Latest / Combat Veteran News / Putin’s Latest Tactic: Hot Women In Your Area!

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Putin’s Latest Tactic: Hot Women In Your Area! · Combat Veteran News

0:00
Being in the military comes with all
0:01
kinds of risks, especially nowadays. FPV
0:05
drones, ballistic missiles, terrible
0:07
food, and questionable commanders. But
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there's one risk that frankly I don't
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think any soldier has really fully
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appreciated. Hot women in your area
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looking for you. It apparently is the
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latest Russian tactic that actually
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might just be coming for America. Let's
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take a look. So, the Ukrainian uh uh
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SSU, this is the Ukraine's internal
0:32
security service, kind of like their
0:33
FBI, is warning that military personnel
0:36
are constantly being targeted by
0:39
so-called honey traps. Right. Over 50
0:42
assassination attempts were thwarted by
0:46
the SSO uh SSU by targeting military
0:50
personnel uh who thought they were
0:52
meeting up with a hot girl in your area.
0:55
In fact, just in the first 6 months of
0:57
2026, uh, Ukrainian military personnel
1:00
were targeted and and that led to actual
1:03
assassination attempts over 50 time by
1:05
Russian intelligence services using what
1:07
are called honey traps. Now, it
1:10
classically, a honey trap is an
1:12
intelligence term for using an
1:14
attractive woman to essentially
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shortcircuit most people's critical
1:17
thinking. And if you've ever seen uh a a
1:21
mediocrel looking guy get attention from
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a very attractive woman, you know that
1:25
it just it just starts shaving off IQ
1:28
points. Man, I don't know what else to
1:30
tell you. Uh the number of times where
1:31
I've had somebody who literally got
1:33
approached by a female salesperson and
1:36
suddenly became interested in whatever
1:37
she was selling. I'm like, "Dude, you
1:39
swear at most doortodoor sales people,
1:41
but somehow you let this woman into your
1:42
house. Like, are you an idiot?" Yes.
1:45
Yes. That's what happens. So these
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assassination attempts though were
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targeting of course Ukrainian uh defense
1:51
force members where they had been
1:53
contacted through online dating and even
1:56
sometimes staged dates with women. Now
1:59
obviously this is not an operation that
2:02
is targeting low-level troops. Though
2:04
low-level troops I suspect are probably
2:06
targeted via online dating uh scams to
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release information. In fact, I know for
2:12
a fact because I joked with one of the
2:14
Ukrainian soldiers that I was with in
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Ukraine. He's like, "Listen, every 5
2:17
months I get a text or a friend request
2:20
from a dating app or a friend request on
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on social media that is obviously an
2:24
incredibly attractive woman I've never
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seen before in my life." And he's like,
2:28
"Yeah, I know exactly what this is." And
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sometimes he would actually troll them.
2:32
Sometimes he would just ignore them. But
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uh the SSU is saying, "Listen, Russians
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use these dating sites and chat rooms
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within messaging apps uh like social
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media where they use fake accounts to
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befriend military personnel and lure
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them into staged dates. The soldiers are
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invited to pre-arranged location where
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an assassination attempt takes place.
2:52
Most often, Russian Russian intelligence
2:54
services use homemade explosive devices
2:56
planted at the site of an attack to
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eliminate the Ukrainians. This is
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incredibly efficient. This is
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essentially outsourcing the entire part.
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This is what sort of I think is so uh
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fascinating about this. Uh also
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sometimes they are subjected to lethal
3:10
poisons like narcotics, cypotropic or
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other chemical substances. In one
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instance in March they said an FSB agent
3:16
was actually detained in Hark who
3:18
claimed to be uh a volunteer providing a
3:22
Ukrainian armed force soldier with
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medicine and food to which he had added
3:25
poison which is not quite the same
3:27
thing. Uh, another Russian agent sent a
3:29
soldier a bottle to drink which had a
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lethal dose of uh, methadone, an opiate,
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right? So, essentially OD accidentally
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oding them on fentanyl on heroin. Uh,
3:39
and then pressured them to drink it all
3:41
during an online video call. Oh my god,
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that's so funny. Uh, there was an FSB
3:45
hitman who attempted to sav member to
3:47
death in Zaporahesia. Uh, a Ukrainian
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soldier was lured into an industrial
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zone in a city under the pretense of a
3:53
date with a woman from a dating site.
