:16Speaker 3: confrontation with India at this time. That could change. It
- 29:20Speaker 3: could change depending on where things go in the Pacific
- 29:24Speaker 3: with Taiwan, and it could change if... It could change if...
- 29:32Speaker 3: if India is seen as a major active member of
- 29:35Speaker 3: the Quad and if they are actually if they see
- 29:41Speaker 3: India as challenging China's spheres of influence or projected the
- 29:47Speaker 3: areas China considers spheres of influence. Short of that, I
- 29:51Speaker 3: think it will try to draw a red line between
- 29:54Speaker 3: putting economic pressure, some sort of political pressure, trying to
- 30:00Speaker 3: or some level of internal destabilization and drawing it into
- 30:04Speaker 3: a conflict that could backfire and could create new dimensions
- 30:09Speaker 3: of competition beyond economics. So for now, I don't see
- 30:16Speaker 3: China playing an overt role, but I do see them
- 30:20Speaker 3: as playing a covert role through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
- 30:24Speaker 3: And through BRICS, they will certainly be enhancing the technological
- 30:30Speaker 3: cooperation they mentioned with this MECA pact. And because many
- 30:34Speaker 3: of the members of this pact are already de facto
- 30:37Speaker 3: members or partners of the other two organizations, they could
- 30:41Speaker 3: also benefit from tech exchanges and from defense exchanges with
- 30:46Speaker 3: China through this new mechanism as a group. But again,
- 30:50Speaker 3: I see that as going to be a very slow-moving
- 30:55Speaker 3: process because Every time you have a new group emerging,
- 30:58Speaker 3: you have a completely different set of arrangements for them
- 31:02Speaker 3: from bilateral and other existing multilateral frameworks. I don't think
- 31:08Speaker 3: it will move quickly. I just think China will try
- 31:10Speaker 3: to use it to its advantage as much as it can.
- 31:13Speaker 3: And I think eventually, if it sees that there is
- 31:16Speaker 3: serious defense potential, they will try to become more involved,
- 31:22Speaker 3: more invested. They will try to... engage in trade with
- 31:27Speaker 3: the Pact members as a group, rather than just explore,
- 31:32Speaker 3: you know, buy-sell type trade opportunities. It's going to take time.
- 31:38Speaker 3: I do think China will try to include itself politically
- 31:43Speaker 3: whenever possible, simply to gain political advantage and strengthen its
- 31:49Speaker 3: cooperation with those countries. But, for instance, in the conflict
- 31:53Speaker 3: of the trilateral Pact versus Iran, China will stay out
- 31:57Speaker 3: of it because it has a very favorable relationship with
- 32:00Speaker 3: Iran and it will not wish to take sides.
- 32:04Speaker 2: Absolutely, Irina, absolutely.
- 32:06Speaker 1: Amidst all this thing, Prime Minister Modi, he has, you know,
- 32:11Speaker 1: called out for, you know, economic self-reliance to the people
- 32:16Speaker 1: of India. What, you know, appeal for this particular thing,
- 32:20Speaker 1: how do you see all these things, the Hormuz and
- 32:24Speaker 1: all those things happening amidst all these things. How do
- 32:27Speaker 1: you understand this, especially at this point in time?
- 32:31Speaker 3: Well, the Hormuz situation has certainly created a number of
- 32:35Speaker 3: economic and political dilemmas for India, including energy prices, particularly
- 32:41Speaker 3: in poor areas of India, supply disruptions, foreign exchange pressures.
- 32:47Speaker 3: And more general exposure to instability in the Middle East,
- 32:51Speaker 3: potential attacks on its ships, for instance, not just from Iran,
- 32:56Speaker 3: but even the U.S. role. And we've seen the recent
- 33:01Speaker 3: incident involving a U.S. shooting, U.S. attack on a ship
- 33:07Speaker 3: with Indian links, which has resulted in deaths and diplomatic tension.
- 33:16Speaker 3: So all of these things are real concerns. And I
- 33:19Speaker 3: think these seven appeals are not just tied to the
- 33:22Speaker 3: broader Indian strategy of self-reliance, of non-alignment, of multilateralism with
- 33:31Speaker 3: different players, and balancing with different interests, hedging, if you will.
- 33:36Speaker 3: But they also include essentially securitizing its own interests against
- 33:42Speaker 3: external pressures. So he is essentially asking the population to
- 33:49Speaker 3: reduce consumption that increases dependence on foreign currency and imports,
- 33:53Speaker 3: and that includes unnecessary fuel use, encouraging using public transportation
- 34:00Speaker 3: and carpooling, limiting discretionary foreign travel and overseas destination ratings,
- 34:05Speaker 3: cutting gold purchases, using work-from-home arrangements where it's practical, reducing
- 34:12Speaker 3: dependence on imported edible oils and chemical fertilizers, all of
- 34:16Speaker 3: which are affected by the supply chain in this case,
- 34:20Speaker 3: and supporting domestically produced goods. So, Yes, it's part of
- 34:26Speaker 3: a more longer-running agenda, but it also has an immediate
- 34:32Speaker 3: crisis management purpose. India does remain vulnerable because rapid economic
- 34:38Speaker 3: growth has also increased its demand on resources that the
- 34:41Speaker 3: country cannot currently produce domestically insufficient quantities. Oil is just
- 34:47Speaker 3: the most obvious example of that, but imported fertilizers, those oils, electronics,
- 34:53Speaker 3: industrial components, gold and advanced technologies also create external dependencies.
- 34:59Speaker 3: And gold deserves particular attention because Indian household demand can
- 35:04Speaker 3: generate a huge import bill without directly expanding productive capacity,
- 35:09Speaker 3: encouraging people to reduce gold purchases has an immediate foreign
- 35:14Speaker 3: exchange rationale. And of course, foreign tourism and destination ratings
- 35:18Speaker 3: may sound peripheral to a national strategy, but collectively they
- 35:22Speaker 3: represent significant outbound spending. So Modi is trying to connect
- 35:27Speaker 3: household choices to the country's balance of payments. Energy is
- 35:33Speaker 3: by far the most consequential element in this calculus, because
- 35:38Speaker 3: India simply cannot rapidly eliminate imported petroleum. Reducing unnecessary consumption
- 35:45Speaker 3: is an immediate tool during periods of high prices or
- 35:48Speaker 3: disrupted supply, such as now. And of course, there's another
- 35:52Speaker 3: national security concern linked to the fertilizers, which hasn't gotten
- 35:57Speaker 3: nearly as much attention. Indian agriculture actually depends heavily on
- 36:02Speaker 3: the fertilizer availability and on government subsidies. So food security
- 36:06Speaker 3: is actually vulnerable now to international prices and supply disruptions.
- 36:11Speaker 3: It's a very serious concern. It may seem like India
- 36:15Speaker 3: is more an external player in this issue. They're not
- 36:19Speaker 3: a party to the conflict, and yet they are heavily
- 36:22Speaker 3: affected by what's going on, even if they wish to
- 36:25Speaker 3: stay out completely from military operations or any sort of
- 36:29Speaker 3: sanctions regimes.
- 36:32Speaker 2: Absolutely, absolutely.
- 36:34Speaker 3: So I would add that here in this context, the
- 36:38Speaker 3: meaning of self-reliance is being expanded from industrial policy into
- 36:43Speaker 3: economic resilience. The government wants domestic manufacturing, domestic energy, domestic technology,
- 36:49Speaker 3: resilient agriculture, and more control over strategically important support chains.
- 36:55Speaker 3: But this is not just economic nationalism for the sake
- 36:59Speaker 3: of being productionist or being competitive against other countries. This
- 37:03Speaker 3: is specifically... in response to threats and a period of instability.
- 37:09Speaker 2: Absolutely, Irina. Absolutely.
- 37:12Speaker 1: Now let's move on to the other big topic that
- 37:15Speaker 1: is the CIA director. He read if he was in the,
- 37:19Speaker 1: you know, he was visiting Moscow. Secretive visit and then
- 37:25Speaker 1: now two Trump envoys also to visit Moscow. Does it
- 37:30Speaker 1: look like the end of this Ukraine-Russia conflict? How does
- 37:35Speaker 1: it look like? Why is the US playing such a
- 37:40Speaker 1: big role rather than Russia and Ukraine talking amongst themselves?