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Guys, if the woman asks you, be like, I
3:56
want to have a hot date in the abandoned
3:58
warehouse district. Guys, come on. Come
4:01
on.
4:03
But I get it. Four years deployed in a
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military zone, you're going to you
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forget what a normal date sounds and
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feels like. It doesn't take place in a
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darkened warehouse, right? Instead of
4:15
the day a hitman wearing a baclava
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appeared, attacked the soldier from
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behind, stabbed him six times in the
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chest, neck, abdomen, and right leg.
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Now,
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what I thought was most interesting,
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security services in some cases
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identified the woman who had been acting
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paid for by the FSB and was
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communicating with the man via a fake
4:33
account. So, it what's fascinating about
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this is that what you have is this.
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There's not a repeatable tactic that's
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being used here, right? You could have a
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real woman who really is Ukrainian who
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just is instructed, listen, if you can
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get this guy to agree to meet you in
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this location, there's 500 bucks for
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you. And think about it. How many women
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in your life do you know, listen, uh you
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you could DM, you know, you talk to them
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and say, "Hey, listen. I've got this
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guy." And maybe you don't tell her.
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She's setting up the guy to get killed.
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Maybe you just tell her, "Listen, uh,
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you know, he's my wife's new husband,
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uh, ex-wife's new husband. You know,
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he's kind of a jerk. I just want to I
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just want to mess with him a little bit.
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So, I want you to get him to to go on a
5:12
date and meet you at this restaurant at
5:14
this time, and I'm going to film it, and
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I'm going to like uh prove to my ex-wife
5:19
that her her husband is a cheater. And
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she goes, "Well, okay, that's for 500
5:23
bucks. You know, times are tough. Let me
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let me do it." So, she lures him to the
5:27
date, but there's not a jilted
5:29
ex-husband with a camera there. Instead,
5:31
it's a pipe bomb. Blows him up. Right?
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So, that's how you could end up saying,
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"Listen, I was never I thought I was
5:37
making 500 bucks for something chill."
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But that's one of the key FSB tactics
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now is that it's very rare that you have
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actual FSB agents conducting these
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things. They are outsourced, right? Uh
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just like any other kind of criminal
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enterprise. And so outsourcing
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all the steps of this is a it seems to
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be what the FSB prefers now because
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again it adds a protective layer between
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the actual FSB agent and the criminal
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act. Because once an FSB agent is
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captured, he risks outing huge uh trove
6:09
of knowledge about the actual FSB.
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Whereas what does a random woman on a
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dating site looking to make 500 bucks,
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what does she get? Or even worse, what
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happens when you outsource everything?
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when you say, "Listen, it's an AI
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operated by the Russian government that
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has an AI generated profile picture that
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simply just keeps them along with these
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uh um you know, strings along a
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Ukrainian service member. Then a
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different chat reaches out to a a
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Ukrainian uh gig worker platform and
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says, "Listen, I just need you to take
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this backpack and I just need you to put
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it in front of my buddy on the steps of
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my buddy's apartment." Right? Don't even
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worry about it. Just put it on the steps
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of my buddy's apartment. And then right
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and there's 350 bucks in it for you.
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Boom. You get your courier to put the
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bomb in place. You get your AI to
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arrange the date and you've ne you can
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potentially kill a person and you've
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never set foot in Ukraine at all. That's
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the danger of these honeypot traps is
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that again you they could be done
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entirely remotely. But that doesn't mean
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that Russia doesn't also run even more
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sophisticated honeypotss, right? Because
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remember, the amount of resources it
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takes to hit a target is going to be
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proportionate to the target's value. A
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low-level Ukrainian officer, you might
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simply just try to get them to give you
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your loca, their location uh via a chat
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room, right? And then once you get the
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location, you just have a cab bomb or an
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FPV strike do the rest. But for a
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highlevel connected uh a general level
7:42
officer, a politician, uh a a central
7:45
banker, those might get their own
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people. And that's where things get even
7:50
more interesting because there is a lot
7:55
of evidence that there is
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a huge sprawling Russian honey trap
8:04
operation. And let me show you what I'm
8:06
talking about. So, here is supposedly a
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Russian intelligence services honeypot,
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uh, which she calls herself a sex spy,
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which is very clickable, who is assigned
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to seduce Silicon Valley nerds, tech
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workers, hopefully in order to obtain
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knowledge about American tech progress,
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but also about contacts and contracts.