- 37:46Speaker 3: So the official reason for the visit was to warn
- 37:50Speaker 3: Russia that it's failing in its military objectives, that it's
- 37:55Speaker 3: on the verge of losing the war. And to warn
- 37:58Speaker 3: it against attacking NATO countries, which increasingly more and more
- 38:03Speaker 3: international intelligence agencies and governments are warning is a highly
- 38:08Speaker 3: likely possibility. And Russia is certainly openly building towards it
- 38:14Speaker 3: through legal mechanisms and political rhetoric as well. Unofficially, I
- 38:21Speaker 3: believe there was some concern about trying to get Russia
- 38:26Speaker 3: to stop assisting Iran. Because we are seeing that Russia
- 38:29Speaker 3: has provided Iran not only with intelligence that has allowed
- 38:33Speaker 3: Iran to attack U.S. and Israeli sites and forces, but
- 38:37Speaker 3: also with components and technology and essentially helping it smuggle
- 38:42Speaker 3: and build up weapons that they used in the conflict.
- 38:45Speaker 3: But Putin canceled the meeting with Ratcliffe at the last
- 38:49Speaker 3: minute when Ratcliffe was already on the ground. Apparently, He
- 38:52Speaker 3: did not want to address some of these issues and
- 38:55Speaker 3: he allowed Ratcliffe to meet with the other officials, but
- 38:58Speaker 3: he did not personally participate in the meeting. Essentially, what
- 39:07Speaker 3: this tells us though, is that normal diplomatic exchanges were
- 39:12Speaker 3: not appropriate or not sufficient to deal with the questions
- 39:16Speaker 3: raised by Ratcliffe during his secretive exchange. And all of
- 39:22Speaker 3: this happened at the moment when Russia and Ukraine are
- 39:24Speaker 3: both escalating long-range attacks, quite devastating for civilians. in Ukraine
- 39:31Speaker 3: because they have no serious air defense, but also destructive
- 39:34Speaker 3: to Russian economic infrastructure, the wild berries, but also energy
- 39:39Speaker 3: sites as well. Washington, at the same time, has been
- 39:46Speaker 3: exploring a return to negotiations. Following Ratkov's visit, we saw
- 39:51Speaker 3: that Vitkov and Kushner once again traveled to Moscow now
- 39:57Speaker 3: to be followed by a postponed visit to Ukraine to
- 40:00Speaker 3: discuss a return to the table. The concern is increasing
- 40:04Speaker 3: about Russian sabotage all over Europe, cyber operations, covert influence,
- 40:11Speaker 3: intelligence activity, and other forms of hybrid warfare, which looks
- 40:15Speaker 3: increasingly less hybrid and increasingly more warfare. And some of
- 40:20Speaker 3: the German defense company directors said as much. They basically
- 40:25Speaker 3: said that after recent attacks in Germany, Germany is at
- 40:29Speaker 3: war with Russia. Some of the other countries, like Denmark
- 40:33Speaker 3: and France, have not gone as far, but they have
- 40:36Speaker 3: also sharply upbraided Russia openly. accused of various incidents of
- 40:42Speaker 3: sabotage and terrorism and destruction and other types of organizing
- 40:48Speaker 3: violent and chaotic incidents in various countries. This visit has
- 40:55Speaker 3: been quite often compared to former CIA Director William Burns,
- 41:00Speaker 3: who was also a former US ambassador to Russia, who
- 41:03Speaker 3: traveled to Moscow in November 2021 to warn Russian officials
- 41:07Speaker 3: about the consequences of invading Ukraine Russia, of course, invaded
- 41:11Speaker 3: several months later, demonstrating both the value and the limitation
- 41:16Speaker 3: of intelligence-level diplomacy. But the failure, I don't believe the
- 41:21Speaker 3: failure was the fault of Burns, necessarily. I think the
- 41:24Speaker 3: failure was that the U.S. government was not willing to
- 41:28Speaker 3: follow through on implicit or explicit threats made during that
- 41:33Speaker 3: visit to Burns, and they did not sufficiently support Ukraine
- 41:38Speaker 3: in the early stages of the war. they've only started
- 41:43Speaker 3: providing more serious assistance over time when it became clear
- 41:46Speaker 3: that Ukraine has no intentions of giving up, even despite
- 41:50Speaker 3: extreme levels of hardship and virtually defensive isolation. So there
- 41:57Speaker 3: are some similarities. Some are arguing that this means that
- 42:01Speaker 3: Russia is quite close to a serious attack on one
- 42:04Speaker 3: of the Baltic states, which has been a matter of
- 42:08Speaker 3: speculation for many months now. Others are saying that this
- 42:12Speaker 3: has a lot less to do with warnings than about
- 42:15Speaker 3: trying to get Russia to be more cooperative on other issues,
- 42:19Speaker 3: such as diplomacy or the Iran issue. But regardless, it's
- 42:25Speaker 3: very clear that the goals have most likely not been achieved,
- 42:28Speaker 3: given that Putin refers to meet with Iraq, despite making
- 42:33Speaker 3: plans for doing so early.
- 42:36Speaker 2: Absolutely, absolutely. let's see what happens next.
- 42:41Speaker 1: But, you know, these are hopes that they should, if
- 42:44Speaker 1: this ends soon, at least one big problem, especially in Europe,
- 42:49Speaker 1: we should be, is over. But that is yet to come,
- 42:52Speaker 1: yet to happen. Let's look at the Venezuela oil deal.
- 42:57Speaker 2: And we are here, Mr. Trump has announced this. What
- 43:01Speaker 2: is this all about?
- 43:02Speaker 1: How should a person in this part of the world
- 43:05Speaker 1: specially understand this? Was it about Was it about the
- 43:10Speaker 1: former president, or was it about the oil now?
- 43:13Speaker 2: That story is now actually unraveling.
- 43:17Speaker 3: So just to clarify the terms of the oil deal,
- 43:21Speaker 3: it's a long-term arrangement between the Trump administration and Venezuelan
- 43:26Speaker 3: Oil and North American Blue Energy Partners, known as NABET. And,
- 43:31Speaker 3: you know, for the first time, it actually also includes
- 43:34Speaker 3: the Pentagon as part of the arrangement. So NABEP has
- 43:37Speaker 3: received extensive Venezuelan oil concessions, while the Pentagon's Office of
- 43:42Speaker 3: Strategic Capital has taken a 35% stake in the company.
- 43:47Speaker 3: The State Department receives the right to purchase 20% of
- 43:50Speaker 3: NABEP's oil at cost and preferential access to additional production.
- 43:55Speaker 3: So this arrangement gives Washington access to a very substantial
- 43:58Speaker 3: portion of Venezuelan crude reserves for decades and places the U.S.
- 44:02Speaker 3: government directly inside the ownership structure of a company producing
- 44:06Speaker 3: Venezuelan oil. The deal has attracted additional scrutiny from Venezuelans,
- 44:12Speaker 3: obviously dissatisfied with the terms, but also from American lawyers, policymakers,
- 44:17Speaker 3: and others, because businessman Alejandro Betancourt plays a central role
- 44:23Speaker 3: in ABAP and previously faced U.S. money laundering scrutiny connected
- 44:27Speaker 3: to allegations involving funds taken from PDVSA. He was never
- 44:33Speaker 3: charged in the US, Spain or Switzerland where that scandal
- 44:37Speaker 3: took place and subsequently became a central figure to Washington's
- 44:42Speaker 3: dealings with Venezuela. Ultimately, the control is divided. Venezuela retains
- 44:47Speaker 3: sovereign ownership of its underground resources and grants concessions governing extraction.
- 44:54Speaker 3: NABEP operates the fields. The Pentagon owns a large equity
- 44:58Speaker 3: position in NABEP. The State Department has privileged purchasing rights.
- 45:03Speaker 3: So these are the stakeholders and that's the layout of
- 45:06Speaker 3: the arrangement. The structure allows US to enjoy substantial influence
- 45:14Speaker 3: without formally owning Venezuelan territory or the country's entire petroleum industry.
- 45:20Speaker 3: The practical power actually comes through equity, through contractual rights,
- 45:24Speaker 3: through purchasing arrangements, through the sanctions policy, financing, and political
- 45:30Speaker 3: influence over Caracas. But then the money becomes considerably more complicated,
- 45:35Speaker 3: because operating costs and capital investments have to be covered,
- 45:39Speaker 3: and no one knows who is going to cover that.