8:29
And we know, as we know, the Trump
8:31
administration deeply embed with tech
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companies, AI, venture capital, and
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more. So having contacts within that
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space could get you access to the uh to
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the highest levels of government or
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could get you access to the highest
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levels of American technology. And one
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Russian uh defector has said, "Listen, I
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was one of these." He calls herself Alia
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Rosa who said she defected from Russia
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after she fell in love with an assigned
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intelligence target. She said she was
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trained by Russian authorities to seduce
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and manipulate her targets starting as a
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teenager. They may think these things
9:05
are violations of human rights. This is
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not something that we do. And you're
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correct. The American government does
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not do that. They do not, as a set of
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principles, uh, have their agents uh,
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engage in false sexual relationships.
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But Russia, again, a country that is
9:20
willing to plant drugs on a 19-year-old
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in order to force them to sign a
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military contract, uh, they have no
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compunctions about this. And she says
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really there is it is something that is
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not kind of done on a goof or on a whim.
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These are elaborately planned
9:38
operations,
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right? She says, listen, they get
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assigned a target. Let's say an
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academic, someone in a think tank, uh a
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a Silicon Valley engineer who's
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competing for a valuable military
9:50
contract. She's like, listen, they
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they're trained to see the target. They
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need to get information. They need to
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manipulate the target. their emotions,
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feelings, whatever they can, they can do
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it, right? And of course, this was from
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a report by the Times of London that
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said Russia and China were actually
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engaged trying to deploy female agents
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to ensnare tech executives. Uh Russia
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and China have quote an asymmetric
10:11
advantage since the US is unwilling to
10:12
use the same tactics. And she said,
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quote, "Unlike foreign governments, the
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US strives to protect human rights. the
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Russians and Chinese quote manipulate
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their targets really in a really bad way
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and see their own even their own agents
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as ultimately disposable.
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And she says, "What I thought was
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interesting is that part of this
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playbook is that a good inive
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honeypot never approaches their target
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cold." She said, quote, "You first
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appear in their life seven times to be
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exact before making contact. You might
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show up at their coffee shop, their gym,
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or just keep liking their post online.
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When you finally meet, their brain
10:44
already trusts you. Once the familiarity
10:46
is built, you start love bombing them.
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messages full of compliments, selfies,
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sexy photos. She says they pretend the
10:52
woman pretends to be weaker or alone. My
10:53
parents were killed. I'm a student. I'm
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broke. It triggers the hero instinct.
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Every man wants to feel like a hero.
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Then she says, actually, they fake
11:02
mutual connections to appear legitimate.
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A fake account follows your friends or
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says Bill is my brother's friend. So you
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think, okay, I can trust her, but it's
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all fabricated. So damn, right? The
11:13
psychological manipulation escalates.
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the agent makes you doubt yourself. She
11:17
said, she'll say, "Your boss doesn't
11:19
appreciate your your colleagues use
11:20
you." It creates a bond where you feel
11:22
you understand each other and the rest
11:24
of the world is bad. Right? We've all
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known somebody who's like this, who's
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like they get in a relationship and
11:30
suddenly the woman goes, "You know, I
11:31
think your friends aren't really your
11:34
friends at all." Right? We've all known
11:36
that. Well, again, this is just that but
11:39
codified.
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And then the agent begins to make
11:42
threats if the desired information isn't
11:44
divulge. creates stress, fear of losing
11:46
the relationship. If you don't send this
11:47
information right now, I'll disappear
11:48
forever. Right? Under that emotional
11:50
rush, people gives up things they never
11:52
would otherwise. By the way, you can see
11:53
this is clearly the case because she
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literally has a bunch of photos of her
11:56
at an FSB graduation. So, I don't know.
11:59
That seems like that seems like a real
12:02
thing. What's fascinating is that she
12:04
says her missions were in Europe and the
12:05
United Kingdom where she was sent to
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seduce uh human traffickers, drug
12:09
dealers, and oligarchs who ran a foul of
12:10
the Russian government. We actually know
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a number of Russian oligarchs who uh
12:15
defected, fled Russia. And again, she
12:17
says she had fewer than 10 real targets
12:21
and
12:23
it was but this is a playbook that has
12:26
been run again and again. What's
12:29
fascinating is here is an example. This
12:30
is a acade a Russian academic named
12:33
Setlana Lova
12:36
who this was from this is an article
12:38
from 2017. You might remember uh
12:40
President Trump's national security
12:42
adviser, Michael Flynn, who lied to who
12:43
was convicted of lying to the FBI about
12:46
meeting with Russians. Now, why would
12:48
you want to lie to the FBI about the
12:50
number of Russians you've met? Well,
12:51
this is one of the reasons. She is
12:54
obviously a younger Russian female
12:56
academic uh who of course conveniently
12:59
was at a number of conferences overseas
13:02
uh where she would bump into Mike Flynn
13:04
just accidentally, right? She says, "Are
13:06
you a Russian spy?" I ask her. She says
13:08
absolutely not. I have no formal or
13:10
informal connection with Russian
13:11
intelligence whatsoever. This is refuted
13:14
one paragraph later in the article where
13:16
she says that she is actually uh sorry,
13:20
two paragraphs later where she says her
13:22
research is into Soviet intelligence
13:24
operations. Well, how do you think she
13:26
got her research done on Soviet
13:29
intelligence operations? Why looking
13:31
into an archive? An archive managed by
13:34
Russian intelligence. So
13:37
again,
13:39
uh what's fascinating is that she
13:43
actually gifted him a postcard from
13:45
Stalin to the fiance of his best friend.
13:47
The fiance was helping Stalin obtain a
13:49
fake passport, right? uh and
13:53
the
13:55
uh she gives him a nice little momentto
13:59
uh
14:01
and I think it's fascinating that again
14:06
she claims she was not asked to travel
14:08
to Russia to act as a translator. She
14:10
says that wasn't true. Uh she exchanged
14:13
emails with Flynn and his assistant
14:14
after the event and Flynn soon after
14:16
left the DIA, but again
14:19
ended up as national security adviser
14:21
for the president just a few months
14:23
later. She says we had maybe a few
14:24
emails going backward and forward right
14:26
now. Obviously there's no way to verify
14:28
if this is or is not true. But
14:32
uh
14:33
this is so this is comical, right? I
14:36
mean do you really think I mean how many
14:38
times have you been to a conference and
14:39
a younger blonde woman has brought you a
14:41
personal momentto handed to you, gotten
14:43
your email and emailed you repeatedly
14:45
back and forth? Like has that ever
14:46
happened to you? Lol. You ever have a
14:49
random attractive Russian woman uh bring
14:51
you presents? Like no. No you haven't.
14:54
Because that only happens if you're
14:56
trying if you're being manipulated.
15:01
She also says Flynn is interested in
15:02
Russian espionage and she sent him a BBC
15:04
story about a sixman in the Cambridge
15:07
spy ring.
15:11
I mean this is like here's the thing
15:14
guys, here's the thing. By the way,
15:15
that's not the only one. Here is a
15:18
British seaside resort where Russian
15:20
spies launched honey traps and espionage
15:22
plots. Three Bulgarian nationals were
15:23
convicted in the UK for orchestrating
15:25
honey traps, kidnapping, and murder
15:26
plots targeting high-profile dissident
15:28
and military sites. uh
15:32
and for years uh a guest house in a
15:35
rundown town on Britain's east coast was
15:38
a uh was the hub of a spy ring uh
15:42
sending again Russian buticians tapped
15:45
to carry out who was tapped to carry out
15:47
honey traps a lab assistant who is uh
15:49
possessing identity do fake identity
15:51
documents and
15:54
uh just
15:56
just operating just randomly out of the
16:00
house uh who just kind of like ran these
16:05
these honey traps again targeting
16:07
Russian dissident. Uh from 2020 to 2023,
16:10
the gang carried out chaotic and often
16:12
disorganized covert missions targeting
16:14
one instance an investigative journalist
16:16
renowned for exposing the involvement of
16:18
uh Russia Russian intelligence in the
16:20
poisoning of uh Sergey Skipol in the
16:22
Novetchic nerve agent incident in 2018.
16:24
The group tracked his movements across
16:26
Austria, Montenegro, and Spain. Even
16:27
considered a honey trap with the woman
16:29
potentially involved in the scheme.