- 45:41Speaker 3: Venezuela receives taxes, royalties, and concession-related revenue. NABEP and its
- 45:47Speaker 3: shareholders will receive profits. The U.S. government can potentially benefit
- 45:52Speaker 3: from its equity interests, while American access to oil at
- 45:55Speaker 3: cost creates another form of economic advantage that The mechanisms
- 45:59Speaker 3: by which that money translates to the American taxpayers is
- 46:03Speaker 3: not made very clear. Oversight has become one of the
- 46:08Speaker 3: biggest controversies of this deal because the petroleum industry in Venezuela,
- 46:15Speaker 3: let's face it, has a very long history of corruption, patronage,
- 46:19Speaker 3: opaque contracts, and political diversion of revenues. And we've already
- 46:23Speaker 3: seen the US government engage in political diversion of revenues
- 46:27Speaker 3: at the initial stages of this engagement with Venezuela, when
- 46:33Speaker 3: a portion of the early oil proceeds passed through Qatar,
- 46:38Speaker 3: through Qatari banks, rather than directly to the treasury. And
- 46:42Speaker 3: while they were supposed to be fully moved to treasury now,
- 46:45Speaker 3: no one really knows if that actually happened or not.
- 46:49Speaker 3: So placing government money in the Pentagon investment vehicle in
- 46:53Speaker 3: this environment creates obvious questions about auditing congressional supervision, conflicts
- 46:59Speaker 3: of interest and accountability. Also, the fact that the administration
- 47:04Speaker 3: is leaving office in about two years raises questions about
- 47:09Speaker 3: what happens to contracts. The contracts don't just disappear because
- 47:13Speaker 3: the Trump administration leaves, right? Long-term concessions and corporate equity
- 47:18Speaker 3: are supposed to survive presidential transitions unless a new government
- 47:23Speaker 3: has legal grounds and political willingness to alter them. A
- 47:28Speaker 3: future US president could change sanctions, diplomatic recognition, purchasing arrangements,
- 47:34Speaker 3: the government investment policy, and the political relationship with Caracas.
- 47:39Speaker 3: Congress could also intervene if lawmakers ultimately conclude that Pentagon
- 47:43Speaker 3: should not hold this type of commercial stake. And that
- 47:46Speaker 3: could happen after the midterms if the Democrats take the majority,
- 47:51Speaker 3: even just in the House. There's also uncertainty from Venezuela itself.
- 47:56Speaker 3: A future Venezuelan government, or even this one, could argue
- 48:00Speaker 3: that the concessions were negotiated under extraordinary political circumstances, even
- 48:07Speaker 3: under duress, and it could demand renegotiation. Research nationalism has
- 48:14Speaker 3: very powerful historical roots in Venezuela, making any perception of
- 48:18Speaker 3: excessive foreign control politically exclusive. And frankly, they could just
- 48:22Speaker 3: renationalize these concessions without any warning and We've seen that
- 48:27Speaker 3: sort of happen in Iran back in the pre-revolutionary days
- 48:32Speaker 3: with Mossadegh, which ultimately led to his assassination. But whether
- 48:38Speaker 3: anyone would bother with that in Venezuela is also an
- 48:40Speaker 3: open question. So the arrangement would need legitimacy on both
- 48:45Speaker 3: sides of it to survive for decades as Trump is
- 48:48Speaker 3: supposedly planning. Venezuelans would have to see that the deal
- 48:53Speaker 3: produces jobs, a functioning infrastructure, investments, higher production, and government revenue.
- 48:59Speaker 3: So far, they are calling these terms unfair and disadvantageous.
- 49:03Speaker 3: And as for Americans, they will have to judge whether
- 49:06Speaker 3: Washington secured energy benefits without assuming unacceptable financial and political risks.
- 49:12Speaker 3: And there's certainly a lot of questions about that, not
- 49:15Speaker 3: that Trump has been really asking anyone's opinions. The most
- 49:20Speaker 3: unusual feature in all of this is Pentagon's direct economic stake. U.S.