16:32
They survived a journalist critical of
16:34
Russia. In another bizarre plot, they
16:37
tried to spray the Kazak embassy in
16:38
London with large quantity of fakes pig
16:40
blood. These seem pretty stupid, but
16:44
doesn't matter because as we've
16:45
discussed, the FSB is likely one step
16:48
removed from these guys. These guys are
16:51
the dummies.
16:53
And that's not the only one. Here's from
16:55
February of this year. Nama Zarabuna was
16:59
lying to the caught lying to the FBI or
17:01
again who was tasked with where she
17:05
denied well she was convicted of meeting
17:07
prominent Americans to lure them in the
17:08
orbit of Moscow's intelligence. Her job
17:11
was to identify potentially helpful
17:12
contacts in the US and pass them on to
17:13
the FSB so the agency can invite them to
17:15
Russia to convert them to quote the
17:17
Russian way of thinking. Yikes. The
17:22
I mean and
17:23
Again, this is someone who was also in
17:26
kind of an academic or NGO setting. Uh
17:28
she worked as a representative for the
17:30
UN for the coordinating council of
17:31
Russian compatriots of the United
17:33
States. Uh but it was all opposed a a
17:36
farce. Uh
17:39
again, that she had been the whole time
17:40
a Russian agent. Uh,
17:44
also, ironically enough, she appears to
17:46
have attempted to actually uh seduce her
17:51
like
17:53
weird uh her own the FBI agent who was
17:56
investigating her. Um, it just goes on
17:59
and on and on and on. This is an
18:02
extremely common Russian tactic, right?
18:05
You have to understand that you think,
18:06
"Ah, that's just something in the movies
18:08
and and a lot of it is, right? Because
18:10
again, these are women who are trained
18:13
to just
18:15
like
18:18
manipulate and
18:21
anyone, not anyone can be a target, but
18:23
anybody who is prominent enough is going
18:25
to be worth their while. Uh, one thing
18:28
that should keep you up at night is that
18:32
Bill Gates, part of the reason, right,
18:34
his association with Jeffrey Epstein,
18:37
um, was actually that he had numerous
18:40
affairs with Russian women. Now, do you
18:42
find it weird that you're the richest
18:43
man on earth, but your affairs are
18:46
exclusively with Russian women? Like,
18:48
just think about it. How many Russian
18:49
women do you encounter on a regular
18:51
basis in your life? And like, if you're
18:54
like, "Oh, well, they're sex workers."
18:55
Well, guys, you're the richest man on
18:56
earth. You can find an American sex
18:58
worker. Why is it that so many of these
19:03
are Russian women? Isn't that weird?
19:06
Isn't that so weird?
19:09
But again, you're thinking, don't think
19:12
like in the movies in the Cold War used
19:14
to be about spy versus spy. You didn't
19:16
care about a a billionaire magnate. You
19:19
cared about uh you know, a CIA employee.
19:23
Well, the times have changed as we have
19:25
discussed. The war is economic. It is
19:27
technological. It is political. It is
19:29
propaganda. And having the ear, the
19:32
ability to manipulate some of the
19:34
richest and most powerful people on
19:36
Earth is as valuable, maybe more
19:38
valuable than killing a general. Uh
19:41
because a general, right, there's a
19:42
million generals. There's only one Bill
19:44
Gates. and getting Bill Gates to become
19:47
have a more favorable view of Russia,
19:49
particularly if you can force him to do
19:51
it with blackmail or simply just
19:53
thinking with his little brain. It's
19:57
worth it for the Russian government.
19:59
Anyway guys, thanks to Chris, Charles,
20:01
Kevin, Brent, Andreas, Jim, John, CPC,
20:03
Leonus, Gabriel, Brendan, Alfred, Peter,
20:05
and all the tenitary folks. Please hit
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subscribe if you can. And also, if you
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want to help the Ukrainians, we uh
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myself and Ukraine aid operations, US
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501c3 are wrapping up. We're so close to
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being done. Our huge fundraiser, 99% of
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the way there to get our $100,000
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benchmark for the unmanned systems
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forces of Ukraine. It's US tax
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deductible. It's a US501c3
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and it saves lives. Ground drones, heavy
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lift transport drones, these things keep
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soldiers in the fight. Keep them alive.
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Help Ukrainian soldiers get home. Links
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in the description. See you.