- 49:25Speaker 3: national security policy towards Venezuela could now affect the value
- 49:30Speaker 3: of an asset held by an arm of the U.S. government,
- 49:33Speaker 3: creating additional questions for future administrations and Congress to confront
- 49:39Speaker 3: when Trump is long gone from office.
- 49:44Speaker 2: Absolutely, absolutely, Irina.
- 49:46Speaker 1: Moving on to the last topic of the day, US-China
- 49:51Speaker 1: fighting over AI data center in Egypt. What's about that?
- 49:56Speaker 1: What's happening there in Egypt?
- 50:01Speaker 3: Well, the chickens are coming home true, so to say.
- 50:09Speaker 3: Because this is not, you know, while the media has
- 50:12Speaker 3: portrayed it as some groundbreaking development, as you can imagine,
- 50:16Speaker 3: this has been in the works for years. Essentially, we
- 50:23Speaker 3: are facing a situation where China has been a major
- 50:29Speaker 3: investment and loaner to Egypt since after the June revolution,
- 50:36Speaker 3: which brought Morsi to power and broke and ousted the
- 50:41Speaker 3: short-lived Morsi Muslim Brotherhood government. Egypt is currently emerging as
- 50:48Speaker 3: a very important arena in the US-China tech competition because
- 50:51Speaker 3: Cairo is looking at this as a major investment in
- 50:55Speaker 3: the AI infrastructure, cloud computing, telecoms, and other data centers,
- 51:00Speaker 3: not just one thing. Xi's visit to Egypt this week
- 51:06Speaker 3: highlights how far China's economic and technological relationship with Cairo
- 51:10Speaker 3: has developed over 12 years of China's direct involvement. Chinese
- 51:16Speaker 3: companies already have a substantial presence in telecoms, just as
- 51:21Speaker 3: with many other Arab countries, by the way, infrastructure, manufacturing,
- 51:26Speaker 3: and other tech projects. Also, Egypt's geography is what makes
- 51:31Speaker 3: the data center issue in particular very important, because major
- 51:35Speaker 3: submarine communications cables connecting Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle
- 51:40Speaker 3: East all pass through or near Egypt, giving the country
- 51:44Speaker 3: unusual importance to global digital infrastructure. The U.S. obviously has
- 51:49Speaker 3: an interest in providing competing AI and data center options,
- 51:54Speaker 3: and that interest has only increased after these recent announcements.
- 51:58Speaker 3: But Washington is entering a field where Chinese companies have
- 52:01Speaker 3: already spent years building commercial relationships, whereas multiple U.S. administrations
- 52:07Speaker 3: have basically ignored Egypt except for diplomatic developments related to
- 52:14Speaker 3: Israel and Gaza or Sudan and Ethiopia and other African
- 52:20Speaker 3: regional concerns. In terms of economic investments and anything beyond the... $ 1. 3
- 52:28Speaker 3: billion in aid that the U.S. gives Egypt annually in
- 52:33Speaker 3: exchange for its entry into the Camp David Accords decades back.
- 52:40Speaker 3: This has been handled by the State Department on a
- 52:43Speaker 3: local level. Issues such as health, education, Loan assistance through
- 52:53Speaker 3: IMF and other international monetary mechanisms where U.S. plays a
- 52:58Speaker 3: substantial role. Those were basically the ways U.S. has dealt
- 53:02Speaker 3: with Egypt, not any direct major projects. Russia has been
- 53:07Speaker 3: building civilian nuclear energy plants. U.S. has been not doing much.
- 53:12Speaker 3: From an economic standpoint, U.S. has found Egypt to be
- 53:17Speaker 3: a difficult place to operate, there's been corruption, the involvement
- 53:20Speaker 3: of the military, high-risk commercial environment, economic crisis of the
- 53:26Speaker 3: last few years. All of these things made major U.S.
- 53:30Speaker 3: companies reluctant to expand, and there's also regulatory burden and
- 53:35Speaker 3: a difficult investment environment compared to places such as UAE,
- 53:40Speaker 3: for instance. So all of these things made it relatively
- 53:44Speaker 3: difficult a non-priority for both the U.S. government and commercial companies.
- 53:52Speaker 3: But China has seized on that opportunity, including the developing
- 53:57Speaker 3: energy sector, including defenses. Egypt has included Chinese.
- 54:02Speaker 4: Jets in its training exercises, including close to Israeli borders,
- 54:07Speaker 4: to signal its growing independence from the reliance on U.S.
- 54:13Speaker 3: Models. And it's the diversification, not only to Chinese, but
- 54:18Speaker 3: also to French and Italian defense jet planes and other weapons.
- 54:25Speaker 3: But China has been a growing player. And at the
- 54:29Speaker 3: same time, data centers are becoming not just a commercial,
- 54:33Speaker 3: but a geopolitical form of infrastructure. There are many questions
- 54:39Speaker 3: about who supplies the chips, the cloud platforms, the cybersecurity.
- 54:44Speaker 3: the networking equipment, the software, the financing, the maintenance, and
- 54:47Speaker 3: the technical standards, and whoever is able to corner the
- 54:54Speaker 3: market on all those things will become the bigger player.
- 54:57Speaker 3: And China has an advantage in packaging those types of projects.
- 55:01Speaker 3: Beijing has often combined financing, construction, telecom equipment, cloud services,
- 55:08Speaker 3: government relationships, and broader infrastructure investments. US companies still have
- 55:14Speaker 3: significant practical advantages in advanced semiconductors, in frontier AI systems,
- 55:20Speaker 3: in cloud services, in many parts of the software ecosystems.
- 55:24Speaker 3: Washington can use access to advanced chips as leverage because
- 55:28Speaker 3: Chinese firms cannot currently offer equivalent access at the highest end.
- 55:34Speaker 3: So Egypt most likely will try to avoid choosing exclusively
- 55:37Speaker 3: between Washington or Beijing. Cairo wants the Chinese capital, including
- 55:42Speaker 3: the $ 20 billion or so in investments and loans in
- 55:47Speaker 3: just a few years. And it does, at the same time,
- 55:52Speaker 3: want to preserve its strategic relationship with the U.S. and
- 55:55Speaker 3: to gain access to advanced American technology. In other words,
- 55:58Speaker 3: it's hedging. Washington's problem is timing. Chinese investment in Egypt
- 56:04Speaker 3: did not start with these recent developments with AI. It
- 56:08Speaker 3: spent years cultivating relationships across other important sectors, such as telecom,
- 56:14Speaker 3: industrial development, infrastructure, financing, and, as I mentioned, increasingly defense.
- 56:20Speaker 3: The US response centered exclusively on AI data centers arrives
- 56:24Speaker 3: after China has already established a very substantial position. And
- 56:28Speaker 3: this competition could become even more complicated and difficult. If
- 56:32Speaker 3: Washington continues to condition access to advanced ships on Egypt,
- 56:36Speaker 3: limiting Chinese participation in sensitive infrastructure, Cairo could then face
- 56:42Speaker 3: technical compatibility requirements that make its preferred balancing strategy harder
- 56:48Speaker 3: to maintain. Another issue from Egypt's perspective is data sovereignty.
- 56:54Speaker 3: Egypt wants sensitive government, military, financial, and commercial information protected
- 56:59Speaker 3: from any foreign access, while seeking enough domestic technical capacity
- 57:04Speaker 3: to avoid permanent dependence on foreign providers. This situation gives
- 57:10Speaker 3: Egypt significant bargaining power. Cairo can ask Washington what it
- 57:15Speaker 3: will provide to prevent Chinese dominance, but at the same
- 57:17Speaker 3: time it can demand Beijing ask for additional benefits to
- 57:24Speaker 3: maintain its position and not to give greater leverage to
- 57:28Speaker 3: the U.S. So Egypt may end up being in a
- 57:31Speaker 3: position at the end of all this to extract financing, technology, infrastructure, training,
- 57:37Speaker 3: and even political concessions from both sides as the AI
- 57:41Speaker 3: competition spreads into North Africa.
- 57:46Speaker 2: Absolutely, absolutely.
- 57:47Speaker 1: With this, it's a wrap on this very special edition
- 57:51Speaker 1: of The World According to Irena Shukerman on the KJ
- 57:54Speaker 1: Masterclass Live.
- 57:55Speaker 2: Thank you so much indeed for joining us.
- 57:58Speaker 3: Thank you so much. It was great as always.